JPRS ID: 8287 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000100020032-3

~ : r ~ ~ ~ OF 1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
JPR5 L/82~i
26 February 1979
~ ~
_ ~
TRANSLATIONS ON NEP,R EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 3/79)
� '
. ~ .
- U. S. ~,~INT PUBLIC~?TIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
NOTC
_ JPR5 publicaL-ions conCain i.nFormation primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and i,;,;,K;;, buC also from news agency
transmissions ~nd broadcayCs. Mater.ials trom foreign-language
sources are Cransl~ted; those from English-language sources
_ are Cranscribed or reprinted, wiCh Che original phrasing and
other characCeristics reCained, ~
Headlines, edirorial reports, and maeerial enclosed in brackeCs
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerpC] in the first line of each iCem, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how Che original information was �
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- -
maCion was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or CransliCerated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
Cion mark and enclosed in parentheses were noC clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times wiChin items.are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or aCtitudes of the U.S. Government. -
r=
\
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
BIDLIOGRAPNIC DATA ~epatt No. 2. 3~ Hccipient's Aecesaion No,
SNEET ~p~s L~ 828~ �
, 1 u r un tiu ~tu c S~ Rcport Uacr
'I'It~NSLA'l'IONS ON NCAtt ~AST AND NOR'I'!I AFRICA, 26 Februar 1979
(FOUO 3/79) d,
_ 7. Author(e) 8~ Pcc(orming Organization kept. -
No.
9. I~crtorming Otganization Name ond Addres~ 10, Projcrt/T~sk/Wo~k Unit Nu.
Joint Publications Reaearch Servica -
1000 North Glebe Road 11. Conttect/Gr~nt No,
ArlingCon, Virginia 22201
12. Spon~oring Org~ni:~tion N~me ~nd Addrei~ 13. Type of Report 8c Period
Covered
As above
l1.
1S~ Supplementary Note~ �
16. Abstncta
The serial report containa information on socio-economic, government, political,
and technical de~velopments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Key Words and Document Analyiis. 170. De~eripcor~
Political Science Tnter-Arab Affairs Libya Sultana~e
Sociology North African X Mauritania of Oman
_ Economics Affairs Morocco Syria
Culture (Social Sciences) Afghanistan People's Demo- X Tunisia
Ethnology Algeria cratic Republic Iinited Arab
Geography Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Technological X Egypt Persian Gulf Western
Military Sciences Iran Are~ Sahara
X Iraq Qatar Yemen Arab
1~6. [dcntiEiers/Open-Ended Terms Israel ~Saudi Arabia Republie
Jordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa -
_ X Lebanon Sudan
17u COSATI Firl~/Group SD~ SC~ SK~ ZS
18. Availabilit~ Statement 19. Security Class (This 21. \o. uf P~grs
For Official Use Only. Repo~~ ~ ~p
Limited Number of Copies Available From JPRS . ��~~~~y ci~s: ~ n~s ~2. H~~�
Page
UNCLASS(FIED
~ 1011M NT13�~e ~Rev. ~�~i~ THLS FORM MAY BE REPRODUCED usccMM.oc }~oe:.N~~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOFt OI~'F'TCIAL U5L ONLY 4
JPRS L/8287
26 February ~.979 -
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRI CA
(FOUO 3/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
EGYPT
Haykal Coromenta~ on U.S., USSR Middle East Policies
(Muhanm~ad Hasanayn Haykal Interview; THE MIDDLE �
EAST, Feb 79) 1
Al-Sadat's Negotiating Tactics Opposed; Attqupted Coups
- Reported
(AIrWATAN AL-'ARAaT, 21 Dec 78)..' 10
LeftisC Leader Discusses Harassment by Regime
(Khalid Muhi al-Din TntervieW; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
28 Dec 78) 18
Secret Supplements to Camp David Accords Uncovered -
(Shafiq al-Hut; AL-WATAN AIr'ARABT, 28 Dec 78)........ 28
IRAQ � _
To~~-Level Delegation Visits Soviet Union
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARA$I, 21-27 Dec 78) 34
Press Attache in Paris Describes Pan-Arab Nature of Media
Effort -
(Sami Mahdi Incerview; AL-WATAN Ai,-'ARAgI, _
14-20 Dec 78) 43
LEBANON
Interview With Army Con~ander Gen Victor Khuri
(Victor Khuri Interview; TtiE MIADLE ~AST, Jaii 79~..... 46
Interview With Lebanon UN Representative Ghassan Tuwayni
(Ghassan Tuwayni Interview; THE MIDDLE EAST,
Jan 79) 50
- a- [III - NE ~ A- 121 FOUO~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS (Continued) Page
MAUltl'1'ANIA
Interior Minister Evaluatea New Regime's Positive, ~degaC~ve
Points
(Jiddou Ould Saleck InCerview; AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI, -
4-10 Jan 79) 56 ,
SAUDI ARABIA �
]:mplementation of Munitions Ciry Pro~ect in Doubt
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Jan 79) 60
TUNISIA -
FuCure of Bourguibism Threatened by Opposition Forces
~
(AL-WATAN AL-~ARABT, 28 Dec 78 3 Jan 79) 62
I
s
-b-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
~GYPT
~
HAYKAL COI~IENTS ON U.S., USSR MIDDLE EAST POLICIES
London THE MIDDLE EAST in Engliah No 54, Feb 79 page number not given LD
[Interview wiCh Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal by roving correspondent Ful~io
Grimaldi on a"recent" visit to London]
[Text] Grimaldi: How do you evaluate preaent Soviet policies toward the -
Middle East, in the light of Camp David, the Egyptian-Iaraeli peace nego-
tiaCions and the Baghd~d Summit? -
Haysal: It is a wait-and-aee pos3tion. The Soviets have been through
several shocka in the Middle East. Most of the arms they ever gave to
_ the xegion went to Egypt and Syria between Novemher 1972 and June 1973.
� Then came the October War, and Soviet spirits were very high. The biggest
shock was experienced after the war, when they were expelled from E~ypt -
and Kissinger managed to seriously impair their options by the situation
he brought about in the area.
Since 1975 the Soviets have been re-evaluating their ideas on the Middle
Easr. But these new developments, which are part of a huge American of.fen-
sive, came too early. They weren't ready yet, engaged as they were with
moe:: of their energies in the east, where they face China, and in Europe. _
And they were still licking their wounds after the failure of what had
~ been their own offensive in the Middle East, previous to the abrogation of
the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty in 1975.
- Their reactions are therefore limited, for the time_being, to exploiting ,
, the opportunities being offered. They have reconciled Chemselves to a
tactical defeat and are waiting for upcoming chances. I believe that the
~eneral situation is bound to offer them these changes. When, I don't
know.
Question: But are you really convinced that the West is on the offensive '
- and is succesaful in its offensive?
Answer: In 1955 the West was mostly concerned with the northern part of
the region and it established a series of alliances to stabilise that part:
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
_ FOI2 OI~'FICTAL USE ONLY
NATO, SEATO and ~he abortive Baghdad Pact, rhey appeared to succeed,
_ as Turlcey, Zran, Paltistan seemed pretty stable. But they didn't succeed
in drawing Iraq inLO the system and they needed Iraq for strategic depth.
:~tie degree to whicti tihings can go wrnng in auch operations is shown by
the fact that now the whole northern area is collapsing. There is serious
rrouble in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, and Afghanistan has been lost.
You ca~n see trat the Americdns a:e making incredible mistakes, and they
_ keep making them now by pushing thinga as Chey are doing, particularly by
concentrating all their efforts on peace between Egypt and Israel alone.
The north is in disarray already and this strategy is now going to destabil-
ise the southern part as well. =
_ Question: In that case one would imagine that the opportunities for a. `
global Soviet strategy are ripe. Or are they perhaps not too unhappy with
Camp David?
- Answer: I don't think they are at all happy ~ith Camp David. But their
subdued reaction to the agreements and even to the subsequent Baghdad Summit
of the countries opposed to Sadat's policy doesn't constitute a strategy.
- It rather shows a lack of strategy. The USSR realises that the situation
is sti11 extremely fluid; things are happening all the time, and it wants
to keep its options open for a while. It is not as yet ready to move full
blast in one specific direction; ~.t hasn't worked it out yet. So the -
- Soviets limit themselves to watching the developing situation closely, and
until the situation becomes clearer their isn't much they can do without -
risking mistakes. However, I don't think they will have to wait much
longer.
_ This of course doesn't mean that they don't have a general strategic con-
cept. The strategic concept is there and won't change. What they are
hesitating about is putting all the necessary power behind thi~s concept
and gathering the readiness to get out and implement its next parts. But,
make no mistake, ~his hesitaCion doesn't mean that the Middle East isn't
important to them. Whenever I had meetings and discussions with Soviet
authorities at the highest level I felt clearly how important it was to
them, The people in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party
d~aling with the Middle East have always been, and are, one of the most
powerful pressure groups in the establishment.
Question: Do you therefore fee~ that the Soviet Union has learned its
lesson from its Egyptian experiF~;ce?
Answer: In the course of the years the Soviets have made enormous invest-
ments in the Middle East, in political, economic, ideological, military
_ and other terms. Gradually they have developed a set of rules which has
changed with the times and has certainly adapted itself to the new circum-
stances in the light of the experiences made.
. 2 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFI~'ICIAL llS~ ONLY
However, differencea over dealing with the area exist within the leader-
ahip, mainly between those that tend to opt for a more adventurous, dynamic
policy--and these are the generals and admirals obviously--and those who
favour a more cautious and rational approach. Nobody, among all theae ~
people, however, queationa the general strategy that acknowledges the
absolute need to be there. The argumenta are mainly about timing.
Question: Haw do the Soviet Union and the United States development aid
~ pol.icies for EgypC compare?
Anewer: From the point of view of cash, the United States and the West
generally may be more useful. But for development, the USSR contribution `
- is by far better. The U.S, for inatance, would have never helped us to
build the Aswan Dam. The Soviets, in helping us in our industrialisation,
_ might have hoped to build up a atrong labour force which they expected to
carry out a revolution along their lines, buC this kind of development
fitted our requirements well in those days. _
What the United States can offer is a very expensive and discriminatory
pattern of conaumption and, though I have criticised many aspects of Soviet
poliay towards Egypt, their contribution was much better for our development.
Nasir uaed tu say that Egypt and the USSR could walk together for 50 per- "
cent of the road, particularly for that part of the road that was needed
to get rid of the colonial heritage and to puC down the basis for industrial
developmenC. From that point onward our ways weren't the same any more.
Question: But several economists in the West say that only through close
economic links with the U.S. can Egypt's problems be solved.
_ Answer: Not at all. Our first need is development in agriculture and
ind~istry and this can only take place within the fr ~nework offered by the
Arab world. Ok, so the U.S. gives us $1 billion a year. But I fail to
see one single country where U.S. aid went iiito r~al development. We don't
need to be flooded with Coca-Cola, Cornflakes or Kentucky chicken. In 1977
we received $5.S biilion in foreign aid. $4s5 came from Arab sources, and -
only one from the U.S~ or U.S~-related bodies, such as the World Bank or
- the IMF. On top we have to pay back those loans. -
There is anly one class, and a small one, of people t:iat make huge profits
out of Cornflakes and the like. There are of course people who can afford
to eat Cornflakes at breakfast or smoke cigars at press conferences, but
they are not the ones that matter. The real decisions are matured elsewhere. "
Question: The big dispute going on at the moment is whether the Camp David
agr~ement will lead to stability or to destabilisation in the Middle East.
What is your view?
Answer: Camp David as such is of little consequence. What will upset thP
area will be an effective separate peace between Egypt and Israel. And I
3
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
_
FOR UFFTCIAL USE ONLY
don't think, as many do, that destabilisation will come from the possible
breakdown of the peace negntiations. I aee it as an internal Arab damger,
noe ae an external threat, for ar preaent thexe is no poasibility of war -
with Israel. The inter-Arab qt~�~rrel that would atem from a separate peaGe ^
could cause the greateat dangers to Che whole area.
- Question: But the Egyptian people seem to expect things to improve g~reatly -
for them, particularly at ~he socio-economic level, if there is peace.
A dis~ppointmenC could be very upsetting, don't you think?
Anawer: I don't think so. Egypt's problema need more than a separat~a
peace with Iarael. The only chance for Egypt to solve ita problems atld -
to develop effectively lies in its connection with Che Arab world. rlobody
can replace the Arab world for Egypt, not even the United States, Fu~:ther-
more, the United States will not give all that Egypt needs. Nobody, :Ln
fact, will give us as much--and on such easy Cerms--as the Arab world has
given us between 1973 and 1977.
, Question: Were you surprised to see 5audi Arabia take a different stFind
from al-Sadat on Camp David?
Answer: Not so much. One tends to divide everything into white and black ~
- hlocs, as Nixon used to do. One thinks that a regime, being moderate, will
accept any American diktat. And one overlooks that certain basic require-
ments are extremely important to ~he Saudis--Jerusalem, for one. The
struggle for Jerusalem and getting Jerusalem back for the Arabs and rluslims
legitimises the Saudi regime.
- Nowhere in~the ~1rab world are there people that would toleraCe rulers who
J don't satisfy t1~is minimum requirement. It is therefore central in Saudi
thinking. They will never follow a line renouncing Jerusalem.
And, I tell you, the more the United States tries to pressure them, the
more impetus will be ~ained by the destabilisr~tion process in the area, -
We are all heading towai~a a very important aud crucial period in time,
the Saudis like the rest of us. There ia a critical stage in development
where you simply can't suddenly freez~e it. I believe that overdue changes
are g~ing to happen in Saudi Arabia, and they would be accelerated by
capitulation on Jerusalem.
Question: In a way the Camp David agreement and its follow-up have had a
un9.fying effect on the Arab world--of course againet Egypt--wouldn'z you
agree ?
Answer: Yes, these developmen~s have been laading to something of that
sort. But Egypt has been central to the Arab w~rld for centuriea and its
- defection .;ill have negative repercussions on t~:~ oalance of power, what-
ever the others do, and will therefore lead to a more nrecarious situation.
4
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I want to say tihat I find it very strange that President Carter should
have pushed so hard for a aeparate peace. In the past American adminis- -
_ trations didn't believe in it, for Chey knew it would af:Eect moderate -
policies in the c~r~n. I rnally can't underst~nd auch a line. Many be- -
licvc ttiat it ia bc~aed on strong Amcrican internal needa And conditions.
But how can a superpower sacrifice its global intereats for transient
domestic purpoaea?
Question; *tost of the Weatern press seems to beLieve that in Che end the
conservative.~rab states will accept Egyrt's peace. -
Answer: We in ti;e Arab world very often fail to explain our point of view
and existing realfties. Things are much more complicated Chan opting for
- one policy or the other. Here we have a conflict between two civilisations
_ for a piece of land, Yalestine. But Palestine is not only a piece of land.
_ It used to be the bridge between Aaia and Afr3,ca. And Egypt has traditioti-
ally always looked east for an outlet. It tends east, and this is a his-
- Corical neceasity, and hiatorical necessities must be respected. Every-
body wants peace, but on what terms? A t the risk of going against reality?
The c~nservatives wa~t to join Egypt, all right, but they won't join a -
- peace that leads to a highly precarious aituation. Any Tel Aviv-Cairo
axis is impossible, artificial, absurd.
QuesCion: In rec~~nt weeks al-Sadat has clearly stiffened his attitude.
_ Article 6 of the Camp David agreement, which gives priority to peace wiCh -
Israel over Egypt's commitments to the Arab world, became a major obstacle
at one stage of the negotiations. Is this the result of the isolation im- -
p~sed by the Arabs on al-Sadat?
~ Answer: Egypt has made mistakes. The fact that at a certain stage Egypt
refused to accept Article 6 is a good sign. The chances to correct further
mistakes are still there. In any case, I pray that this attitude is not
only the result of Arab oppositfon prompted by the Baghdad Summit. I hope
thaC it is the result of some real rethinking, And we have to sit down and
_ think some more.
Question: What is your evaluation, in political and military terms of -
the revived "Eastern Front"?
Answer: The Eastern Front was alwa~s a very important component in the
_ confrontation with Israel. But nobody should make the mistake of thinking
that it is enough to have a confr~ntation on the Eastern Front. I think
_ that the Eastern Front can achieve a certain independence and freedom of
action, even without Egypt, but only in 10 to 15 years. What this front
- can do is a holding operation. Let's face it; the local balance of power
since World War II was based on Iraq, Syria, with the Arabian peninsula
on one side, and Egypt on the other. -
= As for the Baghdad Summit, I think that those who expected very much from
it were mistaken. They were looking at things ae. they should be, not as
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~ ' FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY -
tt~~y Are. But whaC happened in BAghdad ia nevertheless importnnt, and ie
is important that Iraq and Syria found it neceasary to overcome their
feud, and that the countries of the Arabian peninsula Fdund it imperative
to back all this. This is going ~o sCart putting in place n new balance
of power and new equations. But it will take the long time I mentioned
before, In anx casE, with the human, political, economic and milirary
potential of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the FalesCinians, backed by the -
ArabiB;n peninaula, we will be able to finally have a viable and strong
front.
Question: Do you Y.hink that the Palestinians have been given a fair chance
of ~oining the peace progress? -
Answer: Well, we'll have to see the peace agreement, which, however, Co ~
my mi.nd is not a peace agreement. As Co Che texts that have been published ~
so far, I dAn't think that they offer the Palestinians anything. I can't
see that adminiatrative self-rule means anything at all, especially in the
light o� the balance of power inside Paleatine or around Palestine. '
Question: So what options do they have?
~ Answer: You know what advice I give--as a friend--to everybody in the
Arab world? We are going towards a very important Curning point, and in
front of such turning points, historically people tend to rush into action.
If I am allowed, as a friend, to say anything, I would te11 the Palestin-
ians that we are facin.~ a moment in history where we need to think before _
we decide on the ~ourse of action. All the Arab worlc~ needs to think. We
are facing a situat.ton t~~at could lead to Egypt's isolation or to Egypt -
opting oufi of the Ara~? ~nrld, which would be a very dangerous thing for -
both Egypt and the Arab ndtion.
- The Baghdad conferen~e ~of~the rejectionists was a success, because i*_ '
showed an Arab position that does net accept the Camp David agreement; and
- took decisions pending the implementation of that agreement. It .was a
- re~ection and it was a warning to Egypt not to go it alone. More than y_-
that, it was a warning tu~~the United States not to pursue this dangerous
path. A1~ of this was ~till on the passive side. After the signature of
the peace you can implement what was decider; upon in Baghdad. But the big
question is: Then what? What we need is a viable Arab strategy before
- rushing into action. This was a necessity when Egypt was still there. It
will be even more necessary without Egypt. Naturally ther~ will be a ten- -
dency to condemn, accuse, insult. But this would be merely a hysterical
reaction. What we need is a rational reaction. This is why the Pales-
tinians and the whole Arab world must sit down and think what can be done,
what aims we must have, for the short and long terms, and how we may reach
them.
Question: But the dynamics of the situation seem to impose certain choices -
upon the Palestinians, for instance regarding the Palestinian state in the
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
� ' ~ FOR dFFICIAL U5E ONLY
, Weat 3ank and Gaza. It hae bcen reported that 'Arafat asaured an Am~rican
- congressman that he ia prepared to recognie~ Israel if he gets this state.
Anawer: Tiii~a is what this congreasman said, but what have the Paleatiniana
- publicly stated? 't think thax if the Paleatinians wera of�ered an indeper?-
~ , dent state in the West Bank and Gaza w3th a link bet~aeen the two, as well
as.East Jerusalem, obviously everybody would tell them to go ahead and
_ accept. This however is a mirage, a~dream, not a concrete option.
- Queation: You have ~;~ritten that the United States is trying Co replace
~ the concept of an Arab w.orld, w:tCh the concept of the Middle East, which
envisages an ailiance of Arab and non-Arab countries. Was one o~ the ,aims
' af Camp David to frurther promote thia atrategy?
. Answer: Not only of Camp David. Ever since World War II America's aim
has been to break up the Arab world by isolating Egypt fran it. So far
- they ,have failed and I think that the ob~ective conditions are such that
� they will continue to fail. I am always asked whether I think that the -
; Sovieta have learnt their lessons, but the real tragedy is that the United -
States has learnt nothing from the last 25-35 yeaxs.
Question: The concept of an Arab nation aeems to be undergoing a change.
- Nationalism used to be the big driving force, whereas now aeveral Arab
regimes are trying to unite the Arabe arcund Islam. �
' ~ Answer: I don't think that it has changed so much. Islam has always been
and still is one of the ingredients of Arab nationalism. But it alone
cannot ct�eate a riation. What makes a nation is not reiigion; it's a common
language, a.commori mind, a common interest, a common culture, a common
- security.~ Religion is but one aspect of all this. In Malaysia too the -
people are MusLinis, but what else do they have in common with the Egyptians?
However, the idea of Islam a~ a unifying factor is not new. The idea of
an Islamic com~nonwealth iQ~.a legacy of the Ottoman Empire and after the
. end of ?~orld War I, with ~the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it was superseded
~ , by the concept of nationalism.
In the developing world religion alone cannot be a progressive force.
_ � There must be other ingredients, such as independence, social emancipa-
tion and so oY~. But these ingredients don't app~al to certain forces in -
- the area. The supremacy of religion is the result of an instinct of self-
~ defence, to the point~where Islamisation should neutralise Arab nationalism. ~
Question: But where, would you say, does the idea of an Arab nation exist -
today?
Answer: Everywhere in the Arab world, with the excepti4n of some conser-
vative leaders. Societies musf ~organise their lives beyond religion and
its rules. The period of religion-dominated societies is gone. Today we
don't have a Christian entity, but Europe, which is something more tangible.
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~Oit OI~'CICIAL US~ ONLY
Qu~gtion: Would you ~~y ehat Cod~y i.n Egype there ~tre forceg at work
th~C ~im at th~ de-Arabisc~tion of the country, by, for insC~nce, stree~ing
it~ Phnraonic heriCage, or ita African link~?
An~w~~r: Srnn~~tl~tng linpp~ncd in Lgypt thnt wa~ purt of n gen~ral movcm~nt in
Che Arub wnrld during v~rious cenCuries. Muh~nnngd 'ALi wgs ehe firat who
~~w the need for ~n ind~pendent ~gypC, for a diffe~-~nt Egypt. At the end
of ~he Ottoman bnpire, ~gypC went through a search for identitiy. It wae
th~ eime of all ehe Phgraonic discoveries and Europe did its beaC to nake
the ~gyptians feel that Chere was eheir identity. The Phnraonic legacy
w,~s the intellectual link with ~urope. But 'Abd al-N~eir realiaed that
. c�:~r tru~ identity wc~s Arab, He made ~ne mistAke; Chis fact waa noC auf-
f~cienCly diecusa~d an ~ wider acale. It was taken �or granted without
helping ie Co sink into ehe consciousnese of the masaea, together with its
sncialist curollary.
ltevisinniam disputed Chia idenCiCy, particularly the classee that had been
hit by our.measurea of natior~aliantion. In a way it is a good thing that
the whole question ie being discuased again. The final reault will cer-
tainly assert our Arab idenCity and place it on a firmer base. The trouble
is that, wh~.le doing so, we are loain~ time and introducing doubta about
our Arab identity when we most need the awarenesa of this identity.
, Question: Fifteen yeara ago Egypt came to the help of the revolutionariea
in Yemen, against WeaCern-backed feudalism. Today Egypt, after having
intervened in Zaire, is reported ko be in North Yemen again, but this Cime
. on Che side of the conservetives.
Answer: I am not sure thaC Egypt is in North Yemen; I have no proof of
this. Anyhow, I am vary proud of our first intervention in Yemen. Aa to
the'second, I can only pray to God that we are not there.
Question: How do you think the upheavals in Iran will affect ttt~ Middle
_ East?
Answer: I consider myself more or less a Nasserite. Therefore you can
imagine what I feel about today's events in Iran. I wrote my first book
on Iran, among other things. Of course, I can't tell what's going to
happen, but I have the impresaion oi being before a deja-w aituation.
I was in Iran during the first anti-shah insurrection, in 1953; Now the
_ conditiona are very different. The popular forces learnt their lesaon,
they are bette~ organized and more determined.
_ The hiatorical friction that always existed between the Arab world and
Iran has been accentuated by the ahah and his policiea. This is a pity,
_ Even if there are contradictions, on the Gulf among other things, they
could be contained. We are neighbours and ahould live together in peace.
I am sure that if, as I pray, there won't be a prolonged military dictator-
ahip in Iran, if things follow their right course, a time for real
8 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
rox o~~rctnt, us~ orn~Y
coop~r~Cion batween Iran and ehe Arabs will come. And Y hope ehaC Che
Acgb world will ehen be in ~ condition Co use ehte grene cpportunit~�.
.
Question: How dn you view your fueure role in Egyptian politics7
- Answnr: This is a difficulC queseion. I reglly don'e know. I have alwnys
tried to be a~ourngliet, able to eay evarything I feel. This is still my
ambitintt. Recently I have be~n offered many chances tio go and work abroad.
But for me there is no place if not in Egypt, wheCher aC home, in the office,
= or in pxison. Let's hope for the beae. _
Question: But somehow your poaition was a bit apecial. Yuu were Che -
closeat adviaer to President 'Abd al-Nasir. -
Answer: You must undere~and th~r Che aituation of the ~resa in the de-
veloping countriea ia dif�erent. Given the problema of the Middle East,
you can't juat be carriers of news. You are in Che midat of eventa and,
_ ehus, you.~re obliged to take aidea. Before yo~ir revolution there was a
parliamentary debate in Iran which went againat the ahah. T reported
this, adding but one little aentence: This is what happened in Iran.
Thia caused me to be arrested for 24 houra, but, according to the law, I
_ could have got 12 yeara. We are not as privileged as you here; we cannoC
afford to be detached. It's a matter of to be or not to be.
COPYRIGHT: 1978 I C Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4820
~
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
rutc urr L~ie~L u~r, u?v~.,~
~
EGYI'T
AL~-SAD~T'S NEGOTIATING TACTIC5 OPPOSED; AT'rE.MPT~D COUPS REPORT~~
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21 Dec 78 pp 16-18
IAr~icle: "A1-Sadat in the Negotiatione Cauldron: 'A Hot Pan and a Cold
Pan'; Regime Eacapes 'I~ao atte~pted Coupe: One Failed a_cause offlcera' _
InCentions Were MLs in`.erpreted; A1-Jamasi Was Rem~~ved from Kis Poat Bec~use -
He wae Suspac~ed of Covering Up Che Second Military Attempt; the Predicament
of Iran's Shah Ia Making the United StaCea Raconaider th= Experience of
~~YPti'e Shah"]
[Text) Qn the basis of information obtained from well-informed EgypCian r
sourcea AL-WATAIV AL-'ARABI can confirm that two succeasive military attempCed
coups that sought to overthrow al-Sadat and hia regime were among the
principal reasone that led the EgypCian preaident to make up a crieis that ~
he had agreed tQ beforehand w.tth Waehington over the ltn'tage between a p~ace
treaty with Ierael an3 a schedule for autonomy on the West Bank a~d Gaza.
_ Thia fabricated crisis aerved local poliCical purposes in Egypt and in the
Arab world. It aought to contain any resentm2nt Cowards the concessions m3de
by al-Sadat by meane of makin3 up "intrasigent" position: it. accord3nca Co
the tactica of ahifting from e? "hot pan" to a"cold pan." A1-Sadat came
upon this concept in the summat;~ of book about the French-Tunisian negotiations
by Mr Christian Pinaud the former Frer~ch miniater of foreign affairs. -
Naturally, the summary was the work of Dr Butrus Ghali the miniater of state
for foreign affaire.
Meanwhile informed observers are saying that al-Sadat is c~nducting himself
_ in government an~i in official life as though he were the autocratic chief
of a village in Ci~e remote areas of upper Egypt who rules according to his
fancy. ~ ~
It is on thts baeis, when his assiatants began to be shaken by pessimism as
a result of the media magnifying the newe abaut the Israeli-Egy~tian dispute
and the newe about Vance's falr.ering miaeion, that al-Sadat would aeaume the
poature of a village chief in his palace at al-Qaaatir al-Khayriyah [the
Barrage]. He would reasaure hie assiatanta and the editor-in-chief of his
newspapere, who were diamayed by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict which appeared
to be brewing, that everything that k~as taking place was occurring according
10
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OIt OI~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY
to a carefully drawn-up plan. He hiwself had eugEested this plan to C~rtar
who bec~me enthueiaetiic about it and, afeer much e�forC, had pers~saded
Beg~.n Co go along with it up ~o a ceregin poinC. 'This plan is be~ed on
shifting the Cgyptian-Isra~li negoeiaeions rapidly, continuously and wiChout -
ittterruption from a cold pan ~o a hot pan for a cerCain period o~ Ctme~
Instancea of peasimiem and optimiem with eheir increasing psychologicgl
preasures on al1 wou~.d ~aneue. If a peacy Creaty cantaining the stipulationa _
Ct~gC were agreed upon in Washington were to be eigned, e~erybody w~~u1d have ~
- n~igh of relief and considar iC "an accomplishmene."
, A1-Sadat said that it wae Che book by Pinaud, the former French miniaeer of
foreign affair~, Chat suggested thia policy tn him. Pinttud had said Chat
Che French and the Tunisiana who negotiated the independence of Tunisia hnd
gdopCed a plan "of continuously ahifting the negotiaCiona from a hoC pan to
_ a cold pan" by holding official seseione for the negotiati~ns and then
making up a crisie that they had agreed to beforehand. Afterwards, through
unofficial comnunicationa and Che mediation of third parties an announcement
. would be made that the crisie had been overcome. Tnen the door would be
opened for the r~aumption of publlc official negotiations. Then another
crisis would take place, and it would be followed by another ahift to new
negotiations and ao on unCil an agreement granting Tunisia autonomy would be
reached after h�~ving exhausted all the factions of Tuniaian and Arab oppo-
aition. Ultimately, the entire matter would appear to have been a ma~or
victory that was very hard to pull off.
The Principles of al-Sadat's Ai~alysie
Although there ie a ra3ical difference between the aub~ect of Tunisia-France
and that of Egypt-Israel, al-Sadat did adopC ChriaCian Pinaud's tactics with
Carter's approval. This was done to confront obstacles and difficulties
that had not been taken into accaunr when everybody sat down to draw up the
Cerms of the Camp David deal.
During his chieftancy aesaion at the al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah palace al-Sadat
would idenCify to his asalatanCa three levela of these obstaclea and diffi-
culties:
The first level of difficulty was that of the increasing opposition in Egypt
to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
The second was that of abaolute Paleatinian re~ection on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip of the autonomy project.
The third level of difficulty was that of the Arab re3ection of the Camp
David accorda. At the Baghdad Summit Conference this rejection produced a
_ broad front that politically encompassea Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Libya,
Democratic Yemen and the PI~~ as well as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United
Arab EmiraCes.
11
- FOR OFFICIAL l1SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~Oit O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
Tl~e fgct ig that ~1-SadaC'e supporCere and Che Mafi~ in Che government of
~KYI~ti rr~~~1 Chrnugh tti~ir Coral conCrol of a11 the media--televiaion, r~dio
gnd Che prees--to give the impr~~sion ehae all the Egyptian people, axcapt
for a small minority of leftiets who are oppoaing Camp David on orders
fram Moecow [were supporCing e1~5adgt's efforts].
Hnwever, fareign ~ournallate and obaervera in ~gypt aoon noeic~d that this
"sma11 minority of leftiaCs who ~re Moecow's agenta, according to al-SadaC's
definition, were holding popular meetinge under the name of the United -
Naeional Progreesive Grouping Party" and that thousands of citizens from
Alexgndrig in the north to Aawan in the aouth were participating in Chese
meetinge. The foraign ~ournaliate and observera noticed that al-Sadgt's
regime and government were not able Co toleratie the opposieion of "Chis
amall minority of 1ef Cieta." GovernmenC agencies were continuously,confis- -
cating Cheir newspaper AL-AHALI. Afterwarda, the atate owned al-Ta'awun
Publiehing Firm, whoae board of dtrectore ia chaired by Mr Mamduh Rida, -
was advised Co cancel its contract Co print and publiah the newspaper on
the basis of the fact that the newapaper was coating the publiahing firm -
considerable damage and was hurting its repuCation.
Opposition from the Right and from the Left -
The observera noticed that the United National Progresaive Grouping may
have been xhe firet to condemn Che Camp David accords and the direct nego-
tiations with Iarael d~ecisively and clearly. But they w~_re not the only
opposing force on the political scene. Tnere were the Moslem Brothers
with their three organizations and factions. They announced their firm
opposition [to the accords and to the direct negotiations) on a religious
- and a political basis. Tney expreased their opposition clearly in the two
- newspapers AL-DA'WAH and AL-I'TISAM and also in the public prayers on
feasta where they advocated such oppoaition at the square facing 'Abdin ~
Palace which al-Sadat ia using as the official seat of his regime.
There ia also the Wafd party. Although Che party decided to disband
itself six months ago to proteat the [government's] unconstitutional,
~ terrorist, repressive measurea and the political isolation of its leaders--
these measures are contrary to Che simplest rules of democracy--it is still
operating and active on the political scene. With regards to Camp David
Che Wafd party ia divided inCo two factions. The first one~ which that
of the ma~ority, is atrongly opposed to Camp David. It is led by Fu'ad
Sira~ al-Din who announced that Israel was Egypt's direct enemy 3uat as
it was Paleatine's and that Eqyptian aecurity rould not be separated f rom
total Arab aecurity. The second faction is led by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad -
member of the People's Assembly. Although this faction has not expressed
its clear opposition to Camp David, it did submit 17 reservations which
undermint~d the foundations upon which the Camp David accords are based.
- 12
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~O~t O~~ICIAL L'S~ ONLY
Libergls and national technocrats a1eo, who are ].ed by Mu~Caz Nnssar a
_ prominent gCtorney, n formc~r presidene of ehe Lawyers' Club and member of
the People'e A~sembly gnd Dr ~ngineer Mnhmud al-Qadi member of the Y~ople's
Aeeembly who is described as Che m~~st skillful contemporary Egyptian
parliemenCariun~ are condemning tihe foundaCiona of the C~mp navid ACCOrcIS
and gre coneidering their action eo be Che principgl preface to eheir
- attemptia to form a new party in ~gypC under Che ngme "Natiional ~'ront."
In gd9itinn, tha movement to oppose Camp David and al-Sadat's policy,
which does not serve national and pan-Arab intereats, includea the indepen-
dent Nasiriata who are led by Kamal Ahmad, the only nasirist represenCative
. in the People~o Aasembly. This movemenC also includes all the communisC
organizationa which are noC 1ega11y permiteed but which puraue their
activiCieg in aecr~t. The number of Chege organizaCions amounCed to siz;
moaC prominenC among them are Che Egyp~ian Communist ParCy, Chs Communist
Labox Party and the 8 January Organizaeion.
All the living membera of the 23 July Itevolutionary Cou~cil are going along
with the oppoaition. They are 'Abd-al-Latif Baghdadi, Zakariya Muhi al-D{.n,
Husayn al-Shafi'i and Kamal al-Din Hueayn. The only one who did not go along
with Che opposiCion is Hasan Ibrahim wl~o preferred to maintain silence and
refused to sign hie colleaguea' sCaCement ao that al-SadaC would not attack
hie comnercial interests. Two men who had served as prime ministeta in
al-Sadat's adminiaCration have also ~oined the oppoaition movement. They
are Dr M:~hmud Fawzi and Dr 'Aziz Sidqi. Tne third prime minieCer, Dr Hi~zi,
has kept hia peace. BuC al-Sadat got the support of the former prime minister
Mamduh Salim, a former investigative officer, who was rewarded by al-Sadat:
he was removed from the ministry and appointed as al-Sadat's asaistant. It
is a"ceremonial" job, and the only work he has to do is accept on behalf
of his "boss" the prizea that have been pouring on al-Sadat from Zionist
and U.S. organizations.
The Ruling Mafia
It is thus that today all the viCal and active forces on the Egyptian
poliCical acene are variously motivated to demona~i-ate varioua degrees of
opposition to al-Sadat's policy of capitulaCion to Israel and the United
States. Theae forces have cornered al-SadaC politically and have ieolated
him and the group that has benefited financially, economically and bureau-
cratically from his regime. According to official statistica issuec by the
Ministry of Planning in January 1977, this group of beneficiaries repre-
sents the interesta of 2,353 families whose average size is five or six
~ individuals. Thanks to the commercial openness each family earns an annual
income that varies from 55,000 pounda to over 2 million pounds.
Squatting on top nf the pyramid of the ruling Mafia families are al-Sadat's
family; �Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman; Sayyid Mar'i; 'Abd-al-Ghaffar (the president's
in-laws); Muhammad Shahin; Ahmad Sultan, the former vice president and
~ minister of electricity who was accused ia the United States of accpeting -
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I~OIt n~~ICIAL USti nNLY
- n brihe; Ur Mugea�g KhttLi1, Che currettC prime miniseer who i~ considered
one of the most prominetlt representatives in the Middle ~asC of Che well-
known conglomer~Ce ITT, the company Chat financad Chile'~ bloody coup
uggingC Che governmene of Chi1e's latie Preaident A1lende; Mfil~r.iud Abu Wafiyah,
Che pr.esidenC's broeher-in-law and husband of Kamiliya, Jihan al-5adaC's
_ sietier. -
This Mafia gsaumes political for,n in two partieg, A1-Sadat is proud of
h~ving est~bliehed them at Che same time--according to him--by plowing the -
poliCical mainatream. The ruling official ma~oritiy party is Che bemocratiic ~
National Party; and Che official oppos3tt.on p~rty is Che Socialist Aceion
~ Party. To load this party gl-Sadat chose his brother-in-law Mahmud Abu
Wnfiyah and Engineer ~brahim Shukri the former minieter of agriculture.
The two par!:iea eried Co convene popular meetings under ehe slogan "Peace
wiCh Israel is Che way Co democracy and prosperity." But they soon suspended
these meetinge on ordera from al-Sadnt himself after it became clear thae
- the masses were raising questiona about Che Camp David accords even thougti
they were cnncerned in a primary degree about aolving their accumulated
economic and social problema whoae tight grip was affecCing undersecretaries
of ministries, not to mention workere, farmers, ~unior and mid-level em
employeee. These reaerv~tions were expreased with so much hostility that
Fikri Makram 'Ibayd the secretary general of the president's party said
they were "very disturbing."
And even inside the small circle of government observera noticed that all
~ the members of the People's Assembly who participaCed in the discussion
of the Camp David accords, especially supporters of the regime, were careful
- to underscore their reaervations. This came about in view of a general
trend in public opinion. People are becoming increasingly aware of the
gorwing link between the fierce hardahips of life they are experiencing
and the economic openness policy and the political opennes policy with
Israel and the UniCed States. The people have become aware of the fact that
Camp David not only isolatea EgypC from the Arab community, but it is also
makin~ it poorer and increasing the fierceness of iCs economic problems.
On a personal. level some individuals who are close to al-Sadat were advising
hi[m to ponder the matter somewhat and to reconsider the situation. When
Chis advice was repeated, al-Sadat became very angry and sharply accused
hts advisers of co;aardice and disloyality. Even his wife Jihan was not
spared this accusation. She had conveyed to him obervations opposed to the
accords made by profesaors of the College of Arts where she recently gradu-
ated. ~en Sayyid Mar'i the former speaker of the People's Assembly was
accused of becoming the prisoner cf his relations with some "leftists who
are agents for Moscow and for the Palestinians." He was removed from his
position as epeaker and was replaced by "the exponent" of the new regime
Sufi Abi Talib. [Mear.while) Sayyid Mar'i cowered in the "preaidential
warehouse" like his arch enemy Mamduh Salim as an assistant to the president.
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY
_ Two AttempCed Coupa
There ie also ehe position of the army. We1l~informed eo~rces gffirm that
there were Cwo u~tempCed coupe against al-Sadat during tihe lage aix montha~
The first attempt was carriad out by . group of young officera. Their
- purpose was to kill al-Sadat and his aseieCante when they met aC one of
Che meetittge. Forey-eight hours before Chey were Ca carry out eheir p1an, -
some o� them contacted the Nasiriat repre;~entazive Kamal Ahmad and asked
him to set up meetings for them with some nationalist politiciane who belong
to different factiona. But ~he NasiriaC repreaentative auspected that Che
matter might be "a trap prepared for him by the inveatigative police."
_ He reporCed ths incidenC to Che police who arreated thoae who planned the
aCtempted coup. They were 63 officers, and the highesC ranking officer
. among Chem was a colonel.
_
The second attempt was carried out by a R:oup of mid-level and senior
officera. There were ma3or generals and brigadier generals among Chem. They
distributed handbills inside the army in the name of the New Free Officers
in which they condemned the policy of impoveriehment and aubordination
to U.S. colonialism and Iarael which is being pursued by al-Sadat. They
criticized his military ventures againet the Palestine Liberation Movement
and againat Libya and Africa.
It has been said that that attempt was reported by a pro al-SadaC secreC
organization in Che army which is aupervised by Husni Mubarak and that the
investigations which included 14 officers who had been arrested led inves-
tigators to auspect that LC Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani al-Jamasi the former
cninister of defense and commander-in-chief did know about this organization
- and was covering up for it. This may have been the principal reason for his
sudden diamissal from his poaition afCer the officers were arrested.
Some sources add that al-Jaa?asi had expressed his opposition to the position
of "liberated Sinai" as stipulated by the Camp David accords with regard to
Egypt's military security. Militarily speaking, Sinai would actually be
under Israel's control. It see~ca that this view which al-Jamasi expressed
on ehe question of Sinai wae widely ahared in the army and that Lt Gen
Kamal Hasan 'Ali the new minister of defense had to inform al-Sadat about it.
In view o~ this internal situation in Egypt which constitutes the possibility
that a broad oppoaition front may be esrabliehed on the political scene
on the basis of the opuoaition Co Camp David; in view of the activities in
the army; in view of the damage to the unity of the existing relations between
al-Sadat and a number of people who are in close contact with him, al-Sadat
did adopt the [alternating] "hot and cold" tactic in the Israeli-Egyptian
negotiationa to Cry gaining time, to prevent the formation of political and
military opposition factions within a unified movement; and to appear to be
the one who was drawing from Israel concessions that are consistent, at
leget in form, with the reservations of some people in his regime.
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~ox ~r~r'ICLAL US1~ UNLX `
- A1~Sadat ie also facing ehe problem of hie o,~en an~i secxet pledge to go
ovar rhe PLn's head as the aole, legitimate rapreaentativa of the
Pal~stint~n p~.aple. With leading parson~litiea of the WeeC~Dank nnd tha
Gaza Strip he would create a unitAd Palestinian-Cgyptian forca ChaC would
be capab~e of carrying out the [plan for] autonomy in accordance wieh
ehe Camp David a:corda~ When al-5adat w.~s confronted wiCh ehe firm
re~eceion o` Che people of the West Bank and Che Gaza Strip, he asked
Carter and Begin for Che freedom ~o maneuver Co the point of m,3ktng up
imaginary criaea with I9rae1 about "the legitim.gte rights of ehe Palea-
tinian p~aopl~; the posaibility of the Paleatinians eatablishin3 their
natic~n~liat atate in the future; and Che p~eaibiliCy of linking the Sin~i
agreement with Che autonouy agreement. He also asked them to suppor~ him
financially and politically in hie effortis Co use all m~~ana Co creaCe in
~ the occupied terriCory a climate that is favorable to Camp David.
Accordi.ng to the mo3t confidential sourcea Carter has exoressed his under- -
_ stand'.ng for "al~Sadat~s di�ficult poaition" and has aupported all his
- dema+~~is~ B~agin, however, expreased serious reservationa over what is
calied al-Sadat's f reedom to maneuver, He bas~d his reservations on the
�a~t that this would create serious problem3 for him inside Israel~ He
_ d~d, howeve~, approve of the financial and political eupport for al-Sadat's
_ gctiol inside the occupied land in the attea~pt to recruit aome mercenaries
w'.~o would aupport the formula of autonomy.
Egyptian Action o~ the Gaza Strip and on Che West Bank
It was in this context that al-Sa3at escalated his campaign ro l~�.nk t~ie
- Egyptian-Is,:seli agreement with Che autonomy agreement and to affir.n at
the same time--in order to reaseure Begin--that regardless of the circum-
sta-~ces h~: would not abandon the letter an3 Che apirit of the Camp David ~
- acc:ords~ He also obtain~d monetary fin�ancial support from tre Unlted Statea
e:3timated aC 60 million dollare, and he obtained political supnort fro~
Begin that took the form of travel facilities for about 12 or 15 Egyptian _
intelltgence officials who w~~uld travel to the Gaza Strip and the West B~nk
u~zder the guise Chat they were E~yptian businesamen, They would ~aork under
the leadership of Col Mahastn whv has close personal contact with ~1-Sadat.
~ It is said that he ie the ~ousin of Vice President Husni Mubarak,
The purpoae of this mission is "to buy some prominent per~onalities in the
occupied homeland: by financing a number of ~oint pro3ects wiCh Egypt,
especially in the area oF trade transactinns. Theae woild later spread to
Israel. Consequently, "new interests" would be formed that would be
favorable to azd h~rmonious with the sutonomy and w~uld at the same time
be inconsistent with the c~urse of the revolution w'~ich is representec by -
the Liberation Organizationa
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFCICIAL U5~ ONLY
In�ormation �rom knowledgeable sources indicates th$t ehia miasion did
actually begin about a month ~nd a hal~ ago. But it aeeme that this mission _
- ie severely ~loundering and hna nat yet achie+~ad~ according to Prime MinisCer -
Mueett~'a Kt~ulil, as he told Cnrtar whan he vieited WaehingCon recently, the
required minimum. Lt seems thaC ~he mat~er requires more time, more supporr _
and deeper Ierae~i un3eratanding for tihp ob~ectives and m~sans of the miesion. _
The unity of all political a1d social trends in the Arab homeland which was -
produced by the Baghdad Summit Conference with regard to re~ecting the C~mp
David accorda and all their pertinent implications and results intensified
al-5adat's criais. This matter wae the furtheat from the calcuati~ns of
Che Camp David people who had baeicalYy depended on al-SadaC's analyais. He
- ~ had stated that he was capable of attracting the Arab oil countries at leaet
to follow in his footatepa and to ieolate and aurround the progressive
countries. Hence.the reaolutions of the Baghdad Summiti Cnnferencp did pro-
- duce a stunning blow to al-Sadat, to Carter and to Begin.
In view of this too al-Sadat was,asking hia two Camp David partners to give
him more timp and freedom Co maneuver and tu use the "not and eold" tactica
in an attempt Co bring about division in the Baghdad front and to brAak the
siege of Arab isolation from hia regime.
However, observers are noticing that in epite of or perhapa because of the
. hot and cold tactics, al-Sadat ie aggravating the hiatc+rical crisis in
which he ia floundering. _
Sources close to the U.S. embasay in Cairo are stating that in view of
facts and reactiona that have eaerge3 after the Camp David accords ir. Egypt,
in the occupied land and in the Arab world, Washington was reconsidering
the capability of al-Sadat an3 hia ragime ta cuntinue on the Camp David
course and to implement it. Today, the factuat view of al-Sadat at the
White House is that al-Sadat is the one who is torturing himself and hia -
regitae with his acrobatic shifts from a hot pan to a cold pan. The question
now requirea serious thinking about another al-SadaC.
- COPYRIG}iT: 1978 AL-iJATAN AL-'ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
_ 17
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
~GXPT
LEFTIST LEADER DISCUSS~S HARASSMENT BY R~GIME
. Paris A'L-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Dec 78 pp 18-20
~ [Interview with Khalid Muhi al-Dtn by Salah Hashim: "The Unofficial
Oppoaition in Egypt: Khalid Muhi al-Din; Government Has Lost Respect
of People; We Re~ect the Camp David Accords and We Believe that -
Egyptian Character of Egypt Is Con�ixmed Through Its Arab Character;
There Ia Not One Peraon in the National Party (al-Sadat's Party) Who
Would Support Him in a Criais; We Admit There are Differencea over the
Palestinian QueaCion Within the Grouping Party Between the Pan-Arabists
. and the Marxiste"]
_ [TextJ . The court seasiona to try the def.endants who were accused of -
creating the diaturbancea of the 18th and 19th of January 1977 are raising
important questions about the reallty of current Egyptian political life
and about the opposition under Presfdent al-Sadat~s regime which is pur-
sutng an increasingly individualisCic trend. President al-Sadat's regime
is trying to contain any open or secret opposition; it is trying to ,
� smother it in its early stages or contain it in a manner that would prevent
it from being heard by the masaes and from affecting their inclinations.
Opposition to the Egyptian regime etill canatitutes an unknown quantity
whose effecCiveness and strength cannot be determined until all the con-
ditions for testing thia strength are completed as a result of an internal
_ crisis that would affect the citizen's daly bread or the sources of his
~security. This is because the opposition movement has in most cases chosen
- silence; there is the labor oppoaition that expresses itself in union un-
rest; there is the opposition of some factions of the Moslem Brothers;
there is the opposition of the rightiat reltgious groups that are resisting
any concessions on Jerusalem and Palestine; there is the communist opposition ~
that is work~ng in secret and is trying to infiltrate different opposition
groupa; and there is the silent opposition in the armed forces. This
opFoaition began to emerge in different forms aad precipitate actions which -
led to arrests, releasea and extensive transfers.
An there ia an official ogposition which was appointed by al-Sadat by law.
It is repreaented in the Socialist Action Party which has become the source
and the butt of jokes.
~ 18
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The only open oppoaition that hae scrapoa with the regime and has maintained
_ its reailience is that wh:tch lies in tha Grouping ParCy that is led by Mr -
Kha11d Muhi al-Din.
In an attempt to clarify the true naCure of tihia opposition and Co evaluate
ita true atrengeh before the agenciQS attack them--and obaervera expece ,
thia to take place soon--the correapondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Salah Hashim
conducted thia inCerview wixh Mr Khalid Muhi al-Din, a reporter [himself] -
and preaident of Che Grouping Party. In his anawera to the following
- queationa he preaented signi�icanC facts about the party, the oppoaition and
the current political life.
Letter to the Miniatry of the In~erior -
' [Queation] Police and intRlligence agencies intervened to prevent the
commemoration of Palestine Day at party headqu$rters. You complied with
the orders of the miniater of, interior, and the meeting was broken up even
before it was held. Don't you think that this position will incite the ~
leftist forces outaide the Grouping to ra11y against you because your
party was avoiding a confrqntation with the governmenC, avoiding making it
angry and submitting to ita orders? -
_ [Answer] I am asking you to read the letter that we wrote Co the minister
of the interior. I believe that we atated our case fully. The forms of
opposition differ and vary from one situation to another. It 1.s the party
that determines when to enter into a confrontation with the government.
It is careful to give good conaideration to circumaCances. I believe that
not since the age of the firsC liberaliam in Egypt hae a political party
sent Che minister of thP interior such a candid letter. We know how angry
he is with this letter which we printed and distributed in large quantities
to news agencies, correapondents of world newapapera, members of the People's
' Assembly and ordinary citizena. IC was also diatributed to the newspapers. -
' ~'tiis letter expresaea a very diadainful and a very harsh position againat
~ this decision. Reading the text of the letter will indicate this.
Your Excellency, the Minister of the Interior
Greetings
The United National Progressive Grouping Party received notice from one of -
your assistants that he had ordera from his superiors to cancel the obser-
_ vation of International Palestine Solidarity Day which was to be held
Thursday evening December 7, 1978 at party headquarters.
Whereas the party regrets and re~ects that large numbers of your policemen
gathered in the street leading to the party's headquarters to carry out
the decision to cancel the observance; and whereas the party views this
cancellation as a blatant violation of the party law which gives party
_ headquarters [certain] immunity determined by law, the party wishes to
_ put the following mattera on record:
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~ ~ V1\ V?i ~.Vi~LL1 N~JL1 V!\~,/? _
FirsC, those who isaued the decxee tio prohibit observance o� Tnternational
Palestina Solidarity Day which was declared by Che United Nations and
- obaerved by it are only placing themaelvea in a curious poairion vis a vis
the national and pan-Arab question at;~ the etiatements and interviews
about the Paleatinian queation that abound in the newepapers. .
Second, the fact that your policemen have violated the law--in fact, they
deri~ed ~he law when we reminded them of it--indicatea ehat a real threat
_ to the laws which must be respected and abided by doea exisC. This is
because the h~bitual violation of the law by pollcemen is a very serious
and dangeroua matter. It bagina with a etep or a poaition which if opposed _
becomes [a matt~r o�] public policy from whose consequences no one is immune,
= Third, if some people imagine tittey ca~ easily dieregard the law, pasC and
recent experiences affirm thaC time ;noves in cycles and that the 1aw will
in time regain its power no matter how long Chat span of time may be. The -
law ia always capable of holding people accountable. -
Finally, Xour Excellency Mr Minister,.we are making these quick observations -
as we hold on to all our cons ttutiional and legal rights that were deliber-
_ ately violated by your policemen. We want to mention in closing thaC this
is noC a letter of protest. This letter is a reminder; memory may perhaps
be useful to the faiChful. -
God will provide guidance.
The llnited National Progresaive Grouping Party
The Rules of the Grouping Party
[Question] So~ne are saying'that the fact that the Grouping Party has not
identified its social identity has caused it numerous problems with the
Egyptian Government. To what extent has t~e Grouping Party succeeded in
mobilizing the labor forces that it has the power to reprep~:�nt, and what
is the role that you.are aseuming at the preaent time?
[Answer] I.et me firat explain two pointa. First, it is difficult to say ~
that there ia now in Egypt one Egyptian party that represents Che interests
of the working clasa only. Thia ia because we cannot aeparate, especially
during a'stage like that which we are experiencing, between the interests .
of the working clasa and the interesCs of the other classes.
Second, ideological membership in a party--any party--is a relative matter.
Practical experience in Egypt has proven that people ~oin a party first,
and then they understand its ideology afterc�~ards and not vice versa as is
the case in Europe. In Egypt one ~oina the Communist party and then becomes
a MarxisC; and one ~oins the Moslem Brothers and then understands their -
- beliefs.
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY
Tiie actual reali,ty about the Group~ng Parey a�f~.rms the �ollowing: ~he
Cotal number of Marxists, Nasiriets, pan-Arabiats and a11 other ideo- -
logical componenCa inaide the party representi approximaeely 10 percent
[of party membera]~ The reat are ordinary cirizena who crteicize ehe
- government p~licy and the policias of Che government. They generally
critize Che methode, approaches, prioriCiss and d~recti~ns o� the -
_ government in Egypt. It is possible Co congider theae people Grouping
- Party membera. They constitutie rhe ma~ority of the party's mid-1eve1
- cadres, and they are also capable oF deterinining the general caurae of
= the party's aCtion.
We are the only party in Egypt that ia based on slectiona from Che base
_ unit to the top. It is through the procesa of preparing for the party's _
general conference and through ito democratic pra~tices Chat different
~actions deal with each other within the party without any friction.
- The le~adership doea not aelect, diacriminate or favor one facCion as -
opposed to another. We welcome any faction thaC wins in the elections.
From the organization'~ central office we observe the course of events and
we correct their balance by giving othei political factions an opportunity
to be :epresented whether or not they obtained a ma~ority of the vote.
_ , The ;:act that 51 percent, 52 percent or even 90 percent of one faction are
ret~resenCed does not mean that representation for the remaining 10 percent
is to be cance3.led. This is because the presence of the 10 percenC is also
_ ?.egitimate, necessary, urgent and pertains to the party. Hence, we resort
- to ;,ne method of representing the other factLons that were not represented ~
in the elections. -
Differences Within the Party ~
[Question] Can it be said that the aharp differences that could deveYop -
between the different political factions within the party on a specific
issue like PresidenC al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem or the party's position
on Che Camp David agreement do not impair the existing balance and impede
the progre~s of the party?
[Answer] Firat, we have not had a difference that split the party. In
- case such a difference does occur~ every facCion is to make some con-
cessions. There have been differences that no one cay deny. They are
differences between the pan-Arab view of a aolution to the Palestinian
question and the Marxisr view of thia solution. Some Nasir~sts may agree
on this suh~ecC with some pan-Arab factions. For example, when we
established the party we had a differen::: about UN Resolution 242 and about
the Geneva Conference. On the other hand, there was a difference about
how the full liberation of Palestinian soil was to come abouC. But we
were all able to approach one idea which different factions could agree
upon even if they did not subscribe fu.tly to it or to Chis position or the
other. This meana that we find the formula upon which all parties can
agree without all these parties being fully satisfied.
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
ru?t urr~l~i~~~ u5~, uaLt
- We tiave, ~or exemple, ~pnken ~bout the legieim~te n~tinngl rights o~ the
I'~le~einian people ~n~i nf their right to egti~bli~h their ~taCe on thoge
- p~rt~ n~ their land Chge are llberated. We did not ~~y thi~ wgg fin~l~
gnd we did nnC ~~y it we~ not~ Inse~ad, we ~~id i� tih~y c~n 1ib~rgee their
1gnd, 1ae ~hem e~tgbli~h Cheir ~Cgte nn it. And gt ~he geme time we ~~id
that we recognix~d Ch~t ehe PLO wae the ~ole legitimate repregenC~tiv~ of
eh~ Palestiaian peopl~. ~rom Che pnint ~f view df Che t�tnrxi~e elements
= in Ch~ parey rhis me~ne tt cnmmittnenC en eh~ ~CgCemenC~ ~f the I'~1~geinign
~ p~np1~. This i~ bec~u~e thEr~ are no penple nr n~turgl powwerg whd hgv~
the riglit to clgim Co speak ~n beh~lf ot gnoChe~ people nr ~notiher n~turgl
. pawer. Thig meang Ch~C if ehe pL0 eayH iC gcc~pCg a certgin gdlution, we
cgn only in this cg~e gccept whaC Che YLO eayg b~cauge apeglcing for people
ie noC an idedingical luxury ehat I expact of my opponenC~ ~nd do not
prncCice myself. ~
We eupp~rC principles, and we d~t~rmine them. Among the principles i~ the
right for self-determinnCion of Che PalegCinian people. If Che pglegtinian
people ch-ose a course and an approach, we support them. I believe that
ehie would solve many of Che diaputes Chgt emerge.
The Party, DefamaCion Campaigns and News $lackout
(Question] What po~Cure is the Grouping Psrty taking vis a vis the defamation
and blackout campaigns that are lr~unched by the governmental presa in Egypt
ugainet it and against iCa role on the Egyptian political acene?
[Answer] The ruling party~s poeition on the Grouping ParCy has changed from
one atage to gnother. The firet stage was oiie of diseatisfied acce~tance;
ChBC is, it was a de facto acceptance of us. This acceptance was accompanied
by Che ruling party's diapleaeure that we were not up to forming a reaponaible
oppoaition, an oppoaition that they call honest, that is, a skeleton of an
opposition or an opposiCion in form.
The second atate [of the ruling party's poature Cowards us] assumed the form
of blaCant attack against us. But the regime failed in both cases. I think
that the. media campaigna to which the party was sub~ected were intended to
harm tC. They have been unprecedented in Egypt's history.
Yes, we were sharply and impudently attacked. Nevertheless, this attack
produced a very etrange result. The party's popularity appeal increased -
for a very simple reason: the government has lost the respect of thc
public and the government's propaganda machinery has not been succeasful.
_ For example, during the events of January 1977 the genius of the government
media contrived to place the reaponsibility for the popular uprising on us.
_ They tried to protray this uprisi.ng as "an uprising of thieves."
But the attack against the party only aroused the derision of the r^asses -
who had no longer any respect for the media agencies and for the aL..hors
or writers who write and attack without having the public's confidence. -
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~UR OFF'ICIAL US~ ONLY
Henc~, the ider~l eolutinn--thi~ ie what th~e gnvernment ehought--w~g ed
mgk~ Che mgeeee fnrget Che Grouping t'grey. This meanC that el~. di~cusgion
of tihe pgrCy in Ch~ n~wepapera would ceaee. No mention, either good or bad,
would be mnde of it and the masses would forgee ehae ehere was a Grnuping
p~rey. The governmenC Cried eo etop thQ ttgeural processes whereby Che
. oppneiCinn would give vent to iCe view~ in the newspapere A1-~ANALI and in
the cdnference of the ma~ses. A vicious cempaign wae launcued to inCimidnte
membere of the Grouping party eo rhey would etop boagting about being
membere. There were 150,000 member~ who talked in eide-walk cafea abnue
_ ehe har~esment they ~ere sub~ected to by government ggencteg. The meatts
mu~C be found Co eil~nce Choee people so as to diminish the common f~~ling~ -
eh~t ~xigt between the parCy and the masses. It is my opinion that ehis
_ ngtion is both inte113genC end stupid. It ia intelligent in so far ae it
- ach~evee Cemporary reeulCa and calme the nerves of the ruling gentlemen
who imag~.ne ehat the n?aCter had ended compleCely for the Grouping Party
gnd that the pgrty, ehank God, had gone forever. It neither moves, acts
nor publishes g magazine; it does not hold ite confer~nce for the masses;
gnd we are making no mentinn of iC. Then iC followB Ch~t the Grouping Party -
is no mor~
Does noC Chia posiCion resemble thak of the ostrich which hides its head
in the sand?
The Grouping Party is a nationalist progresaive party that doee not depend
on outside forces or on motivating agencies. It is a party that does
depend on collecting its power from the power of ita 150~000 members--even
if that power were amall. It organizes ita members and drawa from them a
large strong tool with which it can take uction among the masses. We are
atrong even without AL-AHALI newepaper. It is enough for ua that we
mobilize 150,000 fighters among the Egyptian people who apread their views
in Che midat of the living reality. It is enough for us to say that as
far as the masaes are concexned no when a problem surfaces and emerges,
= the ordinary citizene aska, what is the opinion of the left?
Thia is enough for us. The left expresaes ita vpinion verbally, on a small
piece of paper no larger than one's palm, or in statemenCs, conferences or
party debates. The question is not one of a comparison between us and
_ govet~n.ment ageicies. The government owna three daily newapapera, and iC _
owns weekly magazines; it owns ratio, tele ision and other mec'ia. The
ordinary citizen in Egypt now can read a daily newapaper regularly for
a whole year without noticing any truth in it. Such a newapaper cannot
have any effect on thia citizen, and the model for that is evident.
Government agencies have all the capabilities, but I did not have anyting
when I published AL-AHALI, which is the only newspaper in the history c~f
Egypt that did not pay one millieme to an editor. Everyone who wrote for -
the npwspaper did so as a volunteer, and everyone who worked on the news-
paper worked ae a volunteer. Nevertheless, its circulation was 150,000
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~Ott U~'~'ICIAL U5~ dNLY
gnd thar is the totgl ci.rculgeion of Itb5~ AL-YUSU~, SABAH AL-KHAYIt,
AL-Mt15AtJWAtt, OCTOBCR, AL-AHRpK gnd MISR. Th~ circuY~Cion of thege
maggzines dep~nda in g l~rge nn governmenC eubacriptione and public
epGeor sub~cripCtons. Why is ehi~ ea7
Thie exp~ri~nce h~e giv~n u~ the opporCuniey eo perceive Che ~n~~ibiliCieg
~f nur movement ~ven under g new~ blackout. We ~re now publi~hing ~
bulleCin, AL-TAWAllbUM ~Prdgreas~. Neverthele~~, I mainCain thgt AL-TAQAbbUM
gcgres th~ ~ov~rnmen~ itt ~pite o� the f~ce Ch~e ie ia formembers only gnd
is print~d on a gma11 hum'ble prees in ?~umbere Chgt are not mgny and aslo
nnt few. Nowever, we dd succeed in i~suing it regularly every Wedne~day.
~very Wednesdgy eveing, 3t can be fou?ia in Aswan, Qina, Alexandrig,
Damietta and Port Said.
Our ability eo cgrry out Chie organized ~ction which ~l~o dependg on the
enehuEigem of inembere gives Che maeae~ a~ense of Che Grouping Party's
sincerity. Tf, a~ they eay, we are an inaignificant group wiChou~ offices
or media tiools, leC ua aek together what do th~ othere have? I eay nothing.
What can a member of the NaelonalieC Parey tell the ordinary public? I say -
he can tell them nothing.
The prgcCical experience which has earned for the membere of the Grouping
Party the reepecC of the public has proven Chat the other partiea have
nothing but thoae cadres which ravaged the counCry and became a burden on
- its adminisCrative agency. They are the same cadres thaC tranafer ed Cheir
loyalty very simply (and perhapa naively) from the leadera of the Socialist
Union to the leadere o� the May Movement. Then they transferred their
= loyalty to the Miar Party and then to the new party, the Nationalist Party.
But if the Egyptian rulere believed that there would be one peraon in the
Nationaliat Party who would eupport them in a crisis, I think they would
be suffering from a ma~or misconception.
Iie went oii t~ eay:
Our party has withstood cruel experiences.
- In Sanuary 1977 we had 120,000 membera. During that ~nonth 2,000 of them
were imprisoned, or 2 percent of the total members. They were charged with
disorderly conduct or inciting isorderly conduct. But the party, neverthe- _
less, continued to cling to ita positiona. Ita organizational atructure
was continuously becoming atronger, and its organizational capabiliCies
were increasing. It was treating the governmental preasurea with disdain.
These preasures are quite numerous and very bitter and assume the forms of
the arbitrary tranafer of officials who are suspected of being members of
the Grouping Party. For example, they tried to evacuate all employees who
are Grouping Party membera from Port Said and tranafer them suddenly to
remote towna.
24 _
FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OI2 O~~ICIAL USC dNLY
One df Chdep who wa~ mnved from hi~ po~iCion Co another came to us to
~CCend the meeCing of the conetituenC agency. He eaid, "I congraCulgte
you b~cnu~e Y wes Cran~ferred to Safa~nh from Port 5eid eo I ese~bli~hed
' a parCy chapter in 3afa~ah. Y hope th~y wi11 continue their favor ed me
an.d tranefer me to another place so we cgn cemplete leyin~ do~n the
_ organi~ational etructure of the p~rCy in otfier greas.
- 'Phe proc~g~ of preeenCing the idenlogical nppoeition ie a dgngerous.
gam~ and a double-edged ~word because, f3ret, it ecarea other partieg of.
the oppoeition. There are thoee who hav~ dienppegred from ehe ecene
bpcgus~ th~y felt Cha~ if they enid leas than we were s~ying, Chey will
be subjected to less than wh~C we are eub~ented to. And they ~re noe at
a11 ready to eub~ect themeelves to a little or to a trifling amoune of
what we gre be~ng eub~ected Co.
It is for Chis re~~on thgC oCher.~fyppoaition parCies like the ~'ree
CCitizen~'~ PaYCy dieintegrated. The ~'ree [Citizeng'] ParCy tried Co
publish AL-AHRAR magazine, but govprnment agencies prohibited ite publi-
_ cation. When the etudents' brgnch of the party publiahed AL-HAQTQAH
[The TruCh~ maga~ine, it was confiecated, ~nd its publiahers took no action.
action. This ie the kind of oppo~ition thae the regime wanta. Today no-
body can agy that Chere ie a party called the Free [Citizena'] Party. It
io expected that the Socialiet Action Party whoae oppoaition to the regime,
_ it is said, daes not exceed the limita of honeet opposition will be aub~ected
to one of Cwo sitt~ations: either ite destiny will bs the same ae that of
Mustafa Kamil Murad* or its deatiny will be eimilar Co oure. It doea not
' have any other eolution.
[QueaCion] Are you thinking about resuming publication of AL-AHAL1?
[Anewer~ We believe that the Egyptian character of Egypt is part of its
Arab character. We don't find any inconsietency here. 7'he real Egyptian
character of Egypt ia the real Arab character of Egypt. Any claim that
there is an inconsistency betWeen Egypt and the Arabe ia a fabrication
~hat is theoretically and politically erroneous.
~Some rulers imagined that it was poeaible to say that the Arab character
was burdeneome to Egypt. They said we fought three ti~ea for the Araba: -
we sacrificed and we worked a great deal for the Arabs. We sacrificed
our blood, and they sacrificed money. In fact, some of them were not
ashamed to eay that they--i.e., the Araba--did not pay us the money in
a good, sntisfactory manner. Instead, they spent it in nightclubs, resorts
and dunce halls.
*Mustafa Kamil Murad was appointed leader of the official opposition
at the suggeation of Jihan al-Sadat. In this capacity President al-Sadat
gnve him a private office in the People's Assembly.
25
FOR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
Ti~p r~c~nC ~imple exp~rience ha~ proven tih~C Che Arab ch~rgcter wae not
- burdensnm~ tio Egypt. QuiCe Che contrgry, Che ~gypeian r~gime did not
_ bec~m~ etronger after it god rid nf thi~ buYden; it grew weaker.
- Most cerC~inly EgypC did nnti becom~ seronger when it e~e agid~ th~ burden
di the Arab chargct~r. IC did n~t ~pring lightly when it ~~ti g~ide thP '
Argb cheracter ga eomeone would spring lightly gnd heave a ei~h df relief
~feer eetting aside hi~ h~avy burdea.
It i~ our view Ch~t the Argb ~gyptign direceion is g question df deaeiny.
Just as much a~ ~gypt cannot rel~nquirh the Ar~bs, the Arabe cgnnot relin-
quigh ~gypt. We re~ece ~11 attempte which differenC parties regort to
create a barrier that would isolute ~gypt from the other Arab countrieg,
~nd we think that ir ig not 1n anyone's power, nor ia iC anyone'~ righC
to try and ~eparate Egypt from rhe Arabe. Thi~ process ie no longer in
Cha handg of the rulere. In ~pite of what aome people are carefu~. to
gpe11 out, the ~gypCian citizen ie more aware of thie maCter now.
We Re~ect the Camp David Accorda -
[Queetton~ What ia the party'o poeition on Che Camp David accorde?
[Answer~ Out of ita ~ense of national reeponeibility and its sense of -
its pan-Arab obl3gations, our party is announcing ita re~ection of Che
Camp David accords. It is announcing that it ie continuing ite oppoaition
to the policy of aeparate Egyptian-Iaraeli negotiations and whatever reaulte
the8e negotiatione may produce. Our party is asking that Egypt and the
Arab countriee adhere to the approved Arab poeiCions. Chief among these
are the al-Rab~t reaolutione. Our party ie calling for suspension of the ~
separate talke with Israel and is also calling upon the Arab confrontation
countriea and forces to hold an urgent meeting that would pave the way for
an Arab conference. It ia asking that there be Che broadest posaible
dialogue on the Egyptian and Arab arena. It is asking that all polttical
factions in Egypt, eapecially the oppoaition, be guaranteed an opportunity
to expreas their opinions freely for the purpose of actually participating
in formulating the final reaolution.
It is also calling upon the nationaliat Arab forces within the Arab front,
which they share with the Palestinian revolution, to conduct a dialogue
immediately that would mobilize the forcea of the Arab nation for the
purpose of overcoming the general negative aepects of the eituation and
achieving the common unity of action in the atruggle that would be capable '
of initiating and taking action. It is alao asking that oil be used as a ~
political weapon along with other weapone to achieve Arab goals, especially
with regard to Jerusalem, in oppoaition to the American-Israeli conspiracy.
The party is calling upon the noble al-Azhar and the Egyptian church to
fulfill their religious and pan-Arab responsibilitiea; to defend the
Moslem-Chriatian Arab character of Jerusalem; and to oppose the Zionist
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~nK n~~~icinL usr nNLY
plot Co Curn i~ in~d g campletely J~wi~h aity. TC ie gl~~ cglling upon
~gype'e three minieters df fnreign a�fairs whd reeign~d to proee~t thi~
~pprogCh of direct negotiat3ons wiCh Isra~l and Che Cgmp bavid ACCOxdg en
tegtify itt publia ee~gione of Che people's Asaembly gbouC Che �ull data
and information Chnr led them Co r~~ign nnd to explgin their pn~ition to
~gyptian end Areb public opinion.
~'~lling b~ek uprn the ~gypeign people wieh all thpir polieical tendencies _
in eheee decieive.moments i~ eh~ only way eo m~ke every ~gyptign ciCizen--
regardl~es of hie nrient~eion--bpgr hi~ hi~torical respongibiliey b~fore
th~ country becnmes entengled in the final ~3gning c~f g p@eC@ agreement
between ~gype ~nd Israel ehat would hgve direcCOnsequencee nn Che future
of the ~ntire Arab hom~land.
COPYttIGi1T: 1.978 AL-WATAN AL-'Ai2A.t3I � -
8592
C50: 4802
21
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
' NUN UNNLli1HL U~N, ULVLI
~GYpT
5~CIt~T SUPPLF~N'rS TO CAMp DAVID ACCbRDS UNCOV~R~D
paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arebic 28 Dec 78 pp i6-17
- CAtiticle by Shafiq gl-Nut: "Secret Supplemente Co Camp David Accorde: ~
Israel Is To Nave Air Cover in Caee of War wirh Arab CounCriee"J ~
[Text~ U.S. diplomacy ie making deaperate efforte to contain the double
digpute. -
1. The Egyptian-Israell dispute regarding the conditiona for aigning a
separate peace Creaty.
2. 7'he U.S.-Ieraeli dispuCe which is the result of Iaraeli intransigence
Chet took Washington by aurprise. T'his Iaraeli intransigence stem~ fram
the Ieraeli allegation that exieting U.S. bias was eorrying Preeident
al-Sadat.
Ia order to contain this doubla diapute and keep it from turning into
a gap [hrough which embarrasaing secrets about the Camp DaWid accords may
be leaked, U.S. diplomacy is trying to arrange a tripartita impromptu
meeting in Brusaels between the United States, Egypt and Israel during the
travels of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrua Vance in Europe. This would be a
last-ditc}~ effort to revive Che Egyptian-Israeli negotiationa and to pro-
tect the Camp David arrangementa that pereain to the secret political map
of the Middle East. This i~ the map that propoaed in accordance with
the "U.S. peace plan" which ia based on a aepazate peace between Egypt and
Israel.
In gpite of all pre~cautions the broad outlinES of these momentous U.S. plans '
began to leak in the form of information from confidential sources about the
contenta of the secret protocols that were attached to the Camp David
accords. This infonnation appears logical in light of tre etandarda of the
- American view of khe Middle~East problem. In apite of auperficial variables,
these etandards have a permanent core.
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
- ~OIt O~~ICIAL USC dNLY
IC hae b~.en obeerved that ever aince ehe C~mp bavid accords were signed,
, U.S. dlpl~macy hae b~en c~rrying ouC nn energeCic campaign, which has
been descr3bed unprecedenCed in ehe higtory of the 5Cgte bepartmenC,
for Che purpnse of gaining approval and internnt3onal support for Chese
two ~gre~mente. In addition to tlie swifC gceion ehet characterized tihis
campaign ~nd Che enormou~ media r~enurc~g Chat it had at ite di~posa~.,
the purveyore of Che Se~ee D~partmenC used mose nf their reaources
eccording to the neede and Che conditione of the party with whom they
w~r~ talking. They would sometimes CempC gnd at oCher e3mes thregten
the inCernation~l community. ~
DUe to the opening of ~nother ~eaeion of Che UN General Asaembly U.S.
activity reached g peak during tl~e month nf October. A large number of
eenior world diplomAt~ were in New York Cn parCicipaCe in the general
debaee c~f ehe General Assembly.
Cyrus Van~e, who had chosen tn se~y ae the UN P1aza Hotel, which ig only
200 meC~ra from UN headquarCers, wa~ like the m~ther of the bri.de on the
eve of her deughter's wedding. Ne was h~rdly along even when he aCe; ~11
his me~ls--breakfase, lunch and dinner--were working meals during which he
would explain and advocate the Camp David accords which he regards as Che
achievement that distinguiehes him from hia arch enemy Zbigniew Brezezinski.
It was the Camp David accorda that promoted him to the oppasiCion of Che
president's firat advieer.
People who are cloae to Vance say that he ia a"good salesman" and that in ~
view of the fact Chat he was originally an attorney, he is a good conver-
s~Cionalist ~nd can say what will plense his gudience without conceding
anything to them.
In the context of arouaing his interest Vance met with an Arab diplomat ~
who is known for his contacts with the PLO and his persistent efforts to
lay bridges between WashingCon and the organizaCion.
Vance began by telling hia diplomatic friend, "I know beforehand what
you will tell me. Without the Paleatinians and wiChout a selution to their
problem, perrtu~nent peace will not be nchieved. I agree with you on this
~ and, even more, I will confess to you that I don'C want anything more mow
than to meeC with the PalesCinians and explain to them the matter ta pre-
pare for their participation in the ongoing proceas."
When the Arab diplomat told him Chat a meeting with the Palestinians
signified a meeting with the PLO because it is the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people, Vance replied apologetically, or
perhaps he was pretending to~be apologetic:
_ "But I cannot do that. What can I do on this mAtter in particular when my
predecesaor" (referring to Kiasinger) "tied our hands with the cov~itment
he made in the name of our co~mtry?" -
� 29
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~
~OR OF'FICIAL US~ ONLY
Then V~nce turned to Haro~.d Sgunders a aenior Stgte DepartmenC official
and expexr on Arab ~ffc~ire who was attending thia meeCing and asked him
"innocently:"
- "Ie ther~ gnyChing we can do?" Seund~re ~honk hie h~~d eo ~.ndicute that
there waen't anyChing thaC could be dc~ne and said, "If Che Ieraelis were
to hear nboue what'g being said here, they would go out of ehei~ minds:"
The resC of the dialogue ehat eook place is not relevant becguse what I
want to asc~rCg3n ie wheCher or not Vance, while complaining about Kiesinger
to ~ustify hie poaition, wae noC at the sam~ time playing ehe role that his
predecesaor had played during the Sinai agreementa. In other words I want
Co aecertain that Vance too did not provide "some eecret supplemenea" as
payoff for ~he Camp David accords ~ust as Kissinger had done pre~�iouely.
We a11 remember what was said in ehe days of the aecond Sinai agreements
gbout the exisCettce of secret supplemenCa, and we remember atatementa thati
were issued to deny their exiatence. Theae deniale were later proven Co be
false.
And theae days are like the others: there is talk about secret supplemenCs
but we have not heard anything to deny or to confirm their exiatence.
They are as follows:
Firat, Between the United Statea and Israel
1. U.S. airplane~ will provide air cover to Iarael in case a new war -
breake out between it and any confrontation country--or group of countries--
which opposes the Egyptian-Israeli negoCiations. If the Soviet Union were
- ' to interfere on behalf of these countries, Waehington would put ia troops .
on alert and would be ready to undertake a venture in opposition to Moscow.
2. The U.S. government agrees to use its influence to prevent western
weapon~ ~rom reaching Arab countries that are opposed to the Camp David
accords.
3. During the next five yeare (those that were determined as a transition
period to explore the destiny of the West Bank and the GaZa Strip) the
U.S. government will supply Israel with loans amounting to 5 billion dollars.
In addition, the Iaraeli armed forces will be supplied with very a~vanced �
weapons, especially airplanes and miasiles which have not yet been a~ade
available to NATO countries. Such a commitment naturally requires the
- approval of the U.S. Congresa.
4. The United States will try to persuade its western alliea to aupport _
the Camp David accords, and it will encovrage Third World countries to
reaume their relations with Iarael which had been auspended after the 'S6,
the '67 and the '73 Wars.
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I~'b!2 OI~~ICIAL USC ONLY
5. U.S.-Isr~teli negotiations for a common defense pack are Co continue.
This agreement which wi11 provide U.S. gunraneees for israel~s security
wi11 definite~.y be accomplished be�ore the end of 1983.
6. Cooperntive arr~ngements are to be mgde Co liquidgte the redical
elements in the PLO and to eurn it into a"pegceful" ~rggnization. .
SeCnnd, Between Che Un~ted SC~tea and ~gypt
1. Negotiating en agreement thfit would engble abc~ut 5,000 military adviserg
und techniciana Co asaist in the org~?nization and Che CrAining of Che
~gyptian armed forces.
2. Egypt wi11 be ~iven U.S. military proteceion in case of any conflict
between it and one of ita neighbora. In case of w~r with Y.ibya the EgypCians
c:an depend on U.5. inCerventinn on their behalf.
3. In nrder to prevent tl~e creation of any atrong alliance between its
Arab oppnnents, Che United 5Cntes wi11 supporC Egypt in aceion~ to instigaCe
1oca1 struggles that would reduce the presaure on President al-Sadat.
- 4. President Cnrter's administration will exert every pressure possible -
- on moderate Araba to gain r.heir support for the Camp David accorda or at
least to obtain their supporC for a separate peace berween Egypt and Israel.
~ The Ast~in~ton government also commiCed itself to persuade the Arab oil -
countries to continue providing E~ypt w~t~i financial aupporC in the neigh-
borhood of 4 billion doll_ars annu~lly.
, 5. The UniCed States will stipply the Egypti~n army with modern weapons to
guarantee ita defenae capability and to enable it to intervene in Third
World countries that may be threatened by internal revolutions or inter-
national communism.
6. The United States and Egypt will strengthen the c.ooperation between
their intelligence agenciea in the United Stntes and in Egypt so as to
enable al-Sadat to receive re~ulnr information about local and international
events And occurrences that affect his policy.
The United States will hel.~ Fgypt establish a"Marshal Plan" with U.S.
and western financinp,. It will provide Egypt with several billions of
dollars over the next five years. -
Third, Between Egypt nnd Isrnel
1. A joint military political agency is to be established to confront any
actions undertAken or instigated by the Arab countries that oppose the
Cnmp David accords.
- 31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
-
- FdR nrrICIAL USC ONLY
- An acCu~1 miyi~ary alliance berween IsraeJ, and EgypC will be esC~blish
gfter Israel withdrawe from :inai; the b~sea of ehis a11~.ance wi11 be
deeermined before thMt time~
2. In the case oE conflict beCween Israel and any Arab country or group of
countr~.es, ~gypt w~.11 noC inCerfere against Tsr~e1. In addition, ul-Sadat's '
government wi1Y help the Tsrnel3e uncover terroriats' bases whereever theee
n~y be for th~ purpose o� liquidaCing them.
3. An agency for cooperaCion beCween Che int~lligence agencies in the two
countriea ie to be eseablished for thc purpose of ahgr~.ng information Chat
affects the aecur3ty of both countries. This agency will have eight linison
officea: faur 3n Europe, ~wo in Aaia; one in Che UniCed Statee and one in
- Africa.
4� Egypt and Ierael will tak~ ~oint me~surea Co force Syria to leave Lebanon
_ in 12 monChn.
5~ ~gYpt commiCs itself to stop insisting on giving the PLO a role in
determining ~he future of the WeaC B^nk and the Gaza Strip. IC commiCs
itself to encouraging efforts to establish u"third power" that is made up
of Palestiniana who are willing to cooperate and who can accpet the Camp
David nccorde. ~
6. "Ties of friendehip" between the Egyptian and the Israeli arm~Les are
to be reinforced through an exchange program for officera. This program
will be designed when diplomatic miasion begin in carrying out their
functions.
~
If the existence of such supplements is proven, and most probably they do
exist becauae what they contain is consistent with what is contained in
the proclaimed accords, this would mean that the U.S. conspiracy againet
the Ar~b cause is not the exclusive province of any U.S. administration
in pnrticular or a specific president. It is not a matter of policy with
one party and not the other, nor of a certain aecretary of state. This
conepiracy is a constant and a continuing position which constitutes Che
backbone of the American regime's policy whose monopoliatic economic
inCerests require thaC it puraue a colonialist, racist policy regardless
of what its fronts and ite writers claim about its commitment to democracy
_ and to human righta. ~
If Kiesinger committed the United States to deny recognition of the PLO
and not to talk with it~ it is Vance who, while complaining about his
predecessor, is committing his country to liquidate the organization from
its base.
32
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
rox o~rrc~nL us~ ortLY
And Chen... There ig noChing surpriei~~g or geConishing in Che~~ ~upple-
ments b~eween Israe] and the UniCra~ S~aeee. Bue wh~e breaka one'p heare
nre thne~ supplemente b~Cween Cgy;pC a?;d the two hi~toricnl enemies. Is it
erue that gl-Sadae did sign sueh papers?
COPYItIGHT: 1978 AL~WA'rAN AL-'ARAgI
8592
CSO: 4802
33 -
FOR OI~FICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I~'OI2 Or'i~C~1L US~ ONLY
I~A~
.
TOP-LEVBL DELEGATION VISITS SOVI~T UNION -
- Parie AL~WA'TAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Dec 78 pp 30-33
/Article: "Saddam Husayn on a Historic Trip of 5olutions!'/
/Text/ An element of surpriae accompanied the trip which Mr Saddam Husayn,
vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, made on a sudden long- -
range inCernational move that took him Co Moecow~ and, also suddenly, from
the froaCe of Moacow Co Havana, the warm Cuban capital which he left with-
out forewarning to eurprise Bagt~dad with hia return at an early hour on
Monday morning after an exhauating 14-hour flight between Havana and
~ Beghdad.
_ However, the real yurpriae, according to what informed sourcea relate,
lies in the reaulta Mr Saddam Hueayn achieved on the international and
~ Arab level8 and in the context of consolidating Iraqi-Syrian defense capac-
- ity. These are resulta which will be revealed when the time comea.
Mr Saddam Husayn's vieit to Moacow was ahroud~d in political circumsrances
which aseumed a dramatic character in the context of Iraqi-Soviet rela-
tions in particular and Soviet-Arab relations in general. The Soviete did
not completely undersCand or digest the legal procedurea which overtook
Che Communist persc~nnel who tried to violate the terms of the National
Compact in Iraq in order poliCically to infiltrate the Iraqi army. Clouds
of blame were still gathered in the firmamenr of Iraqi-Soviet relations,
in spite of the fact that the tWO partiea agreed to consider what had hap-
pened as a pasaing matter.
Isaueg were hanging somewhat &a regarded the response to the requeats for
aupplying arma to the Iraqi army--requeste on whose account the Iraqi min-
ister of defenae, the Revolutionary Command Council member Staff Lt Gen
Mr 'Adnan Khayrallah, traveled to Moscow, where his presence coincided
with that of Maj Gen Hikmat Shihabi, chief of war staff of the Syrian
army on a aimilar viait which assumed a crisis-wracked character because
of a diepute over the interpretation of paragraphs in previous agreements
on the arms Syria needed to consolidate ita national defense in the light
- of changes in Sgypt's departure from the front of confrontation with Israel. ~
34
F(~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
1' Vl1 V? 1' .LV~.~ w vUL Vl\L.L
Th~ Syrian-5oviet MisundersCanding -
The 5yrian-Sovier difference in viewpoint appeared openly when Ma,j Gen ~
Hikmat 5hihabi decided Co terminate hie viaie to Moscow and reCurn to -
Damascus, once i.t h~d become clear ChBC the agenda which had been prepared
fnr him in Moacow involved no working meeting with Marahal Ustinov, the -
SovieC miniater of defense, as opposed to the program set forrh for SCaff
Lt Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, which involved a number of working meetings with
Marshal UaCinov.
Theae developmenCa occurred at a tim~ when the movement toward union be-
tween Iraq and Syria had become a strategic fact in the Arab world. Con-
sequently ir was not reasonable that Iraq should pretend to disregard the
Syrian-Sovi,et miaundersCanding, eapecially aince it dealt with the defense
espect of Syrian military power at a Cime whQn agreement had been reached -
Co close the Egyptian breuch in the confrontation front through total
_ Iraqi militury participation with Syria.
. Thus the matCer of Syrian-Soviet relationa was the subject of a special in-
quiry from Baghdad, supported by the impressions and information from _
Damascus.
_ Aa a reaulC of that, urgent contacts took place between Moscow and Baghdad.
In the light of these conCacta, which concluded on the eighth of thia month
with a peraonal letter from the SovieC leaders to Mr Saddam Husayn invitfng
- the latter to Moacow to discuss various subjects "of common importance to
the two countries," the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council,
after consulting with Preaident Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and members of the
Revolutionary Command Council, took the decision to travel to Moscow on
the llth of this month.
The~expresaion "subjects of common importance to the two countriea" means
many things and includes a number of issues with Arab and international
dimensions.
Precautions were taken to prevent the leak of the news, which came as a
total surprise to all observers. The trip oecurred at an eariy hour in
the morning, without attention-~;etting measurea.
Saddam Husayn's Trip Was a Surprise
Observers in Baghdad did not know that Mr Saddam Husayn hari traveled to
Moscow until Moscow broadcast the news of his arrival on the afternoon of
that day at the head of a large Iraqi delegation which was'welcomed by
Mr Alexei Kosygin, prime minister of the Soviet Union and member of the
- Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party,
at the head of a group including Mr Vaseili Kuznetsov, first vice chairman -
� 35
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~'OIi OH'T'IC?11L~ tJS~ ONLY
of the Cnmmise~riat df Che 5upreme 5oviet preaidium, gnd a maes o� ~enter
_ officiale ~nd membere of Ar~b diplnmati~ mi~~iong gccredited to Mogcow.
They w~r~ inform~d gt the 1~gC moment di the vieit, for whose sake Soviet
proCnrol made a big ~ffort ~d give it a ~#ietinctive charecter.
The temperaCure in Moacdw was aeveral d~gre~s belnw free~ing~ from the
etandpoint of the climate the Soviet capiCal has been experiencing Chene
days, but, on the various levels of discusaion, it was high�-eappcielly
after thn firat working sesaion between Mr Saddam Hueayn and President
Leonid Brezhnev. .
What im~arted epecial eignific~nce td these digcuesiona wgs Che ~acc thnt
thia was the firet time the leaders of the Soviet Union had listened to a
d~rect ~tetemenC by a great Arab leader who had played a ma,~or, hietoric
role in directing the course of eventa in Che Arab wnrld through two his-
toric initiaCives: that of the joint ngtional ecCiOn charter and Chat of
the Baghdad aummiC to confront the consequence~ which had ariaen from the
Camp David aumnit.
Therefore eha mediation Mr Saddam Hueayn performed in order to diapel thc~
clouds of mieunderetanding between Syria and the Soviet Union aesumed
special, effective eignificance.
~r~e could state, relying on infnrmetion frum reliable eourcea, that
Mr Saddam Husayn, in his diecuesions on thia aubject with the 5oviet icad-
ers, ~residents ~rezhnev and Kosygin in particular, inaisted that he hed
not come to present an actual fact, namely [hat the union between 5yria
and Iraq had become a reality on the political, military and economic
planea, that there was no room or place to retrPat from it and consequent-
ly that the coneolidation of the d efense forces of either party Would im-
_ mediately, without preparation, be reflect~d on the other.
The Soviet leaders listened with the utmoet attention co Mr Saddam Nuseyn
as he described the stages which unificationist action between Iraq and
Syria was going through and h~.a conceptione of future conditions and prob-
abilities in the light of the orientation of the Baghdad summit reaolutions.
Mr Soddam Husayn aCresaed Iraq's concern for the treaty of friendship and
cooperation with the Soviet Union and the development of mutual relntions
~ tn various fielda of cooperation.
In the light of these basic facts, during the visit, which took 3 days,
Mr Saddam Husayn and the Iraqi delegation reviewed varioua aspects of the
problems outstanding in the Middle East, among them the Lebaneae problem
and the need to pravent any development Which might threaten the unity and
security of Lebanon and consequently expose the Syrian-Iraqi confrontation
fronc wiCh Israel to any danger fram separetiat elements in Lebanon or
~ Israeli plans encouraging sectarian diviaion~ in Lebanon.
36
_ FOR OF'FTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
? Ya{ VL a ~yV~4a\L tl4..L VIILl
In gddition, Mr Seddam Nueayn put the finiehing touche~ on Che work Seaff
Le (3en 'Adnan Khayrallah~ the Iraqi minister of defenae, hgd done to meet
ehc~ Iraqi ermed forc~s' ne~d for adv~nced weapong to conaolidaCe their d~-
fene~ capebiliCy, eepeciglly in Che light o� Cheir expanded misaion as g
remult d� thQ joint natidnal acCion charCer wiCh Syria. _
A1Chough the ,~oittC cotmnunique contented iCself with alluding indirectly Co
thie gepect, and algo to that of the diecussion on Britrea ~nd Che African
1{orn, informed aources underatand that oCher importunt conclusione re-
sulted from the Iraqi-Syria tglke on rhe defQnse level.
Among these conclueions wae the g~erantee theC wiChin short periode of
time Iraq would obtain defeneive miastle syatema which would meet the re-
quirementa of defending Iraqi airspace in addiCion to an unepecified num-
~ ber of the moeC advanced MiG eircraft, especially th~ clasa known by Che
name "BaC," which is two and a half times greater than the apeed of sound.
_ One could eay Chat the joint communique, thie time, choae a precise formul~
for preaerving a number of Che important reaulCs the vieit realized, espec-
ially during the second working aession in Preaident BrezhnEV's office.
Bilateral Itelatione Since 1972
In any event, an enlarged review of the joint communique may point to many
important conclueions on the political and military levels and can expl~in
the importgnt expressions which appeared in atatementa Mr Saddam Husayn
made at a dinner party the Central Comnittee of the Soviet Co~nuniat Party
held in his honor in participation with the Soviet government. At this
dinne~r, which was attended by Kosygin, heading the Soviet officials, as
well as all the membera of the Iraqi delegation, Mr Saddam Husayn gave a
talk eaying "It has become a permanent fact in relationa between Iraq and
the Soviet Union that we carry on consultation between ourselves on basic
iesues concerning us jointly, as regards both bilateral relations and con-
ditions in the Arab nation,the Middle East region, and international is-
sues and conditions.
"Experience has confirmed the truth and necessiCy of this evaluation."
He edded, "Our bilateral relations, aince the eigning of the treaty of co-
operation between ua in 1972, have been distinguiahed by the fact that
they are based on fixed foundations of principle which stand on true friend-
ship and mutual respect wi[h principles of soversignty and concern for the
cormnon interests of our peoplea."
~ After he expresaed his satisfaction with the level bilateral relations
between the two.countries had attained, he atressed that both the Iraqi
and the Soviet partiea were ansiouw, during the discuasion of issues re-
lated to the juat struggle the Arab nation was waging against the _
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
F'dR dF'F'IC~1L U~~ ONLY
zioniet enemy, "to und~~retand the circumetanc~s gnd cnn~idQrations o~' `
Che other eide in gccordenc~ wieh the principlea it believed in ~nd the
reeponeibilitiee it bore."
Mr 5edd~m Hueayn wa~ Chug referring to the facC ChgC differences in ehe
deCeiled philosoph~cal inCerpretation of mattere relaCed Co the principle~
gnd baeeg of g eeCtlement in the Middle ~aet did noC prevenC cnoperc~~ion,
'Therefore, Mr Saddnm Husayn emphaeized the fia~ro of al-Sadat and the
- American forcee in pereuading the Arab world of their p1~Cform and the
C~~ Davf.d eumnit agreemente, eayin~:
~
The Arab ~ummit conferenc~ held in 8aghdad has come as an gffirmation to
the world Chat the overwhelming majority of Che Arab people reject theae
agreemente and do not agree to ehe plgtform by which the Bgyptian regime
ie proceeding.
"The Arab summiC cnnference also affirmed that the Arab nation te able to
adopt a united stand and arrive at a sound program which repreaenta a min-
imum ,~oin[ Arab poaition for protecting juat Arab righta and demands."
He added, "On thie occasion, we esteem the position of the Soviet Union,
the friend who has aupported the reaolutions ~f the eumnit conference in
Baghdad and haa backed the orientation this conference expresaed in con-
solidating joint Arab action againet Zioniat aggresaion."
A Bigression of Significance -
From that he made a digresaion of aignificance, emphasizing the achieve-
ment which the joint national action charter between Iraq and Syria repre-
sents in embodying the national hopea of the masses in both countries,
which coincide with Arab national hopea, poinCing out that "The Soviet
friends have always appealed for solidarity betwe~en Iraq and Syria."
The joint cortmunique iasved following conclusion of the visit on the even-
ing of 12 December stated, at the outset, that "Detailed, fruitful discus-
sions took place in an atmosphere dominated by friendship and mutual un-
dersCanding between Comrade Saddam Husayn, deputy secretary of the Region-
al Cortmand of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and vice chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council, and Comrade Alexei Kosygin, member of the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Conm~unist Party
and Soviet prime minister. The discussions dealt with the situa[ion in
the Arab region, the results of the ninth Arab aumnit conference held in
Baghdad, the development of bilateral relatior~a and a number of issues of
concern to both sides."
Condemnation of the "Car~" Agreements
Fo1loWing that, the joint communique cont~ined the following general
- points:
38
~ Ft~t OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
"In rh~ir diecut~aton~, iraq and the 5ovieC Union expressed special inter-
e~k in eh~ e~n~e ~iruaeion in Che Argb r~gion.
"'They ~xpreee~d Cheir exCr~me anxi~ty ~ver Che rnnetane Cension in the
r~~ion r~eulCtng from gggresaive~ expgnaionist zioni~r poli.:y guppnrted
by imperialiet circleg.
"The two eidea severely condemn~d the Camp Uavid agree~r,~nt~ concluded be-
tween the 2ioniet ~ntity and ehe ggyCr.ian leade~s, with the active partic-
ipgtinn of the United States of America.
"The two sid~~ condemned the agreemenC which ie being propnunded in
- W~ehington on thie baaie, which conatitutee a ploe being hgtched behind
Che Arabm' back, conflicte with their intereeta, fundamentally r~lies on
resistance to the Arabe, aime at the attainmenC af partial, geparate agree-
mente which will enable the Zioniat entity to retain the occupied Arab
territories and prevenC the Paleetinian Areb people from obtaining their
_ legitimaCe righte, and consequently obstructs the eatabliahment of a just,
permar.ent peace.'r
After the communique had condemned the Lgyptian leaders' capitulationist
measures, which were aimed at aplitting Areb ranke, it sent on to refer
to the etatemente Mr Saddam Hueayn had made concerning the stepa Iraq ia
continuing to adopt to in~lant ita ralations with Syria in the cont~xt of
the zeal of leadera in both countries to continue along the road to total
cooperation in accordance with the joint national action charter. The com-
munique proclaima a Soviet poaition on this development, aince the Soviet
party had praiaed the Iraqi and Syrian leaders' decision to consolidate
_ their efforts to cause the capitulationist schemes to fail and develop
unificationiat relationa between themselves for the sake of atrengthening
the unity of the Arab countriea, counterattacking the 2ioniat aggresaion
and gueranteeing Iegitimate Arab national righta.
The Soviet party praised Iraq's initiative and effdrts in holding the
ninth Arab sumnit conference in Baghdad; it participated acti.vely in unit-
_ ing Arab ranka, etanding up to the Zionist schemes and their aggressive
aims, and thwarting achemes for a capitulationiat settlement. The two
parties stressed the importance of applying theae Baghdad conference res-
olutions.
_ The 5oviet Union and Iraq aleo expresaed their fircn convicCion that a just~
stable peace in the Arab region can be established only throu~h the liber-
ation of the occupied Arab territories and full attalnment of the ffxed,
legitimate nat�onal rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their
ri~ght to determine their deatiny and establish an independent Palestinian
state.
39
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
- ~'b~ 0~'~S~I~1.L U5C ONLY
'y CnntenC nf Cha Comnun~que
Ae reg~rds m~eting requirementa for atrengthening Ireqi d~f~an~~ e~p~biliey,
~ the communique ront~ined a p~ragr~ph with long-xan~e gignifxcanee, etatin~;;
"rhe ewo parCi~~ ~nae ~gain streeeed th~ir re~dineeg ~o ~ontinu~ to coop-
ereCe in the sphere of strer~geh~ning the def~ng~ capgbility of the ttepublic
of Ir~q, in view of Che fact th~C it ia en importgnt facCor in etrengthen-
ing the national independence and eovereignty of the seate.
~ "The two partie~ praised the imporCant gaine which have b~~n achieved in
th~ fiald of mutual economic cooperation, observed that there gtill are
bro~d poseibiliei~s and horizone for ehie cooperetion, and wi11 QXerC ef-
- forta to develop it."
In Moacow, the ~raqi miniater of planning and member of the Revoiutionery
Comnand Council, Mr 'Adnan Hueayn, ~oined the Iraqi delegation; Mr 'Adnan
Hueayn had preced~d the delegation to Mnecow on a visit which had been de-
cided upon earlier to discuse nwang of expanding economic and techntcal
cooperation betwaen Iraq and the Soviet Union and reviewing the atagea of
implementation of the projecte Soviet organizations are carrying out in
Iraq, eepecially in the context of oil inetallatione.
The delegation which accompanied the vice president to Moecow, then Havana,
included Mesere 'Izzat Ibrahim,mamber of the Etevolutionary Command Council -
and interior minieter oE Iraq, Tariq 'Aziz, member of the Etevolutionery
Command Council~ Burhan-al-Din 'Abd-al-Rahman and 'Abdallah Fadil~ Who are
both membera of the Revolutionary Comnand Council and the Regional Comnand
of the Ba'th Party, and Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, minieter of foreign affairs,
in addition to a number of genior Iraqi government and party officials.
When the official vi.eit ended, there was no indicatian of Mr Saddam Husayn's
move to Cuba. Twenty-four houre before leaving Moscow Mr Saddam Husayn met
with Mr Carlos Rodriguez, vice preeident of the Councils of state and min-
isters in the Republic of Cuba, Who had a18o been making an official visit
to the Soviet Union.
It appeara that the principle of accepting the previoua Cuban invitation
to visit Cuba wae decided at this meeting, particularly in view of the im-
portance of completing the diacussiona Which took plece With the Soviet -
leaders regarding a reasonable settlement in Eritrea and the Africsn Horn
in the context of the expanded African role Cuba played and the care Cuba
had shown not to subject ita relatione aith the countries of the Arab
World to embarra8ament.
From the Forst of Moecow to the Warmth of Havana
Thus, on the evening of the 13th of thie month, While Mr Saddam Husayn
and the membera of hie delegation were receiving a warm farewell, all
40
F~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
1 Ull t11 1 ~4NJJ W tr~.L V11L1
db~arverg th~upht ehat h~ w~~ ~oing back to Ua~hdad ~rid new~ ~~~ncie~ actu-
~lly e~bled Chei~ Co~reepondente to ~~t ready ed ~r~ver the return gnd try
tn l~~terprnt tha reeulte of thu Mn~caw eelk~,
However, Mr S~dd~m Nu~ayn'g airplan~ l~ft the fro~t of Mogcow for the
w~rmeh of Navang withdut pr~vioue en�oun~~m~nt. The vice chairman of the
EtevoluCionaty Command Counctl wga thua responding ro gn officigl invita-
Cion tander~d by Che Cuban gnvernm~nt and the Cuban Co~nunits Perty %tn
him/ in hie capaaity ae a~sietent eecretary g~ner~l of Che Areb 5ncialigt
Ba'th Party and vice chairman of the ~~volutionary Comnend Coun~il.
At Ch~ dawn of the 14th of thie mcmth, Mr 3addam Nugayn~s plane ~anded at
Havana Airport in the midgt of a great mase gathering headed by Fidel Castro,
preeident of the Council of State and s~ecretary g~neral of the Cubxn Com-
munita Party and Reu1 Caetro, minister of defans~, in addiCion to membera ,
of the PnliCical Bureau of the party's Central Committee and mernbera of
the Arab and foreign diplomatic corps.
For Mr 5addam Nueayn, the d~rk-haired Arab leader comi~~~ from the credle
of ancient civilization in the Arab east, Havana truly had prepared a re-
ception whoee features were diatinguished by the warmrh of 5panieh blood,
and Baghdad'e worda inspired in people's minds many meanings linked with
the country which had imparted its character to the feblea of the Thoueand
and One Nighte and given ita name to brilliant Arab civilization.
This concern to honor the Arab gueat Was cryatallized When the papers came
out with headlinea bearing expressions in Arabic, alongside the Spaniah,
- welcoming Mr Saddam Nusayn and the members of hia delegation.
The rt~aeses were most eager to express the warmth of the meeting on every
occasion Sed~am Husayn was invited to meet and encounter.
The Iraqi-Cuban Talka
In apite of the great diatance between Moscow and Havana, official talks
betWeen the Iraqi perty, headed by Mr Saddam Huagyn, and the Cuban party~
headed by Mr Fidel Castro, atarted on the afternoon of the 14th of thia
month.
In an atmoephere deacribed ae "extremely friendly," the two parties re-
viewed Iraqi-Cuban reletiona of friendship which had made rapid, fruitful
~ development in various apheres. The two delegations then turned to xeview
the aituation in the Middle Eaet and the Probabilitiea accruing from
President al-Sadat's continued iaolated platform. This discusaion wes
the prelude to a frank talk on the impact of the recent developments in
the region of the African Horn, especially Lritrea.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's informatinn has it that the Iraqi delegation insist-
ently stresaed, ea it had in Moscaw, that it was essential to deviate
41
?
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~'OFi ~~~'ZC~L U9~ dNLY
~rnm Cha ~ttempt to ~olve rh~ prdbldm of the r~lnCidnn b~tween tha
Britr~~n r~volution and ehe 5thiopi~n r~gime milirarily, for the ~~ke of
rpaehing a raasonable, viable mutual underatanding with the deeachrr~nt~ -
_ of Ch~ ~ritrean revolution in a mann~r which would con~ritute ~ Compro-
mie~ solution betwe~n Beh~npien etr~CegiC requir~m~ntg end th~ requir~-
mente nf gritr~en netional ~nver~ignty. ~
In~ormed circlee pr~di~t thgt Mr 5addam Huegyn'a talks in Moscow and
Hevane will have positive reeults which ai~l become r~pidly crystellix~d
in Britreg~ aince they contgin en atmoaphere which aill help a settlement
through negotiationg.
In gddition~ the two deleggtione al~o exchanged infnrmation reg~rding the
~xperiencee of both th~ Yraqi and Che Cuban r~volutions and their achieve-
menta in verioue epher~e.
These frank, amicable diecuaeiong led to aupport for understanding between
the two countries and coneolidation of their ,~oint actione in facing Zion-
ist eggresaion and actions of the imp~rialist fdree~ in the Arab World.
Mr 5eddam Humayn's Cuban visit offered a new international forum for st~t-
ing Arab viewpoints in the broad form With which his vieit to Moscow wes
characCerized. In addition to the political gaina from thie viait, there
wag the economic gain of developing the growing cooperation betaeen Iraq
and Cube. 7'he tao countries aigned a detailed econamic cooperar,ion agree-
ment b~tWeen themselves. Signing the agreement for Iraq was Mr 'Adnan
Husayn, minieter of planning and n~ember of the Revolutionary Cortonand
, C~uncil, and, for Cuba, Mr Carlos Rodriguez, vice president of the coun- -
cils of state and ministera, who had returned from Moscow at the same time
as the Iraqi delegation.
Obaerv~rs aho have been informed of eome of the reaults of Mr 5addam
Husayne's trip to Moscow and Navana have described it ae a historic trip -
of solutions, by Which thay mean that numeroua signs show that Saddam
Hueayn manageci to mobilize further international forces for a solution to
Arab problerr~e in accordance with the requirementa of Arab national inter-
eets, going beyond tha :ext of the Middle Bast to Arab portione of Africa.
Theae aigne also point out that he attain~d aomething important in the
field of aupport for the ~fefensive capability of the Arab front~ which
Nill iiot accept non-Areb solutions to Arab problems.
COPYRIGAT: AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI~ 1978
11887
CSO: 4302
_ 42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OIt O~~ICIAL US~ UNLY
I~AQ
PItB55 ATTACHB IN pAtt1S DBSCRIB~~ PAN-ARAB NATURB 0~ M~UTA ~fi~ORT
1'~rie AL-WArAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 bec 78 p 6
/Interv~ew with 5gmi Mrhdi, Yraqi Preeg Attache in Paris~ by Ibrahim al-
Sgyyah: "With the Preee Attachee in P~ris (3): Sami Mahdi, Embassy o�
Iraq: 'Our Media Bffort Is Natianalist and Arab
/rext/ As part of the interviewe with prese and cultural attache~ of Arab
embaeeiee in France, Mr 5ami Mahdi, press attache in the Ireqi embasgy and
director of the Iraqi cultural Center in Paris, is talking this week to
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI about Arab media activity and the center's ectivity in
France.
I asked Mr Sami Mahdi, "Ie there a general idea about Arab information in
France? What are your recommendationa?"
/Ansaer/ Arab information in France is still weak and limited for numeroua
reaeons, moat important of which is the lack of agreement among Arab media
about minimum cmmwn media goals and action to achieve theae goals.
It should also be obgerved thet these Arab media are concerned with whaC
is regional, if I may use the expression, more than with wh~at is Arab in
g~neral. They look for regional a~edia gaine more than they aeek to perform
the general Arab infot~nation miseion in France, which leada to a fragmenta-
tion of efforta on the one hand and the creation of contradictions which
are perceived by our French frienda, who talk about how to create a common
ground on which to move without coming up against the aensitivitiea of one
Arab body or another.
The greateat and most obvioua example of this ia the Arab-French Solidar-
- ity and the difficult circucnatances fecing it as a reault of this sort of
fragmentation.
ThP Arab League Office Wae to have drawn up and defined comnon goals and
Worked to carry them out~ but, for one reaeon or another~ the office does
not seem ablc to perform ite obligations.
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~'OI~ O~NIGIAL U5~ ONLX
/~upetion/ Whr~C ~bouC 2ioniat informaeion7
/Answ~r/ ZioniaC inft~rmation hge orgenix~tinn~ which c~dper~te with on~
ennCher, gome nf which romplement ehe othere' wnrk, behind it. Then, the
ztonigt8 ere orgenized end have Cheir influ~nc~ aithin the media. ~aeili-
t~ting their activitiee furthar ie the fact that eome of them are ~renrh
and enjay nll Che benefita of I~rench citizenehip.
Th~ National Goal ~iret o� All
/sue~cion/ What ig Iraq's miasion in the infnrmation field?
/AneWer/ Uespite the fact that our organizationa are thoae of an Arab
couhtry, namely Iraq, we do not eo much work with an Iraqi apirit as with
en Arab spirit. That is, we etrive to keep the greatest poaeible degree
of integretion and harmony between what ie Arab and what ie Iraqi in our
pction. Thie naturally is an embodiment of the principlea of the Arab
Sociatiat ~a'th 1'arty, the comnander of the revolution in Iraq.
This appliea alao to preae departmenCs as mnch ae it applies to th~ activ-
ity of the cultural center, whose activity is plainly obvious as it is
oriented toward the public.
/~ueetion/ What are the center's spheres of activitiesZ
/Ansaer/ The center'e activity ia of a cultural chara~ter, aince culture
has a public and also because We aspire to have French public opinion
realize that the Arabs are not just "oilmen" but thet they are also a nation
With a deep-rooted civilization, a rich heritage end a developing modern
culture. Therefore, We are anxioua to present the French public first of
all wiCh the wherewithal of Arab civilization and present-day Arab culture.
We Want Greater Activity
/Question/ Are you satiefied with the activitiea of the Iraqi Cultural
Center in Paris?
/Anawer/ So far We are not satisfied with the level of the center's activ-
- ities and Work, and We believe that the center can perform broader, more
effective activity. For thts reason We are now intending to reorganize i[s
atatus, atarting With a aearch for a building in a euitable spot and ending
With the organization of aeasonal programs absorbing diverae cultural activ-
ities open to the broader French public. -
/Queetion/ Sahat did you do last season? What do you intend to do in the -
near future?
/Anawer/ We preaented a program covering a period of 6 months. Every
month there were two aectione. This program Was carried out With
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OIt ~t~~ICYAL US~ dNLY
~ ronepicuoug nu~cee~, bue we belidve, as we hnd previougly pointpd nut, ChBC
we can perform betCer, moYe broadly eff~ctive ~ceivities, and if we ger be-
yond th~ et~g~ of reorganiz~tion in 2 monthg' Cime we will have made a~ub-
eCanCial stride elong the rond to achi~ving ehe cenCer's ~spiratione,
The artivitiea Che center carriee nut include lectures, pr~sentation of
documentary and hietorical films~ establishment of diverse artistic Exhib-
ite, and cultural, literary and poeti.c soiree~. In addition, the center
present~ Iraq and the Arab nation, diatributes newep~p~ra and publication~~
and answerg letter~ and queries from the ~rench public, which are very
numerous~ -
~ We aleo participate in French cultural and even non-cultural acCivitiee on
eome occ~eions in order to highlight the principles we are talking aboue.
An example of this is our participeCion in Che Rheime Commercial Exhibit
~and the Book Fair in Nice. We also try to conduct activities in other
French ciCiee, ~nd we try to offer our assistance to Arab organizations
which aek for films, picturea and documents.
_ /~ueation/ What about the Center Library7
/Answer/ We are intending to reorganize the library ~nd set up a lending
syetem es ~oon as we move the center (in about a month). Part of our task
is to folloa up on implementation of [he technical and cultural coopera-
tion agreement between Iraq and ~rance. Among the programs are bringing
artistic groups from Iraq, such as the National Folklore Troupe and the
Mueical Keritage Troupe, and eatablishment of Iraqi dresa exhibits and folk-
lore exhibita. In our eatimation~ none of thia will achieve the deaired
aspirations ae long as Chere is no Arab activity complementing oura.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1978
11881 ~
CSO: 4802
45
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
_
~OI~ O~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
L~BANON
INT~~CJI~W WI~N AttMMY COMMANn~K G~N VICTOIt KNU~I
Londnn TH~ MIDbL~ ~A5~ in Lnglish Jgn 79 pp 28-3U
~Intervtew with Gen Victor K1w ri, dgte and place not given]
(Texrj The Commander of the Lebgneg~ Armed ~orces, General Victor Khoury,
hnld~ one of the most eensitive posts tn Lebanon now. N~ is regpnn~ible
for rebuilding the Leb~nese Army from gCr~tch despite the odds ag~ingt him,
with the miliCary gsgiscance promised President ~lias Sarkig by the ~rench
Government. In this exclugive intervieW, Genergl Khoury discusses ~ome of
the problems he had to face When he took up office ~ust ~fter the Civil War.
He aleo deacribee hig relationship with the Syrian-dominnted Arab D~eerrent
~orce, ~xpreg~~a hig determin~tinn to build up an ermy repreg~nting all the
Lebanese, and voices support for the new Army Bill now before Parliament.
Nothing Will deter us from bringing all renegade officers to trial," he
adds. General Khoury also expressed his readiness to collect all the arms
in the country once he is asked to do that but only efter the army has been
completely rebuilt. Excerpts from the interviea with THB MIDbL~ ~AST follow.
O You took over a~ Commander of the 'Chen of rourse there were the pre~eures
Lebane~e Mmecl Fotce~ Juet aRer the which had beeii exerted prior to my appoint�
two�year Civil Wo~. Wh~t kind of inent. 'Cheec even culmineted tn the
�ituation dfd you inherit Prom your abortiae ettempt on the life of the ~oreign
predecesao~~ Cee~eral Nanna 3aeed7 1ltinister, Fued Bucroe, when 16 kiloa of
O Weil, pe~hape the exiatence of eo mnny TNT wa, pieced in his ho~use; this was done
fectinns and groupin~ iruide the atmed ju.t the night befote the wuncil of
force, wa. the mast difficult problem 1 feced htiniaters wes due to meet to decide on my
at the time. There we~ the i.ebene.qe Arab eppointment.
Army in centml of one pert of the country It wa~ under such condition~ thet I took
end it enjoycd the eup~+nrt of x~mc pertie~ up the tnsk of rebuilding the armed forces. i
end nrgnniwtir?n~. 'Iberr was the ,o-cAllec! 6r,t hnd tn appoint e Chief of StaR. Becouse
I,ebnnese Army, bncked by pertiew fmm the he belnnged tn e perticuler sect, i even hed
dherside. to tnke rn~er the tt~pon,~ihility of ep~x?inting
The divetgence of views and even hatred tni~tnl ~r~rci~ t~ dri~~e him to the Defence
between the dit~erent fectioru iruide the Al~i,;.~q, We then ep~w~inted of(icer+ end
army wa~ a reality which cennot be denied. i hcn~l.r 1~~ the vari~rus brnitichr~ of the nrmed
e~rn t?ad to bring in my pers~x~al guerd~ forcc~. Thi~ we.r fnllnacd by thr trbuildin~
with me; i rnuld not trwt enyrone I did not of the variou~ directoretes from people
kM?w - the ~plit of loyaltie~ we.~ at~vng at the repre~enting all the verio~U ~ecty end crred~.
ti~ne.
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~ ~OIt O~ICrAL US~ ONLY
'1'ha d~R~r w~~~ ~r~~rneci fur vulwitny pnll,t� new unitp hnve heen aet u~,.'I'his will enebic
ment. A nrw breecl nf 1,100 tu ~,(1(1t1 s+old~ers thr nrmrd fnrres tn nb~c,rb more arme and
jninrd tn?m nli pnrts of I~eb~nnn ~nd th~y rniae the cornbet e~pebilitie~ of ita m~mbees
fnrm~cl th~ nurlcus oF u brigndc ditrctly tn fecr th~ immensity of the thre~t fecing
ntlilinted w tMe Atmy ~ommnnd. '['hc us. pe,rt nf thi~ teRk has been accompliahed
Military Schoo) wa~ etso o~ned ~nd neatly euc~e~,fully,
~(10 ~tudent d~'icers regiater~d.'Il~ey ere no~v t7 Prrsldent Sarkis har rmphaetecd n~
~t the pnd of their firstyear. 1V~ also con� numeruur necaeinnr that the Syrian
tinu~d treining ~eseions abroad. ~o besieally forcc� in ~.ebanon are here at the
on~ can eay thet th~ psychol~g;ral ~ectors requ~et df end under the Cumplrte
~ which t had ta deal with in tcrm, of th~ m~n ~uthnrity di the Lebeneee r~gime, Th~e
and thrir m~tale end th~ di~~isi~~eneU of th~ ~yri~nr hnv~ gteo mentinn~d thia ~nany
~tmed forres were the most dimcult pro= timee. Now a~~uld ynu be~t deerrlb~
bl~tns fe~ing me ~t the time, ~�nur rel~tion~hip with the 5yrian~ und
d iVhat made ynu aa~ept eu~h a hoa~ do you foreeee the future in thet
s~n~iNve and unrewarding te~k at yuch respect, teking into cuneidcrution the
diP(ieult times? , viewg ~nd ~tande nf the varinua pertle~
~o Well, it wag based on my rdnvict~on that involvcd in the Lebnnerr conflict?
thrr~ ie no homelnnd witlx~ut in� c~ ~zperienre ha~ tnught ue 3het thete cen
deNendence end no independen~~e withnut b~ nn govemment witirout en army; the
the army", i wae aleo convinced thet a ~emp experience has shown u~ thet there
homeland canndt be built withaut ~eriRre~. rnn be no '
_ Nab~relly, i gr~cetly apprerintcd the mn� t.ebanesc A~rmy hich i~ now be~ng
b~iilt up
Adence that Presidcnt Serki~ end hi~ and the Areb Deterrent ~orce are both
Cwemment hed pleced in me and i S~pp~ ~~~ponsible for ane ta~k:
appreciatecl the fect thet the trgime wn~ mainteining Fecurity. '11~ey ere both
d~ng it~ ehare of the ~criRcc drypitr the aupposed to obcy the nrdera o[ one
_ mor~l end phyvical pr~s.,urc~ it had been euthnrity: the I.ebaneee rnnstitutional
eubjected ta. authority, de,pite the fect some incidenta
t1 You have nnw be~n in o(fice nearly a ~ometimes indicat~ othenvise, in most cases
yeer and a ha1L Now mueh heve you �uch incidenta are just passing and have no
been able to achieve in the rebu{Iding of significance. As Commander of the
ths new Lebane~e Army and what erc t,,ebanese prmed Forcea, my relation~hip
~ome otthe ob'tacles that have etood in aith the Atab Detement Fotce {e one of
your way7 mutuat rc~pect; our contecte ane made
O From the 8rat day 1 eueumed o(fice, 1 through t.ebanese army ~Iicera n(t;l;atrd to
tealiaed thet any ertny mwt be rebuilt and the Army Cammand who have been tem.
not ~~etrhed up. Thet's why I caricentrated porerily sronnded to the Deterrent Foroe,
. on fint feciliteting the work ot thc etatf~ Despite whet ia being heand end aaid
ep~~inting its chief end thpn m~n7ng c?n to ebout the divetgence in viewpointa among
appninhng hencl9 of the othcr dc~?+inmen~, the t,ebenrse vis�~.vis the Detemnt Force~~
and dinrturetcs. t even had to huil~i our the Lebanese know ve~y well that the
mvn etack f~tre tn ptv(ect the ikfence burden carried by these forres on our behalf
Minirtry eo thnt all th~e~e ~.~h~~ ch~.xr t~~ help i~ ~~y ~m~~ry, ~ own foroea
u� in th~~ rcbuil~lin~; pnKr~, can rnme and go have been mmpletcly rebuilt and we are
. fn,�I~ wilFxrut eny Ihrcet or dnnger. We eerioue in thet and have gone e long way in
c~,tn}~li~hcc', the ilfe Cemp, which gmuped that direction - we wiU a,sume that
aoldi~rs fmm all porta uf i.ebnrxm. We al~o resp~sibility elone. 'I?~e hiendly Arab
formed cur S~eciel Scruhty Squad fomes~ heeded by the Syrians, will then
(Alokefehe? which enables the Army leeve and we will be etemally greteful for
Command t~ ndopt der;sions without fear of their avrlc.
uny pre~+ure or threa~ preedom of choia o One eector of the Lebane~e pop.
n�nt M~ ~itoleclecl by fo~, ulation hai been eharging that the
lin.irnlly, all t hn~~e done so fnr is to peve Lebaneae Army Command i~ not truiy
Ihe ~~ny fnr s re}n~ilding prtx~ lhnt wil) representative of sll the Lebenese and
rnrer ell lhe Lebeneae ~en;tory, i he~~e that the iiluation ha~ not changed
e~nintrd a~mmender~ for eech te~ion and de~pite the two�year Civil ~Var. What ii
47
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
_
- ~OR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
ynur r~gptinea tn eunh chargee? 'remrmber that th~ aini 6ehind the proExi~ed
d No bne cen deny th~t during th~ time of chunges cannnt b~ simply r~garded ae a gnin
the ~rench mandete there wes a fur one porty and n Ioss for nnother; one
different(ation in the acceptance of ~hould solely regnrd those changes es a gnin
appli~pttte to the Mtlitary Acndemy ba~cd for the army, The current diec�~ssions on the
on their eect; even the epplicents Army gill nre a reflection of intereet in the -
themaelvea usecl to comp &vm nne eect nnly, nrmy and its fateflil role,
M,r~ the mandate, however~ when the army Aa for the propoc~ed omendmenta, Pnrlin�
wee Lpbaniseci, more of a belance wes ment is mastcr of itself and whetever it
8CI1~EVf(J, Lebanon went through e lnt nf up� egrees on we will imple?nent, We give our
hpnvals quitp differont from the preeent onea viewg when consulted on milit~ry m~+tters,
duting which the ertny wag an exemple of but politics and legieletion ~hould bc
n~tiunel unity, 'll~ie could only be hnndled by the competent nuthorities,
ntttibutc+d to the balence which exieted C] Develnpmente of the laet month ehow
urrnmg the difterent eects whirh th~y now that the arr~y ie nnw elso undcr attack '
~leim is l~clcing, even by rightwing m1liHae. Even your
Then ceme the eventa of the laet three home in Ameheet hee been attacked. -
yeers when the crnmtry became the victim Thls ie a merked change tlrom the
of prnctically every plot; it wae naturnl that eituation 1n the paet when the arrr~y
the nttny ehould euffer in the same wny the ueed to come under attack Prom leftiat
rountry had sufT'cred, i would like to remind forces. To what do you attributc+ euch a
yr?u Ihat when T took over es a commender change and would it aftect your
of the arm~d forcc~, all the ot~'icers were po~ition on the pereonal level and at the
from one ecct, with the chcception of nne. Artqy Command level? '
Sinre thett I have been working hard to O The information and military campeign
redress the balence and to unitc the men, end attacks thet are being waged ngeinst
I would very much like to eay here thet the army are well fonnded ae a motter of
whet hae been echieved ao fer ie not all thot principle. This is due to the fect thet the -
I went to echleve. i will continue to work tn eecurity plan created a presence for the
thet direction until justice. hae bcen army in ereas where the militias are in con- _
etteined, trol; so there is a naturel divergence in ob-
O The new Lebane~e Army Bill hee jectivea on military mattera. It is equal~y
~ now been before Pa~liament for eome true that the army ia absent from other
time without ratl8cation. Thi~ hae ereas for pe~sonal and political reasone.
cau~ed a eplit in~(da the country'� But all these campaigna ,being weged
Ieglilative and executive powers. Do againat the army spring, from' one main
you think the bill rhould go through cause: the atruggle tor power. I must atress
Parliament a~ It le and would you think here that' many partiea to the conflict will
ot making any amendmente to it.1f eo, auETer when the army is rebuilt beceuse it _
whnt kind of change~? will deprive these partaes of s lot of the
O I am convinced of the need to make power they er~joyed in various areas during '
ame~xlmenta in the Army Bill. I welcomed the eventa. So these parties feel they must
the idea of the eetablishment of the Higher 'plevent the rebuilding of the army: But I
Defence Council which will be' responsible feel that no metter what we do, ettempts to
~or drawing out the country'a defence policy. undermine the work of the army will con-
i was one of thase who propoeed it in the fi~at tinue; the ieasons behind it are known to -
place~ because the propoBed amendment~ everyone. '
wil) facilitate the work for the rnmmender As far es I am concemed, I do not suffer
end his ~ubordinatee. ' from any complexes towards anyone, not
I wes elso one of thoee who pru~eci the e~~en the Arab Army. The best example of
epp~~intment of four deputies to the Chief of that is that meny of its officers and soldiers
Staff because whet epplied in 1948 docs not have rejoined ~ in the army and they hn~�e
hold in 1978. all tefrained from getting involved in
But whet I am apprchensive of whero it situations which break the army codes.
rnmes to limiting the authority of the Army All thesg campaigng being waged agair~st
Cammand by the politiciens ia thaf the t~s will only make us more determined to
nrmy can bernme more or less neutrnlised continue the merch. The carrying of arms
- thuv Msing ikq combat ability. One must belongs only to the professional soldier; so
48 ~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
_
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
dcey the protection of the country's in-
dependence and guaranteeing the eafety oit is true that the decision to send ~nn'
and sQCUrity of the citizen, My sole objective army force to the South in.vtilled n lot of
- is to build a nrnrpertisAn and etnmg ermy h~~pe emong the I,ebe~nesc. [ plen to keep
no matter how other people'p stcuidy change, thnt ho~e alive, The halting of the forcQ in
O Under the recent decieions tnken by Kawk~ba does not menn thet the decision to
. the Army Commnnd it wns decided to I enter the South has been revoked, The
bring to justtce ull the renegndo offlcers determinntion is atill there but, as you
who havo led their ow~i fuctions of the know, carrying out auch a decision is not
nrmy during and after the civil war, purely military, The atoppnge was due to
These have included aueh offlcery as the changea that took plnce in the stands of
Ahmud Khatib, Suud Hnddad, Sumi the conflicting parties involved in the South.
Chidiak and othera. What brought What I can stress here is that the etoppnge
~ about the decieion nnd are you wea purely tactical and temporary, Entry
determined to bring them to Pace into the South remains our immediste ob-
military trlal no matter what the jectiv,~ in collaboration with the United
obstacles mighi prove to be? Nations forces. When the conditions are
~ O In' military terms, the answer to auch a auitable we will enter, no mstter what the ~
question ie, common knowledge. Every sacrifices,
deciaion teken muat be followed by .C7 At all the conferencea held to try to
implementation. And it was on that basis aolve the Lebanese criais - national, -
that I took the decisions. The Nming for Arab~ or international - it has been
rarrying out these deciaions is not impor- emphasiaed that no aolution to the
tant. ~ . c~ieis cnn be reeched unless an effective
But I would like to point out here - and role ie given to "the new and
not ea u criticiam - that the responsibility reconstructed" Lebanese Army. How
for these deciaiona should have been taken do you visuallse auch a role, taking into
_ by my predecessor. The mistakes for which eonsSderation the expertence of the last _
they have been referred to the military few n?.onthe when you deployed the
courta were' committed during the period army ln euch pleces as Hadath~ the
preceding my present term of of6ce. As far Port area, and in the eastern sector of
as I am concemed, I did not hesitate to take the capital before that?
quick and decisive action when similar O The army remains an executive organ in
breaches happened during my term of office. the hands of the country's political authority
Thus when we were faced with a case similar no matter what decisions are sdopted at any "
� to that of the Lebanese Areb Army in the conference, Because of the complexity of the
. � pe~son of 'Mu}iammad Salim, I took Lebanese crisis and beceuse the security
immediate action. The�eame applied to the threat involves every region in the country, I
- Lebanese Revolutionary Army, which was see no way out unless the army is able to -
led by Captain Ashkar. I aimply nipped the make its presence felt in all these regions.
movement in the bud. I will not hesitate to This is what we are working on now,
take similar ection in the future in order to , 0 It ie generally accepted that the
� facilitate and quicken the rebuilding of the Lebanese conflict will not be sol~~ed
~my, until a dny comes when all the arms in
As to whether the army is capable of the country are collected. If euch a taek
implementing these decisions, that is taken 1e given to you, how will you go about it
for grantad. An ermy is always capable of and do you think you can succeed?
carrying out tasks much bigger than it. The O When the army is completely rebuilt and
decisions will bs implemented at the right is able to protect every citizen and his pro-
time. One must not forget that our objective perty, then I will work on collecting all the
ie to consolidate aecurity and to rebuild the arms in the hands of the Lebanese if I am
country. We are builders not judges. asked to do that. If thut hep~Pns, there will _
O A lot of hope had been pinned on the be no need for anyone to carry ~rms, which
new Lebanese Army when y~u eent they now possess because they clnim they
units to South~Lebenon. But then the want to protect themselves. I am sure that
force was etopped et Kawkaba. Why many people will get rid of their erms volun-
didn't you push aheed to establish your tarily when tl~e authorities nre in a position
presence in the South no mattcr what to tehe strong mensures again9t thoae who
the price, and are you still determined do not obey the law, es~xcially on the
to deploy army units in the South in t!`he question of pcr.;sessing nnd carrying arms. ?
near fvtt~re?
COPYRIGHT 1978 IC Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4820 49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
.
~l~R d~~ICtAL US~ ONLY
~
L~BANON
INTC~VI~FJ WITH LL�BANON UN R~pIt~S~NTATIV~ GHASSAN TUWAYNI
Londnn 'rH~ MIbDLE ~AST in ~nglish Jan 7g pp 31-34
(Interview Witt~ Lebannn UN ItepresentgCive Gh~gsan Tuw~yni, by Judith Kipper,
dnte nnd plac~ nnt given]
(Text J Ghaesnn Tueni~ Lebanon'e No riowcomer to politice,
' Permanent Reproeentative at ~ Tueni hae been n minieter
the United Natione~ ref!ecte on ~ eeveral times and was a member
hie action-packed year therb a of Parliument and Deputy ~
S'e~r of conflict and tragedy f~r a Speaker of the Houee in
country that wae once Lebanon. He served as Special
conaidered the baetion of Representative of the
liberalism in the Middle Eaet. President of Lebanon to
Philosophically, Ambaeeador Waehington in 1976 and of the
Tueni believea that "hietory in: _ Arab League to the US in 1977.
the regton is an encounterf~+A~:M: Before embarking on hie
betaveen the humQn'and the' current diplomatic mieeion~
divine". Hie human talente~'.'i~ ' Tueni wae well known ae the
were tested within monthe of his publidher and editor of the hnrd-
arrtval at the UN when he found hitting Beirut daily An-Nohar,
= himeelf plcading Lebanon's case considered the most .
� before the Security Council authoritative newspaper in the
during the Ieraeli invasion of ~'ab world. An-Nahar wae -
Southern Lebanon. Hie pereonal publiehed continuously
command of the eituntion is through~~ut the Lpbanese civil
credited with the US-sponsored War which Tueni cla~ma wag n =
reeolution to reaf8rm nnd result of ite defence of Lebanese
unity.
protect Lebanon'e terrltorinl Ghaesan Tueni does not avoid
integrity, eoverelgnty and hard quPetione. Nere he
political independence. discusses some of the moet
dlf6cult with Judith Kipper.
50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I~'Ott dl~'t~'ICIA1, US1. ONLY
Kipp�rt Renent~y i'rerldent Carter clrcumetnnere in w1~i~l~ thu U5 and the
~eked ~ovlet Iender I3rorhnev tn Jnin UyyR huve mndC a cartnin eommit=
tho U8 (n eupporting u Ceaen(Ire ment to eaving i.ebanon, what ie the
reeolutlon. Thle euperpower~ IniN~,ti~e n~tionul politicnl sotutlon7
wlth rtrdng we~ninge to partiee on ell o'I`here Can nnly be nnC nntionnl eolution, -
ridee nf the Lebeneee con8let reemr to one whirh will bring nll the I.ebanese
bo wnrking, What nontinuing rnlo do tc~gether, It is stupid to think that nRer the
- you eee for the euperpower~ In ep~~calyptiC events which Lebanon has gone
Lebanon? ~ � throu~h th~t we ran go back to what was.
7'ue~ni; In the Sreurity Council you hav~ to There is no moral, ecnnomic, political or
have nn agreement o[ the veto powere, so physical precedent in history, Out of the
_ there h~d to be aupcrpower intervention, If wnr, new forces have been born that will
what was happening in Lebanon hed been trunsform the face nf Lebnnon, not ~
ellowed to cnnttnue, the enperpowero woutd revnlutinnury forces. Lebanese democrucy
have hed to intervene thtough e traneitional � hnd its foundation in n crrtain form nf social
etage, where ' meny. minipowers. or elient~ ~ democracy, the existence of a middle class of '
etates jvould also have hed to intervene, crEil'~~mrn, traders, professionnls, etc, This
~ No i~eue of. mtnor. importanre tn is the cinss most hit by the war-- it has vir�
appearance, et leant, would heve been tually disuppeared.
brought to the Security Council, made the We do not yet know how ta aseess the con�
object nf e euper~er dietogue, if there aequences of the disappearance of this class.
v?~ere not a concem about poesible conse;, In term~ of chan~ing the political eystem,
quences '[or .yrorld peace and . eecurity; whnt is importnnt is the emergence of new
Lebenon ~s~ ~he only plece where there ts a clesscw, 1f we push this analysis s little
� criais which is unmenegeable a~ part of the furcher,. in terms of the politic~l Christian
v~hole Middle East wer, It is a projectton community, those who have gone to war, the
inside Lebanese atructures of international time will come when qucstions will be asked
confrontetion, It has been etandard which have no answers, ~Ve know they
Lebenese doctcine whi�h h~ slways been cannot be nnswered in terms of victory.
maintained that thi~ war i~ not a I.ebaneae ? Can you begin to identify these ncw
_ wer. It ia a multidimen~ional conflict, Areb clnsaes?
vs. Arab, Arab va. Iaraeli, Arab ve. O I cen only guess. There will be a greater
Lebe"ese' radical trend among young Christinns. The
O Thle kind of inltistlve bae great
politicel. eignl9cance. Doea ft �et a ~~r clasaes among young Christians have
precedent � tor 'othec Mlddle ' Eset ~'ought, oontrary to what.is often said, and
- ' hotepote? ' � they have euffered tremendously, They wi11
o I hope it does. It showa thet both euper� be the new leR in L:banon. �
po~vers are concemed with the preservetion Another political force is ~the army. We
of Lebenon in different ways, It also ahowe must have a strong army if we are to absorb
thnt there can be contact between the eupet� ~d contain the various pnvete armies. The
powers to extinguish fires thet could heve e~Y can be an instrument of govemment I
lar~er ~onsequences. ' ' and an instrument of socinl integration, I do
O In whst wa do the su er ~t think we are at the threshold of a~
y p powere Bee military era, but the military arm of the ~
I.ebanon? govemment will have to play an important
o Che US has thad a constnnt interest in role in terma of sociel integration.
prc~ervinK the'integrity of I.ebenon. One O Dcea economic recons ruction have
wc~ndera t~~dny if the Soviets are not keener , �
tu mninfnin thc~e+e qame liberties in Lebnnon j to wait for a peace settlement?
~ecnuge it hns become the only place where ~ O It is imperative with a vision of the
Si~~~iet policy can be defended vis�a�vis an I. ~banon of tomorrow to define the social ob�
Ar~ib ~rorld which is becoming more end )eMives of reconstruction. You connot redo
more ~nvAmerican, despite appearances. whet was undone. New political realities
U You have eaid that Lebanon ie not emerge, demographic changes have
ne~;otiable, nor fe it a diepenaeble occurred, whole areav have been destroyed,
entity. Coneidcrin~ these new old alums tom dow~n end new ones built. (
- ~ 51
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I
I
~OIt n~~ICIAL US~ dNLY
- 'I'here ie an aIr nf Calcutta in'the nnCe� 19 GOI1sCIUU9 Of L~'~ fact t~~nt its destiny is t.ii
feshionaUla dietrict nf Hamr~ in geirut, be part of the A?ab world, It is probebly the
'I'here ig an exoclus to the mountnin, the ruuntry thnt hns the grenleqt vested interr.st
land, the vill~ges, We muat plnn com� in unity. T}~is is alnn trur in the (3ulf. '1'he -
pr~hensively the reconstruction of the wlwle wenlthy emirnles don't wnnt unity; thc
rnuntry, at least identify objectives nnt nnly poorer ones crave unity,
in economfc, but eociel terme. P:.~cl, wh will Arab unity will not be rreatcd
- have W be eonecious of the pnii!ir.1 demcxrntiCnlly nr inste~ntly, but nchl~~~ed bY
implicatians of th~ eocial options. steps nnd the pc~sitive use of f~rce; or by tt~e
C1 Tha eurvivul of Lebannn wili dep~.:~, force fartor of outside dangers which compel
ut Ieast partlqlly, on bullding a etrong countrica to get together.'I'here ig a need for
army. Wlth the dcep religitiua divislnns closer eroiiomi~ rnlationa airnilar to what has
whieh exfat tnday le thrrr nny renl hopc been nrhieved in the ~uropenn Common
of this? ' Mnrket. But like ~uro~e it will not rrente n
O I think eo. precisely, beceuse the nrmy ~ common nationality. ~Vhnt we will aee is
tends to etereotype and wipe eway developing identities, greater egnigm in
diRerences: It ie probebly the one melting certnin comtnunities, bnt in n menner not
~ pot where aome tocm of national unity cen incompntible with closer economic cn� ,
be achieved. The old concept of the army operation, perhaps in foreign policy nnd
being meinly Christian will heve tn be dealt military mat.ters as well.
wich at the politica) level. It ia unrealistic o What et'feat will peace with iarnel
not to recognfso thet L,ebanon was alweys have on tho procese of economic in-
govemed ae some sorL of federetion bet~~�een tegration?
religious communitiea. We ha~~e to re�im�ent o Israel hns pluyed an integrnting rolc in
a plurulistic aystem which talces into the Acab world. The Bngl~dad aummit has '
account the ttligious realities, but hn~�e to to be taken es a rnality. It is not expediency
be le9s plurelistic than before. nnd it mny not crcate unity, Uut it hes its
O The protection of the minoritiea hes effects. Baghdnd met under the pressurea of
become ~ eritical iasue, With political the ~gyptinn�Israeli peace and events in
self�determination ns thc primury,gonl Iran ~~hich have ahnken all tnken�for-
af former colonies, doesn't this imply granted realities among the Arebs.
an almogt inaoluble dichotomy? Pence is a challenge for Isrnel not [or the
o Protreting minorities; there ia no recipe Arabs. The Arnba somehow have accepted
[or it. What is necesaury i9 social integration lsrael ea o fact which is there, but one which
of diversifled mmmunities that }iave never thcy do not have to deal tvith; a reality thnt
leamed to live together, but only side by has isolated itself und remained a foreign
aide. implantation. V there is to be peace end a
; O The sociel end economic changes in normalisation of relations, Israel will heve to
the Arab world eince 1973 hnve had n create its own rules of Arab acceptability.
dramatic impnct. 3o hns Presidcnt How will Israel behave vis�~�vis the Arabs?
Sadnt's viait to Jcrusalem, which fun- ~1'ill it go on being the fearful enemy always
damentally chnnged the nature of the de~~eloping the danger'complex? VVill it
Arab�israeli conflet. Theye chnn~es epproech the Arabs like the white mnn in
have eeused serious polfticnl dis- Rhodesia with technological superioriry?
locetions. ie thcre atill a basis for nra~b ~1'ill it want a privileged position? If so,
unity~ for convergence or mcrcly fur co- there will never be acceptability, nor peace.
operntion? Iuael cannot hold beck the cultural,
- O Arab unily elweys eppenrcd to Ix~ nciinr politicnl and economic development of lhe
unti) the time camc to trnnslnle it into 120 million Arabs.
reality, The Arnlrs then d'?.~vcrecl how o By the time normalieation becomee a
remote it wns. Wr,~Ith hn.r becn reality, won't the Araba be a mntch for
rnunter~inxlucti~�e. The I~~~r pm~ilc~;c~l hme israel? � ~ .
nlwnys IKtin the grrutcst ~iq~~x~rtcrs o( Arnb O Many o[ them already nre. The Isreelis
unity, I??m ,+ure PrtiwiJent Sndat, who hA~�e eo eccep~ equali~y wich the Arabs.'Ilie
nppearz+ to 1~e rejecting Arob unity, is not ex� reletionship of superiorrnferior can only
prec~ing his innenncx+t fceling. i think Ep+pt entrench enmity~ hatred and miscrust and
produce later a will to destroy. On the con-
52
FOR OFFICIAL EJSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~OIt O~~ICIAL US~ ~~NLY
trnry, en adtnle~inn nf cqunlity, Israel beco� militnry,' Whet hpppened in iran ie pn~f
mtng just an~ther Mlddir ~ngtern stnte, the thnt the military end nuthnritnrian ~lution
'le~~antigatton nf I~+rael , is the only peth to ie ndt tho right a~~pronch, Pnlitiral and
normallty, t~~en tn pnrtnerahip,'i'hia i~ going eronbmic eolutio~~s wili have to be
to need a trempndous change within IerAeli d~~~~~np~, -
nnciery, Begin do~s not bhow any signs of I d Won't there netinne which ere
this, unfortunattly. vulncr~ble need greeter US euppnrt if
tI Snudl Arabia hnr tricd tn prnttct Ite military euthorlty ie not the right
, int~resld ~n the regton and ite ercurity apptnach? ~
by playing g modcrating pnlitirel rnlo O Yee, but what ktnd of eupport? 'I'he
nnd ue the bankcr. Uo you think they reality is thnt we have to admit that ~5audi
have had much influcnce In cnnoureq- Arebia ie now more importent ta the US
tng the forcea for modernte polittCal natinnul security than the US ie to Soudi
refurm in the Arab world7 Arabien netionnl eecurity, Interdependence
0 7'here ia nn imbetnnce in thr Snudi role fe a two�way etreet. I clon't believe oil can be
due to the fect that their importnnce in de[ended by pumping plenee and
humnn terms Le nnt rommensurate with , eophiaticeted military hardware intn oil�rich
their importnnce in financial terme. Tho etates. 3tockpiling hardware might even be
future of Saudie Arabie can aily be in n unf. dangerous and counterproductivc, ~~Y
fication of the Acnbian Pcninsule to ptovide 'O Thc US'and $audl.,~ltebia heve' a
the population baqe for the power und :'~peciai rel'atioriehip' and it ia'dff6cult
finenciel weight they commond. If unity fe to see that either would purauo~a policy
not nrhieved, the Arabien Penineula ie detrimental to that relationahip. Yet,
hended for tremore. Social and economic f'rom timo to time the 9audia have to
de~~elopment will also push the need for un{� bend towarde thc rlrab coneensus, ae
ficntion with oowitries Wce Yemen where Prince Fahd did in Baghdad when he
~ povcrty is creuting a revolutionary threat, tupported the Arebe egeinat Egypt,
The amnller wenlthy atates are likely to which wae clearly not in the Amertcan
become more satellitised by Saudi Arabie, t intereat. It thie a weaknegn in US ~
O Could the threet of inetability in Iren Middle Eaet policy which has shifted
forgo the new allience you epeak of toward the Arabs in recent yeare?
with the support of the US in a eort of O No, thi~ te a eudden revelation to
NA't0 of thc Gulf etatc~? American opinion of the beaic paradox of
O Thia alliance wes there before Iran. The American policy. The US was fevouring
aituntion was developing and the events in ~ Iarael to a point thet was not commensurate
Uan were not a totel surpriae to anyone. The with American interests. Another example
Shah described it as the 'Japan of the of this erroneous equation is the bill
hiiddle East', A certain attitude of the presented to the US by Iarael aft.er Cemp
Uanians negetively produced closer relations David to be paid as the price of peace. This
amnng the Arabs bc~rdering Iran, pushing is a besic reality the Arebe have always
those Arabe to find the~ own atretegic con- cleimed that Isreel was really a aubsidised,
cepts independent d Iran, It was a miatake artificial atate, -
_ to think thet Iren could be the stabilising Now, can larael aurvive in peace without
fnctor in the Gulf. It has its major impor� these aubsidiea7 Md, can the US go on
tance, but there has never br.en e reel axie depending on the Arabs while eubaidising -
between Riyedh and Tehran. There was a the Arabs would say - the enemy atste
~licy of fear nnd eolicitude, friendship and which ia implanted there? A totally new
secret enmity; ellience in ahort�term in� relationship will have to be invented in this
teresta, but rivalry in long�term goale, trienguler relationahip of the US, the Arebs
Also, the cultural ditYerencea between the and Isrnel.
Persiena end the Arabs are very important ? How can the US cope with the rapid ~
though they may not be visible in the Weat. changes in Arab eociety which pro-
Satidi Arnbia and Kuwait will have to look fou~dly in(luencc US relations with the
at both Nurth and South Yemen and the Arabs?
mounteina of Oman~ where Iran played a o it is no more or less complex than the i
role which will now hsve to be a~.vumed by coming together of the Crusaders (the ,
the Arabs. This role cannot be played the Europeens) and the Arabs in the Middle
~+me wa.y es Iran plnyed it, pmtective and AQes when the Arabs were the developed _
53
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~Ott O~t~'ICIAL USL ONLY
nn~l thc Crusadern werc the undcrtlevelu ~ed, �~~~~n~7
E~'.rnnumic facbrs wlll play a tremenc~ous ~ o The notion of the Third ~Vorld is totnlly
. mle. W~ wil) never create a Wentem�type out of dete. Thitd tn w}~t? We prob~bly
enCirty in the Arab world, 'i'he trnnnfer of nnw hnvc ~I10 ~OUfIII Atta even the ~itth
tcchnnl~?Ky ie a multidini~~nsi~mal pniblrm world, 'I'here h~s nut bcrn eutlicient
whirh rnnnut be h~n~lled artificially, Arnb kn~wledp,e nbout how to utilise the resourcen
~cx:irty will be a eociety that belnngs to tf~is of the wenlthy underde~~eloped, ~Ve ~hould
century, an~ that will be able tn invent ~16s have discovered a link whinc ~ould have
~ end Cadill~cs, Importing technnl~r will been th~ United Nations. 'I'he we~lthy
~ive way tn a new p~a of inventinn and : g~~ng their money to nn independent inter�
cMntivity, it la a nnturat byproduct of nationnl body with eccess to techndingy
development. ~ could have become en instrument of
C1 What ie the baele of thfe Amurican development.'I'he wealthy underde~~eloped
tesletance to the Arebe~ : heve not found the way to prompt de~~elop�
b There is a kind of AmeriCan pro� ~ ment beceuse of a lack of prepnrednegs,
vincinlism which ia not really in harmony p Cen the United Nations reully bc thc
with Amerira'a intemational role, Thcre la structurel linkl An Arnb ambussador
- atill tl~e rrpiatonce of the image of the Arob has called lt a"tnothlrss" orgen-
as the villain, the man who can endnnger ~ggtion, How would you evalunte the
pnx~perity nnd peace. ! effectivenese of the UN7 Uoes it depend
C1 ~tavo you eeen any changee? ie thie on superpower intcrest to enhancc its
Amrricun rerietance betng eubdued poegibilitiea?
~omrwhnt? O The United Nations is what you meke it.
O Yrni dn see eome changes. k'or instnnce, 'I'here is a certain eector of activities where
thrre nre mnre and m~~re publiceti~me enu greater ro�operetion emong the superpo��ers
erticlr~ �I~,ut the hetter a.apecW of Arab life. would make it ao much morn producti~�e. i
'1'h~~r?~ i~ a~gre?it curiosity which has pm� would not say it ie "toothle~v", but in some
duced many boolcs, Alms and television pro;, areas it is parslysed in politicnl decisions. It
gremmes on Arab ctiltute. If there ts in�; hesn't been so in South Africa. The UN hns
terdepende:ice, eomehow economic realitie's~ been incapable of ecting on Cypnis. [n
_ do become political realitiea. Ultimetely it i~ Lebanon it has been uneful, it hns created
in the Arebs' interest to be undetstood in the this unique and unusual situati~n ~~�hercby
United States. the PLO has become a full pnrtner in
~ o You recently referred to a new peacekeeping. Where the UN cnn be more
equatlon which emer~ed aRer the 1973 useful is in pencekeeping if it is ello�ed to
war by eaying: The world had been act on beheV of the internatinnnl com-
governed by the belance of power~ but munity without being crippled by super-
. eince 19731t lr governed by the balance power rivelries.
of wealth. The paradox of thia eituation In certain areas neutrnlity should be
ie thet tor the 6rst time the war of emall eccepted by the auperpo�~ers so thet the
nattons perturbed the life o! blg development of countries will be protected
nationa." Do you etill hold this view7 by the UN frc~m these rivnlries thnt produce
What i~ the wey out of this dilemma for crises detrimentnl to both.
both tho emell and the big netions? O The Sovict Union has been acti~~e in
O Yes, so much so that when there is no Africa, In Yemen and in Afghanistnn
~ wenlth, but only an acceas or en investment with some degree of success. hat is
of weelth, it i~ atill true. I.ebenon is an ex� ~ the key, in your vicw, to Soviet sub-
ample, I continue to believe that the balnnce ' veraive influence in the hiiddle Eest?
of wealth has alternd all the old concepts of ~ ~ O I would not call it Soviet sub~�ersivenecs,
the balance of power. In the past developed i but Soviet influence. The Soviets are more
nnti~,ns were the rich nations and the eggres.give than the Americens, Thcy i~n�est
devclo~~ing the poor. Now it is the revecse. more in popular movements; they ha~�e en
11~e underdeveloped were totally dependent ideological content ~vhich the democrecies
on the industrinlised, but todny the in� ha~�e not been able to creete in spite of Presi-
du.9trinlised are dependent on the develop� dent Carter's human�rights eppronch which
ing nations not only for markets, but for eppeared aL one time to be a ce~tain -
nnturnl and finnncisl resources a9 well, ideologicnl appronch. It has not been con�
? Ie thia truo throughout the Third aistently observed.
World or only among the oil-rich
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~~tt ~~~ICIAL US~ i~NLY
~ t think democrnry as a system i9 buund to ~
remain bchind the dynamic, Ag~rr4ni~~e, pru�
Iet~rien revolutfon~ry ~ppronrh, Ynu cnuld
Ca~~ a tevolutinnery appmnrh euUver~ivr if '
you nrc on nnr eidr di the fence, but th~Me
whd ere on the rc~eiving eide ca11 it e
tevolutionnry pertnerahip. Whcre do I
pereonnlly gtnnd7 I db not Rtnnd un the nide
nt Marxism, but 1 eccept it n.q som~timcs a
pc~nitivc Factor. d
~ COPYRIGHT: 1978 IC Mggnzines LCd.
CSO: 4820
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~
~t~R 0~'~'ICIAL US~: ONLY
MAURITANIA
INTERIdA MINISTER EVALUATES NEW RECIME'S P03ITIVE, NEGATIVE POINTS
Paria AL-wATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabio 4-10 Jat~ ?9 p 23
Interv~ex with I~{{e?uritanian Interior Miniater Jiddou Ould Saleck~ by
abil Msghribi]
[Text] Everything about him revealg serlouaneas and disoipline. He is sur-
rounded by a epecial air o~ dignity, but his friendllness encourages trhoever
is with him to be completely at ease. He ia Mauritarnian Interior Minister
Jiddou Ould 3aleck~ who playe~d a vital part in planning and carrying out the
10 July refor~n novement, and xho has orga,nizational abil~ties the effects of
xhich are no~r becoaing evident in Mauritania.
This intervieN took place in his office in the Mauritanian capital of Nouak-
chatt. I had'intended the~t the interviex atart off xith a provQCative ques-
tion, not in o~der to find out if he could x~eply ob,~eotively, but because he
ha.d told me that he Nould speak Mith complete franlrn~ess once he deaided to
apeak.
I asked Interior Minister Jiddou Ould Saleck, "In light of your basic partic-
ipation in the 10 July refaacni aovenent and your experience in the practi~e
- of suthority~ cou]d you give AL-MATAN AL-'ARABI's readers an evaluation of
the results~ including "$elf-aciticiam" if need be?"
He replied calmly~ as if he had been expecting auch a question, "Let us start
_ off Hith the positive factors. The reform e?ovement has succeeded in direct-
ing the people's forces alcmg a course leading to the achievement of definite
goals. The nex governntent has also xorked to cleanse these forces of the
previous regl~ne's filth, xhich xas hindering p~ogress and Nas in fact standing
as a barrier to development.
"On the econoaic level, the country was on the brink of banlaruptcy rrhen rre
took over the gavernment. The nex leadership has successfully formula:ted
_ nex econonic guidelines xhich have s~ade it possible to ma.ke a start on
realising ~a~Ar developaent pro~ects.
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
. "On the ad~inietrative 1eve1~ we have Kc~mked to revitalize the administration
in ordor to brinq it in closer ~dntact x~th the aitizeng' daily problen?e.
"On ths fnrelgn level~ the neN governn~ent h~a guaceBSfully adopted a dynamic
thru+~t toxarde peaee~ xhleh hae enab].ed i,t to take import~nt etep~ in the
~ searoh for a aoaprehensive eolution to tho westorn des~rt probl~m.
"Not to mention the faat that the 10 July move~eent pre~cribed the atate'8
domestio and international pre~ence~ a~aking the issue of preserving aover-
eignty an introduation to the eatablielunent of pQrallel relatioa~s Kith c~ther
gtate~--relations aerving oommon intereste on an equal footing.
'This balanced role xi11 help expedite the desired eolution to the desert
problem~ for it aeriou,~~jr and effeotive]ar serves region~l etability.
"In light of these new developments~ the nex leadership has been able to
_ redouble its efforte in aearching for eolutions to the eoonoaie, eocial and
political problene which xe inherited from the previoua regime.
"Nrn+ we eoae to self-critieiam~ aa you p~oposed. I have no ob3eation to
Bpeaking about the negative aapeats which have eccoppanied the reform move- _
a~ent. Indispu~ably~ every regi~e in ite e3rly stages has to face difficul-
ties khich unight hinder ite efforta to cleanee itaelf of some a~ the filth
xith the neceaeary speed.
"I believe thdt the adaninietration (ite organization and in~ection xith neN~
efficient persennel) atill needs co~prehensive, radical reform~ to eli�inate
any attempte at opportunism nnd profiteering and to infuse the adminietrative
agencies xith new blood and sincere dynamisn~ xhich xill bring it in greater
contact xith the p~oblenis being brought up.
"This phenomenon ia due to a lack of peraonnel, or proficient elaments capable
of replacing the ossified eleeoenta xho did not play the role required of the~.
"The nex regiae must be axare of the danger of this problem~ and aust give it
the study and eoncern it deserves. This can be done by conducting radical
administrative refor~ in order to put the right n~an in the right place.
There are eeployees Who have been treated un~ustly ~nd who have not been en-
trusted xith the reaponsibilitiea they deaerve. Therefore~ appointments must
- be oade acco~ding to ob~ective atandarda."
The Interior Ministry's Nu~erous Activities
~ Queati~~ Yith respect to the Interior Ministry, xhat have you accomplished
to dato?
Msxer: He hava cowpleted the ad~niniatrative refora o~ the piniatry's agen-
cies, not ~uat to make thea responsible for social and political stabilii~y
but to ~nake this lead to participstion in achieving national groxth. A
political departsent has alao bean eatabliahed, concerned xith the cultural
S1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
- ~'UR d~I~~CtAL USC ONLY
und pol~tiioal aotiv~ti~~ of organixe?tione and enoieties. Vle havo deoid~d
to eatabllsh a seotion to ~ook ~fter foreignere ~nd regulate their entry
into snd exit from the aountry~
We Ni11 Acospt No Solution F'or irhioh We Have To Pay a Prioe
qua~tior?~ Do you person~X~y hav~ any ~peaiflc ideas about the deeert problea?
Anawer~ Our position, ag atated by the Military Go~ittee for National fi~-
ao~rer~r~ is plain ut?d united on thi~ ~atter. Iie are nou xaiting for the
"Con~ittee of Judges" ta finieh ita xork. To date~ xe have not app~aved
ea~? epeoiflc~ final golution. One thing that ia eertain ia ae folloxa i
!'q?uri~aaia oannot aeospt ar~y solution for xhich ~,t hae to pay a p~iee. It
is alao oppoged to any ~ilit~ry solutian~ and ea11g for a~ust solution Hhioh
xi11 preaervs th~ righte o~ the partie8 oonaeraed.
Ttto Years Before Deaocracy is Regtored
Queatic~ i Nhet~ you took po~er you p~o~aieed that democratia or~ani~ationa
xould be eotabliehsd in tha oountry and that free eleationa xould be called.
Mhen xill tt~t twppen?
Ansaer~ At thia stags~ the frdMexorks o~ the atate are being rebuilt on
sound eaano~io Uaees. This funda~ntal step wuat be taken before any po-
litioal steps towe~rds eatablishing de~aocntic organieations la taken.
Queetion~ How muah tias do you think 18 needed to eatnblish these democratio
politicul organi$ations?
Anstreri It t?ill be at lea8t 2 years before general eleationa are called~
This tine period is needed to ar?chor the pillars of the atate and reconstruct
- it~ as I hdve ~entioned~ aocording to nex bases.
Queations It ia aaid that there is eome clash of opinions about certain
topica xithin the Military CoAnittee for Natio~al Reeovory.
Msxer: 3oAe xeatern neKapapara ars trying t,~ damage the co~nittee's unity
and coheaiveness by apreadir~g su~h atate~aenta. I oan assure you that the
c~ittee ~eobera are in ~o~+plete agreen+ent on every na~or topie that has
been brought up. If some argwents have taken place in the codmittee about a
certaiti topic~ this is a healtt~r phenoaenon indicative of deoocratic dialog,
xhieh xe spp~ove of in diaeus8ing propoeed Lasuea.
Nasir� Sadda~a Husayn, and al-Shadhili _
Questi~~ Jiddou Ould 3aleck is a prominent pers~ality in Mauritania. You
have played a diatinguiahed role in organizing the doxn.fall a~ Ould Dada~
Who are you?
58
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
~dlt O~~ICIAL US~ dNLY
An~xer~ Y xae born Sn 1945~ T believe in liberalism and re~eet Marxigm,
although I respeat it~ defenders~ for evory ~?an should h~ve hig politieal
aho~ee. I am besioally a ailitary man. I believe in radical ~olutione~ and
I re~eot he?lf-Nay eolution~.
The polltir,~1. figureg T admire are the late Pr~gident 'Abd-al-Nagir snd
S~ddam Hwgoyn, viee president o~ the Traqi Rnvolution Command Couneil, and
the ailltary leader I admire is Lt Cen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili. Is thi~ _
enough to give you an idea?
2'he Fate af Mukhtar Ould Dada
Queation~ Lt your capaaitY as interior ~inieter~ are you looking into the
eircu~tances af Former President Mukhtar OuLd Dada, xho le in detention?
MsWer~ I vieited hi� once in wpr capacity ag interior ~inistar. He ie not
in priaon, but la under house arreat. I infor~ed him that it had been decided
that he xould ultinate~}r retire from politioal life and live as at~ ardinary _
aiti~en.
Questio~n ~ Will you releaee hi~n?
The young miniater sniled before a~nswering, "Tf no aentence ia passed _
_ against him!"
COPYRIGK!'e 19?8 "Al-Watan al-Arabi"
a559
CSO e b4a2
59
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020032-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024432-3
I~'dit O~~ICIAL U5C dNLY -
SAUbI AftAIiIA
IMPL~tENTATION 0~ MUNITIONS CI'TY PROJ~CT IN nOUBT
L~ndon TH~ MIDDL~ ~AST in Fngligh Jan 79 pp 120, 122 -
(~exe ~ ry�~e ~t dieturbencee attd rapebilities. in eddition e
etrike~ (n Iren pdec ~ eecurity munitions city ie planned for the
threat tn the CuU region, and AI�Khary' re~ion, Anuth�east of
partiCUlnrly to 8audi Arabie, Riyadh, and, although thie
whirh becvmee the tocua nf projrrt has been hanging fire, it
attention in the event nf eny now eeems possible that there ia
elowdown or etoppege {n the frc~+h impettu+ for it to go nhead.
dutput of Iranien crude oil. `Il~e munitions city was
R~ardl~se of gny deri~ion tu bri~in~lly rcmreivrd as a StObn
- allow 9audi crude to flow freely project under the rode name
that may be taken by the Seudi Asad (lion). It wen to provide a
Cabinet and Crowm Prinee ccntre for prod~cing tnctical
~'ahd, ecting Prime Minieter miaeil� and other military
duttng Kiry~ Khaled'e con� equipment et e Iocetion near
veleecen~e in 9witzerlend, the Ftiy~dh.
fect remaine thet Saudi Arebia The plannecf populeticm of
cnnnot e~cpand it~ crude nil ~ome 90,OOU to 100,000 would
eaporte much beyond lOmn meke it rnnaiderebly bigger
berrele e day. The limite than the pmpc~ed i0,000�atrong
impo~t.~d by praluction capecity King Khaled Military City end
mean that it carmot cover the five timee the eiu of either
laes euetained by atoppege of Tabuk or Khamis�Munhayt. _
pmduction in Iran. Otherwiee there is litde infor�
Moreover, the eventa in iren m a t i o n e b o u t f u t u r e
rnme at e criticel time for 3audi dcwelopmenta in Al�Kharj.
defence plenniry~. The qovem� What ia krxrvn ia that the
- ment hen already committe~d 3audi Covernment ha~ ewarded
itHelf to a policy of building eo� a pteliminary deAign contrect
called militery citien in etrategic for the entire pmject to the New
locetiona throughout the York archittcturel end engineer-
Kingdom, but it could be the ing firm Eclward burrell 9tone
turmoil in Irart that will decide and Aesociates. Acrnrding to in-
the pece et which theee cities formed saurc~, flnal bick wetr
- are built. They include the KinR to be submitted eRer Apri11978
Khaled centre in Hafar al� and the contrect was to be
Batin. eouth of the [reqi bcirdet, awarded in September.
'Cebuk, near Jordan, and It was thought likely laqt
Khemis-Mushayt~ near the hpring that the consuuction job
Narth Yemen bader. would go to an international
Eech eervee an a troop~ consortium led by Sem P.
treining and housing centre an Wellece Compeny of Dallae, ~
well aa e military . gamson Texas, which is 38