JPRS ID: 8256 TRANSLATIONS ON ON WESTERN EUROPE

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JpRS ~,/9256 _
1 February 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 9/79) ~ s r
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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SHE6Y
, u e rn ~u t it c S. eport �te
~ 1. Februar ~979
TRANSLA'CIONS ON ~IESTERN ~UROP~~ (FOUO 9/79) 6,
7. Authu~f+) 6. Ne~rforming OrR~ni:~tion aept,
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- Covered
As above
t~. ,
15. 5upplemenury Noccs
16. Abatraets
The serial report contains political/economic ix~formation on West European
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JPRS L/8256
~
Z February ~9~9
TRP~NSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
. (FOUO 9/79)
CONTENTS � PAGE
_ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Tindemane Analyaes International Currency Proepecte
(Leo Tindsmane; EURAPA ARCHIV~ ],0 Dec 78) 1 -
FRANCE
Reeponeibilities of Arn~amente Delegate Outlined
(AIR & COSM~S~ 6 Jan 79) 10
Socialiete Viea Communist Participation in Leftiet Union
(Jean-Pierre Cot; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR~ 8 Jan 79) 12
Briefe
PCF~e 13th Congreee 15 -
ITALY
� PRI La Malfa Reply to PCI on Today~s Capitaliem
- (Ugo La Malfa Inte~rvieW; CORRIERE DELLA SERA~ 23 Dec 78) � 16
SPAIN
PSUC Divided Into PRA, Anti-~Leniniet~ Factions
- (CAMBIO 16, 24 Dec 78) 29
ETA Affiliated Baeque Leader Intarviewed by Italian Magasine
_ (Federico Krutwig Sagredo Interview; PANORAMA, 14 Nov 78) . 32
- Ma3or Shakeup in Ambassadorial Poete Reported
(CAMBIO 16, 17 Dec 78) 44 _
Britiah HistorLan Analyzee Conatitutional Guarantees~ Righta '
. (Hugh Thomas; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 22, 23 Dec 78) 46
~ - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (ConCinued) Page
Briefe
USO in Difficulties 52
SWEDEN
Briefe '
FireC Swediah Sate111te 53 ~
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~oK ~~~~rcrnL us~ oxi.Y
INTERNATIONAL AF'FAIRS
%
TINDQ~lANS ANAI.YZES INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY PR03PECTS
Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 10 Dec 78 pp 747-754 -
LArticle by Lno Tindemane, prime minieter of Belgivm fraa April 1974
to October 1978, ba~ed on s report delivered by the author in September
at the Tokyo Institutn for Foreign Policq: "International snd European
Currency~Perspectivee"] ~
~Text~ In 1973, ahile holding the office of minieter of finance, Presi-
dent Valery Gi~card d~Eetaing ie euppoeed to have eaid: "Formerly the
currency~problem Mas a concern of tha experte; plane Mere made that -
repze~ented a curioue mixture of sophietication and incamprehenaibility.
NoM it hae become a problem for thn governmenta and thus a~ xopic for
discussion� a~ong the variou~ etatea." -
Never before in the postwar history of monetary policy has thie remark
been eo unquestionably true as no+~. At the svmmit conferences of the -
- chief� of �tate of the European Coamunity in April 1978 in Copenhagen and
; at the beginning of July in Bremen~ the diecu~sion focused on currency
' problems. Lik~?ise, at the summit meeting of the ~lestern stateo in July
1978 in Bonn~ currency problems represented the key topic. At the
a~aetings betneen Pricae Minietar Takea~ Fukuda~ President Jimmy Carter and
Faderal Chancellor Helmut Schmi,dt, currency prob~ems aere alwa~e on the
agenda.
Md thi~;ie quite natural~ since the monetary oituation increasirigly
~ffecte the international trade~ the econanic conditione and thus alao
the welfare of the various natiozti.
It is froa this political viewpoint that one mu4t conaider the attempt�
to stabilize the relationehipa between the Europeaa curiencies. We Will
fir~t place the European endeavors in the larger context o~ Mhat hae to be
done on the g:ebsl level, in order to reestabliah a monetary systea.
Secondly, Me aill discueo the reasona underlying theee atteimpts, the crit-
iciem voiced in saoe quartero, and the hiatorical background. Finally,
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we Mill analyze the reoults of the Bremen eummit conference, Where signifi-
. cant progrese Mae made i.n regard to the eetabliehment of a zone of mone- -
- tary etability in EuYOpe. '
ToNard a NeN International Moneta~ry Syetem -
A� regarde the preeent international monetary aystem, the queetion arises ~
ae to hoN to overcome the imbalancee in payments and correct the aurpluees _
and deficite. The experts call this an adjugtment procees. In the Organ-
izaCion for Bconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), theae probleme -
are dealt Mith by Study Teem III Mhich is headed by the Japanese Miniater
of Finance Met.eukuwa. Ae ie Mell known~ in the Bretton Woods Sqe~eaa, '
which for over 2S years rendered good services to the Morld econoany, ehort-,
terra belance of payments deficite Mare for the moet part corrected through
internal measures, i.s. primarily rhrough monetary and fiacal policq. A
- country ahoMing a deficit used to subject itself to etricCer budgetarq and '
monet~ry discipline. By reatricting dcmeetic demand, reeources ~ere ~aade
. available for exporte; ioaports Mere reduced and thue equilibriv~a Wae ra-
etored. Onlq in the event of a particularly serious imbalance in paymenta ~
Wa4 a foreign trade-oriented soLuCion adopted, i.e. a ehange in the ex-
change rate. ~
This eyetem collapoed primarily because the external ad~ustinente Mere not ;
carried aut in a Nay appropriate. On the one hand, the United Statee had _
far too long tolerated a considerablo d~eficit Mithout re~orting to dnpre- _
ciation. Thie Mas made po~sible on ~ceount of the automatically available
_ financing: The dollar etill is reeerve currency. On the other haad,
saae countriee that ehoMed a balance of pay~aente surplus refused to re- '
valne their currencies and tried to neutralize the effect of thie surplus , i-
on monetary policy. Thus the monetary syetao cres"ed by the Bretton ~looda !
Agreement suffered from the fact that at timeo it Mas.applied too rigidly.
Since 1973, monetary policy hae gone to the other extreme: Exceaeive
~ flexibility and general floating of the most.important currenciea. Such ~
a solution had long `een recomcaended bq the theoreticiane. Anglo-S:.xon ~ � i
academic circlee had aiYeye been inclined to~ard the vieM that in orfler ~
~
to correct psyments eurpl;~ees.and deficite it ase eufficient to let the
currencie� float. Theq fel; that currency revaluation could eliminate ~
the surplueea and that depreciation could quickly reduce the deficite.
Thuo it Mould no longer~be neceasary to influence domeatic.demand.
Monetary and budgetary maaeures Mere no longer to be employed for solving ~
balance of psymente problems, but onlq for internal pnrpoeea such ae
econanic gr~rth, eaployment palicy and price etability. ~
Actually, in the la~t 5 years the payments imbalances of the industrial
countries Mere enormoue. Apart fraa the effecta of the oil crieis, the ~
induatrial coumtriea~ balancea of paymenta are influenced nwre etrongly .
by thr groMth of domeetic demand than by exchange rate fluctuatione. This
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ie due to the fact that Che exchange rate fluctuatione affect importe and �
exporte onlq,gradually~ whereae e rise or decline in domeetic demand
, quickly i,nfluences goods turnover and eervicee.
The development of the Japaneee economy is a good eYample in ~thie regard. -
_ Deopi~e thn epectacular revaluation of the yen, Japan continuee to eccumu-
late iminenen paqmenCs eurplueee. The eame goee for Switzerlend nnd--to a _
_ leeser degree--for the Federal Republic of Gerd~anp. In contraot, the
Americnn dollar depreciated greatly, and the Unit:ed States incurred con-
oiderable deficita.
Thus it ree an illusion to aeaume that the paymente balance could be re- -
~tored through the mxchange rate approach alone and that currency floating
could eolve the problame. Exchange rate adjuetmenC can produce the re-
- sulte da~ired onlq if internal meaeuree are taken concurrently. In
countries ohoo?ing a chronic deficit and a high rate of inflation, cnrrency
_ devaluat3on ia advieable onlq if it ia accaapanied by meaeures aimed at
reetricting doane~tic demand. Thie ie What became apparent in the laet.
few yeare in Great Britain.
Incident+ally, currnncy revaluation will reduce a balance of paymente
aurplus only if it ie accompanied bq measures aimed at prc~moting daneatic
~ expaneion. In the abaence of a,concurrent stimulation of domeatic demand,
' a curr~ncy revaluation will lead to decreased profite in the export
sector alnd to a elaaing of econcmic activity, and thie in its turn Mill
, negatively affect iniporte and further increase�the eurplue. Conaequently,
one ehould aelcome the pump-priming meaenree recently adopted bq Japan and
the Federal Republic of Genaany.
At the emae time, hoMever, the countriea ehrnring paymente deficits must
likewise take meaeures; this goea especially for the United States, ahich
could reduce ite deficit through an appropriate energy policy. Theee
eteps that ahould be taken by deficit as Well as surplua countriea Mill
help reduce the imbalance in paymente and bring about greater monatary
stability.
The.e coneideratione regarding the overlq rigid application of the Brettan
Woode System and the obvious ahortcaninge of a monetary eyatem characterized
~ by an exceoeiye influence of exchange ratea lead to a third method of im-
proving international currency relationa.
Thie third solution Wae taken into coneideration as earlq as the�end of
1975 in the "Tindemane Report" on the European Union. Fortunately~ these -
coneider.atione.have since attracted greater attention. For thie reaeon, -
~ ae Mill�develop the topic in greater detail. On the one hand, it goes
without eaying that unusually eharp exchange rate fluctuations vill have
a disturbing effect on international trade and Will introduce a aenee of
. uncertainty into economic activitq. It is very difficult for the entre-
preneurs to predict in ter~ne of .the local currencq the price of the
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imporCed raw maCerials used for producing their gooda or the proceeds of
~ the eale of theee producte abroad. Theee extraordinarily wide fluctua-
tione are one of the cnures--albeit not the only one--underlying the
preaent economic crieis.
On Che other hgnd, it must be conceded that it would be unrealiatic to
expect for the near future a retu~n to a global eyetem of fixed pariCiee.
The expeneion of inCernational capital traneactione due to the interna-
_ tionalization of economic life has aseumed euch dimensione that a return
to a global system of fixed parities--such as exieted under the Bretton
- Woode Sqetem--ie highly unlikely. _
So ahat improvement� could conceivablq be c~ade? Ther~ are tMO aepects
that desarve coneideration:
The firet aspect of a gradual return to greater international monetery `
etability is the eubdivieion of the Morld into large zonea characterized
by eCable monetary interrelationehipe; in theee zonea, the exchange rates ~
would be more atable due to improved coocdination of economic policq. '
There are thrae principal zones that should be coneidered: A yen zone, a i
European zone and a dollar zone. At the European summit meeting in Bremen, '
the foundatione were laid for a European zone of monetary atability,. ~
The eecond aspect aould be the attempt to restrict to a minimum the ex- I
change rate fluctuationa betwean theee three xones and at the eame time
to enaure a high level of econanic activity thi~ough improved coordination
of the economic policies of the three zonea, eapecielly in the budgetary
and monetary sectore. Ae ie Well knoam, monetarq policy directly affects ~
capital transact~.ons, end fiacal policy is of crucial importance in regard � .
- to the developtnent of daaeetic �demand.
In the attempte to improve the monetarq aituation in regard to theae two
aepecte, Japan and Europe~in canpany aith the United Statea can play an =
important role. The European atatea must trq to etabilize the relation- ~
shipe betMeen their currencies and they ehould all participate in a progrem
' aimed at economic recoverq. Japan, too, can make a contribution by etim- -
- ulating ita economq and opening its bordere to importa; theae meaeures -
would reduce it� surplueea and keep aithin limits the fluctuatione of Che
yen in relation to the dollar and the European currenciee.
Finally, it goea Mithout eaying that the United Statea, toa, could make an ;
important contribution bq red,ucing ite balance of payments deficit--
primarily by taking energeti.c measurea in the energy eector--, bq more em- '
- phatica~ly checking inflati~m and bq pursuing a eufficiently atrict
monetary policy.
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Monetary Measure� in Europe
Having preeented thie eurvey of international moneCary probleme, Ne will
now diecue� the epecial role to be played by Europe in regard to u ac?lution -
of theae problems. First of all, we mueC examine the retionale underlyi~g
the European moi~etary plane; aubeequently, we will diecues certain critical -
coQOmente that tiere made in thie regard; finally~ we Will present a
eumaiary of the conclueione reached in Bremen by the European Council.
The Reaeona Underlying the Efforte Toward MoaeCary Stability in Europe
Stable moneCary relatione are of great importance in bringing abouC eco� -
nanic recovery and in reducing unemploqment--problems that the European
countries ere very much concernad about. _
It ie becoming more and more apparent that the monetarq inetability in
_ Europe has a deflationarq effect on the econaaiee. The abnormally eharp
appreciation of eane currenciee has led in Europe to a coneiderable reduc-
tion of profite in the export sector and to an indisputable drop in regard
~ to eales figures. The fact that in 1977 the Federal Republic of Germany
~ wae repeatedlq forced to adjust downward its grrn+th rate reprasente une-
. quivocal proof of thie Chesie.
In those countriee, in which the currencq wae depreciated too aeverelq in
relation Co the etrong currenciee, thie depreciation has an inhibitory -
effect on econooaic recovery. Theee countriee are afraid of stimulating
' the economy Nhen importe are on the increaee. This puta preaeure on their
balance of paymente and eventually leada to further currency devaluation.
Thue, th~i loM growth ra~e in countriee dietinguiehed by e~ atrong currencq
- operatee like a etraightjacket on~ the ~?eak-currencq countriea. Moreover,
the uncertainty in the currency sector hae by iteelf an inhibitory effect
on inveetment activity and economic recovery.
Coneequently, an increaee in monetary stability ahould have a poaitive ~
effect in regard to the employQaent eituation and economic recovery. M
_ increase in monetary ~tability is also an incentive to puraue a more ex- 'l
pedient induetrial and trade policy than would b@ practicable Within the
- framework of a mere cuetome union.
In diecueaione Mith busineea leadera, one again and agein hears the com-
plaint that due to the contfnuing eachange rate risk it aae difficult to
eatablish enterprises of European dimeneions. It is difficult for'the
entrepreneurs to calculate in terme of their o~m currency the right p~~ce
of imported gaods. It is aleo difficult to estimate in tez~ne of local
money the~proceeds from export gooda~ the price of ~hich is calculated ia
foreign money.: Due to thie uncertainty, the enterprisee do not realize -
the full potential profit :fram a market encompaseing all of Europe.
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It ie eafe to eaq that as far ae the negaCive eff~cte on the development.
_ of trade are concerned, the exchange rate fluctuatione have taken Che
place of the former custane frontiere. M increaee in monetarq atabilitq '
could greatly pranoCe indu~trial development and eerv0 to aaeintaix? an .
open trade policy. ' -
Greater monetary stabilitq ie aleo a meena of fighting inflation. An ex-
cessive currencq depreciation immediately resulte in higher import prices. _
In countriee MiCh indez-controlled pricee and aages, these imporL� pricea
quickly affect the general price level. Thie goea eepecielly for free-
market economieo, in which forcign trade accounte for a large ehare.
Furtharmore~ it ie eelf-evident that any increase in anonetary atability ~
in Europe aould improve the functioning of the agrarian market Mhiah due
to the exchange rate f luctuetiQna hae been aub3ect to eevere dierupxiona
in the laet fea years. Finally-�and thia ie by no meane the leaet im- .
portant argument--, progreas in regard to the monetary union ie bound to
epeed up the proceea of tha political integration of Euro~e. Ae early as
_ 1949, the French economiet Jaquea Rueff ~rote: "Europe Mill be unified
on a monetary baeia or not at all.~~ One need not accept this Without
reeervatiane. But it can~ot be denied that progresa in the fi~1d of -
monetary policy Would be an important etep ahead for Europe. ~
The Objecti.one I
A large number of ob~er,tions have been raised againat the current efforte '
in the field of monetary policyt
i
Frequentlq, it ia pointied aut that in view of the extreme divergence '
bet~veen the rates of in~lation in the European countriea~ it aould be pre- ~
mature to launch the mon~~arq union. The reply to this srgmaent can be
~ ewnmarized in four pointe: ~ _
Firatly~ one muet realize that the exchange rate mechanisme can have only
a limited effect if they are the only inatrument of coordination. Ap Mas
- pointed out above, it ia imperative that the introduction of a system of
exchange rate etabilization be accompanied by a real coordination of ;
economic policq in other eectora, eepecially in the field of internal
capital formation, but aleo in the field of budgetarq policy.
Secondly, it ehould be conceded that due to the exchange rate mechanisms ;
an increaae in moneCary etabilitq can help to pranote econoauic convergence. !
Thie aas evident already in the European "enake," whi,h canprises the ~
currencies of Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countriee and to ahich ~
the Norxegian krone has been linked up. The snake has definitely brought
the various currencies cloaer together, eince affiliation aith the snake `
presuppoeee in every participant a certain degree of discipline.
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" Furthermore, we would like to point out that the recent paet haa been
characterized by a renewed convergence of the economic development of the
~ European statee; thie ie primarily due to decreaeed imbalancee in paymente
and leaoening differences in regard to price hikes. One need only mention
here the fundamental improvements in Great Britain and Italy. o
Finally, the nea exchange rate mechaniem notwithetanding, the potentiallq
pereietetit great differencee between the rates of inflation will affect
the exchange ratos.
According to a second ob~action, auch an arrangement would deprive the ~
varioue countries of all freedom of action and Mould represent a loea of
- sovereignty. In replq to thie argument, three pointa can be made:
The recent evente in the currency areas affected bq the unetable dollar
rate aere an indication of the limite reatricting the individual nation
. etate. On the other hand, if they establiah the Eurupean monetarq union,
the European statee a~uld in a body recoup at least part of the loet
power. ~ �
Furthernlore, eoroe countriee that had encountered difficulties had to
submit to the peremptorq ir,~unctione of the International ~Ionetary~ Fund.
In doing so~ did they not give up much more of their aovereign authoritq?
Ia it really aeking too much to call for a limited tranefer of authority _
to tre European level, particularl~ since auch a tranefer aill 6e coupled ~
with measuree aimed at ~trengthening European eolidarity? _
And finally, Me Would like to repeat that fran a technical point of view �
the planned tranefer of authorit}- does not entail excessive injunctions
~ comprieing~intolerable coercive mreaeurea. -
s
Finallq, there is the abjection that progresa in the monetary aector _
would be posaible only on a global level, within the frameWOr~C of the
Interriational Monetary Fund and on condition that an agreement will be
reached in regard to the dollar.
In reply to this argument, one muet firat of all point out that the re-
- etabiliiation of the dollar will obviously greatly contribute to monetarq -
etebility in Europe and on a global level. It is a fact that the eatreme
�luctuatione of the dollar have exacerbaCed the teneions between the
_ European currencies. In collaboratfon with the United Stxtee, Europe
muet continue ita efforts and aupport any move likelq to increase the
atability of the dollar vis-a-vie the European currencies. Hut theae -
efforte ehould be a complement, not an alternative, to the intra-EurApean
efforts.
As was pointed out above, an important factor in regard to the return
to greater international atability ia the establishment af large stability
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~dK d~~~icta~, us~ dNLY
sone� conducive te ~tabi~ ~xchange rat~e. 7'hi� can coneribute to an im-
rrov~d coordinarion of tha ~conomic and monetary policie� in theoe zoneA~
, thu� pcev~nt~ng ~xcdr~iva fluctuation~ betwean the �tronger currancieo or
groupe of currencie~.
Tha 3ubrtancQ Af the Br~men Agraemants
In Brem~n, the chief� of er.ete exaaai~ed a detaiied pian concerning th~
~~tebli~hme~t of e zon~ of monetary etability in Europ~. Th~y aere agreed
thst thi� p~~n wao to form the baei~ of a technicai ~tudy which aauid be
- completed by 31 October 1978 nnd wh3ch would contain a~l the regulatione
concarnin; ~he opar~tion of the �y~tem. On the baeie of thiA ~tudy~ th~a
- European Councii in 8rueseis io to adopt by tha end of 1978 the appropriate
reeolutions and errangemenes.
ThQ Bremen plan comprioeo three parto:
1. M exchenga rate machaniom aimed at etabilizing th~ ralatioriohtp�
between the European currancie~. This �y~tem ehould ba ~?t le~st ao strict
a� the "enake." in principle, the in t~rventions will be carried out in
the currancies of tha participant countriea.
2. T'he introduction of a European currency--the EWB LCuropaan NoneCary
Unit~��~ the pre~ent Buropean aocounting unit which in fact consiste of
the currancie� of th~ community. Thi� EWE is to be usad rbove all for
money tran~far� ~mong the monetary institution� of tha BC �tates. In
other Nord~, the cantral banke are ~uppo~ad to be abla to make their pay-
mento in EWE, wharaa� up to now the in~trument of tran~fer has almo~t
aluayo baea the dallar. Th~ee EWE are to be based on fund� rhich ara de-
po~itad br th~e centrai b~nks and which ara partly mad� up of gold and
dollar� (e.g. 20 parcant of the cu~tomarr re~arv~ fund of the cantral
~ bank~) and pirtly of currencie� of the aember ~tate~. In this ca~a,
however~ the EWE are to be convertibla into a national cnrrancy only if
the recipiant country mants the acdnomic conditions attaching thereto.
The iasuance of EKE in return for gol~i or dollar� a:ll be accompanied by
a ccmmen~urate raduction of tha cantral bank re~erve~. `
3. The e~tabli~hmant of a European monetur fund whiah ia to davelop
into a cn~tcal bank.
Concluding Remark�
The inetability of tha international eaonetary situation ha� s haro~ful
effect on the Morld ccon~a~ and i~ one of tha cau~e� u~darlri+ng tha
present crioi~. Horaover, che eoincidance of monatar~ instability and
increa~ing unemp~oyment intensifie� in mu?y countrie~ the protectioni~t
tendencies threataning the world aconomy. Finally~ the monetary in-
stability ha� a negative effect on the legitimate intere~t� of tha de-
veloping countrie~.
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t~'Ok dl~'~LCtAL US~ t~NLY
Ir~ conaideration of thi� danger~ the induutrialized countriea muet at any -
price demoneEr~te their eolidgrity and reeolve. The European efforto in
tha monetary �ector �hoUld be conaidered the firet etep in the raturn to
greater internationai monetery stebility. Along with rheee effort� toward
- the eetablishmant of a~urope~n monetary union~ the participants muot
ehov gre~Cer determination to cooxdingte the Buropean econo~iaa. Thair
afforte will then be for Che genaral benafit of the world economq.
Aeide from thi� ~uropaen contributiion~ an increa~e in monatery otability ~
on a global ecala pr~~upposa� greater effort� on tha parti of the tlnitad
3tateo in r~gard to tha raduction of ite pay~aent� deficit and on the part
of Japan in regard to the reduction of ito larga ~urpiu.. Coneequently~
Japan~� recant d~ci~ion Co taka pump�priming mea~~res is very much appraci-
ated in Europa. _
InAOfar e~ each one of the large induotriai cauntrieo purpoeefully con-
- triburao to monatery �tebility end to the recovary of the vorld aconomy, y
Lhey will a~i heip to promote tha well�being of hundrads of miliion� of
people in both the indu~trieli~ad and the davelopiag countrie~.
COPYRIONT: 1978 Verlag fuar Internationele Politik QabH~ Bonti
8760
C30s 31Q3
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~RANC~
R~SPONSIgILITIB5 OF ARMAh~N`fS D~L~GAT~ OUi'LtNBD
Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in ~rench 6 Jan 79 p 13
[Text] A decree of 18 December which appeared in the official ge~eCte
of 24 December i978 set the responsibilities of the general armaments de1~e-
gate.
The general armaments delegate:
Prepares, submits for the approval of the minister for the Armies and
causes to be executed the programs of study, research and manufacture
of armaments within the framework of the objectives defined by the
- Defense Minister and the military programming established in terms of
the neods expressed by the quartermaster generals. The general delegate
takes into account particularly the military specifications defined by
the quartermaster generals for new materiel. The general delegate pro-
poses to the minister technfc~l and industrial actions to be taken on
the international level; _
Causes repairs of an industrial nature to be executed at the request
of the quartermaster generals concerned;
Is responsible, by delegation of the Defense Minister, for ensuring the
protection granted to the concerned ministers over the organizations
subject to control by the state. This control is especially extended to
the nationalized aerospace industry. But the genera]. armaments delegate
_ is also responsible for the controi of private enterprises working for
armaments.
The general delegate for armaments provides, except for speciai provisions,
the vice presidency of coromittees or councils presided over by the minister
having to do with research, studies and programs of armaments. Ne alsn pro-
vides the chairmanship of restricted proceedings of these same committees or
councils.
The general armaments delegate manages and administers the military corps
placed under his authority. He exercises vis-a-vis other personnel affected
by the general armaments delegation or put at its disposal the responsibilities
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t~'tlk h~~IC ~AL US~ ONLY
givan ':Lm by th~ sp~~iul texts. N~ prep~ras th~ dr~�t budg~t f~r tihe depnrt-
mants pl~~~d under his uuthority. Na p~rtiCipatos in th~ man~g~m~nti of th~
~r~n for which the d~p~rtments ~Si~c~d under his ~uthority are responsible,
Th~ gen~ral ~rmam~nts d~leg~te is assisted by a dnputy ~nd h~~ at his dispns~l -
~ st~ff, of military advisers appointed with his agreement by the quarter-
_ m~ster gener~ls, ~nd ch~rges d~ mission appointed by th~ minist~r ~s prdp~sed
by him. H~ h~s ~uthority over the inspector of armaments ~nd over th~ tech-
nicgl inspectors of armam~nts, Ne muy request th~ minister to cguse tn be
~xecut~d by the army 11sts investiig~tions that come within the ~rea of his
L~nsponsibilities.
CO~Y~IGEtP: Air ~ Cosmos, Paris, 1979. _
8946
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~RANCG
SOCIALIST5 VIBW COhA~1UNI5T PARTICIPATION IN LEFTIST UNION
paris L~ NOWBL OBSBRVAT~UR in French 8 Jan 79 pp 28, 29
[Article by Jean-Pierre Cot, Socialist deputy from Savoie: "We Must ge Aware"]
[Text] Only the truth is revolutionary, especi~lly when it is not easy to
spoak it. When the Soci~list Party questions itself several weeks ~fter the
Metz congress, it is necessary to recail that maxim. Unity of the Party wiil
not be achieved in confusion, but in clarfty. The difficulties will not be
resolved by strokes of procedural cunning, but by posing the problems in depth.
In that respect, will we have Lhe courage to take a clear look at reality? Or
_ else, succwabing to the temptation of the new romanticism, will we seek refuge
- in a dis~course that persists in ignoring reality?
. No one can any longer be unaware that the "Common Program of the Left" was
signed in 1972, whereas the present France is the France of the Barre pian. -
At the time there were 300,000 unemployed; today there are nearly a million
and a half. The growth rata was around 6 percent per year; it has fallen to
_ 3 percerlt. Inflation, which was about S percent, has doubled since then,
while the accumulated indebtedness of the Giscard budgets exceeds the former
10,000,000,000,000 francs.
In this unsettled context, the Communist Party's attempts to get votes in 1977
_ and 197g addly unbalanced the project: transforming into a demanding six-month
program c:hat was a program to be applied in five years.
Today we have to pose the problem: do we continue to scrutinize the text that
has no great relation to present reality or do we build the program the French
are expecting for the 1980's? Let me be throughly understood. It is not a
question of questioning again the nationalization-planning-self-management
triptych, terms of the break with capitalism, but one of d~efining it in a rad- '
ically different situation. Strictly, not complacently.
On one can any longer be unaware that the Communist Party broke up the Union
of the Left in September 1977. No one has the right to act as if nothing had
~ happened, to repeat "Unionl Unionl" as if the incantation could replace the
reality or resuscitate it by some magic property. It is a question of rebuild-
- ing the,Union of the Left, patiently and tenaciously. Starting with the basic
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~o~ n~~tcint. us~ ot~,Y ~
construction tih~t ~1one beers th~ work~rs' hop~s ~nd th~t is for this re~snn
morc necessnry th~n ~ver. But knowing th~t it is more difficult th~n ever. -
7'he Communist Party has locked itself into a divis3.on logic, from which it
cannot be extructed by ~ simple change in the proportion of electoral strength.
It is nec~ssary for all worknrs to forc~ it to change its position by making
its prasent attitudo untonable.
The Communist Party today is th~ only leftist organlzation to h~ve ~ system~t-
ically anti-unitary pr~ct3ce, to dispute 3n ~~tiion and ~very d~y the Union o� ~
th~ Left, even while proclaiming the reverse. It is necessary to take up the
conflict on social ground--the taggfng nlong innocently extolled by some would _
run counter to th~ sought-after goal--and coalesce the unitary energy, in or-
dor to condemn the Communists to union, Concrete proposals toward the Com-
munist Party should follow later,
No one can any longer be unaware of the world crisis, the co~lapse of the in-
tc~rnational monetary system, the multiplication by five of the price of oil,
the general ~conomic recession with its train of confusion and protc~ctionist
attempts, the wsve of nationalism and chauvinism. Jacque~ Chirac and =
GQOrges Marchais, bound by a st:ange alliance, stroke the jingoism sentiments ~
and reawaken the fear of the hereditary enemy by mesns of the image of a Ger-
m~n ~urope. We have no right to act as if nothing was happening, to let this ~
dfscourse develop until it reaches our ranks, even while we protest our good
Esuropean sentiments. -
The German question backs the Socialist Party into a corner. For my part, I
consider it too important to be treated parenthetically with c~nsiderations of
domestic policy or, even worse, of congress strategy. On the whole the nat-
ionalist talk works, undermining the bases of a still recent over-the-Rhine
democracy, awakens dangerous forces and gives them a credibility they were
not hoping for. By undermining European constructi~n, this nationalism is
throwing Germany into the arms of the United States, unless it is into the
arms of the Soviet Union. Is that what we are looking for? If so, we need
to say so clearly.
The same nationalist temptation drives some to refuse Southern Europe, to op-
pose the expansion of the Common Market. A singular concept of international
solidarity--to go back on a commitment clearly subscribed in 1972 within the
framework of the "Common Program." Whereas all the forces of the left in ~
Spain are demanding membership for their country in order to consolidate its -
democratic regime, the Fren~h left has no right to say no, except by denying
itsclf. -
Finally, international solidarity is put to the test in our relations with the
third world. One cannot at the same time demand a new world economic order
and reject any change in the international division of labor; demand more jus-
tice in international trade and extol an egoistic protectionism in order to
solve our difficult internal problems. To give a rath~r uncomfortable exam-
ple, we all know that steel is basic in the effort of industrializing the
third world countries. Are we accepting this fact, with all the consequences
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~Ott d~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
it bring~ with iti, dr ~r~ wa s~~king tn m~~.ntgin the third worid in ~ pr~-
industri~l ~ondition7 5oci~list solutions ~xist: codevelopment ~greem~nts,
i.nterr~~tfonal planning for producti.on, r~specti for th~ 3.nternational org~nizg-
tion ;ttandards for l~bor, etc, The dilemma is nonetholess posed. Have we
decide+d to solve it7
No nn~ cgn gr?y longer be unaware that we 1~st the el~ctions of last 12 ~nd
19 M~rch. S3nce then the Socialist ~urty's 1a~d~rship h~s been iocked into
_ silence, as if paralyzed, Today the too-long-spurned debate must take place,
not to bring judgment on a past, but to prepare for the future. For to re- -
peat is not enough, We are familiar with the danger o� a discourse on the left
which, for lack of coping with the real wouid come to cover compromises ~nd,
- under the pretext of fighting th~ Giscardian government, wouid help it.
COPYRIGF!'I'; 1979 "Le Nouval Obeervateur"
8946
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~ 1~ RANC~
BRIE~S .
pC~'S 13TH CONGRESS--The 13th congre~e of the PCF will take place from
10 to 13 May 1979, at the Centre Sportif of Saint-Ouen [northeastern
auburb of Paris) whare it was held in 1976. ~Text] (Parie PARIS MATCH
in French 19 Jan ~9 p 79~
CSO: 3100
, !
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ITALY
PRI LA MALFA REPLY TO PCI ON TOL~AY'S CAPITALISM
Milan CO1tRZERF DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Dec 78 pp 11-12
~Interview wiCh Ugo La Malfa by Alberto Ronchey: "What Is Capitalism Today?
La M~lfa Anewers Berlinguer and Amendola"; date and place noC given~
, [TexCj Does a capiCaliat crisis exist? What ia capiCalism
today? How can we interpret the shock suffered by western -
industrigl economies following ehe international monetary
system and petroleum crises? Why is the inatability of the =
Italian economy more serious than that in other weatern
industrial societies?
- Theae queationa are the aub~ect of a tenacioua discusaion
promoted by the communist left. The diacussion is parallel
to the confrontation between ICalian politi~al forces on .
� the emergency government and on future proapecta. They
are not merely theoretical queations, or of no intereat to
practical men, whether these be line engineera or bankers,
trade unionisCs o~ businessmen.
According to Ugo La Mal~a's analysis reported here by
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, the discussion on what is called
capitalism is tod&y clouded in Italy by conceptual backward- -
nesa and verbal misunderstandings. Rather he presents an
explanation of capitalism as a simple "instrument" Chat can ~
be directed by different impulaes or conditioning so long
as they do not contradict each other.
The thoughts and practical observations by La Malfa, inter-
- locutor and also contradictor of the left, are based on his ,
numerous experiences: From research work in the research ~
office of Raffaele Mattioli's Banca Commerciale (Commercial
Bank] in the years of the great crisis to the first report
drafted for the De Gasperi government on the system of state
patiticipatior., from trade liberalization decided upon in
1951 as foreign tr~de minister, to the "Note" of 1962 as
budget minister on distortions in Italian development, from
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i-
~nCiitt�1aCionary m~gsurea ae ere~sury min~.ater to the recent -
_ batCle for admis~ion of ICa1y into the ~MS ~Europear~ Mone-
tary System]~
Alber~o Ronchey queeeions him and commenee on his answera.
He hae ~ir~gay aegit wi.th Ghe controver~ial aub~ect of
"C~pitalist crisis" in COItRIERE DELLA SERA and in a telp-
vision debaCe wiCh Giorgio Amendolg.
1-- Ronchey--In hie epeech aC Genoa, ~nrico Berlinguer spnke of "obaolescence" ~
of capiCallsm. Franco Rodano prefera ~l?a new word "fuoriuacita" [flight]. In
L'UNITA, Giorgio Amendola maintained that a"general crieis of capiCaliam
exista." Claudio Napoleoni wrote that we are in "no man~s land" in Italy
eaday. It ie no longer capitallem but eti.ll not soci.aliam. Pietro Ingrao, in
~ his lategt bnok "Criaie and the Third Road" apeake of a crisis of the social
model, of sGate economy which has prevailed in the west, only of trnublea and
difficultiea in the nationa of the east. In a recenC diacueaion, you said
_ inatead, that the capitalisC syetem ia merely Che industrial system and that
you believe this ie neutral per se. What did you mean by this?
_ Lg Malfa--It is necessary to add Co the episodes you recall, Che case of ;
socialiats euch as Lombardi. They Coo speak of the c:isis of capitalism. I
have given much thought in recent years to terminology referring, an one hand, i-
to countries wiCh "real socialiam" and on the other "the capitalisC system."
Accepting such definitiona, even the non-Leninist left forgets that a classi-
_ fication of this kind can only be made if we return to the very old concept '
that holds ehat capitalism exiata where there ia private ownership of the ~
means of produ~cCion and socialiam where there ie no private ownership. But ~
_ if thia is accepted, what progress have we made? Really, are the capitalist
and socialiat systems distinguiahed on the basis of private or public owner- '
ship of the means of production? Yet the left in general, even those so-called
- ideologically up-to-date critica, consider those nations capitalist in which
- privately owned means of production move the mechaniam. ~
Why, then, do I consider the mechanism neutral? Because one syatem as well ;
as another is affected by the forces of the political structure and s~cial ;
struggle.' Now the theory that considere political forces, and even trade union
forces, as auperatructure, while the basic structure ia capitalist, seems to
me entirely without foundation. ~ ~
.
i
Political and aocial forces provide the atimulus. Naturally the atimulus ~
depends on the character of the individual forces. Now, this capitalist system
has been capable of receiving stimuli.~ That is, when we speak of what the
social democraciea have done we say that they have corrected capitalism. More ~
- precisely, what sort of stimulus has it provided? Since they did not claim
that the dietinction between privgte and public ownership was fundamental, and
therefore could choose whether or not to establish national owrership, these
socio-political forces have brought about a redistribution of income.
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Now it ie snid thnt there is g CgpiCaliBC cri~is f~llowing the increase in nil
. pricea. But thaC i~ nnC a capiraliat c~~~.sis. When the syatem suffers an our-
side impact on raw materials, iC ~.s not the syatem that is~ placed in crisie,
but dieCribution of income which the polieical-social forcea have employed in
order to abaorb the blow.
Ronchey--Neverrheless, it can be recalled thaC the price increase for raw '
maCerials, like the four-fold increase of oi1 pricea, is not a r.ause buC an
effecr of the phenomenon which American sociologist Daniel Be11, called the ~
"revolution o� rising expectations." This phenomenon, which is widespread -
in the more productive econamies, was largely bait for those inflationary -
Censions that are the consequence o� competition for distribution of income -
in weatern socieCies. After many years--abour 20 years--of such tensions,
when because of inflaeion the Third Wor1d could no longer accept the terms of
, trade between the west which was an exporter of ~nduatrial products and the
- nationa rhat exporCed raw materials, on a propitious occasion auch as the
Yom Kippur war, there was noC only an external disturbance of western mechan-
isms, but this was provoked by the way the weatern mechaniams functioned.
La Malfa--You talk of rising expectations. It is clear that production was
� atrongly sCimulated to encourage dis~ribution on the damestic market. Then
the expectations concerning Che domestic market were added to the expecta-
tions of the Third World. IC is clear that in the Third World comparison
with the standard of living of the weatern massea has arouaed these expecta- -
tiona, in fact, I must say that even socialist nationa such as China today
think of everything buC keeping Cheir societies in a primitive state and
therefore they compete to achieve an advanced degree of industrializatfon.
� But it must be established precisely what the Third World expectations put
into a state of crisis. The problem of oil is thsC the wesCern sysCem is
deprived of the use of cheap raw materials. The Arab nationa have obtained
a redistribution of income because they have had a monopoly position and they
have imposed it. Do we want to support other areas of the Third World?
Very well, we need do nothing but restrict the conaumption potential within
_ the system. Therefore, to speak of a crisis o� capitaliam when it ia a crisis
that affects Che social mass of the western world is a conceptual error
that leads to distortiona. The oil prices indicate that the system is
' receiving external stimuli, but it is not capitalism that must be aware of
_ this, it ia Che logic of political and trade union control of the system that
must be aware of it. And how is it possible to support the other pre-indus-
trial nations? An absurd situation is reached when capitalism goes to build
a plant in the Third World, whexe there is labor, and this is called exploi-
tation. Instead, capitalism through these transfers, pushes the Third World _
forward, exercising leverage on the low cost of labor.
Ronchey--Concerning use of raw materials, on the other hand, it can also be
recalled thaC, for example, petroleum is good so long as a market capable of
absorbing it exists in the industrial world, and it is produced because there
exists a technolo~y that emerged from the industrial world that can produce
it. Therefore, the price of oil, revalued again in recent weeks, is what
Marx defined specifically as income from monopoly or position.
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La hialfa--Y want to emphg~ize rhe concept ChaC when Che pric~ of raw materi~ls
from Che underdevelnped world increases, the power of conaumption of indus-
trial socieCies is limited but the system ia noC aff~cCed. Now, Co what do
~ we refuse to adapr? At Chis point we find a atraw man, known gs capiCalism,
upon whom Co unlond c~ll respongibility. The crisis of the aid philosophy
nf cnpitnlieC nations is now being discussed. BuC that criais refers Co how
_ the social democracies have posed the problem. What have the social democ-
raciea done? They have provoked arimulus of the syatem presuppoaing, for ,
~xample, the relativel.y 1ow price of raw materials and letting capitalism
implemenC a diatribution on the basis c: growing conaumption on a vereical
order. Naturally, if outside influenc~ is exercised, this diatribuCion can
enter a critical phase. But it is not a crisis of capitalism, iC is a crisis ;
of how the lefCist forces have aeen the terms of the problem. Now suppose '
' Chat I wanC Co aid the Third Wor1d and make interest-free loans assuming ~
'the financial burden for it. If I grant EgypC an inCereaC-free loan, as a
consequence I reduce consumption by Che population of my country. 2hen
capiCalism, the productive aysCem, receives iCe stimulua �rom the Third World !
market instead of from the domestic market.
In Russia ProducCivity Is 'Very Low Because Incentives Have Never Existed
2-- Ronchey--Then what is called capitalism is merely the industrial system, ~
Chat is, an insCrument. But the inaCrumenC tn itself does not err. It can ;
be used wrongly in the same way that it is not the computer,that~errs, but the
- programmer. The machine can be used in various ways. ICs ownership cari be
private, mixed or state, as happens in eastern Europe. It is a maCter of
seeing how and through what ownership system it functions beat and produces -
_ more, but to asaign blame to a machine is animiem within the framework of a ~
theological concepC of economy. Is this what you mean? ~
La Malfa--Exactly. -
Ronchey--Giorgio Amendola speaks as though the instrument had a soul. In fact, ~
he went so far as to assess it in L'UNITA with this phrase: "The survival of i
capitalism infects the whole world." Amendola considers capitaliam even re-
sponsible for world underproduction in terms of the 7 billion people at the end
of the century, as if the problem of dealing with population growth is the re-�
spon~ibility of only one nart of the world and not also of the USSR, China,
Cuba. '
La Malfa--Even here I think things are said that are not true. Let us auppose
a confrontation between the USSR and India. What distinguishes the two nations
_ from the point of view of world problems? The USSR has infinite resources, ~
even though they have been used badly or not used at all during the Czarist
period while today they are exploited through a system whose production is low -
because of bureaucracy and lack of incentives. Nevertheleas, the Soviet
Union's power resides in the relationship between population and resources.
In fact, the relationship between population and resources in India is
frightening. This is a natural condition that can be corrected, but in order
to correct this it is not true that the capitalist system must be abolished.
c
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Th~ sygtem can be aCimulaCed so deeply as to creaL�e a crisis in nationa uaed
ro a high eCandard of living in order to achi~ve improvementi where the s~and-
ard of Living was lower. There is a refusal eo recognize that this is the
problem, -
~ Certainly in India's case Che problem may depend, as in tihe case of Czarise
Russia, nn the inability or failure o� an entrepreneur~.al clasa, that is, on
. the lack of personnel capable of developing a capitalist-style pxoductiive
system, and therefore it is due to backwardness. Perhaps. Nevertheless, a
revoluCion can be undertaken and aims proposed thaC gre morP modern than
Czarism, but not more modern than the exploitation of resources. In short,
the difference in natural cond~tiona does not depend on cgpitalist expecta-
tion. There will be margins of explo3tation that can be corrected. Certainly,
for example, the exploitaCion of rubber in the colonies was useful to Holland,
buC ~olland did not perish becauae it no longer exploies rubber. It found
the solution to the problem precisely in the enCrepreneurial spirit inherenC
to the producC3ve system.
Whnt muaC be clear in western societies is that the system can be ~ffec~ted
by different stimuli, so long as they are not contradictory stimuli. Stimuli
may increase private consumption: By continually increasing salaries, private -
consumption ie stimulaeed. And this is naturally absorbed into the system.
~j Or, by limiting privaCe purchasin~ power through an incomes policy, an accumu-
lation of public resources can be achteved: Then a different direction is -
imposed on the system. What cannot be done, is to in~ect incompatible logics
into the system. This is pure nonsense. �
Ronchey--Many reply that they would acc~pt an incoati^.a nolicy, but this is
- impossible in view of.the "rising expectations" of the working class in the
capitalist syatem, or more precisely, in the industrial system. Also because
effective instruments to moderate consumption of oCher classea do not exist.
La Malfa--If the policy is, as I believe, not a superstructure but a funda-
m~ntal structure, when action by the government and trade unions is designed
to achieve certain objecti.ves, it does achieve them. If I w$nt Fiat to become
oriented towards certain types of consumption, I must tell them first and I
must not create kind of competitive consumption. It is an orientational
maneuver that m~.s~ be mastered.
Ronchey--Sylos Labini, in.his "Essay on Social Classes" observes that tod3y
the wages and profit precisely defined in Italy total less than 50 percent of
the national income. More Chan conventional conflict between salaries and pro- -
fits, there is today a conflict between salaries and the incomes of inter-
mediate classes who are not directly productive and often parasitical.
~ La Malfa--I was the first in Italy to say that the workers were sacrificed for
this kind of policy. But the spread of parasitical classes is a purely politi-
- cal creation and I must sa~ 'that it responds to a backward men~tality. In fact,
parasitiflm is more frequent in underdeveloped societies than in developed.
societies.; Then why complain about capitalism? The trade union, when it was
advancing demands within the productive system, found'resistance because
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n~Curally whoever is responsible for making Che system function has limi~s; .
inste~td it broke Chrough into public instiCuCions where almost no one keeps -
. track of Chinga and where everything ia much easier. Therefore, what are they
Calking about?
_ Ronchey--Under the same roof wiCh rhe confederations there exiats the warker's
_ sa~ary as well as many trade-unionizecl parasitical incomes in Che gdvernment
and semi-government sector which are a burden upon industrial wages. This -
is a contradiction, wt~ich the confederations Chemaelves should deal wiCh. ~
" La Ma1fa--At first in Italy there wa~ an increase of the so-called privileged -
parasiticnl remuneratior~ with a very tii~h coRt that fell upon thp shoulders
of the working class becauae the businessman, burdened by high taxes Co main-
- tain unproductive public apparatusea, tried to unload them. Then the workers
' began their action and this system, which is neutral, suffered sCimuli which
were incompatible. I recail that years ago I engaged in polemics with
Moravia, who had wriCten in one of his articles that oura is a Bourbon state
~ because Fiat wanta nothing but a Bourbon state. I asked iahy must FiaC wanC
a Bourbon state, from whict;~ it would gain nothing but higher coats. If
anything, the political for~e~ desire az Bourbon atate. My opinion is that
when a political class does not underst~:id these things everything is ruined: -
First the admin~istrative apparatus and then the productive sysCem.
Ronchey--1'ou may have observed that now even the language of Chinese leaders
seems more realistic and pragmatic than that which still pre~�ails among those -
who apeak of a"general crisis of capitalism." 'Deng Hiaoping, on watching
the Island of Singapore transformed by 2 million Chinese emigranta into a~
little Asiatic Switzerland commented: "We will not have your atandard of
living even by the, year 2000." In Tokyo, where he went to sign the Sino-
Japanese treaty, he recognized the impossibility of denying Chinese� economic
backwardness and said: "It is useless for an ugly woman to pretend.she ia ~
beautiful." There have been "tazebao" [wall newspapers] containing questions ~
like: "Why is our economy not on the level of that of Taiwan run by the
_ Chiang Kai-shek clique?" ~
I,a Malfa--More than ra '
p gmatism, it is the understanding of how a productive
system functions.
Ronchey--Lucio Colletti defines the thesis'of a general criais of capitalism
. as "an ideological illusion," which to a g'reat extent derives from Leniniam.
In a debate published very recently by T~aterza, entitled "Socialism Divided,"
Colletti says: "I believe that the view of this crisis now depends upon ~
assuming Lenin's analysis of imperialism as valid. Here, decisive weight is
attributed to the thesis of 'the last stage' of capitalism, the talk about ~
'putrescence' and 'parasitism'." '
But Lenin has only translated this ideological vision onto the terrain of
so-called imperialism. I believe the origin of misunderstandings about how
thc capitalist system works is to be found in Marx.
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Rnnch~y--Uur M~rx w~rn~d Ch~C Capitdli~m cannoe ~xi~~ wiehnu~ ~onCinu~ily
r~vnlutiunizing the mnnn~ c~t' hrdduc:C~dn, el~~refor~ r~laeion~ of prod~ceion,
eh~r~fnr~ the CdCtility nf ~ocinl relgtinn~, In f~ce, h~ ~e~rt~d wieh th~
~t~eemant eh~t ie h~d generuted "prnduceiv~ fnrc~~ who~~ numb~r and impore~n~~ -
cxC~ed~d wh~t ~;ould hnv~ b~en done by ~11 p~~e g~n~retinng."
Lg M~lf~--Bu~ Marx'g nnely~is did noe perceiv~ ehe r~~1 dyngmiCg of th~ ~y~-
rem, nor did it eeg iCg eermingl d~v~lopment Che poinC of Ch~ catg~trophp.
~dnchpy--Sahump~C~r ~lso fnreoaw a catastrophe, alr,hough of ~ differ~2nt eyp~,
when he wroee that capiCalism pr~duc~g g SnC3A1 ~tmosph~r~ hd~Cil~ Cn ie~~lf,
which in Curn produn~e polici~g Ch~t do noC permit iC to function.
Lg Malfa--Cereginly, by estgblighing e hierarchic~l r~1~Cion~hip wiChin Che
buginegg gygCem, cepitaliem nlgn produCe~ Chpge gttitudeg. BuC iC produce~
them with the decieive concurrence nf idenlogical pre3udice~. I would lik~
Co knnw why'Japan did not experience this feeling of intolerance Co the gys-
eem ro the same exrent as other nations, I believe there wae a different
, ideological influence. And the Americang? They do not have the fe~ling df
dependence, of eubaervience in revolt. In~read th~y have a gense of the
differenC function ex~rciged in Che produceiv~ system, therefore ther~ ig no
rebellidn ngainst Che entrepreneur, everyone doea hig ehare, and they ~ngure
for ehemgelves a standard of living they conaider satigfactory.
Ronchey--In Itnlian common language there prevails what Max Weber already
defined as "the ingenuous definiCion of the concept of capiCaliam." According
_ to Weber, the thirst for profit, the aspiration Co earn a~ much money as
poesible~ in itself has c~othing in common with capitalism: "This aepiration
is found among waitere, doctors, coachmen, arCista~ ladies o� easy virtue,
~ corruptible employees, soldiers, bandits, crusaders, gamblera, beggars, we mgy
" say all sorts and conditions of inen, in all timea in all the nations of thp
e~rth." Wt~at distinguishea capitalism instead ia the profitable organization
of labor. Nevertheleas, tti~ "ingenuous conception" still prevails in Italy
and in South America and is widespread in France itaelf, and in general in
t}~e Catholic countriea. Instead it does not prevail in nationa more influenced
by Protestants even if the question of whether Weber's explanations are really
persuasive is controversial. But that notion of capitalism contributes to
provoking rebellicn and tt?e conditions that prevent cgpiCalism from function-
ing. To the point that, between maximalization of lossee and the totality of
- social conflict, we have the worst of what ie called socialism and of what ia
called capitalism.
l.a Malfa--I will tell you something else regarding Max Weber's concepta. What
i9 typicnl in the capitalist productive system is the desire to reinvest. I,
for example, see busines~men who could live a life of ease and luxury but who
- riee ut 6 am, go to the plant, study, run to the markets. Yet often there is
n feeling that even there there is a creative passion, as in the politician
or the artist.
The Leaders Are in a State of Crisis
3-- Ronchey--During his lifetime, Keynes said that if the temptation [o run
a risk did not exist--the 9atisfact 22 of building a plant, a railroad, a
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_ Cnrm--ti~rr~ wuuld nc~e b~ mr~ny invr.~tmpnt~ eh~ �ur~ r~~u~e n� ~u1d ~n1~u-
t~tinu~ lic~w~vc~r, lnnk ~e wh~e C1~udi~ N~poi~oni ~~y~t th~~ in iecrly eod~y w~ '
ur~ ln ~"nd-twn'~ 1and," and eh~e i~ eru~ to ~dm~ ~xe~ne~ ~he fundam~nCal
lgw n~ c~pi~~ligm w~g gumm~d up by Weber in ~ f~mdu~ ~x~mp1~: "~er ~ix pr,und~
~terling per ye~r ydu Cgn h~ve Che ug~ nf 1U0 pound~, pravided ya~i ~re ~ man
_ whn ig knnwn for. hie fdr~~i~he gnd hnne~ey." Nnw, in~te~d, in i~~ly ~rediC
ig grdneed bpG~ugp ~ public or ~~mi-public ent~rprig~ in financigl difficulty
cnnn~t b~ thrpgt~ned by b~nkrune~y, ehug muleipLyin~ th~ degtructidn ~f
regaur~e~ whiCh ~~uld b~ u~~d f~r Ch~ gener~l gond.
l~~ M~lf~~-L~e u~ get ~gid~ publi~ ~nternri~~g, ~nd 1~C ug C~ke the ~y~C~m nf
privat~ ~wn~r~hip. ~'h~r~ i~ eh~ ~ecumuln~ion, r~inv~~CmenC, brn~denin$ of
th~ m~rk~r. ~ut ther~ i~ aiso a b~tt~ar ~t~ndard c~f living. if i coneid~r
eh~ eompl~x of inenm~~ and th~n congid~r how Agn~11i liv~~, what d~ I Care
~~bnuC Chi~7
k~nchey--Th~ argument c~rrieg wiCh it tw~ quegeion~. ~irgt: If for example
in 1945 Fi~t h~d b~~n n~tionalizpd or handed over to Finmeccanica, what wo~ld
it b~ ttlddy? S~conds Som~ high individugl income~ cnn pose ethical-social
ur pgychologic~l probl~m~, but how much do they weigh on rhe economy'g qu~n- ~
eitative ec~l~?
La Malfa--When you gn to the Soviet Union ~nd hear that th~ bureaucratic
org~nization we~tee an infiniee amount of r~sources and energy, you learn that
certain individual incomes co~t ~ lot lese than the non-income of the bureau-
cr~~ic 8ystem~ Now, let us spe~k of th~ public sector in Italy. One of the
things I have noted in Italy ie that IEtI [Indu~trial Reconstruc-
tion In~titutej functioned so long as it was modelled on the organization of.
the so-called capitali~t productive eygtem. ~1hen did IRI eCop functioning? ~
When degenerative elementg, introduced preciaQly by the political forces ar,d ,
trade unions, shifted the model of public enterprise away from a position ~f '
competition in relation to the private syetem. That ie, at a certain point
s~e had a syatem of public companie~, which ie gimilar Co Che Soviet syeter~, -
which produced very little. Add to this that when the entire syatem is s:ate i
controlled, as happens in Ruseia, at least production is low for everyone. ;
But in our country two systems coexiat which are in flagrant conflict. !
Ito�chey--IE we consider factorg in Italy that made the capitalist induatrial
ingtrument largely unugable, I ehould also like to recall eome notes by
Cuido Caxli in the "Interview on Ca~italism" with Eugenio Scalfari, in which
he abserves thet Itelian society oacillates between backwardnesa and advance- '
men[. The primary backwardness is in the adminiatrative apparatus, public
and social eervices~ in areas of inefficiency and parasitism that impose -
suffncating burdens on induatry: "However, on the level of values, ideologies,
nfeds, we are very advanced. We have the most advanced feminis~ movement in
Curope, the strongeat European communist party, the nwat combative trade union
irt Europe, the most revolutionary student movement in ~urope, the highest
number of college graduates in Europe." Carli eaid, "This is a situation that
I define as schizophrenic." But these same factors, asseased in this way by~
Carli, instead induce Pietro Ingrao to ask hiaiself in the essay "The Masses
snd Power" Whether the Italian case is not one of backwardness or exaggerated
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edvaneam~nt concerning problems eh~e mm~eutiing in otiher natione ae we1i.
It i~ under~tood that for Ing~~o, Italy i~ p~rhap~ in rhe vanguard of an
hietoricgl proce~~ tanding to change we~Cern eo~ieeie~~ The ~ama concept
i~ r~peated ~nd developed by Ingrao in "Cri.gie and eh~ Third ttoad," where
he d~9CU88g6 Ch~ crie3e o� the ~ocial modei, of acdnomy, of governmeneg
pr~velent in ehe western world.
La Mg1f~--It ie u~eleae, it seem~ eo m~, Co gCeempt rheoretical fl3ghe~.
There ie noChing in what happen~d in Italy ehae could indicate a vanguard -
nwveue~ne. Uf what? A pol3ttcal claee mu~t consid~r--and in thi~ T con~ider
my~~lf mnr~ Mgrxiet than many--how the productiv~ ~ygCem worke. M~rx'~
, method invnlves analyeie fir~t of all. If id~ae abaut how Che ~yetem func-
tiong are noC clear~ it ie us~le~g to gay that you are in the v~nguard.
Certainly 3t can aleo be eaid rhat wage~ are an independent v~rigble, but
thi~ l~ade only to the conclusion that we don't know how to eneure the future
for youth, don't know how to increase investmenC beeauae we did not know how
to meaeure the capacity of the syetem in r~gpect of the etimuli we pr~duced.
The crieie ie precieely here. There ie ealk abouc a masa educational eystem
and a mass soci~Cy. But what ie rhis society really? In Italy we have a
~dciety which is a formless mass. Not a ma~g eociety, buC iCe caricature.
While the producCive sysCpm wa~ being weakened, accesg Co.higher education
w~e being liberalized. Th3.~ w~g a contradiction in terms. Then they say
that the cri~is involves capitalism. But 3t is the leederghip class who do
thingg that do not mak~ aense.
_ It Is Not the System That Cannot So~,ve Pr~blems: It Is the Governments
Thgt Do Nnt Govern
4-- Ronchey--I don't know whiCh theoretical achool can be followed by those '
who consider cerCain ob~ective conditiona, largely quantitative, as banal
data. In any case, Ingrao maintaine that Italy ie a"laboratory" in search of
a"third road," an expression which in addition to e'erything else is poorly
chnsen because the Czechs were the firgt communists to use it. But Norberto
Bobbio has already observed how difficult it is to pretend to be those who
found laboratory solutions for the future, in respect to the more advanced
~ nations, in a backward nation not only in economic institurions but homeland
of the Mafia, of patronage, the most atrocious terrorism. In L'UNITA, Biagio
~ de Ciovanni has insinuated that those who use the concept of backwardneas are
conservativea, often interested in confusing conflict with backwardness.
_ Yet wt~en there is a situatiun of conflict that does not make means commen-
surate to ends, it leads preciaely to backwardness.
La Malfa--Possessing an instrument that could have been used for certain ends,
we dieorganized it by overloading it with impoasible burdena and creating
expectations in a vacuum. The result of this is that Che social crisis
~ increasingly turns upon itself. As a result, at a certain point, even the -
PCI can no longer bear the crieis. As soon as it enters the system it is
charged with betrayal. This is the result of not having given enough thought
t~ things. Capitaliam has dem~~strated that it can and has supported the -
increase of raw materi~ls be::ause it acts. I think the true problem of tl;ese
industrial,societ~es is that the rising expectations cannot continue. Those -
expectations must be halted in order to inaert new generations into the
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~Cdn~mie pro~~~~. If noe, iC i~ nor th~ cepie~list ~y~t~m Chae d~~~ nae o
~uac~~d i,n ~olving its problpmd, it i~ Ch~ gnv~rnm~nt~ CheC n~ longp~ ~ucc~~d
in gov~rnin~. And i~hould like eo propo~e another ex~mple c~� tih~s~ di~fi-
cultie~, AC g c~rt~in poinC, ev~n C~chnc~ld~ic~1 progr~~~ i~ pu~h~d by wag~
pre~~ur~~. gue w~ mu~t be ngr~ful ehgt ehi~ prac~~~ do~~ not ~ec~l~r~ee ~
C~~hnoldgi~~1 pro~e~~~~ b~ynnd thp potenti~l of ~,~oci~Cy. ~mploym~nC, whi.ch
xt nne time wae only our probl~m, ig in facC becoming a more wideepre~d problem~
, Ronchey--I~ this the denger of a t~chnology thaC ie puehed toward an exceePive
capit~l in~~n~ity ~nd ~o ~n ~b~orbti,nn nf labor th~t ie Coo low?
La Ma1fa--Yeg, gttd ~0 long a~ the n~~d for emplnymenC i~ ~bgorbed by eo-called
Certiary eervices, Che criaie is noe alweye visible. But we muet be wary of '
rechnological acceleraCion in a country that hae exCenaive unemployment or '
black [unreportedJ labor. This black labor, or what is callpd the eubmerged
_ IC~ly, is etill a regource for which even the communisCe cen take pleasure
- ~in the credit,balance of payments. BuC for all of that it ie a eubmer;;~+d
`~Caly. .
Ronchey--It ie always repeated that the ~itua.r,ion of conflict is a phenomenon ~
of all induetrial eocietiea. BuC there ie ofCen the riek of confuaing phyaio-
ingical conflicC in other countries with our own which ie pathological. In
Ita1y~ the crucial question has for ~ome time been Che pretension of antici-
pating innovatione to aolutions~regarding natione that have far arore advanced '
inatitutions. It ie sufficient to recall thaC table by Giorgio Fua in "Em- ~
ployment and Productive Capacity: The Italien Reality," the net stock, the ,
fixed capiCal of enterpriaes per capita in various countries, is compared.
In 1960 Italy's index was 100, France 162, Germany 177, the United Kingdom
149, the United States 261. Yat beginning in the 1960's there already were
demands for the "European Salary" neglecting the enCire logic by which wagee
are correlaCed with productivity, which in turn ie correlated with the use
of fixed capital. ~
La Malfa--In fact my criticiem of thoae dp~�Q^aQ ~4 ~'hst the pointa of arrival (
and the points of departure cannot be confuaed. !
i
Ronchey--Reading Ingrao's eesay, the firat ob~ection comes precisely from ,
Marxiat theaes which hold that the most developed induatrial nation does
notl~ing but demonatrate to the lese developed nation the image of its future. '
It will not always be thie way, but how can the reverae happen? The known i
response to such ob~ection~ in general ie that one mus[ Se aware of "vulgar '
Marxiam" or theoretical economics gince the development of productive forces ~
ia not the only problem. It certainly will not be the only problem. Would
it not perhaps be a aufficient but not necessary condition? �
La Malfa--At a certain point we become more Marxist than the Marxiats in
examining reality.
Ronchey--Rut they, who so speak are often literary or emotional Marxists, have
a mental reservation. a profound prejudice. What they really think, and at
times do not say openly merely out of politeness, is that hiatory in any case
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i~ on eheir ~id@. And yau ~r~ Chp ~n~my of Ch~ p~op1~, yau oppo~~ Ch~ d~~ir~~
of the people. A1tdg~th~r Ch~n y~~ ~r~ confrnnC~d wiCh thi~, dnly thi~. ~ome
Cime 8~0, fr~llowing ~ digCU~~inn with Am~nd~l~ on th~g~ ~ub~ece~, tha film
- direcCdr ~~io P~Cri tel:,phon~d m~ ~nd ~~id: "Li~t~n, wh~e dd you pi~n to dn
wiCh th~ poor efC~r ~11?" I r~pli~d th~e eh~ poor h~v~ in~r~~~~d in recpnr
ye~r~, th~refor~ I gm conn~rn~d pr~~i~e1y gbouti ehe pnnr. An int~ll~ctu~1
di the left h~e written thnt by r~~~oning on Che ba~ie of dat~, no consi.d~rg~
tion 3~ given to Ch~ f~ct that eh~ world g1~e h~~ f~~ling~, irraCional impul~eg~
if i~ had been up to us, Anna K~renin~ wduld noC hgv~ ehzown hpr~elf under the
train, eh~ would have boarded the tr~in. I r~plied thae p~rh~p~ in ~ ghore
time the train wi11 no l~nger pass thrdugh her~~
La Malfa--We made the dyn~micg of eh~ productive ~yseem the center of our
analy~i~. If they depart from this ~naly~ie, th~y movp Ch~ir force~ in a
vaeuum and recommend ideals Chat havp nn poggibiliCy of ~uccee~. But their's
ie not ~ fe~ling, it ia a pure ideoingieal error which l~adg gociety to die-
inte~ration. 'Chis was a nation of hi.gh indugtrial development, in rhe sixrh
or seventh place. Now, while we are 16~ing that place, we are plann3ng on
propo~ing to Che Europeans a reduction in work3ng hour~.
Rnnchey--A kind of double etandgrd is d~v~loping. ~or ex~mple, Eugenio
Scalferi wrote a book, "The Ruling Itace," illu~er~ting the failure of Italian
~id policie~. BuC then he p:;,tests with indignation, in a discussion on EMS,
because Giacard d'~staing and Helmat Schmidt conceded noChing out of Italian
aid policies to the European proce~~. Is this not a contradiction?
La Melfa--Not only is there contradiction, but at times I have the impression
that we are speaking about our problems as if the othera did not know where
they come from. We claim to ob~ectivize our difficulties, while the others
knnw very well that there are not ~~nly ob~ective difficultiea, but also thoae
that depend on ~ur sub~ective behawior.
5-- Ronchey--The other European governments often have seen themselves as the
"rich man's club," which ia wrong by definition. Isn't thia also an expres-
sion of homage to the Leninist conditioned reflexes? .
La Malfa--ThaC could be said if we think back to the ideologies superficially
. ini~erited from the past. The Leninist iden:ogy could aerve a country that '
had enormous resources, a large number of `^r~era, a backward leadership clasa. M
This experience has no value for us. Even admitting that we must study what
happened in other times and places, we must above all examine the kind of
society in which we funcCion, whaC are its constituent elements and what are
the mechanisms to interpret and perhaps correct them. But we cannot escape
elsewheYe, in the world of Leninist conditioned reflexes, or in legends of
aelf-administration, as the socialists claim. But does 'it seem to you that I
could substitute this mechanism with self-administration? If it were up to
mc I would give them the self-administration of the railroads.
Ronchey--Then, modern technology is far more complex than the railroads. In
order to understand how much an experim~nt in industrial self-administration
costs, today it is sufficient to take a trip to Yugoslavia.
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- Lr~ Mnlfa--L~ek fle Ch~ ~~1E-~dminiger~eic~n of n~w~p~p~rg, iC dd~~ noe ~~pm t~
m~ ehne ~m~11 ~m~unt~ ~r~ ~uffie3~nC ed fin~nc:p Ch~m~ And, in d~m~nding ~p1f- -
~dmin3aeraeion, what doe~ ehi~ docerin~ of perm~n~nC eonflice me~n? In urd~r
~o hav~ a di~l~ceic b~tw~pn forr~~, ehe ob~eceiv~ mu~t b~ ~i~~r.
~on~hey--ie ~~~mg tn m~ Cher~ ~r~ Cwn different w~v~ 1~ngCh~. Ynu gn~lyx~
Ching~ nn g rgtional level. But her~ myths and gymbol~ cnter intn p1gy. And
we cgnnoC ~ep a pr~gmaCiC Curning pointi. In pg~e ye~r~ in Chin~, U~ng Nigoping
was remov~d from offic~ b~~~ug~ he h~d ~gid: "Ie mgk~g no diff~rpnc~ wh~rh~r
ehe cat i~ b1~ck or white; it is impor~ant that h~ know hnw Co c~tch mice."
Tod~y Ueng pr~vails in China but in IC~1y w~ continue to dignu~s wheeh~r Ch+2
Cat i~ black or white, that i~, w~ di~cuge ideologic~l symbols. And here I
nwe you nn ob~ection~ You have alwaye ~aid that it was not impnrtant ~t g11
ro agk the communiete td renounce Lenin3~m~ They cgn k~ep eheir Leninism eo
long a~ they stage one lpgg ~Crike. And in~t~~d, i� thpy keep Lenini~m, ie -
tg m~r~ lik~ly thar Chere wi11 be one more etrike.
La Malfa--I said that recalling that the Catholic Church, even in renewing
itself had to maintain sanctugri~s and Cabernacleg. It has demonsCrated this
Co us over thousands of yeare. It muat be under~tood that a party, even when .
iC r~newg iCself, cannot obliteraCe a picCure.
Ronchey--Now let ug state xn hypothesie: ThaC many communist leaders know
thege things very we11, even becter Chan we do. After all, the capitalism
that functiona as you say could alen be what aome among them describe as
gocialiam~ And after all, if at the origin~of capitalism there ia the capac-
ity to exercise leverage on what Adam Smith deacribed as self-interes+. in
the service of Cha general inCerest, already in Smith's bible on capiCaliem
it was explained that aelf-interest had to be properly understood: And today
the self-intereat that ia well underatood, durable, certainly is not that '
consumeriam which you call "vertical development of individual coneumption." -
- Let us suppose that the problem of the communiets is something elae. They
are between the oppoeition and the government. For Che time being, they
- cannot take over government, and they cannot return to the opposition. They
_ know that they are wearing down and in this phase of diacouragement in their
militant base, equipped with certain conditioned traditional reflexes, they
have to say that indeed they are in trouble but rheir perennial enemy, capi-
talism, is dying. They have to say this. Therefore, the offensive on the
sub~ect of "general crisis of capitaliem" is a work of ideological comfort
and the moat difficult teat the PCI has faced in 30 years. '
La Malfa--It would be less dangerous to say Chat Marx is right and hia think-
- ing iH always valid. To say that capitaliam is in a state of crisis and we
will replace it generates an expectation. If I told the worker that capital-
ism is in a atate of crisis, he interpreta this as he must interpret it, that '
is, that that organization of production muat be eliminated. Now, if I give
the impreasion of not being able to eliminate this, it is uaeleas and dangerous
ko create this attitude.
Etonchey--Alao because no one ever told us how ta eliminate it. Rather, already
in the 1960's Luigi Longo had said Chat communists in Italy were not seeking
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n~aw erc~~~ of ~t~Ce eonerol. in r~~~nC y~~r~ Gi~r~3d Am~ndol~ ~nd eh~ C~SP~
~C~nr~r for 9Cudi~~ i.n ~conomic ~oiicy (PCI)j hav~ confirmed Ch~ti Ch~ prdbl~m
w~~ not aC ~li more ~tate control. Th~n g~rlingu~r pro~l~.imed Chat cgpiC~lism
h~d en rom~ tn an ~nd. Am~ndoi~ ~nnnunc~d th~ g~n~ral crisi~ of c~ptt~li~m,
gnd what did tti~ p~ople und~rgt~nd4 Th~t ~ mixed economy mu~t be d~f~ated,
La M~1fa--Thig generate~ forms of h~rr~d, unl~~~h~a cnnflict, gnd eh~ir ~wn
policy becomes difficult. ~haC i~, ~ picture, a tabernacle can b~ reCained;
I repe~C ~hae the Church nu~int~ined all, but c~re mueC be exerciged in det~r-
mining what prevenCe the pr~ci~~ ~v~lu~eidn df aontemporary problems. _
COPYRIGHT: 1978 ~ditorial de1 "Corriere d~11a S~ra" g.a.e.
6034
CSO: 3104
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~ox o~~ic~nL us~ orn,Y
s~eix
PSIIC DfI'PJDi~D ZN'1~D PRO ~ ANTS~' LII~II~IBT' ~ACTIONS
- rraar~a cnr~cto ~ 6 3n spant~ 24 nea 78 p 34
~Teat�] Offioially, there no faations 3n the PSITC ~IIniFied
Sooiali.et Party of Cataloni~, tha partyr of Catalan Communiete.
_ Nevertheleee~ the I~eniniat~ vere vio~orious at the laet party conferenoe.
(3regrorio Lopem Raimundo~ tt.4 president of the P3tTC, and Antoni Cu~ierrez~
the eeoret~ty g~naral~ are cc:netantly ~aying that "~here ie no faational.
war" Sn the party; however~ the etand eupported by the Leninist eeators
~ron out in the lsteet aonrerenae ,~f the peart,y of Catalan Communiet~.
The propoeal imrolved e~calueive membership in the Workera Commiseione
(C000) a~nd at the same time an end to gupport for tha unified teaobers'
and publia adminietration workere' unione (USTFX! and STAC). The debate
wa~ lengfi~y and profound. 2lie ultimate vote waa: 10Q in fav~or oP the
- Pm~g~, 71 ag~inet and 11 abstentfone.
From I,avapiee to the PSQO
One of thoee rrbo voted against wae fllture PSQC d~::rputy Miguel Nune~~ who
xill replaae reaignit~g Antoni Gutierrez~ Who prefera to devote himeelf to
Catalan politias. 8nn~s aom~ented to this magazine that "all opinions -
are valid in the PStTC, and e~f`tier they are debated and voted on, � the one
that g~etg ma~ority ba+aking xill be heeded by the rest of the par~y. We
werit ta have an open debate on everything, but it hee to b~ing us
tog~ether; otherwiee, the party might eventually break up."
E1ren though he was born in the Madrid distriat oF I,avapiea, Nunez
coneidere himself 100 percent Catalan. The eoa of a lePtist administrative
employee~ he began reading Victor Hug~n and An~?tole France ae a somall child. -
After atuc~}ring at the Piariet eahool I,.a Corrala~ he entered industrisl
- eahool aud earned the degree of ea~pert accouritant. Parallel to his
etudies, he aleo begari hie political career, whtch laaded h3m ia ~ail
erid in ezile. In 1956 he was placed on the Adminietrative Gbmmittee
of the P30C. He did not ge~ ea identification aard until the year that
Fraaoo ct~ed. $e ves granted s~eport ~n 1976.
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~ox n~~ictnL us~ nN~.Y '
A fallow prieon ~nma~e of M3gve1 NArnandez and a oloee ~riend of Lopez
Raimundo~ Nuna~ i'eel~ ~ha~ the Ca~alan Communiet Party ~,e at pr~~en~
3n the mid~~t of a~r~aeformation= "We are patt3ng aride t~h~ long~~andin~
eeotarian errorg ~ha~ W~ inherited from our ~ime in the undergrowzd. -
There ~re a great ma~~y differing ~dea~ in the party noW~ but there are
no faotione= i~~~ ou~ of t~he queetion."
In the v3err of ~he future deputy~ who aill not b~e abie to take hte
Bea~ in ~arl3ament unt~l the end. of the month becauee of bure~aratia
probleme~ people beg~n ~alking abou~ Lenini~t and soo3al demoaratia
faatione "a~ eoon as w~e etas-red debating Poin~ 15 in ~he Comoruniet
Party bylaw~, whiah dealt with abandoning ~he torm Leninism. This
iseue has been simplified a great deal and, fl~rthermoro~ it~ well~ 3t,
well~ it doeen't exlet~" he e~ammered 1e~ughing.
Dreeeed in a d~urk-broan i,vrtleneck raeater and a tai11 aeave rroolen
~aaket~ Nune~ want~d to maks 3t quite aloar t~hs~ in the PSBITC at preeent
"there i~n't a~r eort of monolithi.o approsahf on the aontraay~ ~re have
_ ~n ong~oing~ opan eund enriching debate."
A Can of Wotms
He then anzwunoedt "We have nov begun the etruggle ag~ainet intransig+enae.
ti?e aannot alloa there to be incLtviduals rrho want to impoae their ideae ~
on the ma~ority~ whiah, unfortunately~ had been happening in reaent
timee. Intraasig~enae ie like terroriem, beaauee 3t hae s epiraling
effeat~ and thet~ no one aan etop it. It's a really eare~ted up thing~ ~
and it vinde up bei~g a real ~sro~ xith irxotion4l thing~ g+oing oa~ '
and then politiaal probleoms are overshado~?ed."
~
~ Miguel Nunez~ r~ho has aleo worked in the Conmuni~t Party in Andaluaia ~
arid the Basque Country, eoneidere himself a Elvcoao~uniet t~om head to =
toe, althou~ more than once "I have been deecribed ss the head of
the Lenintete." Deepite everythfng, ho~never~ he thirilce t~hat E~iroaommuniem ;
still has mar~yi thinge to reeolvss "The trnth is that mar~y t~i.ngs that
used to be inviolsble have been questioned, and therefore ae have
t~heoretioal gapa to bridge." ~
He ie eepecially interaeted in the aongrees that the Italiaa Co~aiuiiet .
Party ie g~oing to hold early nert year and feele that in political
mattere the Italiaae ai~e very aetutes "At the nezt aongreee they are I
g~oing to take the term Mar~ciem-Leniniem o~st of the bqlaas, but there
will be a clauae that will continue to support it 'as s matter of
conscience.' In other a~rde, they're taking it out ia order to aarry
forxard t~heir polioy, but they aren't going to have the conf~rontatione
that xe bad here, because they~ll contirn~e backing it~ albeit symbolically...
Whst happened to ua ie that xe puehed it through by foree~ and ~re had -
our problems becauae af it."
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Nune~ f~el~ ~~hst a#~ee flow o~ informat3on i~ e~~eiitial in ~a pa~rtys
"~'?~Sg wqy~ there i~ no reaeon for speou],ation.'~ Thug, during tha PSUC'e =
e~oond aonFerenae 3n the middle of ~hie mon~h a11 of the meet3nge xere
_ open-door. "So rihat? The rrorld dtdn~~t aome to an end~ hardly~ and ~
nawemen were able to f3nd out about ab8oiuteiyr everyth3ng,~~ he prool~tmed.
Failing Marke for the IICD ~Demoora~Gia Centex Onion,~
Th~ aonforenae'e poli~ical reaolution~ Mhioh wn pa~,~od With 223 votee
~for and 18 abetentiona, expreesea great aonoern "over the unaert~3nty
and indeoSeion ~hut are oonditi~ning the immediate polltioal future"
- and aaous~ee the IICD of having no+ ;,et drawn up an e].eatoral aalsndeur~
of not nomplying ~rith the Moi;al~~a Paate~ of reftieing to negntiate the -
new eaonomio pac~a and of denying authority to pre-autonomy entitiee~
�epecially ~Ehe Baeque Cotuitry. -
After oondemning terrori~rn and a~tampts at ar~ ineurr ction~ the Catalan
Communi~te ea3 that ~hey vould eupport a UCD-PSO~a [~8panieh Soaiallet
Workere Party�~ gbvernment that promi~ed to implement a program Wrorked
out by all the pa~rliamentary group~.
The attention of Catalan Comoauniete, hovever~ ie foouaed~on the munioipal
eleotions~ in which they rrould like to run togrt~h~r ~dth ~the Sooialiete
and Demoaratia Convergenae, Pu~jol' ~ party. A1tho~ngh a unite~d f5~ont aould
oome sbout in emall towns espeaially, beaause in mar~y oasee a gingle party
i~ unable to form a team due to 4 laak of people and resouraes, unity
is almo~t impoerible in larger toWne. It aae Nune$~B opinton that among
them~ the Soaialiete arid Pu~ol'~ nationalfete~ they aould garner 70
psroent of the votee, but the Sooialiete gre atill hesitaut about ~uob
aa option. Nunez aommented that they etill d~ aot have a aandidate Por
_ Baraelona~ aithou~ thsre had been telk of Jordi Sole Tura.
8743
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~
i~ait ~~t~ i~� rr t nt, u~tt~; nNt,v
SPAIN
CTA Al~~ILIATBU BASQUB LEADER INTBItVIEWBD BY ITALIAN MAGAZINB ~
Rome PANORAhfA in Italian 14 Nov 78 pp 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 241 ;
[Interview with Federico Krutwig Sagredo by Gian Piero De11~Acqua in Val
d~Aosta, italy; date not given; '~Always and Oniy Basque"] '
i
[Text] How 3s Basque terrorism difforent from other ~uropean terrorisms?
How have relations between the Basques and the Spanish changed since the ~
death of Franco? How can the Basque issue be resolvedY One of the historic
leaders of the ETA ~Basque Fatherland ~nd Liberty Group] answers these questions.
Last July there was talk of outright civil war: a war between the easque
people and the~ authority of Madrid~ whfch ropresents that '!Spanishness~~
that the Basques reject, cailing for regionai autonomy as their minimum
objective and for national soveroignty as their maximum objective. What
touched it off was a police charge upon a group of young Basque nationalists
at the bullring in Pamplona, Navarra~ where they were attending the second
byllfight of the ffesta of San Firmino. From the arena,.where the crowd ~
was at first divided over the youths~ demonstration but quickly united
against the police, the battle spread into the streets. From Pamplona ~
it spread to the other Basque citfes and to all Spain. There were 2 killed
and 200 wounded, a bloodbath followed by a spiral ~~F attacks and repression
that continues up to the present. !
i
At the center of the conflict between the Basque country and Spain is an inde-
pendent, ciandestine organization formed during the Franco years that has :
turned the heritage of Basque nationalism into an armed struggle. What are ~
the roots of this armed nationalism? How is Basque terrorism different from !
other European terrorisms? How have 'the relations betNeen the Basques and
the Spanish changed since the ~-:ath of Franco? I~hat are the prospects for i
soiving the Basque question?
PANORAMA asked these questions of the most prestigious leader of Basque
nationalism, Federico Krutwig Sagredo. He was born on a farm in the Bilbao '
province in 1922, is considered one of the historic leaders~of the Ei'A,
studied linguistics and is former secretary of the Academy of the Basque
Language; in the 1950~s Krutwig Was forced to leave Spain, where he was
nccused of insulting the government and inciting subversion. He went into
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~ ~xi]e in France and H~igium, whrr~ h~ now reside~. Krutwig profoundly
influ~nced th~ dav~Inpment n~ D~7sque n~tidnnlism with hi~ writi.ngs;
"Busaony, u Di~l~ctlc Study n Natiidnality" (nu~nos Air~s, ~9b2),
"l1~sCOny ~nd thn New Curope" (nt~ydnnc, 1974); f~r some time he h~s been
working nn ~ pnlitiC~1 fnnt~sy nnv~l, whi~h is ~~r~th~r ~ong, mueh more
th~n 'W~r gnd Pe~ce~; it tQlis wh~t future ~uropean society will be like."
It w~11 be published in 2 language~, Bttsque and Spanish.
K~utwig S~gr~do answered PANORAMA~s que~tions during a v~e~tion sp~nt in
V~1 d'Ansta b~fore returning to his homel~nd with the passport he had
finally obt~~ned from the new Sp~nish governm~nt gfter ~ qu~rter century
of exile, Nere are his gnswers,
' (pu~stionJ Mr KrutwiA, wh~t do th~ B~squ~s want? Wh~t is th~ sub~t~nce
nf the Besqu~ prob~em today?
_ [Answer] 7'he same as alweys. Up to 1860 the Bnsque co.+ntry had its own
law~, which were different from those of the rest of Spain. We want them
b~ck. it has had experience with the Castilian administration and has
found its own is much b~tter, it h~s had experience with th~ Spgnish
police and conside~s it neither moxe nor less than an occupation force..
It h~s seen the French Bgsque country ~lmost depopulated, there is less
work there, and has been able to do nothing; it has even had to accept
the immigration o~ a half million Spaniards, which is a huge percentage
out of 3 million Basques, beyond ali reason~ble 2imits with the danger
of fomer~ting a racist backlash.
Why not create a balance between the 2 Basque regions on either side of
the Pyrenees~ Because there is a border down the middle. Isn~t that crazy?
Even the EEC is considering the problem of economic complementarity between '
bardcring regions in different countries.
_ (QuestionJ How do the Basques differ fram other Europegn ethnic minorities?
[Answer] The Basques represent not oniy an ethnic unit but also a language,
culture, traditions and a historicul unit because of its common law created
by the "fueros" and "conciertos," i.e. by autonomous administration. Above
gll, unlike almost all or all other minorities, it also represents an economic
unit. This is the central point. Occitans and BY~tons are minorities, but
they belong to France. The Flemish are 2/3 of the p~opulation of Belgiwn, =
but the other 1/3 rules them because in Belgium the ~apex of thE social pyramid -
is French-speaking. Peoples are considered what thP~ir rulers are, and also
in Val d~Aosta the head of the people has been Italianized.
[Question] And in the Basque country is it the opposite?
[Mswer] We Basques havp our heads on straight. The Basque middle class~ _
not ~11 but most, have not gone along with the Spanish government and have
remained Basque. This means that Basque society has been able tu produce
its or+n, riper fruit and is capable of governing itself. But Spain does not
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wc~nc tn undnrstnnd thr~t. Althdugh it 1q knnwn th~t ~ nr 4 langunges c~r~ spokon
nn tl~~ tl~arli~n ~~aninwulr~, nnly nne iw rac:n~nlzn~. tli~squc i~ nn 1on~~r forUidden
� nt ychoal ns it w~~ under itranco, but it is still consi~d~red a foreign langu~go
ns f~r as th~ press is conC~rned. Publishing ~n gasque cnsts 40 percent more
th~n in 5p~ni~h.
'~Mudrid Dnesn't Understnnd"
[Question~ How aware is the gasque population of this diversity, i.e. of its
own identity?
[Answ~r~ In ~urope today the cultural issue emerges at th~ level of the masses. .
In Afric~ the m~in problem is still getting enough to eat, but not~in Europe.
- Thgt is why the peoples' thoughts turn to culture: we Basques have every right
to d~velop our lanQuage and culture, which are peaceful matters. It is a problem
of dcmocracy: if we have, and we do, the right to make our contribution co the
dev~lo~ment of the country we live in, we must be able to speak our own language. '
It i~ not a m~tter of a difFerence in prenLnc3ation. It is a matter of different
~nnstructions ~nd synt~x. In the B~sque country today nnly 35 percent of the -
penpl~ spe~k 6asque and only 20 percent regd and write Basque because Franco
~rippled the teaching of Basque, and the church agreed with him at the time. ~
But gll this is coming back to haunt them. The most determined separatists
gre precisely those who do not speak Basque because they have been deprived.
They feel themselves linguistically defrauded. You realize how much your health
is worth when you lose it.
[Question] The center of Basque nationalism used to be considered to be.the
EusknJi, which includes the 2 regions of Guipuzcoa, with San Sebastian as its
capital, and Viscaya, with Bilbao as its capital, but the big mass demonstra- -
tions of last July started in Pamplona during the fiesta of San Firmino. Pam- �
plona is in Navarra. Now come this involvement with Navarra? _
- [AnswerJ Historically, Navarra is the ori~inal region of the Basque country.
It used to be called Basconia, and Pamplona was named Iruna, which means capi-
- tal~ and so it is indicated on the ETA map. Thus, Pamplona is the historical
capital of the Basque country, not Bilbao or San Sebastian. Nowever, Bilbao
is where industrialization began, while the rural ideology prevailed in Navarra
- even under the Pirst Republic. Hence a feudal spirit still manifests itself
= occusionally in Navarra, and progressivism and conservatism coexist somewhat
as in some parLs of Japan. Still, the events of July in Pamplona show that
Pamplona is senstitive to the same problems as all the rest of the Basque ;
count ry. ~ .
[Question] Doesn't it seem to you that the police intervention at the "plaza
de toros" in Pamplona, which was the spark that set off days of demonstrations
in the whole Basque country last July, was a provocative act? ~
[Answer] Not only provocative but stupid. How stupid Madrid~s policy is in ~
its confrontations with the ~asque country! In Navarra there is a center-right
government, but that of Euzkad,i is center-left. Madrid should have every
interest in dividing the two regions and opposing Navarra's administrative
and political demands. Instead, the opposite is happening. What was the
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E result in Pamplona7 First, the people talked, then the police intervened
and then overybody united ~.g~inst the police. Even a baby would understand
that a policy of ropression is stupid.
But they don't understand that in Madrid. They hate the B~sques. When -
hate takes the lead, they don't act intelligently but mess things up ins~ead.
That is why I say the Spanish government is being made a joke of by the ETA
these days.
[Question] In what way? Does this mean that since the death of Franco
nothing has changed in the relations between Madrid and the Basque country?
~
_ [Answer] The CTA wus very popular in the Basque country during the last 15
ye~~rs of the Franco dictatorship because from the beginning it held high the -
banner of revolt, protest and anti-fascist rebellion against the repression
of any human rights or autonomy. The death~of Franco in 1975 began a pexiod
of uncertai7ty. From the ETA's point of view, this period might have been ~
dangerous. If Madrid had understood the Basque problem politically, the ETA
might still have continued to exist as a clandestine organization, but it
- would have lost much or all of its popularity. The ETA understood this and
was prudent. They ceased guerxilla action for several months, but the central
government was not able to take advantage of this opportunity, and guerrilla
operations were resumed. Suarez~s Spain has inherited from Francoism, besides
being Franco~s offspring, an intolerance and incomprehension of everything
- Qasque that does not bring in money to the governemnt.
i
[Question] Can you give some examples?
[Answer] That of not naming a Basque to the presidency of the local government
_ of Navarra, and they had available a bourgeois registered with a bourgeois
_ Catholic party, a law and order man of the kind they like; the Madrid poli-
ticians found it more convenient for the Bemocratic Center Union (the party
of the head of government, Adolfo Suarez--editor's note), which is purely a
party of the center-right, to vote for a Spanish socialist.
[Questionj What do you ichink is the solution to these problems?
- [Answer] The separation of the Basque regions from Spain and France and
the unity of the Basque country. There is no doubt about that, but it is
not something that can happen today, nor should it. Tomorrow, yes, in the ~
context of a really united and federated Europe. I do not believe in an
abstract separatism; it would be meaningless. Europe must come sooner or
later to a division of sovereignty within every state and to a federal union
of all the states thus formed,
The federal government will cancern itself with military problems, foreign
uffairs and general economic laws, but the individual states will have to
think about the other things. Moreover, this trend towards restoring auto-
nomy to internal states ("devolution," as the English say) is already~wide- -
spre.3d in Europe, e.g. in Germ~ny and Italy. The Italian regions are a bit
- ' 35
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tno numc~rous nnd tnn sm~li~ but the prin~ipl~ has b~en ~~c~pt~d. I h~ve don~
- ~tudies on thd b~st and most gov~rn~b1~ basic n~tionni units, ~nd th~ optimum
dimonsidns nra thosc of st~tos with 3-5 million ~nhabit~nts with capitals that
hnv~ 3Un,00U to h~lf n million inhabit~nts~
(pu~~sti~nj '~hen everything has to start over~..
- (Answor] It's nc~t ~s hard us a11 th~t. In It~1y~ for example, it would be
suffirient to reduce the number of regions to S or 6 and likewis~ in Sp~in,
giving thes~ st~tes their proper politic~l weight. True, the f~derative id~~i
is still fgr off, ~nd Europe is marking time, but the people ~re not gt fault. -
Rathcr, the governments are, ~rance~s~specfaily; it is the reai ~nemy of the "
ncw I:urop~. France insists on emphasfzing at every turn its own independence
~nd is pursuing an anti-Lurope policy. Tho other countr~~s, not so much~
The lorge states formed in the past cenLury are still less sensible and less
cap~bl~ of faring up to their responsibilities.
(QuostionJ The theme of the future, th~n, is nationalism?
,
[Answer] If that means the concept of nation as a people, as a basic com-
munity, yes. For the French, however, the nation is the government.
[Question] Doesn~t the world situ~tion, which is in the nuclear age, suggest
a lot of caution in this direction?
[AnswerJ Precisely. The states are preatomic entities. 'Che atomic bomb has
caused the peoples' national consciousness to mature. True, the world is
divided into opposing blocs of states, but what other remedy could there be
_ for this than the fragmentation of fictitious sovereignties? It is no inven-
tion of mine that the peopie exi.sted before the present states. And they
still exist, don~t they? Even the unity of Italy is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
"We Are Not Terrorists"
(Question~ Won~t the states you mention finally make, a union of the rich,
lcaving the poor to their fate? .
[Answer] Nas the unification of Italy by any chance solved the problems of
thc South? It is much better for a people to develop its own resources by
itself than to expect outside aid that may not come. It has not come to the
South of Italy as it has not come to the South of Spa~n. They have to do it
themselves, for they must do or die. ?.~~en you wait for something from out-
side, you end up doing nothi~g. The first thing that ought to be awakened
in a people is th e spirit o~ initiative. I am also opposed to a policy of
aid for the Third World. Aid fits a Christian, Catholic conception of charity,
but sometimes to be good Christians people do bad things. I have seen it
happcn. I was in Aigiers for a month. The people have to do it themselves
or Jic, and I think the people don~t want to die.
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(~u~stion] A11 right, but nn ~nvernm~nt is r~~dy to dn wh~t you w~nt, whi~h
is for th~m to giv~ up g par~ of thei~ ~~vereignty~
[AnswarJ dh y~~, of cours~; i know th~t nll too we11. No cnuntry, no po~i-
tici~n will w~ke up unless they ~r~ bl~s~~d with dyngmite. They just want
to keep on ~s thoup,h nnthing wer~ the mutter. In xhis context, I thtnk th~
~`I'A h~~ don~ end is doing sorn~thing~ If Sp~in anta~d the Common Market, I
dn not know how h~ppy they would b~ in grusse~s to embrg~~ ~ldng with it
th~ t~ns~ situgtion that now exigts in th~ gasque country. it is an exeuople
that might be contagious. The Irish InA s~em~d to be dead g few years ago,
but it e~me b~ck.
(~ucstidnj U~ you think it ~s sti11 pdssible to re~olve the Basque issue
by demncr~tic means7
[Answor~ Not only do I tliink it is p~ssible but Y hope so. Not to hope for
a peuc~~ul solution to surh ~n impdrtnnt prob~~m would have to mean a person
_ was intnxi~~t~d with v~olence. Still speaking frankly, though, I must say
the solutidn does not dep~nd dn the B~sques. I mAy have every desire to
cngnge in a dinlogue, but if y~u don~t agrEe, we won't tglk. The ~'CA is -
nat a thing in itself: it is only g response to the Spaniards' desire to
do hnrm. When it comes to terrorism, I say the E'I'A is not terrorist but
anti-terrorist. It is merely a protection gg~inst the ~errorism of the
Spanish gnvernemnt.
I know v~ry well the peop]Q and militants of the ~TA, and there is not a one
nmong them who is a terrorist, who likes violence for itself. Nor do I.
in fact, I dislike violence. But if a robber comes into my house and I say,
without attacking him, only, '~No, you can~t do that,~~ there is already a
conflict and a confrontation. If the Bgsques gave in whenever the Spanish
wanted them to, they would be finished. ~inished in every sense of the word.
That is why ae have the ETA.
[Question] Do you h'ave first-hand memories of the founding of the organization?
(Answerj Na, I had already been abroad for several years. It was, in fact,
when my book "Vnsconia" appeared in 1962 that I became the soul of the ETA,
but it was not through any merit of mine. It was through the merit of Franco's
minister of information at the time, Mane~~l Fraga Iribarne. Nobody, or almost
nobody knew that the ti"TA existed because under Franco everything was hushed up.
- liowevcr, Fraga Iribarne played it up by ordering a newspaper to print some
pages on the E'fA that said, among other things, that my book had given the ETA
an ideological basis. They even printed some quotations from it. Although
~ it was not exactly what Fraga wanted, people read this excellent explanation
with great interest, and many young people found the E7'A this way.
(QuestionJ Haven~t you gone back to Spain since 1952?
[AnswerJ Officially, no. I returned secretly in various months in 196? and
participated in the second part of the Sth Assembly in Guetaria, a small area
nedr Zarauz (San Sebastian). The Assembly met in an old house, 200 meters
from the police station. I coordinated work in the ideological section.
This was a period of intense theoretical study on what a clandestine movement
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~(~[t UH'~ICIAL US~ nNI,Y
nugl~t to dd dr nught n~t t~ do, on the kind df structure tn be adupt~d and .
ehi~ weup~ns td be used. Others then went ~nd bought them. I don~t lik~
weapons, but you can~t fight a w~r without them. 7'hen I work~d.at keeping
the [:'i'A in tnuc:h w~th nther movements beeause w~ must not get more isolated
but h~v~ cont~cts with other people.
[Quastion) W~th what mov~m~ntr, ex~ctly?
[Answer] ~or example, with the Algi.eri~n Liberatian ~ront and the Ir~sh IRA,
In the lutt~r C~se, it was mninly to e.cquire or exchange arms, even though ~
th~ Il2A is not for a united ~urope gnd the E'fA is. -
[Question] Were there sother contacts, e.g. with the German RAR [Red Army -
rnction (B~ader-Moinhof group)]?
CAnswer] No, I have to say not. Myway, the ~7'A ean't be said to enjoy
much credibility with these groups and grouplets of the new left, perh~ps
because the ~TA is automatically popular, and this goes against their mind-
set, which is more or less wrapp~d up in Marxism, In general they are '
people who ov~restimate themselves and think they have to accomplish some
mission, In Germany everybody was against them precisely because of this:
you cgn't carry out a policy if nobody accepts it. I cail it negative
terrorism. .
(Qu~stion~ Flas the ETA had close ties with Algeria for long?
[AnswerJ No, I don't think so. All the liberation movements represented in
Algiers enjoy an ulmost diplomatic status, but when I was there, at least, -
besides being invited to dinner l don't think there was anything else. One
thing is sure: the ETA has never received a lira from anyone. Even today
there are newspapers that write that we take money from the CIA [Central
Intelligence ARency] and from here and there. That's silly. The ETA finances
itself. It doesn't want anything from anybody because~~f you give them
an inch, they'll take a mile.
[Question] What models did you use in your writings?
[AnswerJ The Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. I studied attentively the ~
organizational forms of the Vietnamese liberation movement and took from it
some structural ideas that, I must say, have stood Up well in the ETA. ~
Secondly, it was necessary for me to eliminate the Communist or Spanish
type infiltration that had already been noted. I thought these structures ~
would last a few years at most, but they have lasted longer.
[Question] However, infiltration or at least division and outright schisms ~
have been a part of the whole history of the ETA. '
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[Answer] Y~s, but this is a 1dgiCal d~velnpm~nt. At the tim~ of the 5th
A~sembly th~ ~'~A hgd glr~ndy h~d a s~hism with ~'Crot~kyite group. I was
furious with them becgus~ thcy k~pt mxking the semE dld mistakes, I main-
tnined th~t us n libe~ation movement the ETA should have n~tional libergtion
~s its first gnd fundamental objective with Lhe social struggle as second
priority, Th~t group, un the other h~nd, wantod to lib~rgte Spain first,
m~ke it soc~~list ~nd then re~p n bonnnzg for th~ Basque countries. i h~ve
_ always opposed thi~ position: the Basque cnuntry must pursue ~ pnliCy of
indepQndence with its own liberation tts its ultimate goal. _
[Question] As ~ result of this, h~s the ETA continued to maintain these
positions7
[Answcr~ The strongest group, the military group, yes. They don't do much
politic~ily but they can work together with political groups; they are primarily
~ nationnlist group, Thcy ~re ordinary people, usually workers. That is the
rcal nucleus of the CTA. The others are from more or less detached sections,
particularly the "polis-milis" group, which is the politico-military ETA.
I have ~lways been against them because they reason according to the logic
of the Russian revolution. In Itussia it was necessary to use Caarist offi-
Cials because revolutionary military le~ders were lacking; then it was a
good thing to have political commissars. But in the Basque country the mili-
tary leaders are already well oriented politically, and there is no need of
political commissars. politicians sometimes create dangers for the others.
_ Politicians and intellectuals may do great work in their respective sectors, -
but they get scared when it comes to taking action. Fear is a human thing,
so we must not use these people in action. We must especially not give in
to their desire to be always informed about everything, to know everything.
- When they are caught, we know they will talk sooner or later. The best way
for them not to talk, therefore, is for them not to know. That is why the
ETA military group is always separate from the others--for reasons of security.
[Question] What do you think of the twa high army officers killed in Madrid
on 21 July in reprisal for the deeds of Pamplona and San Sebastian? Don't
you think these attacks might play into the hands of the right?
[Answer] The ETA only wanted to show that the Spanish army is not as strong
and invulnerable as it wants people to believe. As for the right, I do not
see what advantage they can derive from it, The extreme right group in parlia- _
ment is a small group and will not become any bigger be~ause of it. Then too,
. things are much different from what they were when Franco took power in Spain,
and they are much different abroad, too. As for public opinion, you have to
remember that every ETA action is frowned upon by the Spanish and approved by
the Basques, which is natural. The people who care about the fate of the Basques
- in Spain are not very strong. They are only a few individuals. When it comes
to a war between peoples,.though, divisions are usually very clear.
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' In 1914 even the an~r~hist~ took up arms to ~ight th~ Germen enemy, and Je~n
Jgur~s w~s left ~lmo~t alone to preach ~gainst war, ~ven Marxist parties do
not defend Bgsques' rights in Spain today. Th~ Span~sh Communist P~rty has
~7 u]wnys proclaimed thc Bnsques' right to self-determination and has oven written
it intn their pro~ram, but they haven~t s~id a word about it since the moment _
they set foot in parliament. That is another good reason for the Basques always
to remember that the problem exists,
(C~uestinnj Last 28 August, two members of the Guardia Civil and two armed
poliCem~n were kill~d in the Basque cnuntry, in Galicia and Catalor?ia, If
the 5panish government decided to withdraw the police gradually and replace
it with the urmy, would this be accepted by the Basques?
[Answur] I think so, provided the present police forces in the field were all
withdrawn. The people consider this special corps a real enemy, I don't think
they would have so much animosity against the army.
[Question] Does the E'CA have the sympathy of the people?
[AnswerJ Certainly. Many citizens have hidden and are hiding ETA guerrillas
in their houses. Many spokesmen for the Basque National Party aid members of
the ETA. They earn~a lot of sympathy especially as a revolt and resistance
movement, much less as a political organization of the extreme left. The ETA
has blundered repeatedly in politicizing itself too much in this direction,
but I think it decided recently to reconsider its political alignment. The
strength of all liberation movements is in nationalism, not in making too clear
a political choice. It is the same way in the Third World. The ETA has had
representatives of all non~church forces, including liberals and . leftist ~
Christian democrats, as has happened in the Ttalian Liberation Committee, for
that matter.
[QuestionJ Now many ETA militants are there?
i
[Answer] That is hard to say. There are the leaders, the militants and the ~
sympathizers. Even these categories overlap. The ETA certainly accounts for .
for more than one in a thousand people, i.e. more than 3,000 people. ~
[Question] Why did you not go back to Spain right after Franco died? ~
[Answer] I wanted to see which way the wind would blow.
[Question~ How is it? ~
i
[Ansrrer] A little be~ter than before, but not well. I would be happy if every- I
thing could be worked out peacefully. ;
[QuestionJ Mr Krutwig, are you sure tne Basques aren't somehow pursuing a utopia?
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r~or~ ~~~rir,ini, usr nNr,v
(Mswer] If the Besques give up on themselves, they wi11 be gssimil~ted and
elfminated by the Spanish, If the g~sques succeed in getting their own gov~rn-
ment, they are ready to get glong with everybody else, 3ncluding the Spenish -
and their Culture,
MAP CAP7' I ON
This is the Basque country that aspires to national independence; 4 provinces
in Spanish territory and 3 in ~rench territory divided by the Pyrenees frontier,
a unit formed by the inhabitgnts' common origin and language (~uskara, the origitt
of which is known only to be non-Indo-~uropean); about 700,000 Basques live in
the country itself, and 2-3 million are scattered around the world. It has a
solid economy: tourism in the north and south, on the French and Spanish edges
of the enclave, industry in the Spanish provinces rich in iron ore, with ship-
yards and mctalworking plants.
INSBT ~
The Two Souls of the ~TA
How the Basque independence movement was born and developed. Difficult rela-
~ tions between small bourgeois and workers.
1952; A group of Bilbao students publish a pamphlet entitled EKIN ("Do It").
Among them are Jose Manuel Aguirre, Benito del Valle, Julen Madariaga, Jose
Luis Alvarez Emparanza "Txillardegui." The latter gives the organization the
name 8TA the following year. Ideologically, the group is inspired by classic
Basque nationalism, especially that of Sabino Arana Goiri (1865-1903), an inte-
gralist and traditionalist Catholic who set the countryside against the capi-
talist cities and advocated an independent, fcderated Basque state made up of
the 7 provinces (Guipuzcoa, Alava, Viscaya and Navarra on the Spanish penin- -
sula and Laburdi/Labourd, Bernabarra/Lower Navarre and Zuberoa/Soule in France).
- 1956-57: Awakening of the working class (originally the "comisiones obreras"),
politicizution and gradual radicalization of the Basque small bourgeoisfe
whence the leaders and staff of the ETA will come.
1956: At the world Basque congress, held outside of Spain, Federico Krutwig
Sagredo, who is already secretary of the Academy of the Basque Language,
speaks on the subject of guerrilla war as a possible means of obtaining Basque
independence.
1959: The ETA is constituted officially on 31 July ("Euskadi ta Askatasuna,"
i.e. "a free Basque country made of free men") and publishes a clandestine
' organ, ZUTIK ("Arise") and defines itself ideologically as an "abertzale" or -
nationalist group, which is also democratic and non-sectarian. The ETA adopts
violence as the only possible response to Francoist violence and as a slap at
, the pacifism of the Basque Nationalist Party (but the first violent actions
occur only in 1961). �
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~(~it d~~LCIAL US~ dNLY
1gG2; The first gssembly of th~ CTA is held ~bro~.d in M~y (now thut ~rgn~oism
hus tha ~TA in its sights~ ~11 its l~~ders havc gon~ abroad) and is defin~d
aq n"revolutionnry Hnsqu~ movement of nnt~on~l liberation" that demands the
praciiimiitl~n nf t:u~kr~ri~ nK tha "sola ni~tinnt~l langung~~" is ngain~t nny die-
tut~r~l~lp, ~~both ~usclst nnJ Communist" ~nJ ~~vors the "federalist integration
nf Ctirope bo~s~d on natinnality,"
In October, Kederico Krutwig Sagredo's book ~ppegrs in Buenos AirES: "Vasconie,
estudio dialectico de una nacionalid~d," signed with the pseudonym ~ernando
S~rrailh de Ihartaza. It contains 2 theories: that of a new, progressivist
nationalism that identifies nat~onal opporession with socisl oppression and
_ the theory of revolutionary struggle conducted after the examples of Algeria
and Vietnam.
1963: Second assembly of the E'fA, abroad in March. A cc+nflict emerges between
a mujority party~ which is nationalist and third-world oriented, and a minority ~
party, which is socialist-worker oriented. In October, attempts at strtkes in
Bilbao and the Basque country; Francoist repression and destruction of the in-
ternal organization of the ETA.
1964; The ETA booklet~ "The Insurrection in Euskadi," is published in Bayonne,
in the ~rench Basque country. It supports the war of liberation.
The 3rc1 assembly of the ~'fA, in April and May, institutos the position of full-
time, paid militant. ~ ~
1965: The 4th assembly of the ETA, in swmner, the first held in Spain. It
creates a political office and makes a first, positive report on links between
the ETA and the Basque populatian. At the same time, another work of Krutwig's
appears, '"I'he Basque Question," which identifies progress with nationalism. '
1966: First part of the Sth ETA assembly. Four spokesmen of the political
office are expeiled for having supported the Trotskyite faction, called Bta-
berri, in San Sebastian.
1967: Second part of the Sth assembly. Concerning the thrust of the strikes ~
in the Basque country, the ETA's left wing prevails, identifying Basque nation-
alism as an aspect of the world socialist revolution.
- 1968: ETA militants kill Police Commissioner Meliton Manzanas, a notorious ~
torturer, in Irun on 2 August. Madrid unleashes harsh repression in the Basque
country. ~
1969; Repression continues all year long throughout Spain. Arrests, numbering
1,953, involve many ETA militants. ~
1970: The 6th assembly, disavowing the Sth, declares itself against the "His-
panification" of the Basque struggle. The trisl of 13 ETA leaders and 2 priests
takes place in Burgos in December. M ETA grovp (Sth assembly) kidnaps the
- honorary West German consul in San Sebastian (he is liberated in Germany on
24 December to show that the "ETA is not a band of irresponsible fanatics").
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~
On 28 decemb~r sentence i~ p~ssed in ~urgos; 6~re condemn~d to degth, ~r~ncn
commutes the de~th s~nten~~~ on 30 ~ec~mber, ~
1971-72; These aro th~ years of confiict betwee;~ the 5th gnd 6th ~TA ~ssemblies,
~ eonfliet th~t is resolved in favor of the Sr;, assembly, The 1~ft prevails.
In fact, the left had c~ptUred in Uec~mb~r 1971 an industrialist who, though
hQ was Basque, beh~ved like sn infiexible boss. "~'he history of the E'fA,"
says an organization mggazine, "has be~n an uninterrupted, diff~cult dialogue
between sma11 bourgeois nationalists f~voring armed struggle and the workers."
1973: Sixth ETA as~embly, which cancels the precedfng 6th. On 20 becember
an attnck is made against Franco~s heir appurent, Admiral Luis Carrero-Blanco,
who is blown up in his automobile in Madrid.
The success of the strikes o� December 1974 reinforces the politico-military
wing of the E7'A, which decide~ to integrate the armed struggle with th~ mass
movement to the detriment of the exclusively military wing, which calls for
freedom of action independent of the masses.
]975-77: The post-Franco period gives the ~TA 2 problems: the first is whether
or not to maintain clandestinity and is resolved by remaining clandestine,
especially because the exClusively military wing opts for autonomy; the second
(the attitude toward confrontation with the Spanish government) is discussed
~ by Krutwig in the interview. In the matter of relations with the other poli-
tical forces, the ETA recognizes and is recognized by KAS [expansion unknown],
a coordinating group between the Basque forces and the extreme left. -
PHOTO CAPTION
The bullring in Pamplona. Here in July 1978, during the fiesta of San Firmino,
there occured the first serious incidents between police and Basques in the
_ post-Franco period.
COPYRIGNT: 1978 ARNOLDO MONDADO(tI EDITORE S, p. A. -
8782
CSO: 3104
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1~R OFE'IOYAt, U9E ONLY ,
BPAIN
M~4TOR SHAKEVP IN AP'~AS3ADORIAI, POST3 REPORT~D
Madrid C~0 16 in Spanieh 1? ~a 78 p 41
~Text~ Adolfo Suaro~ and hie minieter of foreign a,Flaira~ Maroelino
Ore~a, are in fav~or of undertaki~g a wideranging reorganigation of
Spa~niah e~aba~eiea overeea~.
Suare~~ who seemg to have dieaovered the "deligl~te" of foreign poliay
einoe hi~ firet trip sbroad last yrear (to Me~doo ~nd ths United 8tatee),
is entertuir~ing the poaaibility of s radiaal ahong+e in the ori0atation
of 3panieh embassiee ovarsaae.
An lnitial indiastion of the Spanish "p~em~ier~e" interset in forsi~nn
polioy mattere ~+ae hie involvea~snt in the appointm~nt of a number of .
political ambaeeadorao who are not odreer diplomate and rho hsw aav
taken over ma~or poete in forei~ eerviae.
Despite the oppoeition of career diploma~e~ in reoent roonths ambasssdorial ~
posts hsve been aeeumed bq politiciaae tied to the IICD ~Dsmoaratio '
Center Union,,,~ or by ~ome well-lmovn figuree outside the s
party but with~their o~+n politiosl rsaord atyid the aonfidenas o~ghsr
bodiea.
The Diplomaay Of "Conseneue"
In the first tMO oasee ve hsve Jose I,lado, the fo~ar oo~eres miaieter
under Suarez, s brother-in-lstr oP MarceLino Ore~a and a momber ot ths
IICD, who has taken aharge of the 8paniah ~nbaeeq in Waebington~ one ot
~ the moet coveted poete in the esrvioa, a~d Manwsl Jimene$ d.~ Pa~rga~
- the former labor miaiater~ for whom the g+ovarnavent eet up e"ani g+snerie" ~
- embaesy to deal vith the IIA, aad iasvitably it hae oollided xith the ~
3panieh Hnbaeey headed by Fernaudo d~ Benito ahioh handlee vatters vith ~
international organisations.
� Raul Morodo amd Mariuel Prado y Colon d~e Carva~al, rrho r?ere named ~pecial
ambaeeadora in AtSciaa aud Lstin amsriaa~ are ssparste oa~sea. Morodp,
a Former me~ber o~ Bnrique TierYw'e People'e Sooisliet Party~ Se a
profeeeor ot political lsrr and xill parovide the diplcaoaoy of "aoaseneua"
xith nsv vievpoiate. ~
44 ~
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I~t)It c~ ~t~~l r,]. A1, U:?L nN1?Y
Manue~ ~r~~ y Co1on de ~~rva~al~ aha 3~ alo~e ~o Kit~g Juan Carlo~ and \
ha~ replaoed Joee Maria Mo~o at the Ib~ro-~mnrioan Cooperation Center~
W311 brSng to diplomacy ~he tBOhrLtoal economic and manag~ment kt~rr-how
~h~t i~ ab~dlutely necesgary ~or the great Latin American politiaal
adver?tvra that the ororm wante ~o undertake.
At the moment~ Maraelino Ore~a'e a~utonomy in the area of ~ppoin~tments hae
been aign3fiaantly affeoted by 5uare~'s intereg~ 3n keeping a cloee
xatoh on foreign poliQy, xith whiah~ ~acording to ~ number of hia
aolleaguea~ he t~ "faecinated."
7'he atten~ion that Suarez hae for some montha been aevoting to dome~tio
polioy issueg (the aon~~itution~ the "aoneensue~" the referenflum~
lnveeti~ure...) has preventecl him from etarting up the wideranging
reor~nization pYan that h~e been talked sbout at 5anta Cruz Palaoe,
the geat of the 3panish Fbreign Affatre Mintgtry~ the plan is keeping
a g~ood number of career diplomate up in the air inamnuch as they Fear
the unneaeesary proliferation of politiaal ambaseadora.
As far as these politieal ambag~adors are coneerned~ there ~re indication~
~ that our repreeentative in Me~ciao, Luig Coronel de Palma~ Marquia de
Te3ada, is about to reaign. Hie diplomatic performance hae left much
to be deaired~ and i~ the Wake of the king~e trip it se~g that he
personallf asked to be relieved. Diplomatic sourcea eay that he will
be replaaed by Jone Mari~ Moro, who Was auddenly dismieeed se the
pre~ident of thQ Ibero-American Cooperation Center.
~lnother political amba~sador~ Juar~ Antonio Sa~aranch~ the 5panish
r~presentative in MoscoW, might aleo be relieved if he is, in faet~
appointed the Fbreign Ministry dQlegate to the 1982 World Cup Commfttee.
Chang~es in the Americae
As part ot a first Suarez-fnapired diplomatia maaeuver, the Spanish
embassies in Mexico~ Cuba, Bolivia, Colombia aad a Central Ameriaaa
country are suppoaedly gaing to be overhauled. Sueh Chaag+ee are
tied in xith the nex plar~s tor L~tin America arid would be followed by
udditional diplomatic changing~s of the guard in I,iberia~ Gabon~ Angols
and Tarnzania. The changea Will be important in thesa A!`riaan countriee,
~,*iven the Fbreign Miniatry's new plans in connection tirith the At'rica~n
contfnent and'in liEht of a poesible trip there by the king in 1979�
9'he appointment of Jose Manuel Ulrich as ambasaador to Alg3ers ~+~ould leave
the Bagdad poat vacant, Whfch aould suppcaedly be taken by Samaranch'e
~ predecessor in Moscow, Rafael ~lerrer.
GUpYRiClIT: 1918. CAMUIO 16
eT43
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SPAIN
~itITISH NISr~RtAN ANAt,Y2ES CdN3TI'TUT~ONAL GUARANTEE3, RIGNTS
Mi1~n COtt1tIER~ D~LLA SL~A 22, 23 U~c p 3
.
(Article by Nugh Thomae: "Ju~n Carlos Like ~li~ab~th ti?"~
[22Dec 78 p 3~
~Tex~J Thp fundam~ntal ~t~t~ ch~rt~r approv~d by the
r~f~rendum ae~ms to be a revised and corrected veraion
of the unwritten British ConstiituCion. The ~upreme
commgnd of th~ arm~d forceg granted to the king t~till
not count more than the authority of the queen over
the United Kingdom Army.
Hugh Thomag, the great ~nglish hietorian, hgs written
this article (who~e gecond part Will be publiehed to-
morros?) concerning the nea conatitution ~pproved in
Spain by the recent referendum. Thomas, vho begins work ~
as a contributor With CORRIERE, is a name that is linked
to Spanish and Latin American affairg. The Einaudi
Publiahing Company has published hie "Hietory of the
5panigh Civil War," (1963), and "Hietory of Cuba From
1962 to 1970." (1973).
The first thing to be said about the neW Spaniah Conatitution is that the
fnct that it was accanplished is amazing. For anyone vho has some feeling
for or minimum knoaledge of history, the leafleta iseued by the old Carliat
party and the comiaunist party both urging a"yes" vote in the 6 Decpmber ;
referendum seemed surprising. (
The aecond thing to be said concerning this constitution ia that noa it has
been formally approved by the majority of Spaniards. Perhaps the favorable
vote was not aa broad as the government foresaW and deeired; perhaps propa-
ganda by the goverc?roent on TV in favor of "yes" aas too heavy; and probably,
the Spaniards Were tired of voting (they have already done ao three timee in
three years: The Eirst time in December 1976 for the refere~ndum on constitu-
tional reform in general; the second time. for the general elections of June
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~d~i d~~tCIAL U~~ dNLY
1977; gnd thp third fdr ehi~ i~fegt rpf~r~ndutn)~ Y~t, thr~gp who v~t~d "no"
Cdngtitue~ ~~m~11 ~llinnce g~~ing~ the ppdp~~ who ath~rwi~~ would hav~ ~iCElc ~
in ~ommon: Ri~l~ti~r C~thalicg~ F~langigt~, r~v~iutionary ~oeia~i~C~ and
r~voluEianary ~e~hu~~ ~th~ affi~iai ~a~qu~ National ~grty which is incapabl~
oE fr~~in~ it~~lf fro~n i~~ pogition oE godt,qeh~r of eh~ r~volutiona~i@~ h~g
r~edii~mended abgtention, and ~d p~rc~n~' o~ e~~ B~~qu~ ~laGtdr~t~ followed thia -
~dvi~e, ciearly E~erEui of eh~ phy~ie~1 con~~qu~nc~~ d~riving from being spen
votin~).
Ae fir~t gight, ehig ~an~eieutior~ c~n ,~~~m gimil~r eo th~ ~ritigh Con~titution~
ngs~ming ehae any writCan ~ongeitueinn c~n be ~o ~inc~ noa Sp~in has ~ congei-
tutinn~l king, a biramer~l p~rliam~nt and ~ prime miniet~r to be - eelected
_ by Eh~ king on eh~ be~ig of thp mgjority vote in th~~low~r houee. 3ince the
drafe ~on~titution Wag wriee~n ori~inaily by e~inisters favorab~.e to the king,
which l~~t y~ar W~g--a~cording eo th~ uord~ of Cambio 16, the "motor" of
demoar~tie change--i~ is r~agonabl~ to ~uppoee thae King Juan Carloe uae eh~
~rincip~l in~pirpr of this doeum~ne.
Th~ dc~tai~g on how gnvprnment~ arp ~l~ce~d t~r on how it is decided Which pro-
vine~~ rougt be independ~ne werp gdded by others folloWing compromises and _
conc~~sion~, but th~ g~n~r~l lin~g c~rtainly rem~in thoge ~k~tched out by
.tunn C~rlo~. He, in turn, probebly wa~ influenced by his family's attachment
to Engl~nd und his admirarion for Que~n ~lizabeth Ii.
.
During the years fn which he W~~ pati~ntly bphind Franco~ tolerating the lies
- of the aorld's pr~gg and aaitin~ for better eimee, tMis intelligent and reso-
lute prince pre~umably Wa~ aorking out some of th~ ideas noW contained in
th~ cons~itution. C~rtninly, eo b~ gble to arriv~ at a constitutional monarchy,
h~ mugt have fnr gome time, behaved lik~ no con~titutiongl king, ordinarily,
has ever done. Th~ constitution Franco l~ft to Juan Carlos gave him, ae heed
of state, cnngiderable power although these aere less absolute than Franco
had had before h~ greW old.
Franco'g Thinking
I suppdg~ that Franco thou$ht that efter his death th~ succeeaion s~ould have
be~n diEf~rent: In ~ much-quoted phra~~, h~ told hig aide-de-eamp snd couain
that everything wa~ cied, +~nd Well-tied, together: atado y bien atado (atar
ig a v~rb that ib~ria airline ete~ards uee to invite passengere to fasten
tl~~cir seatbeltg). NQ meant by this that after his death the elaborate etruc-
ture of Eavoritism, censor~hip, intimidation and control by various police
Eorces aould be preserved by his old lieutenant, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and
the.king Would be asked to give them a human face by means of a campaign in
- popular nevgpaperg Iik~ 11ALA. Hhat Would happen if he refused? Kell, Carrero
I~.~d a certain influence on Juan Cerlos, Franca probably thought~ and if every-
tt~ing else failed, there were other members of the Bourbon house vho could be
disposed to accept the chance at a kingdom on Franco's terms.
The decisive role the king played in transfoiyaation meant that at leaet one
choic~ for the Euture of Spain was excluded. I do not mean so much a republic
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n~ thne Ch~ ide~ ~f r~viving Chp S~~ond Republic eeill borhers some ~oci~lisCe
nnd i~ also ehp main pr~~udice of c~rCgin f~g~ingeing ~nc~ ~lderly personagea
who r~turned after 1975 followi~,~ a 1tf~ i.n exile wiCh the hope of reviving
d r~publican con~G3ousnege (af~~ar a11 what doee r~publ3c~n~.~m megn nowadayg?)
I n~e~n th~ po~gibiliey af ~ p~~e~idential gystem auch as developed in ~'rance
by D~ G~ull~ ~nd by ~en~~ in PorCugal or likp Chae which, I~uppoee, Manuel
~r~gg, th~ 1~ad~r nf 4;:~ ropul~r A1lianee Pgrey, supposedly reque~ted--gnd
whiCh h~ wa~ ~uppo~~d to h~v~ b~~n in a poei.e~,on to requese--if ie had not
b~~n fnr the pr~s~nce of ~h~ king. Whpther Chis wi11 really limiC the effec- '
tiv~negs of the gov~rnm~nt remgins to b~ geen. In eny case, so long as he ~
liv~~, Ch~ king will repree~nt an inseieution with great 3nfluence and author- ~
iCy Chenkg to appreciation �or the actiona he Cook and the realism he showed ~
br~ginning in 1975 even though h3s ~ctual powers are as modest as Choae of the I
Queen of England. In truCh, it doea not seem that the king was left with ,
thae ~ting~r rh~r beee uae in case of emergency and which ie available to '
th~ ~ngligh monarch. '
~nr ~x~mple, art 62 of the conetitution oblfges the King to approve laws, to ~
convok~ and di~band parliament, only in initiative of the government. He i
mugt ~aign legielation within 15 days from approval by the Cortes (art 91). i
rhe r~Eerendums can be called (only) upon proposal by the prime miniater
following authorizaCion of the Cortes, even if there aeema to be the need to '
introduce furth~r legislation to explain exactly when the referendum can and '
must be called (art 92, par 3). By comparison, the right to grant honors and
similar actg aeem relatively inferior, such as the right "to be informed" of ~
aEf~ira of atgte, or to chair meetinge of the cabinet when the prime minisCer I
considera it opportune. I
~
What exactly does supreme coaimand of the armed forcea mean? Much, I would ~
say, in the firet days of this conatitution, but once the Army accepted the -
constitution for all time, perhaps no more than the Queen's command over the
British armed forces. There is room Co discuss the powers of the king re-
garding the naming of the head of government (art 99), aince he will take, ~
these ateps after having talked about it with party leadera, thie particular ~
monarch could at times impoae his own views. � I
I
- But his formal poWers are modeat. Similarly, the government will fall only,
it geems, if it loses an election or loses control of the ma~ority of the '
Cortes (art 161). The king plays no ro1P. Only the prime miniater can i
disaolve the Cortes and call elections.
~
In qeneral~ therefore, the preaent Spanish constitution gives the prime
minister a power whose rights derive from the lowe~r chamber of the Cortes
(parliament). This lower house is elected as the presently-exiating Cortes '
was elected last year by direct suffrage of all citizens over 18 years of
age. Doth houses ot the Cortes have a geographical basis in the old pra- ~
vinces of Spain. Congress~ or the lower houae, is elected by a vote propor- i_
tional to the size of the population of the provinces and consists of 300 ~
to 400 membera. Ceuta and Melilla, last Spanish (and European) possessions
in Africa, are fully legal electoral districts (art 68, par 2). The term ~
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ol' c~anuress iH 4 ycnr~ c~v~n rhough (u~ in Lngland) it can be dissolved
- er~rller evidently upon decision of Che prirne miniaCer.
~ The upper ch~imber consis~s of four senaCora for each of the G7 continental
provincea of Spain with various subsidiary arrangementa for the Canary and
- Balearic Islands and for CeuCa and Melilla. Senaeors, like deputies, are
- elected �or. 4 yearg and can impose a delaying veto which can be overturned
only by the abaolute ma~oriry of votes in both chambers (arC 90). In special
circumatancea (art 91), it ia also possible to resort to a referendum.
All these provisions, carefully developed, make it seem Chat the new Spanish
Constitution is a revised and corrected version of the unwritCen English -
consCitution. The official acts performed by the prime minisCer in the _
name of Che mona`rch, however, have no place in the choice of the upper chamber.
- JusC as the herediCary aristocracy doea not have it. Another reatriction is
that as a result of Che accent placed on the old provinces, the rural elector-
are wi11 be more generously represented by the urban electorate in both houses.
-
[23 Dec 78 p 3] "
Most of the new constitution approved in the referendum consists of generaliz-
_ ations~ The Spaniards have always believed it necessary to include these in
documents of this kind in relation to Che right to work or to study. Many
- believe these things more properly belong in economic or social legislation.
The long list of rights and fundamental freedoms (arts 15-38), nevertheless,
- could perhaps be advantageously analyzed by those who believe that a law on -
civil rights would be useful elsewhere, but the fact that such rights are
formally "guaranteed" in other constitutions (for example the Russian) does
. not always mean, naturally, that they have real value. Among the basic rights
there is the right to privacy.
Other friends of freedom will be encouraged by seeing that article 28 not
only guaranCees the right to Spaniards Co establish a trade union, but also
guarantees that no one can be forced to ~oin a trade union. We hope that .
' this provision will be maintained in a Europe that is becoming increasingly
� corporative.
The sections of the constitution that concern regional independence are `the
;~aragraphs that have already caused the greatest difficulty and which in the
~ end could lead to the greatest possible disturbances. These paragraphs of
. Che constitution give the impression that they were pieced together a�ter a
- series of compromises without a profound study of the real problems posed
by the coordination of administrative decentralization with a centralized
' state. The compromises among politicians are important, in their way, bu~
concerning problems of.relationships between the Spanish state and its regions, -
which have already contributed to unleashing three civil wars in the past 150
years, a long-term strategy is essential and no trace of this is seen yet.
The provisions drafted provide Chat each of the histor2cal regions---that is
the old domains legally abolished at the beginning of the 19th Century, but
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d whicll ~ontinu~ to hnve ~~ignific~nc~ ~.n Sp~in--~ou~.d ~~k for a~1f-gov~rnm~nt
through a con~id~r~bly ~nmplicated m~Ch~maCical formul~. Thi~ would m~an, in _
tl~e firet p1ec~, an ind~p~nd~nc~ in ~ome wgy ~im~.lar to a modified version of
thc~ old StnrmonC gy~tpm in NorChern irpland.
Compromige
'Ct~~ g~aronomou~ rEgiona would continue to eend deputiee to Madrid even though
Chey hgv~ their own institurione~ Th~ gCgCuCe un ~utonomy giv~~ the local _
- gnvprnm~nts ~ome deleg~ted pow~rg over a 13mited number of actione: Vari~tinn
oE municipal boundarip~, touriem~ and puUlic healeh.
t~y a gCrgnge and unsaei~factory compromi~~, the gutonomoug government could
nleo orgnnize a police force to protect its own building~ and plant, but the
conrdinarion beCween Chis end other national police forc~s must be worked out
later~ The autonomous regione can aZeo draft prngreme "for their own cultural
life" including teaching of thair own language. Thie clause e~ema Co pet~mit
the Ba~que~, let ue egy, to impoee obligatory Ceaching of the Basque language -
in rhe echools.
This prospect is not go rosy, parCicularly for the 50 peraenC of the Basque ~
provinces inhabited by Castillians who speak Spanieh. Yet, these provieione
~are not aufficient for the Baeque Nationglist Party, which wante apecific
mention of old rights (fuerog)~ ~s something s~par~te from tho~e af the other
regi.ona. 5uch rights presumably include the old practice, aboliehed by Franco
in 1937, of collecCing their own taxea and aending them to the Spaniah govern-
ment. ~
Naturally, the Baeque nationaliste also want complete control of the police
in their region. At one time the Catalano asked to be allowed to establish
a confederation of provinces in which Catalan was ~poken (that is Valencia,
the Balearics, as weYl as CaCalonia) to revive a greater Catalonia such as
existed more or less in the 13th Century--but for the time being they with-
drew thia request and finally concretely aupported the constitution since
they are a realiatic and obstinate people and they know, as Cambo 8aid in �
1916, that an independent Catalonia~ in effect, would beaome a department of
France. '
After nll, the Basque Nationaliat Party by now could also have agreed Co a '
compromise S.f it had not been for the ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty ;
Group] revolutionariea who with obvious impunity fire on policemen every `
dny, rob banks and buaineases, extort money for "protection" and in general
pursue the aim of eatablishing a revolutionary atate through terror and ;
intimidation.
Naturally the legislation regarding autonomy is denounced as insufficient
by the ETA~ but no degree of.autonomy evidently would be sufficient for the
members of the ETA, because they are revolutionary aeparatists and have for
so lons lived with violence that it is difficult to believe that they can
ever do without it. They are the provisionals of the IRA (Irieh Republican -
Army] on the Spaniah scene.
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'Phreee~ or Sl~oor3ng~
~ranco'e rpprpe~ion in Ba~qu~ counCry gftQr 1937, including persecution for
the uea of the B~~que language, permits the E~A to play deceptively on Che
emotions of a vaet numb~r of peraone who, in economic ~ffeira, are very cnn-
e~rvativ~ and~ in their hearte~ are not separatiete at g11. AgainaC thoae
upon whoe~ emotione ~hey cannor p1ay, Ch~y can exerciae thregCe or ehooC
them. In the meantime, Ch~ Medrid gdvernment wae too involved with the
question of the conetitution, and p~arhaps too anxioue to gvoid accusatione
of authoritarianiem, to dedicare much atCention to the Baeque problem.
Many memb~r~ of th~ government, afCer gll, ~r~ reformed Falangi~tg, who are
anxious to prove their own dpmocratic credibility. Interior Minieter Martin
_ Vi11a, for example, practically hae never had a moment in hie life when he
did not have an official position (and an official automobil~~ ae eome acidly
remark)~ borh under Fr~nco and under the king, eince 20 yeare ago he headed
the officiel aesociation of etudents.
In any ca~e, by f~r the mose importanC taek of the government now muaC be
Che Baeque question. In the paet, Adolfo Suarez reeolved hig problemg by
concentrating ~11 hie efforrg on a single aub~ect, excluding a11 the others,
and in Che second place, by manipulating and offering blandishments to hia
opposition. Sven now a concentration would be necessary, but rhe same could -
- be eaid of n greater deaire to risk a temporary unpopularity and to aseume
n atrong 1ine. Becauae aC the moment, the ETA hae the upper hand in at -
l~ast two Basque provincea, that of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. These two beauti-
ful and once proeperous provincee have been reduced to ruins in recent years.
8uainesa ie in a atate of crisis, the price of real eetate has crashed at `
5an Seb~sti~no, Madrid residenta no longer apend their summer vacationa on
the coast at 2arauz, capital ie gyetematically withdrawn, and the police have
implicitly admitted that they cannot protect businesamen.
Someone has therefore suggeated that the Spaniah atate abandon the Basque
country to ite own devices. This wo~ld be fooliah and a mistake. Firat of
. all, becauae the majority doea not want it; secondly because an action of that
kind aould constitute a retreat in the face of violence, which certainly
would not~fail to have effects elsewhere; in the third plac~, because domestic
politicnl effecta,on the Spaniah Army and on the right in general would be
incnlculable; and fourth, becauae the creation of a Basque mini-atate that
Would be extremist and revolutionary and economically inadequate would produce
formidable strategic problems for Spain, for France and all of Weatern Europe.
- COPYRtGHT: 1978 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera," s.a.s.
6034
CSO: 3104 _
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- ~OR 0~'~YCIAL U5~ ON~.Y
, SPAIN
BRI~FS
USO IN DIFFICULTIES--USO (Workers Trade Union~ has grave financial problems
due ro the f~ce thaC ie only covera 30 percent of iea general expenaea from
ir~ duea. Also in the forthcoming monrhe iC will have to repay many of the
bank credie~ ehat it has received. The confederal secretary for economy of ~
this union hae reaigned his poeition. [Text] [M~drid CAt~IO 16 in Spanish
14 Jan 79 p SJ
CSO: 3110 '
, � ;
. ,
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SW~DEN
BRI~FS -
FIRST� SW~DISH SATELLIT~--The Swedish Space Corporation is preparing to build
the first national sateliite, "M-Sat", which is to launched in 1982-83 by
a Soviet rocket. Negotiations are in progress with the Intervosmos Council
near the USSR Academy of Sciences concerning the launching of the sate113te,
which will be manufactured in Sweden. "M-Sat" (Magnetdspheric Satellite)
will have as its mission the study of the aurora borealis, as well as reac-
tions between hot and cold plasmas of the magnetosphere beyond the two ter- ~
: restrial rays. We recall that Sweden and the USSR have already been cooper-
ating for several years in tlie space field. Swedish scientific experiments
have been taken aboard Soviet satellites and stratospheric balloons launched
~rom Kiruna (Sweden) have been recovered in the USSR during joint operations.
The choice of a Soviet launcher for "M-Sat" thus marks a continuance of that
operation. However, it is surprising that Sweden, which has been cooperating
longer with other countries in the European Space Agency, did not see fit to
use the new European launcher "Ariane", which will be available at that time.
[Text] [Paris AIR $ COSMOS in French 6 Jan 79 p 35] 8946
END
CSO: 3100
53 _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020001-7