JPRS ID: 8254 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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Y
JPRS L/8254
30 January L979
~ ~
TRANSLATIONS GN JAPAN
(FOUO 3179)
~
U. S. JQINI' PUBLICATIONS ~ESEARCH SERVICE
? ~
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. t e �n ~tit~e`~~~ S~ Heport )~te
7'ttAN5LAT'IO?~5 ON JAPAN ,(FOUO 3/79) 30 Januaz 1979
d.
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- JPRS L/8259
3o Janv,ary Z9~9
TRANSLAtIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 3/79).
~
, CONTENTS PAGE
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOaICAL
'SHUKAN AiS~1HT~ Reviewe Ohira~s Life and Character
(Yu~i Katsumata; SHUKAN ASAFiI, 15 Dec 78) 1
MILITARY
US9R Indochina Strategy Anslyzed
(Takio Yamazaki; QUNJI 1~NIOfU, Jr~. 791 8 ~
ECONOI~IIC
~YOMIURI~ Blames EC for Delay in Tol~yo Round Trade Talks
(Editorial; TgE DAILY YQMrIJRI, 21 Dec 78) 21
SCIENCE AND TECSNOLOGY
Government, Business Leaders Plan Nuclear Complex
(r~zca~ nAU,Y x~rs, 5 J~ 79) 23
Japan Atanic Industry Forum Reports on Nuclear Industry
- ( NIIQCAN KOGYO SHINBiTN, 7, 8 ~e c 78 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5
. Science Council Proposal.s on Genetic Engineering, Ocean
Reseaxch ~
(ASAHI sxINBUN, 19, 3o Nov 78) 33
Proposals Detailed �
'ASAHI' Ed.itorial
I~tI Handles Sale of DeclassiPied U.S. Documents for 1~IS
(NIIQCAN KOGYO SHINBUN, 24 Nov 78) 37
Jl~t Conducting Survey for Magnetic Levitation Railroad

- Route
_ r * (MAINICHI DAII,Y NEWS, ~ Jan 79) 39
~ ~ r~~~ . 171 ,
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~OR ur~r~~.cini. US~ uN~z
CONTENTS ( C~ntinued) p~�g,,
New Mi~.lia~ Machine Hae 500-Meter-Per-Minute Ceramic
Cutter
( NSKKA.N KOC~YO SHTIVBUN, ~ Oct 7E3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brie Pe
Ocean Observa~ion Sate7.lite 40
IC T.est 3ys~em 43
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_ POLITICAL AND ~OCIOLO(~ICAL
'SHUICAN ASAHI' REVIEWS OHIRA'S LIFE AND CHARACTER
Tokyo SHUKAN ASAHI ~n Japaneae 15 DF:c 78 pp 196-199
[Article by Yu~i Kataumata: "The 68 Years of Masayoshi Ohira, the Man"]
[Text] The man known gs Masayoshi Ohira has been an
enigmatic politician. Though apparently intelligent,
he is not a clear-cut genius. One wondprs if he is a
coward, yet when it is time for tenacity, he can be
Cenacious. His well known hesitant manner of speech
is found to be surprisingly lucid when given careful
attention. This man, however, hae now become prime
minister. He can not rema~~n an enigma. Let us try
to trace the peth the man, Ohira, has walked.
Masayoshi Ohira returned to his home in Setagaya in Toky~ the night of
November 27 followiag the decision that he should assume the positions
of president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and of prime minister.
_ He spoke in Sanuki dialect, almost as if muttering to himself, to his wife
Shigeko and those awaiting him: "Something incredible is going to happen..."
That morning, Ohira, making an effort to maintain his composure, had said,
"It would be ridiculous to get excited at the announcement of the initial
test." The day before, when he appeared at the offices of the Kochikai
- (the Ohira faction) in Toranomon he spoke to such top party executives as
Zenko Suzuki, who were calculating the Ohira votes. "Tomorrow the long
. awaited ship comes in, doesn't it?" he said, borrowing the words of
Kuranosuke Oishi spoken the previous night.
But the facial expression of the Ohfra wh? muttered, "Something incredible
is going to happen..." was different from both the poker face of that
morning and the Aggressive look ~of the day before.
"I dc~n't knoW how to describe his expression, but it was, at any rate,
' extremely stern." (Yoshiko Morita, Ohira's oldest daughter.)
Few politicians have persc.,ally experiencecY the fascination of political
power and the difficulty of maintaining that power to the extent that
1
1
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_ Uhiru hna. I:v~n now, mcneinn oE Ohiru evnk~y a persi~tent nnd irritaCing
n~~onintion wiCh Kukuei Tunakn, Chough over Ch~ y~ure Che pnlieicinn mogt
reepnndible fox liKhting Che Eire of Ohirn's politicnl life has ~een the
late Hayero Ikeda.
Ohira aeaiaeed ~k~de, during Che Ik~d~ cabineC era, firsC as ch~.ef Cabinet
secreCary, and then gs miniatier of foreign affairs. Unttl Ikeda'e pre-
canceroug condition caused resignatinn after the Tokyo OlympiCS, Uhirn was
- consCa:lrly at his eide, representing rhe Ikeda adminiseratin~z. Tt was a
pained political regime, thaC arose in ;.he midst of rhe Curbulent condieions
following the rioCs releking ro Che Jap~n-U.S. Security Treaty and the
Asanuma incident (assassination in 1960 uf Ine~iro Asanuma] in 1960.
7'he nighC Ikeda ggaumed office as preaident of the LDP, Ohira offered the
following ndvice: "To etate the extreme, rhe cabinet formed in the morning
may fall by evening, but there ig nothing to be done about it. It is the
people who will decide how long one will be permiCCed Co sCay in power.
Henceforth, it ~aould be best to completely avoid auch words as 'long-term
political control."'
- Ohira is a type who has already begun thinking of the eventual collapae of
nn enCerprise, its goals unrealized, even at the beginning. One can we11
imagine the atrain Ohira felt as he watched Che drama of the "Fukuda col-
lapse," realizing that it was the resulC of the battle he himself had be-
gun.
Aa Child Apoligized for Mischief of BroChers
Though Ohira has ascended to the premiership, the general impression of him
h~s been rather the opposite of that of a"man of great destiny." When
newspapers forecasting the reaults of the primary elections appeared with ~
headlines reading, "Overwhelming Victory for Fukuda" and Ohira to Battle
_ Nakasone for Second Place" one LDP Dietman declared, "Ohira is, afCer all,
simply not destined to become prime minister or parCy head."
Ohira does not show strong leadership characteristics, nor does he have what
it takes to excite wideapread popularity. His features may be called
_ fatherly or ox-like. His speech seems inarticulate, typified by his well
known halting delivery. During the last election, rumblings that, "It's
a big ~ob because we are trying to sell defective merchandise" w~re heard
ev~n from Dietmen in Ohira's own faction.
. What lifted such a man to Ohira's present position? There are man~+ who find
the anew:~r in Ohira's nchievements in his persisCing role as behind-the-scene
aavisor. The Ikeda period hardly needs mention as a case in point. Further,
Ohira was "one in body and spirit" with Kakuei Tanaka, a younger man than he; -
and he served the aloof Takeo Miki as fina~ace minister.� And even with Takeo =
Fukuda, Ohira devoted himself to being the power in the background as ~
~ Secretary General of the LDP. _
~
~
~ ~
I
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It ecem~ thHC Chix "Number 2;, cnn be trnccd bnck to Ohirn's nneurn~.
InHC[ncCH ri~th~r Chnn to rhe rrr.cl[yrciHieinn c~f n pnlttic3i~n of burc~iiucri~ric
_ c~rlgin ro be 111 nt eng~ in snme kind oC poet.
Oh~ra's elder si~ter, Mumn Ynmada (74)~ recnlle that us a child, wh~never
hia two brothers were scnlded by rheir father for mischief, Ohira, who
himself hnd don~ nothing, would stand before hia faCher Rikichi ~nd apoli-
gize. P~rplexed, R~.kichi would say, "WhaC's the maet~r with him, always
going around bowing and acraping...." Such behavior r~quires a willingness
to be self-deprecating, to bow one's h~ad In ord~r to calm a situation. This
m~y, in l~ter years have a relationship Co his submitting meekly Co Shiina's
~udgment when the Tanaka Cabinet fell, and Co conceding power to Fukuda
during efforts to geC the poliC3.ca1 situarion under control after the "Miki
_ ouster." Kenzo Kawano'(former presidenC of Che House of Councilore), in hie
work "My Term as House of Councilors President" ("Gicho icidgi"), wrate:
- "Ohira's virtue lies in his aelflesanesa. He has a greaC flexibiliCy, an
ability to driFt wiCh the current. This is clever, buC iC also lends
strength."
During his days as a student at Takamatsu College ^f Commerce, Ohira became
a Christian. A schoolmate, Eliichi Hashimoto (chairman of Mitsui and Co)
observed Ohira on the aCreet solicitaCing contributions with ~ charity ~,ut
on a snowy night.
Unless one elbows through and aCtempts to push ahead he will, of course,
noC be conspicuous. Tsuneo Kawahara, who aCCended the old system Mitoyo
Middle School (now Kanonji First High School) at about Che same time as
Ohira, says, "He was inconspicuous.. Even his marks were not ouCstanding."
5o inconspicuous was he that until recently there were those among his class-
mates aC Tokyo University of Commerce (now Hitotsubashi University) who would
= say, "Now that you mention it, I believe there was s fellow there named Ohira."
Ohira has, however, in his own way, left a strong impression on those who
were close to him. Eisuke Yoshinaga (Professor Emeritus of Hitotaubashi
University), who was 1 year ahead of Ohira at Tokyo University of Commerce,
= was sold on Ohira's nbility to get things done. At the end of a course on
administrative law given by Tatsukichi Minobe that had only five s;udents,
Yoshinaga and Ohira discussed the possibility of giving a farewell lunch~on
for the professor. When Prof Minobe readily accepted the invitation, Ohira,
feeling it would be a waste if only five students were there, placed a notice
on the school's bulletin board announcing "A Luncheon With Professor Minobe."
The result was a packed faculty lunch room, as more than 100 people attended
the luncheon.
Though noe as flashy as Takeo Fukuda, who coined such phrases as "Kyoran
bukka" [Erenzied .commodity~prices) and "showa genroku" [a contemporary
Cenroku era-noted for decadance], Ohira is not lacking in the ability to
~oin new phrases. His "magnanimity and perseverance" (kanyo to nintai) of
the Ikeda era is only too well known, but even taking only, the last 2 or 3
years we find such phrases as "ablutions" (misogi) and "governability" coined
at the time of the Miki ouster. After he was chosen party president he
expressed his feelings with the words: ~
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~'0[t ~ US~ unLx
- "'1'here urc tim~~ when cven 10 nr ZO yeur~ huve no significnnce; yer eh~re
urc orher Cimes when one insCanC ia Cerribly signi.Fic~nt."
'1'hough a:~omewh~e ~mbi~uoua phrase, when spoken by Ohiru ir seem.~ snmehow rn
t~ke on ~ign:Lfic~nce. One Ching thar evokes rhis feeling is Che voluminnu3
n~ture oE Ohira'g reading. Cven when saddl~d with the exh~usting duriss of
secreCary gener~l of the LUP, Ohira never alCered his habie of dropping by
_ a booksCore once or twice weekly.
Though he claims to be so busy he cnn nnly skim, he is, in facC, a careful
render. A classmate at Tokyo UniversiGy of Commerce Chizuo Kamida (former
head, Weatern Uivisiott Br~nch Office, .lapan National Rail~oays), has ehis
recollection:
- "It was, as I recgll, one of his 1aw books. The points he wanted to remember
~ circled in red, word by word. They were not ~ust underlined. Once I tried
doing the same, buC it was so Cime consuming I gave it up."
Ohira sends books he has finiahed Co the local municipal offices in Kanon~i ~
City, where lie is creaCing an Ohira Library. In the back of one of ehe
books there, Principles of Economics," is the following record:
FirsC Reading: 1933, manCh date unknown
Second Reading: 1934, 17 September '
Third Reading: 1934, 4 October afternoon.
It t~as been said ef Ohira thaC, "He is not the type to push himself agres-
sively ahead" (Ohira faction Dietman, Hiroyuki Kurihara), buC Chere is ap-
parently a side to his personality which includes a secret to success ob-
tained from his upbringing. �
LDP member Miro~i Sakamoto once heard Ohira in deep reminiscence,
"I envy you, Mr Sakamoto. I had to borrow m~oney fron people to get through
~ school, and my life has been such that I always had to be concerned with the
Eeelings of those around me."
In addition Zentaro Kosaka (former foreign minist~er), who went to the same
' university and entered the political life, was told by Ohira:� ~
"You were born with a silver spoon in your mouth."
5akanx~to is owner of major forest lands in Noto, and Kosaka is heir to
- the Kvsaka financial group in Shinshu.
Ohira was born March 12, 1908,'third son of a middle-class farmer in Toyohama-
clio in Mitoyo-gan, Kagawa Prefecture. It was u~ual on farms of the day that
children began helping with the work at the age of 6 or 7. The daily task
consisted of we:.ving straw plaits to be used in the manufacture of straw hats.
On days when there was no school the assigned quota was as much as one roll
(1.5 centimeters by 50 meters) of woven straw. ~
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AfCer finishing Mieoyn Middle School in ?Canon~i CiCy, bh:irn Curned tn h~.s
married nunt 1lving in Tukamatau Ci~y ~or auppore And ateended Tekemareu
~ Co11`ge o~ Commerce. After gradu~ting, he begnn work ussoci~ted wi.th the
Chrietian mi~eioniiry eCfort, but afrnr 1 y~ar, yr.ifled, he decided ta prnce~d
Co univergiCy.
"Of course, my fnmily hadn'C the meana ro send me Co univeraity, go along
with admission to the unive~sity I was to be lenC achool exp~nses by both
th~ Sakaide City Kamato MuCu~1 Aid Soci~ty ~nd Che Kagawa PrefecCure
Scholarahip Society in Takamatsu City. Hence it was Chrough the good graces
of both organizations that I began un3veraity life." ("Personal History")
�
~ Sensikive to Jeglousy of Fr~ends
~ While in school Ohira passed the mnst difficult teat of a11 Che higher civil
service examination, placing among the top 30 (as Kamida remembers it), and
wns the �irsC Tokyo University of Commerce graduate in 6 years eo go into
tt~e F'inance Ministry. There is, eherefore, no questton of his elite aCatus.
But this w~a the pre-war period. Ir is not surprising that Ohira should
= deve.lop a complex of sorts as he looked about himself at the university to
diacover that nearly all Che students were children of the distinguished
familiea of the area.
After enteri.ng the Finance Ministry, Ohira was not particularly forCunate.
Compared to Takeo Fukuda, who consistently followed an eliCe course, Oh~ra
may even be cal~ed ill-favored. Three yeara after beginning service he was
ordered to proceed to the Asian Development Board, which was responsible for
the administration of occupied Inner Mongolia, and apent 1.5 years in the
Creeless desert land of Chang-chia-k'ou. After the war he was transferred
to thP Economic Stabilization Board, a conglomerate from all ministries.
Even afCer~returning to his original minisCry, he served twice as confi-
dential secretaxy to his senior from Che same town, ~'inance Miniater Shuichi
Tsushima.
Hence it was that when Hayato Ikeda, a high official in the tax division,
� was appoinCeci Finance Minister and designated Ohira confidential secretary,
, Ohira held back momentarily. IC 3ust happened that Ohira was away on business
in Kagoshima, and he sent a telegram of actual refusal which read, "Though
deeply grateful for your kindness, my emotions are torn apart with confusion,
and I am unable Co reach a decision." Ikeda's failure to acknowledge the
telegram and coercive letter of appointment became a turning point for Ohira.
, Ir is difficult to enter the mind of Ohira, who rather than seeking to stand
_ out always tried to hide himself. There are too few clues.
~ If one persists, the word "3ealousy," which Ohira often used, is perhaps a
clue. For instance, there is his statement, "Among friends, raCher than
being congratulated, I was more often the ob~ect of jealousy." (His feelings
after remuval from an important government office.)
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I~OR _ . USL uNt,z
'l'li~~ tr.rm "Jeiilc~u~y" ir~ nnC c~nG rhuC fincly Cr4qu~n~ use nmong p~].iCici~ns ~.n
nntmnl cizc~maCances. Is lt because of my petry-m~,nded susp~cion th~r I
f3nd in his ataCement a dnrk napecC in Che henrr of rhe mnn Ohira?
- Al� L�he snme time, use of Che term "friend" such ns w}~en he said, "Among
~riends, r~Cher than being congratulated,.,,the ob~ect of ~ealousy," reveals
moyC di.recCly the mindfulness that stems fr.om this facCor,. Surely, "friends"
:Ln rhe true sense of the wnrd congratulate and noti envy. Tt appears, however,
th~L� Ohirn includes in Che Cerm "friend" a11 people who have even the slightest
rel.nCion to him.
IC ~.s char~cteristic of Ohira that, almost wiChout fai1, the tierms "friendship"
_ or "friends" w~.ll be woven into his wr3tings and reminiscences. Apparenrly,
even the members of tihe Seirankai, who are unrelenting in rhe3r hostility
_ to Oh:tra, are covered by his term "friends."
- Whenever n word leaves Ohira's lips it has passed through two or even Chree
. EilCers. A~taCement which might incite the other pa~ry is skillfully
eliminated by the~e Filtere. He once ~ustified his faltering manner of
speech:
"As f.oreign mini.ster, I had to speak while simulCaneously considering the
r~actions of other natfions. Hence..."
Iiur Ohira's hesitancy is not limited to his testimony in the Diet. His
_ "ul~'s" and "ah's" are perhaps best viewed as activity to fill up Che time
required ior words to pass through the filCers.
- I'olitician of Both Hardheadedness and Sense of Mutability '
Icl~iro Nakagawa of the Seirankai, who sCood against Ohira anci opposed
- normalizatfon of Japan-China relations and the Japan-China Aviation Agree-
ment to tl~e last, never he~itates to say, "Ohira is deceitful." There is a
concern even among dovish members of the Diet who support Ohira that he may
indeed be capable of ma3or falsehoods. The concern stems from failure to
- dispel mistrust resulting from Ohira's noncommittal atance as Foreign Minister
in the Taiiaka Cabinet vis-a-vis the Kim Tae-chung affair.
After 26 years of continuous work as a professional politician, Ohira has
at last reached tlie highest post. That he has made his way solely on the
basis of "sincerety," "selflessness" and "honesty" is contrary to common
sense.
On one occasion, when dealing with the Japan-Korea problem as foreign minister
In the Ikeda Cabinet, he asserted:
"My diplomucy is realistic.'~
~ We may conclude that in the depths of those narrow eyes there lurks an
ability for hardheaded calculation. Indeed, in a conve ' with auth ~
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Suburo Shiroynma, Ohira more or less compared himself wiCh Teynsu Tokugawa.
"In personality, he (Kakuei Tannka) is 3n some w~ys 1~.ke Hideyoahi ToyoComi.
I, on the oCher hnnd, am not like Hideyoshi. If anyehing, it is T~kugawtt...
(rephrasing), rhat is, T Cend ~o be unspectaculnr." (GENDAI, a monChly)
At home,~Ohira is said (bv D~.etman Yukihiko Iked~) ro bey "No C a man Riven
to extrava~ance." He is unhappy when lights are left one, and goes about
turning them off, whether at home or in his minisrerial offices.
When he Cakes off a shirt, he is apt to say, "It's nor dirty yeC. I'11
wear it again tomorrow." On 1 December, when chosen party president at rhe
convention, he was interviewed by press agencies until 2300 hours. YeC,
on the m~rning of the 2d, when he 1efC home he wore the eame shirt as the
night b~fore.
Moreover, Ohira, who is so concerned and gives such circumspect care Co
outward appearances, upon returning home becomes "almost embarrassingly
casual." His concepC oF home as the ulCimate havan is unusually stron~.
Ohira (to whom ltome is so important) lost his oldest son (Masaki) (26 at
the time) to BehqeCs disease in 1964. He has wriCCen of that time:
. "Cott~ran mortal Cr?aC I am, I nearly lost all hope and passion for living.
He was irraplacable--nearly everything to me."
Ohira is apt quite casually to speak of "the evanescence of human existence."
We seem to have a prime minister. the likes of whom we have not haci before.
_ COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1978
9369
CSO: 4105
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l~nft t~rrrr,rnr, U5~ ONi,Y
MILITAi2Y
~
U5SR INDOCHINA STRATEGY ANALYZED
Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU (JAPAN MILITARY REVI~W) tn Japanese Vol 14 No 1(No 154)
- Jan 79 pp 34-43
(Artlcle by 'Takto Yamazaki~ ~nternational affatrs researcher: "Commentary
on Soviet Indochlna Strategy"~
(T~xt) With the concluslon of the Indochina war wh`,ch covered thirty years
after Worid War II, 1t was expected that a period of peace would settle in,
withQUt any wars in Southeast Asia, and that peaceful coex~stence would come
about among the three socialist countries of Indochina and the 1lberal coun-
tries of ASEAN (A1liance of Southeast Ilstan Nations).
In reality, however, Vietnam and Kampuchea are continuing a fferce "proxy
Sino-Soviet war" (National Securlty Adviser Birezinski); and the si~~+~ition
has changed to one in which the Soviet Union, wnich is backtng Vte~nam, and
China~ which is backing Kampuchea, are in fierce conftict in Ind~~:hina~ from
which the United States withdrew.
With this kind of situat~on, Chfna, while restraining Viet~iam with a problem
of the overseas Chinese, strengthened its containment of the Soviet Union
by making a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan. But the Sovtet Union
strengthened its support of Vietnam in order to roll back this containment,
and, at the same time, has aimed at closer relations wlth ASEAN.
In June of last year, Vietnam became affiliated with the Soviet�led COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Aid); also, Party Secretary Le Duan and Prime ~
Minister Pham Yan Oong visfted the USSR tn November, and ostentatfously
displayed the unity of the Soviet Union and Vletnam by issuing a Soint de-
~ claration.
Now the Soviet Union is reinfo rcing the fighting power of the Sovlet Pacific
F1eet whfch is based in its maritime provinces. There must be some purpose
to this reinforcement of milStary power, and it would seem related to the
strengthening of its support for Vietnam. But there is a concern that the
development of such a state of affairs wi11 influence the security affairs
of aur own country. .
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5t~vt~?t Str~~t~qy V1~~wtd frc~ni f~u5t-war 111stnry
If the post-wer history nf the As1an t~aGffie n~~an 1s taken in summary, the
- Pa~iflc Ucpan was under the cdntrol nf th~ Unlted Statps fnr a ldng tlme
after the war, although the USS~ support~d thp ~hlnese rpvolutior, end
- ~xtended th~ "communist sphere" to the ~hinese cantlnent. The United Stetes
stationed many m1l~tery bases in Japan, South Korea, Okinaw~, 'Taiwdn, the
Phtlipplnes, Thalland and otl~~r ~ountrtes; and the security of the w~stern
Pacific was rn~intained by American naval power, as represent~d in th~
5eventh F1eet.
Th~ Sovi~t Unton changed thls state of affair$ end tried to push back even
mor~ American power from Asta. The strat~gy the SovSet Union empldyed tu
do Chts~was to set up a rSvelry between the United States and Chfna. That
strategy was inaugurated at the time of the Korean War in 1950.
The 5ovi~t Un1on avoided any dSrect interventSon ~n the Korean War, and
wanted China, whlch had ~ust establtshed its Chlnese communist government
th~ year before, to send troops into thp Kore~n peninsula to fight against
the Amertcan army. Taking this opportunity, both th~ United Stat~s and
China entered into a state of bftter antagonism; but this was allowed to
happen by none other than the 5oviet Unton.
Also, the Vietnam war, which began in 196A, aggravated even more the Sino-
American antagonlsm.
In order to get rid of this Sino-American antagon9sm, the American scheme
to turn the tables fn its own favor was the Nixon visit to China in 1972
and ~~as the drive for the Nixon Ooctrine whlch followed from the visit.
The United States withdrew 540,000 troops from Yietnam and reduced its mili-
tary strength elsewhere in Asia as well. However, alth the retreat of Amer-
ican military power, a"power vacuum" was created and the Sovlet Un~on
stepped in to fill that vacuum.
Likewise, Nixon's visit to China became an opportun~ty whlch allowed the
- communist parties of both China and Vietnam to become antagonistic toward
each other. As the Nhan Oan magazine pointed out in August 1972, the Viet-
namese comnunist party has harbored a feeling af mistrust, which 1s hard
to uproot, toward the Chinese comnunist party which "gave an innertube to
a drowning bandit". It was none other than the Soviet Union which gave
enormous mflitary aid to Vietnam, whSch further deepened its mistrust of
China, and helped it ~btain its victory in 1975.
Naving done this, the Soviet Union acquired a"base" of power in Vietnam
from which the United States had withdrawn. And Nanoi, whtch won a victory
in the Indochina "liberation war" with Soviet aid, aimed at formin~ an
- "Indochinese Federation" with itself as the leader.
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1'h~ 5ov1~t Unien strongly supported Vietnam in th1s. Pro-Sovi~t Party 5ecre-
tary Le buan of the Vtetn~mes~ Communist Pa rty visited iMnscow in Ocxob~r
1975, and issued a~oint declaratlon with th~ Soviet Union. 6ut, so es not
to give any room for Chin~s~ int~rventton, it hurried wtth its uniflcation
nf north and south Vietnem and, at the same time, removed a11 people of
Chlnes~ 11ne~g~ from positions of r~sp~n5ibility tn the party and the mili-
tary. Yhis b~ceme the source of the pres~nt "problem of the overseas Chin-
_ ~~e".
- Taking nff on this "prablem of th~ overseas Chinese," China unfolded a cam-
' paign of critlcism against Vietnam. Nr~~rever, 9n opposition to this, th~
Soviet Union lntensified its crttlcism of Ch1n~, and, on June 29, Secr~tary
Br~zhnev made a definlte statement that Vietnam is an "advanced base" in
which socialism c~n put 1ts trust.
Th~ Soviet-led COMECON had fo?~na11y d~cided on Vletnam's affiliatlon the
day befor~, June 28. This was an i~dication that V9etnam, the important
plac~ in Southeast Asia, would be committed to the SovSet camp. Undoubtedly,
Brezhnev's speech ~bout "advanced base" was the result nf these facts.
According to info rn~ation from thp United States Pacific Forces Commander
Wiesner, 1t is said that the Soviet Un~on has already completely equipped
~ Soviet missile base Sn Cam Ranh Bay. It is also said that a Soviet naval
base has been built an Cat 8~ island, ~ust outside Naiphong Narbor.
in short, the Soviet Union has changed to a situation which literally makes
Vietnam~ the important spot in Southeast Asia, an "advanced base". This is
nothing less than a sound victory for Soviet military and diplomat!c strate-
9Y�
USSR Strategy P1ans for Asia and the Pacific
Thus, the Soviet Union progressively pushed into the Pacific and post-war
Asia; and, with the retreat of United States military power, ~t acquired a
base in Vfetnam, thereby reinforcing its containment of China.
It seems there are the three follow~ng broad aims to this Sovfet strategy.
rhese are the elim9nation of American military power from Asia, the actual-
ization of China-USSR reconciliation, and control of marlt~me traffic
from their Far East bases to the Indian Ocean.
First, the elimination of American military power has shown greet progress.
The Unfted States military porrer already has been withdrawn extensively
~ from Indochina; and Thailand, which yfelded to Vietnamese pressure, asked
for the withdrawl of United States forces stationed in Thailand. The United
States army pulled Sts presence out of 7hailand in July 1976. Likewise,
American troops are supposed to be Nithdrawn from South Korea as well.
Consequently, the next.irnportant aim will be directed at the elimination
of American military power in the Philippines.
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5econdly, the actualiiatton of Sino-Sovi~t reconciliation is expected to be
achieved by reinforcing its containment of China. The USSR's gr~at~st de-
sire is that China will yteld to Soviet pressure and convert to th~ Soviet
line; and then, Sino-Soviet reconciliation will be complete. With that, it
would be possible to divert to Europe the 45 army divisions deployed along
the Ch1na-USSR border. Therefore, the USSR is reinforcing its containment
of China. By dding so, they anticipate that Soviet influence will gain
power within China and that Chtna-Soviet reconciliation will come about
from the seizing of political power. Their ~ontalnment of China has been
showing progress. Vietnam, together wlth Laos, is deepening its leaning
~ toward the USSR, especially since Vietnam has become an "advanced bese" for
the Soviet Union. Therefore, the next aim is directed malnly at ASEAN.
Third, the "control of maritime traffic" has become indispensable for sup-
porting not only USSR strategy toward Asia but its world strategy.
As for Gontrol of maritime traffic, they want to have under Soviet control
maritime trafr'1c which goes through the Strait of Korea, heads south from
the South China Sea, goes through the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean.
in other words, it ~s to Q1imSnate American control and establish Soviet
- control over maritlme traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.
However, Southeast Asia is a great gateway for this maritime traffic from
the Pacific Ocean to the lndian Ocean. After all, whoever controls Southeast
Asia can control maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian
Ocean.
5outheast Asia conslsts of the three socialist nations and the five liberal
nations of ASEAN. The USSR has acquired a base in Indochina. Therefore,
the Soviet Union rvill try next to expand its influence to all of the nations
of ASEAN from its base in Vietnam. That will contribute greatly to its
attempt to contain China to the south, to cause American military power to
pull back from ASEAN, especially from the Philippines, and to establish
Soviet control o~ maritime traffic under the protection of Soviet naval
power, which wi11 use Soviet naval and air bases now in Vietnam.
Whoever Controls Otl Controla the Norld.
In the above manner, the Soviet Union has aimed at control of maritime traf-
fic floaring from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. But, as a Soviet
r+orld strategy, that seems to have a close relationshlp with its strategy
Lhat aims at controlli~~g the petroleum shipping routes rvhich go from the
oil-rich Persian Gulf to ilestern Europe and Japan.
- The Soviet Union has attached great importance to the Indian Ocean where
petrolewn shipping routes pass from the Persian Gulf to EurApe and to Japan.
Since 1968, they have already put their naval po+wEr permanently in the
Indian Ocean, and given it the duty of "checking" the petroleum shipping
routes of the west.
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I~~is nrrrr,tnt, U,~I; ~Nt~Y
After that, the USSR made
+,,~,f~, ~ , ' a military ~id pact wlth
(1~'}~C"t~t~~iti~ (2 ) y~~ ( 3~~tp~t~i~ South Yemen i n 1969, and
s~.}~P;'~ ~ . 0 acquired a naval base in
, ; Aden and an a i r force base
~ ' on Suqutra i
~ ' r, ~ sland. On the
' ,,r r p�q j,~ ~
_ ~"~.--r;;~ ~