LOUDOUN NEWCOMER PUZZLES NEIGHBORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500230030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 13, 1985
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Releasa6bb)bkd~IC4
28 January 1985
RnMM030-8
'ffF , LV
The seven regional telephone companies created by the divestiture of
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. last year will join a Texas-based advanced
computer research consortium, it was reported Monday.
The Austin American-Stateman said the companies will join the
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. through their central research
and development arm, Bell Communications Research inc., known as Bellcore.
Bellcore, headquartered in Livingston, N.J., declined comment and MCC said
only that a new member is expected to join within two months.
Twenty major U.S. companies hoping to become more competitive with Japan have
already joined MCC for long-term research into advanced computer architecture,
software technology, component packaging and computer-aided design and
manufacture.
The telephone companies reportedly ready to join MCC include Bell South,
Southwestern Bell, Pacific Telesis, U.S. West, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic a na
Nynex.
The companies once owned by the Bell System are branching into other lines of
business, including sales of computers and other information processing
equipment.
Industry analysts said joining MCC would be a logical step for the companies
because they are heavy users of computers and software.
"They face competition from a whole host of companies involved in
communications,'' said Neal Yelsey, industry analyst for the Salomon Bras.
investment firm. 'The more modern their network is the more competitive they
are in delivering (new) services.''
MCC, headed by retired Adm. and former CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman,
selected Austin in 1983 over sites in Atlanta, San Diego, Calif., and
Raleigh-Aurhan, N.C.
MCC is operating out of temporary quarters while a $20 million permanent
research headquarters is being constructed on the University of Texas campus.
The 200,000 square-foot center is expected to be ready for occupancy in
mid-1986.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230030-8
 Y
STATINTL
WH5H1NGTON POST
13 January 1985
Loudouii Newcomer
Puzzles Neighbors
Controversial Leader Lives
On Heavily Guarded Estate
By John Mintz
Washington Past Staff Writer
If you look between the trees along Rte. 704 in ru-
ral Loudoun County one weekend day, you might see
the rnen in camouflage fatigues going through their
drills, local residents say.
Neighbors say they have grown accustomed to the
groups of men with semiautomatic weapons rushing
across the rolling fields of the Woodburn Estate out-
side Leesburg. On a recent Saturday, a resident said,
he heard what he thought was shooting from the old
estate. "It sounded like light mortar," the neighbor
said. "A sort of a `kapook.' "
The people who stay at the Woodburn Estate say
there are no mortar emplacements on the premises.
But they say guards there carry an array of hand-
gun: -Colt Combat Commanders, Walther PPKs,
'.iAC i C's-and other armaments. There are sand-
oz uttres;, d guard posts near the estate's 13-
roem mansion, cement barriers along the
ror,d and sharp metal spikes in the driveway.
The tea: security is for Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr.
LaRouche, who lives or the estate, is a perennial
right v:ing presidential candidate who is convinced he
is in imminent danger of assassination by hit teams
dispatched by the Libyans, the Soviets or narcotics
pushers.
.n part because Lal'ouc says he finds the Lou-
doun countryside safe, he and his associates are
moping into the area in a big way. LaRouche's as-
sociates have bought three properties in the county
wortii a total of more than $1 million, and they
ar;,t d tc buy another for $1.3 million until the deal
fell through.
LaRouche, 62, is the leader of a tightly knit world-
wvide organization known for its shifting ideological
stances ~:nd apocalyptic rhetoric, according to inter-
vicv s with former associates of LaRouche, numerous
ind vidua':s familiar with the group, and government
and law enforcement officials, as well as an exami-
1970s, has espoused an ideology that some
Jewish groups say is anti-Semitic. Its phi-
losophy is a mishmash, but the main thrust
is that LaRouche and his followers are vir-
tually the only force on Earth able to stop
nuclear war and world starvation.
The organization supports itself financially
through a variety of means, including sales of
its literature and intelligence-gathering for
corporations and individuals, said LaRouche
and some associates. He gets public funds as
well-LaRouche's recent presidential cam-
paign received $494,000 in federal matching
funds, federal records said.
So far, in addition to renting the Wood-
burn property, corporations operated by
LaRouche's associates have bought three
properties in Loudoun for $1,048,000. At
this point, about 25 of LaRouche's associ-
ates have joined LaRouche and his wife,
Helga Zepp-LaRouche, in the Leesburg
area, sources said.
. The group also has decided to move
many operations of its national headquar-
ters from Manhattan to Loudoun, say peo-
ple familiar with the group. As many as 200
LaRouche followers are expected to move
there to work in a new printing plant and of-
fice complex the group is building in a Lees-
burg industrial park, according to former
members cf the group and a Loudoun Coun-
ty official.
In this historic region, where monuments
pay tribute to Gen. Robert E. Lee's Con-
federacy and farms stay in the hands of fam-
ilies for seven generations, residents are
greeting LaRouche with intense curiosity.
They do not know how to react to him, and
some are afraid.
"We feel if we rock the boat, they could get
nasty with us," said one county resident who
has dealt with LaRouche's associates but
who, like most of the dozen or so local people
interviewed, does not want to be identified.
"We have to coexist with them, but we don't
agree with their political beliefs."
To Leesburg Police Chief James Kidwell,
Lyndon LaRouche's entry into Loudoun
County is shaping up as a clash of cultures.
"Out here are more country people," Kid-
well said. "It's a different world they're in.
They'll learn as they go along. The things
they're interested in, the country people
aren't interested in."
Indeed, LaRouche and his group seem
strikingly out of character in a variety of
ways in slow-paced, neighborly Loudoun.
According to former members of
LaRouche's organization and other individ-
uals familiar with its operation, group mem-
bers follow LaRouche's dictates almost
without question. Members of the group-
sect In the ? ? ,tis but whirr ar eu t',e rlbht~~b13.04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230030-8
Approve or e~ease
nation of the group's internal documents and publicly
distributed literature.
LaRouche's group blames many of the world's ills
on p'iots by the Soviet secret police, the queen of
England. "the dope lobby," Jewish organizations and
other groups it considers to be its enemies, the or-
ganization's literature shows. The group has 500 to
1,0(10 n-,embers, former associates of LaRouche s .
Tile group, which started as a left-w,ving socialist
9sb ti i:; ~ =!~
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP9-0090'180
a
T
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
13 January 1985
Ex-sp)rm mustering hi-tech forces
By WILLIAM H. IN:IIAN Instead, he's trying to cre-
Austin, Tex.-(UPI}-Bobby-
Ray Inman has, swapped.
cloak and:- dagger for
businessman's mufti, classi-;:
fied secrets.for proprietary
ones, but the master spymas-. ter is still outfoxing his
competition
The former ' CIA deputy -
director and-chief of the
u tl rasecret National Security
..Agency heads what has been
ca ie one of the nation's
great business experiments
an attempt by rival American
companies to join forces and-
eat the Japanese at inven- _
tine, the next generation of_
corn uters.
"Our success or failure
here," - he predicted of the
hybridized outfit, Microelec-
tronics and Computer
Technclogy _ ? Corp., "will
affect the long-term security
of the United States and its
economic viability."
INMAN, M. is no tvro
when it comes to high tech. A..
seii tvie tech no ogist, he
created electronic espionage
networks f o r t e 7a\'v t g:
1efense Intelligence Agen-.
cv the CIA and the NSA, an
acencv so secretive few gov-
ernment ' leaders knew its
function: to crack enemy'-
co es, monitor foreign com-
sationana s ie
secret transmissions.
But Inman no longer pur
sues that: "ungentlemanly
task of looking into other
people's mail"-his words,
paraphrasing a former secre-
tary of state.
.ate "an atmosphere of
genius," a reserach work
.-place,- conducive to: -?bril
liance, a place where the sec
rets of thinking'. machines
can be unlocked--a daunting
challenge even for an accom-
plished codebreaker:
BUT THE MCCy experi-
ment appears to be working,
despite the long odds, Busi-ness leaders in other fields
have contacted him about set-
ting up similar joint research
projects to meet the growing
competition from abroad.
"One thing we 'have
proven indisputably," said
the soft-spoken admiral,
sounding more like an in-
trospective professor than a
spy of three decades, "is that
this is the way to meet the
competition, a collaborative
research effort. We have
already made great headway
on our projects and have
completed hiring our staff. -
."We still have a long way to go before we see
results.But-we know now this was the way-to do the
job."
The first months at MCC were simply a battle of
survival Many corporate leaders felt the project's
was foredoomed because of a fundamental obstacle:,,,
The corporation was at odds with the Sherman,
Anti-Trust Act. .
Already, the Justice Department was threatening
to close down the project.
But nobody had counted-on Inman'sgalvanizing.:
presence. He. and his: proxies., argued persuasively.
in the right corners of Washington. The competi-
tion was just too strong and unique, they argued. At
stake was eminence in world technology, The
winner will take all. The Japanese had a head start.
An exception to an "archaic" rule had to be made.
IN AN extraordinary move, the Justice Depart-,
ment -made a exception. In December 1982, it
announced it did not object to the existence of a
coalition of American business giants, a turnabout
in the policy held since the trust-busting days of
ur::ir:ue
Teddy Roosevelt. Even so, the agency reserved the
right to review the corporation's major programs
for possible violations.?
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230030-8
 v WALL STREET JOURNAL
IV A41T C1,> AF: ME D STATINTL 11 January 1985
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R00500230030-8
dictions came true, Mr. Casey made things support, and that meant avoiding contro-
worse by mishandling his already strained versies. Mr. Casey, in contrast, wanted to
Volatile Spy Chief relationship with Congress.
"What Bill did wrong was to let the
agency get back into large-scale covert ac-
Casey Raises Morale tion, which isn't covert action at all, but an
unofficial form of warfare," argues Sen.
And Budget at CIA, Daniel P. Moynihan, a former member of
the Senate Intelligence Committee and one
But Not Public Image of Mr. Casey's sharpest critics.
6 I A leading member of the House Intelli-
Stumbling on Covert Action
Obscures Higher Quality
Of Intelligence Analyses
The Nine Mexico Revisions
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-Some years ago, Wil-
liam Casey wanted to buy a fancy house
here that had already been promised to the
Japanese embassy. The owner, a genteel
society woman, worried about what she
would say to the Japanese.
"Tell them," Mr. Casey replied, "Re-
member Pearl Harbor." The brash Mr.
Casey didn't get the house.
That anecdote, told by one of Mr.
Casey's close friends. illustrates the vola-
tile personality of the current director of
central intelligence. He is quick-witted and
aggressive, but he is also impulsive, with
an arrogant streak that often gets him in
trouble.
As CIA director, Mr. Casey has demon-
strated that same mix of good and bad
traits, of smart deci-
sions and dumb
ones. He arrived
four years ago hop-
ing to restore the
agency's morale,
budget and public
image after a da-
maging decade. He
has done well on the
first two goals, re-
viving enthusiasm at
the CIA and giving
it probably the larg-
est proportionate
gence Committee sums up the balance
sheet this way: "Mr. Casey deserves
credit for improving morale at the agency.
But he has focused the agency on the
wrong thing-covert action. And I don't
have any doubt that the Image of the CIA
today is as bad as it's been in recent years
in Congress, and probably the country."
Irreverent New Yorker
Mr. Casey, a New Yorker who is irrev-
erent toward official Washington, isn't wild
about Congress, either. Exasperated by
what he viewed as unfair congressional
criticism, he joked to a friend recently:
"The best thing about Washington is that
it's only an hour from New York." Though
he remains wary of Congress, aides say he
now is trying hard to improve relations.
For all his failings, the cantankerous
Mr. Casey is a colorful personality in a
generally gray administration. He is a
compulsive reader who races through sev-
eral books in an evening. He has an Irish-
man's temper, with strong loyalties to his
friends and long grudges against his ene-
mies. And he is a notorious mumbler, who
talks In gruff fragments of sentences that
are often unintelligible.
"Casey gives the impression, because
he mumbles, that he has a messy mind,"
says former CIA director Richard Helms.
"But he doesn't have a messy mind at all.
He has a tidy mind. And he has the street
smarts of a lot of New Yorkers."
OSS and SEC
A CIA colleague once described Mr.
Casey, only half in jest, as "an American
colossus." He is certainly an American
success story, a self-made millionaire who
got where he is by hustling, playing poli-
tics and taking risks. As a young lawyer,
he joined the wartime Office of Strategic
Services and ran spies into Europe. Later,
he made a fortune as a tax lawyer by pub-
lishing books about tax laws..Still later, he
was chairman of the Nixon-era Securities
and Exchange Commission. Finally, he
managed President Reagan's 1980 presi-
dential campaign.
budget growth of any agency. But he has
failed to improve the CIA's image with
Congress and the public-and may even
,have made it worse-largely because of his
own mistakes.
Mr. Casey slipped on the banana peel of
"covert action" -specifically the CIA's
"covert" war against the government of
Nicaragua. He plunged ahead, despite
warnings from his own aides that the pro-
gram couldn't be kept secret and would
blow up in the CIA's face. When those pre-
Mr. Casey brought the same hard-
charging, risk-taking style to the CIA, and
it caused him problems. The agency, still
struggling to recover from the traumas of
the 1970s, was in many ways a frightened
and self-protective institution when he ar-
rived. It wanted public and congressional
mobilize the agency and test the limits of
its congressional mandate.
The new director plunged into his iob
with boyish enthusiasm-zapping off daily
suggestions to CIA analysts, touring CIA
stations overseas, and taking a personal
hand in planning covert-action programs.
In his eagerness to revive the agency, re-
marked one colleague, Mr. Casey some-
times acted "like a first-year case offi-
cer."
His greatest successes at the CIA have
probably been in improving the analytical
side of the agency, known as the director-
ate of intelligence. He told one friend in
1981 that he knew how to produce good in-
telligence estimates because he had
earned a fortune doing the same thing in
his tax guides-taking complex data and
putting it into concise and readable
form.
Mr. Casey started by reorganizing the
intelligence directorate along mainly geo-
graphical lines, so that analysts studying
the Soviet economy and the Soviet leader-
ship worked in the same section rather
than different ones. He increased the quan-
tity and, by most accounts, the quality of
CIA reports. And he installed Robert
Gates, a widely respected young CIA offi-
cer, as deputy director for intelligence.
Some of the analytical reforms were
simple. The CIA had never bothered, for
example, to keep files of each analyst's
work, so it was impossible to assess
whether an analyst's predictions tended.
over time, to be accurate. Mr. Casey and
Mr. Gates started keeping files.
The CIA still makes too many mistakes.
It correctly forecast some major events in
Lebanon, from the Israeli invasion in 1962
to Syria's later intransigence, but it *ai:ed
to provide specific warnings abort _,e
bombs that destroyed the American Em-
bassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut
in 1983. It correctly forecast that Yuri An-
dropov would succeed Leonid Brezhr,s as
Soviet leader, but it failed to presi -t the
later succession of Konstantin Chernenko.
Trying Harder
Under Mr. Casey and Mr. Gates, ana-
lysts are at least trying harder. The intelli-
gence community produced 75 interagency
estimates in 1983, compared with about 12
in 1980, and the agency embarked on about
800 long-term research projects, st[:dy:ng
everything from likely Soviet weap ms in
the year 2000 to the history of Shiite Islam
in the 12th century.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP 'f--OOTJM1 600
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIk-W9'1=009+000500230030-8
Th - ABC NIGHTLINEr
FEU
When we come back, we'll get some different views on the issues we've raised as
we talk live with Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, and with
Time magazine diplomatic correspondent Strobe Talbott, who's written a highly
acclaimed book about the Reagan administration and arms control.
KOPPEL: Joining us live now from our affiliate KVUE in Austin, Texas,
Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA and an expert on so-called
'Star Wars' antimissile technology. And in our Washington bureau, Strobe
Talbott, whom I knew from a different incarnation as diplomatic correspondent
for Time magazine. He is now their Washington bureau chief. More to the
point,
he is author of 'Deadly Gambits,' the definitive book on arms control
negotiations. Adm. Inman, let me begin with you. Let me try analyzing, which
I
used to do years ago,.what-our Soviet friend said from Canada a moment ago. I
interpret that as being if things go badly, then that's the way the United
States wanted it'to be in the first place. If we wanted it to go well, it is
within our power to do that. ADM. BOBBY INMAN (former deputy CIA director):
You're exactly on target. One other correction I would make. In sort of
letting the U.S. always be the one who moves out to new areas for new weapons,
Soviets are the ones with the operational antisatellite system. The U.S. does
not have an operational one.
KOPPEL: Why do you think the Soviet Union initiated or agreed to come to those
talks? INMAN: The Soviets painted themselves into a corner with the
propaganda
campaign they had going in Western Europe to block the deployment of the cruise
missile and the Pershing. When the shoot-down of the Korean airliner caused
that whole effort to collapse, they didn't have an easy retreat. But they're
practical people. They believe there is a genuine prospect that the strategic
defense initiative would work, and I believe that concern, that fear is the
primary factor in the initiative that they've now started for a new round of
talks.
KOPPEL: Strobe T~_lbott, let me ask you. Does it really matter whether it will
work or not work as long as the Soviets believe that it might? STROBE TALBTT
(arms control expert): Well, I think that's... Your, your question suggests a
good point. The very danger that it might work, that is, an American strategic
defense initiative might work, obviously casts a whole pall of uncertaintly
over
their own military planning. And also, Ted, they have to worry a great deal
whenever the United States moves into a whole new area of military. technology.
Perhaps 'Star Wars' might be disappointing to those who hope that it'll give us
an inpenetrable defense of our populations. But who knows what other military
benefits it might give to the United States that the Soviets would. then have to.
contend with? They are very frightened of American technology, and 'Star Wars'
is a kind of apotheosis of that, and therefore terribly worrisome to them.
KOPPEL: All right. If you were responding to Alexander Podakin, and, indeed,-
there's no reason why he can 't jump in right now, and he has said to us it is
really in American hands to make this thing go well beyond the-kind of limited
goals that, that I sketched out earlier, you would say what? Was the question
so vague, Strobe? It was to you. TALBOTT: Sorry. I wasn't sure it was to
me, Cu~~W~..,v 1
Ted. Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230030-8