ADDRESS AND Q&A, PORCUPINE CLUB 7 SEPTEMBER 1978 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100230082-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: September 7, 1978
• Content Type: TRANS

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, Frank Carlucci
Address and Q&A, Porcupine Club
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Sari Francisco, California
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very
much, Cap, Gordon. It Is Indeed a very great pleasure for
me to be with you today, particularly this opening session.
I feel it's extremely important that those of us engaged
in the intelligence business have effective contact with
leaders of the various communities.
Cap, let me digress for just a minute by saying
to the group that I have never worked with anyone who has
been more capable, more dedicated, or indeed more compassionate
than Cap Weinberger, and working for Cap was the highlight of
my career. In fact, as I think back about it, Cap, you only
made one mistake, and that was on the basis of a recommendation
from me. Do you remember sometime, I think it was about 1974,
an outgoing Governor of Georgia named Carter vetoed the Head-
start program run by HEW; vetoed it on the grounds that it did
not correspond to the state planning commission. Well, we did
not have the legislative authority to change the boundaries
of the program, but we did -- the Secretary of HEW did have
that authority to override the Governor's veto. Cap having
come from California, the state government was always very
reluctant to override the governor's veto. But Cap came
to me and said, look, you've just got to convince me to
override the veto. It's a good program.
Well, I went in once, twice, and it was about the
third time when I finally persuaded Cap to call Governor
Carter, and Governor Carter was on the move. And so we
were approaching the deadline, about four hours from the
time the program would go out of existence. And Cap came
to me once more, and I said, Cap, dammit, this is a good
program; you've got to override the veto. After all, it's
a lameduck Governor and you'll never hear from him again:
[Laughter
Well, I guess we all make mistakes. And we try to
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our mistakes as small as possible.
But clearly one of the larger mistakes of our era
-- and I'm sure Dave Packard can verify this -- was what
happened at Pearl Harbor. And as historians took back and
try to put the pieces together, It's most clear that there
was enough evidence, enough Intelligence to Indicate that
the Japanese were going to come. And In fact, the Japanese
task force had orders to turn back if spotted. The combination
of their ship movements, diplomatic moves, Intercepted messages
was clearly enough to tell us the Japanese were planning an
attack. But there was no one charged with the responsibility
of putting this all together and going to President Roosevelt
and saying, "Hey, something Is up." No one short of the Pre-
sl'dent. The result was, of course, tragic. And out of that
arose the creation of the OSS as the predecessor of the CIA.
It had a very simple mission: pull together all the intel-
I i gence, analyze It and make sure that It's available to
the public.
And that mission characterizes the CIA today:
pull together all the foreign Intelligence that we have
gathered overseas or here in San Francisco, analyze It,
evaluate it and get it before the decision-makers. We
don't try to make policy in CIA, contrary to what a lot of
people would have you believe. We simply try to give the
policy-makers the most objective Information possible on
which to base their decisions.
In the early days It was fairly simple. Al l you
had to do was worry about the Soviet Union and whatever in-
formation you could pick up around the world. And with the
United States having clear strategic superiority, you can
make some errors. Today, It's infinitely more complex.
Even taking the Soviet Union -- and that's still
our first priority -- if you look at what Is called strategic
parity, which Is based on mutually assured destruction -- not
a very human term, but It's an accurate term. That's how we
survive today, That doesn't mean that we count up the missiles
the Soviets have and count up our missiles and say roughly
equal, because the balance of terror is something very dif-
ferent than that. Sure It Includes the missiles. But It
Includes theater capability. It Includes weapons systems
mix that It's very different between the two nations. It
Includes alliances. And most importantly, it Includes Inten-
tions, And a change in any one of these factors could alter
the strategic pattern. And at a time where missiles can reach
us in ten minutes, it's very Important that we assess care-
fully any given changes In any one of these factors.
Well as our technology develops, as our weapons systems
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develop, our need to gather information, our Intelligence commun-
ity become more important. But we can't just deal In isolation
with the Soviet Union. Given the complex web of relationships,
economic and political, In the two countries today, we really
have to have an intelligence capability that Is worldwide and
that is Integrated. It no longer serves to just look at one
country in isolation. Take a took at recent situations. The
Horn of Africa. You can't analyze the Ethiopian situation
without looking at what's going on internally In Somalia, what
the Kenyan reaction Is going to be, what the threat Is to the
Sudan, If that threat is going to stem down into Zaire. What
about the capability of the Cubans moving from Ethiopia to
Rhodesia? And what Is the attitude of Mozambique? Or looking
across the water from the Horn of Africa, what about the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen? What kind of threat
does that pose?
I can assure you that the Saudis are very worried
about it. But then you'd move to the threat that the Saudis
see, both on the Horn, Iraq, and right away you're all the way
up to Afghanistan and what's happening in Afghanistan. So It
becomes a complex web of Interrelated Information gathering
that has to be pieced together In very careful analysis.
There're new areas, as well, that didn't exist at
the time of Pearl Harbor. A key area Is nonproliferation.
We have to find out what other peoples are doing In the
area of nuclear proliferation. And you can bet your life
they don't want to tell us. That requires Intelligence.
Or SALT. A SALT agreement is only as good as the capacity
to monitor it, and that really takes Intelligence, quite
frankly, of a greater capability than we presently have.
Finally, there're -- well, even before that, there're
two area that didn't bother anyone ten or fifteen years ago,
the area of narcotics, which Is an international effort, pos-
sible of touching any one of our families. And the best way
to stop narcotics Is to know where the transfers are taking
place, where the growing is taking place, to bring pressure
on the appropriate governments. And that's an Intelligence
function.
Or terrorism. Fortunately, our country has been
by and large free from terrorism In the recent past. I don't
know how long that will last. But the best way to assure
it does Is to know when and where they're going to strike.
That poses a problem. How do you get an agent Into terrorist
groups? If he Is In a terrorist group, do you allow them to
go ahead with their hit? Well, maybe not a murder. How about
a bank robbery? W e l l, I don't know. I f you pull It off, he's
a dead man. But yet In this day of hypermorality, some of It
retroactive, how far can we go In penetrating terrorist groups?
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It's the kind of di lemma that we face every day.
But security today is much more than just a sneak
attack, or even an analysis of the political positions of
different countries. It also has to do with economic policy,
and those of you in this room are far more familiar with that
than I am. Today, we have to assess what the policies of the
Federal Republic of Germany are, economic policies. Are they
going to expand or not? That has a distinct bearing on our
security.
Or to take something even more obvious, the energy
situation, petroleum reserves. You may agree or disagree
with the CIA analysis that was put out on petroleum. But
I don't think you can argue with the fact that an analysis
of what the petroleum needs and resources of the world will
be over the next ten, fifteen years Is very fundamental to
our security in this connection, and indeed In connection
with some of the analysis of the technical systems that are
being developed in countries which might be potential ad-
versaries.
Let me mention that the cooperation of the business
community is absolutely Invaluable. We have some thirty-six
offices throughout the United States. They're In the phone
book, listed under two names. Their purpose Is to try and
get pieces of information that business can provide. That
information Is fed back Into Washington, put together. This
might give us new Insight Into a weapons system, or give us
some new insight into the petroleum situation. One can never
know what a piece of raw intelligence -- what it will ultimately
tell the analysts and how valuable It will ultimately be to the
policy-makers. But the Input that you make is very valuable.
And we make every effort to protect the source of our In-
formation from the business community, just as strongly as
we try to protect the lives of our agents abroad.
Just as the nature of Intelligence Is changing, so
Is the environment In which we operate. And taking advantage
of the Informality of this group and your desire for frankness,
let me go into a couple of those Issues. And I don't want to
dwell on the past, the revelations, the abuses, accusations,
some accurate, some not. That's history. I wish I didn't
have to spend so much time on history. The fact Is that
we are going to have a set of controls on the intelligence
community. I, for one, think that's basically healthy, pro-
viding we don't use overkill, providing we maintain Inte! I igence.
Part of the Issue Is the ability to keep a secret, to
maintain confidentiality. No agent anywhere In the world Is go-
Ing to put his life -- and many of them do -- In your hands If
he thinks he's going to read about it In the newspaper or see It
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come out in some congressional hearing. It's just as simple as
that. And secrecy Is not a new concept, like some would have you
believe, In the United States. We have the confidentiality of
the lawyer-client relationship, the doctor-patient relationship,
executive and grand jury proceedings. Indeed, our friends in
the newspaper business maintain, probably the best, the con-
fidentiality of their sources. Frankly, I wish at times
they would defend our right to confidentiality of our sources
just as strongly as they defend the right of confidentiality
of their sources. The principle Is the same. In our case,
quite frankly, sometimes lives are at stake.
But the central issue that we face today is to strike
a balance between accountability and openness, because open-
ness Is a fundamental tenet of our society, and we have to
recognize It. And how do we strike that balance between ac-
countability and openness and protecting sources and methods
and intelligence effectiveness? Those are the scales on either
side.
And let me just take a minute to review with you
some of the touchstones and some of the equities,' as I see
them.
There's a public right to know. Nobody will argue
it. Indeed, one of the things that we are trying to do in the
CIA today Is put out more Information In the form of a finished
product. Last year we put out some 1 50 unclassified publications,
ranging from assessments of the Soviet defense establishment to
the world steel market, to energy, to energy development In
China. We put them out through the Library of Congress, through
1300 libraries around the country. We think we ought to be do-
Ing that so that the public will have some knowledge of what
our product Is. And we think we can do that without revealing
sensitive sources and methods.
But contrast that with the Freedom of Information
approach, which gives everybody the right to, in effect, have
us rummage through the files, based on any kind of request, to
produce whatever information we might have on me, on you. We
get requests from 13-year olds: tell me what is In the file on
me, or tell me what's In the file on Israel. Those have to be
treated seriously. And each such request costs us an average
of $540.00. It's a process. Last year we spent 109 man years
processing these requests, two and a half million dollars, UU,i-y
little classified information comes out, because we have swords
unintelligible], but we spend a lot of time analyzing it. So
here we have a law under much Mr. Andakhoff (?), the h`-d of the
KGB, could write us. a letter and say "I want all the rriformation
you have on the KGB," and we will be required to respond in ten
days. And If we respond and say "No, Mr. Andakhoff, we're not
going to give you the Information on the KGB," he can appeal.
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We have to answer his appeal in twenty days. An absurd situa-
tion, where an Intelligence agency, designed to protect the
national security, is in danger of being made the purveyor
of Information to the world.
Or take the balance between Individual liberty and
national security. I th 1 nk we can a I I agree tht we ought to
do everything we can to guarantee every citizen the liberties
to which they have a right under the Constitution. Nobody's
arguing that point. And there're ways of doing It. And the
President has put out a new executive order on Intelligence
which lays out what we can and cannot do; lays out a process
when you want to deal with Americans, which says that if you're
going to put an American under surveillance, you've got to
get the permission of the Attorney General. We supported
legislation that would require a warrant for domestic elec-
tronic surveillance. We have said quite categorically the
CIA will not be Involved In any kind of domestic activities
other than collecting Information on foreign countries. This
Is the proper way to go about it. We've accepted, Indeed
welcomed oversight from our congressional committees.
But yet at the same time, we have very-little capa-
city to protect our real secrets. You know, If a Department
of Agriculture employee gives out information on commodity
Issues, he's immediately subject to criminal penalty. There
are some thirty laws in the federal government that make It
a criminal offense just to give out information in that par-
ticular department -- the Department of Commerce, the IRS,
a number of them. There Is no such law for national security
information. You can give out national security Information
to the p u b l i c , and you can o n l y be prosecuted successfully I f
we can prove intent to damage the United States.
Now, It seems to me we have things just backwards.
And we face a situation where a CIA turncoat, Mr. Agee, can
set up shop i n DuPont C i r c l e I n Washington and Issue a monthly
bulletin called "Covert Action" designed to release the names
of all CIA employees, all agents, and Indeed incite the world
to violence against the CIA. And It's not clear -- we're
working with Justice now -- It's not clear if there's any
statute under which this man could be prosecuted. Now if
he would just give out a few commodities Issues, we could
get him. But we have a very difficult situation there.
On the Issue of accountability, I think we can at%
agree that more congressional oversight Is needed, presidential
guidance Is needed. But we're In the area today of the whistle
blower, the glorification of the whistle blower. Now, Woodward
and Bernstein performed a great service, that everybody should
aspire to be an Investigative reporter. There has to be some
effort at constructing the evidence. And we had a series of
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cases in the CIA of people who've left the agency, taken infor-
mation they got while in the agency, written books and profited
by it. And we brought one of those people, MMr. Snepp, under
suit for breach of contract, because when people come in they
:sign a contract not to reveal information without checking
with us. And by the way, that's not censorship, as press
articles would have you believe. We could just tell them
what we want taken out. I f they don't want to take it
out, we then have to go to court to get it taken out. We
have no right to censor.
But what we are saying is that the individual
employee should not be the judge of what Is classified or
unclassified, because If every employee can come Into the
CIA, pick up Information, then make his own judgment on what
could be released and published and profit thereby, this is
government by take. And we might as well give up the in-
telligence business.
Finally, there's an issue with which Cap Is as
familiar as I am and Dave Packard, I'm sure, is familiar,
the question of oversight versus micro-management. And I
think this Is a sign of our time where the Congress really
does believe that It can administer the federal government
from Capitol Hill. But this has rather difficult ramifica-
tions when It applies to the intelligence community.
We have, In fact, created an optical Illusion. By
agreement, the Congress has said, yes, we should have a covert
acts capability In our government. The President has said we
should have a covert action capability In our government. And
that means we ought to have a capability to do something more
than a diplomatic demarche and something short of sending In the
Marines, that If a country wants some help, we ought to be able
to supply It covertly. Or If we want to put out some informa-
tion in a given country through a media contact that we have
through covert channels, we ought to be able to do it.
But the fact Is that to carry out any covert action
under the statute, we have to have an NSC meeting, a presiden-
tial finding, and then we have to brief 140 members of Congress.
Now it is axiomatic that when 140 people, as good intentioned
as they might be, know something, It is no longer covert. And
the other day we had a case. Somebody suggested that in a
country where there had just been an election and the military
seemed about to move to nullify the election, that we use one
of our assets, a senior general in that country, to try and
make sure that the election results were upheld.
Well, there's no way I'm going to use that asset,
because if I Instruct him to do that, that Is automatically
a covert action, and that requires that we brief 140 members
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of Congress, and that general surer than hell is going to be
blown.
Or to get even more absurd, and unfortunately it's
true, during the Moro kidnaping, the Italian government was
desperate. They were asking us for all kinds of help. And
in the course of that, they said "Could you send us a psy-
chiatrist who has some experience In terrorism?" And I said
sure and asked if we had a psychiatrist. The people said
yes, "Well, put him on an airplane." The General Counsel
came In and said he can't go. I said why. "That's covert
action. You're infuencing the situation in Italy." I said
"What does that mean?" "Well," he said, "It means that If
you're going to put him on that airplane, you'll have to have
the NSC -- a presidential finding." And by the way, the Pre-
sident was in Brazil at that particular time. "And you have
to brief 140 members of Congress."
As a result, I called the State Department and I
said "Do you have a psychiatrist?" They said yes. I said
"Put him on a plane to Italy."
But that's how we've gotten ourselves so tangled up.
In those cases, we think we have a capability that we really
don't have.
I'm sure all of this has affected our capability.
It's very hard for me to give you an honest damage assessment.
We've had agents who've come to us -- I remember one case --
and said "Yeah, I knew that was going to take place In advance.
But I didn't want to tell you guys, because it would have been
blown." Or I've had the head of a friendly liaison service
for an Important country sit in my office and say "I don't
think I can cooperate with you. How can I give you Informa-
tion that's going to go to your Congress when I don't give It
to my own Congress? So I'm going to have to cut back on your
information." And that information was Information on terror-
ism. In fact, twenty-five percent of our information on terrorism
comes from liaison sources.
I don't bad the damage how much Information you're not getting, But Itnclnever
earl
hurts us. Y
At the same time, I see favorable signs. I think
the Congress, by and large, Is becoming much more aware the
need for good intelligence, of the need to cut down on the
restrictions on the intelligence community. I think our Intel-
ligence organizations, by and large, are the best in the world.
I think technologically we're ahead of the Soviets. I think
we certainly have better analytical capability. In fact, most
of CIA consists of analysis. Most of the work we do consists
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of analysis. In fact, we have a small university in CIA. Some
thirty percent of our analysts have Ph. Ds, fifty percent have
advanced degrees. And they can conduct their analysis In an
atmosphere of freedom and lack of constraints that certainly
doesn't exist In the Kremlin where they have to perform their
analysis with certain ideology. That's a great advantage. I
think our people are still good. And despite the criticism,
applications to CIA remain at a high level, and the people
who are coming in are of excel lent caliber.
Sure, the KGB has far more resources and far fewer
constraints. But man for man, I think we can match our people
against theirs any day.
We're receiving very strong support from President
Carter, and he's taken a deep Interest in intelligence. He
uses It, uses It extensively. He's using It extensively right
now up at Camp David. I think we've taken a strong position
with the Congress and with the public, In general, on the need
to protect our sources and methods, which Is the heart of any
Intelligence operation. We enjoy I think broad support through-
out the country. We enjoy, In particular, support, good support,
from the business community, and It means a lot to us. And I
would hope that as you continue that support and as you have
contacts In circles In which you're moving, you would help us
convince our fellow Americans that there is nothing Insidious
about an intelligence organization, that every country in the
world has one, that Its purpose is to defend the national In-
terest, and that the CIA and Its sister Intelligence organizations
consist of an awful lot of talented and dedicated professionals
whose sole purpose really is to safeguard the national Interest.
Thank you very much.
[Applause -- End, Side I.]
Q: Frank, what did happen In Afghanistan....?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The answer to the latter
question Is the coup did take us by surprise. It looks very
much like the Afghanistan Communist Party Is In charge. There's
been a fairly natural Influx of Soviets since the coup. And I
think we have to bear in mind that Afghanistan Is still funda-
mentally a conservative country. There are very conservative
religious groups. It's not going to be as easy as It seems
for the ruling group to consolidate their position. And it
also is not clear that the Afghanistan -- the Afghan Communist
Party Is totally subservient to Moscow.
Returning to the first question, we try to be alert
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to these things throughout the world. We don't have a hundred
percent batting average. You have to allocate your resources,
limited resources, to the areas of highest priority. We had
some intelligence capability In Afghanistan. It wasn't quite
as great, obviously,. In retrospect, as it should have been.
Frankly, within the confines of the group, we're doing a
damage assessment, trying to see what lessons can be learned
from it and to prevent a repetition of this.
Q: Could you elaborate on your comment about may-
be your lack of recourses to check on SALT compliance?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We haven't acknowledged
officially that we have overhead collection techniques. So
that information really shouldn't be confined to that term.
But it's in the papers every day. And we've just had a rare
case of a former CIA employee who sold the manual of what is
known as Stage 11 In our book, Sensitive Systems, to the So-
viets for three thousand dollars. And it is not at all clear
that the overhead systems have the technical capability to
monitor all the fine points of the Soviet's strategic capa-
bility.
[Segment unintelligible]
There are a number of techniques that could be used
to make it difficult to verify compliance with a SALT agree-
ment. All of those can be overcome, but it will require more
resources into some our technical capability. And obviously,
as with any technical system, there's a certain amount of lead
time. And so we have to really get busy at this point and
start preparing ourselves for that overhead monitoring capa-
bility we're going to have when a SALT agreement comes about.
And I think one is going to come about.
you al I?
Q:
Is the situation in Nicaragua of interest to
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Yes, we've been following
it. And obviously it doesn't rank on the priority list with
Lebanon or the Middle East. But all too often we tend to neglect
Latin America. It's a difficult issue. The opposition to Somoza
seems to be fairly well polarized to a Sandinista Marxist group.
On the other hand, he was reelected. He says he's not going
to step down until his term ends in 1980. There are signs
that some of the more moderate opposition groups in Nicaragua
are trying to get together to provide an option both to Somoza
and the Sandinista group, which, in my judgment, would certainly
be desirable.
But fundamentally, I would judge that we're heading
for a highly unstable situation in Nicaragua.
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I don't know if that answers your question.
Q: I had in mind whether the communists would
gain control.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The Sandinista group
Is a Marxist group.
Q: Whether they will gain control.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCC I : I f they got in power,
I would think that they would be a Marxist group. I'm not
sure. For the moment, I don't think they have the power to
topple the government. I think the government has the secur-
ity forces necessary. But I said "for the moment." I'm not
sure how long they will.
Q: [Question Inaudible.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No, I think -- I think
there I s hope if we don't get them all locked Into this
slate. What we need here is a lot of public understanding
and hope it will be reflected In the Congress. We already
find that this Is happening. The Senate produced charter
legislation, draft charter legislation, S-2525, which had
all kinds of "Thou Shalt Nots" In the script: "You shall
not poison; you shall not assassinate." And any time you
try to draw up a list of things you cannot do, you get no-
where. That's no way to set up guidelines for an Intelligence
organization.
And they have, by and large, backed off of that ap-
proach, and considerably. They've Indicated that they do not
Intend to go ahead with the bill until they have us on board.
And so I think there Is hope that we can negotiate an Intelli-
gence charter that Is just that, a charter and not a detailed
system of managing our organization.
That we support. We think It would be helpful to
us. Some of the o l d- 1 I ne professional s say, no, we shouldn't
have any charter. We think given what we've found true, it
would be better to have that stamp of endorsement.
I think In the context of developing that legislation,
we might be able to even [word unintelligible] their constraints.
But It's going to be hard. How do you tell a hundred of a hun-
dred and forty congressmen who now have access to covert actions
"We're not going to tell you." It's going to be very hard.
Q: At the present time, it's a crime to threaten
the life of a President of the United States. It's a crime
to threaten that you'll plant a bomb In an airline. But It's
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not a crime for an individual or any terrorist group to threaten
to put a bomb 1n the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel or anybody's
business. Do you think there's any possibility Congress might
get to that problem?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that's really more
in the area of the FBI 's responsibility than ours. And, yeah,
I think -- I think that after the first few bombs, they' l l
get to the problem, if you want my judgment, just I Ike they're
now beginning to focus on the problem of revealing names of
CIA people overseas. We've had one assassination as a resu It.
One agent was assassinated in Athens as a result of these
revelations. It happened in Portugal when I was In our
Embassy there. And what they do, they don't only reveal
the names, but they give the address and they say "second
apartment to the right," deliberately provoking violence.
And that's not a crime.
So I think some of the more conservative members
of Congress are beginning to focus on these kinds of Issues
now. And depending on how the next congressional elections
go, I would hope that subsequent Congresses would take a more
serious view of the national security issue.
And one of the problems Is that, as a result of
recent history, national security Is a dirty word. Any time
you say, well, it's in the interests of national security,
they say "Ah, some sort of cover-up." Well, dammit, it Isn't.
It's your life; It's my life. The very existence of our coun-
try's at stake, and I think we've got to recognize that.
Q: Frank, how would you assess the situation In
Portugal a year and and today?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I would assess it as
politically stable now. There's no danger of Portugal going
leftist. I think that danger was eliminated at the end of
1976.
The real question is whether they can make their
democratic institutions function. And there the answer lies
In their ability to bring the economy back on Its feet. The
communists In 1975 made a deliberate effort to break the
backbone of the economy. And they did very well. And they
still own today, lock, stock and barrel, the labor unions.
So they're able to throw a roadblock In any government's
program. They also own the large agricultural producing
area southeast of Lisbon.
The Soares government essentially fell because
it was not perceived to be moving as aggressively as Its
coalition partners, the Christian Democrats, would like to
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have had it move in the agricultural area. The succeeeding
government, the Novella de Costa government, is essentially
a caretaker government. It has no political base, other than
its total dependence on the President.
My own view is that that kind of government Is go-
ing to find it very difficult to deal with the tough Issues
that the country faces. It's going to be able to move for-
ward in some areas. I think it will go ahead with an austerity
program, but not with the vigor the country really needs to get
Its economy back on track.
So I am Inclined to think that the political forces
have to get back together again and to get a government which
has a political base and move forward. If It doesn't, I would
say that It's only a matter of time until they summon the mili-
tary and decide that they can administer the country better than
the political forces. And they would be military from the right
wing. But I'd say that's a year or a year and a half away.
In the meantime I think the West has to continue
to help Portugal strengthen Its democratic Institutions.
Q: I was going to ask you If you could tell us
anything properly about the relationships of China and Russia.
Are 'there any destabilizing factors? Is either one getting
so much stronger relative to the other than there is some
Indication that the present tense situation might explode
Into something else? Or does it just look like it would
continue pretty much along the same basic lines of tension?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, in terms of military
capability, China, of course, can't compare with the Soviet Union.
But tension Is rising as a result of the Vietnam-Cambodian.situa-
tions. It's quite clear that the Soviets are backing Vietnam.
They've started an airlift there. They've got communications
In there. The Chinese are supporting Cambodia.
The Issue Is less one of a border dispute than It
really Is "Who's going to be dominant power In Southeast Asia?"
So I think the clash is a real clash In political terms. And
the Chinese are really upset with the Soviet Union. And their
solution, of course, Is to try to get from us as much technology
as they can. In fact, the latest assessment we have Is that
the Chinese, or the People's Republic of China Is less Inter-
ested in the recognition Issue, although they are Interested
In that, than they are In gaining access to Western technology
so that they can get their military capability up. But their
land army would be absolutely no match for the Soviets If it
came to all-out war.
So I think they would do everything they can to avoid
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war, but they wi I I certainly try to encircle the Soviet
Union, politically. Hua Kuo-feng has just done that on
his recent trip to Eastern Europe and Iran, They're being
very active.
Q: Frank, recently I was in South Korea. And
there seems to be an almost -- well, there is a conviction
on the part of the people that I talked with there that if
the 8th Army Is removed, that the North Koreans would shortly
take over South Korea.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCC I : Korea Is one of the most
d i f f i c u l t areas. I confess to you that our I n t e l l i g e n c e capa-
bility in North Korea I s not as good as we would like It to
be, simply because It is such a closed society. And the Koreans,
North Koreans around the world shun all contact with Westerners.
It's a little bit like the Cubans. It's very hard to find out
what's going on in Cuba.
We have obviously technical Intelligence that gives
us some idea when they're about to move. But they're always
In a high state of readiness, the North Koreans. So your
warning time would be very short. And they're practically
on top of Seoul, so we would really have a hard time defending
it.
I can't substantiate what you've heard -- our military
people say the North Koreans have this Intent. We have no hard
intelligence which tells us that they have an intent. We can
surmise from their military posture what they might do. But
I can't confirm that.
Q: You mentioned that the Soviets have far more re-
sources In the Intelligence gathering area than we do. Could
you give us some example so we could get sort of a level of
comparison?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'd say they have about
three times as many intelligence officers overseas as we do.
And they certainly have a hell of a lot more In this country
than we have In the Soviet Union.
You've got to be wary of simplistic solutions as to
that. There's a thesis In Congress. The Judiciary Committee
came out with a bill, which is that we shouldn't let any more
Soviet intelligence officers Into this country; we refuse them
visas. Well, what that really means Is that the Intelligence
officers that you know about -- and by the time they've been In
this country for a while, we're able to spot them, They leave,
and they send In guys you don't know, because they can spot our
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people very easily, but we can't spot their people anywhere near
as easily.
The other thing It overlooked was the U. N. And
if you're going to take that approach to the Soviets and want
to cut down your intelligence officers here, then you've got
to say we've got to shut off the U. N., because they can send
as many as they want to the U. N. There're absolutely no
restrictions.
So you've got to be wary. And I'm not saying you
advocate any specific solution. But there's a simplistic
solution being advocated on the Hill that would simply result
in reprisals against us.
Q: How do we overcome diplomatic immunity? It
seems that every one I read about, a Soviet agent, It seems
he's involved as an aide to a diplomatic office?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCC I : You don't.
Q: You don't. You wouldn't want it?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCC I : Uh-huh, I'm not sure
I'd want it. Because, frankly, we....
[Segment Inaudible.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The guy that doesn't get
kicked out, the guy that goes to jail is not the intelligence
officer, but the agent. You've got to make that distinction
in terms of the trade, the trade terminology. The FBI uses
the term agent to mean an FBI man. We use the term agent to
mean somebody who is recruited by the intelligence agent. Our
people are intelligence officers, and the people they recruit,
whether it's a Soviet citizen or a Hungarian or a Romanian,
he is the agent. He's the guy. He's the guy that goes to jail
and sometimes gets a little worse -- shot. I can tell you
In all seriousness that some of the press revelations since
I've been in the CIA, which is about three (?) months now,
have, we think, resulted in the death of some agents. We
don't know, because the minute we see somebody's name in
the press, somebody blown -- you don't have to see his name;
all you have to see is some Information in the press which
could be attributed to him -- we cut off all contact. But
in that area, we can be pretty certain he's dead.
[Applause -- end of Interview and Q&A.J
CHAIR: ...Inaugural meeting was stimulating, In-
teresting and certainly Informative about national security.
We thank you very, very much for coming.
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Cap, we thank you for helping in this. Our next
meeting will be November 2nd, the first Thursday of every
other month,
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1.5 Apri.11_ 1Y1b
Share Its Felfle
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director Stansfield Turner gave further evi-
dence of his agency's new and more open look
when he told Detroit's Economic Club the
other day that the CIA wants to share its
intelligence information with the public.
"There is economic and political informa-
tion that we can collect that would be of value
to American businessmen," he said, and added
that the CIA is prepared to expand its
intelligence activities into non-military areas
that might give taxpayers "a better return on
their investment."
Later, in Columbus, he said the old modus
operandi of keeping CIA, work secret "is no
longer the policy because the public wants to
know. We will be speaking more, answering
the media more completely and publishing
more."
And in an address at Ohio State University,
he said: "We hope the academic community
can gain from intelligence. We need the
relations with the academic community be-
cause the lifeblood of intelligence is the annual
infusion of a few good, high-quality persons
from the c_ampus.,"
CHANTED M -IT much of what Turner
states may be attributed to rhetorical image-
building on behalf of his embattled agency.
Still, the, promise to share intelligence gains
with those in this country outside' the military
and governmental community -who might
benefit from it, is constructive and overdue.
No other organization in the United States
has the formidable facilities for sheer collec-
tion of information that the CIA does with its
electronic devices, its high-flying planes, infra-
red cameras and assorted language and politi-
cal experts and grey eminences.
TURNER NOTED THAT through the use
of satellites there is a good deal of data
available about possible oil and energy re-
serves, crop, projections and industrial paten-
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agency, should share such information on a
larger scale.
 "AN FRANCISCO CII RONICI~
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U'.~4007ia BS
iLPhe
ilemma of
icha-rd Helms
RICHARD HELMS, the former Director of
Central Intelligence, went into federal court
theotber day to plead "no contest" to the
charge of failing to testify "fully, completely
and accurately" before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 1973. He had been
asked about covert CIA operations in Chile, and
be had told the conunittee that the'CLA had not
provided money for the use , of Chilean
opponents of the late Salvador Allende, presi-
dent of Chile- This statement was not only
incomplete and inaccurate, it was.misleading
and.a lie.
CIA was later found by Senator Church
' The
to have funneled more than $8 million to help
Allende's opponents, some of whom in Septem-
ber,;1973, brought off a coup in which he died.
1This may appear to be an open and shut
situation in which Helms, clearly deceptive at
his committee appearance, has been let off
easy by the Justice Department on a plea
bargain. But the case is not that simple.
HELATS NOW SAYS that when he testified i
;in 1973 .he was "simply trying to find my way I
through a very difficult situation." He had
sworn an oath to "preserve certain secrets
from unauthorized disclosure." He felt he had
to say what he said to protect his oath and I
-serve the interests of national security.
But of course officers of the United States,
whether they are in secret intelligence or not, I
havb no right to lie under oath to congressional
committees. At the same time, says the Justice
Department, Helms' trial on the charge would
have cost a lot and might have jeopardized
national secrets; further, he had had. a,
distinguished and outstanding career, Hence to
dispose of the case by a "no contest" plea was,
in Attorney General Bells. opinion, "fair and'
justey;
The underlying" problem here is that of
both protecting national secrets and protecting
the flan whose responsibility it is to keep them.
Director Helms could not be expected to carry
the responsibility of secrecy on one shoulder
and the responsibility to tell the truth on the
other shoulder. That is asking the impossible.
Th ?'dilemma should be? recognized and Con= f
gres should abnegate the role of .inquisitor
when matters stand like that.
O BE CERTAIN that the CIA would not
intervene with American money in Chile's
election, we would have had to be able to trust
Richard Nixon not to order it to intervene. As
it happens, we couldn't trust Nixon. It does no
follow that we could not have trusted Helms.
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I,i - X16 B ;, 0 91
FE8 2 4 11774
Overseas
SOME OF THE REVELATIONS of the
past few days about CIA payments to the heads
of foreign states are erroneous, said the
President in. his press conference yesterday.
And some have substance. His observations on
this embarrassing expose were cautious and
otherw-se unrevealing.
So once again the American people are
confronted with new episodes of the CIA's
realpolitik (though probably the Germans, who
invented that term, would call this particular
form of CIA activity Geltpolitik) Certainly the
CIA is gaining no points in public esteem by the
disclosures of the Washington Post's Watergate
reporter, Bob Woodward. ..
AN D YET THERE MUST be something to
say for a policy of financially supporting King
Hussein of Jordan in our own international
political interest. Since Woodward's report of
this has not been denied, indeed cannot be
denied, we proceed to ask ourselves what the
United, States got for its money, $750,000 last
.year alone.
Woodward reports that the justification for
20 years of secret annual payments, distributed
to Hussein, he says, by the CIA station chief in
Amman, was the king's toleration of U. S.
intelligence operations in the country. Another
justification may be inferred from the fact that
,?o.rdan. lying alongside Israel, is no longer the
host and home to the Palestinian liberation
activitsts. If getting rid of them was Hussein's
quid for our quo, who is disposed to complain
about the bargain?
OF COURSE, the Intelligence Oversight
Board, which called them improper in its
report to President Ford, would have cut the
payments off, and now Mr. CWter,..alerted, has
done so. But a sudden access of virtue after 20
years of secret complicity does not answer the
question, how does an upstanding, democratic
nation hand out payments for the beneficent
behavior of foreign potentates save by secrecy
through the CIA?
It seems not too cynical to suggest that
funds handed out to King Hussein were not
very different, in terms of what they were
meant to procure, than those Marshall Plan
funds of 30 years ago which in some cases went
to purchase, not steel and cement, but desira-
ble political behavior.
WE ARE BOUND TO SAY that the denials
of taking CIA money which have come from
some other foreign leaders, particularly Vene-
zuela's president, carry weight with us, and we
would have to see the evidence before w
would believe of Venezuela what is easy to'
believe of, for instance, South Korea.
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 Approved For Releatqg0p/P360CI-At 00901 R0001 00230082-5
28 June 1978
Spying between the superpowers
W ILLIAM COLEY, who headed the CIA from ambassadors and are expected to be free soon to
1973 to 1976, doesn't think highly of today's ? -return home -
Soviet spies. He says they lack ideological fervor.
The Russians offer "some guy $5,000 or $15,000 for - = Spying Is a tit for tat business between the two
secrets. They'll get odds and ends that way, but they superpowers, with agreed on protocol in case of
won't. get very much." , . capture. Up to now, each country In recent years
- released the other's spies without undue publicity.
- : ~ - This time, however, the United States,, for undis,
How true! Take the two Soviet employees of the closed reasons, blew -the whistle immediately on
United Nations who were arrested in New Jersey Valik.Aleksandrov Eager and Rudolph Petronovich.
on charges of buying defense secrets from a U.S. Chernyayev
naval officer. The data they got . was worthless Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's edginess
because the American was cooperating with the is
FBI. The Russians didn't know when to come in understandable. In light of his problems with China
from the cold.' and Western criticism of his Imperialist aspirations
In Africa. But we believe the espionage arrange.
So we think an exchange of this pair for ments between Moscow and Washington will return
American businessman Francis Crawford is a good'. to the status quo without harm to detente. President
deal. Crawford was impiisoned in Moscow on Carter echoed our feelings when he said he believes
obviously trumped up currency charges in retalia- Brezhnev wants peace. "We're too strong a nation to
tion for the New Jersey arrests. The three have. be pushed around. We want?to be friends with the 1
been released In custody of their respective Soviets."
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Well suited for CIA
RESIDENT CARTER has paid Admiral Stans-
field Turner, his nominee to be director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the highest possible
compliment for a military person. The President
said that Turner "in the future could be another
George Marshall."
We hope Carter's estimate is not extravagant.
Marshall was a public servant of enormous
stature as Army chief of staff'. in World War II
and as secretary ,;;, of, defense and secretary of
state.
Turner has an impressive record that at this
stage indicates Senate confirmation. Directorship
of the CIA is.one the most demanding jobs in
Washington. His performance there will give us a
pointer as to whether he has the potential to fill
George Marshall's shoes. ,
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