LETTER TO DR. JAMES B. RHOADES FROM JAMES E. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 16, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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- Dr:. -James B_ . Rhoads
UUW t;U L:'11 trl
Archivist of the United Staten
Zlational.Archives and Records Service
Eighth and-Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C.. 20408
Dear. -Dr. Rhoads :
?Pursuan*_ to Section 5(E) of Exacutiva Order- 11652 the Central
task of conducting a systematic declassification review of_ these
Intelligence Agency has detailed three experienced officers +to the
on'.which sucn?.iaaterial shall become declassified.:
Office. of Strategic Services, and in the custody of the National
Archives (MARS Record Group 226). They are currently in the process
of:-developing:a list identifying those records which require continued
classification, indicating in each instance the reason why continued.
protection is deemed necessary. When completed, this lint will be
submitted to me for final determination and specification of~the dates
possible use in the broader context of the government--vide declassi
that they will prove of interest to the National Archives and of.
gu ance is also ral y _applirable to related. intelligence records
af~tfi3s~ envy. the guidelines are foraarc'ed fiere,~th in the belief,
though formulated with Record Group226 svecificall in'mind .t$-
. the.revieuing officers in fulfilling their re3ponsibillties... Al-
D' eclassification guidelines have been promulgated to assist'-
Sincerely,
Enclosure
SAIC:CS:GFD:mj
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 General Guidance
The purpose of declassification review is to make available to
.the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the
obligation to safeguard national security interests, to protect
sensitive intelligence methods and sources, to avoid exacerbating
foreign relations, and to respect legitimate rights of privacy. Of
these, the matter of protection of sensitive intelligence methods
and sources will be of paramount concern in determining whether the
defense classification of OSS records must be continued. At the
risk of oversimplification, "sources." can be defined as the origins
of information and "methods" as the ways in which things are accom-
plished. Often source s -a-H methods utZ. zze in particu ar progxams
are essentially inseparable and cannot be considered in isolation.
The Agency's declassification jurisdiction is limited to those
records for which the OSS exercised exclusive or final original
classification authority. If, as is likely, non-OSS documents are
found in the OSS files, such documents should be tabbed or other-
wise noted and eventually referred for declassification action to
whatever agency exercises current security classification juris-
diction over them. Similarly, classified materials which were
received by the OSS from foreign governments or international bodies,
with the express understanding that the information would be kept in
confidence and that security protection be continued, should be noted
for future action but must not be unilaterally declassified or down-
graded.
f v^U,7r.~ ~!-
"./""PIED BY
APT F,RO.'d G .Y.~R:.t. VCL!,S? rFICAr1
SCHEDULE QE . Q. it 1-:-:;: C.i IL(
SB(I ) G!, i 31 ,': (w') ~?>,?. r: ?s. or mo
(cnlees imposciLre, insert dote or event)
GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RECORDS
it is determined that a document musT ~teitl^classitied,
that It could be released provided that certain limited portions
one or two personal names) were-excised, this fact should be
noted on_.the wor et.--This guidance will enable National Archives
reference pers one ._.ta__provide sane- _ ions of.. otherwisecl.assi-
Nl1193B0119
Central Intelligence
rhers...ansah -uld... b_e_. done, a1thau9"Qt__re-3uixed
under the ovis~n_ s-.e-f--ExecutiveOrder--11452.
Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals
1. OSS personnel identities should be protected only if it is
known that they continued their association with US intelligence organi-
zations or were otherwise involved in intelligence activities beyond
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the date that the OSS was disbanded. If, however, an individual's
affiliation with the OSS has been previously surfaced in open
literature, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the
classification of the document on the basis of his post-OSS in-
telligence associations. Doc, ument;z~at_decias sified because OSS
personnel are identified can be declassified. 40 -vearsaf lei the
pub ication o t e ocument.
2. Cyg. , .agents1.__identities. even though it is not clear
that they were witting of their OSS connections, should continue
to be concealed unless it is known that they have voluntarily
publicized their intelligence roles or were otherwise exposed
beyond any reasonable doubt. If in doubt, do not declassify;
protection of agent sources from compromise is fundamental to
the continued effectiveness of an intelligence organization.
Ideally, agent identities should never be revealed, but such
action would be impractical in the real world. Adequate.pro_.
tection canbeafforded them and their families if clQ umen s
identifying them are w from declassification until_ __
ears~r "tfie publ~,c~ date of_tt-e-3ocument.
If 3. The identities of yliaison, Q.f#ine.r.~--from _coop_erat_3ng
foreign_intell~g or counterintelligence services should be
protected from disclosure. Declassification of such matters re-
quires the concurrence of the foreign government concerned. The
I date that such documents can.be declassified is thus impossible
to determine.
4. If a contact in a foreign government is identified as
the source of information, his identity should be protected unless
it is clear that he was consciously passing information to a member
of the OSS in accordance with instructions from his superiors. If
the document reveals a degree of collaboration between a foreigner
and the OSS, the disclosure of which could be a source of,a ute
embarrassment to him, its.classification_should-_be continued. Do
not rul_ n or of declassification if any reasonable doubt
exists. The declassification date for such documents should be
75 vears after the publication date.
5. The identities of US private citizens who had furnished
information, or otherwise cooperated with, the OSS with the under-
standing -- ~_ __ _--
standing that their role would be kept in confidence_should_-be
accorded protection from public disclosure. In those instances
where they are not identified by name, a judgment should be made
as to whether the source description is specific enough to permit
their identification. The date that such documents could be de-
classified is,_7 ears_after the publication date.
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6. Individuals, particularly-US citizts, mentioned in
investigative reports or similar records, the release of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or a breach
of confidence, should be protected from disclosure. Though covered
also in the Freedom of Information Act, the need for protection in
national security related documents justifies continued classifi-
cation. Such documents could be'declassified.75 years after the
document's publication date.
7. Any report containing information, the disclosure of which
would place an identified or identifiable person in immediate
jeopardy--whether covered by the foregoing categories or not--should,
of course, continue to be classified. Such documents could be de-
classified 75 years after the publication date. I
Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods
1. Sensitive intelligence methods which must be afforded pro-
tection beyond the 30-year mandatory review period include information
concerning or revealing_ technis_ues of agent recruitment, nonofficial
and other unconventional cover arrangements,. deception techniques,
methods equ pmen temp oyed or covert commuc s, to nical
surveillance devces and strategies, micro hoto ra_hzc methods and
equipment, escape and evasion techniques, i.a., provided'that such
met sod are -n`oessential yly Td ical to those universally employed
by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that advances
in technology have not rendered such methods and supporting equipment
entirely obsolete. Documents containing such information must remain
classified as long as the methods are utilized in-operations,, and
therefore it is impossib a to fix a date for automatic declassification.
2. Methods related-_t ?al+,and._oh~._su.port activities--
as oppose o intelligence collection and covert action techniques
adapted to the particular operations and circumstances of World War II,
do no them _e1V .u lif~_ -sensitive
jau protection.
3. Information with respect to the internal organization of the\
OSS, the chain of command, component functional missions and personnel
ceilings, and intercomponent working relationships has lost much of '
its sensitivity with the passage of time. Moreover, a considerable
amount of this sort of information has already appeared in ope'
literature. Documents dealing with the various cover organizations
created..or.employed by the OSS, however, should continue to be classi-
fied for 60 years after the publication date of the document.
Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Crypto gra nhy
1. Communications intelligence, cryptography, and related
activities must be provided with protection from premature dis-
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their sensitive nature. Included are any data concerning or revealing
.the processes, techniques, technical materiel and equipment, particular
operations and overall scope of communications intelligence, and
cryptographic security. The date for declassification of such infor-
mation, being dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore
impossible to predetermine.
2. Decrypted cables should be declassified on the basis of their
subject matter content. Modern techniques of massive computer attack
agsinst encryted intercepts of World War II systems are so effective
that it must be assumed that any hostile intelligence service which
decided to expend the effort to retrospectively process the data could
have read the texts of cable messages.
Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content
1. Classified information contained in OSS documents and other
record media, regardless of the subject,' the origjn__of which can be
clearly traced to another US Government agency, should not be de-
classified unilaterally. Declassifying or downgrading action must
await the decision of thz._-agency. exarci,sing-current-eclassi_fication
author ty and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.
2. Classified information which was passed to the OSS by liaison
representatives of forei-n intelligence or counterintelligence services
and subsequently incorporated into OSS documents should not be declassi-
fied unilaterally when it is apparent that this was the case. Declassi-
fication of such material must await the concurrence of the foreign
government concerned, and the date for declassification is therefore
impossible to determine.
3. Any information which would probably adversely affect the
conduct of present'day or future US foreign_po1jy or international.
s cum it arrangements if disclosed should not be declassified without
the prior concurrence of the Department of State and/or the Department
of Defense, even though the document and the information contained
therein is exclusively OSS?in origin. Declassification or downgrading
action must await the decision of the competent agency, and therefore
the date would be impossible to determine.
4. Biographic information of a nature that would be highly
embarrassing or compromising to friendly or collaborating foreign
nationals, the release of which would be likely to impair US re-
lations with the nation involved, should not be disclosed. Documents
containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years
after the publication date.
5. With the passage of 30 years, the re ortoria and aualvtical
content of the bulk of OSS documentation wil aye lost whatever sensi-
tivity it once had. Illustrative of the subject matter which can be
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readily declassified are: translations or summaries from the foreign
press and radio broadcasts; prisoner interrogation reports; translations
or summaries of captured enemy documents; statistical data or other
purely factual reporting, with little or no attempt at predictive
analysis; information dealing with conditions prevailing at a particular
point in time, e.g., enemy order of battle, and thus highly perishable;
and any information which has been extensively and accurately reported
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GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE OF
OFFICE. OF CENSORSHIP RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS
The President of the United States has removed the "seal" formerly placed
on Office of Censorship records and approved these guidelines. The Archivist
of the United States shall implement these guidelines for the systematic
review for declassification and r lease of regards. and documents originat&I
by the Uorld War Il Office of Censorship, which have been accessioned. by the
national Archives and Records Service Into the National Archives of the
United States.
Part A
All national security-classified Information originated by the Office of
Censorship Is automatically declassified except that information and
r; terlal categorized under paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 of this part and determined
by specialists of the named Departments-or agencies of primary subject-
... matter interest as requiring continued protection. Emphasis will be upon
deci:assifIcation. National security Information and material requiring
continued protection and exemption from declassification following review
shall be listed in accordance with Section 5(E) of Executive Order 11G5Z
and referred through the 'head of Department to the Archivist of the United
Stes. Only national security information and material originate. by the
Office of Censorship of the following categories may be exempted from
disclosure under Section 562(b)(l) of Title a, United States Code (Freedcm
of Information Act):
1. Information concerning communications intelligence or cryptography
,and their related activities. All such Information which night still be
itiv.e will be referred to the National Security Agency for final deter-
urination on declassification and release or the need for continued security
protection.
2. Information of an intelligence methodological natur concerning
secret writing and microphotography. All such Information which might
still be sensitive will be referred to the Central Intelligence Agency for
3'inal determination on declassification and release or the need for continued
. securi ty protection.
3. Info tion concerning foreign governmental censorship activities
is disclosed by U.S. liaison with foreign censorship agendas not previously
c;vaclassifted. All such information which might still be sensitive will be
referred to the D :part nt of State for guidance and consul mo tion in dater-
mining whether to declassify or whether the need for cantlnu'ad protection
rxiats.
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DRAFT
Part 3
Info ation in Office of Censorship intercept and similar files concerning
individuals and organizations the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy (cf. Section 552(b)(w) of
Title 5, United States Code) will normally be exempted from release until
50 calendar years after its origin. Such Information may be further defined
as;
l.. All information clearly identifying individuals or organizations
whose communications were intercepted, were the object of surveillance or
were of particular interest to the intelligence agencies of the United
States or its All ies, including the following;
a.. Originals, photocopies, or transcripts of Intercepted
cocmcuni cations;
b. Submission slips (extracts from Intercepted communications);
C. Daily reports, also known as ' Dayreps" (Office of Censorship
?^ ssages.to stations providing background information on persons and
organizations of interest to the Office of Censorship);
d. Special watch instructions, also known as S'WIs (instruc-tions
or supplemen4al information on particular persons, addresses, organizations,
etc., whose con unlcatlons are to be intercepted);
L'.? Watch lists/?lash lists (lists of persons, organizations,
addresses, etc., with indicator of subject interest, whose corununications
are o be Intercepted, including. proposed entries and deletions;
'. White. lists (names of persons whose col,. , nications were to
be bypassed without 'examination) including entries and deletions thereto;
g. Border watch/flash lists (names of persons whose cor unications
across the U.S. border.; were of particular interest to a local censorship
station), -including entries and deletions thereto.
2. All information identifying individuals or organizations involved
in. complaint;, or recom endations. about carrying out the specific provisions
of the Code of Wartime Practices for the rlrr rican Press and 3roadcasters
not previously wholly released.
3. All requests for information of the types described In Part 3 of
these guidelines shall be referred to the Director,. Federal Preparedness
Agency, GSA, for a determination as to whether that information can be
roleased in whole or in part or should continue to be exempted from public
disclosure.
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2 Jul;; 1979
Classification Review Procedure CRP 79-32 and
CRP 79-008/OSS
GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR T11E PERIOD
FRC11 IE END OF OSS TO TILE BEGINNING OF CIA
October 1945 - Iff September 1947
BACKGROUND 0
On 20 September 1945 President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order
breaking up the OSS as-of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of
State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence system. The Research and Analysis (R&A)
and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department.
The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were
assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that
purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible
central intelligence service.
On 22 January 1946 President Truman issued a Presidential Directive
which established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly
under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of
representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal
representative of the President. The Director of CIG was appointed by the
President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intel-
ligence activities; recommending policies and objectives of the "national
intelligence mission;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic
and national policy and disseminating it within the Government; performing
functions related to intelligence as the President and NIA might direct;
and performing services of common concern where those services could be
performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the
Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence.
The CIG was described as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Since
the SSU had been expected only to serve an interim function, the Executive
Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War to discontinue the
SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could be: 1) placed in a new
central intelligence organization; 2) placed in the War Department; or 3)
dropped entirely. General Magruder, Chief of the SSU, was to superintend
the liquidation of those SSU activities to be dropped entirely during
peacetime. On 29 January 1946 the Secretary of War directed that the SSU
should be liquidated by 30 June 1940. The Director of CIG was to take what
records he wanted from SSU through the Secretary of War and retain operational
control over them. Title .o the records was to he settled later. Magruder
felt.that SSU plans, properties and personnel must be maintained because
they were indispens:rhle for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime.
O
1
n
4 February 19a0 he urgcd that the SSU be placed under the Director of CIG.
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 STATI NT
N
STATINTL
is tie current chief 01 SSU and is authorized to conduct certain business for
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As there was some uispute over whether the Director of ClG should get the
entire unit, an interdepartmental committee was organized under Colonel
to study this question. The cornnit.tec found support for the opinion
WMe SSU, as was, ought not go to the CM. 'I1ic conrnittee had heard that
the bulk of intelligence information came from friendly-governments; that
much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU
personnel had not been adequately screened; and that nuiny clandestine personnel
had become exposed during IVIt' II. 11ic committee thought that the SSU should
be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the CIG as a "goi.ng
concern." The committee thought that ClG should closely coordinat ine
operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate iyinst~
y Institu-
tions to aid possible U.S. military operations, develop liaison with foreign
intelligence agencies and develop sleeper networks while
overt collection of intelligence information should ain wI e o per U.S.
Government agencies. The committee also rccogniz&d the interrelationship
between the SSU and the Rf,A Branch (still located in the State Department)
and urged that their activities be integrated because the R&A !}ranch was
"closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide."
The committee also felt that the Director of CHI. should take authority and
responsibility for liquidation of the Sal.
On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from
30 June 1946 to 30 June 1947. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to
instructions from the Director .of CIG. This made it possible for
Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services of
#,00 take over such SSU assets as the Director of CIG wanted while unwanted
assets would be absorbed into the War Department or abandoned. The arrange-
ments for the transfer of.,SSU to the CIG through the War Department were
complicated but it enabled the CIG to take legally what it wanted while
Magruder, Chief of the SSU, got rid of unwanted facilities through the War.
Department. Although no specific legal action,was taken, the passage of time
and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to
have vested title of SSI1 property to the CIG.
In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of CIG (replacing
Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of CIG must be the NIA's
executive officer and he immediately struck out to obtain greater authority
and independence for the CIG. While his ideas met resistance from the member
agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some points. For example, Vandenberg
wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage and counter-espionage for the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence abroad. This proposal was modified to allow the
Director of CIG to conduct only those "organized federal" operations which
were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the
authority to collect intelligence information. The purpose of the revision
was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental
purposes and it was meant to protect the FBI in performing its duties within
the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operations to
collect foreign intelligence. During the seamier and fall of 1946, the CIG
arranged to take over the personnel, undercover agents, and foreign stations
of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as
a bonafide organization never actually went out of husinctis. `Ihe C/IMS/!11X)
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and on behalf of SStI, Most SSII act ivit ice IinvuIye decking; out special
requests from liX-SSU or OSS persOrutcl .) l ic.ld staticros were notified that
effective 19 October 1946 "SSU discontinues all overseas activities and the
Office of Special Operations of CIG assumes responsibility for conducting
espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection of foreign intel-
ligence information required for 'nat ionaI security.
As noted above, the CIG takeover of the SSU stretched over a period of
several months in 1946. During this period the CIG took over many of the
personnel, installations, facilities and cover arrangements and units as well
as administrative practices of the SS11. Thus you will find CIG, after
19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and letterhead stationery
from such units making it difficult to identify GIG documents from appearance
alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSII
document. Be that as it may, for general purposes in classification review
consider all records created before 11) October 1946 as SSII and all records
created after that date as CIG.
should be reviewed as a CIG document using tile CIA gulde,111c.S.
GUIDELINES
For our general use in the classification review process, the date of
19 October 1946 will he considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the
SSU and the eginrning" of the CIG. Generally speaking, records dated prior
to 19 October 1946 will be considered SSU documents and those created after
that date will be considered CIG documents.
The methods of orgarti:ation and operation used by the SSU were very
similar to those developed and used by the OSS. The SSU was essentially a
military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War
Department under military correnand. It is therefore pertinent for us to review
SSU documents under those guidelines developed for utd used in the classifi-
cation review of OSS records. The CIG on the other hautd, very soon after its
creation began to take on an independent life and although many CIG personnel
continued to be military it quickly attracted more civilians and it was not
under direct military conunand. We will, therefore, look at CIG document, as
relating closely to the beginnings of the CIA and will review CIG documents
under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of
CIA records. As a general rule, the OSS review team will he responsible for
reviewing documents originated before 19 October 1946 and the other (Rl)
reviewers will be responsible for those documents it ginated after 19 October
1946. This date is not intended to be an absolute rule; as in all rcvie
work, individual judgement must he used. For example, a document originated
after 19 October 1946 might refer to the past and to activities or problems
of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU document containing
material relating to the SS11.. Such a document should be reviewed as being
essentially -a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the classifi-
cation action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 1946
might refer to the future and-to activities or problems. relating to the (:1G
making it in essence amore -or less typical CIG docLmtent. his type document
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All reviewers should be especially alert for these types of documents
and pay particular attention to their classification review. If there is
any question, coordination should be effected between the CRI) Operations
.Branch/OSS and the CRD Operations Branch/CIA through the Chief of the (RI)
Operations Branch.
The major categories of information which most likely will require
continued protection are: 1) information which identifies sources; 2)
foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we
had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence
methods not generally known or used and not outdated; and 4) information
which could still cause negative reactions that could impact adversely on
current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines
are as follows:
1. Protect all sources to avoid creation of a reputation' that U.S.
intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to
this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental,
insignificant and overt.
2. Identification as an SSU staffer will he judged and handled the
same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Staffers generally will not he
protected merely because they later worked for the CIG or the CIA. If
however, the person engaged in sensitive work for CIG or the CIA, their
SSU (and OSS) employment may he exenq)ted from declassification to protect
the later sensitive work, :or position in the CI(. or the CIA.
3. Persons who served under non-official cover are protected at all
times as is their cover.
STATINTL
Classification Review Division
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