UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL TO ASSESS (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00789R003000040002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 11, 1980
• Content Type: PAPER

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`V V hen President Jimmy Carter quietly, but of-
ficially, opened the closet door on one of the nation's
most coveted intelligence collection systems in a
Cape Canaveral speech on 1 October 1978, he pub-
licly marked the beginning of the end of an era. His
announcement was part of the preparation for the ex-
pected battle with the Senate over approval of the
SALT II agreement. It was anticipated that the battle
might eventually include the release of photographic
satellite reconnaissance materials to establish both
the verifiability of the provisions of the SALT tt treaty
and the reasonableness of some of the treaty's provi-
sions. If this had occurred, the president may have
had in mind a restricted use of these materials by the
U. S. Senate. However, the House of Representatives
probably would have insisted upon equal treatment,
and once the process was started, the president may
have been forced to go (or would have seen consider-
able advantage in going) to the general public with
his supportive evidence.
The Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan froze the SALT approval process in the
United States. The currently negotiated SALT II
treaty is now more than likely a dead document.
Whatever the timetable and in whatever manifesta-
tion arms control negotiations might resume, any
administration of the future should anticipate a most
difficult problem in gaining congressional approval
of a SALT-type treaty. The pendulum swing away
from accommodation toward confrontation strongly
suggests that this will be the case. Another possibil-
ity is that any SALT approach is dead for many years
to come, so that no administration will find it pru-
dent to pursue this path. Instead, increasing tension
and serious preparations for the use of force may
cause the current or next administration to present,
to the American public and the world, hard intelli-
gence evidence that justifies the action being taken.
Whatever the basis, attempted accommodation or
anticipated confrontation, if it happens, the taxpayer
will have the opportunity to see examples of what has
been one of the most valuable sources of strategic,
scientific, and technical intelligence for 19 years:
U. S. satellite intelligence collection systems. The
degree of success in controlling specific knowledge
about these systems has. been high. The conviction of
a former CIA employee, William P. Kampiles, of es-
pionage in November 1978, when the court found
him guilty of selling a top secret manual of one of
the country's operational photo satellite systems, rep-
resents an important exception to this success. Ac-
cording to news accounts which cited unnamed
"U. S. officials," the Soviets first learned that the
KH-ll spy satellite was photographing their territory
when they purchased a stolen copy of the satellite's
manual. On 23 November 1978, The Washington Port
reported, "The KH 1 l 'was misclassified' by the
Soviets as a nonphotographic satellite, .. so they
did not bother to try to hide sensitive weapons or
operations from it when it passed overhead." News
reports about the spy trial and the KH-t t revealed
that ICH was an abbreviation of the CIA code name. If
correct, the selection of "Keyhole" to name a system
that secretly and silently peeked down from space is
apt. The code word was probably too suggestive to
be openly used, so it was abbreviated. There is no
way for anyone outside of the U. S. and Soviet intel-
ligence communities to judge the claim that the
Soviets did not recognize the KH- I t for what it actu-
ally was. The Soviets, however, with their large
land-based optical and electronic systems, will prob-
ably be able to determine whether the manual they
purchased for X3,000 is authentic or a U. S. plant in
an attempt at misinformation.
A more important point is that the court effec-
tively ruled to keep the American public from know-
ing what the Soviets know. Reporters covering the
trial petitioned U. S. District Court Judge Phil M.
McNagny to release all evidence submitted to the
jury. A copy of the manual with certain parts cen-
sored was admitted into evidence, but Judge Mc-
Nagny refused to release it to the media. Apparently
the United States may have decided that it is un-
avoidable or even worthwhile for the Soviets to know
about our capability in this field, but that such
knowledge is not to be shared with our other enemies
and the American public. This does not reflect a de-
sire to keep the American public in the dark. There
is no practical way of sharing with Americans and
not with the rest of the world.
The problem for the government during the trial
of Kampiles was to be able to make its case well
enough to get a conviction without being placed in a
position of revealing intelligence information beyond
that alleged in the charges against the accused. Press
interest was high, and reporters pressed for details
and explanation of testimony. Compromise of the
system's technical photographic capability may not
have been the government's most serious concern. It
would be highly upsetting if the compromised
document enabled the Soviets to enter the satellite's
command and control links in order to insert false
data, cause the satellite to dump data upon com-
mand, or to cause system malfunctions.
As for the material which did reach the press, it
may have been slightly confusing for the general
reader. On 23 August 1978, the headline in The
Washington Port was "CIA 'Big Bird' Satellite Manual
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Was Allegedly Sold to Soviets." The accompanying
article described Big Bird as no more than five years
old and reported that a dozen such satellites had been
placed in orbit. Its photo capability was described as
being so precise that it could pick out the makes of
automobiles and even read their license plates. The
article presented additional details, "Intelligence
sources said yesterday that KH-11 was the CIA code
name for Keyhole-11, which is the Big Bird photo-
graphic reconnaissance satellite 'The Russians
know this satellite has been in orbit taking pictures
for some time,' the source said, 'Getting their hands
on the manual doesn't stop the satellite and doesn't
stop the pictures.' "
Clues that the U. S. Government may have ini-
tiated a misinformation effort appeared in a 23
November 1978 Washington Past article. It alleged
that the KH-ll had looked down on Russia for more
than a year without the Soviets realizing that it was a
photo satellite. Compare the following quotation
with that which appeared in the 23 August news
item:
"The Soviets have known for years that the
United States has been sending a number of dif-
ferent spy satellites over their territory, with those
known as Samos and Big Bird among the ones it
identified as picture-taking ones. But For some
reason, the KH11 was not picked out from the
clutter of U. S. satellites as a new eye in the sky."
Are KH-11 and Big Bird one and the same? One re-
port, apparently heavily dependent upon "official
sources," said that they are. A second report clearly
indicates that they are different. The point is not
earth shaking, but it is instructive about the will-
ingness of U. S. officials to plant seeds of doubt or
perhaps deliberately to mislead.
What new information entered the public domain
about U. S. photo satellites as the result of the
Kampiles trial? On the matter of system identifica-
tion, Samos had been in the news officially in the
early 1960s until it was "disinvented" by security
fiat around December 1961. At that time, the De-
partment of Defense stopped identifying the name
and mission of certain satellites when they were
launched. Since all others were identified, the rea-
sonable assumption was that those about which there
was no publicity or "no comment" were launches for
satellites with a national security mission. Big Bird
was prominently in the news in January 1978 at the
rime of the crash in Canada of the Soviet Cosmos 954
satellite. In its issue of 6 February 1978, Tinte maga-
zine carried a report of Big Bird's capability and a
color sketch of the satellite. Much earlier, specula-
tion on the system was published in Philip Klass's
Secret Sentries in S~iace CNew York: Random House,
1971; pages 170-171), the most definitive book
available on U. S. photo satellite systems. It cannot
be discounted that the 1978 news accounts to some
degree were based upon Klass's 1971 research. In the
Klass book Big Bird is identified as the first of the
fourth-generation photo satellites. Klass identified
the fifth-generation satellite by the code number
1010, indicating that the U. S. Air Force was going
to call for industry proposals for the 1010 satellite
during early 1971. The significant new capability of
1010, according to Klass, would have been the inte-
gration of a "real-time" reconnaissance capability.
This wauld allow controllers to observe the satellite's
view as it overflies the globe. Such a capability
Orr a clear day from a U-2 you care see Washington, D. C.
. . I n the center of the picture, diagonal streets converge osi
the Capitol; on the left bank of the Potomac River is the
Pentagon, and near the right side of the photo is the circular
Rohert F, Kennedy Stadirun.
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would have required institutional and bureaucratic
adjustments not only ro manage the system, but to
exploit it fully. The existence of a bureaucracy for
that role was indicated in a 1976 report by the Sen-
ate Select Intelligence Committee: ". the Na-
tional Reconnaissance? Office, an Air Force intelli-
gence agency only recently disclosed to exist, .
reportedly operates satellite intelligence programs for
the entire intelligence community.. ."
A summary view of the system needed to support
and exploit photographic intelligence from satellite
sources mandates that it is not one of those com-
partments for which only a handful of people are
cleared. Discounting the thousands of personnel who
would have knowledge and responsibility about parts
of the overall system, there remains the potential for
thousands of others who would be actively involved
in one phase or another of video production, negative
handling, and printing of the photographic and other
sensor material. In the first category are personnel of
supporting industries-the builders of rockets, mis-
siles, cameras, film, tape, and electronics. Few of
these people need see the final product except to ob-
serve coverage of a calibrated U. S. target to deter-
mine sensor performance. It would be in the second
category of photo analysts, technicians, and intelli-
gence estimators, where the largest number of
cleared people would be found. Alternatively, the
largest group of clearances could be held by the le-
gion of civilian and military planners and operators,
the decision-makers, and their supporting staffs at
the national level. The number can thus reasonably
be? expected to be large, and the potential over the
years for specific leaks to the media is great. Security
has been good, though, and Congress and the media
appear to be playing active roles in this regard. This
does not mean that knowledge about the systems-
particularly specific knowledge gained from the
systems-has not appeared in the public domain.
U. S. Presidents have. been the most notable
"leakers." An argument can be made that the presi-
dent cannot be liable for any security leaks or viola-
tions, since the whole classification system is his.
One of the most publicized references to photo satel-
lite material came from President Lyndon Johnson.
Speaking off the record to about 100 educators in
Nashville on 15 March 1967, Johnson said that be-
This satellite view of the Middle Bast shows the easily
recognizable shapes of the Sinai Peninsula, Gulf of Suez, and
Gulf of Aqaba. At the upper left is the Mediterranean, and at
the lower right is the northern end of the Red Sea.
cause of satellite reconnaissance, "I know how many
missiles the enemy has." He claimed that this system
alone had justified spending ten times what the na-
tion had already spent on space, X35-$~0 billion up
to chat time (The IVew York Tinier. 17 Ivfarch 1967).
President Dwight Eisenhower had also gone public
on this intelligence capability. He and Premier
Nikita Khrushchev had a short discussion about
satellite reconnaissance in Paris in May 1960. The
ill-fated summit conference foundered over the issue
of the downed U-2 aircraft over Russia. Before the
conference broke up, there was one meeting.
Eisenhower wrote afterward chat he ordered a stop to
further U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Two rea-
sons were cited. The first was the belief that the
Soviets could shoot down the high-flying U-2. "The
second was that considerable progress was now being
made in photography of the earth from satellites."
(Waging Peace: 1956-1961, [Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965, page 552.]) The
president told Khrushchev that he had plans to sub-
mit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation
of a U.N. aerial surveillance capability. He commit-
ted the United States not only to accept such aerial
44 Proceedings /June 1980
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surveillance, but to contribute to the establishment
and operation of such international surveillance. Fol-
lowing Eisenhower's statement, French President
Charles de Gaulle observed to the select gathering
that within recent days a Soviet satellite had passed
over France, and that reconnaissance photography
might have been taken of the whole of France.
Eisenhower wrote that "Khrushchev broke in to say
he was talking about airplanes, not about satellites.
He said any nation in the world who wanted to pho-
tograph the Soviet areas by satellite was completely
free ro do so."
This may suggest that the Soviets have held a
casual attitude on the subject of intelligence satellites
streaking over Mother Russia. The opposite is the
case. Until they. obtained a similar reliable capabil-
ity, they bitterly opposed the successful U. S. pro-
grams. The turning point came in September 1963.
To a large degree, Soviet sensitivities probably ex-
plain the U. S. refusal to acknowledge our own pro-
grams from 1961 until the present time. However,
technical advances concerning space sensors not ex-
clusively related to the Department of Defense have
seriously eroded the security curtain. The vast
amount of imagery available since 1972 from the
LandSat system (before 1975, this program was
called Earth Resources Technology Satellites, ERTS)
available for commercial exploitation has served for
most to dull the edge of curiosity about the
capabilities of other satellite systems. It also served as
a benchmark from which reasonable assumptions
about still classified systems have been made.
Everyone who has written on the subject of intel-
ligence satellites has addressed the area of capability.
For the photographic satellite the area of greatest
interest has been the degree of ground resolution pos-
sible. A news report cited earlier in this article
claimed that products from Big Bird were so precise
as to enable the identification of particular makes of
automobiles. In addition, it was alleged that license
places could be read. Are we being informed or mis-
informed? It would take many pages to discuss the
automobile claim in terms of feet and inches of reso-
lution. Remember that there are hundreds of dif-
ferent car models and many of them are very close in
size. The license plate claim would be easier to dis-
cuss in terms of inches of resolution if we could get
by the fact that automobile plates are conventionally
displayed so as to provide a top edge view to satellite
cameras. The Director of Central Intelligence,
Stansfield Turner, was reported in the C February
1978 Newsweek to have told White House aides that
our photos were so good as to enable the C1A to dis-
tinguts etween uernseys an ere or s on t e
range. Why the CIA would want to identify these
bovine cousins is a small mystery, but what can we
learn from the statement? Guernseys are Fawn and
white and slightly larger than Herefords. The
Hereford is red and frequently has a white blaze
mark extending from the white face to accoss the
withers. From a satellite view the Hereford would be
more rectangular in form than the more triangular
shaped Guernsey. They are rarely herded together.
Perhaps Turner's statement meant that our color
photography was good enough to have color separa-
tion for a target the size of a cow. To speculate be-
yond reason, he may have identified one of our photo
satellite calibration areas, the precisely fenced hold-
ing areas of farms engaged in artificial insemination
operations. Here one would find almost all breeds of
cattle grazing expectantly side by side. More than
likely, Turner was adding one mote story to those
that say something but tell nothing.
There is a good deal more unsubstantiated but
clear information on the subject of resolution. On 8
December 1963, The Washington Port published a
long feature article on the Samos program. Author
Howard Simons claimed that one released photo-
graph, taken by a U-2 in 1956, demonstrated 4-inch
resolution of painted stripes in a parking lot. He
surmised that technological improvements up to
1963 might permit similar resolution from a satellite
150 miles overhead. James A. Fusca, writing in
SpacelAeronautica in June 1964, was quite positive in
his statements concerning Samos: "Photographs ob-
tained have a ground resolution of 16-20 in. at al-
titudes between 100-120 miles, sufficiently good to
detect the dark shadow of a telegraph pole, and
equivalent to the photographs taken by U-2s ar ex-
treme altitudes." It is the estimate of the previously
mentioned Philip Klass that Samos-2, which was
launched on 31 January 1961, had a ground resolu-
tion of 20 feet from its orbit of 300 miles. He
further stated that the "unidentified" satellite
launched on 22 December 1961 (possibly Samos-5),
with half the altitude of the earlier Samos-2, perhaps
had resolution as good as 5-10 feet. It is Klass's in-
formed technical opinion that the second generation
of U. S. satellites, those which sent their imagery to
earth by radio transmission, could discern objects as
small as 7 feet in diameter. The United States proba-
bly orbited 25 of this generation satellite during
1964 and 1965. Resolution in itself is not an objec-
tive. It is an expression of some ability to communi-
cate intelligence via graphic form. It would be mis-
leading to expect that each subsequent generation of
reconnaissance satellite provided better ground reso-
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lution. In fact, even though some improvements
were probably technically possible with advance-
ments in camera designs and optics, film and film
processing, and computer-supported incerpretations,
other objectives may have competed with the costs of
obtaining such improvements. While the third-
generation reconnaissance satellites may have had a
higher resolution camera system, it had other signifi-
cant new attributes. According to Klass the satellites
of 1966-1967 were equipped with an infrared scan-
ner that enabled them to take reconnaissance pictures
during night passes. The number of satellites
launched from this generation equipment was fewer
than previous generations. The suggestion is that
they carried a larger film supply and had an im-
proved data transmission capability to ground sta-
tions.
The fourth-generation reconnaissance satellite has
had more of a public character than any of its prede-
cessors. This was the Big Bird, first launched in
1971, capable of both radio transmission of imagery
and ejectable film packs. To handle its all-weather
and nighttime role, Big Bird reportedly is equipped
with side-looking radar that, from an orbit of 100
miles, would provide ground resolution of a few feet.
At least some of the Big Bird satellites essentially
have a "real-time" reconnaissance capability. By di-
rect and communication satellite relay from Big
Bird, ground personnel can see through the zoom-
type telephoto lens as if they were on board the satel-
lite. Big Bird's orbiting time has been around 220
days. Much of its payload weight is propellant used
to maneuver both in altitude and in orbit. This ma-
neuverability capability enables it to respond to the
need for coverage of rapidly developing crisis situa-
tion. The trade-off cost is total time in orbit.
Application of "real-time" reconnaissance has been
reported in the book Satellite Spies (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1976) by Sandra Hockman with
Sybil Wong. The following is attributed to a "highly
classified person":
"We used satellite television to monitor the
Yom Kippur war in October and November 1973.
We were there day and night. We watched every-
thing that was happening, especially over the Sy-
rian front, and we gave the Israelis all the informa-
tion we could. It helped them. ... [W]e have
given a few Israelis a general idea of what we have."
The British and the West Germans know. The
necessary personnel in NATO know. We are plan-
ning to build the system into the NATO command
function.. .. [T]he Soviets learned about it in
1973. As soon as we started operations."
The difficulty with this statement is the suggestion
of continuous coverage. This could be accomplished
by a synchronous satellite stationed over a geo-
graphical point, or by a stream of satellites maneu-
vered to make repeated passes over the same area. So
far as is known, there is no photo reconnaissance syn-
chronous satellite capability. The very high altitudes
associated with synchronous orbit would appear to be
beyond sensor capability to monitor battlefield ac-
tion. The records do not show sudden increases in
classified launches during this crisis. Three explana-
tions suggest themselves: the report is in error, at
least as far as the continuity of coverage is concerned;
an unidentified satellite with a unique capability was
at work; or the unidentified source defined "continu-
ous" as repeated orbits over the same ground area,
i.e., a maneuverable Big Bird-type satellite.
The term "photographic satellite" should not be
taken in a literal sense. The point to be made is an
important one and one that is abundantly docu-
mented in open literature. All regions of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, from ultraviolet through far
infrared, have been carefully investigated for intelli-
gence potential. We associate photography with
cameras, negatives, prints, and slides. Radiometers
are the instruments used to sense and capture data in
the nonvisible (to the human eye) electromagnetic
spectrum. What may be confusing is that, in fact, a
visible presentation can be made of data received in
what is labeled the nonvisible spectrum. Fot ex-
ample, an infrared thermal image certainly com-
municates intelligence. The whole of Italy with scat-
tered cloud coverage might be presented. The brain
and eye are not confused by the presentation, and
much can be interpreted, but not nearly as much as
would be possible by a computer using digital tech-
niques. We have gone through at least two genera-
tions of multispectral satellite sensor systems.
Analysis and interpretation of these materials are
principally by computers. Perhaps one measure of the
potential of this intelligence is the commercial appli-
cation already established. Commercial marketing of
LandSat products is presently being done by a
number of companies including General Electric,
Bendix, Earth Satellite Corporation, and iBM, with
others coming in the field.
Three years before the first I.andSac satellite was
.orbited, the 22 June 1970 issue of Aviation Week fr
Space Technology presented a discussion of the hopeful
future of such a venture. It was speculated that a
functional earth resources observation satellite system
would represent the greatest potential return on a
dollar investment of any space project. Sixteen poten-
tial earth survey sensors were identified in a matrix
Prooeedinge/June 1980
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that associated each with objectives in the five
categories of agriculture, geography, geology, hy-
drology, and oceanography. From the beginning of
this project, the Department of Defense was a sup-
porter and participant. It would not be surprising if
a series of military intelligence collection efforts have
been secretly associated with all of the publicly iden-
rified multispectral satellites and some that were
classified launches. In conjunction with the best of
our space and ground photographic capabilities, sig-
nature recognition criteria for all spaceborne sensors
would have been well established long ago. The sur-
vey rate of various sensors differs greatly. If, for ex-
ample, the signature for concrete was reasonably dis-
tinctive and detectable with a rapid race sensor (a
sensor capable of viewing large areas of the earth's
surface at one pass), it could provide and maintain an
index of man-made structures. New findings and
enlargement of previous structures could then be
targeted for photo reconnaissance and other types of
coverage that would reveal adequate details for as-
sessment .
The persuasive power of aerial and space photogra-
phy must be rated high. The best public example
concerned the use of U-2 photos to support the U. S.
position during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Con-
cerned about any possible irresolution on the part of
our NATO allies, President Kennedy dispatched
senior diplomatic personnel with photo interpreters
and copies of U-2 photography. The purpose was to
give foreign heads of state a briefing on the evidence
before the president went to the American public and
the world with our facedown of the Soviets over the
missiles in Cuba.
Dean Acheson delivered to Charles de Gaulle a let-
ter from Kennedy and offered to show the photo-
graphs. "A great government such as yours does not
act without evidence," responded the French Presi-
dent. After he told Acheson, "You may tell your
President that France will support him," he asked to
see the photographs.
Roger Hillsman, who during the Cuban Missile
Crisis was the Director of the Department of State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, writes that the
intelligence community objected to the release of U-2
photography on the grounds that its high-quality
resolution would reveal too much about our intelli-
gence capability. The president decided that the pho-
tography had to be used and authorized its release to
the general public. A similar argument for release is
currently in full bloom. It has been reported that a
White House panel started working in March 1977
to review the policy that governs what could be re-
leased in order to achieve more civilian benefits from
our photo intelligence satellites (The Washington Post,
13 November 1978). The argument is in progress
again with the U. S. intelligence community,
perhaps joined by counterparts in allied nations who
may share at least in part the bounty from these col-
lection systems. There is serious concern that if the
decision is reached to release materials from our less
capable older systems, it will lead to inevitably suc-
cessful demands for the release of materials from the
current and best systems.
Sbots like this one, taken in 1962, gave President Kennedy the
proof he needed of Soviet missiles on Cuban launch sites. Tbey
were enough to convince Cbarles de Gaulle, too.
There are and have been other proposals for releas-
ing satellite intelligence. In "The International Con-
trol of Disarmament" (Scientific American, October
1974), Alva Myrdal outlined a detailed proposal for
the creation of a new U.N. agency that would be
charged with the collection and dissemination of in-
telligence regarding the compliance of nations with
disarmament agreements. Mrs. Myrdal assumed that
such a U.N. agency would have to depend at first
upon the satellite photography from "national
sources." At the time of writing, this would have to
have been either or both the United States and the
Soviet Union. This idea was officially updated during
the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly
Devoted to Disarmament. France presented at this
session a proposal for the establishment of an in-
ternational satellite monitoring agency. The proposal
acknowledged that consent would be required from
any nation before it could be monitored for com-
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Hance of a disarmament agreement. A possible ex-
eption was suggested if the Security Council in-
oked Article 34 of the U.N. Charter which au-
horizes the Council to investigate disputes or situa-
ions. that might lead to international friction ar give
ise to a dispute. Three technical stages were identi-
fied. The first capability the new agency was to es-
ablish would be a processing center where materials
rovided by nations having operational satellite sys-
ems would be interpreted. During the second stage;
he agency would establish data-receiving stations
hat would be directly linked to national observation
atellites. In the 6na1 stage, the agency would have
'ts own satellites.
The attitude of the United States on this proposal
ay be inferred from a speech given at the 1978
.N. Disarmament Session by delegation. member
aul Newman. Mr. Newman gave details of the U.S.
erial photographic surveillance provided to Egypt
nd Israel in the Sinai. He made a general invitation:
"The United States is prepared to consider re-
quests for similar monitoring services in situations
where they might be applicable. To the extent
possible U. S. assistance would be provided under
the auspices of the United Nations or of regional
organizations but, in any event, only upon the
joint request of the affected states." (Department of
State Bulletin Reprint, August 1978)
If, for whatever reason, the United States and the
.S.S.R. are unwilling to share their observation
atellites with the United Nations, France may offer
to develop and launch a satellite series in support of
its~own proposal. President Valery Giscard D'estang
told the disarmament delegates that France would
ave a photo satellite capability within five years.
'estang was too modest about his country's existing
apability in this field. The report of awell-informed
iscussion group on problems of international secu-
ity in outer space concluded that France uses satel-
ites for reconnaissance, geodetic studies, and other
ctivities necessary to the development of its land-
nd sea-based missile nuclear deterrent force.
One public Soviet response to opening dialogue on
he possible U.N. use of observation satellite mate-
ial appeared in an article by Yuri Kolosov in the
ovember 1978 New Timer:
... if these photos have a sufficiently high
resolution they can be used to obtain information
about the defense potential of a country and its
resources. That is why such photographs should be
made available to all only with the consent of the
countries whose territory is probed. Soviet -scien-
tists hold that photographs with a linear resolution
of 50 metres or better can be used to obtain in-
formation the distribution of which could be det-
rimental to the national interests of states. This
criterion was proposed for dividing photos taken
from satellites into two categories: photos that can
be distributed freely and photos that can be dis-
tributed only with the consent of the state con-
cerned. Such an approach is vigorously supported
by the socialist and developing countries and is
opposed by the imperialist countries led by the
United 5tates."
Apparently the Soviet view is that ground resolution
of around 160 feet is too poor to be of much value;
hence it can be tolerated as "legal" for distribution.
The Soviets do leave the door open for photos with
better resolution, provided the involved country
gives consent for release.
Recently, the United States has gone public on the
general legal standing of satellite photographic re-
connaissance. Major General Walter D. Reed, Air
Force Judge Advocate General, said in a speech on
31 October 1978 that the U. S. position is that
under current outer space treaty provisions, the term
"peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and that space re-
connaissance from a satellite is anon-aggressive, pas-
sive function of a satellite. Two different points are
at issue here. The Soviets are not saying that satellite
reconnaissance with excellent ground resolution is il-
legal. They are saying that the use of reconnaissance
materials is not without some legal sanction and con-
trol. Their suggestion that 50 meters is the break
point is obviously arbitrary, but one that may stand
if it allows the use of the bulk of the U. S. LandSat
material already collected. On the other hand, the
United States may insist that this figure be reduced
to whatever the average linear resolution is expected
to be for our next generation LandSat system. The
new LandSat system should generate many millions
of dollars for companies commercially exploiting its
materials, and an unpredictable amount for com-
panies and countries that then successfully exploit
the resources identified by LandSat. The Soviets are
sure to label this as technological imperialism and
tout themselves as the guardian of the resources of
underdeveloped nations that would be taken advan-
tage of by U. S. industry with superior knowledge of
the location and extent of raw material resources.
The U. S. military also has adjusted to the new
reality following Carter's October 1978 confirmation
of photo satellite operations. The fiscal year 1)80
Military Posture statement from the U. S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff includes this comment on the subject:
"The purposes of the US reconnaissance and
surveillance program are: to provide strategic early
warning; to monitor enemy forces; to assess
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weapon systems characteristics; to develop and
maintain a data base for operations planning; to
conduct ocean surveillance; to monitor compliance
with strategic arms limitation agreements; and to
support crisis monitoring and decisionmaking.
The US collection effort employs ground-based,
airborne, shipboard, and satellite systems.
Space technology has contributed importantly, to
the reconnaissance and surveillance program."
This document provides some additional specific
information on satellite reconnaissance systems. In
the glossary two acronyms are identified: EORSAT
(ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite) and RORSAT
(Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite). A RORSAT
system was identified in Navy testimony released by
the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Clipper
Bow project was described as a satellite equipped
with an active radar that was being designed to pro-
vide atactical all-weather capability of detecting sur-
face vessels. The Navy's White Cloud project uses
clusters of EORSATs. When Clipper Bow is fully op-
erational, the EORSATs will allow correlation of sig-
nal emissions with radar targets obtained from that
system's radar satellites (see Aviation Week fi Space
Technology, l0 May 1.976, page 21; 12 February
1977, page ); 19 December 1977, page l8; 10 July
1)78, page 22; 28 August 1978, page 50).
In yet another use of satellites, the Navy gained
favorable publicity during operation Stopgap for its
radar ocean surveillance. In July 1)78, a news report
credited the use of information provided by Navy
ocean surveillance satellites in the tracking and sei-
zure of 40 oceangoing ships attempting to smuggle
more than a million pounds of marijuana into the
United States. For four and a half months, the Navy
Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC) re-
layed its intelligence to the Drug Enforcement
Agency which then passed it on to the Coast Guard
for enforcement action.
The point of the real and potential political impact
of high-altitude and satellite photography has been
made in the case of the U-2 incident and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The impact that such material has al-
ready had in the SALT negotiations, and will have if
there are future efforts to get a SALT treaty approved,
is yet to be revealed. There may be another historical
example of high political use of such material. A po-
tential for such use would have been during the 1)72
Nixon visit to China. The following scenario is, as
far as the author knows, a complete fabrication.
There is only one very chin reed upon which to base
any speculation concerning the possibility of its real
occurrence. This will be identified later. The action
opens on 2 June 1971 in the Oval Office of the
White House during the planning phase of Henry
Kissinger's 9- t 1 July secret visit to Peking.
President Nixon: "Henry, we know from our
Warsaw talks chat the Chinese are ready for more
public discussions, higher visibility, heads of state
meeting, But I want. you to make it perfectly clear
that in no way is the United States going to China
with apologies or humility. We are the premier
power in the world, and I want you to be careful to
point that out in a diplomatic way, of course."
Kissinger: "I understand, Mr. President. It is a
bold and imaginative move you are planning."
Although not used for intelligence, the earth resources
obserr~atron satellite, LandSat, offers potential for information
gatherh:g rn the areas of agriculh~re, geography, geology,
hydrology, and oceanography.
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Scene 2, 13 July 1971. T e Ova 0 ece a ter Kissinger's
visit.
Kissinger: "Mr President, the trip went ex-
ceedingly well. As you note in my report, I found
the Chinese leadership to be aging but very prag-
matic. There was an absolute minimum of rhetoric in
our private conversations. They are vitally concerned
about their security problem with the Soviet Union.
It is an area in which we can gain great leverage, but
we must not overplay our hand. I have a suggestion
that will demonstrate our understanding of their
problem, our power to monitor worldwide military
events, and to place them in our debt for covertly
assisting them vis-a-vis the Russians."
Scene 3: The National Photographic Interpretation Cen-
ter.
Technician 1: "Why the hell does anyone want so
many high-resolution graphics of sites along the
Sino-Soviet border?"
Technician 2: "At least this gets us off the French
medium-range ballistic missile cave search. I'm be-
ginning to feel like the mushroom king of Southeast
Washington. Let me have the first stack, and I'll
start annotation of Soviet troop deployment and
equipment identification."
Act 11, Scene 1, 22 February 1972; Anteroom off the
Great Hall of the People's Palace in Peking.
President Nixon: "As Mr. Lord has indicated dur-
ing the last 40 minutes, the Soviet troop dispositions
and equipment were, on the days of photo coverage,
in defensive positions. Obviously, we have the capa-
bility to observe changes in their position and
thereby infer some degree of Soviet intentions. I hope
that this briefing has been helpful and that you ac-
cept these photos as a token in the quest for peace
and stability in the world-a goal I am sure both of
our great countries share."
Scene 2; The lakeside state guest house, 18N, Northeast
edge of Peking.
President Nixon: "What do you think, Henry,
how did it go?"
Kissinger: "It was an excellent beginning; we have
the initiative."
Act 111, Scene 1, 28 November 1975: Oval Office.
Chief of Staff Cheney: "There are several items on
your upcoming China visit. The Agency reports fran-
tic Chinese activity in their second attempt to get a
photo satellite in successful orbit. Henry has anno-
tated the report with a comment that for once the
Agency is pcobably correct."
President Ford: "Henry is convinced that the
Chinese will try to balance the account from the
Nixon visit."
Act IV, Scene 1, evening of 3 December 1975: Lakeride
guest Ouse, Nu~ra er 181V, e tng.
Chinese Briefing Officer: ". .one final item, as
the People's satellite reveals, the Imperialist
Socialists continue to test the "cold-launch" tech-
nique of the S5-ts fcom Tyuraram. We estimate that
these missiles will be placed in the 5S-9 complexes
south of Novosibirsk and in other areas known to
both our countries."
Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping: "The threat of
hegemony to the world has never lacked visibility.
These photographs merely confirm the specific reality
of it and established how capable we are of detecting
any danger. It is lamentable that some nations be-
lieve they gain security by planting [CBMs in the
ground and, while watering them with the sweat of
the oppressed worker and the tears of the misguided
proletariat, are ever fearful of their sudden sprouting.
We see no stability in such acts and prepare for the
inevitable bitter fruits from such a harvest."
Chinese $ciefing Officer (aside): "IF we could have
launched four days sooner, we could have shown him
105,543 people watching Ohio State beat Michigan
21 to 14 at Ann Arbor."
The facts that could support Act IV are that the
People's Republic of China launched a photo satellite
on 26 November 1975 and recovered it on 2 Decem-
ber, during President Ford's visit.
As previously noted, the United States has on oc-
casion used the fruits of its reconnaissance programs
for political purposes. There is no public evidence
that Nixon did so in China during his February 1972
visit. It is speculated that the temptation to do so
was present. Whether or not it was acted upon is not
publicly known. What the public does know is that
a smiling Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping artfully
ducked a question on the number of Chinese troops
committed to the Sino-Vietnamese border war in
February 1979, by noting that "as regards the esti-
mate of the size of forces involved, your satellites
offer accurate information, and that's about the size
of it." (The Washington Port, 28 February 1979.)
Whether or not we have shared any hard photo
intelligence with the Chinese about the Soviets
should remain in genuine secrecy. The possibility of
this must be of serious concern to the Soviet Union,
and it seems to be in our best interest to avoid reliev-
ing their tension one way or another. In the mean-
time, the Chinese are working to achieve their own
independent capability in this field. The Soviets have
orbited an impressive number of intelligence-related
satellites, and we know that they have enjoyed at
least one striking espionage success in finding out
about the capability of the KH-tt. This failure not-
withstanding, the prodigious efforts of the United
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Stares to protect this technical intelligence system
appear to have been along-run success.
There certainly will be a secret future for Soviet,
Chinese, U. S., and other countries' military intelli-
gence satellites. Whether or not some of the U. S.
materials are released for domestic political purposes,
the world appears to be on the threshold of a bur-
geoning use of space-derived sensor material, The
United Nations may get into the business of verifica-
tion of treaty provisions. Equally important, the
United Nations may have a paramount role to play in
managing LandSat-type materials for the general
benefit of all member nations, but for the specific
protection of Third and Fourth World nations. The
United States will have to make a decision on the
type of role it will play. We have many years' worth
of collection of worldwide graphics in our military
archives and improving capabilities for more of the
same. Additionally, we lead the world in experience
and capability with earth resource materials gleaned
from our LandSat systems. Plans have been an-
nounced for advanced LandSat systems, and the ex-
ploitation of these materials has high commercial
interest. If it has not already been done, the devel-
opment of an integrated optics data processor capable
of satellite on-board comparison of sensor output
with scored reference data should provide capability
in our reronnaissance satellites to dually accomplish
military missions and those missions dedicated to
support the United Nations as well as some commer-
cial enterprises.
The incredible capability of these technical intelli-
gence collection systems has been vital to our na-
tional security. This view is also probably shared by
the Soviet Union from its own security perspective.
More than 17 years ago, Deputy Defense Secretary
Roswell Gilpatric addressed the ironic consequences
of Soviet secrecy and American openness, "The
Soviets are forced to work very hard to keep up with
what they know we are doing to keep up with what
we think they are doing." In 1962, that was a rea-
sonable statement. In 1)80, the Soviet Union should
be well over the shock of being on the wrong side of
the "missile gap." Both countries for some time have
had the technical capability of knowing with reason-
able accuracy what each other's strategic offensive
strength actually is. We concede that the Soviets
know what we are doing, and we claim that we know
what they are doing. Such statements appear to be
adequate explanations for expected dampening of the
strategic anus race. Something has not worked our.
Some of our national security managers who have
been supported by satellite intelligence systems that
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Proo a ngs une
have provided evidence that the Soviets have not
been satisfied merely to close the gap of strategic
weapon systems, are now nervous that in order to
obtain a SALT treaty, these vital intelligence systems
to some degree may be compromised.
I think that there is another equally important
consideration. If any U'. S. President uses satellite
photographic materials to make his case on the ver-
ifiability of a SALT treaty, or to justify potential mili-
tary action, he will be taking unpredictable risks in
public response. The same proof that SALT can be
verified may also be interpreted by a suspicious pub-
lic that SALT II is many years too late, and that we
now should not be limiting our strategic options in
the face of graphic Soviet capabilities. In the case of
justification of potential military action, what would
the American public response be when presented
with a larger portion of truth of graphic danger to
the country? One would like to think that Americans
can take the truth and would thereby be galvanized
in support of whatever sacrifice is necessary to meet
the peril. If this occurs, it will be a dangerous mo-
ment for the world. The Soviets will be placed at a
critical point of decision. If war is avoided, the
eclipse of their power someday may be measured
from such a moment. In the United States, one re-
sponse can be safely predicted. In this case, "One
picture will provoke more than ten thousand words."
There will be many, many words. More importantly,
there should be a quickly developing vision of many
additional applications of a technical system now
primarily serving the national security community.
That may be considered by a few as an unacceptable
loss of monopoly over precious technical resources.
There is, of course, the potential of strong counter-
weight arguments. But these can reasonably be made
only when the closet door of satellite photographic
system capability is further ajar.
Commander Jones w:u commissioned in 1)50 fol-
lowing flight training in the Aviation Midship-
man program. He made two combat tours in
VF-191 flying the F9F-2 Panther (rum the USS
Prinrernrr (CV-3?). He received his A.B. degree at
George Washington University in 19C,] and also
t '` has an M.A. from the University of Maryland
(1961), and a Ph.D. from American University (1975). A variety
of intelligence assignments rounded out the latter part of his
career. These included intelligence officer, Carrier Division 14;
assistant naval attache, New Delhi, India; Navy Scientific and
Technical Intelligence Center; and J-2, U. S. European Com-
mand. Since retirement he has taught at the University of
Vi/yoming and Casper College. Currently he is research director
with R. F. Cross Associates, Ltd., in Alexandria, Virginia.