COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN S CABLE ON AIR OPERATION IN LAOS, NOVEMBER 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030031-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: December 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Rele
95R0008000300
CENTRAL ZNTELL O NCR AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Intelligence Memorandum
Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on
Air Operation in Laos, November 1967
Project S- 25 y,3
December-1967
DIA, State Dept. reviews completed
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
00800030031-5,
Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on
Air Operation in Laos, November 1967
Summary
1. In a cable of 27 November 1967 commenting on the air war
in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan stated that 1), the total of trucks
destroyed in Laos in November would in all probability exceed 600,
2) an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills".had been on
Routes 911 and 912 and as a result practically none of the North
Vietnamese dry season cargo is reaching as far south as Route 9,
and 3) ". . . if this rate of success continues, the entire inven-
tory of trucks which the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh
Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of this calendar
year."
2. During November, Seventh Air Force pilots reported 531 trucks
destroyed and 198 damaged, the highest monthly rate of destruction
reported in Laos during the past two years (see Table 1). Ninety-
eight.percent of the trucks reported destroyed in Laos during Novem-
ber and 95 percent of those reported damaged were found in the
Panhandle (Steel Tiger) Area of Laos. The number of trucks reported
destroyed in Laos in November has been exceeded in North Vietnam
only during the months of July and August 1967 when 603 and 743
respectively were reported destroyed (see Table 2).
3. The record level of reported destruction of trucks in
November results from a combination of factors; (1) exceedingly
good weather in Laos and the highest number of sorties over Laos
since April, (2) the first full month of the dry season and an
increase in traffic densities, and (3) possibly poor convoy dis-
cipline resulting from the use of inecperienced truck drivers.
We know of no change in US tactics or weapons systems that would
account for the increased effectiveness of US air attacks.
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4. We agree with Ambassador Sullivan that air operations in
Laos were especially effective in November. Even allowing for the
inflation known to exist in pilot reporting, a continuation of such
heavy losses would seriously erode the North Vietnamese truck in-
ventory in Laos and North Vietnam unless imports from the Communist
countries increased substantially. It is to be noted, however,
that reported truck losses in North Vietnam in November were light,
only 50 destroyed and 66 damaged.
5. We disagree with Ambassador Sullivan's claim that practi-
cally no traffic is reaching as far south as Route 9. While road
watch teams report little traffic south of Route 9, recent aerial
reconnaissance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at
least 15 percent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operat-
ing on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Finally, there are anomalies
in the data for November which cannot yet be explained. In November
relatively more trucks were destroyed than damaged than in any pre-
vious period. In addition, only 6 sorties were required per truck
destroyed or damaged compared to 35 sorties per truck destroyed and
damaged in November 1966, when about the same number of sorties were
flown but only 115 trucks were destroyed.
6. We believe that the November experience is heartening but
it Iis still too early to conclude that a major turning point has
been reached in the US. air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia.
Based on past experience there is considerable doubt that the
November performance in Laos can be sustained.,
Comments
7. Exceedingly good weather prevailed in Laos south of Mu Gia
Pass in November which made it possible to identify trucks at night
to a much greater extent than is normally possible. Truck activity
in Laos takes place almost exclusively during the hours of darkness,
and approximately half of the 4,400 attack sorties in November were
flown during these hours. Bad weather over much of North Vietnam
made more attack sorties available for Laos (see Tables 1 and 2).
November was the first full month of the current dry season in Laos,
prompting the Communists to increase their truck traffic to and in
Laos at this time. Truck traffic has increased substantially in
November 1967 as compared with 1966. During two weeks from 1-14
November. 1966, pilots reported sighting _!about 160 trucks in
the'entire Panhandle of Laos. In the two weeks from 4-17 November
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1967, however, pilots reported seeing 1,722 trucks in the same area.
These reports also showed substantial increases in truck movement
on Routes 912 and 911 in 1967 as compared with 1966. No Road Watch
Reports are available for Route 912, but for Route 15 these reports
show about the same average number of trucks moving south per day
for the period 1-25 November in both 1966 and 1967, but a consider-
ably higher number moving north in 1967 than in 1966.
8. The desire to increase truck traffic during the month prob-
ably forced the Communists to use less experienced truck drivers
new to the Laotian roach which way have led to poorer ooz woy dis-
cipline)thus making the trucks easier to identify and more vulner-
able to air attacks.
9. During January through October 1967 it required 24 sorties
to destroy and damage one truck but in November it required only
6 sorties. The only previous period which witnessed the same
effectiveness in Laos was in April and May 1966, also periods of
high traffic density, when it took only 8 and 6 sorties, respectively,
to destroy and damage one truck. The average for all of 1966 in
the Laotian Panhandle was 16 sorties. In North Vietnam the average
for the period January 1966 - to date has been 22 sorties. Undoubt-
edly good weather and a large number of trucks on the road contri-
buted to the increase in the kill ratio. We cannot fully explain
its dramatic improvement in November and past experience suggests
that it will not be possible to maintain it month after month.
10. The relationship between the number destroyed and the num-
ber damaged also changed considerably in November reporting. From
January 1966 through October 1967 about half of the trucks attacked
in the Laotian Panhandle were reported to be destroyed and the other
half damaged (see Table 3). In November, however, nearly 75 percent
were reported destroyed and the remainder damaged. Similar data
for North Vietnam show 55 percent destroyed since January 1965.
Although there has been a shift in favor of destroyed in the report-
ing from both North Vietnam and Laos during 1967 compared with 1966,
the ratio of destroyed to damaged for November in Laos is the highest
ever experienced in either country. We cannot explain this sudden
change. It may merely reflect:a change in the criterion used by
pilots in their reporting, rather than a real change in efficiency
,of operations.
11. Pilots claims of trucks destroyed or damaged are not an
accurate measure of actual destruction rates. Operational condi-
tions make it virtually impossible for pilots always to report
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accurately as to whether a truck is destroyed or damaged. There
is also duplication in reporting which analysts in OER attempt to
eliminate. In addition, the Communists have the capability to
cannibalize and repair some "destroyed" and damaged trucks. To
take into account operational problems in reporting, duplicate
counting and repair capability, OER and DIA have agreed to consider
75 percent of the trucks reported by pilots as destroyed and 25
percent of the trucks reported by pilots as damaged to be effectively
lost. Applying these factors to the trucks reported destroyed and
damaged in Laos during November 1967, effective losses become about
450.-
12. Ambassador Sullivan's statement that ". . . the entire
inventory of trucks which we believe the North Vietnamese hold for
the Ho Chi Minh Trail activity will be wiped out before the end
of the calendar year." has little meaning. The entire North Viet-
namese inventory is the one of importance. If the November truck
loss rates for effective losses in Laos can be maintained, and
losses in North Vietnam increased, the North Vietnam truck inven-
tory would be seriously eroded unless imports from other Communist
countries are increased substantially. From January 1966 through
November 1967 North Vietnam.imported about 7,950 trucks, an average
of about 345 per month. This rate has been sufficient to maintain
the truck inventory at between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks since
January 1966.
13. We agree that an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills"
during November were probably on Routes 911 and 912 (see the Map).
But this does not necessarily mean that practically none of the dry
season cargo reached as far south as Route 9. There is no assurance
that all trucks moving south were destroyed. The Road Watch Team
in the Mu Gia Pass Area, outside the target area, reported 343 trucks
moving north and only 242 trucks moving south during the period 1-
25 November. Moreover, our most recent report of aerial reconnais-
sance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at least 15 per-
cent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operating on
Route 9 or south of Route 9. Furthermore, this report also?.indicated
that,oof the total of 1,464 trucks observed during this two.week
period on the routes north of Route 9, only 267 or about 18 percent
were destroyed and damaged. For these reasons we think it highly
unlikely that the North Vietnamese have been unable to move cargo
as far south as Route 9 during November.
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Laos: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged
by Air Operations
1966 and January-November 1967
Trucks Reported Destroyed Number of Sorties
and Damaged Attack Flown Per Truck
1266 Destroyed Damaged. Total Sorties Destroyed and Damaged
Jan 52 44. 96 8,000 83
Feb 9o 143 233 --5,262 23
Mar 146 144 290 6,247 22
Apr 421 377 798 6,206 8
May 314' 387 701 4,421 6
Jun 102 115 217 3,540 16
Jul 14 64 ' 78 2,207 28
Aug 10 28 38 820 22
Sep 19 31 50 1,265 25
Oct 9 36 45 1,568 35
Nov 76 49. 125 4,369 35
Dec 115 187 302 4,808 16
Total 1,368 1,605 2,973 483713 16
.; a
L967
Jan 103 88 191 5,570 29
Feb 117 169 286 6,752 24
Mar 131 99 230 5,326 23
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Table 1 - continued
Laos: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged
by Air Operations
1966 and January-November 1967
Trucks Reported Destroyed
Number of Sorties
and Damaged
Attack
Flown Per Truck
Destroyed Damaged T
ot
al S
orties
Destroyed and Damaged
1 - continued
Apr 133 92
2
25
5,160
23
May 55 62
1
17
2,523
22
Jun 51 35
86
1,441
17
Jul 26 29
55
1,299
24
Aug 37 24
61
1,241
20
Sep 18. 27
45
1,668
37
Oct 60 73
1
33
2,922
22
Nov 531 198
7
29
4,400
6
Total
(1o months) 731
1, 4
29
33,902
Total
,'262 8L6
(11 months) 1
2,1
58
388, 302
,
Total
21630
2,,201
x,1
1
8~101~
17
1966 and.11
months 1967
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots, Both CIA and DIA
accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed and only 25
percent of the trucks reported to be damaged as effective losses.
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North Vietnam: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed
and Damaged by Air Operations
19 and January-November, -1-977
Numbers of Trucks
Nu
Number of Sor
mb
t
er of Attack
ies Per Truck
Destroyed
Attack De
st
royed and
Destroyed Damaged
and Damaged
Sorties Dam
a
ged
1966:
Jan
n.a
130
Feb
22
14
36
2,810
78
Mar
85
124
209
4,480
21
Apr
83
96
179
5,450
30
May
105
74
.179
4,470
25
Jun
178
164
342
7,790
23
Jul
389
322
711
10,200
14
Aug
496
393
889
11,310
13
Sep
259
292
551
12,350
- 22
Oct
113
154
267
8,700
33
Nov
137
128
265
7,260
27
Dec
68
40
108
6,710
62
1966
Totals
1,935
1,801
3,736
81,670
22
1967:
Jan
22
41
63
6,580
104
Feb
82
51
133
5,470
41
Mar
74
80
154
8,500
55
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Table 2 - continued
North Vietnam: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed
and Damaged by Air Operations
wand January-November, 7
Numbers of Trucks
Number of
Number of Attack
Sorties Per Truck
Destroyed
Attack
Destroyed and
ed and
d D
ma
ed
Sorties
Damaged
a
g
Destroye
1967: - continued
6
8
32
Apr
103
179
282
0
,9
May
384
134
518
11,330
22
Jun
332
326
658
11,470
17
Jul
603
235
838
11,310
13
Aug
743
441
1,184
11,890
10
Sep
284
142
426
8,920
21
Oct
103
93
196
9,370
48
Nov
50
66
116
7,187
62
11 months
1967
2,780
1,788
4 568
122,u987
22
i71L
1:282
8,,304
i82:672
22
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots. Both CIA and DIA
accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed and only
25 percent of the trucks reported to be damaged as effective losses.
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Table 3
North Vietnam and Laos: Comparison of the Number
of Trucks Re orted Destro ed and Damaged
and January-November 1
Destroyed
Damaged
Destroyed as
Percent of Total
North Vietnam
1965 318
487
40
1966
1,935
1,801
52
1967 (ii months)
2,780
1,788
61
Total
5 , 033
1+, 076
5555
'
1966
1,368
1,605
46
1967 (11 months)
1,262
896
58
Total
2,630
2,501
51
Laotian Panhandle
1966
1,243
1,508
45
1967 (10 months),
609
573
52
November
520
186
74
1967 (11 months)
1,129
759
60
Total
2,472
2,267
52
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots. Both CIA
and DIA'accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed
and only 25 percent of the trucks reported, to'be damaged as effective
losses.
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