NOTE ON TRANSPORTATION ATTACKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200200012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/08/16
,Fb4478S02149R000200200012-4
24 February 1966
25X1A
25X1A
SUBJECT : Note on Transportation Attacks
1. During Admiral Mustin's recent briefing, he mentioned the
fact that U.S. Air Forces had flown about 9,000 sorties against
Laos during the period of the bombing lull. Using his ordnance
figures, which show slightly over two tons per sortie, this would
mean that something on the order of 18,000 tons were delivered
against Laos in the five-week period beginning with 24 December.
2. The interesting point is that the U.S. strategic bombing
survey concluded that a bombing tonnage of 12,000 tons per month
against railway targets in Germany was sufficient to exceed the
ability of the Reichsbahn in the repair effort and to break the
back of the railroad system. In the German war, the weight of
attack did not exceed 12,000 tons a month until September 1944
and thereafter rose gradually to 32,500 tons a month in March of
1945.
3. I think we should examine the Laotian experience carefully
because apparently the weight of attack which was considered suf-
ficient to overcome the recuperative powers of the rail system in
Germany is not sufficient to overcome the recuperative powers of
the highway system in Laos. If this conclusion is correct, it
bears directly on the question of tonnages needed to effectively
interdict the existing highway system. We should get all the
information we can on the Laotian experience.
Deputy Director
Research and Reports
E
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200200012-4