BRIEFING BY BRIG GEN JOSEPH A. MCCHRISTIAN, AC OFS, J2, HQ MACV, 28 NOVEMBER 1965 - SAIGON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200100027-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 28, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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BRIEFING BY BRIG GEN JOSEPH A. McCHRISTIAN,
HQ MACV,
ofS, J2,
28 NOVEMBER 1965. - SAIGON,
MR. AMBASSADOR, SECRETARY McNAMARA, GENERAL WHEELER-
I WILL PRESENT OUR ESTIMATE OF THE VC/PAVN BUILDUP AND THEN,
BASED UPON' CAPABILITIES, FORECAST ENEMY STRENGTH AS OF
31 DECEMBER 1966.
I WILL ALSO LIST PROBABLE ENEMY. COURSES OF ACTION AND
VULNERABILITIES.
THE OVERALL STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE DRV LAO DONG PARTY
IS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONQUEST OF THE RVN. THE FIRST
PART OF THE PLAN, IN ESSENCE, CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A FIRM POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASE. HAVING ESTABLISHED
A SECURE BASE OF OPERATIONS AND FORCED THE RVN FORCES INTO
A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, THE.COMMUNISTS WOULD THEN BE IN A
POSITION TO MOVE.INTO THE FINAL PHASE, THE ANNIHILATION OF
THE ENEMY. BY MID 1964 THE VC WERE WELL ON THEIR WAY TO
ACCOMPLISHING THESE GOALS. INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM THE
DRV TO THE RVN VIA LAOS AND CAMBODIA HAD BEEN IMPROVED,
SEA INFILTRATION WAS ALSO IN FULL SWING AND THEIR LOGISTICAL
SYSTEM ANO BASE AREAS WERE WELL ESTABLISHED.
*Army, JCS and DIA
review(s) completed.
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J2/90/65
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A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMUNISTS PLAN IS THE
ATTAINMENT OF "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" STRATEGIC MOBILITY
IS THEIR ANSWER TO OUR TACTICAL MOBILITY. THEIR OBJECTIVE
IS TO AMASS SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS TO
BE CAPABLE OF POSING A SUFFICIENT THREAT IN WIDELY SEPARATED
AREAS WHICH WILL NOT ONLY TIE DOWN LARGE NUMBERSOF ALLIED
FORCES IN STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLES, BUT WILL ALSO ALLOW THEM
TO DESTROY SELECTED TARGETS AT A TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR
CHOOSING, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE FORCE STRUCTURE NECESSARY
TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" HANOI APPARENTLY DECIDED
TO INTRODUCE REGULAR PAVN .TROOPS INTO THE RVN. INDICATIONS
THEREOF CAN BE TRACED TO AS EARLY AS APRIL 1964 WHEN THE
325TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION BEGAN AN ACCELERATED TRAINING
PROGRAM IN THE VICINITY OF DONG HOI.IN THE DRV.
THE INFILTRATION OF PAVN REGIMENTS IN ORDER OF THEIR
ARRIVAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS SHOWN ON THIS VIEWGRAPH.
(VUGRAPH NO. 1 ON)
THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION ARRIVED AS
FOLLOWS-
THE 95TH REGIMENT IN DECEMBER 1964, THE 101ST IN
FEBRUARY 1965 AND THE 18TH IN APRIL 1965. A NON-DIVISIONAL
PAVN REGIMENT, THE 32ND, WHICH TRAINED AT SON TAY AND
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XUAN MA.I, DRV, INFILTRATED INTO THE RVN SHORTLY AFTER THE
95TH, AN U'/I REGIMENT INFILTRATED INTO QU.IANG TRI IN J up.LY,
WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THE EXACT TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE
42ND REGIMENT. THE 250TH REGIMENT TRAINED AT PHU BINH
DISTRICT, THAI NGUYEN PROVINCE IN THE DRV AND WAS FORMED
FROM INDIVIDUALS DRAFTED FROM HANOI AND THAI NGUYEN
PROVINCE. DEPARTING NORTH VIETNAM IN LATE JUNE, THE 250TH
ARRIVED IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN QUANG DUC PROVINCE IN MID SEPTEMBER.
WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE 325TH DIVISION LEFT CADRES FOR
THE RECONSTITUTION OF A SECOND 325TH DIVISION PRIOR TO ITS
DEPARTURE FROM THE DRV IN LATE 1,964 EARLY 1965. PRISONERS
CAPTURED EARLY IN THE PLEI ME BATTLE IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES
AS MEMBERS OF THE NEW 325TH DIVISION. IN ADDITION,
SEVERAL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATED THAT THE NEW 325TH
DIVISION HAD, IN FACT, FORMED THREE MORE REGIMENTS. ONE
OF THESE REGIMENT S, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AS THE
"SONG LAM" REGIMENT, DEPARTED THE DRY IN JULY AND ARRIVED
IN THE RVN IN EARLY OCTOBER. THIS UNIT WAS GIVEN SEVEN DAYS
TRAINING AND RESUPPLIED PRIOR TO ATTACKING PLEI ME CAMP.
A DIET LONG CAPTIVE FROM TIE ??SONG LAM" REGIMENT STATED
SEdRFT
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THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE NEWLY REFORMED
325TH DIVISION WERE ALSO TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN.
HOWEVER, THE TIME FRAME WAS NOT SPECIFIED. IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE RECENTLY RECONSTITUTED
325TH DIVISION ARE EITHER INFILTRATING OR ARE IN THE LATE
STAGES OF INFILTRATION PREPARATIONS.
ONE OF THE PAVN UNITS WITH WHICH THE 1ST .AIR CAV DIV
WAS IN CONTACT AT PLEI ME WAS THE 66TH REGIMENT OF THE
304TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH ARRIVED IN COUNTRY IN
OCTOBER 1965, AS REPORTED BY MACV IN MARCH 1965, ELEMENTS
OF THE 304TH DIVISION HAD BEEN PREPARING TO INFILTRATE INTO
SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE LAST YEAR. ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH
DIVISION WERE ALSO REPORTED AS PARTICIPATING INTHE ATTACK
ON THE ROYAL LAO ARMY (FAR) OFFICER IS SCHOOL AT DONG HENE
LAOS, INMARCH OF THIS YEAR. PRISONERS TAKEN AFTER THIS
THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE 9TH
REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION WHO WERE ON THEIR WAY TO
INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN, AND HAD BEEN DIVERTED IN ORDER
TO ASSIST THE PATHET LAO IN THEIR ATTACK ON DONG HENE.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE 9TH IS UNKNOWN.
IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE
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66TH MAY HAVE BROUGHT THEIR 120MM MORTARS WITH THEM. IF
TRUE, THEY WILL BE THE FIRST 120MM MORTARS INTRODUCED INTO
RVN.
A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR
PAVN UNITS INTO THE RVN IS THE INCREASING RATE OF INFILTRATION.
IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY RATE OF 3 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS
PER MONTH DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1964 THERE IS GROWING
EVIDENCE THAT THE DRV HAS SENT AS MANY AS 12 BATTALIONS. PER
MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INFILTRATION OF THE U/I QUANG TRI,
250TH, THE "SONG LAM" AND 66TH PAVN REGIMENTS WHICH ALL
LEFT THE DRV IN LATE JUNE AND EARLY JULY OF THIS YEAR.
(VUGRAPH NO. 1 OFF). THIS ACCELERATED INFILTRATION RATE
WAS PROBABLY DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS, THE PRIMARY ONE
BEING THE DRV REVISION OF THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE FORCES
NEEDED TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY! IN VIEW OF THE
EXPECTED BUILDUP OF U. S. AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES. THE
APPARENT NEED OF HANOI AND THE VIET LONG FOR A MILITARY
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS
STILL RETAINED THE INITIATIVE AND TO BOOST HOMEFRONT MORALE
COULD HAVE BEEN AMONG THE SEVERAL FACTORS,
DURING THE TIME THAT PAVN' REGIMENTS WERE INTa ILTRATING,
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THE INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CADRE PERSONNEL
DESTINED FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY UNITS AND
ORGANIZATIONS ALSO CONTINUED. AT THE SAME TIME NEW VC
UNITS WERE BEING FORMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
A COMPARISON OF VC/PAVN ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE
IS SHOWN HERE. (VUGRAPH NO, 2 ON)
IN JULY 1964 OUR ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE CARRIED
A TOTAL OF 46 VC BATTALIONS; IN NOVEMBER 1965 WE HELD 83
VC BATTALIONS PLUS THE 27 INFILTRATED PAVN BATTALIONS FOR
A TOTAL OF 11.0 (103 CONFIRMED, 4 PROBABLE AND 3 POSSIBLE
BATTALIONS). (VUGRAPH NO. 2 OFF)
NOW LET US EXAMINE ENEMY MANPOWER AND LOGISTICAL
RESOURCES. (VUGRAPH NO. 3 ON) TRAINED MILITARY FORCES
LOCATED IN THE DRAT INCLUDE: 265, 000 REGULAR ARMY, 27, 000
ARMED SECURITY FORCE, 200, 000 CLASS I MILITIA AND A POTENTIAL
OF 1. 8 MILLION MILITIA. COMPOSITION OF THE REGULAR ARMY IS
SHOWN BELOW. (PAUSE), WITHIN THIS FORCE STRUCTURE (FLIP ON).
THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 38 INFANTRY REGIMENTS. THE CLASS I
MILITIA PROVIDES A TRAINED POOL OF PERSONNEL FOR THE
REGULAR ARMY AND PAVN IS CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING 475, 000 MEN
BY M-DAY PLUS 180, (VUGRAPH NO. 3 OFF)
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OF THE 38 PAVN INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN THE DRV DIA CON-
SIDERS 14 TO CONSTITUTE THE STRATEGIC RESERVES, THIS LEAVES
24 REGIMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED TO CADRE AND TRAIN NEW
'UNITS (VUGRAPH NO, 4 ON) IF THE PAVN UTILIZE 1.1 OF THESE
AS TRAINING REGIMENTS AND EACH TRAINS A NEW LIGHT INFANTRY
REGIMENT EVERY 90 DAYS THEN THE DRV CAN TRAIN 36 NEW
REGIMENTS BY THE END OF 1966, PROVIDING 9 OF THEIR CURRENT
REGULAR REGIMENTS ARE READY TO INFILTRATE, OR HAVE ALREADY
TRAINED NEW REGIMENTS, THE DRY CAN MAINTAIN AN INFILTRATION
RATE OF 3 REGIMENTS PER MONTH AT LEAST THROUGH 1966.
(VUGRAPH NO. 4 OFF)
IN SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET LONG CONTROL A MANPOWER
POOL OF 526, 000 PHYSICALLY FIT MALES BETWEEN THE AGES OF
16 - 45. THEY ALSO HAVE A WELL ESTABLISHED GUERRILLA BASE AND
TRAINING SYTEM. WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY CAN FORM TWO NEW
BATTALIONS EACH MONTH AND CAN TRAIN AT LEAST 2,500 REPLACE-
MENTS MONTHLY. BASED UPON A VC BATTALION STRENGTH OF 500
THESE TRAINEES WOULD EQUATE TO 5 BATTALIONS.
Q VU'GRAPH NO. 5 ON) THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS THE PAVN/VC CAPABILITY
TO INCREASE THEIR STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS IS EXPRESSED
IN BATTALION EQUIVALENTS BECAUSE SOME TRAINEES WILL BE FORMED
INTO NEW UNITS WHILE OTHERS WILL BE REPLACEMENTS.
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THE PAVN CAN TRAIN AND INFILTRATE 9 BATTALION
EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH AND THE VC SEVEN FOR A TOTAL~OF 16.
(VUGRAPH NO. 5 OFF)
LET US NOW DETERMINE HOW MANY OF THESE BATTALION
EQUIVALENTS ARE REQUIRED TO REPLACE LOSSES. (VUGRAPH NO. 6 ON)
THE BARS ON THIS VUGRAPH REPRESENT THE PAVN/VC
AVERAGE QUARTERLY LOSSES. THESE LOSSES INCLUDE KILLED,
CAPTURED, DESERTERS AND RALLIERS.
THE PROJECTED LOSSES PER QUARTER IS A STRAIGHT LINE
PROJECTION BASED UPON THE AVERAGE QUARTERLY INCREASE IN
LOSSES. THIS AMOUNTS TO ABOUT 4.5 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS
PER QUARTER. THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT LOSSES PER QUARTER
ARE SHOWN ON THE TOP OF EACH BAR GRAPH. (FLIP ON) THIS
.FLIP SHOWS THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT INPUTS EACH QUARTER
BASED UPON THE 9 PAVN AND 7 VC INPUTS PER MONTH PREVIOUSLY
DISCUSSED OR 48 PER QUARTER. SUBTRACTING LOSSES FROM INPUTS
WE OBTAIN THE NET GAIN PER QUARTER. BY THE LAST QUARTER
OF 1966 LOSSES EQUAL INPUT. BY THAT TIME A. TOTAL GAIN OF 45
BATTALION EQUIVALENTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. ADDING
THESE 45 TO THE CURRENT 110 WE CAN PROJECT A FORCE STRENGTH
EQUIVALENT TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF 1966.
(VUGRAPH NO, 6 OFF)
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WE KNOW THAT PAVNiTVA"C HAVE EXTENSIVE STOCKPILES IN MANY
BASE AND STORAGE AREAS THROUGHOUT THE RHOLUNTRY. (VUUGRAPH NO.
ONE THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS MAJOR BASE AREAS AND THE GENERAL
DRIFT OF INFILTRATION ROUTES, THE ENEMY HAS HAD SEVERAL YEARS
IN WHICH TO STOCKPILE AND PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH ACCEPTED COMMUNIST THEORY. QVUGRAPH NO. 7 OFF)
THE PAVN CAPACITY TO INCREASE THEIR CURRENT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
IN THE .RA'NIS CONSIDERABLE. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN LOG
STUDY OF THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE (VUGRAPH NO. 8 ON) WE CON-
CLUDE THAT WITH A MAJOR TRUCK EFFORT THE DRY HAS THE CAPA-
BILITY OF MOVING 300 TONS PER DAY FROM THE DRY THROUGH LAOS
INTO THE RYN DURING THE DRY WEATHER. THIS 300 TON CAPABILITY
FALLS OFF TO 50 TONS PER DAY BY VARIOUS TRANSPORT MEANS
DURL)NG THE NORMAL FIVE MONTH RAINY SEASON. THE .AVERAGE YEAR
ROUND DAILY CAPACITY FIGURES our TO BE 195 TONS PER DAY.
DRV? LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY THROUGH CAMBODIA IS .ALSO VERY
SUBSTANTIAL. W-E ARE UNA
LE TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT THAT IS
BEING INFILTRATED OR SMUGGLED INTO THE RBI N. HOWEVER, WE CON-
SIDER 2.5 TONS PER DAY TO BE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT. BEST INFOR-
MATION ON SEA INFILTRAflON IS AB O' T 14 TONS PER DAY. WE CONSIDER
BOTH THE SEA AND CAMBODIA OFFER .A GREATER CAPABILITY BUT
WE USE THE LOWER FIGU :. ES FOR THE WANT OF MORE ACCURATE
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FO MA IONS ALTOGETHER PAVN'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THEIR
FORCES IN THE RVN TOTALS Z34 TONS PER DAY. ('VUGRA.PH NO. 8 OFF)
WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PAYN TROOPS AND IM-
PROVED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE LEVEL OF COMBAT WILL IN-
GREASE AND THE ENEMY LOX-37,13T. CAL REQUIREMENTS WILL INCREASE.
WE ESTIMATE THAT :R:EQUIRE:D POUNDS PER MAN PER DAY WILL REACH
A LEVEL OF 8.2 POUNDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR PAVN TROOPS AND
306 .POUNDS FOR VIET CONG TROOPS. OUR ESTIMATE IS BASED ON A
REDUCED VERSION ' OF A DIA, STUDY (VUG.R.APH NO. 9 ON)). THE DIA.
STUDY GIVES 13.2 POUNDS FOR A PAVN SOLDIER IN LIGHT POMBAT IN
THE RVN. WE HAVE REDUCED THAT AMOUNT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER.
ONE POUND FOR CLASS I BASED ON THE KNOWN PAVN/FTC; PLANNING
FIGURE OF 2 POUNDS OF CLASS I PER. MAN. WE ELIMINATE CLASS III
FOR. INFILTRATION AS WE HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR IT IN OUR LOG
CAPACITIES. WE REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF CLASS V FROM 5.5 POUNDS
TO 3. 2 POUNDS. OUR REASON FOR THIS IS THAT WE CONSIDER THE
LIGHT COMBAT :RATE TO BE HIGH. WE CON'SI-'/.,;:R, A RATE OF 1/5 OF
THE FORCE TO BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT EVERY SEVENTH DAY AND
EXPENDING 1/3 OF THEIR BASIC LOAD TO BE MORE ACCURATE.
(VUGRAPH NO. 9 OFF). NOW LET 'S COMPUTE OUR 'TONNAGE REQrUIRE-
MENTS. (VUGRAPH NO. 10 ON)
AS WE HAVE SEEN, TOTAL LOG CAPACITY IS 2,34 TONS PER DAY.
UNDER LIGHT COMBAT CONDITIONS PRESENT ENEMY FORCES WILL
OUT 84 TONS PER DAY FROM OkJTSID.E THZ RVN OR FROM
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WE COMPUTE THIS AS FOLLOWS- 27 PAVN BATTALIONS @ 1. 8bf, TONS
PER DAY EQUALS 50.22 TONS. PER DAY. (CLASS I OF 2 POUNDS HAS
BEEN REMOVED FROM PAVN AND VC TOTALS BECAUSE OF ITS AVAILA-
BILIT Y WITHIN THE RVN) 83. VIET GONG BATTALIONS AT .4 TONS PER
DAY EQUAL 33.20 TONS FOR A TOTAL OF 83.42 OR 84 TONS REQUIRED
DAILY. WE HAVE AN EXCESS OF 150 TONS TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL
BATTALIONS. IF 150 IS DIVIDED BY 1. 86 TONS WE FIND THAT 80
ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS CAN BE SUPPORTED. WE USED THE FIGURE
FOR THE PAVN BATTALION BECAUSE IT REQUIRES MORE LOGISTICAL
SUPPORT THAN THE VC BATTALION, THIS IS NOT INTENDED TO INDI-
GATE THE 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS WILL ALL BE PAVN, CON-
SEQUENNTLY, WITH A MAXIMUM DRV EFFORT EXISTING LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS CAN SUPPORT THE CURRENT 110 PAVN/VC BATTAL-
IONS PLUS 80 .ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS FORA TOTAL OF 190 BATTALIONS.
QVUGR APH 10 OFF)
ENEMY STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIM Or, A UNIFIED VIETNAM
11,,'NDER HANOI IS BASED UPON THE COTO UCT OF A. LONG WAR DURING
WHICH THEYWILL EXACT MAXIMUM ATTRITION ON ALLIED AND
ESPECIALLY U. S. FORCES. THEY WILL AVOID COMBAT UNLESS THEY
EXPECT VICTORY. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO RETAIN A FORCE RATIO
OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THEIR FAVOR BY HOLDING ATTACKS
AGAINST OUR BASES. DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS TO DISPERSE OUR.
:FORCES AN'_D SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS .AT WIDESPREAD LOCATIONS.
THEY WILL TfREATEN AND A. 'TACK OUR BASE AREAS IN ORDER TO
IMMOBILIZE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES AND TO
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DESTROY AIRCRAFT, EQUIP.IvI CND S ' PPL ES. THEY WILL MOB T
ATTACKS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF OUR
GENERAL RESERVES. THEY WILL ATTACK ISOLATED FORCES IN ORDER
TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES, THEY WILL CONTINUE ACTIONS TO
ISOLATE AND DOMINATE THE HIGHLANDS IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR
BASE AREA AT THE TERMINUS OF THEIR LAOS INFILTRATION ROUTES.
THEY WILL EXERT CONTINUOUS PRESSURE TO INTERDICT ROADS AND
RAILROADS, TO TERRORIZE AREAS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND TO
WEAR DOWN OUR WILL TO RESIST. THEY WILL DEFEND THEIR MAJOR
BASES BECAUSE THEIR PROTRACTED CONFLICT DEPENDS UPON THE
STOCKPILING THEY HAVE BEEN DOING FOR YEARS.
ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY' HAS GREAT CAPABILITIES HE ALSO
HAS SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES. HE MUST DEFEND HIS LOGISTIC
BASE AREAS, AND HIS LONG LOGISTICAL LOC IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO
INTERDICTION. HE IS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO AIR AND ARTILLERY
.ATTACK, SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS AND AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT.
ADDITIONALLY, HE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL
POPULATION.
IN SUMMARY, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE ENEMY HAS THE
CAPABILITY TO INCREASE HIS STRENGTH TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE
END OF 1,966. FROM THAT DATE ON HIS LOSSES SHOULD EXCEED HIS
INPUT.
THIS CONCLUDES MY PORTION OF THE BRIEFING. I WILL BE
FOLLOWED BY THE J3, GENERAL DEPUY.
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