REVISED TEXT FOR PAGES 6 - 10 (AFTER 'ENEMY TROOPS IN THE SOUTH')

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200080016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORT

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Revised Text for Pages 6 - 10 (after "empa
troops in the South")
Concentra on on Military Objectives
There Is a large body of evidence from meths-spot
observers that United States attacks in the North have been
directed at military objectives and conducted with all the care
that a pilot under intense anti-aircraft fire can exhibit.
First-hand reports from non-Communist newsmen, from western
diplomats and from other third country sources have ell told of
the precise nature of most air strikes and generally have indi-
cated that civilian casualties from those air strikes have
been low.
British journalist Norman Barrymaine, who completed a three-
week stay in the Mei hong area, wrote that US pilots were'very
courageous" in pros ng home their attacks and in "not unloeding
their bombs on civilians by design."
A third country observer who was tn aanoi last June at the
time of the strikes against the petroleum storage facilities in
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas reported th t the bombing had been
exceedingly accurate" and that "civilian casualties were very
light."
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An observer from still another nation reported that according
to all available information the accuracy of the POL strikes
was "excellent that he had heard no first-hand or local reports
that any bombs had dropped off target and that no population centers
were hit.
He said further that from personal observations the attack
on installations outside Hanoi was "extremely accurate and
effective."
Another source who was in Hanoi during the strike on the Gia
Lam petroleum depot said that the foreign community in North
Vietnam regarded that strike as a "technical masterpiece."
noted that "no civilianrea were touched."
Civilian Casualties
Notwithstanding the precise and limited nature of US air
attrnckg against military targets, and the special care to which
w blesses have testified, it is inevitable that there have been
significant)personnel casualties in North Vietnam.
We have investigated this matter as thoroughly as possible
on the basis of all sources of intelligence for the period
beginning with the initial bombing of North Vietnam in rebruayy
1965 and continuing through the month of September 1966. Our
study was completed late in 1966. It does not cover the last
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quarter of 1966, durin& which there tvis ben no thn8e in the
pace of operations that we believe would substantially ettane
the casualty rate.
rau h y
US air attacks against North Vtstiurn 1iave fa en rameatir
into two categories. In the period fromFebruary 1965 to
October 1966, a grand total of approximately 85,000 attack sorties
ere carried out against military targets in North Vietnam.
=what move than 27.000 of these sorties were directed aLnt
ixed military targets. These attacks have destroyed or damaged
aver 20,000 trucks, barges, locomotives and other units of
transport equipment. US planes have destroyed and damaged
10,000 other military facilities -- barracks upply warehouses,
ti-aircraft guns surface-to-air missiles and radar installattons.
ilroad and highway bridges have been knocked out; thermal
power plants have been destroyed; railroad and fuel depot yards
have been struck; vehicle storage stg areas have been attacked.
In seeking to assess civilian casualties. our intelligence
sources include pre-strike and post-strike aerial photography,
oga
s also include North Vietnamese priooner-of-w
officiat radio and press reporting within North Vietui
and reports of western observers.
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US ence expended against a given target is checked against
photography. Bomb damage assessment, known effects of the
weapons used and experience derived from the Strategic kombing
Survey of World War II are related to the hard evidence from
reconnaissance and int lligence.
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Based on these sources e have arrived at an order-of-
magnitude estimate, which is not preclee but which we believe
does indicate the general Level of casualties caused.
This estimate is that the overwhelming proportion of caausIti
with
of all types have occurred in connection milk* attacks on
North Vietnamese communications lines and direct military targets.
It is estimated that bombing operations of this character have
killed or injured a possible total of 26,000 North Vietnamese
personnel. We estimate that roughly 407 of these have been
military personnel and that the great bulk of the remainder have
been war workers, such as bridge and road repair craws, br e-
men railroad men, truck drivers and communications workers.
There have undoubtedly also poen some deaths and injuries
to non-war worker civilians from the armed reconnaissance attacks
normally conducted against moving targets. However, most casual-
ties from armed reconnaissance Alai ns have been those persons
directly engaged in the maintenence and operation of the logistic
system moving supplies and personnel through North Vietnam and
into the South.
Casualties among non-war werkers from armed reconnaissance
flights have been limited almost entirely to time those wa
did not stay away from scenes of repair activity or who were
struck whem pilots jettisoned bomb loads to avoid enemy aircraft
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or to avoid disaster after being hit by enemy antiaircraft
Secondly, we have sought to estimate the casualties associated
with attacks a
t fixed targets not occupied by military
personnel. In connection with targets in this category, we
estimate that approximately 1200 non-war workers civilians have
been killed and approximately 1500 injured. This much lower
proportion of casualites, in relation to the more than 27,000
strike sorties directed at such targets, reflects the special
care taken in operations against those targets. The fatality
tate in relation to this category of target is approximately
one civilian non-war worker per 23 attack sorties. We believe
that the low 1200 non-war worker civilian fatality rate reaffirms
the success of the intensive evaluation which takes place
during the selection of fixed stilitary targets and the extra-
ordinary discipline and control under which US Oilots are
operating
I repeat alt our estimates of civilian cauaIttes are
necessarily matters of judgment. It is noteworthy that the
iubstantially
estimates I have just given are xmlesnorntedity higher than have
ever been claimed by North Vietnam. For example, a Nay 1.966
Erth Vietnamese letter othe International Red Cross claimed
only 239 civilian casualties since January 31 1966, a period
of roughly (3 1/2) months.
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The Education Ministry in October,1966, stated that 300
udents and 30 teachers had been killed since the bombing
began. Even in the well-publicized propaganda statement on
the attacks against Nam Dinh the North Vietnamese themselves
claimed that air attacks against targets in that city of 90,000
had tilled only 89 persons from early 1965 to September 20 1966.
Nam Dinh is a heaviIj defended population center with m thaii
500 anti-aircraft guns within its air defense area. These
are augmented i by surface-to-air missiles. Military targets
are located in densely populated areas. It is not a typical case
and the percent of Its casualties should be regarded as an absolute
upper limit, an upper extreme.
In view of these North Vietnamese statements in relation to
specific situations our own estimates may conceivably be in error.
Nonetheless, they reflect our own best over-all judgment prepared
by wholly objective analysts not associated in any way with
combat operations.
(Resume at page 10: "The guided tours . .
with a heading Specific Targotv".)
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