(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200020004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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Total Casualties
1. Preliminary estimates of casualties for the first four
months of 1967 demonstrate the stepped-up rate of the Rolling Thunder
program. The monthly casualty rate increased from an average of
2,200 during 1966 to 3,000 in the first four months of 1967. The
markedly greater number of armed reconnaissance strikes in heavily
populated Route Package IV (which includes the cities of Nam Dinh,
Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa) were chiefly responsible for an increase
in the casualty/sortie ratio from .33 in 1966 to .41 in January-April
1967. In addition, the fixed targets selected for initial strikes
during this period were situated in heavily defended areas of greater
civilian population density. A breakdown of total casualties for
1965, 1966 and the first four months of 1967 is shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
Estimated Casualties, North Vietnam
1965 - April 1967
Jan-Apr
il
1965 1966 1967
Total
Civilians
Fixed Targets 2
,000 900 40
0
3,300
Armed Reconnaissance 4
,000 18,100 8,70
0
30,800
Subtotal 6
,000 19,000 9,10
0
34,l00
Military
Fixed Targets 4
,300 400 90
0
5,600
Armed Reconnaissance 2
,900 7,300 2, 90
0
12,200
Subtotal
7,200 7,700 2,90
0
17,800
Total
13,200 26,700 12,00
0
51,900
DIA, JCS reviews completed
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it is estimated that about 40 percent
of the total casualties -- about 21,000 -- are killed. The total
casualties have undoubtedly had some disruptive effect on North
Vietnam. This number of casualties to military action is small,
however, in relation to a total population of over 18 million. The
impact of these casualties, particularly of the number killed, seems
even smaller when compared with the annual total in North Vietnam
of some 350,000 natural deaths, and the annual number of accidental
deaths n exceeds the deaths resulting from Rolling Thunder program.
Composition of Casualties
3. The composition of casualties resulting from air attack
underwent a radical change during 1966 as the Rolling Thunder program
changed from one emphasizing attacks on fixed targets, which are pre-
dominantly military, to an armed reconnaissance program. During 1966
armed reconnaissance attacks accounted for 95 percent of total casual-
ties, compared with 52 percent in 1965. In the first four months of
1967 armed reconnaissance accounted for 89 percent of total casual-
ties, its decreasing share reflecting some of the renewed emphasis
on attacking fixed targets in the past two months.
4. The emphasis on armed reconnaissance and the extension of
the Rolling Thunder program against targets in more heavily defended
and densely populated areas has increased the share of civilian
casualties. During 1965, for example, civilians accounted for only
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45 percent of total casualties. During 1966 they accounted for 71
percent of the total and in the first four months of 1967 they
accounted for 76 percent of total casualties.
5. The preponderance of civilian casualties resulting from
the acceleration of armed reconnaissance has in large measure
involved those civilians working on military targets or directly
engaged in the maintenance and operation of the logistics system
which moves supplies and personnel into Laos and South Vietnam.
Hence, it is heavily weighted with transport repair crews, truck
drivers, and personnel operating logistic craft on the rivers.
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Casualty Estimates and North Vietnamese Claims
7. The estimates of casualties resulting from the bombing of
North Vietnam are subject to unknown and conceivably large margins
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of error. Information from Hanoi generally has been of little value
in estimating casualties. Two recent reports, however, make us
reasonably confident that our estimates are of the right order of
magnitude. The first report, a detailed statement from Hanoi,
"Report of US War Crimes in Nam Din Hity," released a number of
statistics and allegations concerning the US bombing of Nam Dinh
during 1965-1966. The information presented in this report seemed
to be accurate when measured against detailed studies made on the
basis of post-strike photography. The casualties claimed by the
North Vietnamese were also consistent with independent casualty
estimates made by this Agency and using Nam Dinh as a pilot study.
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8. The North Vietnamese government has consistently charged
that the US air offensive is directly aimed at populated centers
and non-military targets. The Communists have implied that civilian
casualties are inordinately high, but they have never released
official figures on total civilian casualties. While the validity
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of propaganda claims is difficult to assess, tallies of specific
claims appear to be well below total US estimates. There is a wide
variety of first-hand reports on the accuracy of the bombings in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area
These reports have
consistently provided evidence of the generally precise volume of
the air strikes as well as information indicating that civilian
casualties from these air strikes have been low.
9. Hanoi propagandists have released hundreds of specific claims
of civilian casualties since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder
campaign. Confirmation or refutation of these specific claims is
made difficult by the vague and generalized manner in which they
are expressed. In many cases, even the specific geographic area of
the attack cannot be identified. Some of the propaganda claims are
obvious fabrications -- an outstanding example is the Communist claim
of 1,883 US aircraft downed over North Vietnam from the beginning
of the US attacks thru 11 May 1967. During that period, actual US
losses due to both operational malfunctions and hostile action were
only 619 aircraft. Other instances have been noted of high civilian
casualties reported in areas where the US has not conducted air
operations.
10. Some propaganda claims appear to be quite accurate. The
statistical information concerning damage to civilian areas in the
North Vietnamese "Report of US War Crimes in Nam Dinh City" was
remarkably close to estimates based on post-strike photography.
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The Nam Dinh statement claimed that air attacks killed or wounded
494 persons from early 1965 to September 20, 1966.. An application
of the methodologies derived by US intelligence to the air strikes
flown against targets in Nam Dinh yielded casualty estimates ranging
from a minimun of 320 to a maximum of 690 with the probable number
being 480 casualties.
11. The Hanoi press has reported "more than 100 capital resi-
dents killed and wounded" as a result of the 13-14 December 1966
air attacks on the nearby Yen Vien Railroad Classification Yard
(JCS 19) and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot (JCS 63.11). An intensive
analysis
to substantiate this claim. Photography reveals approximately 250
buildings destroyed in the Phuc Than area immediately south of the
Doumer bridge; the destruction appears to have been caused mainly
by fire rather than multiple bomb blasts. The fires could have been
caused by US rockets or even North Vietnamese air defense weapons
falling back into civilian areas. Additionally, 10 buildings were
destroyed or heavily damaged at the west end of the Doumer bridge on
Nguyen Thiep Street. Heavy damage to the North Vietnam Federation
of Trade Unions is confirmed
Based on accepted intelligence methodologies, a maximum of 240 casual-
ties would have been estimated as the result of the 13-14+ December
attacks. However, the effective civil defense procedures followed
in North Vietnam, the fact that there was probably ample warning of
the attack means that the actual casualties were well below 240
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and probably close to the number claimed by Hanoi. Eighteen of a
list of 23 other specific North Vietnamese propaganda claims concern-
ing civilian casualties, could Te chedked by photographic analysis.
Of these only three could be confirmed with certainty and one could
be zmx tentatively confirmed. Three of the claims could not be
supported by photography. Photography for the remaining 11 claims
showed damage outside the immediate target areas, but it was not
possible to identify the existence of the buildings or institutions
claimed by Hanoi to have been attacked.
12. Comparison of a tally of specific casualty claims made in
Hanoi news media with the total US casualty estimate suggests that
these claims are not entirely unreasonable. A study of all the
specific North Vietnamese propaganda claims made by the Hanoi radio
and press during the first quarter of 1967 resulted in a tally of
764- civilian casualties. For the same quarter of 1967, CIA has
estimated that 6,300 North Vietnamese civilians were casualties of
the US air strikes -- over 8 times the number specifically claimed
by Hanoi. However, Hanoi presumably does not announce all casualties
and would certainly not release total numbers to the population.
Many claims do not give specific numbers and speak only of "numerous"
or "many" civilian casualties. They are excluded from this tally.
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