SPECIAL REPORT - SUN STREAK EVALUATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
30
Document Creation Date:
November 4, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 8, 2000
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 2, 1989
Content Type:
REPORT
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SE-RET
SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAM
VI LVAT'.
WARNING
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR
METHODS INVOLVED. NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS. THIS COVER SHEET OR
ENVELOPE WILL BE USED AS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO ALERT
RECIPIENTS OF THE SENSITIVITY INVOLVED.
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SUN STREAK EVALUATION
WARNING NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL IS
RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH VERIFIED
ACCESS TO SUN STREAK LEVEL 3 (SS-3).
9 I! PREPNOFORN
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SUN STREAK EVALUATION
WARNING NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL IS
RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH VERIFIED
ACCESS TO SUN STREAK LEVEL 3 (SS-3).
FORN
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/ST
DECLASSIFY BY: OADR
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONTENTS
PURPOSE
--------------------------------------
I BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------1
II EVALUATION
---------------------------------------3
1. Database
2. Evaluation Techniques
3. Evaluation Results
APPENDIX
I. PROJECT RECORD DETAILS
II. DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO ANALYSTS/DATA REVIEWERS
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1. Number of Projects as a Function of type
FIGURE 2. Data Categories
FIGURE 3. Evaluation Scales
FIGURE 4. Summary Data Evaluation Sheet---Example
FIGURE 5. Overall Data Correlations
FIGURE 6. Overall Averages for all Project Types
FIGURE 7. Expected Results for Approximately 70% Data
Accuracy---Selected Personnel
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SUN STREAK EVALUATION
PURPOSE: (S/NF/SS-2) Purpose of this report is to provide an
evaluation of the SUN STREAK operational projects conducted since
1986.
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I BACKGROUND (U)
(S/SF/SS-2) SUN STREAK is an in-house DIA project for
developing an operational psychoenergetics (i.e., remote viewing)
capability for the Intelligence Community. Twelve General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) billets were authorized for
DIA in
1986
for this activity. Personnel from the ARMY INSCOM
CENTER
LANE
Project were transferred to DIA to form the SUN
STREAK
core
group. DIA had earlier (1985) received operational
control
from
HQ DA for this 6-person Army unit.
(S/NF/SS-2) In 1985, the DIA SUN STREAK Program Manager
prepared an Action Plan that: (1) detailed the steps necessary to
transition the CENTER LANE unit to DIA; (2) identified SUN STREAK
staffing and support needs; and (3) set forth key programmatic
requirements for the SUN STREAK activity. The Action Plan
anticipated that the time required for achieving a prototype
operational capability would be approximately 3 years.
(S/NF/SS-2) Key aspects of this Action Plan, along with
additional procedural information, were sent to congressional
committees in 1986. The IC staff was also briefed at this time
on the Action Plan and on anticipated SUN STREAK operational
development and data evaluation procedures.
(S/NF/SS-2) Programmatic and operational requirements
identified in the Action Plan were to: (1) gain Special Access
Program (SAP) status (accomplished in March 1985); (2) gain human
use approval (granted in March 1985); (3) set up a Senior
Oversight and a Task Coordinating Committee (accomplished --
though not currently activated); (4) establish tight project
controls along with an automated database management and records
system (accomplished); and (5) to establish an R/D link for
supporting operational capability development (accomplished via
HQ SGRD funding and a DARPA MIPR).
(S/NF/SS-2) The R/D link, via SRI International, has
yielded improved data evaluation procedures, has identified
potential personnel selection techniques, and has contributed to
training/development methods that are currently in project use.
The activity at SRI has received and continues to receive
extensive oversight by a 9-member peer review panel to insure
that scientific rigor is maintained in all their activities.
(S/NF/SS-2) The basic approach employed by SUN STREAK
toward developing a prototype operational Remote Viewing (RV)
capability is to locate personnel with potential RV capability
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and to develop these abilities via appropriate training/
development procedures. Once satisfactory progress is noted on
simple-to-verify training tasks, these individuals are presented
advanced training and operational simulation targets.
Operational simulation targets are usually US military or US
scientific targets where ground truth is totally known or can be
readily determined. Satisfactory performance on these tasks
qualify an individual for operational projects of interest to the
intelligence community. In many of the operational projects,
however, ground truth is usually not known (or is only partially
known). Consequently, complete evaluation of the viewer's data
cannot be made until a later time when ground truth does become
available. In the interim, reasonable estimates of the overall
validity of the viewer's data can be made for many of the
operational projects worked, based on what is generally known or
suspected about the target. These interim evaluation results are
updated whenever new ground truth is received.
(S/NF/SS-2) The operational projects pursued by SUN STREAK
are approved by the Program Manager and are, in part, based on
the Program Manager's familarity with Intelligence Community (IC)
needs and on solicitation from others within the IC who have been
briefed into the SUN STREAK program.
(S/NF/SS-2) The Evaluations performed for this report cover
all the operational and operational simulation projects
(approximately 200) that have been worked by SUN STREAK personnel
since 1986. A few of the special operations called upon
consultants from the SRI talent pool. These results are also
included in the overall evaluation.
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S wr
II EVALUATION (U)
1. DATABASE (U)
(S/NF/SS-2) The SUN STREAK project maintains an extensive
record of all project activity. Details include project timing,
people involved (i.e., viewers, interviewers, and possibly
observers), and a variety of other data considered essential for
good record keeping and for evaluating project results. This
data, along with project summaries, are maintained in an
automated data base for convenient retrieval. Copies of project
summaries are also sent to the Program Manager for his review.
In addition, all raw data (i.e., sketches, viewer's notes) are
maintained in a separate file that is available for review and
analysis (Additional project record details are in appendix I).
(S/NF/SS-2) Evaluations conducted for this report involved
a complete re-examination of the entire SUN STREAK operational
database. Many of the earlier projects had only been partially
evaluated, or not evaluated at all, due to lack of suitable
ground truth at the time they were completed. These projects
were re-evaluated at this time to adjust for new intelligence
data that has since become available.
(S/NF/SS-2) For this evaluation, the database was
subdivided into 6 main project types: (1) Scientific and
Technological (S/T); (2) Counterterrorist (CT); (3)
Counternarcotics (CN); (4) Counterintelligence (CI); (5) Document
Contents (Doc Cont); and (6) predictive (pred).- Total projects
worked for these categories are shown in Figure 1.
(S/NF/SS-2) Of the nearly 200 projects worked,
approximately one-half cannot be evaluated since ground truth is
not sufficiently known at this time. For approximately one-
fourth of the projects, ground truth is totally known (or highly
certain), and for the other one-fourth, ground truth is only
partially known but considered sufficient for making a reasonable
interim evaluation.
(S/NF/SS-2) Some of these project categories can overlap.
For example, prediction data is also an aspect of most of the CN,
many of the CT and a few of the S/T projects. The prediction
category in Figure 1 refers primarily to an exercise in which the
viewers' were asked to predict significant military/political
occurrences. Such general tasking did not seem to hold much
promise. Therefore in future analysis, predictive data will be
evaluated as a separate aspect of the otherwise specific project
categories.
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z
2. EVALUATION TECHNIQUES (U)
(S/NF/SS-2) Techniques used for evaluating the SUN STREAK
operational and simulated operational database depend on the
nature of the task and type of project. S/T projects are the
most difficult to evaluate. This difficulty arises from the
general complexity existing at most S/T target sites, from
possible ambiguous aspects of the target site, and from the
nature of the information desired. The sources' raw data will
usually contain a mixture of clear and unclear-elements. Unclear
data arises when the source, generally unfamiliar with the
technology involved, tries to describe the intended target in
terms of similarities within his experience. A degree of
subjectivity will therefore be involved when assessing the most
likely meaning of such data.
(S/NF/SS-2) To assist in reducing overall subjectivity of
evaluating complex S/T targets, the viewers' data is examined and
compared to ground truth with several data categories in mind.
These categories are shown in Figure 2, and include geographic
descriptions, large and small scale objects, large and small
scale functions, personality data, and predictive data. Not all
these categories may be relevant to a specific project, and in
some cases may even be part of the RV targeting procedure used
(e.g., when a photo of target building is used as an RV targeting
reference for accessing its unknown contents).
(S/NF/SS-2) After identifying the appropriate data
category, the next step is to examine the viewers' raw (or
summarized) data for comparison to known or estimated ground
truth and to make a best judgement on what approximate degree of
data correlation actually exists. Figure 3 defines the scale
ratings used along with their approximate degree of data
correlation. (Appendix II contains detailed instructions for
analyst consideration when reviewing the data).
(S/NF/SS-2) Final evaluations and summaries are prepared by
the Program Manager and/or his project representative (who is not
part of SUN STREAK staff) in conjunction with the responsible
system or Area Analyst or Intelligence Community point-of-
contact. Latest intelligence data and reports on that target
site are also reviewed during this process. In some cases, area
analysts and the IC points-of-contact provide written appraisals
to assist in the final evaluation process. These evaluations are
recorded on summary forms and are maintained in the Program
.Manager's files.
(S/NF/SS-2) An example of an S/T target evaluation is in
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5
SG1A
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EVALUATION SCALES
APPROX. DEGREE OF
NUMERICAL DATA CORRELATION
RATING . PERCENT
0 0-10
1 10-30-
1+ 30-50.
2 50-70'
2+
DESCRIPTION
LITTLE .OR NO CORRELATION
MIXTURE OF RELEVANT
AND INCORRECT DATA
WITH MAJORITY INCORRECT
MIXTURE OF RELEVANT
AND INCORRECT DATA
WITH MAJORITY CORRECT
70-90 AND UNAMBIGUOUS
90-100 _ VERY HIGH TARGET
CORRELATION WITH
ESSENTIALLY. NO
AMBIGUOUS DATA
SP5353.11
FIGURE 3
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SECRET SG1A
(S/NF/SS-2) A more sophisticated analysis methodology has
been recently developed by SRI for use in evaluating complex
projects. This method's main advantage is that it allows
quantitative estimates to be made for each and every data element
generated by the viewer with respect to both actual target
existence and importance. This technique is currently being
examined for use in the SUN STREAK program and has been applied
to a few projects. However, it is a labor intensive technique
that will probably be used only for select high interest projects
in the future.
(S/NF/SS-2) Most of the other SUN STREAK project types do
not require a complex analysis methodology. For example, due to
the nature of what type of data is desired (and availability of
collection assets that can be cued), most of the CT, CN, or
predictive projects where ground truth is known can be evaluated
in a "black or white" manner. The viewers' data, even if not
acted upon, either correlates with the subsequent location of the
fugitive or ship, or it does not. The event predicted did, or
did not, happen. Thus, overall results for many of these
projects are simply a matter of counting hits and misses. Hit
ratios or percentages of hits/misses form the basis of overall
data correlations made in this report for these types of
projects. Additional data analysis is, of course, performed to
determine how close to ground truth the data actually was. This
may be of value in understanding how to conduct future projects
of this nature.
SECRET
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SUMMARY DATA EVALUATION SHEET
0-3 SCALE
DATA.. CATEGORIES
PROJ CMPLTD . SESS SRCS
a;
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
COMMENTS
GEO.
OBJ
L.S.
OBJ
S.S.
FN
L.S..
FN
S.S.
PENS
PR
8701
870611
12
003
2
.2
1
1+
{1)
-
0-
ESTIMATE
018
-
-
0
1
0
021
1
2
(1)
-
-
-
-
101
1
2+
2+
1+
(1)
-
YES
PRED 6
MON IN
ADV
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3. EVALUATION RESULTS (U)
(S/NF/SS-3) Overall data correlations for all SUN STREAK
operational and operational simulation projects performed since
1986 are shown in Figure 5. These results were obtained by
averaging the data entered on the Summary Data Evaluation sheets
for each project primarily for two data categories (i.e. large
scale and small scale object and function). The top lines on the
bar charts reflect data averages obtained from the proven or
experienced viewers. For some projects, especially some of the
CN and CI projects, the distinction between large scale and small
scale is not clearcut; furthermore, this differentiation may not
be too important. For the predictive category and most of the CN
projects, data correlations were based mainly on a hit/miss
calculation.
(S/NF/SS-3) Figure 5 indicates that, on the average, data
from proven SUN STREAK viewers for S/T projects will tend to have
a 20 percent to 30 percent correlation with ground truth for
small scale targets, and a 30 percent to 50 percent correlation
with ground truth for large scale target features. Likewise, for
CT or CN projects, about 20 percent to 50 percent of SUN STREAK
data would be expected to correlate with ground truth. Caution
must be exercised in interpreting this data, however, since the
database with known ground truth is quite low in these
categories. For CI and Document Reading projects, SUN STREAK
data shows a 40 percent to 60 percent correlation level with
ground truth; however the size of this database is also quite
low. The Document Reading projects were, however, carefully
isolated and in a known or designated location. Predictive data
of political/military situations) when no context is provided the
viewer, shows a very low data correlation (i.e., reliability) of
about 10 percent or less.
(S/NF/SS-3) If all SUN STREAK projects are averaged
together, as shown in Figure 6, data correlation would range from
about 20 percent for small scale aspects to about 40 percent for
large scale aspects. While "averaging" such data may indicate
overall results in the long run, such averaging tends to washout
those results that have singular high merit, such as the
identification several months in advance of a specific area in
the US where a fugitive was later found. In this case, SUN
STREAK data was not acted upon; fortunately, the fugitive was
nevertheless captured in this area due to the alertness of a
local law enforcement official.
(S/NF/SS-3) Another way of considering overall SUN STREAK
project data correlation is to consider only the proven viewers.
This data is shown in Figure 7, for times when these experienced
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PERCE-1,17. OF
DATA. '.#'ORRELATION
r
m
m
m
i
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SELECTED PERSONNEL
m
m
m
m
w
m
DATA
?
1101 a" L 9:1
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viewers received a 2 or 2+ in the numerical ratings assigned to
their data correlations. Only two types of data are presented
here; S/T, and Personality data as obtained from the various CT,
CN and CI projects. For S/T projects, proven viewers would be
expected to receive a high (i.e. approx. 70 percent) data
correlation rating on about 20 percent of the S/T projects
attempted. For Personality projects (i.e., background, state-of-
the-health, specific activities), around 50 percent to 60 percent
of the projects would yield high results. Essentially, this
chart indicates certain strengths/weaknesses of the present SUN
STREAK staff and suggests that more projects on foreign or CI
target personalities are warranted.
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III FINDINGS (U)
(S/NF/SS-3) Although the overall data correlations provided
in the previous section have, in some instances, have a low
overall average, the results are unique enough to warrant further
attention and continued SUN STREAK activity. Even in the lowest
reliability case (i.e., predictive), identification of even one
important future event out of ten could in fact be highly
significant for cost or life saving. These "averages" do not do
justice to the single unique cases that cost little to act upon,
as in the case of the fugitive location cited in section 3.
(S/NF/SS-3) Specific findings that resulted from in-depth
review of the entire SUN STREAK data base include:
o Individuals' performance correlates with project type.
This observation has already assisted in better task/person
matching, and overall data correlations would be expected to
improve in the future.
o SUN STREAK has a distinct potential for direct
contribution to certain CI, CN and CT cases, as born out by
specific instances over the past two years.
o Predictive data is promising under certain conditions,
such as near term events or situations that do not involve
dynamic, complex interactions.
o S/T data, though having promise for select tasks, does
not yield parametric data.
o SUN STREAK viewers work well under operational stress.
It may be that an environment of operational stress
generates a clear and immediate need. This situation seems
to foster conditions that enables RV to function better.
o Obtaining highly reliable RV data and then applying it to
real operational projects is difficult. However, it is
evident that continued work with RV data does result in
greater insight on how best to use RV data and on how best
to utilize RV talent available. Thus, it is anticipated
that RV data utility will increase as experience of the SUN
STREAK team grows.
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APPENDIX I
PROJECT RECORD DETAILS
UNCLASSIFIED
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E X A M P L E
3L ..,, !r~/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
PROJECT SUN STREAK (U)
Session Procedures Report
INSTRUCTIONS
WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
Item Number:
1. (U) Control Number: Indicate the control number provided
for use in the total mission package. This number will consist
of the two letter year code (e.g. 85, 86, 87 etc.), followed by
the sequential mission number for that calendar year, (e.g.
86011-86-02, 8603 ? etc )?.
2. (U) Date of Session: Indicate the date of the session,
(or sessions when the report contains a composite of mulitple
sessions). Date should be written in military sequence,-e.g.,' 1 August 1986. For composite reports of multiple sessions, the
date of each session should be indicated, e.g., 1,3,4 Aug 86.
3. (U) References: Indicate by title and date the most
recent Session Procedure Report and any other, written
documentation which may impact on this report.
4. (U) Date of Report: Indicate the date the report is
prepared in draft form.
5. (S/NF/SK) Technique Utilized: Indicate the initials ERV,
CRV or SRV. ERV indicates the Extended Remote Viewing
technique, (Hella Hammid; CRV indicates the Coordinate Remote
Viewing technique (Ingo Swann) and SRV indicates the
Spontaneous Remote Viewing technique, (data provided to the
viewer in a sealed envelope without the assistance of a
CLASSIFIED 8Y: DTS-DIA
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E X A M P L E
OFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
PROJECT SUN STREAK (U)
Session Procedures Report
FORMAT
WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE S.O.URCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
Control Number: Nickname:
Date of Session: Target Country:
References': Session-Number:
Date of Report: Mission Status:
Technique Utilized: Source identifier:
1. ( ) OPERATIONAL DATA:
a. ( ) Targeting Material Provided to Interviewer
Prior to Session
b.
to Session
c.
2. ( )
3. ( )
4. ( )
Targeting Material Provided to Source Prior
Feedback Provided to Source Following Session
UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES:
SYNOPSIS OF RAW DATA PROVIDED BY SOURCE:
PRODUCTION DATA:
(INTERVIEWERS SIGNATURE)
CLASSIFIED BY: DT-DIA
DECLASSIFY: OADR
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EUflET/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
monitor/interviewer to structure the reporting of the
results). The initials ERV, CRV and SRV are in themselves
unclassified terms.
6. (U) Nickname: Indicate any internal or Headquarters
nickname or codename assigned to this mission.
7. (U) Target. Country: Utilize. the standard US Government
-two ? letter country codes to ? indicate :all -countries act-urally
mentioned in this report. If no specific country is mentioned
indicate "Unknown" in this heading.,
8. (U) Session Number: Indicate the sequential number(s),. of
the sessions described in: this report. This number must
coincide sequentially with the previous Session Procedures
Report for this mission. This number refers only to sessions
held for each particular mission.
9. (U) Mission Status: A mission is either "(Initial)
Continuing", ".Continuing" or "Closed". "(Initial) Continuing'.'
indicates that this'.:is-'.ahn initial session for, this miss"ibn and
that other sessions are contemplated.
10. (U) Source Identifier: Indicate the coded number of the
Source. Under -no circumstances is the Source Ito -ever ~-be
identified. or described in any official documentations or
correspondence (internal or external) which pertains to a
specific SUN STREAK (U) mission. It is permissible to refer to
the Source by gender for ease of composition.
This page unclassified when separated
from classifed enclosure.
E?i?/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
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APPENDIX II
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO ANALYST/DATA REVIEWERS
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INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION SHEET
INFORMATION and INSTRUCTIONS:
The information in this report was obtained in direct response to
an intelligence collection requirement provided by your office.
The material furnished to you has been acquired through a unique
and highly sensitive collection technique. Your care in
evaluating this information will form the basis by which USI can
assess this technique and/or modify and refine the technology to
improve its overall value. While formulating your evaluation the
following comments concerning this unique collection technique
may be helpful.
Foremost it must be stated that the information obtained through
this technique is likely. to consist of a mixture of correct,
incorrect or at times apparently, irrelevant data. Given this
anomaly the consumer should be sensitive to the following:
a. Conceptual descriptive data tends to be more reliable
than analytic labeling. As an example, a source may
inappropriately report (label) a body of water in an artificial
holding device at a designated target as a "recreational swimming
pool," when in fact it is a water purificati.on sewage pool. More
critical however, is that an aircraft fuselage may be erroneously
labeled by the source as a submarine hull. Caution is therefore
advised when a source's descriptions evidence a great deal of
analytic labeling. Again, conceptual descriptive data tends to
be more'reliable than analytic labeling.
b. Certain anomalies may exist in the overall descriptive
reporting. A report on a known three building complex may, for
example, only contain data pertaining to two buildings.
Furthermore, significant buildings or facilities may be
attributed to a site when it is known that such "additions" do
not exist. Such gaps or additions are neither intentional nor an
attempt to fabricate information. In fact, they occasionally may
prove useful with careful analysis on the part of the consumer.
Whe'a this type of serious gap or addition is encountere,?it
should only be weighed in the context of the actual tasking and
how it affects the results of the information sought. In other
words, if you were initially seeking the purpose of a deep
circular hole in the ground, do not be concerned about additional
descriptions of a nearby lake when previously confirmed
information indicated no lake is present at the site. Instead,
focus your evaluation on the data pertaining to the deep circular
hole, while-within reason, ignoring extraneous data.
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
c. At times, some data may appear to be abstract with no
apparent importance even though other data tends to confirm and
improve upon the known data base on a target. Information of
this nature may, at a later date, be valuable. For example, a
reported lack of personnel at a normally bustling defense
installation may seem incongruous until it is learned at a later
date that this particular reporting period coincided with a
evacuation drill.
d. The consumer should be aware that for reasons of
security, strict compartmentation and operational effectiveness,
the actual collectors (sources) of this data are given only
general guidance. Therefore, the collectors may tend to report
on many seemingly extraneous facets of a target as well as the
specific area of interest to the consumer. If this otherwise
superfluous data is known to be true, the veracity of the
source's other descriptions is enhanced.
It is recommended that the consumer first examine the information
provided to isolate the data already known, if any, about the
target. From this data base the consumer should extract any new
and heretofore unknown information relevant to the specific
target. The "irrelevant" information should be examined
carefully in light of the comments listed above. Patently false
or irrelevant information should be. weighted as a facet of your
evaluation only when this data contradicts previously confirmed
information pertaining to the target.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, the Intelligence
evaluation Sheet (IES), or any information provided to you by
this activity please contact this office at any time.
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
U) For the summary evaluation, plrats check the following boxes as to the accuracy of the submitted material.
Approved For Release 2000/0840QRDP96-00789 R001800710001-4
Little
Correspondence
0
S) Geographical locale descrip-
tion (terrain, wnter, etc.)
S) Large-scale manmade elements
(cities, buildings, silos,
docks, railroad lines,
airfields, etc.)
S) Small-scale manmade elements
(antennas, computers, tanks, a
missiles, offices, etc.)
S) General target ambience (re-
search, production, adminis-
ments, naval activity, air
monitoring, etc.)
Personality information
(physical descriptions,
actions, responsibilities,
plans, etc.)
Sit
nta
C
t
e
o
c
,
with
Not
Mixed Results Good Excellent Unknown App
licable
1 2
3
D ^
M
El
El
0 a
M
Q
Q Q
Q EJ
Q
t
t I
L
J
U
U
.
0
a
0 Q
tI
------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Cannot be de-
Overall utility - - - - - None Marginal Useful 0 Very Useful 0 termined at this time E
U) Definitions for the accuracy scale:
0 - Little correspondence . . . . Self explanatory.
1 - Site contact with . . . . . . . Mixture of correct and incorrect elements, but enough of the former to
mixed results indicate source has probably accessed the target site.
2 - Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . Good correspondence with several elements matching, but some incorrect information.
3 - Excellent . . . . . . . . . . Good correspondence with unambiguous unique matchable elements And relatively
little incorrect information.
Approved For Release 200G/O8 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
activity, weapbns testing, etc.)
Relevant specific activities
(nuclear testing, missile
firing, CAW storage, ELINT 0
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4
INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION SHEET
IES Control Number:
Collection Requirement:
Collection Requirement Generated By:
(ICR/CIR/DIRM/INITIATIVE/OTHER)
Does the information YES IN PART NO CANNOT BE
satisfy your Intelli- -DETERMINED
gence Collection r-i r-i- -11 r-1
Requirement? L-j j j -j
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A narrative explanation is required:
(Use a continuation sheet if necessary.)
(classification)
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4