LAOS: SOME NEW CONTINGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900280023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 22, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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Z2 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
1. 1 talked to Torn Hughes about the attached. Everything
he prepares for the Secretary goes to 3/3 which is the Execu.
tivo Secretariat of the State Department. If any distribution
outside of the State Department is made, it is made by S/S and
generally without Tom's prior knowledge. On the other hand,
Tom's people send direct to CIA a copy of practically every-
thing they produce for the Secretary -- on a concurrent-delivery
basis insofar as practicable. Those are received by the DD/I.
Z. In the subject case, Tom did not know it was going to be
distributed at NSC nor, in view of the delivery time, would there
have been any opportunity for you to have seen it prior to the
meeting.
3. 1 think this is something that should be straightened out
between you and Dean Rusk, since it is really not in Tom Hughes'
bailiwick once be has furnished the basic paper to the Secretary.
If you prefer, I will take it up with Dean Rusk.
4. The one thing I do slot believe we should tromp on is Tom
Hughes' responsibility to advise and consort with his own Secretary.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
MSC:blp
Attachment: Memo from Director of Intelligence and Research, State
Dep nt~nt the Secretary of State dtd 22 April 1963,
Tew Contingencies
Subject: atps:~ GRIX
Distribution:
Original - DCI w/att
K - DDCI w/cy att
State Dept. review completed - ER w/o att
1 - DD/I w/o att
- Ececutiye nir[.c?tnr w/o att
p7. O- :-~. _-C-0 /
cd/
C`7'{s^- ~ ) :P"Cad.,;
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE W
THz DntEEG?roh OF INTELLIGENCE AND R$SLAUcJH
TO The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM INR - Thomas L. Hughes APR 2 9 1963
SUBJECT: Laos: Some New Contingencies N
Souvanna's announcement April 21 that he had reached agreement with
Souphanouvong to keep the peace. for a few days, pending arrangement of a
more permanent truce, may stabilize the military situation temporarily.
However it is not entirely clear that Souphanouvong has agreed to a cease-
fire. Even if he has there may be further local actions on the Plaine des
Jarres or elsewhere.
Communist Position
Moscow has maintained virtual silence on Laos, but Peiping and Hanoi
have continued to charge that the United States and Lao reactionaires are
conspiring to divide the neutralist center, undermine the Lao government,
and violate the Geneva agreements. Souphanouvong, broadcasting an account
of his meeting April 21 with Souvanna, carried this line one step further by
claiming that he and Souvanna had agreed that the "infiltration" of Phoumi
troops into the neutralist ranks was the principal cause of the conflict.
Communist strategy appears designed not only to frustrate countermoves
against the Pathet Lao but also to deprive Kong Le of even the support he is
now getting.
Souvanna's Position
One effect of this communist strategy is to pressure Souvanna to accept,
for the sake of a cessation of.fighting, a reduction of the strength and
territorial scope of his own neutralist forces. To the extent that he does
so, Souvanna runs the risk of weakening his own support through friction with
Kong Le, further defections among his neutralist forces, and alienation of the
cooperative support he has been accepting from Ph.Zoumi. On the other hand if
Souvanna maintains a strong position, laying the blame on th((== Pathet Lao and
North Vietnam, and holding out for territorial restitution a!t the Plaine des
Jarres, he risks renewed external pressures on the neutralist position by
further military action on the Plaine des Jarres or elsewhere, and by direct
communist criticism of his own role.
The military standstill agreement Souvanna believes he has obtained may
give a limited amount of time for United States and United Kingdom diplomatic
efforts to engage Soviet influence without further neutralist territorial
losses. If however -- as seems the more likely in the light of Gromyko's
reply to Lord Hume, -- the Soviet position basically remains'a passive one,
it will be next to impossible to engage Soviet jnfluence in behalf of a
meaningful effort to restore the neutralist center by diplomatic means alone.
-- S,i, ,tic:
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SE .~~'J/NO FO ZSEK
Deterrent Moves
Deployment of 7th Fleet detachments toward the Gulf of Tonkin may affect
the situation as follows:
1. Souvanna initially may consider his dilemma intensified because,
as the neutralist leader now in what he believes is a military standstill
agreement with the Pathet Lao, he might be subject to more direct communist
attack on his own position if he tacitly accepts the United States action.
However he may be brought to realize that without such action the chance of
checking communist military and political pressures are poorer.
2. In any case, in combination with stepped-up supply efforts, it
seems likely that Kong Le and his forces, as well as the rightist elements,
will be heartened.
3. To the Kremlin, the dispatch of 7th Fleet detachments will
represent evidence of United States concern. Indeed, in a sense it may be
more effective in argument with Moscow than movement of ground forces into
Thailand. This is so precisely because it suggests the possibility of action
against North Vietnam to protect the neutralists rather than a precautionary
movement into Thailand to protect Phoumi. It raises the quespion of Soviet as
well as Chinese commitments more directly than would the dispatch of forces to
Thailand, potentially for Laos. Nevertheless, given the current political
maneuvering in Laos, it seems likely that this preliminary action will have
effect only insofar as it recommends caution -- possibly cease-fire -- to
the communist forces. It is far less certain that the move will bolster
Souvanna's hopes to restore the status quo ante.
At this point it would appear that further United States military moves
in the immediate future -- air squadrons, possibly a battle group into
Thailand -- in addition to the 7th Fleet would have the following effects:
1. To the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese the immediate
deterrent impact would be increased. However they would also seek to exploit
the moves politically and to make Souvanna disassociate himself from if not
oppose them.
2. Such additional moves would therefore involve the risk that
Souvanna might denounce or disassociate himself from them. Advance consul-
tation with Souvanna on these moves would be necessary to convince him to
remain silent although he might not accept their desirability. He probably
now believes that signs of direct United States ;intervention only complicate
his own efforts to resolve the issues for which he needs time and the absence
of conspicuous outside intervention.
3. Phoumi would be heartened by United States moves indicating a
willingness to intervene in Laos. It is always possible that he might seek
SEC;RT/NO FOEIGN DISSEM
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to seize on them as an opportunity to take the initiative with his own forces
and possibly together with Kong Le. However, the chances are:that Phoumi would
watch for a while to see how things develop on the scene in Laos before deciding
to take any action on his own.
4. Therefore, if further movements on the ground are to be taken in
Southeast Asia, they must be judged in the context of what strains they may
add to the relationship between Souvanna and Phoumi -- a relationship that
needs to be fostered.
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