LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN A MCCONE FROMELLSWORTH BUNKER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R002900280006-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 15, 2002
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 2, 1976
Content Type:
LETTER
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
2 September 1976
NOTE FOR: D/OPEI
Admiral Murphy is extremely concerned
about technology transfer.
Hope you have someone looking into
How. about letting me know where we
stand on it. et, yW1-t t? r Idy?' Mt, H a/
if-
cc: AD/DCI/IC and EQ/ICS
INFORMATION
OSD HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DELASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.
OSD review(s) completed.
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1SSEP 1976
IC 76-2387
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
Chief, Production Assessment and
Improvement Division
Director of Performance Evaluation,/'
and Improvement
SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Effort on Technolo_
rans ter
1. The Intelligence Community provides a wide range
of support to the Departments of Commerce, State, and
Treasury, the major agencies charged with the control of
the export of US technology. The attached documents
stra-
tion of US export policy CTAB A) ; (2) ations
t oToo y
ounterintelli ence and internal
,and visitor control. SPC. ; y (TAB B) ; and (3) organizations charged with
s
the review and assessment ot US exchang s an contacts
(TAB C). A maze of formal and informal co tacts exists
among the acti toy moni `ori:ng
technology transfer and the appropriate elements of the
Intelligence Community, primari the DCI JL~es
following economic inte li ence tLiui nges OMEX),
2. The survey we are currently undertaking for the
NSC semiannual review indicates that the various users
of technology transfer intelligence are generally satis-
fied with Intelligence Community support. The Community
disseminates background information on the consignees
of US technology and the stated and likely uses of the
technology. A significant portion of the Community's
effort is in the form of brief assessments of the USSR's
17"i r ~1i-1
E-: _l__IMPDET CL
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4
-""] I Ia3L
2 7 -
technological base in those areas where sales are being
negotiated. Lengthy, more formal studies have also been
produced on the economic impact on the USSR of technological
transfer and on the possible upgrading of Soviet military
capabilities by the transfer of specific technologies.
3. Most of the users are satisfied with the lines
of communication between themselves and the Intelligence
Community. The specific areas cited for increased at-
tention in intelligence production, however, have included
the capability of the USSR to assimilate Western technology,
additional "case studies" on the military implications of
technology transfer, and further information on the actual
application of exported high technologies.
4 . - T h e suhiec of hnnlna-
cite few examples, the Department of Commerce is now
completing a study on the effectiveness of the US export
control compliance program (with a sizeable intelligence
discussion), CIA's Office of Economic Research has detailed
an individual to Commerce to study in depth that Department's
specific needs and how to satisfy them effectively, and
the DCI's Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel is looking
into the general area of technology transfer and the
Community's efforts relating to the many aspects of the
problem.
logy
t-e pooTic -"-ositions a or example,
t He c views of o and the more liberal trade
policies of the State and Commerce Departments. Indeed,
the Community has been unable to reach agreement on such
fundamental questions as the degree of importance the
USSR places on the acquisition of Western technology.
6. We will kee ou informed of the findings of the
Community s ey are comp e e
Attachments:
TABS A, B, and C
iE TlAL
erra e ana y~
2
_. _Y e _ nevitable conflict etween t the. views nj
the
2
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Distribution:
Orig - D/DCI/IC
1 - EO/IC and AD DCI IC
1 - SA/D/DCI/IC
1 - SA/D/DCI/IC
1 - D/OPEI
1 - D/OPP
1 - D/OPBD
1 - C/OPEI/IS
1 - C/OPEI/ID
1 C/OPEI/SD
1 - C/OPEI/HRD
1 - IC Registry
1 - PAID Chrono
1 - PAID Subject
1 C/PAID
1 - DC/PAID
1 - JP Chrono
DCI/IC/PAID/ty/6875/15 Sep 76
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Administration of US_Export PoiiD
The Departments of Co::mlerce, State, and Treasury are the major agencies
charged with control. of the export of US technology.*
A. The basic legislation is the Export Administration Act of 1969, as
amended and extended, which authorizes control. of US exports for three
purposes--?-national security, foreign policy, and domestic short supply. Under
Executive Order, the Act is administered by the Secretary of Commerce (or the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business acting
on the Secretary's behalf).
In controversial cases affecting U.S. national. security, the
Secretary does not normally take action until agreement has been reached in
interagency advisory committees (the committee structure fulfills legislative
requirements for interdepartmental consultation by the administrator) or until
a Presidential decision has been handed down. The required consultation is
carried on in three committees: 1/ (See diagram illustrating interagency
coordination of the mechanisms to control/monitor East-West trade.)
1. The Export Advisory Review Board (EARl3), established by
Executive Order, consists of the Secretaries of State, Defense,
and Commerce (Chairman). The Board may invite heads of other
agencies to participate as needed. The EARB meets to deliberate
on, or to resolve major policy issues relating to US export
controls. The Secretary of Commerce shall refer to the Board,
upon request of any US Government agency, differences in the
lower committees, extraordinary cases, and other export license
matters. Differences in the Board may be appealed to the
President.
* The so--called Jackson amendment to S. 3792 (which amended and extended
the Export Administration Act of 1969), however, gives the Secretary of Defense
broad powers to determine whether the export of goods and technology will
increase significantly the. military capability of any Communist country and, if
so, to recommend to the President that the export be disapproved. If the
President overrules the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, that fact
must be reported to the Congress.
1/ T, 1 ' igencv clearance of a c>oc: r::.;~~r r_t.; is obt.- i.aed on a bfl.tera'
hasi ,. ~. (.' it red cost ro`. +1?i (_..._ arc! Z' d o i:hP Advisory
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CUN1'iu ;Nr'iAL
2. The Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACED) is chaired
by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International
Business; other members include Assistant/Deputy Assistant Secretaries
from State, Defense, Agriculture, AEC, Interior, Treasury, Transportation,
NASA, and OEP. CIA attends in an advisory capacity only but takes a
position on some intelligence related items, e.g., certain communica-
tions equipment. CIA is represented by its Director of Economic
Research. The voting members may concur in, reserve, or disagree
with the decision of the Chairman. Dissenting agencies may appeal
to the EARB. ACEP usually meets only two or three times a year,
and matters are sometimes cleared without formal meetings.
The President has delegated to the Secretary of Commerce
the power and authority provided by the Export Administration Act
of. 1969, as amended and extended. In turn, the ACEP Chairman has
been delegated general policy supervision over the administration
of the export control. program. Accordingly, the ACEP structure
provides advice on virtually all aspects of the program. Specifically,
ACEP makes determinations concerning:
a. US export control policy objectives;
b. Strategic rating methods, criteria, licensing
policies, listing and delisting of commodities and
related technical data;
c. Export policies relating to particular countries
and areas, or to particular commodities;
d. Short supply export quotas;
e. Issuing of licenses in controversial or
important cases;-
f. All other export control. problems such as
relations with other agencies having special export
responsibilities (AEC, Agriculture, Treasury, State's
Office of Munitions Control, and EDAC) and appeals
from its subcommittees, the Operating Committee.
3. The Operating Committee (OC) is the standing subcommittee
of ACEP,with the same agencies represented, at the senior staff
level, and with the same frames of reference. Its chairman is
the executive secretary of ACEP and of EARB. OC recommendations
are subject to the review and. approval of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade. CIA is represented
on the OC by members of the Trade Controls Staff.
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The OC usuall.y meets weekly, departing from the schedule
only as its workload dictates. In 1973, it handled about 450
matters including short supply determinations, additions to or
deletions from requirements for validated licenses, licensing
cases, and policy deliberations.
B. ACED--OC Operation; theLicensi STstem of the Deart_ment. of Commerce
1. All exports of commodities or technical data from the US
that are not under the specific export control authority of
another US Government department or agency come under the
export control jurisdiction of Commerce. Depending on the
strategic rating and destination, commodities and technical data
are authorized by Commerce for export under either of the
following:
a. General. License -- The General License is a broad
authorization established by Commerce to permit certain
exports under specified conditions. Exports under general
license, which applies to the vast majority of commodities,
may be made without filing an.appli_cation or getting a
specific license.
b. Validated License -- The Validated License is a
formal. document issued to an exporter by the Department
on the basis of his detailed application to the Department
of Commerce. Applications may be licensed, denied or
returned without action. A validated license authorizes
export of commodities-or technical data within the specific
limitations of the document. Many items which require a
validated license also require formal interagency coordination
in the OC. To avoid overwhelming the OC, however, the ACEP
delegates to OEA-BEWT/Commerce authority to approve some
cases without formal interagency coordination. In some
instances, bilateral clearances are required and/or certain
conditions are imposed.
2. To learn what kind of a license is required to export a
particular commodity or data to a specific destination, the exporter
must consult the Department of Commerce's _Cor rehensivc Export Schedule.
The Commodity Control List contained in this schedule provides license
requirements for all commodities. Other regulations in the schedule
provide license requirements for the related technical data. In many
cases involving items under COCOM control, neither the applicant nor.
Commerce can determine in advance if the application will be granted
or denied inasmuch as approval depends on a careful review of each
proposed transaction on its merits.
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C. Tech ica:l Advisory Comm t:tee Activities
government-industry Technical. Advisory Committees (TAC) ,
l.. The
established by the Depar. tment of Commerce pursuant to section 5(c)
of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, are made up
of representatives from industry including scientists, engineers
and other eminently-qualified personnel, and high-level government
technical experts.
2. Seven TAC's have been. established to provide advice on.
Computer Systems; Telecommunications Equipment; Numerically
Controlled Machine Tools'; Semiconductors; Semiconductor
Manufacturing and Test equipment; Computer. Peripherals,
Components and Related Test Equipment; and Electronic
Inst.r.umentation. These committees have been meeting at least
once every three months and some have formed subgroups to deal
with specific problem areas.
3. The principal recent work of each TAC has been to
provide the Department of Commerce with technical information
and advice in formulating the government's positions in regard
to forthcoming COCO1 list reviews. In this connection, the
committees have been:
a. identifying commodities produced in non-COCOM
Western and Eastern Europe that are equivalent to
those produced in the United States;
b. providing technical information enabling the
Department to judge whether certain commodities meet
established strategic criteria;
c. identifying military and civilian use of
certain types of equipment under export controls; and
d. offering conclusions and recommendations as
to desirable courses of action.
II. The Dcy~artment of State
A. The Department of State's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
chairs the Economic Defense_Advi_sor Committee (EDAC) through which the
Department secures the advice of other government agencies in carrying out
its responsibilities under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951
(Battle Act) to develop US positions in COCOM. There are two Working Groups:
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Working Group I deals-with COCOM List Review matters and
individual export cases;
Working Group IT deals with COCOM compliance and enforcement.
Matters that cannot be resolved at the working level are referred to the EDAC
Executive Committee.
B. The Office of Munitions Con_ trol_ of the Department of State has
replaced what was formerly known as the Munitions Control Board. While this
office solicits interagency (DoD, AEC, Commerce, NASA, Treasury) opinions on
matters relating to the export of military and related equipment, interagency
meetings are held only in critical or unusual cases. The Department of State
publishes the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which set forth
US policy on the export of munitions.
C. The State/Commerce Working Group coordinates US Government interests
in the technical exchange agreements under. Article TV of the 1972 US-USSR S&T
Agreement between private US firms, the Soviet State Committee for Science
and Technology, and other Soviet technical ministries. Concern has been
expressed that from the aggregate of these close arrangements a net undesirable
technical drain from the US might occur without significant reciprocal
information or trade developments. The Working Group was formed to consider
the implications of these developments and to decide what, if any remedial
actions should be taken through government action.
The De artment of the Treasury
A. The Department of the Treasury is concerned that the international
cooperation agreements to which the US is a party shall be implemented
constructively and in an orderly manner consistent with our national security
interests. The Long-Term Agreement between the US and the USSR to facilitate
Economic, Industrial, and Technical cooperation which was signed by President
Nixon in Moscow on 29 June 1974, contains new and very broad undertakings
aimed at encouraging the longer term expansion and more balanced growth of
trade.
B. The Secretary of the Treasury is Chairman of the. US Section of the
Joint US-USSR Commercial. Commission set up in May 1972. The Commission reviews
the spectrum of US-Soviet commercial relations and examines possible US-USSR
joint projects. The Commission will oversee the operation of the Agreement
on Trade concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 October
1972, when the Agreement enters into force. The Commission will also monitor
the practical implementation of the Long-Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial, and Technical Cooperation which was signed by President Nixon in
Moscow on 29 June 1974. The Under. Secretary of the Treasury for. Monetary
Affairs is a member of the Joint Commissions we have established with Poland
and Romania.
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SON It I1)ENTI AL
C. President's Commit- -ea On Last--West Track YoJ.zcy/East--West I'ar ,n
Trade Boari. A proposed Ixecut:ive Order would transform the President's
Committee. on last:-West Trade Policy into the East-West Foreign Trade Board.
The Secretary of Agriculture and the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank
would become members of the Mar.d, in addition to all the present members
of the Committee, The Secretary of the Treasury would be the Chairman
of the Board and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs would
be its Deputy Chairman, The Board would perform the functions previously
performed by the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy and, in
addition; shall mont:ior trade between persons and agencies of the United
States Government and nonmarket economy countries or instrumentalities
thereof to insure that such trade will be in the United States' national
interest, and shall perform such other functions and duties as are
required by Section 411 of the Trade Act of 1974. The Secretary of the
Treasury, as Chairman, would be responsible for transmission to the
Congress of such reports by the Board as are required to be submitted
to Congress under the Act.
D. In addition, the Treasury is responsible for administering the
Foreign Assets Control regulations. These continue to apply inter alia
to Chinese assets held in this country,' pending eventual conclusion of
an overall claims settlement with the PRC.
IV. The Ad Hoc ~Intelli pence Grog on Exch es
The IGE, which functions under direction of the US Intelligence Board,
has no role in the administration of US export policy. The opinion of IGE
members is occasionally sought, however, through the IGE Secretariat on
specific commercial contacts between the US and the USSR or East European
countries. These opinions can be supportive or critical of commercial
contacts.
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EDAC
Working Group Ill
Working Group 112
ACEP
'Operating Committee
Executive Committee
(COCOM)
TACS
Computer Systems
Computer Peripheral
Semiconductor
Semiconductor Mfg.
Electronic Instr.
Machine Tool
Telecommunications
Ad Floc State/Comrrrerce
Working Group on US/USSR
Technical and Industrial
Agreements
Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear
Energy
`President's Committee on
East-West Trade Policy
Export Administration
Review Board
V. Interagency Coordination-
Mechanisms to Control/Monitor East-West Trade
"Other members include Agriculture, Interior, FAA and the Office
of Emergency Preparedness.
`Other members include Counselor to President for Economic Policy
and Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Administration of ClassifiedTechnolo v and Visitor
Control.,__ Counterintell:i ence and Internal Securj.~~
The visa office of the Department of State, the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), the Defense Industrial Security Program
of the Department of Defense, and the FBI are responsible for the national
security aspects of US exchanges and commercial contacts with the USSR, East
Europe, and the PRC.
I. The Department of State
The Visa Office (VO) of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA)
and consuls abroad are responsible under the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) for determining the' eligibility of aliens for visas.
Posts submit Soviet visitor applications to the State Department, which requests
security name checks from Washington intelligence agencies. The applications
of Soviet commercial visitors are required to include the alien's itinerary.
Since the majority of :oviet applicants, are presumed ineligible under Section
212 (a) (28) (Communist party membership and/or affiliation) of the INA, V0,
with the responsible desk officer's concurrence, requests waivers of ineligibil-
ity from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Washington.
Eastern European visitor applications are submitted to the Department for
prior approval only when the applicants are engaged in S&T matters or military
related programs. Posts may request Washington name checks. If the alien is
.ineligible under 212 (a) (28), the post requests a waiver from an INS office
abroad (usually Vienna) or the Department. New visa procedures to tighten visa
controls for EE commercial visitors are also being considered.
Visas are not issued to official PRC visitors without prior Department
approval and a Washington name check.
IT. The Interdepartmental. Committee on Internal Security
The procedures for entry to and exit from the US for exchange, conference,
student, and tourist: visitors from the USSR, Eastern European countries, the PRC,
and other communist. nations are the responsibility of the ICIS. Instructions
published by ICIS subcommittee II, "Security Measures Applicable to Nationals of
Communist--Controlled Countries Entering the US as Non-Immigrant Aliens," dated
5 June 1969 pertain. Much of the ICIS system has been revised, including
de-Splexing (removal of special exchange procedures) on all East European exchange
visit-ors !''os?e in\c?v"d its. it f' ?-t 1 . 41--ary related Tiatters.
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CONFIDENTIAL
III. The Defense. Industrial Securi Program
Under the Defense Industrial Security Program, the user agencies (Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense agencies the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the cleared defense contractors work
together through a complex system of individual Defense Security Agreements,
Facility Security Clearance, Personnel Security Clearances, and Contract
Security Classification specifications at the task of controlling and safe-
guarding classified. defense information. Security measures are established
by individual Standard Practice Procedures for each facility according to
the rules of the Industrial Security Manual. This system has evolved of
necessity, because of the very large number of cleared facilities (11,513)
and the enormous number of cleared individuals (approximately 1,210,949).
IV. The Federal Bureau of lnvesti ation
FBI procedures for handling commercial and special exchange visitors
from the USSR, East Europe, and the PRC involve name tracing visa applicants
for possible intelligence connections and derogatory information. A visitor's
itinerary is furnished to appropriate FBI-field divisions to alert them to the
presence of Soviet, East European, or PRC personnel and to stimulate prompt
action when visitors, particularly SPLEX (exchange) visitors are designated
as official guests of the US Government under the Protection of Foreign
Officials Statute. The FBI investigates Soviet, bast European, and PRC
visitors whenever information is developed before or after arrival indicating
intelligence activities. Numbers involved and other investigative priorities
preclude even notification to FBI field divisions of the itineraries or presence
of East European visitors unless they are identified as having intelligence
affiliation.
"The Department of State notifies the FBI of name lists and
itineraries of PRC commercial and exchange visitors. The members
of government--facilitated PRC exchange delegations to the US so
far have been designated 'Official Guests' of the US for the
purposes of PL 92-539."
V. U.S. Reciprocal Travel Regulations
After several unsuccessful attempts to induce the Soviet Government to
lift restrictions dating from 1941 on American travel in the USSR, the U.S.
Government established in 1953 reciprocal regulations for Soviet travel in the
U.S. As presently constituted, our travel regulations close one quarter of the
continental. U.S. to Soviet travel and require two days notification for travel
to open areas.
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GUNS .LDENZ IAL
The travel, controls do serve U.S. internal security, since the
notification requirement is of ' value to the FBI and the, selection of some
closed areas reflects the presence of military installations. (Of course,
most sensitive defense-related industrial or research facilities are located
in open areas.) However, the controls are primarily intended to provide the
Soviet authorities with incentive to moderate both the form and administration
of their own controls.
The U.S. regulations are administered by the. Department of State, whose
desk officers coordinate exception requests with. the Defense Intelligence
Agency. DIA, in turn, coordinates the requests with the military service which,
from a security standpoint, has primary interest in the geographical area
involved. The information derived from travel clearance is passed on to the
FBI; in the case of Soviet commercial visitors, the IGE also receives the travel
clearance information.
The travel controls are a convenient and effective vehicle on which to
base reciprocity or quid pro quo bargaining. Since they are unwilling to
grant exception requests to Americans, official Soviet Agencies - such as
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Washington - are obliged to
budget their exception requests. U.S. refusals have been rare. Conflicts over
the controls usually center around requests for their waiver by U.S. hosts in
cases where Soviets have declined to request exceptions. Under COMVIS procedures,
the Department of State has since August been requiring the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to submit exception requests for Soviet commercial visitors
traveling directly from the USSR to the U.S.
Soviet exchange visitors have been exempted from the travel regulations
since 1962. However, the professional travel of Soviet exchange visitors must
be approved by the State Department and itineraries reviewed to ensure
reciprocity and protection of security interests.
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VLJ1' 1' 1i_f.1.~ 11t1L
Review and Assessment of US Exchanges and Commercial Contacts
The mechanisms currently used to assess the US-USSR Exchanges and
Commercial Contacts arc the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the President's
Science Advisor*, the Military Implications of. Technology Transfer (MITT)
subcommittee, of the USIB Scientific Intelligence Committee, two task forces
of the Defense Science Board, DoD, the National Academy of Sciences' Board on
International Scientific Exchanges, and specific CIA analytical studies. There
are no special mechanisms to assess US exchanges and commercial contacts with
East Europe and the PRC at this time. (See diagram illustrating Interagency
Coordination of the Assessment Process.)
1. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee
The NSC Under Secretar.ies Committee assigned to the Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs overall responsibility for monitoring the US-USSR
specialized cooperative agreements, requiring him to draft quarterly reports
for the President on their implementation and to bring to the Committee's
attention any questions requiring Committee action. The Committee, on occasion,
requests ad hoc (sensitive) evaluations on technological loss. The quarterly
reports describe recent events of political, administrative, commercial or
scientific-technological significance.
II. The Steering Group of the National Science Foundation
. The President's Science Advisor* was directed by the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee "to undertake periodic review and overall technical assessment of
progress in US-USSR research and development cooperation with respect to overall
US science and technology policies and priorities." The Science Advisor has
designated a Steering Group, consisting of representatives from the Department
of State, National Science Foundation, and Central Intelligence Agency, to
direct and oversee this study. Their review and technical assessment covers
all US-USSR cooperative activities under the specialized agreements concluded
at the 1972, 1973, and 1974 Summit meetings as well as scientific and technical
agreements under Article IV of the 1972 Science and Technology Agreement (i.e.,
separate agreements between private US firms and the USSR State Committee for
Science and Technology and other Soviet technical ministries). Strictly
commercial contacts are not covered by this assessment. The Steering Group
is focusing initially on the scientific and technological aspects of the 11
specialized agreements and is scheduled to produce a report in early 1975. It
has not yet addressed the Article IV agreements nor is it considering political
or economic factors.
* Dr. H. Guyford Stever: President's Science Advisor and Director, National
Science Foundation.
CONI-' II)E?NTIAL,
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V I_'i l ' AAJ L. L%1 .L t .U
III. The Ad Hoc Working Group on -the Military Implications of Technology
Transfer (MITT} .
The ad hoc MITT Working Group of the USIB Scientific Intelligence
Committee was charged with producing a study on US--USSR military-related
technology transfer to be completed by Fall 1974 so as to be available
during the review of the COCOM list scheduled for this year. The Working
Group is focusing on aircraft, computers, air traffic control systems, and
semiconductors.
IV. The Defense Science Board, DoD
The Defense Science Board is composed of members appointed from civilian
life, on the basis of pre-eminence in their fields, by the Secretary of Defense
upon recommendation of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The
Board advises the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical. matters of
interest to the Department of Defense including overall. research and engineering
requirements, long range planning of weapons systems, and judgments on the
desirable scope and effectiveness of these systems to provide adequate defense.
The Board sets up temporary ad hoc task forces on specific subjects as requested
by the Director of Defense Research and Fh.gineering. Currently there are seven
task forces at work, but only two impinge on exchanges: the Net Technical
Assessment task force, chaired by Dr. Charles M. Herzfeld of ITT, is involved
in threat analysis; another concerned with "The Export of US Technology;
Implications to US Defense," is chaired by J. Fred I_,cy, Texas Instruments, Inc.,
and is involved in studying technology loss. There are several new subjects
tinder consideration by the Defense Science Board for task force review and some
may involve subjects related to the overall exchange problem.
V. NAS Board on International Scientific }?xchan es
The Board is composed of US academicians who review and evaluate the
NAS exchange programs with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It also reviews
the beginning program of exchanges between the PRC Scientific and Technical
Association and the NAS based Committee for Scholarly Communication with the
People's Republic of China. There is no organized NAS program to review East
European exchanges with the NAS or with the US National Science Foundation.
VI. Other.
A. The Federal Council for Science and Technology of the National Science
Foundation is no longer involved in the assessment of exchanges.
B. The President's Fore ign Intelli~ once Advisory Board (PFIAB) is aware
of the need for an overall net assessment of US-USSR Exchanges and Commercial.
Contacts but has not yet decided on how to conduct such an assessment. There
has been much informal discussion of this problem among the PFIAB membership.
(See remarks of Mr. Leo Cherne during 3-4 October 1974 meeting of PFIAB.)
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CONFIDENTIAL
C. The role of the ad hoc Intelligence Advisor. Grog on Exchanges is
limited to the development of intelligence opinion, advice and background
data pertaining to individual exchange projects, working groups and areas.
D. The DefenscAdvanced Research Projects Agency administers several
contracts with private organizations for broad studies of the issues pertinent
to the transfer of advanced technology to the USSR.
CONFIDI-'NTIAL
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Vill.
Interagency Coordination
ASSESSMENT
Military Implications of Technology Trans
MITT/SIC/USIB
ARMY
NAVY
AIR FORCE
DOD
DIA
Defense Science Board
Export of Technology (Bucy)
Undersecretaries Committee
Ad Hoc Study (Export of Technology)
Steering Group: (NSF, State/OES,
CIA)*
Quarterly Report (State)
Board on International Scientific Exchanges/NAS
(Review and evaluation of the NAS exchange program
with the USSR Academy of Sciences)
Staff Group subordinate to Steering Group NASA, AEC, DOT,
HEW, NOAA, EPA, State/OES, USDA.
STATE
INR
OES
NSC
JCS
INDUSTRY
TREASURY
COMMERCE
NOAA
NBS
NSF
CIEP
EPA
NASA
HEW
USDA
DOT
FEA
INTERIOR
HUD
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IAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INI IALS
I,
D/OPEI
2
AD/DCI/IC
3
D/DCI/IC
4
S
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
-SEC--T
Remarks :
The attached responds to Admiral
Murphy's request for information about
Intelligence Community activities
relative to technology transfer.
Pam . Z k
1 714;1 s4-iac 44 4F4
J4
jj rr ~ 11-~
~~, I~Y3L !N 1a .
FOLD HERE TO RETURN T
DRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Chi PAID/OPET
14 S
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENT