REPORT BY: THE GRILL FLAME SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
GRILL FLAME (U) CLOSE HOLD/HAND CARRY
REPORT BY:
THE GRILL FLAME
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION COMMITTEE
CLASSIFIED BY ACSI DA
MR. MANFRED GALE, CHAIRMAN
REVIEW ON 31 DECEMBER 1999
REASON 3
SEE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
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COPY4 of~COPIES
GRILL ~~FLAMEYe(-U)cACpL~OSE HOLD/HAND CARRY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)_
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
SG1D
(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction, Chapter 1
Major Findings & Observations, Chapter 2
Page
Recommendations, Chapter 3 10-11a
(S/NOFORN) DISCUSSION
Chronology of GRILL FLAME.Activities, Chapter 4 12-20
Parapsychology in Perspective, Chapter 5 21-23
Evaluation of Parapsychological Experiments,
Chapter 6 24-27
Assessment of Warsaw Pact Parapsychological
Activities, Chapter 7 28-31
Review of Suggested Parapsychological Mechanisms,
Chapter 8 32-33
Evaluation of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments, 34-41
Chapter 9
(C) ANNEXES
Committee Membership, Annex 1
Places Visited, Annex 2
Comments Pertaining to AMSAA, Annex 3
Comments Pertaining to MICOM, Annex 4
Comrticnts Pertaining to ?INSCOM, Annex 5
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43-44
45-46
47-55
56-60
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(C) ANNEXES.(cont)
Comments Pertaining to Livermore Laboratories, 66-67
Annex 7
Evaluation of SRI Criticisms, Annex 8 68-72
Summary & Evaluation of Free-Response Analysis 73-80
Technique, Annex 9
Recommended Research Improvements (Suggestions 81-87
for RV Protocol), Annex 10
References, Annex 11 88-90
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) All connection between official U.S.
Government interest or participation in the generic
field of Parapsychology is classified a minimum of SECRET,
caveat NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. This connection includes
the word parapsychology (or any derivative thereof) and
U. S. Government. All data related to U.S. Government
programs or interest in Parapsychology is disseminated on
a strict, proven need-to-know basis only.
2. (U) The unclassified nickname for this subject is GRILL
FLAME. Within DOD ACSI DA must approve in writing further
dissemination. or reproduction of this report. Future
security planning for GRILL FLAME includes making it
totally a special access program.
3. (U) Release of this report to cleared U.S. defense
contractors and other U.S. Government agencies is contingent
upon written approval of SECDEF or his designated representa-
tive. Release will be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
4. (U) Under no circumstance, other than that described in
paragraph 3 above, will this report be disseminated outside
the U.S. Government.
5. (U) All portions of this report are classified SECRET/
NOFORN. Removal of unclassified pages is authorized only
upon complete obliteration of the nickname GRILL FLAME.
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Introduction (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) Background. In June 1979 it was suggested
by Dr. LaBerge, then Under Secretary of the Army, that a
Scientific Evaluation Committee be appointed to review the
Army's parapsychological activities. In early July 1979,
Dr. Ruth Davis recommended that because of the special
interest of the Secretary of Defense, that the Committee
review the total DOD posture and report directly to the
GRILL FLAME Oversight Committee. ("GRILL FLAME" is the
unclassified code word for any DOD or intelligence
community association or involvement with parapsychological
activities or interests; definitions of scientific areas
discussed can be found in Chapter 5.)
2. (U) Mission and Organization. The Committee was
organized by the Chairrnarz_ see Annex 1) and highly qualified
members were invited to serve from various scientific
disciplines.. All members enjoy a reputation for an ext"emely
high integrity and bring to the Committee a wealth of
experience in experimental design and evaluation. The
areas of expertise of Committee members include Psychiatry,
Biostatistics, Psychology, Physics, Engineering, and
Operations Research. Committee members were car-,fully
screened to avoid any persons with preconceived notions for
or against the subject under investigation, so that an objec-
tive assessment could be evolved. All Committee members
represented themselves and were selected on their individual
merits; therefore, views expressed are neither implicitly
nor explicitly associated with their employing organizations.
The listing of the organizational affiliation in the Annex is
for identifying purposes only.
a. (S/NOFORN) The mission of the Committee, known as
the"GRILL FLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee" was as
follows:
To review the parapsychological research, investi-
gations, and applications within DOD and the intel-
ligence community.
To assess the validity of claims made for the
alleged existence of the PSI phenomena; with
particular. emphasis on the experiments which were
instituted to approach the "proof of principle".
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To recommend a course of action for DOD in
future parapsychological activities.
b. (S/NOFORN) The Committee visited all DOD installa-
tions involved in any aspect of parapsychological efforts
and conducted additional visits and interviews with non-
government sponsored investigators (see Annex 2). In
addition, a large amount of classified reports, intelligence
summaries, and open literature was reviewed. A collection
of all such documents is stored in the Chairman's office
and was made available to Committee members as required.
In addition, available documentation applicable to the
particular investigations in process or related materials
was made available for inspection at all installations
which were visited.
c. (S/NOFORN) Because of the DOD interest for
eventual application and also because of the considerably
greater activity, the bulk of the Committee's work was
concerned with that portion of PSI research and applications
known as "Remote Viewing" (RV). The work on Psychokinetics
(PK) was also reviewed; however, since these investigations
are concerned with the production of physical effects,
there is considerably less controversy from the point ol
view of measurement techniques, but PK investigations share
with RV the perplexing problems of understanding, controlling,
and, indeed, proving the existence of a general phenomenon
and the lack of ability to characterize the effect.
d. (S/NOFORN) Actually, the government-sponsored
work in the area of parapsychology represents a very small
portion of the total worldwide activity in this field.29
Since 1972, the combined funding for DOD and the intelligence
community was less than a total of $1.5M.
3. (S/NOFORN) Report Overview. The following remarks
pertain to the organization of the report and are intended
to help the reader locate relevant information:
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 together constitute an Executive
Summary of this report.
Chapter 2 - Major Findings
Chapter 3 - Recommendations
Chapter 4 is a chronological overview of parapsychological
activities, providing baseline information input to
the Committee. Any value judgments or critique
contained in the overview are not attributable to the
Committee's action, but are included in order to reflect
as accurately as possible the recorded status just prior
to the Committee's activities.
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Chapter 5 defines the specific fields of para-
psychology which are the subject of this report.
This chapter also attempts to establish the
intellectual gaps which exist in trying to relate
various phenomena under the umbrella of para-
psychology.
Chapter 6 is both a practical and tutorial approach
to experimental evaluation, with emphasis on the
role and limitations of statistical analysis vs.
good experimental design and execution.
Chapter 7 summarizes the existing intelligence
assessments of parapsychological activities in
the Warsaw Pact countries.
Chapter 8 summarizes various theories proposed to
describe paranormal. functioning. The material is
included primarily for the sake of completeness
and also offers some editorial comment with respect
to their collective merit.
Chapter 9 reviews and critiques the remote viewing
work as carried out by SRI. This material is included
in the main body of the, report since the 1W work at
SRI is either directly or closely related to all RV
experiments carried out by the DOD and the intelli-
gence community under contract or in-house.
Annex 1 and 2 furnish detailed information on the
Committee's members and their activities.
Annex 3 through 9 furnish background information
and critical comments on many of the programs
which were reviewed.
Annex 10 contains specific suggestions for the
production of an improved protocol for any future
research in RV.
Annex 11 - References
4. (U) General observations.
a. S/NOFORN) All members of the Committee perceived
a real need to carry out the assigned mission and approached
this task with great diligence and utmost sincerity.. The
very diverse backgrounds and experiences of the Committee
members assured that a wide spectrum of objective views
was brought to bear on the subject. The prime motivation
for the professional commitment invested by the Committee
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members was based on the high potential payoff which
the parapsychological phenomena could have for the
military and intelligence communities, if, indeed,
such effects could be harnessed, controlled, and
further advanced.
b. (U) The Committee in the course of its work
gained a very great respect for the sincerity and
dedication which the individual investigators brought
to their respective tasks; in several cases, functioning
under the handicap of a non-sympathetic management.
c. (C/NOFORN) On balance, the Committee has indeed
been persuaded that there is some probability that effects
attributed to the RV phenomena exist under unexplained
circumstances and in conjunction with particular individuals.
However, to date, the experimental techniques have not
been adequate to document such effects.
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CHAPTER 2
Major Findings
& Observations (U)
1. (U) Assessment of RV Phenomena.
a. (U) RV research and investigations thus far
have not proved the existence of the phenomena and have
not conclusively established any parametric dependencies.
The same may be said about overall results based on
current application-oriented activities.
b. (U) Many of the anecdotal events reported to
this Committee as potential evidence of the existence of
RV do not adequately sustain their claim under careful
scrutiny. A few of the examples are subjectively
spectacular, but lack of scientific procedures precludes
their consideration as scientific evidence of the phenomena.
c. (U) On balance, the Committee has indeed been
persuaded that there is some probability that effects
attributed to the RV phenomena exist under unexplained
circumstances and in conjunction with particular individuals.
However, to date, the experimental techniques have not been
adequate to document such effects.
d. (U) Even when granted the existence of the
phenomena, careful attention to the consequences of
false alarm rates in the achievement of useful performance
levels would be paramount.
2. (C/NOFORN) Critique of Parapsychological Programs.
a. (C/NOFORN) Inadequate documentation and failure
to apply adequate controls are the most frequent causes
which limit the credibility that can be given to reports
of "success" attributed to RV applications. In the
judgment of the Committee, sole dependence on SRI-like
protocols to resolve the.RV issue will not be fruitful.
Specifically, all RV programs reviewed included some form
of subjective judgment of the degree of correlation; this
factor and the ambiguous roles of the experimental designer,
viewer, and interviewer are the two principal shortfalls.
b. (U) Operational programs, that by their very
existence assume the reality of RV as given, may
inadvertently establish the assumption in other communities
that RV is real.
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c. (U) The possibility that present efforts can
evaluate the existence of RV is seriously reduced
because the work is carried out often by persons naive in the
area of human experimentation at low budgetary support
levels, with fragmentation of investigative efforts, usinc
deficient experimental designs, and suffering from a lack of
proper management direction. (Removing these deficiencies
does not, however, guarantee that proof or quantification
of the RV phenomena can be obtained.)
d. (s/NOFORN) Lack of proper management involve-
ment, direction, and review was evident at all activities
surveyed; and the government-sponsored RV program lacks
focus, objectives, and top-down management review and
control. This reflects in ambivalent direction and
support at all agencies visited.
e. (S/NOFORN) Most DOD and government-sponsored
work in the area of parapsychology has been application-
oriented; in relation to the worldwide effort in this
area of investigation, it represents a very small portion.
There are currently more than 15021 individuals, research
institutes, universities, and professional societies in
this country alone involved in parapsychological research
and teaching activities. (Much of this work is also done
under poor scientific procedures and in uncontrolled
environments, especially as it concerns RV investigations.)
f. (U) The Committee found no evidence or any
suggestion of fraudulent intent in any of the work
examined.
3. (U) Parapsychological Research Standards.
a. (U) The conduct of parapsychological research
to obtain scientific characterization and credible evidence
of the parapsychological phenomena, would require an
extremely disciplined and dedicated approach including:
(1) (U) Management commitment to a program
which is sustained for an indefinite period of time at
a cost of several million dollars per year.
(2) (U) Building essentially a new program,
structured on an uncertain foundation, since very little
data developed to date is suitable for further scientific
extrapolation, except that previous research has estab-
lished substantial knowledge of what not to do.
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(3) (U) Attracting .a sufficient. number of
reputable and well qualified scientists from a variety
of disciplines who are willing to dedicate substantial
portions of their professional careers to this research.
(4) (U) Accommodationwith substantial inhibitions
in our society to this type of research, resulting in
significant difficulties: (a) for conducting scientific
investigations overtly;(b) recruiting and maintaining the
high quality personnel required for this research;(c)
publishing reports and exchanging data; and(d) establish-
ing sufficient competition to obtain the required empirical
replications.
(5) (U) Establishing test plans and procedures
which are acceptable to the scientific community, which can to
monitored by the sponsor for scientific and human-use integrity,
and which are sufficiently rigorous to allow for experi.--
menta:l replication,
b. (U) Correct "statistical analyses" are a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for proper inter-
pretation of data resulting from experiments of para-
psychology. It is necessary to demonstrate more than
statistical improbability; the quality of the data and
the application of high scientific standards in the
conduct and reporting of parapsychological experiments
are at least as important as the statistical procedures
used in evaluating the credibility of the results.
4. (U) Ps rchokinetic (PK) Activities.
a. (S/NOFORN) The Army-sponsored experimentation
at MICOM and the related contract with SRI, as a stand-
alone effort to assess the potential effects on a
computer-generated random bit stream, will not prove or
disprove the existence of the PK phenomena.
b. (S/NOFORN) Research work in PK-related topics
and detailed experimental planning has been carried out
in several scientific institutions, including the
investigations by Dr. Hawke at Livermore Laboratories,
Dr. Jahn at Princeton University, and Dr. Phillips at
Washington University. Committee members who visited
Dr. Hawke's laboratory were very impressed by the
scientific approach used in his investigations. His
type of PK experiments (see also Annex 7) is seen as
considerably more valuable than PK effects on random
number generators, such as is planned at MICOM.
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5. (U) Status of"Theoretical Knowledge.
a. (U) The Committee found that to date no adequate
theory has been proposed to explain the mechanisms of the
remote viewing process. Several basic mechanisms have,
however, been suggested to explain psychoenergetic
processes. To date, none of these theories is sufficiently
persuasive from a scientific point of view or precisely
congruent with empirical evidence to dictate the construc-
tion of a set of experimental designs that would lead to
a verification of such a theory. (Most of the Committee
believes that an understanding of parapsychological mechanisms
is of secondary importance at this time.)
b. (U) There is no evidence of any unifying para-
psychological concept or even a speculative notion which
provides a basis for assuming that further understanding
of any sub-category of PK or RV will help explain other
phenomena associated with these parapsychological areas;
for instance, obtaining statistically significant results
in affecting the atomic collision process in a random
generator device bears no known relationship to making
remote viewing more reliable and repeatable. Positive
results from unequivocal PK experiments would significantly
increase the confidence of the scientific community to
conduct other parapsychological experiments.
c. (U) The Committee was not exposed to any programs
or suggested programs, which were adequately structured to
prove or disprove the existence of the RV phenomena. Also,
the Committee has not attempted to generate such a program;
however, if a program were to emerge we would be very
sympathetic towards recommending its implementation, since
that would provide the justification for a sericuE scientific
effort.
6. (C/NOFORN) Intelligence Considerations.
a. (S/NOFORN) Intelligence estimates of the quality
and amount of parapsychological research activities in
the Warsaw Pact countries are, admittedly, highly specula-
tive, since insufficient and incomplete data are available
for evaluation.
b. (S/NOFORN) Operational tests of RV are principally
justified because of their potential high value in
obtaining or supplementing intelligene information; however,
the primary risk is that the test results may not be con-
clusive, either positively or negatively, with respect to
the value of such techniques in an intelligence application.
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7. (C/NOFORN)
Program
Considerations. There are three
potential major
which could be
avenues
explored
of exploration available to DOD,
individually or in concert.
a.
b.
(U)
(U)
Proof of existence experiments.
Characterization of phenomena experiments.
c.
(C/NOFORN) Demonstration of utility through
intelligence applications.
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Recommendations (U)
SG1A
1. (S/NOFORN) Proof of Existence. Work to demonstrate
existence of the RV and PK phenomena should be supported
if a credible approach were to emerge; however, it may be
preferable to do this in some other agency other than DOD
in order to more readily conduct the work in an open forum,
which is necessary to subject the research to peer review.
2. (C/NOFORN) Characterization of Phenomenon. Para-
psychological research (RV & PK) or related activities
which have as their goal the scientific understanding and
quantification of the phenomena, should not be sponsored
until existence is established.
3. (S/NOFORN) Operational Applications. The Committee
agreed that continuation of the operational endeavors
does not necessarily imply that scientific proof has been
demonstrated; however, the Committee was divided as to
whether operational applications for intelligence programs
can be carried out in an adequately controlled manner,
sufficient to determine the usefulness or non--usefulness
of the results. (See page Ila for minority opinion.)
(S/NOFORN) The majority (5 out of 8) believed that
operationally-oriented RV activities aimed at determining
the empirical value of RV to intelligence (like those at
INSCOMI should continue, provided the following
are done:
a. (C/NOFORN) Work must be monitored by an
oversight committee that can review the work for its
adequacy and guard against self-fulfilling prophecy. It
should have members from the scientific and intelligence
communities who can evaluate the adequacy of performance
and reliability, as well as the requirements established
by the user and provided to the operators. The false
alarm rate should be considered in assessing the usefulness
of the technique. Adequate review should occur periodically.
b. (C/NOFORN) Dependence on SRI approach should
be phased out.
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c. (C/NOFORN) The attaining of useful data should
not necessarily be attributed to the reality of RV
phenomena.
d. (C/NOFORN) "Human-use" implications must be
understood, properly authorized, and complied with, if
applicable.
e. (C/NOFORN) Work should include adequate controls
so that either value or non-value can be established.
4. (S/NOFORN) Current Programs. The RV work at AMSAA
and the PK experiments at MICOM, along with the associated
contractual supports from SRI, should be discontinued and
terminated in the most cost-effective manner.
5. (C/NOFORN) Additional Future. Activities.
a. (S/NOFORN) Although no significant military
threat from parapsychological applications has been
evidenced to date, the intelligence community should
continue their collection efforts in this field in order
to avoid any surprises.
b. (C/NOFORN) The progress of the parapsychological
research being undertaken by the private sector in the
U.S, and elsewhere in many laboratories and academic
institutions29 should be monitored and periodically
reviewed via a DOD-assigned mission to an organization
with competence in all relevant areas of science, with
the view towards supporting or sponsoring such work as
may be of interest to DOD.
6. (S/NOFORN) Management. A central DOD authority
should be established to manage and fund the para-
psychological program and monitoring activities. Manage-
ment commitment to activities included in such a program
should be unambiguous.
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MINORITY OPINION (U)
(Orlansky, Holloway, Tang) (U)
(C/NOFORN) Operational Applications.
1. (C/NOFORN) Full evaluation of operational tests of
"Remote Viewing" would require valid ground truth data,
reliable scoring procedures, preliminary trials to
establish adequate experimental procedures and whatever
lead times are needed to conduct adequate tests wherever
and whenever they may occur. Since operational tests
can occur with little warning, it is difficult to assure
that most of the conditions noted above can be satisfied
in that type of program. Further, such tests cannot be
varied systematically in order to provide a basis for
evaluating the. sensitivity of the results to operational
procedures or variations among observers.
2. (C/NOFORN) A minority of the Committee believes that
a test program in an operation-like environment is not likely
to provide. useful or reliable data. We see little to be
gained by recommending operational tests.
3. (C/NOFORN) Such tests can also be dangerous. By
encouraging the conduct of operational tests, this Committee
endorses actions which have dubious scientific validity at
best and can have dangerous implications for those who may
rely on its products. At the very least, this Committee
would be giving scientific credibility to operational
activities exploiting phenomena that it elsewhere notes
have not been proven or disproven.
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 DISCUS ION
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CHAPTER 4 .
Chronology of GRILL FLAME.Activities(U)
(U) NOTE: This chapter contains a chrono-
logical overview, providing baseline infor-
mation input to the Committee. Any descrip-
tions, value judgments or critique of
reported results and investigations contained
in this overview are not attributable to the
Committee's actions, but are included in
order to reflect as accurately as possible
the recorded status just prior to the
Committee's tasking.
1. (U) General Investigations.
a. (S/NOFORN) Stanford Research Institute. In 1971,
two laser physicists, Dr. Hal Puthoff and Mr. Russell Targ
became involved in a research program to scientifically
investigate PSI. In 1972, they had the good fortune to
acquire the talents of a psychic of some renown, Ingo
Swann. Swann demonstrated the ability not only to
remotely view targets at great distance from him, but
also was able to somehow affect physical objects mentally.
In a now famous experiment conducted in 1972, Swann was
able to significantly disturb, on command, a superconduct-
ing magnetometer, which was as shielded as technology
could make it. In 1973 a second formidable psychic came
on board. He was Pat Price, a retired police inspector.
Price had no trouble becoming extremely adept at RV.
More recently, Hella Hammond has joined the SRI effort as
a psychic; although was first picked as a control case
and thought to have no ability whatsoever, she has
performed some rather amazing feats.
b. (U) CIA.
(1) (S/NOFORN) In April 1972, the CIA became
interested in potential intelligence applications of PSI.
After discussions with Puthoff and Targ, a modest effort
began.
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(2) (S/NOFORN) By October 1972, the investiga-
tion had expanded to allow a more complete research plan.
The results were surprising, encouraging, and disputed
within the CIA by skeptics from ORD* and budding advocates
within OSI*.
(3) (S/NOFORN) In Summer 1973, Price, Working
only from a set of geographic coordinates read to him,
provided striking descriptions of a "military-like"
facility. As it turned out, the place was a sensitive
NSA installation in West Virginia. Price was able to
"penetrate" into the building and among other accurate
descriptions, was able to correctly name people working
there -- but most important, spoke out. classified code-
words he "read" from file folders.
(4) (S/NOFORN) Next, CIA decided to give Price
the coordinates of a Soviet facility whose exact R&D
mission was unknown. An extremely elaborate protocol
was developed to guard against fraud or other criticism.
Price again provided a great deal of information, but
typically there was a mix of signal to noise; good data
co-mingled with spurious. Of particular note, however, is
a drawing and oral description of a large "crane" at the
target site. Later, CIA analysts concluded that either
Remote Viewing had taken place, or Price had intimate
knowledge of the URDF-3 (an overhead platform).
(5) (S/NOFORN) It was decided to see if Price
could operationally assist in technical collection efforts.
In two tests checked against the interior plans of foreign
embassies known to CIA audio specialists, Price correctly
located the coderooms, leading the operations officer to
agree that the method did have operational potential.
(6) (S/NOFORN) In Fall 1974, an experiment was
conducted in-house by CIA engineers familiar with the
SRI-Price coordinates protocol. The result was a descrip-
tion of what could only be a SA-5 missile training site
at the coordinates. The Libyan desk officer was impressed,
and indicated that a HUMINT agent had previously reported
the same information.
(7) (S/NOFORN) In July 1975, Libyan coordinates
were provided to Price, who came back with a description
of a guerrilla training site -- again, confirmed by CIA
analysts from clandestine agent reporting. The same
month Price tragically died of a heart attack.
*ORD: Office of Research and Development; OSI: Office of
Scientific Intelligence
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(8) (S/NOFORN) Since July 1975, CIA interest
has remained minimal and unofficial. The Agency claims
to have stopped all work. The primary reason for
abandoning the effort was of winning a "Golden
Fleece Award". ar
c. (U) Army.
(1) (S/NOFORN) Army's interest in Psychoenergetic
(PSI) goes back to 1972 and 1975 when the Surgeon General
(MIIA), with DIA, published studies of Soviet/Bloc work.
(2) (S/NOFORN) In 1976, USAMICOM informally
expressed interest in US replication of claimed Soviet
experiments. SRI worked up a small program', and in August
1977, a one-year $80K contract was let by MICOM. Work
was to be accomplished under the innocuous title,
"Investigation of Unconventional Discrimination Techniques."
Of particular interest was Soviet efforts along the line
of man-machine interface; e.g., radar operators continuing
to guide AA missiles to the target despite the CRT images
being obscured by chaff.
(3) (S/NOFORN) By Spring 1978, enough "demonstra-
tions" of the phenomenon existed to warrant serious
consideration for a comprehensive program to explore
military application of PSI. Most promising were three
subareas: Remote Viewing (RV), Psychokinesis (PK), and
Telepathy.. The Army ACSI was designated focal point to
develop a DA program along the following criteria:
(a) moderate intensity, low profile; (b) balanced
distribution of work -- avoid overlap and husband scarce
resources; (c) balanced in-out house effort; (d) in-house
effort first center on replicating SRI-type organizations'
experiments; (e) consider both basic and applied research;
and (f) fit within any future DOD program. A complete
security envelope was placed over Army's interest in PSI,
and the effort was given the unclassified nickname, GRILL
FLAME.
(4) (S/NOFORN) In March 1978, Targ and Puthoff
presented a talk on RV to a select AMSAA/DARCOM audience.
This led to increased effort by AMSAA to explore RV in
harmony with DA guidance, as it might apply to'target
acquisition and target description: (a) ascertain location
and activity status of enemy units; (b) detect changes in
status of places like enemy assembly areas'; (c) detect,
identify, and report. activity of enemy equipment; and (d)
provide real=time battle damage assessment. Also of prime
interest was accessing enemy communications, and command
and control systems.
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(5) (S/NOFORN) In July 1978, DIA sponsored a
series of four unique experiments, in which intelligence
analysts intimately familiar with target sites interfaced
directly with the Remote Viewer. The DIA Project Officer
had prepared three sets of Soviet/Bloc target coordinates,
and one US control set. Even he did not know the coordinates,
until the moment they were read aloud to the Viewer, Ingo
Swann. Immediately upon hearing the coordinates, Swann
verbalized about and drew sketches of the target. Only
low correlation of target description to actual site was
achieved in the first three trials. However, Swann
provided a "moderate to high", lengthy description of
the last target, a Soviet strategic missile field east of
Moscow, a significant achievement. Most amazing perhaps,
Swann passed through a silo cover, "traveling" down until
reaching a connecting tunnel. Going through this passage-
way he entered a command and control room. One comment,
among many stands out: "The floors are paved in 'white
tilesL.-I'_1
(6) (S/NOFORN) In August 1978, Dr. Vorona, DIA,
chaired a meeting to develop a coordinated DOD program.
A permanent working group, comprised of representatives
from all interested agencies/services was established
and has met a number of times to: (a) ensure scientifically
acceptable experiments and evaluation methodologies; (b)
ensure valid investigation of military applications of PSI
and; (c) investigate significance of foreign technical
and military PSI efforts. The working group also acts
as a clearing house for information on the subject within
the DOD framework, and monitors protocols for compliance
with legal and medical guidelines.
(7) (S/NOFORN) In September-October 1978, Army
ACSI and INSCOM designed a small program to narrowly
examine purely intelligence application of RV. The
concept was to familiarize (train) a cadre of personnel
who had been subjectively culled from the whole Washington
area INSCOM organization. Selection criteria included:
above average intelligence, outgoing personality,.
adventuresome, open-minded, mature, artistic nature, and
successful life career. It was preferred that the individual
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not have in-depth PSI knowledge or background. The
following potential intelligence: PSI applications were
identified: locating and effecting undetected entry
into denied enemy units facilities; SALT verification;
advance warning of hostilities; "reading" enemy battle
plans and intentions; tracking and locating key enemy
clandestine HUMINT operations and activities. Implicit
was the development of appropriate countermeasures to
known or suspected enemy PSI capabilities.
(8) (S/NOFORN) AMSAA concluded a contract in
September 1978 to have SRI conduct a number of experiments
in support of the areas of interest outlined in paragraph
lc(4) above. These would be carried out in concert with
the USACDEC, Fort Ord.
(10) (S/NOFORN) Also on 13 February 1979, the
GRILL FLAME DOD Steering Committee first met to hear and
offer comments on the program's developmental status.
Committee members included: all Service ACSI's, Dr. Ruth
Davis, Dr. LaBerge, and Dr. Vorona {standing in for LTG
Tighe). The tone of the meeting was a positive one.
(11) (U) Ms Volner, AGC., provided legal guidance
on 15 February 1979, to the effect that any GRILL FLAME
protocol should be reviewed by the Surgeon General's Human
Use Testing Committee. If found to involve humans as
subjects of research, or "risk" was entailed, appropriate
HEW guidelines and AR 70-25 would apply.
(12 S/NOFORN) On 6 March SRI briefed, at his
SG11 re guest
Also on request, subsequent rie ings were
prove e to him by DIA, CIA, and the Army..
(13) (S/NOFORN) On 26 March SRI and AMSAA
presented their RV-related protocols to the Surgeon
General's ad hoc Human Use Subcommittee for GRILL FLAME.
That panel judged the proposed RV work to be technology
transfer and application oriented, rather than research or
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testing; therefore, HEW and AR 70-25 did not apply.. It
was recommended, however, that: (a)' adequate scientific
review of research protocols should be provided; (b) a
behavioral. scientist should participate in protocol
execution; and (c) separate organizations like AMSAA and
MICOM should develop Human-Use Review Committees and
processes. These recommendations will be incorporated
whenever appropriate.
.(14) (S/NOFORN) This week, MG Thompson requested
the Surgeon General designate, by name, a fully qualified
behavioral scientist to act as consultant during protocol
development. In addition, the Deputy for Science and
Technology in the Office of ASA(RDA), Dr. Yore, was
directed by the Under Secretary of the Army to put together
a small team of four-five highly regarded individuals of
diverse backgrounds, to assist in protocol development,
and to later monitor the work for its technical and
scientific credibility.
2. (U) Other US Government "Players".
a. (S/NOFORN) USAF. Has maintained a small program
over the past few years mainly to replicate known or
claimed Soviet PSI experiments. Since March 1979, AF
ACSI has displayed a positive attitude toward the subject
and it is possible that within a year the AF program will
escalate significantly.
b. (S/NOFORN) Navy. In the early 70's, conducted
some PSI experiments, but claims to-have dropped out
(perhaps because of criticism by press/Congress of "weird"
projects). Suspicion lingers among Army project personnel
that Navy may have nevertheless kept a tightly compartmented
effort going. Navy representatives attend all DOD meetings,
but remain uncommitted and literally silent.
3. (U) Current Status (1979) and Future Plans.
a. (S/NOFORN) MICOM. Concentrating on development
of a program to exploit potential offered by PK. First,
"Phase Zero" calls for replication and evaluation of
certain experiments already designed and performed by
out-house organizations like SRI. Funds are available for
a complete program, but intention is to commit only some
contractor support monies for Phase Zero; the remainder
held in abeyance until that phase is completed. The
following near-term.actions expected within two weeks:
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(1) A committee of three senior scientists and engineers
has been appointed to review the entire PK program; (2)
the committee will select a qualified scientist as program
director and; (3) the program director will be assured of
a quality staff by the committee. Upon completion of Phase
Zero the following objectives, to which fixed milestones
have not been decided by MICOM, will be achieved: (1)
develop a PK activated switch and; (2) conduct an intensive
analytical effort. The PK-switch phase will involve
development of specialized software, hardware and
algorithyms. The analytical effort will include research
of modern physics and formulation of a protocol to look
for the PK "mechanism".
b. (S/NOFORN) INSCOM. Currently in the initial phase
of familiarizing and introducing six RV specialists to
the subject matter. Over the next six months they will
discreetly filter out to SRI for "training" in RV techniques.
The INSCOM contract is $75K. Long term objectives include
(1) refine specific abilities identified in each of the RV
specialists; (2) establish intelligence collection procedures
using RV and; (3) establish an institutional system for
responding to validated tactical and strategic intelligence
collection requirements (ICRs). Milestones:
Feb
79-Jul
79
Initial orientation
May
79-Aug
79
Individual training at SRI
Aug
79-Dec
80
Refine specific individual abilities
'
Oct
79-Mar
80
s
Establish response mechanism to ICR
May
80-Dec
80
Initial. introduction of RV data to
intelligence cycle
Although only a very few INSCOM experiments have been
conducted,. all in the past two weeks, first cut analysis
is encouraging with a moderate-to-high degree of target
correlation. However, it is still too early to make any
accurate assessments or predictions.
c. (S/NOFORN) AMSAA. On-going effort is divided
between contractor (SRI) development of RV techniques;
and AMSAA independent challenge/verification of those
methods and outputs. Through March 1979, SRI accomplished
the following of significance: (1) Remote Viewer(s)
accurately located person(s) unknown to him, with four
out of five first place blind judge matches and; (2) three
experienced RV specialists scored well beyond chance in
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determining access codes to computers. Current contract
with SRI is about $190K. Between April 1979 and March
1980, SRI will perform as follows:
(S/NOFORN) TASK ONE:
(1) Conduct RV sensing tests on Units/equipment
at Fort Ord.
(2) Provide to AMSAA relevant RV data, protocols,
and procedures.
(3) Provide guidance necessary to establish in-
house RV program.
(4) Conduct training of AMSAA personnel on a ten-
choice numerical device.
(S/NOFORN) TASK TWO: Apply and evaluate RV technique
relative to:
(1) Tracking and locating key enemy personnel.
(2) Detect change in status of military unit.
(3) Rapidly determine damage resulting from non-
nuclear attack.
(4) Determine access.code to computers and other
electronic hardware.
,(5) Determine countermeasures to enemy RV.
(6) Determine general'context of enemy documents
and other information items.
(S/NOFORN) Recently, a number of in-house RV trials were
conducted, in accordance with established SRI protocols,
with encouraging results. The first were of the "inbound
and outbound" experimenter variety (beacon individual
goes to target). The next phase (near term) will use the
geographic coordinate protocol. Targets will be selected
that are both distinctive in nature, and which can be
correlated to tactical maps. Multiple viewers will be
used in an attempt to better "fix" precise target locations.
A major goal is to develop better procedures for technically
demonstrating the existence or non-existence of RV. (NOTE:
AMSAA and INSCOM work very closely on the PSI effort.
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Within the spirit of a true team effort, MICOM will probably
fold in well with these organizations, resulting in the
most efficient approach to the problem.)
4. (S/NOFORN)' Funding: The funding for this program has
been very modest since its inception. Except for some
internal salaries which may have been paid from other
sources, the total funding to date is approximately as
shown below for the indicated calendar years:
a.
CIA, 1972-78:
$240K.
b.
DIA,
1979:
$100K.
c.
USAF,
1976-79:
$300K.
d.
Army, 1977-79:
$490K.
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.CHAPTER 5
Parapsychology in Perspective (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) The subject of parapsychological research
and experiments, especially in the context of potential
intelligence or military applications, consists of two
dominant classes of psychic phenomena -- extrasensory
perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK).
a. (U) Extrasensory perception includes topics
such as telepathy, precognition, retrocognition, and
clairvoyance. The primary subject of this report deals
with a category of psychoenergetics generally under the
umbrella of clairvoyance, but specifically known as
Remote Viewing (RV).
b. (U) Remote viewing has been defined as an alleged
ability of a person to sense information about a site,
event, or person removed from any known sensory link.
It has also been described as the acquisition of informa-
tion not presented to any obvious sense; a perceptual
process that acts as information input to the human
subject.
c. (U) Psychokinesis (PK), on the other hand, does
not refer to perception, but rather to a palpable
disturbance of, or interaction with, another physical
or biological system -- spontaneous.or deliberate. Thus,
it is the production of physical effects not mediated
by any obvious mechanism. These are, therefore, perturba-
tion processes that appear as an action output from a
human subject.
2. (U) Under the label of"remote viewing", one generally
assumes a spectrum of phenomena which are significantly
different and to which some or all of the following
attributes have been ascribed by the experimenters in the
field: unlimited bandwidth; extremely high resolution;
ability to cope with very high noise level; no attenuation
due to medium traversed or distance traveled; independence
of: a. target size and composition; b. observer to
target ranges; c. temporal characteristics of events.
Data which might confirm (or not confirm) the existence
of one of these phenomenological characteristics would not
necessarily confirm the existence of any or all of the
others.
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3. (U) It is helpful to divide' the field of psycho-
kinesis according to the magnitude of the energy
transferred. For example, there are the so-called
macroscopic PK effects, 2such as the spoon-bending
exercises of Uri Geller ' .; th2 saltshaker levitations
of the Russian woman, Kalagina and the self-levitations
of the Frenchman, Girard. These have been very highly
publicized, but to the best of our knowledge have
evaded well contolled, systematic experimentation.
a. (U) Then there are PK experiments which involve
much smaller amounts of energy transfer, where the
effects are made evident by an inherently high gain in
the experimental design itself. For example, magneto-
meters normally used for the detection of weak magnetic
fields2are very sensitive to slight displacement of their
spools , certain types of torsional pendula can trans-
cribe infitegimal forces into measurable deflection of
a light beam , electronic strain gauges routinely used
for measuring propagation of elastic and plastic waves
in solids can be used to detect very small disturbances
of solid objects.
b. (C/NOFORN) Next, there is the so-called micro-
scopic PK domain, where one is attempting to intervene
at the atomic or nuclear scale of a physical system:
to influence a radioactive decay process, for example,
or the emission of an optical photon., of the atomic
collision processes in a gas discharge. These are the
sorts of processes involved in most of the random
generator devices, one version of which is now in the
process.-of design at SRI.
4. (U) In the course of reviewing and discussing
research and related activities in the parapsychological
field, one most often merges both the RV and PK areas
into one topic without specific distinction as to
phenomena, scientific curiosity, or potential application.
The facts are that the functional definitions of RV and
PK (as described above) are substantially different and
that to date there exists no theory or even plausible
concept which claims to associate one phenomena with the
other; this also applies to the transfer of claimed skills
in either areas. There exists no conceptual hint or
scientific hunch as to how the knowledge or talent in RV,
for instance, might be related to that of PK or how the
various fields of PK are related to each other.
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5. (U) We suspect that the overriding criteria for
interest in PK research (beyond curiosity) are due to
the fact that physical systems are involved in the
interactions, and we understand how to deal with them
more precisely than when dealing with psychological
phenomena. These are basically hands-off experiments,
frequently involving a number of. disciplines of several
basic sciences to which we have grown accustomed in
more conventional engineering tasks.
6. (U) In summary, the uniform treatment of all
parapsychological activities, PK & RV, on the assumption
that they could eventually fit into one scientific or
technical discipline can serve only to detract from
gaining further insight into the phenomena and dilute
our understanding of the observed effects. Specifically,
there is no evidence or conceptual notion which provides a
basis for assuming that any further understanding of PK
will help explain the RV process (or vice versa), or make
remote viewing more reliable and repeatable.
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.CHAPTER 6'
Evaluation of Parapsychological Experiments (U)
1. (U) Introduction. Fisher? in his classic book on
experimental design begins with a discussion of the grounds
on which scientific evidence is disputed. In summary,
critics who refuse to accept a.scientific conclusion take
one or both of the following lines of attack:
a. The design of the experiment is ill devised or
badly executed.
b. The interpretation of the resulting experimental
data is faulty.
If the scientific integrity of the investigators (proponents)
were not at issue than a. and b. provide a useful frame-
work for evaluating results and conclusions from any
scientific experiment(s). However, in the case of para-
psychological research, results are vulnerable to yet a
third line of attack, namely fraud8, 9, 10, 11, i.e., the
fudging of all or part of the presented data. Because of
the frequent occurrence of documented fraud, it makes it
very difficult for the disinterested observer to attempt
to evaluate published data and conclusions concerning the
existence of paranormal phenomena. The fact that any well
planned deception would be difficult to detect (certainly
from published descriptions) makes the task of evaluating
even more difficult. It appears necessary (unfortunately)
that the issue of investigator (those who are responsible
for the-planning) and experimenter (those who actually
carry out the experiments) credibility must be addressed
in attempting to evaluate research in this area.
2. (U) Guarding Against Deception. J. B. Rhine, a leading
researcher in parapsychology, after discovering and exposing
a case of data alteration (by a trusted colleague and friend)
set out three guidelines for conducting and evaluating
research in this area. These were summarized in Barber's
excellent book12 on pitfalls in human research, as follows:
a. "The necessity of trusting the experimenter's
personal accuracy or honesty must be avoided as far as
possible."
b. "A method that can help avoid reliance of the
investigator's honesty is to involve a number of
investigators in each study."
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c. "Each new experiment must be considered in
effect only a pilot project until it is'everitually
repeated by others; and if an important finding is at
stake, the more repetitions the better."
3. (S/NOFORN) Importance of Replication. We especially
wish to emphasize the necessity of replication. In
other scientific areas replication by independent laboratories
is considered a vital step in the'validating of any.scientific
conclusion. Barber points out that such cross-validation
by independent workers is rare in parapsychology. In our
opinion such independent replication is a scientific
necessity if the existence of paranormal phenomena is to
achieve any degree of credibility. Such replication could
be either literal or constructive. Literal replication would
include exact duplication of experimental procedures,
measuring techniques, and methods of data analysis -- for
example, following SRI's protocol for remote viewing (with
or without same subjects). This is a natural and commonly
used validation procedure. In fact, reported replications
of the work of SRI on RV were essentially of this type.
This was also to be the basis for MICOM's efforts in the
area of PK (influencing the output of random physical
process). The limitation of this type of replication is
that even if similar positive results are obtained, one is
still left with the possibility they were an artifact of
the: a. design, b. the measurement methods, or c. method
of analysis. This problem is somewhat reduced if the
paradigm employed (design, measurement, and analysis) is
widely accepted among the scientific community. This is
certainly not the case for parapsychological experiments in
general:. and is even more of a problem in the area of remote
viewing. In fact, the problem of quantitating (measuring)
the information in a target to be viewed and in the viewer
description (transcript) is a major methodological problem.
This along with other thorny. issues (complicated scoring
techniques) would not make the interpretation of results
from such replications more (or less) credible. In
constructive replication one begins with a clear statement
of the empirical fact (ability to remote view). The
investigator then is free to choose his design, measuring
technique, and procedures for analysis. Positive results
in this case provide stronger evidence for the empirical
fact that is being advanced. Negative results, while they
do not disprove the claim, certainly limit generalization
(the phenomena exists in my laboratory, using my techniques,
subjects, measurements, and data analysis).
4. (U) 'Relationship Between EXperimentalDesign'and
Interpretation of'Data.
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a. (U) Statistical Analysis.
(1) Even if the possibility of fraud could be
discounted (using Rhine's three suggestions would certainly
help), published accounts claiming the existence of para-
normal phenomena may well contain misleading results and
conclusions. The major reasons being faulty experimental
design (ill conceived or badly executed) and/or faulty
interpretation of resulting data specifically when
statistical methods are employed.
(2) It should be emphasized that the experimental
design or plan provides the logical basis for any inter-
pretation of resulting data. If the design is faulty or
if carried out in a sloppy manner (by not strictly follow-
ing protocol specifications),then any interpretation of
results is faulty too. This point is essential to
understand because of the widespread use of statistical
methods, in particular, the statistical significance test,
to support the claimed existence of paranormal phenomena.
b. (U) The'Statistical Significance Test. In brief,
a significance-test is a statistical technique intended
to assess, in probabilistic terms, how likely an experi-
mental result is to have occurred "by chance alone". it
is intended then to help rule out chance as a possible
explanation for an experimental result. For example, a
person who claims to be able to remote view participates
in an experiment in.which he is presented with six targets
to view. A judge after visiting each target attempts to
match each description (transcript)--with one, and only
one, of the six targets. This results in a perfect match,
i.e., each transcript is successfully matched to the
appropriate target. Such a result could have occurred by
random pairing (guessing) of the six targets and transcripts.
However, since the probability of this observed outcome
is 1/720 = .0014 either a rare event has occurred by
chance or some other explanation is more tenable. In this
case the other explanation (offered by the proponent) is
that remote viewing has been demonstrated. Deceptively
simple, but what if the transcripts contained cues
(counter explanation). The results of a significance test
aimed at assessing the likelihood of some experimental
outcome being due to chance does not provide proof that
the explanation offered by the proponent is true. Too
often the results of such significance tests are taken as
proof for the advanced conclusions. Because of the
widespread naive use of this procedure, one must be
extremely cautious in relying on them in evaluating
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published results. The following are but a sample of
the misuse of this technique:
(1) The naive interpretation that statistical
significance implies proof.
(2) A single test of significance (single
experiment) is meaningless. Only when an experiment can
be conducted which when repeated gives similar results do
we accumulate real evidence.
(3) Incorrect calculations (mistakes in arithmetic)
or inappropriate methods.
(4) When they are applied to large amounts of data
looking for interesting findings and when one cr more are
found they are published.
(5) Perhaps the most serious problem in inter-
preting positive results in the literature is that
negative results are not usually published and hence
unavailable. The literature is, therefore, biased in
favor of positive results -- even though they may have
occurred by chance.
5. (U)' Summary.. In a nutshell the quality of the data
(and hence the interpretation) is more important than
whether the "statistical analyses" are correct. This can
only be insured by insisting that the conduct and reporting
of parapsychological experiments meet the highest scientific
standards. Any results from efforts which fall short of this
goal should be, we believe, disbelieved. While honest
differences of opinion may exist as to experimental
approach or interpretation, the burden of proof lies with
those who advocate the existence of any paranormal phenomena.
UNCLASSIFIED
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CHAPTER 7
Assessment of Warsaw Pact Parapsychological Activities (C/NOFORN)
1.(C/NOFORN) The scope of work in this area of research in the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia is detailed in a document
prepared by the U.S13Army Medical Intelligence and
Information Agency. In this document it is pointed out
that beginning tf~th early work (1930's) in the laboratory
of L. Vasiliev (Leningrad Institute for Brain Research),
Soviet efforts in the area of paranormal functioning have
concentrated on behavior modification and control (e.g.,
putting people into a trance at a distance through
hypnosis). This is in contrast to the Western orientation
toward remote data acquisition. Also, apparently in
keeping with their ideology, the Soviet's work is strongly
oriented toward the physical aspects of the channel, such
as determining the propagation mechanisms involved.
2.(C/NOF')RN) The intelligence repvrt13 citea above points out
that Soviet parapsychologists continue to face problems
similar to those of their Western counterparts, in that
observed phenomena are unstable and there is low probability
of proving them in controlled tests under selected condi-
tions. Soviet critics of the science have been quick to
seize on these two characteristics in order to categorically
reject many of the phenomena, and they have belittled
some forms of such manifestations by contending that the
conditions under which tests have been conducted have not
been adequate to preclude fraud. In view of this situation,
the Soviets will continue to investigate methodology, since
they feel it absolutely necessary to quantify observed
phenomena. Although they have not yet done so, the Soviets
may very well be the first to identify the field forces
involved and the means by which they are generated, due
to their concentration on the mechanisms and energetics
involved.
3. (U) A study by Garrett Airesearch, 15, 16 a review
of the Soviet literature on psychoenergetic research,
treats Soviet application of statistical theories, research
done on electrostatics, the development of remote sensors,
hypothesized carrier mechanisms, human sensitivity to
magnetic fields, and training to improve psychoenergetic
performance. Garrett concludes that the Soviet Bloc has
had and probably still has an active interest and vigorous
research program in this area.
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4. (U) The above report points to the increasing
importance of the psychoenergetic area in Soviet research,
an importance underlined in 1973 when the Soviet
Psychological Association issued an unprecedented position
paper calling on the Soviet Academy of Sciences to.step
up efforts in this area. The Association recommended that
the newly-formed Psychological Institute within the
Soviet Academy of-Sciences and the Psychological Institute
of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences review the area
and consider the creation of a new laboratory within one
of the institutes to study persons with unusual abilities.
It also recommended a comprehensive evaluation of experi-
ments and theory by the Academy of Sciences' Institute
of Biophysics and Institute for the Problems of Informa-
tion Transmission.
5. (C/NOFORN) A most recently available intelligence
report17 confirms the continued interest of. Warsaw Pact
research in paranormal phenomena with strong emphasis on
the basic mechanisms involved. However, it is concluded
that most research is of questionable value and difficult
to evaluate. The document also reports. the following:
a. (C/NOFORN) Most of the current research on para-
normal phenomena appears to be performed as an adjunct
to other official duties; however, it is likely that
some researchers are involved on a full-time basis and
are receiving government support. The level of funding
and extent of research is unknown at this time. At least
three and possibly more officially-sponsored research
groups exist in Moscow, Leningrad, and Alma-Ata.
b. ''(C/NOFORN) The striving for ideological acceptance
has led researchers to create .a variety of new terms for
this research and to emphasize theoretical explanations
based on known or yet-to-be discovered physical mechanisms.
While this may lead to improved research in some areas',
it could cause other possibilities to be ignored. An
emphasis on application potential is. also apparent.
Ideological objections have usually given way, in the
USSR, to practical considerations regardless of the
controversial nature of a new idea or unusual phenomenon.
c. (C/NOFORN) Most Soviet research has been with
people who demonstrate consistently high paranormal
performance ability. It is known that there is a program
to screen "gifted people" from the general population and
that training techniques are used to enhance such abilities.
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d. (C/NOFORN) The data for assessing. achievements
in paranormal phenomena research are quite limited, and
very little information is available from reliable
researchers. Even their data usually lack sufficient
backup material. This may be due, in some cases, to lack
of proper publication channels for such research or
possibly to factors of a political or security nature.
Although limited, however., the data available from reliable
researchers are highly significant.
e. (C/NOFORN) Very little quality research data on
paranormal processes are available from Warsaw Pact
countries. This is not necessarily an indication of a
small research effort; lack of publishing opportunities,
caution exercised by the researchers, and government
controls (particularly for government-funded research)
are likely reasons. Although results and conclusions are
reported, the evaluation of experimental reliability is
difficult, since sufficient procedural data are usually
not provided, or sufficient experiments are not performed
(or reported). For this reason, other factors such as
status, cred.-ibility, and facility association of the
researcher, have been considered in the evaluation.
f. (C/NOFORN) There are indications that the
application of paranormal abilities in an intelligence
mode is being considered in the USSR. However, significance
of this interest or existence of specific intelligence-
oriented research is unknown.
6. (C/NOFORN) The reasons for frequent iron-curtain
representatives at Parapsychological Conferences may not
be primarily stimulated by the opportunities to obtain
technical information from U.S. experimental and research
efforts, but may, in fact, be motivated in establishing
contacts with selected attendees for intelligence purposes
beyond the immediate subject matter under discussion at
such conferences.
7. (C/NOFORN) In summary,. neither the Soviets nor the
Czechs are likely.to abandon research on paranormal
phenomena in the foreseeable future, although there will
be more and more demand for objectivity in such research.
Current research is concentrated on efforts to discover
the basic mechanisms underlying phenomena of physical
alteration of animate and inanimate objects at a distance
by mental or other physiological energy transformations;
such effects at present remain totally unexplained. Many
Soviet and Czech parapsychologists are convinced that
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physical alteration is not different from psychical
alteration, since both types of manifestations must
eventually be proven to have an underlying.scientific-.
mechanistic basis. It appears that their parapsychology
research is now concentrated on the energetics of the
problem and is aimed at achieving direct production and
control of the energy involved.
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CHAPTER 8
Review of Suggested Parapsychological Mechanisms (U)
1. (U) To date, four basic physical mechanisms have been
proposed to describe paranormal functioning on the basis of
present theory or reasonable extensions of same.. These
are the ELF (extremely low frequency) electromagnetic
hypothesis, the quantum correlation hypothesis, the extra-
dimensional hypothesis, and the thermal noise theory.
2. (U) The ELF hypothesis suggest's that psychoenergetic
processes are carried by electromagnetic waves in the
frequency region below 1 kHz.18-21 Experimental support
for this hypothesis is claimed on the basis of lower-than
inverse-square attenuation, low bit rates, and ineffective-
ness of ordinary electromagnetic shielding; factors (among
others) apparently common to both ELF and psychoenergetic
processes. The quantum correlation hypothesis stems from
the recognition that a theory of reality compatible with
quantum theory cannot require spatially separated events
to be independent,22-24 but must permit interconnectedness
of distant eggs in a manner that is contrary to ordinary
experience. The extradimensional hypothesis is based
on the ideas of Targ, Puthoff, and May (SRI), G. Feinberg
(Columbia University) and E. Rauscher (University of
California Berkeley Laboratory) pertaining to the use of
extra spatial and temporal dimensions to provide a space-
time.metric especially suitable for-describing psycho-
energetic processes. 27 It has been recently proposed by
E. H. Walker that in psychokinesis (PK), mind influences
a physical system not by transferring energy to it, but by
utilizing the energy already present in the form of
"thermal noise", i.e., the random fluctuations in the
state of the system stemming from molecular heat motion.
'Mind is assumed to do this by identifying and selecting
those low-probability states which give rise to the desired
PK effect. This requires information, and one finds a
relation between the informatiog-processing rate of mind
and the size of the PK effect.
3. (U) None of these theories is sufficiently persuasive
from a scientific point of view or reasonably congruent
with empirical evidence in order to dedicate the structure
of experimental designs to its verification. The current
status of hypothetical underpinning for the possible
existence of psychokinesis is more in the realm of
recreation than theoretical. foundation. Until substantial
repeatability of psychoenergetic processes is established
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and until some basic parametric dependencies of the
phenomenon are understood, it is not justifiable to
pursue a course of action which: pretends to verify any of
the hypothesized mechanisms identified to date. Rather,
it is expected that most likely a suitable theory will be
evolved as basic data is developed from thoughtfully
planned experiments, specifically directed toward
achieving reliable replication.
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CHAPTER 9
Evaluation of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments (U)
1. (U) ' Introduction.
a. (U) Interest in paranormal psychology has ebbed
and flowed in many countries and many laboratories since the
early 1800s. Several professional societies, a few
scientific periodicals, a couple of university departments,
and a variety of popular publications have been devoted to
the general subject matter.
b. (U) While numerous scientific investigations have
been recorded in various types of paranormal functioning,
the field has also been plagued with constant criticism
from the "harder".sciences, including the more conventional
experimental psychology. To cast more doubt upon the
claims of paranormal functioning, there have been several
reported and verified cases of fraud and falsification of
data.
c. .(U) As a result, skepticism of paranormal claims
is generally maintained by most scientists outside the
field. Paranormal researchers have thus been placed in a
position of distrust, doubt, and often considered akin to
magicians, charlatans, and-writers of fiction. In essence,
the paranormal researcher has been asked to prove his
results and claims far beyond the levels of acceptance
required by researchers in other scientific areas.
d.' (U) Recently, considerable attention has been
given to research publications emanating from Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) in the areas of "remote viewing",
a term used by Puthoff and Targ at SRI to describe their
research in clairvoyant description of distant objects.
Because these researchers are trained and recognized as
"hard" scientists (i.e., physicists), they have achieved
a much greater acceptance in some quarters than have the
many researchers who have preceded them. Their publica-
tions in scientific journals such as "Nature" and "IEEE
Proceedings" have augmented this reputation. Finally,
they have, through their many publications, stimulated
related and replicative studies.
e. (S/NOFORN) The SRI work, as well as that of
others relating to their approach, has implications for
covert intelligence information gathering. As a result,
their research has been sponsored by several government
organizations, both within and without the intelligence
community.
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f. (U) Puthoff, Targ, and their associates have not
gone unchallenged, however. Reputable scientists have
evaluated and often criticized their methods, analyses,
claims, and results. They have responded to such
criticisms, publicly and apparently meaningfully.
g. (U) Thus, there exists a growing-body of such
"remote viewing" literature which has some very startling
(to the non-believer) results, but which appears to be
well planned and executed. Because the skeptics of
these results are also vocal, quantitative, and respected
in scientific quarters, the time has been taken by many.
to evaluate portions of this literature and to offer
criticisms as well as support of it. The following
comments are broken down by classification of experiment.
Time and the extensive amount of experimental detail to
support these comments prevent any more detailed descrip-
tion within the context of this report. However, more
detail and supporting documentation can be made available.
2. (U) Evaluation of Experimental Types.
a. (S/NOFORN) Project SCANATE.
(1) S/NOFORN) This series of studies relates to
long distance remote viewing by specification of geographical
coordinates. Targets which were viewed in this. fashion
include a West Virginia site, a Urals site, Kerguelen
Island, Project Atlas, the Sylvania Laser Laboratory in
California, the Berkeley Laboratory Bevatron in California,
Utah and China Lake sites, and several USSR sites.
(2) (S/NOFORN) In general, the Kerguelen Island
and West Virginia site results appear impressive. That is,
the sketches and detailed verbal statements appear to
match characteristics of the targets quite well until one
carefully considers the timing and the notion that each
subject could have obtained the impressive detailed
information during the day that ensued between the first
and second "readings" of each target. Specifically,
following submission of the first reading, each subject
chose to "visit" again and obtain additional more detailed
information. This more detailed information is that which
appears to provide a great match to the target characteristics.
Similarly, inconsistent and conflicting detailed reporting
causes the careful reader to be at least slightly suspicious.
In all fairness, these were early attempts in the research
program and. the investigators were just beginning to feel
their way..'More critical evaluation should be applied to
the longer distance and.subsequent targets.
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b. (U) Local Targets.
(1) (U) The most extensive series of studies
was undertaken with local targets, using individuals
as "beacons". Several:criticisms-can be levied against
this work, although, again viewed in total-and with
straightforward reading of the results, one is impressed
with the degree of.accuracy between some of the transcripts
and the targets. Only upon much more careful analysis
and critical-comparison of multiple reports of the same
studies, does one determine that there are inconsistencies
in reporting as-well as-major experimental questions and
likely flaws which can be raised. Major criticisms revolve
around the selection of subjects and their original clas-
sification, as'a first order of criticism. For example,
the SRI investigators had originally planned to use three
types of subjects (gifted, learners, and controls), and
then subsequently decided to use only the gifted and the
learners. Later, a third category (unselected volunteers)
was added due to sponsor criticism and pressure. Upon
careful examination, subjects who were originally considered
learners somehow became. gifted. There is some indication
that subjects were categorized simultaneously in different
groupings, and that in many cases, subjects had more impact
upon the planning of the experiments than did the
investigators. Lastly, various subjects also participated
subsequently as experimenters, outbound experimenters, judges,
and in other key portions of the research.
(2) (U) Another major criticism is the selection
and preparation of the taraet.Dool. There is inconsistent
reportina as to the size of the taraet pool, the person who
selects the target pool, the means by which targets are
selected from the pool, the individuality of targets in the
pool, the specific naming of'individual targets, and the
number of persons related to the experimentation who are
familiar-with the target pool as well as individual target
samples for a given experiment.
(3) (U) Other questions of concern to the experi-
mental reviewer include the amount of pre-experimental
orientation given to the subject, including the opportunity
to learn various cueing techniques from the inbound experi-
menter; the actual selection of and behavior of the outbound
experimenter; and the nature of feedback to. the subject by
the experimental team upon visiting the target subsequently.
(4) (U) Of the most major concern, however, is
the nature of the judging procedure and criteria for
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for defining adequate responses. Specifically, one
questions the order in which transcripts are evaluated by
various judges, the selection of the judges (one judge is
also a coauthor), the reason why the selected judge for
many experiments happens to be the "best" judge used in
an earlier multi-judge series, and the specific definition
of the "target" which is used for judging.
definition of the "target" in some cases appears to have
been sufficiently vague that many responses could be
determined to describe elements in the target complex,
although the specific target is defined subsequently by
the experimenters and after the judge has made his
evaluation.
c. (U) Technology Target Studies. Within the SRI
confines, a series of experiments was conducted to
determine the degree to which subjects could identify
specific technolorri cal elements used as terrrets. The
target list included. typewriters, machine shops, and the
like. The results again are similar to those of other
local target studies, and the reporting is equally
inaccurate. For example, in one report all targets but
one are the same as in another report. In the first,
one target is an airplane simulator, while the same target
in another report is a complete machine shop. These have
little similarity, yet the reported data and judging
responses are precisely the same. Clearly, this could
by a typographical error, but it is representative of
other reporting inaccuracies which run across the
multiple experiments.
d. (U) Long Distance Targets*With Cueing.
(1) (U) Several experiments were conducted in
which an individual known to the subject visited various
unknown targets at a prearranged time. This type of
experiment has also been replicated by other organizations,
such as the group at Mundelein College in Chicago. The
results are again typically spectacular. For example,
the first such target visited, an airport in Costa
Rica, is elegantly drawn and described. Later, we learn
that this particular response was by Russell Targ, one of
the experimenters who substituted his time for that of a
missing subject on that day. Yet, Targ never again serves
as a subject in any of the experiments, although his
handwritten notations on that particular response are quite
similar to handwritten notations of other subjects in
subsequent experiments. Individual notations on drawings
in'this series appear to change somewhat from one publica-
tion to the next, ultimately causing concern on the part
of the reviewer.
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(2)- (U) There are similar detailed inaccuracies
in the reporting of experiments done on the DARPA computer
network, and with experiments conducted from one portion
of the U.S. to another. A transcript of the Washington
Square (New York City) fountain appears impressive at first,
until one goes through a detailed analysis of the elements
in this target and realizes that these elements, as
described,. closely approximate a variety of other urban
environment targets. A closer approximation of these
elements is, for instance, to Yankee Stadium, for the
element matches to Yankee Stadium turn out to be slightly
better than those to the actual target, Washington Square
fountain. It is suspected that one could in fact find a
target that would more closely approximate the transcript
than would even Yankee Stadium, although no effort was
made to do so.
3. (U) Summary Observations'of SRI Studies to Date.
a. (U) It is recognized that many details, inter-
pretations, and comments regarding the SRI experiments
would be lengthy and perhaps difficult to comprehend,
certainly impossible to present in a short report such
as this. However, several concluding statements appear
warranted and justified. These are as follows.
b. (U) Positive Characteristics.
(1) (U) A protocol has been developed within
which apparently useful remote viewing of local and long-
distance targets has been demonstrated. (The weaknesses
of this protocol were discussed in'the above evaluation.)
(2) (U) Some of the results, particularly the
long-distance results, are difficult to explain except
by the presence of a paranormal, remote viewing ability,
or by use of uncontrolled experimental procedures.
(3) (U) The demonstrated remote viewing ability
is alleged to be insensitive to time and distance.
(4) (U) Real-time, movement-containing activities
can apparently be seen through this ability.
(5) (U) It has been claimed that untrained
subjects can apparently demonstrate this ability and
improve with practice, often providing information as
valid as that of known "sensitives".
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(6) (U) The remote viewing channel is apparently
quite noisy. Concepts of information theory pertinent to
S/N improvement may some day be shown to apply to this
channel as well.
c. (U) Negative Characteristics.
(1) (U) Research reports are of behavioral data,
yet are not presented with sufficient, rigorous experimental
detail appropriate to behavioral science publications and
acceptable to behavioral scientists.
(2) (U) Conflicting, inaccurate reporting of
experimental "facts" detracts from the acceptability of
the results.
(3) (U) Large methodological weaknesses in the
local target and long-distance target procedures provide
alternate (i.e., non-paranormal) possibilities of explana-
tion.
4. (U) Critique of SRI Investigations.
a. (U) Puthoff and Targ have received numerous
criticisms, and have responded to such criticisms in depth.
They have also chosen to publish a list of typical criticisms
and their responses. Attached to this report, as Annex 8, is
a summary of these criticisms, the responses to these
criticisms by Puthoff and Targ, and comments regarding the
appropriateness of these responses.
b. (U) Also attached to this.report, as Annex 10, is
a list of recommended research improvements to the basic
protocol, which might be considered in beginning to improve
upon this protocol. There is no guarantee that these are
the best modifications or improvements, or that they are the
only areas in which improvement is necessary; rather, they
are offered as a beginning point for future researchers to
consider modifications.
5. (U) Comments on Statistical Procedures Used by SRI.
a. (U) As part of the above discussed evaluation of
the remote viewing literature, we had an opportunity to
evaluate thoroughly the. statistical analysis techniques
used by Puthoff and Targ for the free-response transcripts.
That analysis is attached to this report as Annex 9, and
is summarized here.
b. (U) Essentially, the Morris procedure is a valid
statistical analysis., at least to the extent that we are
capable of evaluating it. Its limitation is that it only
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uses a portion of the data,-that, portion which relates the
actual transcript of a given target to the target itself,
and disregards the overall pattern of other transcripts as
they are compared to the targets in question. It appears
reasonable that a competent statistician might develop a
free-response analysis technique which uses'all the data
in this matrix, rather than only the diagonal data.
c. (U) There are some limitations to this technique,
as indicated in Annex 10. These pertain to the sampling
with or without replacement problem, as well as to the
number of targets and correct matches. Thus, the limita-
tions are real, and the violation of these limitations and
the effect of the violation of these limitations upon the
sampling distribution are not precisely known. Unfortunately,
Puthoff and Targ choose sample sizes which border on the
edge of infringement of these violations. However, since
their results are extremely unlikely by-chance prediction,
it is most likely that the violations of the statistical
assumptions are not severe enough to discredit the results
for statistical reasons alone.
d. (U) The recently recommended sequential analysis
technique, to permit continuing analysis of multiple
response data until an acceptance or rejection criterion
is met, appears to be an appropriate one. This approach
has been used in statistical quality control applications
for numerous years, and appears to have no known statistical
flaws. Its application to this particular type of research
is reasonable?as long as all other statistical assumptions
of sampling, independence, and the like are met. A thorough
analysis of the experimental protocol and its bearing upon
the statistical assumptions is more important than is a detailed
analysis of the statistical technique itself, as the statistics
are well established and beyond need for criticism.
6. (U) Overall Summary.
a. (U) Without question, Puthoff and Targ have
achieved much attention and some startling results; while
reputable scientists have questioned the validity of all
of their results. Simultaneously, their methodologies
are in need of much improvement and subject to meaningful
criticism. The only way that their concepts will be
accepted by the scientific community is for non-reproachable
experimenters to conduct similar research, using improved
methods, without any possible intrusion by persons (such
as Puthoff and Targ) having a vested interest in the
results. It is, therefore, recommended that any future
research which may be funded in this area give great
amounts of thought to protocol improvements, rather than to
mere replication of the existing research.
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b. (U) Mere replication of the current protocol,
without elimination of these methodological flaws, will
provide no additional usefil information or results..
Of primary importance in revision of this methodology
is the need to establish objective report accuracies,
based upon target elements rather than upon subjective
matching. That is, an objective evaluation of all
responses is required, one which is not subject to
individual interpretation by judges or experimenters.
c. (U) Further, while advice from the SRI
investigators should be welcomed and heeded in the
conduct of this research and in modifications of the
protocols to be used, they should simultaneously
be sufficiently excluded from the conduct of the
research so as to eliminate any possibility of criticism
due to contamination of the results by these investigators.
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ANNEX'l '
Membership
GRILL FLAME. Scientific Evaluation Committee
Dr. Douglas-B. Tang
Chief, Department of Biostatistics
& Mathematics, Div of Biometrics
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
Washington, D. C. 20012
Dr. Harry C. Holloway (COL, USA)
Professor & Chairman, Dept of
Psychiatry .
Uniformed Services University of
the Health Sciences
4301 Jones Bridge Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20014
Dr. W. Frank Cartwright
Asst to Executive Committee
Code 015, Naval Wpns Center
China Lake, California 93555
Dr. Richard Montgomery
Consultant
Dr. Jesse Orlansky.
.Science & Technology Div
Institute for Defense Anal
4.00 Army-Navy Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202
Dr. Harry Snyder
Professor of Industrial
Engrg & Opns Research
Virginia Polytechnic
Institute.& State Univ
Blacksburg, Virginia 24061
Laddie L. Stahl (MG, Ret)
Consultant SGFOIA3
MAJ William L. Stoner
Coordinator
HQ Department of the Army
ATTN: DAMI-ISH
Washington, D. C. 20310
Mr. Manfred Gale, Chairman
HQ Department of the Army
ATTN: DAMA-ZD
Washington, D. C. 20310
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ANNEX 2
'Committee 'Visits and Discussions (U)
DATE ORGANIZATION/LOCATION
23 Jul Combat Developments Experi-
mentation Command, Fort Ord, CA
24-25 SRI International, Menlo Park,
Jul CA
26 Jul Missile R&D Command, Redstone
Arsenal, AL
27 Jul Pentagon
1 Aug National Security Council
Executive Office Building
4 Sep Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, VA
8 Sep Princeton University & Bell
Labs, Holmdel, NJ
11 Sep Defense Intelligence Agency
26 Sep Pentagon
27 Sep Intelligence & Security
Command, Ft. Meade, MD
INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED
Dr. Bryson/COL Moses,
et. al.
Mr. Targ/Dr. Puthoff/
Dr. Tart
Dr. Jenkins/Mr. Clinton,
et. al.
Executive Session, plus
initial Army Materiel
Systems Analysis Activity
(AMSAA) Briefing by Mr.
Kramer
Dean Jahn & Dr. Lucky
Dr. VQrona
EEC. a .
Executive Session, plus
LTC Watt, et. al.
28 Sep Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity (AMSAA), Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD
6 Nov Lawrence Livermore Laboratories,
1&7 Nov Foreign Technology Division
Wright Patterson AFB, OH
COL Deprospero/Ms.
Taylor/Mr. Copes,
et. al.
Dr. Cacioppo~
et. al.
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INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED
2&8
Nov
9 Nov Pentagon
Executive Session/
.
LTC Watts SG1
10 Dec Pentagon
A
Executive Session
FINAL
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ANNEX 3
Comments Pertaining to AMSAA Investigations (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) We commend the AMSAA staff for their. effort
to attempt to provide complete and.accurate reporting, and
for their candid way of discussing their plans and results
with the Committee. AMSAA proposes to replicate SRI with
some cautions. This can, at best, test the integrity of
the SRI reports; the real issue is to use procedures
which can more reliably control efforts introduced more
or less accidently by experimenters with no expertise in
dealing with human subjects. The objectives of the AMSAA
work are unclear. The five types of CDEC targets chosen
impose pre-or-post cognitive and real-time requirements.
One type of experiment would seem sufficient-- particularly
in view of the opportunities for confusion in such a
target-rich environment as that chosen.
2. (S/NOFORN) The overall-approach of allowing viewers
to participate in experimental design--and statements
made such as, "Viewers have to be believers", are trouble-
some. The restriction to one interviewer--who is also
part of the experimental team--is a mistake. The judging
process apparently only allows positive correlations--
there are no penalties scored for negative correlations.
Both static and dynamic situations are to be viewed--
the implications to judging are unclear. The use of the
SRI approach detracts from the value of these experiments
as an independent approach. COL Deprospero made good sense
in his comments--particularly about-the need to find an
approach which is not "evaluation sensitive".
3. (S/NOFORN) AMSAA started. out by replicating the SRI
protocols. This was done as part of an AMSAA learning
process. They have also made changes in the SRI protocols
so that: a. the integrity of the work will be improved;
b. the dependence on matching transcripts with targets will
become less probabilistic. AMSAA has employed SRI viewers
and training procedures.
4. (S/NOFORN) Examination of SRI findings by this
Committee has not resulted in a finding that SRI has
proven anything of military operational value. We find
the scientific discipline of the SRI effort leaves
something to be desired. Most important, we believe that
"matching" transcripts to targets and then finding
"goodness" will never be of "go/no-go" value to the
military. "Go/no-go" based upon statistical procedures
simply can't be depended on.
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5. (C/NOFORN) It follows that replication of the SRI
procedures, however great the integrity, will not move
us further along the path of making certain what to do
or not to do about RV. The military cannot be asked to
believe a transcript produced from an interview; matched
on a gestalt best fit, and scored statistically.
6. (S/NOFORN) The SRI effort should be terminated for
the convenience of the government. The current AMSAA
effort should also be terminated. We do not recommend
that AMSAA do anything in the RV area at this time.
However, if they were to do so, it should be to develop
evidence, if such might exist, that RV can be identified
on a deterministic basis. There are potential RV
experimental designs which do not depend on "matching"
by others to find if there is a "hit". Further, "hits"
can be scored by equipment that cannot be influenced by
human intervention--however well intentioned.
7. (S/NOFORN) AMSAA stepped off into an experimental
world where they had no professional qualifications.
Their intentions, however, to respond to a request to keep
the program alive demonstrates their very commendable
mission-oriented attitude. They have changed the SRI
protocol to improve the integrity and lessen the dependence
on statistical voting based on unstructured interviews.
For now, though, let us quit spending money on two
serially-connected, not understood human processes and
then wonder why statistical analysis of such processes
leaves our minds filled with doubt.
8. (C/NOFORN) To repeat. If we cannot demonstrate RV--
determi-nistically--on simple targets, why should we
believe that it exists for complex targets with such
reliability that military worth exists?
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ANNEX 4
Comments Pertaining to MICOM Investigations (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) Formally,:the MICOM proposal purports to
replicate a hands-off experiment proposed by workers at
SRI. The goal of this experimental effort is to provide
an unambiguous documentation that the PK phenomenon exists.
At its simplest, a Haitz noise source, a 147 Pm beta decay
source, and a psuedorandom shift register would be used.
as a means of generating a series of "random" numbers.
It will be confirmed that each of these sources will provide
a signal of "random" numbers.
2. (S/NOFORN) The experiment would involve first the
documentation that without a subject present the output
is a random sequence of numbers and that with a subject
present a non-random variation from this previously random
sequences could be produced. An LSI-11 computer will be
used to create the display,.to assume some preselected
sample rate, and analyze the data using sequential analysis
as a method for identifying a "significant" result. (For
details of numbers of trials, modifications of sampling
signal sources and sampling rates, methods of producing
subject feedback, and averaging procedures, see the MICOM
proposal. For an outline of technical details concerning
the proposed configuration of.the system and the test
procedures to insure the integrity of its components and
the system per se, see SRI document.dated August 1979
prepared by E. C. May, Ph.D.)
3. (S/NOFORN) After review,of the proposed MICOM
experimental protocol, we have no doubt that the scientists
at MICOM will be able to assemble and insure the reliability
of the physical aspects of the proposed systems. There
remain a number of questions about the proposed work. The
attractive feature-.of this work is the hands-off, non-
subjective nature of the experimental procedures. As one
begins to examine the details of this effort, although this
strength continues to be apparent, a number of other aspects
of the work tend to convince us that the implementation of
this program is fraught with difficulties.
4. (S/NOFORN) The assumption that the proposed MICOM
proposal is a "replication" of an SRI experiment does
not appear to be well-founded. To date, the proposed
experiment by SRI has not been performed and has yielded
neither positive nor negative results, ergo, replication
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is impossible. Rather, the proposed work is an identical
experiment to the one which will be carried out at SRI.
Any technical difficulties that are the result of a design
oversight should occur at both sites.. The status of
inferential strength that may: be derived from an exact
repetition and precise copying of an experiment at two sites
is discussed by Dr. Tang in his comments. Since the only
formal difference between the two proposed MICOM and SRI
experiments will be the individuals who will carry out the
experiments, we are faced with the remarkable fact that the
effort seems to be designed as experimental control for the
principal investigators per se.
5. (S/NOFORN) There is one sense in which the proposed
experiment is a replication of previous work. The authors
indicate that there have been 54 experiments of the. sort
proposed and that 35 have reported statistically significant
results. All things being equal, one way to evaluate the
proposed experiment is to assume that-if a variation from
randomness does occur, then one could say that of 55 experi-
ments 36 have proved positive. If this experiment proves
negative, then the conclusion would be that of 55 experiments
35 proved positive. If one accepts this way of examining
the potential experimental results,.then it is difficult to
see how the proposed experiments might be decisive. A few
other permutations of results can be stated but none
improve the potential decisiveness of the experiments. It
simply does not appear that given the state-of-the-art as
represented in SRI/MICOM proposals that this set of parallel
experiments will prove to be critical.
6. (S/NOFORN) On the conceptual level, the basis for
assuming that there is any connection between RV and PK is
not compelling. Yet, reportedly,. the motive for creating
the MICOM experiment was to obtain some method to establish
the credibility of the RV phenomena. The investigators at
SRI have observed that one of the "very talented" subjects
was able to influence a shielded magnotometer. Beyond this,
there appears to be only a vague argument that would
necessarily connect PK and RV. For people who wish to accept
that RV exists, the proposed PK experiment would be accepted
as a convincing demonstration, but we doubt that the non-
believer will be convinced. Direct demonstration that
PK and RV phenomena exist would be necessary before even
the friendly but prudent skeptic would accept their existence
as proved.
7. (S/NOFORN) The assumption is apparently being made
that negative results could logically be used to stop
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further experimentation in the RV and PK area. We are
not convinced that this is the case. A negative result
would not eliminate any of the so-called miracles that
convince some that RV yields important results. Since
many of the so-called clear proofs are doubted. by skeptics
because of the vagueness of the.standards being utilized
to confirm the match between the description and the target,
this problem would remain no matter what the outcome of the
MICOM experiment. (See review of RV experimentation.)
8. (S/NOFORN) If one assumes that one or more of the
subjects in this experiment is present in the experimental
situation when the output of the system judged to be non-
random by sequential analytic procedures is used, then one
will not be able to conclude that PK exists. Rather, one
should be prepared to launch a rather large.scale research
program to investigate alternative explanations for the
findings of the mechanisms, how they relate to subject
characteristics, etc. Is the Army, or are other agencies
within DOD, prepared to. support such a program? Will such
an effort split and fragment the capacity to investigate
RV? Are the potential applications of RV the primary
interest? If there is no intent or capacity to support
an extensive and expensive follow-up research program,
thFn it is very difficult to justify the support of the
MICOM experiment. Such a commitment to further programs
would probably be required whether the positive findings
were reported by SRI or MICOM, presuming that positive
findings could not be explained by gross error or improper
data manipulation.
9. (U) It also appears that the investigators plan to
average results across trials. Since each trial will be
subjected to sequential analysis, this would not lead one
to miss a "positive result" on a single trial. However,
it may spuriously increase the N so that a very small
deviation from "randomness" would be a reason to reject
the null hypothesis. In any case to repeat the point
from the foregoing paragraph in other terms, the rejection
of the null hypothesis would not necessarily lead to
interpretation that PK was responsible for the deviation
from randomness.
10. (U) The Need and'Timing for Replication. Since the
proposed experiments have not yet demonstrated a set of
results, the proposed work does not appear to be replica-
tion in the usual sense of that concept. If a replication
as such is required, then it would be advisable to plan
to carry out that work after the initial work had
demonstrated some interesting results. In order for it
to be a replication in the most useful sense, if the SRI
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group demonstrates some interesting findings, then the
work should be replicated in principle by some totally
independent group. Such a group would assume totally
independent responsibility for . its. selection and calibration
of its instrumentation and for the selection and manage-
ment of the human subjects in the experiment. They might
be drawn from the pool of individuals said to be talented
in RV, or from other populations. Any group undertaking
such replication would have available knowledge of the
methods, analytic procedures used, and knowledge of both
conceptual and practical problems encountered in the SRI
experiments. All of these factors could be taken into
account when designing the attempted replication.
11. (U)' Instrumentation. In general, the equipment would
seem to be adequate to the proposed task. It does have the
disadvantage of limiting the range over which one might
test for the influences of PK, since the physical phenomena
that govern the generation of the "random" signal are sub-
atomic events. There is a lack of clarity concerning
whether the LSI-11 will be'so.lely dedicated to the protocol
presented.
12. (U) Experimental Procedures.
a. (S/NOFORN) The MICOM protocol does not appear to
take adequate account of the role of the subjects and
assumptions about subjects in the experimental design. In
the protocol presented to this Committee, it was assumed
that SRI could assure that the subjects have been selected
appropriately and managed correctly from an experimental
point of view while at the MICOM experimental facilities.
An example of the problems this introduces may be seen in
the choice of subjects from the SRI group (or in the present
protocol from the AMSAA) that have "talent." in performing
RV. This tends to support an implicit assumption that if
any deviation with the subjects present. occurs, then this
finding should be taken as demonstration that RV is a credible
phenomenon. No attempt to manipulate variables related to
experience with remote viewing is noted.
b. (S/NOFORN) Another problem that follows from the
human subjects aspect of the protocol is that it provides
a ready explanation of positive results at SRI and,negative
results at MICOM. That is, it may be argued that the
situation at MICOM was insensitive to some needs of the
subject that must be satisfied before the subjects can
display their talent for PK. In order to maintain the
integrity of the proposed experiments, the experimental
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procedures should be fully independent in their manage-
ment.. This would include responsibility for the
management of experimental subjects. In the most recent
proposal-by MICOM they assume responsibility for the
selection and management of human subjects, but no person
experienced in designing human research protocols is
added to. their. scientific team'. A person experienced_in
designing and carrying out psychological experiments in
human engineering (e.g., concerning such factors as signal
detection) should be on the MICOM.scientific team.
c. (U) Perhaps the central problem with the
research design is its tendency to equate rejection of
the null hypothesis with proof of the positive assertion
that PK exists. The problems of using statistical inference
to reject randomness in a series which may be quite large
is troubling. One might speculate that, given the claim
that PK can modify the magnitude of physical forces, that
an experiment might be designed that would use the
modification of the physical aspect of a structure in a
way that could unambiguously be measured. The resultant
modification might provide a more convincing demonstration
that an unexplained disturbance of physical relationships
had occurred and that one potential explanation for the
disturbance could be PK. (In principle, the acoustic
emission experiment by Hawke might be an example of an
attempt to do this.)
d. (U) The exact procedures that will be used to
vary sampling rate from various random sources is unclear.
It is possible that sampling rates will be faster than
physiologic events in the brain.
13. (S/NOFORN) Relevance. of this'Experiment to Military
Applications. According to the MICOM protocol, the
military application of remote perturbation (RP, a synonym
for PK) is'that it "offers the potential for remote man/
machine interactions with computers, locks, switches, codes
and other sensitive or delicate mechanical or electronic
apparatus, barred or held secure from ordinary physical
contact or intervention." The relevance of an experiment
on remotely influencing.a random process to that of
remotely influencing highly controlled processes such
as computers, locks, switches and codes is neither
suggested nor explained. Nor is it explained in what
way processes found in computers are physically similar
to those found in locks, switches and codes, so that
positive findings on one may be regarded as relevant to
the others. The same argument of reference applies also
between the physical-processes used in this experiment
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(beta decay, noise diode, pseudo random shift register)
and those found in computers, locks,,switches, and codes.
14. (S/NOFORN). Contribution of this Experiment. Since
this experiment uses equipment and experimental procedures
designed by SRI, it offers no unique contributions to the
scientific literature that is not already available other
than those of independent control over the construction
of the apparatus and operation of apparatus by MICOM
personnel. It may be that none of these factors is truly
independent of previous experiments if construction of the
equipment, subjects with previous expertise as remote
viewers, and other items in the experiment are shared with
SRI. Since MICOM and SRI experimenting may develop a
close collaborative relationship, it may be that the MICOM
workers may become less neutral with respect to the scientific
issues at stake here. The significance of this speculation
is that the entire experiment at MICOM should be monitored
throughout by a truly neutral, third party, particularly
since "independent" replication is the only discernible
reason for this experiment.
15. (U) Experimental Design. Assuming adequate
experimental control, the basic purpose is to detect whether
non-random output from the apparatus can be associated with
some influence exerted by subjects. Since the mechanism
which may produce this effect is unknown, it is difficult
to design an experiment which is truly relevant to the
question. Statistically significant departures from
randomness may simply mean that certain events occur rarely,
not that they are caused by influences the experimenter
believes he is bringing to bear. It is, to repeat, difficult
to desi?h an experiment without a presumed mechanism. Con-
sideration should be given to modifying or adding to the
independent variables specified for this requirement:
a. (U) Subjects. Subjects other than those judged
as experienced remote viewers should be used to provide an
independent pool of subjects.
b. (U) Feedback. This is presently conceived asa
choice, still unspecified, of one or more video displays
driven by the computer. To this might be added variants
that are controlled by the experimenter without knowledge
of the subject, i.e., be decoupled from the experiment
proper and report to the subject pre-selected artificial
success and failure at various levels.
16. (S/NOFORN) Instrument Calibration. There do not
appear to be any. real doubts about the technical capacity
of MICOM investigators to properly calibrate the proposed
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experimental system and its elements. If one assumes
that PK exists,, then it should be noted that there is
probably no way to control for its effects or the
calibration procedures per se.
17. (U) Random Source Selection. The equipment
complex to be assembled for the experiment contains
three elements, the purpose or significance of which is
nowhere propounded. One, the Haitz noise source,
generates random noise pulses from a device whose output
depends on atomic forces. (Electronic, subject to inter-
atomic potentials.) The second, a B-decay source,
generates a randomly timed output which depends on nuclear
forces. The third is the complex of Boolean logic devices
comprising the LSI-11 computer, whose outputs depend on
the macroscopic movement of carrier electron motion in
solid state components. Which of these elements does
the PK subject influence? Why use two random sources
(nuclear and atomic)? Is there to be an attempt to
ascertain if PK operates on an atomic level but not on
a nuclear force level? If the experimental result is
positive for both random sources, is the inference to be
drawn that PK'operates on carrier electrons (or holes),
or that it operates on both nuclear and atomic potentials?
The lack of rationale for employment of two random noise
sources colors the experiment with the notion that technical
elaboration has received more attention than rigorous
experimental design.
18. (S/NOFORN) Dilemma. From one point of view, it is
difficult to see what can be learned from any replication
of the remote perturbation experiments that have already
been reported. Table 1 summarizes reports. of 55 statistical
significance levels that range from non-significant to
2 x 10-8; 18 (33 percent) are non-significant; the median
value is in the order of 10-2. Any report(s) by MICOM
must fall within this range and cannot change the funda-
mental thrust of the already existing data base that still
must be explained. One replication that relates primarily
to the credibility of 55 reports will not tell us anything
new. What is really needed is a sufficiently different
type of equipment that is able to test one or more hypotheses
that may be formulated to explain these data. It is curious
that MICOM offers no suggestions for hypotheses that might
be tested. A minimal approach (which is not overly
imaginative) could be to test the effectiveness of different
types of shielding; that would, at least, explain the
possibility of identifying certain explanatory mechanisms.
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19. (U) 'Summary..
a. (C/NOFORN) This experiment on random processes
shows no obvious relevance to influencing highly controlled
processes. If there is an-interest in learning whether
it is possible to influence computers, switches, and locks
by remote means, it is suggested that the experiments use
such devices. It will not demonstrate the existence or
deny the existence of a PK effect.
b. (U) If this experiment shows that certain random
processes appear to deviate statistically when humans try
to perturb them, it will still be necessary to postulate
the mechanism which is involved in order to understand what
the experiment demonstrates. (For example, the effect of
cosmic rays on computer "soft fails" has been scientifically
documented.30'
c. (U) The choice of the particular random processes
used in this experiment is not explained well except
possibly for their convenience. In the absence of a
mechanism, even positive effects (whatever that means)
would require us to explore the possibility of perturbing
other types of random processes in order to understand
whether the observed effects are specific or general in
nature.
d. (S/NOFORN) The most pressing motivation for work
in this area appears to arise because of an interest in
verifying the existence of RV (parapsychological effects).
It is our opinion that the proposed PK experiments will not
decisively contribute to the resolution of the questions
about the existence or non-existence of RV. If questions
concerning the credibility of-the "demonstration of RV"
are the most substantial'concerns, then both the SRI and
the MICOM PK experiments represent diversions. This line
of argument leads to the recommendation that the PK effort
as represented by the SRI/MICOM experiments be stopped
and research effort concentrated on the resolution of
questions about the "RV phenomena". Only if the U.S. Army
or DOD were prepared to initiate a large scale research
effort to follow up on either positive or negative results
from the PK experiments should the current proposed SRI
and MICOM work be continued.
e. (S/NOFORN) If the decision were made to pursue
the line of research proposed in the PK proposal at SRI
(we do not recommend it), we urge that no replication
be initiated until the SRI results are in. This replica-
tion should be done totally independently of the SRI effort.
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Implicit in this recommendation is the recommendation that
the agency or laboratory responsible for the replication
assume full responsibility for the selection and manage-
ment of human subjects. Given the high level of technical
expertise in the physical sciences and computer technology
of the MICOM personnel, they might have critical contribu-
tions to make to the construction and calibration of the
experimental system; but given their overall interest in
this area of research and their expertise in managing
human subjects, it would be advisable to carry out the
replication in a laboratory (either in-house or on contract)
already experienced in carrying out human experimentation
in human factors and performance.
f. (U) The importance of the review, critique, and
replication of any finding concerning PK and RV by the
general scientific community must be emphasized. None
of the proposed areas of research concerning PK or RV
will be truly credible until they have undergone the public
examination by the scientific community.
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ANNEX 5
Comments Pertaining to INSCOM Investigations (U)
1. (U)''History.
a. (S/NOFORN)''Tasking. In the fall of 1978, the
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Ft. Meade,
MD was tasked to establish a program to examine potential
use of psychoenergetics for intelligence purposes. Initially,
specific interest has focused on that element now called
Remote Viewing (RV). The INSCOM project (IGFP) has been
and will be evolutionary in nature:
(1) Establish a training familiarization program
utilizing specially selected INSCOM subjects (RVers).
(2) Establish RV intelligence collection
techniques.
(3) Establish a system mechanism for responding
to intelligence collection requirements (tasking by,intelli-
gence producers like DIA) so that RV-produced data is
quickly and efficiently used.
b. (S/NOFORN)' ' Selection ' of RVers.
(1) To accomplish the mission it was necessary
to locate people who might possess requisite psychic talent.
The approach here was to match a large body of candidates
against a number of subjective traits observed by SRI
over the years (an RVer profile).
(2) A total of 251 INSCOM personnel in the
Baltimore/Washington area were considered. Out of the
251, 117 were interviewed in a "survey" which purported
to determine attitudes about possible use of psychic
phenomenon in intelligence collection.
(3) IGFP managers/interviewers were alert for
individuals who were: well thought of by peers and
supervisors, above average intelligence, self-confident,
articulate, adventurous, open-minded, career successful,
mature, and "emotionally stable". Additionally, artistic
ability was desirable. Those who displayed unreasonable
enthusiasm for or against psychoenergetics were eliminated
from consideration. Also culled were those who, for
personal or professional reasons, were uncomfortable
with the concept of collecting foreign positive intelli-
gence by psychoenergetics.
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C. (S/NOFORN)' Lessons Learned During*Selection
Process.
(1) Of the 117 interviewed, 30-40 met the basic
criteria outlined in paragraph lb(3) above. However,
it was impossible to reduce this number further based only
on the RVer profile. Another round of factoring down
was done by application of a criteria based on assignment
availability (relative permanence in the area). The
number of the candidates dropped to 12. The lesson here
is that should an expansion of the IGFP be required, it
will not be difficult to locate people who will do well
in RV.
(2) More than 90% of all those interviewed
considered psychic phenomenon to be real, and of practical
value.
2. (U) Training.
a. (S/NOFORN) At the time the IGFP began, SRI was the
only major serious organization exploring psychoenergetics.
INSCOM was directed to conclude with SRI, a contract which
called for a certain number of RV specialists to undergo
SRI familiarization training.
b. (S/NOFORN) In February 1979, SRI researchers
intimately familiar with the subject matter selected six
of the final twelve candidates to train. This phase began
in April and is expected to end in December 1979. In-house
familiarization and training at Fort Meade started in
February 1979 and is expected to continue indefinitely.
c. (S/NOFORN) INSCOM has generally followed the RV
protocol first established by SRI, with an orientation
toward collection of foreign positive intelligence.
(Note: The Army Surgeon General's Human Use Review Panel
for GRILL FLAME found this protocol to be "technology
transfer" rather than R&D.) As of 1 Oct 79, more than 150
RV tests have been conducted at Fort Meade. Project
personnel assess the results as moderately successful.
Some of the RV cadre now routinely provide useful intelli-
gence data with the RV technique. These individuals have
progressed far beyond so-called "beacon" and basic
geographic coordinates work, and are now engaged against real
world intelligence targets--a kind of OJT.
d. (S/NOFORN) Lessons'LeaPned During Training.
(1) There are a number of factors which appear
to help successful RVers. First, they must sense a
"seriousness of purpose" for the on-hand task.
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Frivolous coffee table tests seem to produce less usable
data.- The RVer must know and be motivated by the knowledge
that his information is important, and that the reason for
conducting a test goes beyond merely proving ("one more
time") his ability to perform RV.
(2) The physical and social environment has a
significant impact. The individual must feel that it is
"OK" for him to perform this unique task; that he is not
somehow considered an aberration or "kook". Physical
surroundings must be comfortable, pleasing to the senses,
and offer privacy, security, and quiet.
(3) If the RVer knows or believes that the
viewing task is the most important event of his day, he is
much more likely to develop good intelligence information.
Outside influences (e.g., family problems, illness, job-
related conflicts) have detrimental effects on his ability
to do well. The bottom line is that the RVer must be
totally committed to achieving positive results and
allowed to achieve absolute mental concentration.
(4) It cannot, at this point, be said that
familiarization training improves one's ability in RV.
The collective data shows no training improvements,
possibly because the whole organization is in a learning
curve. Individually, however, there is noticeable improve-
ment in specific RV abilities following such training.
(5) All persons involved in doing RV say they feel
that they have learned much about the "process"; and are
beginning to be able to distinguish between relevant
(presumably psychoenergetic) target impressions and noise
(fantasy, "analytical overlay!' or whatever).
(6) Experience shows that a major problem is lack
of suitable physical space. The project's present location
is such that high levels of noise influence or abort
RV sessions. Also, due to lack of appropriate office space,
operational flexibility has been somewhat constrained.
(7) A serious problem surfaced during this phase:
the availability of "Sunday hire" RVers to engage'in sessions
The IGFP essentially operates on an ad hoc basis, with
little or no promise of even minimal permanence. Existence
or demise of the IGFP in fact rests on which way the winds
that control scarce resources (time, funds, and people) blow.
All RVers have other,,normal duties in their parent
organizations. As might be expected, this leads to
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considerable.scheduling conflicts. Because IGFP enjoys
what amounts to second priority, sessions are often cancelled
or are impossible to schedule. It is fair to say that this
issue has hindered progress and has been dysfunctional to
the RV process itself. The latter point is that the RVer
finds it difficult to muster requisite positive attitude
and "seriousness of purpose", knowing that RV tasks rank
below those of his primary duties.
3. (S/NOFORN) Operations. Introduction of the RV process
into actual operations has been accomplished several times.
This is not to say that the IGFP is ready for full opera-
tional employment. A great deal of further work is
necessary to establish intelligence collection techniques.
Also, no mechanical system for responding to tasking
exists. Optimistically, some operational utility can be
expected in 1981. First utilization of this special
technique. will most likely be along the lines of tip-off
(or cueing) to other collection systems. These could then
be brought to bear on the target of interest.
4. (U) Comments.
a. (S/NOFORN) The INSCOM activities are being guided
by common sense and disciplined procedures. We should not
lose sight of the fact that INSCOM is not engaged in a
venture into science, but rather one of a utility nature.
Personnel involved are professional intelligence officers
representing the three major disciplines: human, photo, and
signal intelligence.
b. (S/NOFORN) Notably, the IGFP gauges how good
individual sessions are based on strict operational judgments
(how much usable intelligence is produced). This is in
stark contrast to projects in other places which rely on
exotic, often flawed, statistical methodologies to evaluate
the results.
c. (S/NOFORN) The body of wisdom being accumulated
is not grounded on stagnant repetitions of the basic SRI
RV drill first developed in the early 1970s. It is
impressive that the project is moving into type tests
in'which several interations (they call it "building an
intelligence pyramid") on the same target seem to provide
a more accurate, detailed picture of the site.
d. (S/NOFORN) Data on each session is impeccably
maintained. In addition, the managers have developed
several visual tools that lay out clearly the number of
failures, successes and in-betweens. Onen isonottforced
lrcedM
gone
to guess, or have to pry out, what has
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5. (U) 'Suggested Imp rovements 'arid Observations.
a. (S/NOFORN) The current level of personnel assets
should be immediately stabilized for at least two years.
Intelligence analysts should be a direct part of the effort.
Because of disruptions caused by TDY trips, other job
commitments, etc., personnel involved in GRILL FLAME
should be fixed into some organization configuration
controlled by the project officer. (Note: It is only
fair to recognize that one cannot spend his whole day
doing RV. Common sense should prevail and whenever
possible project personnel should be released to work
whenever needed.)
b. (U) An adequate work and administrative area is
needed. It should meet the general criteria established
in paragraphs 2d(2)(6) above.
c. (S/NOFORN) Because of the uniqueness and
sensitivity of the project, extraordinary measures should
be established, followed, and inspected, to ensure that
these individuals involved in the project do not lose
career standing in relation to peers. For example, a
general officer review of all OERs and EERs appears to be
warranted. There is no small danger that an individual's
career, particularly under the present ad hoc personnel
situation, might be irreparably damaged by rating officials
who feel robbed of control of people under their supervision.
d. (S/NOFORN) Regardless of the apparent near-term
potential offered by RV, the INSCOM's project status
should remain one of familiarization and training. The
work should not be prematurely thrust into the operational
arena. For the next two years,, INSCOM should be permitted
the "luxury" of tightening up procedures and attempting
product improvement (see Chapter 3, para 3). The project
should have, should it be needed, support of any resources
within DOD. An example might be USAF support in development
and analyzing intelligence targets.
e. (U) INSCOM is to be commended for its logical,
level-headed, and professional approach to a most curious
problem.
SEM
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3. (U) Bell Telephone 'Laboratories.
a. (U) At Bell we spoke with Dr. Robert Lucky, the
man who probably started the whole (serious) PSI debate.
He did this during his tenure as editor of the IEEE Journal
"Proceedings', by publishing the now famous Targ and Puthoff
article, "A Perceptual Channel for Information Transfer Over
Kilometer Distances; Historical Perspective and Recent
Research."
b. (U) Bell has no on-going PSI research and given
conservative management's feelings against the subject,
never will.
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c. (U) Dr. Lucky believes that SRI does not have a
bona fide. scientific approach. He feels that. good research
is necessary, but should be. carried out by a group of fully
qualified scientists and engineers, with very tight
experimental protocols.
d. (U) He considers the Targ & Puthoff IEEE piece
a very important forward step, but underlines that to be
credible the procedures they describe must be replicated
by many other people and organizations.
e. (U) in 1975, Dr. Lucky attempted a series of six
RV tests, following the SRI protocol. Using in-house Bell
volunteers, the tests were for the most part failures.
But, enough correlations of Subject transcript to actual
target were present in one or two trials, that he calls
the whole thing ambiguous. He concluded that the issue
should be pursued further, but Bell's management called it
quits.
f. (U) Lucky commented that he. once proposed to Targ
and Puthoff that they allow a "debugger" like Randy the
Magician to watch any RI RV session. They refused on the
grounds that no one believes them anyhow, and did not feel
that ;sermitting an extremely vocal critic to intrude into
their lives/work would accomplish anything. (Dr. Lucky
conceded that they have a point, but still believes that
critics' input has a place in the experimental design.)
g. (U) Dr. Lucky described the extremely poor
treatment given by the news media to PSI research. In his
mind it is roughly divided between distortion of the facts
and outright lies. Since he was once chastised by his
superiors, based on a fabricated story in one of the
sensationalist journals, he no longer talks to reporters.
h. (U) He feels that legitimate, scientific research
should be going on, but the best approach is to do it openly,
perhaps with a sponsor like NSF. Peer review would be an
important part of the process.
GBIM9,11 Tdn WN (5)
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ANNEX 7
Comments Pertaining to Investigations by Dr. Hawke at
Lawrence Livermore Laboratories
1. Characteristics of Experiments.'
a. Highly specific physical phenomena are recovered
by instruments while PK "intent" is being "exerted" by
a Subject. Thus a definite "result" is measured in terms
of a physical phenomenon (e.g., grain fracture measured
by physical measuring apparatus commonly used for such
metallurgical experiments). Thus, for instance, grain
fracture is looked for, its occurrence measured and
control experiments performed.
b. Multiple measuring devices measuring different
physical manifestations of the same physical phenomenon
are made. (Although the AE experiments have not utilized
this feature yet.)
c. Control experiments are performed.
d. No "mechanisms" are adduced. The experiments are
phenomenological only. Cause "A" (the PK Subject's "will")
is associated with specific physically describable and
measurable result "B". The "mechanism" which relates "A"
to "B" is not a subject of investigation. Thus "purity"
of intent is present in the experiments.
e.. The statistical probability of accidental occurrence
of result "B" from natural sources other than cause "A"
would appear very much lower than in Random Number Generator
PK experiments.
2. General Comment.
a. Hawke's experiments are the most objective and
scientific of the investigations we have reviewed. Physical
measurements of specific phenomena are being (or will be)
made. His type of PK experiments are, in my view, vastly
more valuable than the PK effects on random number
generators.
b. A means exists for conduct of these experiments on
a compartmentalized basis: Since the experiments utilize
measuring equipment commonly used in weapons development,
"cover" and access restrictions are relatively straight-
forward. As an example, NWC China Lake. is just now
initiating development of contact fuzing utilizing (for the
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first time in the fuzing community). acoustic emission
of materials transitioning the plastic deformation
regime. A small development project on "AE applications
to guided missile fuzing" would provide easily administered
and controlled PK experiments by Hawke.
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UNCLASSI t
ANNEX 8
1. Background.
a. Because a great amount of attention has been drawn
by the SRI work, Puthoff and Targ have also received their
share of criticism from other sources. To combat this
criticism, Puthoff provided us a brief summary entitled,
"Potential Criticisms and Responses." It is well done,
although our preceding evaluations tend to disagree with
some of his "responses." Since it serves as a good summary
of research philosophy, that paper is useful as a "straw
man" for overall evaluation of the SRI methodology. Each
potential criticism (Cl through C9) is repeated below,
along with Puthoff's responses (R1 through R9) and our
pertinent comments. Not all the criticism addressed in
Chapter 9 is responded to in this Annex.
b. The use of this rebuttal method by Puthoff, however,
does tend to draw attention away from other areas of potential
criticism as it makes it appear as if these are the only
methodological areas of potential criticism. Such is not
the case. The potential criticisms and responses, on the
other hand, are sufficiently important to warrant separate
discussion here.
a.' Experiment Selection.
,-Cl: The experiments discussed could be selected out
of a larger pool of experiments of which many
are of poor quality.
R1: Selection of experiments for reporting does not
take place; every experiment is entered as
performed on a master log and is included in the
statistical evaluations.
Comment : Reported experiments, sketches, and the like are
clearly and understandably selected. There is no room in
the journal or open literature reports for the 7000+ experiments
run with Swann, rior for all experiments conducted with other
subjects. Unfortunately, many of the other experiments are
not reported, even in summary form, anywhere. Further,
statistical analyses are'not given for some experiments,
and contain overlap for other series of experiments. This
criticism appears valid.
mm 5L% Tdn (9)
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b. Data'Selection.
C2: Data for the reported experiments could be
edited to show only the matching elements,
the non-matching elements being discarded.
R2: Data associated with a given experiment
remain unedited; all experiments are tape
recorded and all data (tape transcripts,
drawings,. clay models) are.included
unedited in the data package to be judged
and evaluated.
Comment: There is inconsistency, although sometimes
minor, in the parallel publication of the same quoted
transcripts. Presumably, judging cues are edited out.
This has not been done consistently. This criticism is
at least partially valid. It is also unclear as to how
many viewings are allowed both prior to and following an
experiment. From one publication, it appears that all
transcripts are given to the judge. Although all data
may be given to the judges, other readers and audiences
are given selected data.
c. cueing -
C3: This study could involve naivete in protocol
that permits various forms of cueing,
intentional or unintentional.
R3: The use of double-blind protocols ensures
that none of the persons in contact with the
Subject is aware of either the particular
target or target pool; similarly, no one in
contact with a judge is aware of the target-
list/subject-output correspondence. For
example, judges are not taken to target sites
by knowledgeable persons, but rather proceed
to the target sites, unaccompanied, on the
basis of written instructions generated
without knowledge of subject output.
Comment: It has been shown that the questions and comments
offered by the experimenter could easily serve as perceived
or subliminal (shaping) cues. Similarly, it has been shown
that', in. some experiments, the experimenter does know
something about the target pool or has helped to select it.
Other concerns about judging procedures and available
information have already been raised.
LNUU
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The authors use the term "double-blind" frequently.
Yet, they are quite naive as to the behavioral. science
meaning of this term, a naivete which is apparent through-
out their publications. Traditionally, "double-blind"
refers to an experimenter who collects the data and who
is "blind" to the purpose, theory, and potential nature
of the results of the experiment. Similarly, the
investigator is "blind" to the subjects, the data per se,
and the data recording, reduction, and analysis. Thus,
the experimenter'has little influence on the results
because he theoretically does not know what should be
obtained, while the investigator is sufficiently blind
to the direct subject contact and data so that he cannot
influence the results. They are both partially "blind"
in a sense, thus "double-blind". The word clearly does
not apply in either the traditional-, or in a meaningful,
sense to the SRI protocol.
d. Educated Guess.
C4: A Subject may be able to guess as to which
sites in a given area are likely to be chosen
as targets, and may have familiarized himself
with the locations.
R4: In the statistical judging procedure used,
no advantage could be gained even'if a
Subject were to be given a list of possible
target sites beforehand and encouraged to
familiarize himself with the locations.
Even in such an extreme hypothetical case
(no such procedure was ever used) where a
Subject could not help but render a set of
perfect descriptions of target sites, he
still has the basic statistical problem
of generating blind the correct target/
description pair sequence upon which the
statistical evaluation is based.
Comment: The response is quite correct for the statistical
evaluation series. However, demonstration experiments,
such as Grant's. Tomb, Superdome, Washington Square, Ohio
caves, West Virginia site, and all foreign sites are not
subject to statistical evaluation. Previous comments have
pointed out problems in the results for these targets.
Thus, the criticism is at least partially valid.
e. Target Limitations.
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C5: If a Subject is given feedback after an
experiment that today's target was a fountain,
he knows that the following. target is unlikely
to be a fountain, since targets are chosen for
unique differentiable qualities.
R5: The target pool in use (greater than 100 target
sites) contains several fountains, several
buildings, several parks, etc., and, therefore,
the content of a given target, determined by
random entry into the target pool, is
essentially independent of the contents of
other targets.
Comment: This criticism is at least partially valid. The
target pool does not seem to be established prior to the
beginning of all the experiments and Subjects did not have,
say, two fountains, with the exception of two targets which
appeared once for two Subjects. A sub-pool of targets was
also selected from the larger pool; thus, this selection
process may have eliminated. the possibility of more than
one type of target appearing.
f. Target Generality.
C6: Transcripts generated by Subjects are so
general as to match anything. ("Sky'is blue,
grass is green.")
R6: Judging protocol involves differential matching.
Therefore,. true but general statements do not
help a judge to preferentially assign a
transcript to one site as opposed to another.
Comment: Again, this is a valid response for statistically
judged targets, but not for many others (e.g., Washington
Square versus Yankee Stadium). It should be clear that
many transcripts, in fact, match many targets; i.e., the
channel is noisy. Why then (and how). can so many excellent
responses occur?
g. "Read-In" Matches.
C7: Given a transcript and a target, a judge can
"read in" matches.
R7: Differential matching on a blind basis allows
matches to be "read in" equally for non-
corresponding as well as corresponding target/
transcript pairs, and, therefore, provides no
differential advantage.
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Comment: "Read-in". can-.occur for targets not judged
statistically, as was often the case. Experimenter cues
in the transcript can be helpful here. Such experimenter
cueing, or the possibility thereof, must be eliminated
by protocol revision.
h. Inadequate Handling of _Judging 'Materials.
C8: Preparation of judging materials (transcript
typing) may provide opportunity. for a "leak",
or perhaps degradation of typing ribbon may
provide artifactual information as to order
of experiments.
R8: Transcript typing is carried out in a random
order by individuals kept blind to the key;
one-time ribbons are used.
Comment: Typing cues are not nearly as important as
transcript content and judge's prior knowledge. How does
the tape get from the experimental room to the typist?
The typed transcript from the typist to the judge? How
are both stored? Other "security" problems seem more
important than does the typewriter ribbon.
i. Post Hoc Photography.
C9: Photographs used to illustrate remote viewing
results are taken after completion of the
experiments, and, therefore, suffer from the
fallacy of post hoc matching.
-R9: All blind judging, matching, and statistical
evaluation of the results (which is where the
scientific issues are decided) are completed
before photographs are taken; judges do not have
access to photographs during their analysis, and,
therefore, judges cannot be cued into corre-
spondences observed post hoc.
Comment: Several temporal and content problems exist with
photographs. Was the San Andres airfield photograph taken
after the judging? Why do aspect angles of photographs
always coincide with the direction from which the Subject
"views" the target?
The authors have "in five years of self- and other
criticism, . . not found a way to fault either the
experimental protocols or the conclusions derived there-
from." I do not agree, and I believe that careful evaluation
amply documents numerous such faults. Annex 10 offers initial
guidelines, within the general SRI approach, to improve this
protocol and eliminate or reduce many of the criticisms.
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ANNEX 9
Summary and Evaluation of Morris'. (1972)
Free-Response Analysis Technique
1. Several techniques have been devised to permit evalua-
tion of the correspondence between stimuli (i.e., targets)
and responses.(i.e., transcripts) to estimate the extent
to which any given transcript is descriptive of any given
target. Previous researchers have derived parametric
statistical techniques for such, based upon the likelihood
that a given number of matches of transcripts to targets
would occur by chance. Others have developed rating or
confidence scales to analyze such data. Most of these tests
assume independence of matching (i.e., sampling with
replacement), although Stuart (1942) devised a critical
ratio test to handle those cases in which the judge's
ratings or responses were not completely independent.
2. This independency problem is exemplified by Stuart's
example of a tendency for a judge to avoid assigning any
transcript a ranking of one for more than one target.
If a judge has ranked Transcript A number one for Target
A', Transcript B number one for Target B', Transcript C
number one for Target C', and there are four targets and
transcripts, then he is unlikely to rank anything other
than Transcript D number one for Target D'.
3. While parametric tests have been devised to handle
such dependencies, they are distribution based and have
a small error in them, an error which becomes larger as N
becomes small.
4. Morris (1972) offers a general: formula for calculating
the exact probability of a given sum (or less) of ranks for
the preferential matching approach. He also provides a
table for representative situation calculations.
a. Assume the procedure whereby there are four targets
(A' through D') and four transcripts (A through D) which
must be blindly matched, and that the four transcripts must
be ranked one through four for each target. Then the
correct ranks, summed across all four targets, can vary
from 4 to 16. The data matrix is shown in Table.Cl. Following
the procedural requirements,.the sum in each target column is
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. The diagonal (underlined). scores are
the only ones used in the calculation of the summed ranks;
thus, the sum of ranks in this example is 6. In general,
if there are n targets (and n transcripts), the.sum of
ranks can vary from n to n2, with an expected value under
the null hypothesis of (1 + 2 + . . . + n).
73 (g ?Odd, 2.~?1
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TABLE C1. Example of Preferential'Ranks Matrix.
Transcripts
Targets
D'
B' C'
2 4
In general, let.
s = the obtained sum of the diagonal (underlined) ranks,
N = the number of transcripts,
n = the number of targets,-and
= zero and all positive integers not exceeding (s - n)/N.
b. The number of ways it is possible to obtain a given sum, s, is
given by Uspensky (1937, p. 24) as:
s - n
N # t n-l
E (-1) C C
0 n s-Nk-1
where CC is the number of combinations possible of b things taken a at a
time. Restated in a more conventional combinatorial notation,
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 JCLASSIFIED
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(-1) (s) ( n-l
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= (-1) t!(n-t)!~1(n-1)! (s-NE-n) !
C. We are concerned with the probability, under the null hypothesis, of
occurrence of the obtained sum, s, or of any other smaller sum. Thus, we
need to determine the probability of occurrence of all values from n to s.
This summation is expressed by
d. The number of possible ways that the rankings in the data matrix can
be assigned is N. Thus, the probability of occurrence of the given sum,
s, or of any smaller sum is the summation of equation (C2) over values
n
from n to s, divided by N .
That is,
-? s-n
_
s N _
f
l
1
n E
E
n-
)
) (
(
(-1)
p(< s) =
N i= n t
l
t
0
S - n
1
s N t of (i-Nt-1) !
)
(C3)
Nn
.
i E E O (-1) (t! (n-t) !) 1(n-1) I (i-Nt-n)1
_ n
t
0 0
;MT,21DO C~Q~aU
For the example in Table Cl, this equation is equal tot
1 6 t 41 (i-4t-1) !
Prob. ($ 8) a E (-1) if1 (4-LI ! ) (31(i-4t-4) !
= 0.059 . 75
(C4)
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When values of I and s become large, the calculations become
laborious, although. not complex. Morris (1972) has calculated the
critical values of s for one-tailed p values ranging from 0.20 to 10-7,
assuming that N = n. If N 14 n, the above equation (C3) must be calculated,
as it must.for exact probability values or N > 12.
f. For the example given in Table Cl, Morris's table gives a value of
0.05 < p < 0.10, which agrees with the exact p value.
The method is statistically sound, although the Morris (1972) tabled
values do not permit exact p-value determination. The diligent researcher
would undoubtedly choose to perform the precise calculations by using
equation (C3).
It must be noted that this statistical test is valid only if the
rankings are assigned independently for each target. As Morris points
out (p. 406), the obtained p-values should be used only as a rough
approximation in the case of one judge ranking a constant
response transcript set to a constant 'target pool. This
caution is emphasized especially in the case that (1) N
is six or less, or (2) the judge has previously not assigned
any transcript a rank of one on more than on occasion.
h. The first caution (N is less than 6) does not violate
the sampling distribution of the statistics; rather, it
suggests that a judge is more likely to be influenced by his
memory of rank of transcripts applied to previous targets
when the number of transcripts is small. When the number of
transcripts is larger than 6, presumably the uncertainty
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increases to the extent that the judge's rankings
approximate independent responses. No data are offered
to support this notion.
i. The second caution is simply another means to assess
the independence of the judge's rankings. If he has not
redundantly ranked the same transcript one before, there
is evidence he is not behaving independently, i.e.,
ranking with replacement. The caution seems reasonable.
j. Morris further indicates that either (1) or (2)
is particularly pertinent if more than one-third of
the number one rankings are correct and, therefore,
contributing substantially to the small value of s. When
a single judge and constant target pool are used, other
statistical procedures should be devised and used, contrary
to current practice among researchers.
5. Improvement on the Method.
a. Two general techniques are validly offered by
Morris (1972) to solve the nonindependence problem.
In the first method, separate judges might be used for
each "ranking of the targets". This wording would
suggest that a single judge rank all targets against a
given response transcript. Such a procedure would
involve sequential visits to all targets and necessarily
rely upon the judge's memory for at least some target
details. A better method would be to have a different,
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 Approved For Relga
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single judge rank all transcripts for each target,
thereby having no knowledge of the other targets in the
pool or how the same set of transcripts might be ranked
for any other target.
b. The second methodological improvement requires
that a judge be given one response transcript and its
target (unknown) plus "other similar non-target materials
which are changed from one ranking to the next." That
is, the judge might receive Transcript A along with
materials describing Target A' and nontargets E', F', G',
etc. (Table Cl) If the number of targets (plus non-
targets) is large, then n is greater than N, but equation
(C3) can still be applied.
c. As N becomes large (that is, the number of
targets in an N = n experiment becomes large), the judge's
task becomes more difficult in the "standard" protocol;
therefore, it may be more practical to increase n than
N, and let each judge rank transcripts on only one target.
A good rule of thumb, suggested by Morris (1972), might be
to not use this exact test when nN is less than 35.
6. Summary.
a. While Morris (1972) published an important paper,
and his analysis technique is followed by many researchers,
there remains cause for concern. Certainly, it is more
desirable to calculate the exact probability of a given s
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than to use the tabled value, and the calculation is not
very complex or demanding.
b. Of greater importance is the problem of nonindependence
of rankings by the same judge. Most researchers disregarded
this problem, others argue it away by indicating that some
judges do in fact rank the same transcript "one" on two
or more targets. Neither is an acceptable approach; the
second argument merely points out that independence existed
(or a "mistake" was realized by the judge) on one specific
set of responses. What is needed is a more thorough measure
of exact probability which takes into.account the degree of
nonindependence, much as a covariant might be used in para-
metric analysis to remove confounded sources of variation.
c. Perhaps of the greatest heuristic concern in this
method is its partial use of the data. For the case
where n = N, only n of the n2 data points (ranks) are
used. The (n2 - n) unused data become large as N increases.
For example, in the n = 4 case, only 25% of the rankings
enter into the analysis. In the n = 9 case, only 11% of
rankings are used! An exact probability method based on
the correlational relationship in the total data matrix
should be developed. It would potentially provide greater
sensitivity and more confidence among readers unfamiliar
with this particular area of research.
79 ? 'ILL t!') (00)
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7. 'References.
Morris, R. L., "An Exact Method for Evaluating
Preferentially Matched Free-Response Material",
Journal of the American Society for Psychical
Research, 1972, 66, 401-407.
Siegel, S., Nonparametric Statistics, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1956.
Stuart, C. E., "An ESP Test with Drawings", Journal
of Parapsychology, 1942, 6, 20-43.
Uspensky, J. V., Introduction to Mathematical
Probability, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.
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UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX ' 10
Recommended Research Improvements
1. General.
a. Lengthy, careful study is required to develop a
safe, perhaps foolproof protocol. Experience with this
general type of research will be required to refine the
protocol further, to render it acceptable to the
behavioral science research community. Such is beyond
the scope of this report.
b. Rather, the following suggestions are offered
for improvement in. the experimental protocol used generally
by Puthoff and Targ (and others). These improvements,
when used in the context of a "local area" series of
experiments, will yield valid results which can be used
to address questions of channel capacity, phenomenon
existence, learning rates, and the like. Thus, the
suggested improvements are classified by experimental
operation, much as is the published SRI protocol.
2. Target Pool Selection.
a. To carry out a series of n experiments, the target
pool should be much greater than n. The target pool
should be selected prior to the experiment and should
contain distinctive targets. Once distinctive targets
are chosen, however, there should be other similar targets
selected, such as several fountains. These should have
specific, individual details so that a general fountain
description will not apply very well. Most important,
the target pool should be selected by someone not involved
with the experiment and unknown to the experimenters,
investigators, Subjects, or judges. Further, the
experimenters et al. should not know the size of the
target pool.
b. Ideally, the targets and their locations should
be totally unfamiliar to the experimenters, investigators,
Subjects, and judges. For example, the targets could be
selected in and the experiments conducted in a city
totally unfamiliar to the above individuals. In this
manner, cueing and reading-in are less likely. Each
target should be listed on a separate card and should
include what aspects of the target are to be viewed,
e.g., the fountain in.a plaza, and from what viewpoint.
The particular distinguishing aspects should also be
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noted as well as unique, meaningful behavior of a
target person for that specific target. The description
should then be enclosed in an opaque envelope and sealed.
The envelopes should then be thoroughly. randomized. No
numbering system is necessary.. The targets should be
stored in a safe or container inaccessible to the
experimenters, investigators, Subjects, and judges.
Further, the location of the safe or container should be
unknown to the experimenters et al.
3. Investigator. This is the person or persons who
designs the experiments and is familiar with the literature.
He does not collect data, select targets, prepare transcripts,
analyze data, or in any way interact with elements of the
experiment in a manner by which he might deliberately or
unintentionally affect the experiment or its outcome. In
a word, he remains "hands off".
4. Subjects.
a. Subjects can be experienced or inexperienced, as
the purposes of the experiment dictate. As long as the
Subjects remain totally uninvolved in other aspects of.
the experiments, their characteristics are less important.
They should not serve also as experimenters, judges, co-
authors, and target beacons.
b. Further, they should not be close friends of the
experimenters, investigators, or judges. With such a
lack of personal familiarity, idiosyncratic behavior by
the Subjects or investigators is less likely to serve
as a useful cue to the judge.
c. It is assumed that an. intelligence application of
remote viewing would, necessarily and desirably, use the
same Subject(s) repeatedly.. Thus, successful Subjects
should logically serve consistently in that capacity.
However, while in a research mode, when the information
channel is being quantified, care must be taken to avoid
artifactual results due to data contamination from
Subject/experimenter communication. The lack of repeated
use of Targ as a Subject is thus supported, even though
he provided an excellent response to the San Andres airport.
(One must wonder why he wasn't used again in view of this
highly accurate response!)
5. Experimenters.
a. Although we fail to see the need for an experimenter
to be present during the actual transcription, if one is
used, this person must be totally unfamiliar with the
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target pool, selection procedure, target beacon, and as
many of the other details of the experiment as possible.
A defined procedure should be established to make the
Subject feel at ease, and assure him/her that remote
viewing is acceptable. Although it would appear
unnecessary to repeat this procedure with experienced
Subjects, to keep this portion of the experiment
standardized it would be best to repeat these instruc-
tions. No previous results should'bc shown In addition,
a Subject should not be told what kinds of elements or
aspects are to be used in their description of the
target, but rather to describe the perception of the
target as accurately as possible.
b. If an experimenter is present during the actual
transcription, a pre-set list of innocuous questions
might be used. These should be used one if the. Subject
seems to be totally unable to continue describing any
aspect of the target.
6. Target Beacons.
a. If one or more target beacons are used, the
number of these should be specified in advance and then
remain constant. It is understandable that they must be
known to the Subject. However, this does not mean that
they must be present at the site from which the viewing
takes place. Since the Subject does not appear to
"track" the target beacon prior to the start of the
experiment, every effort should be made to keep the
Subject and target beacon at a maximal physical distance
before, during, and after an experiment. This is easily
accomplished if the targets are located at a physical-
distance, such as in another city.
b. The target beacon should receive the target
designation and description from a person totally unconnected
with the experiment and unfamiliar to the experimenter.
This person would not know the contents of the target pool
and would select., on a predefined random basis, one
envelope from the target pool.. This person would relay
the target envelope to the target beacon at a predesignated
location distant from the location of the target pool and
the target.
c. An experiment would begin at a predesignated hour
on predesignated days, the number of which would also be
preset, for both individual Subjects, as well as for the
total experiment.
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d. Targets should be used without replacement,
essentially for the reasons stated by Puthoff and Targ.
e. The target beacon should proceed to the designated
target and view the preselected elements of that target
as specified on the target car.d.. The target beacon should
do only these prespecified activities, which should be
uniquely meaningful interactions with that particular
target.
7. Subject Responses.. The Subject should begin his/her
description of the target at the predesignated viewing'
time. No prior viewing should be allowed. The descrip-
tion should be tape-recorded and should include all
experimenter questions if an experimenter is present,
although, again, I see no need for such. (An uninter-
rupted videotape should also be used to verify the
absence of nonverbal experimentercueing.) A Subject
should be allowed to sketch or model if he/she so desires,
but this should also be predetermined by the Subject and
held constant for each experiment. A Subject may be
encouraged to be as specific as possible, but not told
what kinds of elements to include. Only one viewing
should be allowed.
8. Feedback.
a. Feedback and no-feedback experiments should be
conducted. In a feedback situation, only the Subject
(not the experimenter) should receive the feedback.
The contents of the target envelope can be transmitted
to the Subject. Neither the target beacon nor the
experimenter with the Subject need have any knowledge
of the Subject's response to the target or a description
of the target.
b. The tape-recordings and sketches or models
should be dated, sealed, and immediately forwarded to an
independent person totally unrelated to the experiment
and unfamiliar with all persons thus far associated with
the experiment. This individual should hold all data
until the judging procedure is complete. This person
will also type and edit the tapes, eliminating all
references to previous targets, including any experi-
menter's question, should they not conform to the
criteria for experimenter's questions. A target descrip-
tion should be included with the packet.
9. " Judges and Judging .
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a. Effort should be placed on the development of
objective judging criteria, perhaps measured by an
item count or content analysis, semantic content, or
other techniques better known to psycholinguists.
Type/token ratio approaches might be modified to meet
these needs. In any case, objective criteria for the
judging procedure would greatly reduce the subjective
element in this phase of the experiment.
BM7
b. Several judges should be chosen who are unfamiliar
with the experiment and unknown to those who have
participated thus far. While they may be selected on
the basis of certain personal attributes (e.g., artistic
ability, intelligence, sponsor representatives), they
should have no professional interest in the research.
That is, they should not be magicians, consultants to
the project, co-authors, fellow researchers, etc.
c. Each judge should proceed to each target location,
ordered randomly with the edited tape, associated
drawings or models, and the target description card.
No judge should be given a list. of the targets. Each
judge should proceed to the targets in a different random
order. At each target, the judge should rank all transcripts
against that target, as stated on the target card. The
judge would return his rankings to the individual who held
the transcripts earlier and would then be given the second
target location, continuing until all transcripts have been
ranked against all targets.
10. Data Analysis.
a. Once the judges have completed the ranking procedure,
all associated data should be turned over to another
person thus far unrelated and unfamiliar with the experi-
ment and other persons associated with the experiment.
b. Until an a priori judging criterion based upon
target/response content is developed, the Morris (1972)
statistical approach can be followed. Morris' small
sample and replacement cautions must be heeded and satisfied.
c. To be safe, an experimental series should be large,
on the order of greater than 15 targets per series. This
requires a target pool on the order of 200 targets.
d. Since Morris' technique reveals statistics based
on differential judging among targets, additional targets
could be added to the judges'. target list; i.e., they
might actually visit more targets than were actually
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used and rank all transcripts against all targets, used
and not used. This approach would serve to assure a
ranking activity, rather than-a best-case matching
approach by the judges.
e. While research using larger numbers of targets
and more persons is clearly expensive, the "cleaner"
results. warrant the additional cost. Greater data
from a greater number of judges would result in further
data stability. Since judging is subjective even under
a better defined set of response criteria, in that there
is always some degree of interpretation of what a subject
says, the increased use of judges seems beneficial and
logical.
11. Target Coordinates.
a. If scanning by geographical coordinates is to be
used, the coordinates must be selected by an unimpeachable
person not otherwise connected with the experiment or
familiar with other persons related to the experiment.
The coordinates should describe a variety of targets so
that a Subject'may not try to guess a particular type,
some of which should describe innocuous sites.
Preferably these should also vary in geographical
location such that a Subject could not memorize
detailed maps of any given geographical area. A possible
approach is selection by random number of.a large
(greater than 5000) list of worldwide targets of interest.
b. The coordinates should be transmitted just prior
to the viewing time. No maps and no feedback during the
experiment should be allowed. Again, there appears to be
no need for an experimenter 'to be present. The Subject
should complete his/her viewing in a pre-set time period
and only one viewing should be allowed. Details of the
viewing should be relayed ' immediately via a secure computer
network or other similar form of communication. Again, if
feedback is used, only the Subject should be given feedback.
12. Reporting. A major problem with research in this
field is the incomplete, inexact, erroneous, and duplicate
reporting. All experimental details, responses, instruc-
tions, transcripts, etc., must be reported, however
lengthy and laborious the task might be.' Only in this
manner will the "loyal opposition" be able to satisfy
their desire for facts and re-analysis. Only then must
they resort to a malfeasance or dishonesty criticism.
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13. Application to Intellience'Systems.' Research
conducted and reported to date hasa number of
inaccuracies, inconsistencies; and methodological
weaknesses sufficient to cause concern over its validity.
If all results are.accepted without question;'on'balance
the fidelity of the remote viewing channel appears to be
of limited intelligence value. However, that conclusion
may be totally premature due to the insufficient
methodologies used. To assess validly the value of the
remote viewing channel for operational use, much more
careful research is required, preferably by several
laboratories following the same (improved) protocols
with detailed documentation. It would be particularly
desirable to have different researchers (i.e., laboratories)
conduct experiments with the same experienced Subjects
(e.a., Swann or Hammid). In this manner, the reliability
of the remote viewing channel can be assessed, with a
"known capability" Subject, yet satisfy the demands of
the"loyal opposition" by having replication of the
research by an independent research team using the same
protocol.
87 MELD C LQ IE (NJ)
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ANNEX 11
1. Jahn, Robert G., "Psychic Process, Energy 'Ilansfer, and Things
that Go Bump in the Night," A PAW Special Report,. Princeton
Alumni Weekly, December 4, 1978.
2. Puthoff, H. and Targ, R., "Mind Reach," New York: Delacorte, 1977.
3. Hasted, J. B. , "Physical Aspects of Paranormal Metal Bending,"
Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 1977, 49, 583-607.
4. Ostrander, S. and Schroeder, L. , "Psychic Discoveries Behind
. the Iron Curtain, " New York: Prentice Hall, 1970.
5. Puthoff, H. and Targ, R., "Physics, Entropy, and Psychokinesis,"
Chapter in Quantum Physics and Parapsychology, L. Oteri, ed. New York:
Parapsychological Foundation, 1975.
6. Schmidt, H. A. , "PK Test with Electronic Equipment," Journal
of Parapsychology, 1970, 34, (3), 175-181.
7. Fisher, R. A. , The Design of Experiments, Oliver and Boyd, 1935.
8. Diaconis, P. , "Statistical Problems in ESP Research, " Science, 201:
131-136, 1978.
9. Rhine, J. B., "Some Avoidable Heartaches in Parapsychology,"
Journal of Parapsychology, 37:355-3 6, 1975.
10. , "A New Case of Experimenter Unreliability, "
Journal of Parapsychology, 38: 215-255, 1974.
11. , "Security Versus Deception in Parapsychology, "
Journal of Parapsychology, 38: 99-121, 1974.
12. Barber, T. X., Pitfalls in Human Research, Pergamon Press, Inc. ,
New York, 1976.
13. Maire, L. F., III and LaMothe, J. D., Major, MSC, "Soviet and
Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research," DIA Document No. DST-
181OS-387-75, September 1975.
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14. Vasiliev, L. L., "Experimental Studies of Mental Suggestion,"
JPRS Document No. 59163, NTIS, Springfield, Virginia, May 31,
1973..
15. Wortz, E. C. , et al., "Novel Biophysical Information Transfer
Mechanisms (NBIT)," Document No. EW-76-010, Final Report
on Contract No. XG-4208 (54-20)755 Airesearch Manufacturing
Company of California, a Division of Garrett Corporation,
January 14, 1976.
16. Wortz, E. C. , et al., "An Investigation of Soviet Psychical
Research," Proc. IEEE Electro/77 Special Session on the State
of the Art in Psychic Research, New York, N. Y., April 19-21,
1977.
_1.7. .USAir .Force Systems Command, Foreign Technology Division,
"Paraphysics R&D - Warsaw Pact (U), " DIA Document No. DST-
1810S-202-78, March 30, 1978.
18. Kogan, I. M., "Is Telepathy Possible?," Radio Eng. , Vol. 21,
p. 75, January 1966.
19. Kogan, I. M. , "Telepathy, Hypotheses and Observations," Radio
Eng., Vol, 22, p. 141, January 1967.
20. Kogan, I. M., "Information Theory Analysis of Telepathic
Communication Experiments, " Radio Eng., Vol. 23, p. 122,
March 1968.
21. Kogan, I. M. ,- "The Information Theory Aspect of Telepathy;" RAND
Publication P-4145, Santa Monica,California, July 1969.
22. Bohm, D. and Hiley, B. , "On the Intuitive Understanding of Non-
Locality as Implied by Quantum Theory," Foundations of Physics,
Vol. 5, pp. 93-109, 1975.
23. Bell, J. S., "On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum
Theory, " Rev. Mod. Phys. , Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 447, July 1966.
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24. Stapp, H. , "Are Superluminal Connections Necessary?,"
Report LBL-5559, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University
of California, Berkeley, November 1976.
25. Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. , and Rosen, N., "Can Quantum
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered
Complete?," Phys. Rev., Vol. 47, p. 777, May 15, 1935.
26. Dicke, R. H. and Wittke, J. P., Introduction to Quantum
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