LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01054A000100140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1974
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Law of the Sea Country Study
People's Republic of China
Secret
BGI LOS 74-14
June 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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Law .Of The Sea. Country Study
Supplement
BGI LOS 74-14 SUPP
March 1975
Peoples Republic of China:
Caracas and After
Examination of China's performance at Caracas and after
reveals that the assessment of Peking's overall views on LOS and
its positions on individual LOS issues set forth in the PRC LOS
Country Study (BGI 74-14) remains valid. Peking continues to see
the whole affair as a contest between the developed countries,
primarily the USSR and the United States, and the developing
countries. The former are trying to maintain the status quo,
while the developing countries seek to remove all man's activities
in the marine environment from what they see as a laissez-faire
regime and to place them under a regime of precise rules con-
trolled by individual states, regional groups of states, and an
international authority.
A new oceans treaty will add relatively little area and few
resources to China's jurisdiction. The country already has a
wealth of mineral and petroleum reserves on land, and new petroleu7
reserves are being proven in its continental shelf, well within
China's domain under existing international law. China's coastal
fisheries are amply stocked for the country's needs. The only
foreign fishing fleets in what can reasonably be called Chinese
waters are there with Peking's consent through bilateral agree-
ments.
This supplement was prepared.by the Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research to support the NSC Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea. The supplement updates, but is not a_re-
placement for, BGI LOS 74-14. Comments and questions may be
directed to Code 143, Extension 2257.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
China will find a 200-mile coastal state resource zone of
limited value. The country's eastern seas are too narrow and the
geography of the South China Sea is too complex for simple applica-
tion of a 200-mile rule. To delimit its outer sea boundaries,
China will have to reach agreement with its neighbors -- a practice
already recommended by conventional international law. China has
no bordering straits that will be affected by broadened territorial
seas, and, although the Chinese Navy may in the future begin
showing the flag internationally, it will not require greater
freedom of navigation than the United States and the USSR are able
to extract at the conference.
For China, then, the LOS conference is merely an opportunity
to curb the power and influence of the developed countries and to
gain for itself some measure of influence and leadership in the
Third World. The Chinese made their big move at Geneva in 1973
and at Caracas appeared content to bide their time and said little
that was new. Peking can afford to play the waiting game and may
try to persuade the developing countries to do the same until
their demands are met. To avoid being isolated, however, Peking
will join any move by a majority of developing countries to reach
accommodations that will produce a treaty.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
The Law of the Sea Country Studies are prepared to support
the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The
countries to be included in the series are selected on the
basis of priorities suggested by the chairman of the Task
Force.
25X6
Each study has two parts. Part I is an analysis of the
primary geographic, economic, and political factors that
might influence the country's law of the sea policy, the
public and private expressions of that policy, 25X6
Part provides
basic data and information bearing on law of the sea matters.
This study was prepared by the Office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligence. Biographic support was provided by
the Central Reference Service. The study was coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Depart-
ment of State. Comments and questions may be directed to the
LOS Country Studies Working Group, Code 143, Extension 2257.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Factors Influencing LOS Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Law of the Sea Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Key Policy Makers, LOS Negotiators and Advisers . . . . . . . . 11
Part II - Background Information
Basic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Conventions . . . . 20
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests. . . . . . 20
Present Ocean Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Action on Significant UN Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Draft articles submitted by People's Republic of China (PRC) to
the Seabed Committee
Maps: Regional maps
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUMMARY
China does not have a strong need for a Law of
the Sea (LOS) conference. Nature has favored China
with a natural resource security that few nations
can match. International law provides adequate
protection for China's current merchant, fishing,
and naval pursuits; protection from such possibly
harmful activities as pollution and foreign
encroachment of fishing grounds; and an equitable
share of the adjacent seabed.
China's participation in the LOS negotiations, its most active
involvement in UN affairs since attaining membership in 1971, has been
prompted primarily by Pekin 's desire to achieve leadership of the
lesser developed countries (LDC's) in an effort to wrest an "equitable"
share of the world's wealth from what it sees as a near developed-
country (DC) monopoly. The Chinese will to to Caracas with the idea
that the issues are too many and too complex to be resolved at one
conference. For this reason they have not researched their own country's
LOS interests thoroughly, but have, instead, drawn largely from the
positions expressed by the LDC's in formulating their present LOS policy.
In the main, China seeks to insure that all activities in the sea,
with the exception of navigation and overflight in the area beyond the
territorial sea,* are strictly controlled. To this end, China will
support measures that are compatible with: 1) complete coastal state
sovereignty and the regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea,
including, at least initially, international straits that lie within
the territorial sea; 2) coastal state ownership and management of the
coastal state economic zone, with perhaps some sharing of management
and benefits with adjacent landlocked and shelf-locked states; and
3) maximum international control of the areas beyond coastal state
jurisdiction through an international regime, in which all nations
have an equal voice and through which revenues derived from the
exploitation of the seabed will be shared equally by all nations.
*Peking supports freedom of navigation and overflight in the areas
beyond the territorial sea.
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B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
China's entire 8,250-mile* coastline lies on three semienclosed seas.
Two of the seas, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, measure less
than 400 miles between China and the states opposite. The breadth of
the South China Sea between China and the island of Borneo approaches
1,200 miles. All of the Yellow Sea is less than 200-meters deep;
whereas, the distance between the China coast and the 200-meter isobath
in the East and South China Seas varies from 70 to over 300 miles.
Peking makes no specific claims in the Yellow and East China Seas
beyond its 12-mile territorial sea except for the Senkaku Islands,
which are also claimed by Taipei and Tokyo. Since 1970 when Peking made
sweeping claims regarding its adjacent shelf to counter the claims of
Japan and South Korea, the government has moderated its stand, at least
on the Yellow and East China Seas, by stating that the jurisdiction of
the sea between "China and her neighbors has not yet been delimited" --
an admission, perhaps, of the existence of the legitimate claims of the
other countries. Peking does, however, claim numerous islands in the
South China Sea, which has placed China in dispute with other states
that border that sea over ownership of the Paracel Islands, Pratas
Island, and the Spratly Islands. The PRC, along with the ROC, also
claims the Macclesfield Bank, a submerged atoll 75 miles east of the
Paracels. Lying as little as nine meters below the surface, the bank
covers some 225 square miles. A major shipping lane lies between
Macclesfield and the Paracels, and the Soviets use the bank as an
anchorage. Long dormant, these disputes are coming to the fore as the
petroleum-bearing potential of the underlying seabed is increasingly
discussed.
Uses of the Sea
Mineral Resources -- There is evidence that the continental shelf
adjacent to China is geologically suited for the formation and accumu-
lation of petroleum. The Chinese have, in fact, brought in several wells
in the shallow (less than 40 meters depth), near-shore areas of Po Hai;
and farther south on the same continental shelf, Gulf Oil has a producing
exploratory well 100 miles west of the Senkakus in a Republic of China
(ROC) concession, and the North Vietnamese reportedly have hit oil just
off Haiphong in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the PRC's petroleum require-
ments are met from its land reserves, Peking may plan to pursue its
offshore prospects for use as foreign exchange. China has limited
indigenous offshore capability, and has ordered offshore drill rigs
from Japan and Romania. There are reports of Chinese inqueries into the
purchase of American and Western European offshore exploration and
drilling equipment.
*Distances and areas throughout this paper are in nautical miles unless
specified otherwise.
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Living Resources -- China's coastal fisheries (China claims a 12-
mile exclusive fishing zone) provide at least 90% of the country's
total marine fish catch. The country's small deep-sea fishing fleet,
limited in capability due to a paucity of modern equipment, regularly
travels no farther from the mainland than to the Paracel Islands, 150
miles southeast of Hainan Island in the South China Sea; and there is
little need for it to do so. The seas adjacent to the East Asian main-
land contain some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world.
A vast expanse of shallow shelf water, the occurrance of both warm and
cold currents, and an abundant supply of nutrients washed from the
mainland combine to bring huge stocks of a wide variety of fish species
within easy reach of China's coastal fishing fleets. The bulk of China's
marine catch is consumed in the Chinese coastal area; the remainder
provides a steady but unspectacular foreign exchange item.
Peking has entered into fishing agreements with Moscow, P'yongyang,
Tokyo, and Hanoi. The China-Japan agreement deals only with fishing
grounds on the Chinese side of a hypothetical median line in the Yellow
and East China Seas, emphasizing the Chinese predilection for coastal
fisheries, beyond which fishermen rarely venture.
Marine Transportation -- The bulk of China's foreign seaborne trade
is carried by foreign vessels; many of Peking's ships fly U.K., Somali,
Liberian, and Panamanian flags. The ships are controlled by Peking,
though Polish, Albanian, and Tanzanian capital is involved. China is
purchasing ships through Hong-Kong-based companies to increase its own
international flag-ship fleet.
The threat posed by ROC naval forces in the Formosa Strait has caused
the PRC to split its merchant fleet largely into northern and southern
components. The northern component operates on routes to North Korea,
Japan, and Canada; the southern component, to North Vietnam, Southern
Asia, Africa, and Europe. Occasionally, PRC flag ships operate on
routes between Europe and Shanghai, traveling east of Taiwan and through
the Ryukyu Islands; the latter contain several passages that are wider
than 24 miles. China's leading partners in foreign seaborne trade are
Japan, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, West Germany, Belgium,
and Italy.
Naval and Air Transportation Considerations -- The PRC has the
largest and fastest growing naval force in non-Soviet East Asia. The
size of its submarine force is third only to those of the U.S.S.R. and
the United States, and its air arm has over 700 aircraft. Despite its
size, the PRC Navy is still primarily a coastal defense force. The
Chinese are, however, developing a submarine launched ballistic
missile system, an indication that they have plans for more extensive
naval operations. It is estimated that the Chinese will be "showing
the flag" internationally by the 1980's.
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China operates only one over-water civil air route--between Peking
and P'yongyang--but is planning service to Tokyo later this year.
For China, the LOS negotiations are another episode in the con-
tinuing struggle between the "victims of imperialist and colonialist
oppression" and the developed countries (DC's), particularly the
"superpowers"--a struggle between the "plundered" and the "plunderers."
Peking fancys itself the leader of the LDC's, and, by acclaiming and
championing their LOS views, hopes to gain recognition as such in its
effort to minimize what it sees as almost total DC-control of the seas.
Peking looks on the LOS Conference as an opportunity for the LDC's to
get theirs, hopefully at the expense of the DC's.
In its early involvement in LOS affairs, China gave unreserved
support to LDC stands, particularly the right of a state to make
unilateral, unlimited claims to the adjacent sea, to set standards,
and to exercise enforcement. Later, however, Peking began to modify its
stand. Although still an ardent supporter of maximum coastal state
control of the coastal zone, Peking has spoken of limits on coastal
state control, negotiation, reaching concensus, and regional rather
than individual standards. This shift may represent a maturation of
the Chinese view of the world, perhaps a result of its participation
in the U.N. It may also reflect Peking's realization of the limits on
its own options imposed by its semienclosed sea situation. While terri-
torial disputes in the South China Sea may delay implementation of any
international LOS standards there, the very breadth of the seas north
of Taiwan will preclude establishment of 200-mile or greater coastal
economic zones. Peking now must be aware that accommodation with its
immediate neighbors is necessary for the peaceful and orderly use of
its bordering seas, and has, perhaps, begun to project this idea to
the international scene with the realization that certain international
standards also are necessary.
China will probably support the 12-mile territorial sea. Despite
Peking's repeated official statements that the individual state has the
right to delimit its own territorial sea and voiced opposition to having
a 3- or 12-mile limit imposed on the world by the "superpowers," the
Chinese will, to avoid alienation of the LDC's and in the interest of
world order, agree to an international limit of 12 miles for the terri-
torial seas. Peking may make its support for 12 miles contingent upon
the adoption of a 200-mile exclusive coastal economic zone. Peking has
indicated that the innocent-passage regime, as now defined, would pre-
vail in the territorial sea.
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Although Peking claims a 12-mile national territorial sea, it has
yet to commit itself publicly to a specific figure for the maximum
breadth of the international territorial sea. Its early LOS statements
used "territorial sea" and "exclusive economic or resource zone"
interchangeably and defended the right of the individual state to
"reasonably" delimit its own in accordance with the state's geographic
and economic circumstances and with due consideration to the claims of
adjacent and opposite states. However, in March 1973 in private
conversation with U.S. officials, PRC Seabed Committee delegate Shen
Wei-liang said that the territorial sea would be much narrower than
the economic zone. Later, although still defending the right of the
state to delimit its own sea boundaries, Shen said that an inter-
national maximum breadth for the territorial sea should be "settled
by all states through consultations."
Straits
The PRC has thus far opposed an unimpeded transit regime in straits
that are overlapped by the territorial sea. Peking considers such
straits integral parts of the strait state's sovereign territory and,
therefore, under the more restrictive innocent passage regime. Peking's
1973 draft articles (see Annex) stipulate that foreign nonmilitary
ships would enjoy innocent passage in such straits and that aircraft
would have to comply with the laws of the strait state. The articles
further specify that the strait state "may" require foreign military
ships either to tender prior notification or seek prior approval from
the strait state--leaving approval or disapproval of military transit
completely to the discrimination of the strait state. PRC officials
have expressed particular fear of submarines operating submerged off
their coast. At the August 1972 Seabed Committee meetings, however, PRC
delegate Hsia P'u privately indicated to U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegates
that unimpeded passage was negotiable. This, together with what is known
of China's developing naval capabilities and plans, hint that it may not,
in fact, be as wed to the innocent passage rule as it professes. A strict
innocent passage regime in straits that are overlapped by extended
territorial seas would restrict Chinese naval operations, as well as
those of the United States and the U.S.S.R. But the Chinese will probably
not actively push for a regime that is less restrictive than innocent
passage, being content to conduct naval operations under whatever
provisions the United States and the U.S.S.R. are able to negotiate.
A 12-mile territorial sea would change the status of only one Chinese
strait, the relatively unimportant 10-mile-wide Hainan Strait. The
Chinese, however, already view the strait as internal waters, having
included Hainan in the mainland's straight baseline system in their
1958 territorial sea declaration. This same declaration implys that
Peking considered the Formosa Strait to be high seas.
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Islands
The PRC's 1973 draft articles state that the "breadth and limits of
the territorial sea as defined by a coastal state are, in principle,
applicable to the islands belonging to that state." In practice, the
PRC has used islands fringing its mainland as basepoints in the main-
land's straight baseline system. Islands that are some distance off
shore have separate territorial seas.
Archipelagos
China's 1973 draft articles define an archipelago as a group of
islands "rather close to each other" and allow that the outermost
islands may be used as bas epoi nts for a straight baseline system.
Presumably, the waters enclosed by the baselines would be classified
as internal. China can be expected to support the stand of the archi-
pelago states, whatever it may be at conference time, primarily
because these states are LDC's.
China claims three groups of islands that could be technically
termed archipelagos--the Senkakus, the Paracels, and the Spratlys.
The Paracels and the Spratlys if enclosed with straight baselines
would encompass 6,000 and 100,000 square miles, respectively; the
Senkakus are spread over a much smaller area. None of the three groups
can support sizable permanent habitation, and none contains sea routes.
The Paracels and the Spratlys, in fact, contain many hazards to navi-
gation and are systematically avoided. The primary importance of the
three groups is economic--each lies on a potentially petroleum-rich
seabed.
Delimitation and Demarcation
The guides for drawing baselines contained in Peking's 1973 draft
articles closely follow those set forth in the convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone--low-water lines, low-tide
elevations, deeply indented coasts, fringing islands, etc. In drawing
its own baselines, China used a reasonable mix of low-water lines
along its smooth, regular coasts, and the outermost points on the
headlands and fringing islands for its deeply indented and irregular
coasts. Article 8 of China's draft articles stipulates that the base-
line used to close a bay should not exceed twice the breadth of the
territorial sea. When China's 12-mile territorial sea is used as the
standard, the length of the Article 8 closing line is identical to
that stipulated in Article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention--24
miles.
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Semienclosed Seas
Although China has not addressed semienclosed seas as such, it has
stated a preference for regional rather than international standards.
Paragraph 10 of the continental shelf section of its 16 July 1973
working paper on the sea area within the limits of national juris-
diction (see Annex) urges regional agreements and cooperation among
states that share the same continental shelf.
In regard to its own semienclosed sea situation, Peking has expressed
the need for reaching accord with its neighbors. The Yellow and East
China Seas are suited to a special semienclosed sea regime settlement
considering their narrow dimensions, which preclude other than mutually
agreeable or median line boundaries, and the fact that the bordering
states are culturally related and have growing economic ties.
Continental Shelf
In its 16 July 1973 working paper on the sea area within the coastal
state jurisdiction, Peking supports the right of the coastal state to
delimit and claim a reasonable portion of the adjacent continental
shelf. The paper further states that the maximum limit should be
determined by consultation among states--one of the first hints of
PRC consideration of an international limit, although regional limits
are certainly not excluded. China has not committed itself to a specific
maximum limit, but it does oppose the Soviet 500-meter proposal. State
Department Telegram Hong Kong 7506, 25 July 1973, indicated that the
Chinese might favor the 200-meter limit.
Peking has said that the resources of the shelf appertain to the
coastal state. However, Peking places the shelf's superjacent waters
into two categories--those within the coastal state economic zone
(Peking favors a 200-mile economic zone) and those beyond. The waters
within the zone and their resources would belong to the coastal state;
the waters beyond, even though less than 200-meters deep, and their
resources would be placed under the jurisdiction of an international
regime.
Peking says that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
as well as the other three Geneva conventions,* is out of date, that the
convention does not truly reflect the "reasonable demands of the numerous
developing countries," having been drafted before many of these countries
were independent. Peking has, however, cited the convention's 200-meter
limit to support its claim to the Senkakus, and the Chinese 1973 draft
proposal and working papers are similar to the convention's in style,
language, and substance.
*Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Convention
on the High Seas,.Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas.
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Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
Peking supports the right of the coastal state to reasonably define
its own exclusive economic zone out to a distance of 200 miles from the
territorial sea baselines. In Peking's proposal, the coastal state
would own all resources and control all activities other than navi-
gation and overflight within the zone. China also proposes that the
coastal state share with adjacent landlocked and shelf-locked states
a "certain proportion of the rights of ownership and jurisdiction" in
the zone.
China will support no measures that tend to erode complete coastal
state control of fisheries within the coastal state exclusive economic
zone. China has repeatedly castigated distant-water fishing states for
"plundering" the resources of other states. The Chinese do, however,
approve of bilateral fishing agreements and have themselves entered
into several. Only the agreement with North Vietnam is known to contain
provisions that allow the PRC to fish in the coastal waters of another
state (the PRC has access to two areas in the Gulf of Tonkin).
China's coastal fisheries appear to fill the country's needs,
and the Chinese show no desire to develop a distant-water fishing
capability. Thus, they have opposed distant-water fishering interests
in the LOS negotiations. In their working paper of 2 August 1973 (see
Annex), the PRC stated that fishing in the international area beyond
the coastal state economic zone should be regulated by an inter-
national fishing organization and, pending the establishment of such
an organization, that states bordering a given sea area may set up a
regional committee to regulate fishing and conserve the resources in
the given international area.
High Seas
The Chinese have not used the term "high seas," per se, but their
2 August 1973 working paper on the international sea area applies all
of the freedoms except fishing cited in the Convention on the High Seas--
freedom of navigation and overflight and freedom to lay submarine cables
and pipelines--to the seas beyond the areas of coastal state juris-
diction. Fishing in the international area, as explained under Fisheries,
would be regulated by an international organization.
Deep Seabed
The Chinese want the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction to be
governed by a strong international regime. In their view, the inter-
national regime should be empowered to manage and engage in the
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exploration and exploitation of the international seabed, register
claims, issue licenses, and collect fees from other operating agencies
(state, private enterprises). The Chinese also propose that the inter-
national regime control scientific research in and set pollution
standards for the international sea area. To combat its fear of
superpower monopoly, Peking wants all nations and all regions equally
represented on the regime's council on a rotational basis. Peking
opposes the weighted formulas of the United States (industrial nations)
and the U.S.S.R. (Eastern European nations) and has specifically stated
that the superpowers must not be allowed to dominate the council or
have a privileged position on it.
According to its 27 March 1973 press release, China wants revenues
derived from exploitation of the deep seabed "shared fairly and
equitably by all states on an equal footing irrespective of their
size, taking into particular consideration the needs of the developing
countries"--a nebulous and idealistic desire, which implies all states
are equal, but that the LDC's are more equal than the DC's. The PRC
wants all commercial exploitation halted until an LOS treaty that
contains authority for an international regime is ratified. The Chinese
oppose the U.S. proposal for a provisional application of the LOS
Convention during the interim between its signing and ratification.
.China has proposed that landlocked states be afforded free access
to the international sea area through the land territories, territorial
seas, and coastal economic zones of bordering coastal states and, further,
that coastal states afford bordering landlocked states a share in the
resources and jurisdiction of the coastal state economic zone.
Marine Pollution
China's statements indicate support for international pollution
control standards, but also support the right of coastal states to
impose and enforce additional regional and individual standards in areas
under coastal state jurisdiction. China did not attend the IMCO Marine
Pollution Conference in London in 1973, but, as an IMCO member, it may
sign the protocol.
At the regular IMCO meeting in 1973 the Chinese criticized the
composition of IMCO's Council of Maritime Safety on the grounds that
it did not reflect IMCO's membership--largely LDC's.
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Scientific Research
China's 19 July 1973 working paper on marine scientific research
(see Annex) calls for: 1) the acquisition of prior consent of the
coastal state before carrying out scientific research in the zone
under its jurisdiction, 2) the participation of the coastal state in
the research activity, and 3) the consent of the coastal state before
the results of the research activity are published. The paper also
requires that scientific research in the international sea area be
governed by the international regime.
Regional Arrangements
The PRC has proposed regional arrangements and standards as solutions
to several LOS issues, i.e., pollution control, resource management and
exploitation, and jurisdiction delimitation.
Settlement of Disputes
At the spring 1973 Seabed Committee meetings both Shen Wei-liang and
Hsia P'u made statements relative to dispute settlement. Shen, in private
conversation indicated that disputes should be settled directly between
the countries involved. He refused to comment on the use of a third
party. Hsia, while presenting the PRC's views on the powers of the
international regime during general debate on the international deep
seabed issue, stated that the regime should not have "sovereignty or
jurisdictional powers comparable to those of a State"--a possible
implication that Peking does not want the regime empowered to settle
disputes.
Peaceful Uses of the Sea
The Chinese include the "Peaceful Uses of the Sea" theme often in
their LOS pronouncements and discussions. Two demands appear repeatedly--
the prohibition of nuclear submarines and the requirement that all marine
scientific research be for peaceful. purposes. The Chinese also oppose the
implantation of nuclear weapons on the seabed. Peking signed the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace Resolution.
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D. KEY POLICY MAKERS, LOS NEGOTIATORS AND ADVISERS
Interest in LOS matters has been exhibited at the highest levels in
Peking. Chou En-lai at state meetings has voiced support for the right
of individual countries to make unilateral claims, and Chinese diplomats
around the world have done likewise.
Chinese delegates have taken an active part in all Seabed Committee
meetings since China's entry into the United Nations in November 1971.
Peking's delegation to Caracas will have full authority to negotiate
China's demands and will undoubtedly be equipped with fall-back
positions on the issues. The delegation would have to query Peking
before making major changes and in any unsuspected developments. Shen
Wei-liana and Hsia Pu have been the most quoted of the Chinese delegates.
11
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Name and Title (as they appear
on the latest UN listing)
Mr. AN Chih-yuan
Mr. CHANG Chi-hsien
Mr. CHANG Ping-hsi
Chief Engineer of the Bureau
of Geology
*Mr. CHAO Lin
Chief, Division of Science and
Technology
National Bureau of Oceanology
H.E. Mr. CHEN Chih-fang
Ambassador to Switzerland
*H.E. Mr. CHUANG Yen
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Pleni potentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the UN
Mrs. HO Li-hang
Counsellor
Permanent Mission to the UN
*Mr. HSIA Pu
Deputy Director
National Bureau of Oceanology
Mr. HSU Chin-mei
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva
Mr. HU Chin-lin
Mr. HU Tsuan-chung
Mr. HUANG Chia-hua
Seabed Committee Session
Mar
71
Jul
Aug
71
Feb
Mar
72
Jul
Aug
72
Mar
Apr
73
Jul
Aug
73
Conf
.
Dec
73
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Org .
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Name and Title
Seabed Committee Session
O rg .
Conf .
Dec
73
Mr. HUANG Shih-kang
Mr. LI Cheng-huan
Mr. LI Sheng-chiao
Department of International
Organizations
Law and Treaty
Mr. LIN Cheng
Mr. LIN Chia-shen
Mr. LING Ching
Deputy Director of the Department
of International Organizations
Law and Treaty of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Mr. LO Mei -lung
Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry
Mr. NI Cheng-yu
Legal Expert in the Department of
International Organizations
Law and Treaties of the Foreign
Ministry
Mr. OUYANG Tsu-pin
Deputy Division Chief of the
Department of International
Organizations
Law and Treaties of the Foreign
Ministry
Mr. PAO Kuang-tsung
Deputy Bureau Director
Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry
Mar
71
Jul
Aug
71
Feb
Mar
72
Jul
Aug
72
Mar
Apr
73
Jul
Aug
73
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Mr. SHEN Chih-cheng
Deputy Division Chief of the
Bureau of Port Supervision
under the Ministry of
Communications
*Mr. SHEN Wei-liang
Deputy Director of Department of
International Organizations
Law and Treaty of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Mr. TANG Hsing-po
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the UN
Mr. TSIENG Teh-sheng
Mr. WANG Teh-chao
Director of Research Institute of
the National Bureau of
Oceanology
Mr. WANG Ying-fan
Mr. WU Ts i en-mi n
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission to the UN
Mr. Yang Chin-sheng
Mr. YEH Shou-cheng
Mr. YU Yuang-tseng
Mar
71
Jul
Aug
71
Feb
Mar
72
Jul
Aug
72
Mar
Apr
73
Jul
Au
g
73
Conf
.
Dec
73
X
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
x
X
x
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
Org.
Voe
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Part II - Background Information
Geography
World region: East Asia
Category: coastal
Bordering states: U.S.S.R., Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Laos,
Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan
Bordering bodies of water: Korea Bay, Po Hai, Yellow Sea, East China
Sea, South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin
Bordering semienclosed sea: Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China
Sea
Straits: Po Hai Strait (22 mi.), Formosa Strait (74 mi.), Lamma Channel
(6 mi.), Hainan Strait (10 mi.)
Area of continental shelf: 230,100 sq. mi., shared with North Korea,
South Korea, Japan, Republic of China (Taiwan), North Vietnam
Area to 200 mi. limit: 281,000 sq. mi., shared with North Korea, South
Korea, Japan, Republic of China (Taiwan), North Vietnam
Area to edge of continental margin: 281,000 sq. mi.
Coastline: 9,000 statute miles
Land: 3.7 million sq. statute mi.
Population: 920,060,000
Industry and Trade
GNP: $139 billion, $160 per capita (1972)
Major industries: iron and steel, coal, machine building, armaments,
textiles
Exports: $3.1 billion (f.o.b., 1972); agricultural products, minerals
and metals, manufactured goods
Imports: $2.8 billion (c.i.f., 1972); grain, chemical fertilizer,
industrial raw materials, machinery and equipment
Major trade partners: Japan, U.S., Hong Kong, West Germany, U.S.S.R.,
U.K., Singapore/Malaysia, Canada (1973)
Merchant marine: 364 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 2,239,300 GRT;
22 passenger, 267 cargo, 55 tanker, 12 bulk; in terms of DWT, 46% of
the fleet is employed in domestic operations and the remainder in
international operations to Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, Japan,
Canada, and South America; China beneficially owns an additional
128 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 1,100,000 GRT which operate
primarily under the Somali flag
Marine Fisheries
Catch: 2,311,800 metric tons (1971 est.)
Economic importance: national - steady but unspectacular foreign
exchange earner; local - provides means of livelihood and important
source of food for coastal population
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Marine Fisheries (cont'd):
Other fishing areas: coastal fleet fishes off North Vietnam; reportedly
China does not plan to engage in distant-water fishing
Species: yellow croaker, cod, red sea bream, herring, perch, skate,
hairtail, mackerel
Other countries fishing off coast: Japan, North Vietnam
Petroleum Resources
Petroleum: production - 182.5 million 42-gal. bbl. (25.0 million metric
tons) onshore; proved recoverable reserves - 20,000 million 42-gal.
bbl. (2,700 million metric tons) onshore (1971)
Natural gas: production - 150 billion cubic feet (4.2 billion cubic
meters); proved recoverable reserves - 4,000 billion cubic feet
(100 billion cubic meters onshore (1971)
Navy
Ships: Approx. 1,000 combatant units (not including 175 small coastal/
river/roadstead patrol boats and 450 landing craft mechanized),
supported by 270 auxiliaries and 630 service craft, organized in
3 fleets -- North, East, South Seas; units include 6 guided missile
destroyers (SSM), 1 destroyer, 6 destroyer escorts, 4 guided missile
escorts, 1 ballistic missile submarine, 1 submarine propulsion
unknown (SSU), 60 submarines, 102 guided missile boats, 261 motor
torpedo boats, 463 other patrol craft, 40 mine warfare craft, and
54 (plus 22 in merchant service) amphibious vessels
Government Leaders
Head of State: Chairman Mao Tse-tung; Premier of State Council Chou
En-lai
Foreign Minister: Chi P'eng-fei
Multilateral Conventions
Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO)
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests
UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United Nations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Red Cross
20
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Present Ocean Claims*
Type
Date
Terms
Source, Notes
Territorial
1930
3 mi.
1933 Legislative Resolution
Sea
Codification Conference
1958
12 mi
Statement of Sept. 4, 1958
FBIS Text
Continental
1970
1970/71: Claim made to Shallow
Shelf
water areas and resources in
East China and Yellow Seas
Exclusive
Fishing
1958
12 mi.
Customs
12 mi.
Straight
1958
Statement of Sept. 4, 1958
Baselines
Straight baselines join outermost
islands. Gulf of Pohai and Hainan
Strait internal waters.
Limits in the Seas No. 43
*Principal source: Limits of the Seas, National Claims to Maritime
Jurisdiction, State Dept./INR, March 1973 and Revisions.
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Action on Significant UN Resolutions
Moratorium Resolution not UN member
(A/RES/2574 D, XXIV, 12/15/69) at that time
Pending establishment of international regime, States
and persons are bound to refrain from exploiting
resources of or laying claim to any part of the
seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
LOS Conference not UN member
(A/RES/2750 C, XXV, 12/17/70) at that time
Convene in 1973 a Conference on Law of the Sea to
deal with establishment of international regime for
the seabed and ocean floor, and enlarge Seabed
Committee by 44 members and instruct it to prepare
for the conference draft treaty articles embodying
international regime.
LOS Conference, Timing and Site Adopted w/o vote
(A/RES/3029 A, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
(A/RES/2992, XXVII, 12/15/72)
Called upon littoral and hinterland states of
Indian ocean area, permanent members of the
Security Council and other major maritime users
of Indian Ocean to support concept that Indian
Ocean should be zone of peace.
Landlocked/Shelf-Locked Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 B, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of extent and economic signifi-
cance, in terms of resources, of international
area resulting from each proposal of limits of
national jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Peruvian Coastal State Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 C, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of potential economic signifi-
cance for riparian states, in terms of resources,
of each of the proposals on limits of national
jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Abstain
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources In favor
(A/RES/3016 XXVII, 12/18/72)
Reaffirmed right of states to permanent sover-
eignty over all their natural resources, wherever
found.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON TIE PEACEFUL USES OF THE
SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND
THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB-COMMITTEE II
Distr.
LIMITED
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34
16 July 1973
ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE
WORKING PAP]
ON SEA AREA WITHIN TIIC LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
Submitted by the Chinese Delegation
16 July 1973
(1) The territorial c:oa, as delimited by a coastal State by virtue of sovereignty,
is a specified area of sea adjacent to its coast or internal waters, including the
airspace over the territorial sea, and its bed and subsoil thereof, over which it
exercises sovereignty.
(2) A coastal State is entitled to reasonably define the breadth and limits of its
territorial sea according to its geographical features and its needs of economic
development and national
security and having due regard to the legitimate interests of
and the convenience of international navigation, and shall
its neighbouring countries
give publicity thereto.
(3) Coastal States in the
same region may, through consultations on an equal
footing, define a unified breadth or a limit for the territorial sea in the region.
(4) Coastal States adjacent or opposite to each other shall define the boundaries
between their territorial seas on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, equality and reciprocity.
(5) The breadth and limits of the territorial sea as defined by a,
are, in principle, applicable to the islands belonging to that State.
(6) An archipelago or an island chain consisting of islands close to each other
may be taken as an integral whole in defining the limits of the territorial sea around
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(7) A strait lying within the territorial sea., whether or not it is frequently
used for international navigation, forms ?' an inseparable part of the territorial sea of
the coastal State.
(8) A coastal State may, for the purpose of regulation of its territorial sea,
enact necessary laws..and regulations and give publicity thereto. Ships and aircraft
of a. foreign State, passing through the territorial sea and the airspace thoreabove of
another State, shall comply with the laws and regulations of the latter State.
Foreign non-military ships enjoy innocent passage through territorial seas.
Passage is innocent when it is not prejudicial to the peace, security and good
order of a coastal State.
A coastal State. may, 'in accordance. with its laws and regulations, require military
ships of foreign States to tender prior notification to, or seek prior approval from,
its competent authorities before pa.ssing'through its territorial sea.
2. Exclusive Economic Zone or Exclusive Fishery Zone
(1) A coastal State may rea.sona.bly.define an exclusive economic zone (hereinafter
referred to as the economic zone). beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea in
accordance with its geographical and geological conditions, the state of its natural
resources and its needs of national economic development.
The outer limit of the economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical
miles measured from the baseline of the territorial sea.
(2) All natural resources within the economic zone of a. coastal State, including
living and non-living resources of the whole water column, sea-bed and its subsoil, are
owned by the coastal State.
A coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its economic zone for the
purpose of protecting, using, exploring and exploiting the resources as described in
the preceding paragraph.
(3) A coastal State shall, in principle, grant to the landlocked and shelf-locked
States adjacent to its territory common enjoyment of a certain proportion of the rights
of ownership in its economic zone. The coastal State and its adjacent landlocked and
shelf--locked States shall, through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual
respect for sovereignty, conclude bilateral or regional agreements on the relevant
matters.
(4) The normal navigation and overflight on the water surface of and in the.
airspace above the economic zone by ships and aircraft of all States shall not be
prejudiced. The delineation of the course for laying cables and pipelines in the
sea-bod of the economic zone is subject to the consent of the coastal State.
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page 3
(5) Other States may engage in fishery, mining or other activities in the
economic zone of a coastal State pursuant to agreement reached with the coastal State.
(6) A coastal State may enact necessary laws and regulations for the effective
regulation of its economic zone.
Other States, in carrying out any a.etivities in the economic zone of a. coastal
State, are required to observe the relevant laws and regulations of the coastal State.
(7) A coastal State is entitled, when necessary, to deal with unauthorized
fishery, mining or other activities in its economic zone and with violations of its
relevant laws and regulations even though permission for such activities has been given.
(8) The delimitation of boundaries between the economic zones of coastal States
adjacent or opposite to each other shall be jointly determined through,consultations
on an equal footing.
Coastal States adjacent or opposite to each other shall, on the basis of
safeguarding and respecting the sovereignty of each other, conduct necessary
consultations to work out reasonable solutions for the exploitation, regulation and
other matters relating to the natural resources in the contiguous parts of their
economic zones.
(9) The above provisions relating to the ecvx~,,uuc zone shall also apply to the
exclusive fishery zone as reasonably defined by a. coastal State beyond its territorial
sea., except that the resources in the exclusive fishery zone are confined to the
living resources of the water column in the said fishery zone.
3. Continental Shelf
(1) By virtue of the principle that the continental shelf is the natural
prolongation of the continental territory, a. coastal State may reasonably define,
according to its specific geographical conditions, the limits of the continental shelf
under its exclusive jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea. or economic zone. The
maximum limits of such continental shelf may be determined among States through
consultations.
(2) The natural resources of the continental shelf, including the mineral
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil and the living resources of sedentary species,
appertain to the coastal State.
(3) The superja.cent waters of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea
the economic zone or the fishery zone are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
coastal State.
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The normal navigation and overflight on the superjacent waters of the
continental shelf and in the airspace thoreabove by ships and aircraft of all States
shall not be prejudiced.
(q.) A coastal State may enact all necessary laws and regulations for the
effective management of its continental shelf..
The delineation of the course for laying submarine cables and pipelines on the
continental shelf by a. foreign State is subject to the consent of the coastal Sta.te.
(5) States adjacent or opposite to each other, the continental shelves of which
connect together, shall jointly determine the delimitation of the limits of
jurisdiction of the continental shelves through consultations on an equal footing.
(6) States adjacent or opposite to each other, the continental shelves of which
connect together, shall, on the basis of safeguarding and respecting the sovereignty
of each other, conduct necessary consultations to work out reasonable solutions for
the exploitation, regulation and other matters rela.ting to' the natural resources in
their contiguous parts of the continental shelves.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
COMDIITTiE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE
SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND
THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB-COMMITTEE I
Distr.
Lfl IITED
A/AC.138/sc.II/L.45*
G August 1973
Original: CHINESE
WORKING PAPER
ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE IIITERNATIO:NAL SEA AREA
Submitted by the Chinese delegation
(1) The international sea area denotes all the sea and ocean space beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. The international sea area and its resources are,
in principle, jointly owned by the people of all countries.
(2) In order to have access to and from the international sea area for trade
and other peaceful purposes, land-locked States have the right to pass through the
territory, territorial sea and other waters of adjacent coastal States. Coastal
States and adjacent land-locked States shall, through consultations on the basis of
equality and mutual respect for sovereignty, conclude bilateral or regional
agreements on the relevant matters.
(3) Uses of the international sea are-1, shall not projud'.co the legitimate
interests of other States and the common interests of all States.
(4) Subject. to the provisions of paragraph (3) above, ships and aircraft of
all States have the right of navigation and overflight in the international sea area
and in the airspace thereabovc, provided that they fly the flag or show the insignia
of the State to which they belong.
(5) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) above, all States have the right
to lay cables and pipelines on the sea-bed of the international sea area.
(6) Fishing in the international sea area shall be properly regulated to
prohibit indiscriminate fishing and other violations of rules and regulations for
the conservation of fishery resources.
* This.idocument supersedes document A/AC.138/SC.I/L.25 and Corr.1 dated
2 August 1973 and 6 August 1973 respectively.
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A/AC .1 ~8/SC . II/L. 45
page 2
Pending the establishment of a unified international fishexy organization, States
of a Uivon sea area may set up a regional committee to :work out appropriate rules and.
regulations for the regulation of fishing and the conservation of marine living
resources in the international sea area. Fishing vessols of-States of other regions
may enter the said region for fishing activities provided they comply with the
relevant rules and regulations of the region.
(7) The exploration, exploitation and all other activities conducted in the
soa-bod, ocean floor and their subsoil of the international sea area shall bo
governed by the international regime and the international machinery to be established.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
LIMITED
A/AC.2.30/SC.III/L. 55
17 August 1973
Original: ENGLISH
COI4YIITTEE ON T} PEAC"UL USES OP TIM
SEA-BE) AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND
THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB- C0: 1?aTTEE III
Algeria, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran,
Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania,
Sonalia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Yugoslavia:
Draft article on consent to conduct marine
scientific research
Whenever, according to this Convention, the consent of a coastal State is requested
for undertaking marine scientific research in the areas under its sovereignty and
national jurisdiction the explicit consent of that State shall be obtained before
such activity is undertaken.
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LAW OF THE SEA DRAFT ARTICLES
(Informally submitted to UN Seabed Committee, March 1973)
PART I
THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND STRAIT
SECTION I GENERAL
THE TERRITORIAL SEA, AS DELIMITED BY A COASTAL STATE BY VIRTUE OF ITS
SOVEREIGNTY, IS A SPECIFIED BELT OF SEA ADJACENT TO ITS COAST OR INTERNAL
WATERS, OVER WHICH IT EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY.
1. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORIAL SEA EXTENDS TO THE AIRSPACE OVER
THE TERRITORIAL SEA AS WELL AS TO ITS BED AND SUBSOIL.
2. A STRAIT LYING WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL SEA (HEREINAFTER REFERRED
TO AS TERRITORIAL STRAIT), WHETHER OR NOT IT IS FREQUENTLY USED FOR
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION, FORMS AND INSEPARABLE PART OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA OF THE COASTAL STATE.
SECTION II
DELIMITATION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
1. A COASTAL STATE IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLY DEFINE, ACCORDING TO ITS
GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES AND ITS NEEDS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY, THE BREADTH AND LIMITS OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND SHALL GIVE
PUBLICITY THERETO.
2. THE BREADTH AND LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA AS DEFINED BY A COASTAL
STATE ARE APPLICABLE TO THE ISLANDS BELONGING TO THAT STATE.
COASTAL STATES IN THE SAME REGION MAY, BY AGREEMENT THROUGH CONSULTATIONS,
DEFINE A UNIFIED. BREADTH FOR THE TERRITORIAL SEAS IN THE REGION.
1. COASTAL STATES ADJACENT OR OPPOSITE TO EACH OTHER SHALL DEFINE THE
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THEIR TERRITORIAL SEAS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL
RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY.
NO SUCH STATE IS ENTITLED, FAILING AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY OR EXCEPT ON
OTHER REASONABLE GROUNDS, TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL SEA BEYOND A MERIDIAN
(SIC) LINE.
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2. IN CASES WHERE A MERIDIAN (SIC) LINE IS USED TO DELIMIT TERRITORIAL
SEAS, EVERY POINT ON THE MERIDIAN (SIC) LINE SHALL BE EQUIDISTANT FROM
THE NEAREST POINTS OF THE BASELINES FROM WHICH THE BREADTH OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEAS, EVERY POINT ON THE MERIDIAN (SIC) LINE SHALL BE
EQUIDISTANT FROM THE NEAREST POINTS OF THE BASELINES FROM WHICH THE
BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAS OF EACH OF THE TWO STATES CONCERNED IS
MEASURED.
SECTION III
THE BASELINE
A COASTAL STATE MAY ADOPT ITS OWN METHOD OF DRAWING THE BASELINE ACCORD-
ING TO THE TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF ITS COAST.
1. IN LOCALITIES WHERE THE COASTLINE IS REGULAR OR THE COAST IS LOW AND
FLAT, THE METHOD OF NATURAL BASELINES, I.E., TAKING THE LOW-TIDE LINES AS
THE BASELINES, MAY BE EMPLOYED FOR MEASURING THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA.
2. IN LOCALITIES WHERE THE COASTLINE IS INDENTED THE METHOD OF A SERIES
OF STRAIGHT BASELINES, :.E., TAKING THE LINES CONNECTING APPROPRIATE
PROTRUDING POINTS ON THE COAST AS THE BASELINES, MAY BE EMPLOYED FOR
MEASURING THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA. THE DIRECTION OF SUCH A
SERIES OF STRAIGHT BASELINES SHALL BE ROUGHLY IN CONFORMITY WITH THAT OF
THE COAST. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO ADJACENT BASEPOINTS SHALL NOT BE TOO
LONG.
3. A STATE WITH COASTS OF GREAT LENGTHS AND COMPLICATED TOPOGRAPHY MAY
EMPLOY THE METHOD OF MIXED BASELINES, I.E. DRAWING BASELINES IN TURN BY
THE METHODS PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 TO SUIT DIFFERENT CONDITIONS.
1. IF THERE ARE ISLANDS ALONG THE COAST, STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE
BASEPOINTS OF THE OUTERMOST ISLANDS MAY SERVE AS BASELINES.
2. IF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE BASEPOINTS AT THE ENTRANCE OF A BAY
DOES NOT EXCEED TWICE THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE STRAIGHT
LINE LINKING THE TWO POINTS MAY SERVE AS THE BASELINE.
3. IF A RIVER MOUTH JOINS THE SEA DIRECTLY AND THERE IS NO ISLAND OFF
IT, THE STRAIGHT LINE CONNECTING THE TWO PROTRUDING POINTS ON THE LOW-
TIDE LINE ON EITHER BANK OF THE RIVER MOUTH MAY SERVE AS THE BASELINE.
4. IF REEFS AND BARS ABOVE WATER AT LOW TIDE ARE SITUATED WHOLLY OR
PARTLY AT A DISTANCE NOT EXCEEDING THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
FROM THE MAINLAND OR AN ISLAND, THE LOW-T3DE LINES ON THOSE REEFS AND
BARS MAY BE USED AS BASELINES FOR MEASURING THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA.
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ARTICLE 9
IF AN ARCHIPELAGO OR AN ISLAND CHAIN IS COMPOSED OF ISLANDS WHICH ARE
RATHER NEAR TO EACH OTHER, IT MAY BE TAKEN AS AN INTEGRATED ENTITY. IN
THE CASE OF AN ARCHIPELAGO, THE SERIES OF STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE
OUTER BASEPOINTS ON THE OUTER-MOST ISLANDS MAY BE USED AS THE BASELINES.
IN THE CASE OF AN ISLAND CHAIN, THE STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE OUTER
BASE-POINTS ON THE ISLAND CHAIN MAY BE USED AS THE BASELINES.
SECTION IV
REGULATION BY A COASTAL STATE OF ITS TERRITORIAL
SEA AND STRAIT
FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND TERRITORIAL
STRAIT, A COASTAL STATE MAY ENACT NECESSARY LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND GIVE
PUBLICITY THERETO.
ARTICLE 11
FOREIGN NON-MILITARY SHIPS ENJOY INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH TERRITORIAL
SEAS AND TERRITORIAL STRAITS.
PASSAGE IS INNOCENT WHEN IT IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PEACE, SECURITY
AND GOOD ORDER OF A COASTAL STATE AND WHEN THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF
THE COASTAL STATE ARE COMPLIED WITH.
ARTICLE 12
1. AIRCRAFT AND MILITARY SHIPS OF ANY FOREIGN STATE MAY NOT ENTER A
COASTAL STATE'S TERRITORIAL SEA, TERRITORIAL STRAIT AND THE AIRSPACE
THEREABOVE WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE COASTAL STATE.
2. FOREIGN SUBMARINES ENTERING A COASTAL STATE'S TERRITORIAL SEA OR
TERRITORIAL STRAIT WITH PRIOR APPROVAL SHALL NAVIGATE ON THE SURFACE OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA OR TERRITORIAL STRAIT AND DISPLAY THEIR FLAG.
3. IF AIRCRAFT AND MILITARY SHIPS OF ANY FOREIGN STATE INTRUDE INTO
A COASTAL STATE'S TERRITORIAL SEA, TERRITORIAL STRAIT AND THE AIRSPACE
THEREABOVE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL, THIS SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN ACT ON
INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COASTAL STATE. THE COASTAL STATE
IS ENTITLED TO TAKE ANY NECESSARY MEASURES AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE
SITUATION IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS SOVEREIGNTY INVIOLATE.
ARTICLE 13
1. SHIPS OF ANY FOREIGN STATE PASSING THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND
THE TERRITORIAL STRAIT ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES NOT TO
POLLUTE SEA WATER OR DAMAGE ANY FACILITIES, AND VIOLATION OF SUCH RULES
SHALL ENTAIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO1PENSATION.
2. St3IPS OF ANY FOREIGN STATE PASSING THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND
THE TERRITORIAL STRAIT SHALL NOT HOVER ABOUT, STOP OR ANCHOR EXCEPT WHEN
NAVIGATION IS HAMPERED BY FAILURE OF MACHINERY OR WHEN ACCIDENTS ARE CAUSED
BY FORCE MAJEURE.
_mw
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3. IF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF ANY FOREIGN STATE VIOLATE THE LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF A COASTAL STATE, THE COASTAL STATE IS ENTITLED TO GIVE
THEM WARNINGS, OR ORDER THEM TO LEAVE ITS TERRITORIAL SEA OR TERRITORIAL
STRAIT, AND IN CASE OF A SERIOUS VIOLATION, TO INSPECT ON BOARD, DETAIN,
PURSUE, OR PUNISH THEM ACCORDING TO LAW.
1. EXCEPT UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS, NO CHARGES OR TOLLS MAY BE LEVIED
UPON FOREIGN NONMILITARY SHIPS BY A COASTAL STATE FOR PASSAGE THROUGH ITS
TERRITORIAL SEA AND TERRITORIAL STRAIT. PILOTING AND TUGGING SHALL NOT
BE COMPULSORY, AND NORMAL NAVIGATION SHALL NOT BE HAMPERED.
2. A COASTAL STATE SHOULD TAKE NECESSARY SAFETY MEASURES TO ASSURE
UNIMPEDED PASSAGE THROUGH CHANNELS OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND TERRITORIAL
STRAIT, TO KEEP THE LAY-OUT OF ROUTE MARKINGS IN NORMAL CONDITION, AND
GIVE TIMELY PUBLICITY TO ANY DANGERS TO NAVIGATION OF WHICH IT HAS
KNOWLEDGE.
1. A COASTAL STATE MAY TAKE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY MEASURES TO
PROTECT THE RESOURCES IN THE WATER, ON THE SEA-BED AND IN THE SUBSOIL
THEREOF WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND TERRITORIAL STRAIT.
2. A COASTAL STATE MAY ADOPT REASONABLE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND TERRITORIAL STRAIT AND PREVENT
MARINE POLLUTION.
PART II
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
SECTION I
DELIMITATION AND NATURE OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
A COASTAL STATE MAY REASONABLY DEFINE ITS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (HEREIN-
AFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ECONOMIC ZONE) BEYOND ITS TERRITORIAL SEA IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, THE STATE OF
ITS NATURAL RESOURCES, AND ITS NEEDS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
1. ALL NATURAL RESOURCES WITHIN THE ECONOMIC ZONE OF A COASTAL STATE,
INCLUDING LIVING AND NON-LIVING RESOURCES OF THE WHOLE WATER COLUMN,
SEA-BED AND ITS SUBSOIL, APPERTAIN TO THE COASTAL STATE.
2. A COASTAL STATE EXERCISES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ITS ECONOMIC
ZONE FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROTECTING, USING, EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING THE
RESOURCES AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.
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ARTICLE 18
THE NORMAL NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT ON THE WATER SURFACE OF AND IN THE
AIR SPACE ABOVE THE ECONOMIC ZONE BY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF ALL STATES
SHALL NOT BE PREJUDICED, TO LAY SUBMARINE CABLES AND PIPELINES IN THE
ECONOMIC ZONE SHALL REQUIRE APPROVAL OF THE COASTAL STATE.
SECTION II
ACTIVITIES OF OTHER STATES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
1. OTHER STATES MAY ENGAGE IN FISHERY, MINING AND OTHER ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES IN THE ECONOMIC ZONE OF A COASTAL STATE PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT
REACHED WITH THE COASTAL STATE.
2. SURVEY AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CONDUCTED BY OTHER STATES IN THE
ECONOMIC ZONE OF A COASTAL STATE SHALL REQUIRE THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF
THE COASTAL STATE.
THE COASTAL STATE SHALL, IN PRINCIPLE, GRANT TO A LAND-LOCKED STATE
ADJACENT TO ITS TERRITORY COMMON ENJOYMENT IN CERTAIN PROPORTION OF THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP AND JURISDICTION IN THE ECONOMIC ZONE. THE STATES
CONCERNED SHALL SEEK A REASONABLE SOLUTION OF THE MATTER THROUGH CON-
SULTATIONS.
SECTION III
REGULATION BY A COASTAL STATE OF ITS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
A COASTAL STATE MAY ENACT NECESSARY LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF ITS ECONOMIC ZONE.
IN CARRYING OUT ANY ACTIVITIES IN THE ECONOMIC ZONE OF A COASTAL STATE,
THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION OF
FISHERY RESOURCES, THE PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF POLLUTION OF THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT AS WELL AS THE PROHIBITION OF DAMAGE TO NATURAL
RESOURCES MUST BE OBSERVED.
A COASTAL STATE IS ENTITLED, WHEN NECESSARY, TO DEAL WITH UNAUTHORIZED
FISHERY, MINING OR OTHER ACTIVITIES IN ITS ECONOMIC ZONE, AND WITH
VIOLATIONS OF ITS RELEVANT LAWS AND REGULATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT HAS GIVEN
PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES.
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SECTION IV
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEIGHBOURING STATES
THE DEFINING OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC ZONES OF COASTAL
STATES ADJACENT OR OPPOSITE TO EACH OTHER SHALL BE DETERMINED THROUGH
CONSULATION ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT.
FOR THE EXPLOITATION, REGULATION, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
IN CONNECTION WITH FISH, PETROLEUM, NATURAL GAS AND OTHER RESOURCES IN
THE CONTIGUOUS PARTS OF THE ECONOMIC ZONES OF COASTAL STATES ADJACENT OR
OPPOSITE TO EACH OTHER, THESE STATES MAY, ON THE BASIS OF SAFEGUARDING
AND RESPECTING THEIR RESPECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY, CONDUCT NECESSARY CONSULTA-
TIONS IN SEEKING REASONABLE SOLUTIONS.
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Secret
Secret
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