OFFICIAL DIARY (ACTING DD/I)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020056-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: December 1, 1952
• Content Type: NOTES

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Security Information
Official Diary
(Acting DD/I)-
Monday) 1 December 1952
1. At morning meeting apprised the General of the possible compromise of
-12 on an Alaskan mountain-
h of the C-
special intelligence as a result of the cras
side last week. Told him that USCIB had informed LCIB and special efforts were
being made to recover the material. DCI expressed vehemently his views as to the
inexcusableness of our failure to date to provide self-destroying pouches. I under-
25X1 A9atook to get him a report from and Sheldon as to progress on this. Later 25X1 A9a
ith
i
on w
spoke to Sheldon who said he would get up a memorandum in conjunct
2. DCI called me down separately to discuss future Eisenhower briefings. He I
made the following points which I then passed on to - for action: 25X1A9a
a. Eisenhower does not like to read text as much as he likes to
listen to well presented picture of the situation in an area as
illustrated by a first-class map.
b. All comments, events, etc., related to a geographic area
should be handled in one package rather than separated on a
functional basis as we do in our present briefing book -
military from diplomatic, etc.
c. Briefing should be planned from about 30 minutes, compres-
sible to half of that, which of course means the exercise of
careful selection as to items to be covered.
d. The creation of a map room in the Commodore in which we can
leave secret--or nonspecial materials--should be explored and
made ready by the time Eisenhower returns from Korea.
e. No briefing expected this Friday in New York; instead a dry
run will be held in DCI's office for his approval.
chaired the meeting for a few
DCI's absence
I
M
,
n
eeting.
3. Attended IAC
minutes until he arrived. Not much trouble with 21/1 on Austrian security, but 64
Part II turned out to be quite a hassle with the old Berlin estimate rehashed from
soup to nuts. No positions were changed.
a. At the end of the meeting there ensued a rather general talkfest out
of which I consider the following to be worth recordings
25X1A9a (1) said that owing to the Soviets' present lack of all-
weather electronic intercept capabilities, their relative air-
defense capability was high and of course at a peak over the
period of the summer solstice. Therefore, he felt that we should
be particularly on watch for sudden grabs at that time of year.
rity Information This document Is pert of an integrated
ecu r'~tetileiime
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Security Information
Official Diary
Monday, 1 December 1952
3. a. (cont'd.)
25X1X7
(2) DCI said that had remarked to him that in the
1930's one could have got virtual unanimity from the top 5 or 6 German
philosopher-statesmen as to the basic patterns and trends of thought
under given circumstances that had controlled German policy decisions
for generations. He suggested that the same thing might well be true
for Russia and that, therefore, we should devote more effort to study-
ing this pattern for the Czarist period in order to see whether it
might not throw light on their present reactions. doubted the 25X1 A9a
wisdom of this both as a matter of German history and as a current
utility. Armstrong and others thought it worth doing. DCI suggested
25X1 C8c that and George Kennon
25X1A2g
as providing both brilliance and mutual balance.
b. DCI commented that he liked the Board draft of 25X1A2g
and wished the Agencies to consider it broad-
ly, paragraph by paragraph, so as to comment on substance of the con-
clusions rather than to concentrate on drafting refinements. All
agreed to do so.
25X1A9a
c. Led by - the IAC then generally agreed that over the next
ten years the odds were better than even that we would become engaged
in war with Russia. No single situation or possibility or area could
be appraised as containing the seeds of this war, but taken collective-
ly there seemed to be agreement on the following points which were made
principally by DCI, with some contributions from others:
(1) Russia is planning war. The only thing we don't know
is where or when.
(2) Russia is adamantly maintaining a policy directed to-
wards control of the world.
(3) Stalin is not a gambler but others who succeed him may
be more inclined to put the matter to a touch.
?. The U. S. cannot forever maintain a huge counterforce or afford putting
out brush fires. Sooner or later, public opinion will come around to a state exempli-
fied by the German proverb: 'Better an end (to)terror than terror without end." Thus
ultimately there will come an impasse where they cannot withdraw from a position and
we can't accept it.
25X1A9a
It was well put by - that we have not adequately brought this grue-
some prospect to the attention of the readers of our estimates. Said readers relax
perceptively upon reading our standard prediction; "we estimate that the Russians
will not deliberately initiate hostilities during the period ......," they are not
sufficiently alarmed over our paragraphs dealing with the likelihood of unexpected
war. Porter suggested that all estimates dealing with the blocs' major courses of
action start with, or have a cover sheet pointing out this overall estimate within
the context of which, and not separately, the detailed picture should be considered.
DCI closed the discussion by directing the group to do something like that so that
our language would adequately reflect our basic long-term estimates.
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Official Diary
Monday, 1 December 1952
lt. ( cony d. )
25X1X7
(This certainly will create a shock when it reaches Further personal
comment: If this is true, what in the hell are we doing not considering the NSC
level, initiation of preventive war?)
5. General Willems, at the end of the ILC Meeting, came into my room to report
in some detail the special emergency meeting of the Watch Committee which was mued
Friday night, 28 November, to consider the rumor quoted by a high Iranian source of
an impending Russian invasion within two weeks. There was no way of confirming this;
the Committee agreed to give the matter a low evaluation and consider it again at its
regular meeting this week. 25X1A9a
6. Conferred with of P & P, on arrangements to be made for pro-
viding the Special Board -o consider American political warfare techniques and poli
cies, with adequate intelligence background. He told me he had been in touch with
Sherman Kent and given him a list of key estimates and also that Kent had agreed to
review the estimate the DD/P section is preparing on the amount of propaganda, bribery,
etc., that the bloc engaged in country by country. This was laid on originally in
response to a request by Senator Fulbright and is now being expanded to take care of
the needs of this panel. The specific request on DD/I was that we present the Board
with a paper, measuring in quantitative terms, the relative costs of the various
fringe wars, especially Korea, Indochina, Malaya, to the Soviet bloc as a whole and
USSR separately on the one hand and the free world as a whole and the USA separately
on the other. I indicated that:
a. This was virtually impossible to do with any degree of significance
as the cost of these specific wars would not be sensibly separated from
the cost of the US' and its allies' preparedness programs, nor could
these costs be aggregated or contrasted.
b. To the extent that material was available, it was much more apt to
be available in the Department of Defense, particularly all items con-
cerning our own costs and losses. We closed the discussion on the basis
of my suggestion that he consult with Charlie Noyes, OSD, to see if by
any chance they had done some study along these lines that would be satis-
factory, and if they didn't, whether Defense would undertake to prepare
the friendly side of the picture while we came up with our best rough
guesses as to the enemy side.
7. Attended meeting of the Board of Estimates during the revision of NIE-64
required to bring it up through June 30, 1951. A very tough problem and one which
it was almat impossible to solve satisfactorily within the time limit set (December
15th). Various short-cuts and means of avoiding protracted IAC debate were can-
vassed and the appropriate team of the Board left to come up with a draft form t
Thursday. Had a previous conference with the 0/RR. people on the question of re-
vising their economic data. Since drafting the 0/BR contribution to 6l. in April,
revised figuring has indicated that we were substantially in error on the under-
side in our picture of the Russian gross national product and industrial might.
-3-
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Official Diary
Monday, 1 December 1952
7. (cont'd.)
Query whether we correct this by an amendment to 64, handle in this revision of 64,
or forget the whole thing except for a note of our apprehension until we get to 65.
Hoover and O/RR's team will settle this next Thursday.
25X1A5a1
8. Conferred with with refer-
ence to taking on the general survey of research personalities and materials avail-
able on Communist China. Details of this are being handled adequately through
25X1A9a
25X1A9a
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