LETTER TO THE HONORABLE SAMUEL S. STRATTON FROM WALTER ELDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002800280006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 23, 1963
• Content Type: LETTER

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23 May 1963
Dear Mr. Stratton:
Mr. John McCone has asked rr, to ac-
knowledge your Inter of ad May and to thank
you for your note and the tear sheets from the
Congressional Record of 16 ay.
Mr. McCone had noted your analysis
with interest and is grateful to you for bringing
this matter to his attention.
Sinc*rely,
alter lde+r
Executive Assistant
The Honorable Samuel S. Stratto
rjvuse os .Mepresentattves
Washington 25, D. C.
Distribution:
C-rig... Addressee
1 EA/ICI,
I4YASO. (3OVbe3
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 SAMUEL S. sTRAAppooved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8
Congreo of the Vniteb &tateo
Louge of 1 epregentatibeg
waIbington, 0. C.
May 20, 1963
COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
I am enclosing tear sheets from the Congressional Record of
Thursday, May 16, containing my analysis of the Stennis Subcommittee
report on Cuba.
I thought you might be interested in seeing it.
Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
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8296
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May 16
In 1949, after much legal haggling, Los report of the Special Preparedness Sub-
Alamos became a county, and its citizens be- committee of the other body, summariz-
came legal residents of New Mexico with vot- frig its findings in its recent investigation
ing privileges in local, State and national this whole matter.
elections. In 1957, the gates came down and into
anybody who wanted to could come a ;;d go Mr. Speaker, now that this report has
in the town. been released I feel constrained to say
Today, except for its rugged mountain set- that I find myself baffled, mystified, and
ting, the community of bright green lawns disappointed by it. Last January and
and brilliant gardens looks just about like February we found ourselves with a vio-
any suburban town. Its more than 13,000
residents lent, almost hysterical attack being made
enjoy an outstanding school sys-
tem, a fast-growing shopping facility and upon both the integrity and the compe-
tence of our Nation's intelligence of recreation. The housing has never ver gene agen-
caught up with the demand and often seems cies. Either they cannot find out the
to be losing ground, but the big hope for im- real facts about Cuba, we were being
provement lies in two burgeoning subdi- told, or else they are deliberately cover-
visions, where land and homes are being ing up. This attack became so severe
b
the ought and built by private individuals for and so potentially damaging that on
project. first time in the history of the Federal February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of
But, If Los Alamos is still not quite a Defense went on nationwide television
"normal" community, it soon will be. Last for 2 hours with material that only a
fall, President Kennedy signed a bill making few hours earlier had been classified as
possible the shift of commercial and residen- secret or top secret-a truly unprece-
tial property of the Hill from Federal to dented undertaking, which, incidentally,
private ownership. Although the long pro-
cess was of platting, planning and appraisal has It was against this background, Mr.
begun, actual sales are not expected to be- Speaker, that the subcommittee moved
gin before mid-1964. Meanwhile, the AEC
is planning more than $8 million worth of to try to find the real answer to these
construction and maintenance to put munic- grave and very disturbing questions.
ipal facilities in good, salable shape, and Were the intelligence people right-or
the busy members of the Los Alamos Coun- were they not? The Congress ought to
ty commission are tackling the monumental know, and the people ought to know, too.
job of preparing the community for self- This was the task to which the distin-
government.
Many changes have taken place on Pajarito guished subcommittee set itself.
Plateau during the past two decades. Now the verdict is in, Mr. Speaker, and
Changes which have affected not only the I must say I am flabbergasted to see it:
community itself, but changes which have ai- All charges have been factually dis-
tered mankind's whole outlook on the world proved, but somehow the defendant has
in which he lives. But, one thing will not still not been acquitted. Instead he re-
change: the Laboratory's adventurous spirit mains under suspicion, if he is not in-
and the unmatched natural beauty of the .deed actually which provides much of the ins
irs_ y found guilty at least on
p
With an impressive record of accomplish- 1 realize tnat the legislative process
ments behind it, and its hometown becom- involves compromise, but surely when it
ing what the AEC hoped in 1947 would be comes to a question as gravely serious
"a community satisfactory to scientists," the as the one that originally led to the sub-
Laboratory can look to a promising future. committee's inquiry, do not we deserve a
Many technological and scientific advances more specific answer than that, if the
are predictable-achievement of flyable nu- facts at all warrant such an answer?
clear rockets and investigation of more so-
phisticated yet here is a jury verdict with some-
sion; practical ical types systesm for r nuclear rocket obtaining pro power' thing for everybody, a strange amalgam
from controlled fusion; fast breeding fission of both fact and fancy which comes out
reactors; explorations in the field of muolecu- clearly and positively exactly nowhere.
lar biology. Quite unpredictable, however, Surely if the facts point one way, Mr.
are scientific and technological break- Speaker, then we have a right, do we
throughs. There were plenty of these dur- not, to expect that the conclusions will
Ing the Laboratory's first 20 years-there are follow them in the same direction?
,Jrrtain to be many more in the future. Surely when the integrity and the com-
petence of our top intelligence services
THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE have been so viciously attacked, the
AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN American people have a right to expect
MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE a more specific and forthright answer
THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN from this great subcommittee.
Let us look at this report. As I see
WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE? it, every single one of the grave charges
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under -made against, our intelligence services
previous order of the House, the gentle- last February-both on and off of the
man from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is floors of Congress-have been specifical-
recognized for 45 minutes. ly and conclusively disproved by the
(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given subcommittee's report.
permission to revise and extend his re- Let me just run down some of their
marks.) findings, mostly in their own words:.
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as a The subcommittee has uncovered no evi-
member of the Armed Services Commit- dence to substantiate changes and specula-
tee and as a former intelligence officer lion about a photography gap having existed
in the Navy I have been from September 5 to October 14. The evi-
in con- dence before the subcommittee leads to the
e
cerned since last January with the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.
sweeping and serious charges that have - -
been made against our established Gov- The news reports of an alleged conflict be-
ernment intelligence agencies in connec- tween the CIA and SAC with reference to
lion with their performance in the Cu- .the operation of U-2 high-altitude recon-
naissance flights prior to October 14 were
ban crisis. For this reason I have await- also closely inquired into and found to be
ed with great interest the release of the without merit.
To a man the intelligence chiefs stated
that it is their opinion that all strategic
missiles and bombers have been removed
from Cuba.
The intelligence community estimated
that approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel
were withdrawn from Cuba following the
October confrontation. A net of 4,000 to
5,000 additional have been withdrawn since
the first of the year, our intelligence people
say. .
That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote, as
are the others, from the subcommittee's
own report, and that adds up to a total
estimated withdrawal of from 9,000 to
10,000 Soviet personnel. The report does
not mention a single word about any evi-
dence to support the charge, made in
some quarters, that a comparable num-
ber of Soviet personnel-whether called
troops or technicians-have newly ar-
rived in Cuba.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. STRATTON. ?I yield to the gen-
tleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. MORSE. How many Soviet
troops, according to the estimates of
our intelligence sources, now remain in
Cuba?
Mr. STRATTON. If the gentleman
will permit me to develop my point of
view as I have prepared it, I think that
we can then discuss that subject a little
later.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield further, will the gen-
tleman agree that the presence of Soviet
troops rather than the number of Soviet
troops is the critical factor?
Mr. STRATTON. Well, I would say to
my good friend from Massachusetts that
I certainly agree with him that the pres-
ence of Soviet troops is a matter of con-
cern, but what I am directing myself to,
however, is a specific item with respect
to the quality of our intelligence and
with respect to certain suggestions that
have been made in certain quarters that
certain individuals have a different kind
of intelligence from that available to our
top intelligence agencies. Such a sug-
gestion was made, for example, to the
effect that as many troops or techni-
cians, or whatever you want. to call them,
had moved back into Cuba in recent
months as had been withdrawn earlier,
and I am simply calling to the atten-
tion of the House the fact that the re-
port of the subcommittee says that a
total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were with-
drawn from Cuba since October.
And that there is not a shred of evi-
dence in the report-I am not quoting-
but there is nothing in the report to sug-
gest that any number of troops or tech-
nicians or Soviet personnel ever went
back into Cuba.
Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will
yield further, would the gentleman agree
that there are still thousands of Soviet
troops on the island of Cuba today?
Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the re-
ports substantiate that.
Mr. MORSE. Would the gentleman
restate his quotation with reference to
the "photography gap"?
Mr. STRATTON. Well, I do not mind
debating with the gentleman, and I am
always happy to talk with him, but my
time is somewhat limited.
Mr. MORSE. I just missed the dates.
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
8~8s -ate.
those who shared Bradbury's faith in Los Nerva rocket engine program. Nerva's first an increasing store of knowledge and high
Alamos. planned application is as a nuclear third hopes.
Their faith was confirmed often through- stage for the, Saturn C-5 manned lunar land-. Aiding and abetting all Laboratory proj-
out the palance of 1946. In the spring, Gen- ing operation, and will make possible a sin- ects is the work of the chemistry and metal-
eral Groves approved plans for construction gle launch capability. for lunar landing and lurgy division. Chemical and metallurgical
of "The Hill's" first permanent housing, and return. Once engine tests have begun, hope- investigations of reactor materials, and the
prefabricated units were added as quick re- fully sometime next year, Los Alamos' efforts development of new fabrication techniques,
lief for the critical housing shortage. will be shifted to Investigations of more ad- are of prime importance in Project Rover,
The biggest 'roost came In August, when vaned propulsion reactors. power reactor work and the plasma ther-
Congress passed the McMahon Act, establish- The Rover reactor project, however, is only mocouple. Fundamental studies of urg-
ing the Atomic Energy Commission and put- part of a varied reactor research program nium and transuranium elements have
ting atomic energy under civilian-control. that began before the Laboratory was a year added significantly to the world's knowl-
As 1947 began, the Commission took over old. The world's first homogeneous reactor, edege of such materials. A pioneer in the
and the University of California agreed to the Water Boiler, produced its first chain re- field of plutonium processing, Los Alamos
continue operating the Laboratory. With the action in May 1944, and continues to oper- developed an electro-refining process that
Commission establishing as its first priority ate, at higher power, in a deep Los Alamos has been called "the biggest advancement
"the stabilization and revitalization of the canyon. Following the Water Boiler came in plutonium process technology in a dec-
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory," it became the world's first fast reactor, Clementine, so ade." A batch of plutonium refined by this
clear that Los Alamos would continue to play named because it operated in a cavern in a process has been accepted by the National
a key role in the Nation's atomic energy canyon and used plutonium, whose code Bureau of Standards as the Nation's first
program. word was "49." Clementine operated from and only recognized standard of pure metal.
Although the Laboratory continued devel- 1949 to 1953. Still another research reactor, Research in low temperature physics, by
opment of advanced fission weapons, it Omega West, went into low power operation the cryogenics group, has produced signifi-
shortly embarked upon its second major in July 1956. cant work in measurements of the Moss-
mission-development of the hydrogen bomb. In the midfifties the Laboratory entered bauer effect, and in a temperature scale
Theoretical possibilities for a thermonu- another field of reactor research with the based on the vapor pressure of helium 3 that
clear weapon, an idea born during a lunch- formation of a division to investigate power has been adopted as a worldwide standard.
time discussion in early 1942, had been under reactor development. To date, three unique Biomedical research,. a program that grew
study since the earliest days at Los Alamos reactor concepts have been tested, and a out of early concern for the amount of
by a special group headed by Edward Teller. third experiment is under construction. Also plutonium being absorbed by personnel, has
Theoretically, the scientists knew, a fusion in the works: a fast reactor core test fa- become a program of great importance in
reaction was possible, but It required tem- cility in which various fast reactor core de- the Laboratory. The health research group
peratures far higher than any previously signs can be readily interchanged without recently completed a 6-year study of radio-
created by man. With the success of the going to the effort of building an entire re- activity in milk and in humans, the most
fission bomb, these high temperatures had actor for each core. extensive project of its kind ever under-
been achieved. The thermonuclear bomb Another of the Laboratory's major achieve- taken. This, along with the group's en-
was now in the realm of practical possibility. ments, growing out of its reactor research, lightening findings on the harmful effects
But, major barriers were still unsur- was the first direct conversion of nuclear of radiation, have made Los Alamos scien-
mounted. Once the cooperative efforts of energy into electrical power. Though many tests among the foremost authorities on fall-
Teller and Stanislaw I71am made the neces- scientists had been fascinated by the pos- out in the world.
sary conceptual breakthrough, the Labora- sibility since the first nuclear pile went All of the Laboratory's practical programs
tory was able to launch an elaborate theoret- critical, it remained for a group of Los Ala- are supported by basic and independent re-
critical,
and experimental research program. mos men to come up with the plasma thermo- search. The history of the Laboratory af-
The famous electronic brain, Maniac, was couple. Working on the principle of the fords dozens of examples of original research'
built to handle the complex calculations of conventional two-metal thermocouple, the projects which have resulted in unique con-
the thermonuclear process, and the Labora- plasma device substitutes an easily ionized tributions to mankind's knowledge of the
tory went on a 6-day week to get the job gas for one of the metals. It obtains its physical universe. To accomplish this, the
Laboratory is
done. In November 1952, 2 months before heat from the neutron flux of the Omega well equipped with research
the Laboratory's 10th anniversary, the West reactor. After more than 70 in-pile tools. In addition to two research reactors
world's first full-scale thermonuclear explo- tests, scientists now are thinking of a power and many critical assemblies, Los Alamos
sion shook - the Pacific atoll of Eniwetok reactor built of many of these cells, pro- has one of the world's highest voltage elec-
with the detonation of the Los Alamos de- ducing a high power level and capable of variable tic accelerators, two smaller ones, a
vice, "Mike." operating for thousands of hours. varia energy cyclotron, a Cockcroft Wal-
Since that time, several dozen LASL fission Although a practical power reactor prob- ton accelerator and various betatrons. A
enerator will be
lsed neutron
g
u
kil
lt
p
ovo
350
-
'
have been tested In 8
and fusion devices
series of tests in the Pacific and in 8
comprising 100 shots, conducted at
series
,
the Nevada test site. Today, more than 90
y
.
e
or ex
space ships
The weap-
the first 20
ears
.
y
l
y
i
g
ur
n
id
e
d
l w
percent of all fission and fusion warheads in will put ion propulsion within practicathe U.S. stockpile are Los Alamos products. reach. ons program depended heavily on theoretical
During the first decade, as it is today, the work-and still does. In addition, Lasl
Laboratory's primary responsibility was de- The harnessing of thermonuclear energy theoreticians have been active in many peace-
velopment and - improvement of nuclear as a cheap, almost inexhaustible source of ful areas of research, from :nuclear structure
weapons. However, in view of Bradbury's power was discussed at Los Alamos long be- to astrophysics. Much of the complex work,
emphasis on programs of fundamental re- fore the hydrogen bomb became a reality. both theoretical and experimental, is made
search and development related to the prob- Just before the Mike shot in 1952, the first possible by the Laboratory's unique array of
lems of nuclear energy, it is not surprising experiments in what is now called Project fast computers. In fact, the Laboratory
that peaceful and fundamental fields of re- Sherwood were conducted with a device boasts the world's largest computer center.
search have received increasing emphasis called perhapsitron-perhaps it would work. Maniac I, first of the stored program paral-
until today approximately half of the Labo- perhaps it wouldn't. lel electronic computers, was designed and
ratory's effort is devoted to this type of re- It didn't. But the experiments offered built at Los Alamos and went to work in
search, enough encouragement to keep the search 1952. Seven years later, it was replaced by
One nonmilitary project, now the Labora- going and opened up an entirely new field of - Maniac II. In addition, the Laboratory' has
tory's second largest program, is Project Ro- investigation; plasma physics. an IBM 704, two 7090's and the supercom-
ver, the Nation's effort to develop nuclear Since no material exists that is capable of puter, "Stretch," developed) for the Labors
rocket propulsion. Since 1955, the Labora- withstanding the incredibly high tempera- tory by IBM.
tory has concentrated on design, develop- tures required to produce a sustained ther- In the last 20 years, while the Laboratory
ment, and eventually testing of the Kiwi monuclear reaction in ionized deuterium gas, was making notable scientific advances, the
series of reactors. These are named for the the plasma must be confined in the nonma- community of Los Alamos itself was coming
flightless Australian bird, because they are terial walls of a magnetic field, or "bottle." of age.
.not Intended to fly, Successful tests of three Trying a variety of approaches to this prob- The AEC brought to Los Alamos-in the
Kiwi-A and one Kiwi-B reactors, using gas- lem, Los Alamos scientists eventually late 1940's-an ambitious, $121 million plan
eous hydrogen as a propellant-coolant, began achieved, with a machine called Scylla, a for community expansion and laboratory re-
in 1959 and removed doubts about the feast- burst of neutrons showing an energy tem- location which put new, modern technical
bility of developing nuclear propulsion at all. perature of 15 million degrees-and fusion. facilities on neighboring mesas, removing the
This year tests of Kiwi-B reactors using Though recognized around the world as the unsightly old wooden structures-and their
liquid hydrogen as propellant-coolant, will first manmade controlled thermonuclear high fences-from the town's main street.
be conducted with the purpose of evaluating reaction, the achievement also showed that A spacious, attractively landscaped shopping
and modifying the reactor for use in a rocket there was still a very long way to go. Some and community center was added. Schools
engine. During the year, phasing from re- 10 years of work with a variety of devices and housing were built in the frantic effort
actor to engine development is expected in have resulted in some disappointing fail- to keep up with the need. A post office, li-
a cooperative effort with contractors in the urea, some promising successes, and always, brary and medical center were added.
No. 73-2
In
ably will not be a reality until sometime the 1970's, such a device could power the in operation soon, and a tandem Van de
life-supporting facilities man needs in his Graff generator is being purchased.
It also Theoretical studies at Los Alamos ranged
nded journe
s
t
f
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1$63 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Mr. STRATTON. I have a rather long
speech and it might, perhaps, be better
for us to get in the discussion after I
have had a chance to get it in the RECORD.
Let me say that the reference to the.
photography gap was a statement di-
rectly from the committee report that
they looked into the charge of a photog-
raphy gap, and I am sure the gentle-
man recalls when this was made, and
it made big headlines, they looked into
it and found that the charges were un-
founded.
Mr. MORSE. Between what dates?
Mr. STRATTON. Between September
5 and October 14.
Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will
yield further, is it not a fact that there
was no aerial reconnaissance surveil-
lance of Cuba, during. that period of
time?
Mr. STRATTON. No, that is not a
fact. The report-and I invite the gen-
tleman's attention to it-lists the extent
of the coverage and backs up the state-
ment which it made and which I am
quoting, that there was no gap between
September 5 and October 14.
Mr. MORSE. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, here
are some other points the report makes,
in its own wording: .
The intelligence chiefs do not believe that
the Communist forces in Cuba now present
a direct aggressive military threat to the
United States or Latin America.
Offensive weapons systems- were identified
before becoming operational and their loca-
tions and performance characteristics spelled
out in a limited period of time despite ad-
verse weather and an almost - completely
closed society.
Photographic reconnaissance ultimately
produced incontrovertible proof. of the pres-
ence of strategic missiles and offensive weap-
ons in Cuba. Credit is due to those In-
volved in this mission.
It has already been indicated, during all of
this period there was a great volume of un-
confirmed reports and rumors from human
sources' about strategic missile-related ac-
tivity in Cuba. None of these reports were
confirmed prior to October 14, 1962.
And again, on this same subject, which
incidentally lies at. the very heart of the
attacks which have been mounted
against our intelligence performance.
During the July-August period refugee re-
ports of alleged missile activity in Cuba in-
creased significantly. These reports Were
checked out as scrupulously as possible, but
even- though many of them included con-
sistent and similar descriptions of some
form of missile activity there was no con-
firmation of them.
We have been reading a lot, Mr. Speak-
er, about those who had information-be-
fore the President of the United States
went on television on the 22d of Octo-
ber and how those who had this infor-
mation were right and how the Govern-
ment was wrong. Here a direct reading
of the Senate document, which has not
received the attention it deserves in the
press, completely and totally refutes that
kind of a charge.
The MRBM's were discovered while they
were in the process of being deployed. The
IRBM sites were discovered in a very early
stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers
were discovered while they were still in their
crates. The Mig 21's were discovered when
only one had been removed from the ship-
ping container.
CIA and military intelligence, by use of
their highly developed photographic capa-
bility, were able to give a unique performance
in intelligence operations. They ultimately
placed in the hands of the President, ? his
advisers and U.S. diplomatic representatives
incontrovertible proof of the presence of
Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct
contravention of Soviet Government assur-
ances. This visual proof unquestionably
played a major part in the united action of
the OAS and world acceptance of the cor-
rectness of our position.
The Intelligence -community does not believe
that in fact Cuba is now or has been a base
for Soviet submarines.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I have here listed
11 specific points, in the language of the
report itself, which I think are respon-
sive to Some of the charges we have all
been reading in the press. These are
the hard, demonstrated facts about our
Cuban intelligence found by the subcom-
mittee. They add up, in my judgment,
to a simply overwhelming confirmation
of an outstanding job done by our in-
telligence agencies in the Cuban crisis.
And they conclusively refute and, indeed,
demolish, Mr. Speaker, all the myriad
charges we have heard raised on this
floor and in another body about what
was really going on in Cuba, or what
was really known to someone with some
specialized brand of "inside intelligence
dope."
I think this is a tremendous verdict
to be handed down by any jury, Mr.
Speaker, and surely it. should have de-
molished once and for all the nit-picking
attacks that have been made variously
on the competency and integrity of our
Nation's intelligence services. Not only
should these facts wipe out completely
all of these efforts to cast doubt and
suspicion on the performance of our in-
telligence agencies, surely they should
give us a great sense of pride, both in the
performance of our intelligence people
and in the conduct of our Government
leaders acting on the basis of that in-
telligence information.
Yet, Mr. Speaker, and this is the thing
that disturbs me, and it is the reason
why I have taken this time today, having
clearly acquitted the defendant on the
basis of the factual evidence, the sub-
committee jury, by some strange legis-
lative alchemy, then proceeds to find him
guilty not on the basis of the facts but
on guesswork. Let us take a closer look
at this strange turn of events in the sub-
committee report.
First. Having discarded the charge
about missiles being hidden in caves, by
saying that the intelligence chiefs "to
a man" did not believe it, the subcom-
mittee goes on to add:
However, they readily admit that, in terms
of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive
weapons remain on the island concealed in
caves or otherwise * * * based on skepticism,
if nothing more, there is reason for grave
concern about this matter.
What a strange statement, Mr. Speak-
er, that is. Anything, of course, Is al-
ways possible. But are we living in a
real world or are we living in a dream
world? Do we act on the basis of facts
.8287
and evidence, or on the basis ? only of
philosophical skepticism? Do we make
our decisions on reality, or in terms of
absolutes which can have no application
to our real world?
Are we now suddenly to discard the
reasoned, rational, realistic beliefs of
every single one of our intelligence chiefs
and to fall back instead on some appeal
to absolutes and "nothing more" than
philosophical skepticism as the touch-
stone of truth and falsity when it comes
to Cuba? We certainly do not operate
this way in any other agency of govern-
ment; we do not operate this way in the
business world; we most certainly do not
operate on that basis in our everyday
lives. Then why should we now sudden-
ly be told that such an approach is a
meaningful factor in assessing our Gov-
ernment's conduct in the Cuban crisis?
Or consider this statement in the re-
port:
The deficiency in the performance of the
intelligence community appears to have
been in the evaluation and assesment of the
accumulated data. Moreover there seems
to have been a disinclination on the part of
the intelligence community to accept and
believe the ominous portent of the infor-
mation which had been gatherer:.
And again:
It was not until the photographic evid-
ence was obtained on October 14 that the
intelligence community concluded that
strategic missiles had been introduced into
Cuba.
Mr. MACGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Minnesota.
Mr. MACGREGOR. In connection
with the point the gentleman made as
to the verification of ballistics missiles
in Cuba on October 14 for the first time,
I would like to inquire whether the gen-
tleman was in the House of Representa-
tives on September 26, 1962-and I am
quoting the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page
19719-when the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] advised the House
as follows:
We have arrived, Mr. Chairman, at the
point where we had better .march together
while time remains.
I got a lot of information over the 22 years
I have been on the military committee, and
I have other assignments from which I get
information. They are loaded for bear in
Cuba. Russia has missiles, and they are
portable ones that can permeate the United
States-and they are portable-from Havana,
Cuba, to Norfolk, Va. And this is not idle
talk.
Was the gentleman in the Chamber on
September 26, 1962, some 3 weeks in ad-
vance of October 14, 1962, when the dis-
tinguished gentleman from South Caro-
lina [Mr. RIVERS] made that statement
without, I may add, any refutation what-
soever?
Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman
knows I cannot recall specifically
whether I was in the Chamber on a par-
ticular day.
Mr. MACGREGOR. This was during
the debate on the Cuba resolution, and
I assume the gentleman was here.
Mr. STRATTON. I know I was there
that day, and was proud to vote for the
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8288
resolution. I do not recall the gentle-
man's statement being made. I have no
doubt it was made.
Mr.:YIACGREGOR. I assure the gen-
tleman that I have correctly quoted Mr.
RIVERS statement.
Mr. STRATTON. I would not take
issue at all with what the distinguished
ranking member of our committee said.
I simply point out to the gentleman that
what applies to the gentleman from
South Carolina applies to the distin-
guished Member of the other, body, with
whom :C have upon occasion taken excep-
tion with regard to this same point;
namely, that there were a lot of rumors
and reports of strategic missiles and of
short-Lange missiles in Cuba prior to
October 14. The point I am making is
the point made by me in this body before,
and now has been demonstrated and
proven by the report of a subcommittee
of the other body; namely, that until
October 14 there was no proof, no con-
firmation of this charge. It is one thing
to talk about rumors, and it is another
thing to talk about proven fact. When
you are going to take this country to the
brink of nuclear war, as the President
did' on October 22, you had better be
very sure that what you are talking
about is a fact and not a rumor.
Mr. MACGREGOR. I have served,
like the gentleman, in the intelligence
branch of our military services. Would
the gentleman not agree with the dis-
tinguished subcommittee of the other
body that intelligence coming from a
closed society covers a certain range of
factual information, and the principal
problem is proper evaluation and
analysis.
Mr. STRATTON. I certainly would
agree with the gentleman on that point.
If the gentleman will bear with me a
moment, he will see I am now moving
into a discusion of this specific point. I
am sure that after the gentleman has
heard what I have to say, because of his
background in the intelligence field and
his own native sound intelligence, he
will agree wholeheartedly with the state-
ment I am about, to make.
Mr. MACGREGOR. I await the gen-
tleman's further remarks with bated
breath.
Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle-
man.
Resuming the direct quotation from
the subcommittee report on this second
major critique which they make of our
intelligence performance in the Cuban
crisis:
It was not until the photographic evidence
was obtained on October 14 that the intel-
ligence community concluded that strategic
missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In
reaching their pre-October 14 negative
judgment the intelligence analysts were
strongly influenced by their judgment as to
Soviet policy, and indications that strategic
missiles were being installed were not given
proper weight by the intelligence com-
munity.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I regret to say that
this statement simply makes no sense to
me. The report itself has already stated,
as I mentioned just a moment ago, that
until the U-2 flight of October 14 there
was not a single bit of confirmation of
the human reports that strategic mis-
siles had been placed in Cuba, even
though they were most scrupulously
checked out by our intelligence person-
nel. Are we now being asked to criticize
our intelligence people because they did
.not conclude that strategic missiles were
in Cuba before they had any confirma-
tion of these rumors in their hands?
What does the subcommittee think our
intelligence chiefs should base their
judgments on-confirmed fact, or fic-
tion? Before October 14 the record it-
self says there was absolutely no con-
firmed proof of Soviet strategic missiles
at hand. Our intelligence agencies would
have been derelict indeed had toey made
any such conclusion then before the Oc-
tober 14 date. But we also know that as
soon as the October 14 evidence was in,
they immediately made the correct con-
clusion, and they passed it on swiftly to
the President, and he in tufn acted
swiftly, courageously, and effectively.
Does the subcommittee really think our
intelligence agencies are open to repri-
mand because they failed to manifest
psychic powers prior to October 14?
Again, the report says this:
Finally, the intelligence community was of
the opinion that the Soviets would not in-
troduce strategic missiles into Cuba because
they believed that such a development would
be incompatible with Soviet policy as In-
terpreted by them.
. Well, this may well have applied to
some or even many in the intelligence
community, but it emphatically does not
apply to the chief of that intelligence
community, Mr. John McCone, as the
distinguished Senator from Washington,
Mr. JACKSON, makes clear on page 7733 9f
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for May 9, the
day the text of the report was made
available to the other body.
The subcommittee report goes on:
The danger that such pereonceptions will
control the weighting of the facts as events
unfold is evident.
And again:
It appears that on this point [about stra-
tegic missiles] the analysts were strongly in-
fluenced by their philosophical judgment
that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to
introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In
retrospect, it appears that the indicators to
the contrary were not given proper weight.
Now, Mr. Speaker, this statement too
makes no sense to me. I am sorry to say,
the subcommittee's own report has made
it crystal clear that whatever may have
been the erroneous preconceptions and
philosophical judgments of certain ana-
lysts within the intelligence community,
they had not the slightest control or in-
fluence over the weighting of the facts,
because from the very moment the re-
ports of strategic missiles in Cuba came
in, the Government did everything with-
in its power to determine the truth of
these reports. Checked them out, as the
subcommittee itself commented, "scru-
pulously." That is a pretty strong word,
Mr. Speaker. What more could it have
possibly done? Whatever erroneous
philosophical judgments there may have
been, they had absolutely no impact on
our actions. We were not lulled asleep,
as at Pearl Harbor. We did not refuse to
May 16
check out all' the evidence as at Pearl
Harbor. Instead we did a fantastically
thorough intelligence job that got results
as quickly as humanly possible, even
though those results proved to be con-
trary to the philosophical preconceptions
of some people; and then finally we ac-
cepted that confirmed proof and we
acted. on it the moment it was received-
as the subcommittee's factual findings
also indicate. What a vast-and most
fortunate difference-from what hap-
pened in the days before Pearl Harbor.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, we are told that
the intelligence community erred by
substantially underestimating Soviet
troop strength in Cuba. Now let me
make just two comments on this par-
ticular alleged error.
In the first place, there can be no other
basis for determining Soviet manpower
in Cuba except our own intelligence esti-
mates. If our intelligence agencies can
be said to have underestimated Soviet
manpower this can only be so because
they have now, on the basis of further
information, come up with a new esti-
mate. There is no other benchmark
short perhaps of direct Soviet and Cuban
announcements, Mr. Speaker, by which
to measure real Soviet strength in Cuba,
or an on-the-spot head count on'Cuban
soil. So to criticize the performance of
our intelligence reports on the basis of
other updated intelligence reports made
by the same agency strikes me as an
exercise in futility.
Secondly, the subcommittee appears.
to be laboring here, as before, under a-
misapprehension that intelligence can-
not be good unless :[t is absolutely certain
and 100 percent correct. Now nothing
could possibly be further from the truth
than that. Intelligence of the enemy
must by its very nature be inexact, an
attempt at approximating a truth that
is deliberately and ingenously being con-
cealed from us. To criticize intelligence,
even softly, simply because it is not accu-
rate is to retreat once more into an un-
realistic dream world of absolutes that
bears no relation to reality itself. To in-
sist that our intelligence services must
have nothing but perfect scores would be
like insisting on an airplane flying with-
ogt the wing drag-without which sus-
tained flight itself, of course, would be
impossible-it just cannot in the nature
'of the case be done,.
Now, Mr. Speaker, on the basis of this
analysis, I think it should now be clear
that as far as the facts developed by the
distinguished subcommittee of the other
body are concerned, the record of our
intelligence services during the Cuban
crisis, far from being open to doubt,
suspicion or attack, is nothing short of
phenomenal. The discovery of the stra-
tegic missile sites in Cuba was a major
intelligence victory-and one which has
been almost as much overlooked and de-
preciated in recent days as the military
and diplomatic victory which was won
by President Kennedy between October
22 and October 28.
Only when we leave the realm of facts
behind, Mr. Speaker, and retreat into
another wQrld of absolutes and unat-
tainable perfection can there be any
basis for criticizing the performance of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
our intelligence agencies in Cuba or for
suggesting that the attacks which have
been made against them have any real
merit whatsoever.
I deeply regret, Mr. Speaker, that there
has been this strange blend of fact and
fancy. On the facts the committee de-
veloped there certainly could have been
and I believe there should have been, a
clear, forthright, unmistakable, and con-
clusive rejection of all these unwarranted
and irresponsible attacks that have been
made against our intelligence agencies.
The facts were there. The call could and
should have been given, loud and clear.
Instead, Mr. Speaker, the trumpet has
given forth an uncertain sound. Those
who in months past have gained fame
and notoriety by the supsicions they have
tried to create about the performance of
our intelligence agencies have unfortu-
nately been given aid and comfort by
the inconclusive nature of this report.
Indeed, already they are citing the sub-
committee document as proof of all their
earlier- charges. .
But there remains one ray of hope, Mr.
Speaker. This report is after all an in-
terim report. Others, we are told, will
be issued later on. I am indeed hopeful
that when the final report is in, these
curious contradictions will have been
eliminated.
Unanimity is a great thing, Mr. Speak-
er. But let me say that I am hopeful
that if the final report on this vital issue
cannot come down unanimously solidly
behind the ability and integrity of our
intelligence services in the Cuban crisis,
at least we will have a minority report
to read which will state the record with-
out hesitation or apology, as one chapter
in American military history of which we
can all be proud.
FOREIGN, TRAVEL EXPENSES f'JF
1b1BERS OF CONGRESS SHOULD
BE LIMITED
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House. the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. HAI,PERN] is
recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to congratulate the Members of this
House for approving legislation that,
upon enactment, would restrict foreign
travel expenses of Members of Congress.
The legislation is, of course, House Joint
Resolution 245.
1 feel strongly about this legislation
and I trust it will win overwhelming sup-
port in the other body. My only regret
is that the measure did not come before
the House in the original, stronger and
broader version as introduced by the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on House Administration, the gentle-
man from Texas [Mr. ? BuRLESON].
However, the legislation as passed by
the House is a long step forward and I
hope the first of many steps to follow.
It is true that the House Rules Com-
mittee during this Congress has tight-
ened authorizations for matters pertain-
ing to congressional travel. It is also
true trough that the Rules Committee
actipfis do not have the permanence of
law, and therefore, can be relaxed at
will.
It is important therefore that travel
reform legislation is enacted. Other-
wise, Congress will once again be open
to charges of practicing temporary and
ineffectual cures, and of neglecting
permanent and effective ones, in spite
of the Rules Committee's notable efforts.
Commendable as this legislation is, it
should be considered as only a first step
by Congress in putting its Houses in
order. The reform of travel expendi-
tures, after all, is only one of many
necessary reforms, few of which have
been seriously considered lately by
Congress.
The next reform measure that Con-
gress should consider would provide for
the examination of all congressional re-
form proposals. My bill, H.R. 1952, and
several similar bills would establish a
Commission on the Organization of Con-
gress. I trust that the Rules Committee
will give priority to this legislation and
afford an early opportunity for hearings
on it.
This Commission would r'ecommerid
legislation that would take up where the
Reorganization Act of 1946 and relevant
legislation left off. Generally speaking,
the Commission would study Federal leg-
islative conditions, and then recommend
improvements in the organization and
operation of Congress.
The study would be undertaken with
a view to altering Congress in the follow-
ing ways: strengthen it, simplify its op-
erations and make them more efficient,
improve its relations with the other
branches, and enable Congress better to
meet its constitutional responsibilities.
Tile Commission's studies would in-
cl e, but not be limited to, the organza-
"
"and operation of the House and
Senate, and the relations between
gress, including the structure and work-
ings of all congressional committees and
the relations among them, and the em-
ployment and pay of congressional em-
ployees. Furthermore, the Commission
would study the relations between Con-
gress, the executive,-and the judiciary.
The Commission would be composed of
at least seven Members from each House,
with an initial party ratio of 4 to 3, in
favor of the majority. These 14 Mem-
bers would be supplemented by 2 more,
with distinguished records of interest
in public affairs, and appointed by the
President of the' United States, regard-
less of political affiliation.
A majority vote of the Members repre-
senting each House, taken separately,
would be necessary for approval of Com-
mission recommendations.
The Commission would make avail-
able to Congress not only stiffer organi-
zational standards, but also standards
of behavior. Standards in the latter re-
gard have been, and continue to be,
poorly defined, and as a result have con-
tributed to unfortunate and misleading
publicity.
The rules of Congress have been taken
for granted at a time when nothing
should be taken for granted. If Con-
gress continues to neglect revision of its
rules, the work upon public business will
become only more haphazard. We
8289
shall be charged with relying on rules
that appear to be sound chiefly because
Congress has endured, and not because
such rules have aided in the dispatch of
business.
It would indeed be tragic if Congress
would change only when an aroused Na-
tion forced it to change. Force breeds
haste, violence, and unsound reform.
Therefore let this Congress act not from
forced impulse, but rather from sea-
soned deliberation, in order to provide for
the inevitable.
NEW TEST-BAN PROPOSAL
(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 10
minutes.)
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, on
September 26, 1961, President Kennedy
affixed his signature to a document. It
was not an ordinary document, for it
proclaimed to the whole world the desire
of the American people to challenge the
Soviet Union, not to an arms race but
to a peace race. The document which
the President signed on that day was the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
This legislation, of which I was a spon-
sor, received extensive consideration in
the Congress and in the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, of which it is my
privilege to be' a member. It passed by
an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 73 to
14 in the Senate and 290 to 54 in the
House. The purpose of the act was to
create the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. By congressional man-
date, it was to explore, recommend, and
if approved by the President, negotiate
possible alternatives to the arms race in
order to enhance our national security.
Ever since its establishment, I have
closely followed and strongly supported
the activities of this Agency for peace.
This year I introduced the first of many
bills in the House to remove the $10 mil-
lion legislative ceiling on appropriations
which was contained in the original act.
Out of this $10 million, $8.33 million has
been appropriated to the Agency during
the year and a half it has been in ex-
istence. By comparison, almost $50 bil-
lion was appropriated to the Department
of Defense for fiscal year 1963 alone. If
the work of the Agency is to continue,
and if we are to continue to pursue
safeguarded and informed negotiations
in the field of arms control and disarm-
ament, the legislative ceiling on appro-
priations obviously must be lifted.
I admit that I may not be as knowl-
edgeable as some of the experts and
technicians who are concerned with
working out the details of arms control
and disarmament agreements. Perhaps,
though, this permits me, as it permits
other Americans, to be more objective in
my judgments. You have all read and
heard about the controversy over wheth-
er or not our test-ban proposals are ade-
quately safeguarded. Arguments have
raged over whether or not our proposed
verification system is adequate to detect
Soviet cheating under a test ban.
For the most part, this concern has
been directed at possible secret Soviet
tests with a magnitude less than one-
quarter the size of our first nuclear ex-
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - HOUSE
plosion in New Mexico almost 20 years
ago .and less than one ten-thousandths
the sine of the largest recorded Soviet ex-
plosion
It is the view of the State Department,
the Defense Department, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and the Arms Con-
trol ani Disarmament Agency that sig-
nifican, Soviet advances would require
a series of tests; that the probability is
high that any meaningful series would
be discovered by seismic or other means;
and that such occasional small tests as
might evade detection, if the Soviets
were prepared to risk getting caught,
would not have a damaging impact on
the military balance. Weighing the risks
of continued unlimited testing against
the risks involved in a test-ban treaty,
both this administration and the Ei-
senhower administration concluded that
such a treaty would be in our national
interest.
Now let me mention just briefly a few
of the advantages of a test-ban agree-
ment. It would: First, be a first step
toward slowing down the nuclear arms
race; second, be a first step toward in-
hibiting the further development of nu-
clear capabilities by other countries-a
development which would increase the
chances of nuclear devastation; third,
eliminate the expense of conducting nu-
clear tests, an expense which is in the
hundreds of millions of dollars for each
series; fourth preserve for a longer time
our present advantages in nuclear weap-
onry; and fifth, eliminate radioactive
fallout.
Despite these overwhelming advan-
tages, tide issue has been beclouded and
misundersjood. In addition to the dis-
proportionate and sometimes manufac-
tured fears of Soviet cheating, arguments
have also raged over the so-called con-
cessions we have made in the number
of annual onsite inspections. These
critics ignore the fact that, when the
United States was proposing a greater
number of annual inspections, we be-
lieved there were almost four times more
earthquakes annually in the Soviet Un-
ion than has proved to be the case. This
greatly diminishes the number of nat-
ural earthquakes which would be likely
to be confused with the tremors caused
by nuclear explosions. These opponents
of a test ban also ignore the fact that
research has given us improved ability
through seismic and other means to dis-
criminate at a distance and without in-
spections, between earthquakes and ex-
plosions. If these are "concessions,"
they are concessions to peace, to the
greater security of America and all na-
tions, and to scientific progress.
The President, the Secretary of State
and the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency have all
stated that a test ban agreement would
be in treaty form, subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate before it could
be put in effect. Some Senators in Con-
gress have recently speculated that if
the present proposal were submitted to
them, the required two-thirds majority
would be lacking. One Senator recently
suggested, on the basis of a study his
staff had made, that the proponents of
a test ban treaty would be lucky to get
57 out of 100 votes. I speak to inquire
if the country feels the same way-if
American mothers and fathers want to
continue to face the prospect of nuclear
annihilation for themselves and their
children-if they want to face the con-
tinuing and ever-increasing threat of
radioactive fallout as more and more
countries start testing and building up
nuclear arsenals of destruction.
In an address before the United Na-
tions on September 25, 1961, the day be-
fore the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act was signed into law, President
Kennedy said:
Today, every inhabitant of this planet
must contemplate the day when it may no
longer be habitable. Every man, woman
and child lives under a nuclear sword of
Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being cut at any moment
by accident, miscalculation or madness. The
weapons of war must be abolished before
they abolish us.
I do not believe that the estimates for
U.S. Senate support of a test ban treaty,
if correct reflect the sentiment of the
vast majority of Americans. I say that it
is imperative that we make some effort,
in however small a measure, to strength-
en the slender thread by which the nu-
clear sword of Damocles hangs. I say
we must break the stalemate which again
exists at Geneva. Although I am not a
military technologist or an expert on
seismology, I am an American and a
human being. I personally do not be-
lieve it is either realistic or in the
interest of our national security to let
technicalities of comparatively minor
import blind and distort a goal which
two administrations have concluded to
be in our national interest. Over the
years the distance between the Soviet
and U.S. positions has been narrowed
by changes on both sides. Who knows if
time and the possibility of a new regime
in the Soviet Union will render impos-
sible the goal we so earnestly seek and
obliterate forever the frail opportunity
that we now have? I say let us make
clear evidence of our overwhelming de-
sire to go forward in the cause of peace
and security. I say, let us split our di-
vergence down the middle. I say, let
us propose an agreement for 1 year with
the option of renewing that agreement
for longer periods. I say further, let us
propose an agreement calling for five
effective, meaningful onsite inspections.
The Soviets are satisfied to permit two
or three inspections only. We have been
asking for six or seven inspections. I
suggest here a compromise of five mean-
ingful, onsite inspections under a 1-year
treaty, with the option of renewal. In
this way we could promote the cause of
peace, security, and trust, and test the
validity of our proposals. Thus we may
accomplish the results sought through-
out the world by the man in the street-
a test ban treaty. Certainly, this may
involve taking some chance, but is it
comparable with our continuing gamble
on international nuclear annihilation?
If it is determined that the proposed
agreement is found unworkable, we could
always return to the uneasy peace pres-
ently existing.
s.~.
May 16
As Senator CHURCH of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee said at a re-
cent hearing on test ban negotiations:
Practically no attention is given at all-
which would permit the people of the United
States to put this question in perspective-
to the risks that we are taking and continue
to take if, somehow, we do not begin to turn
this nuclear arms race down.
We are like passengers on a train that is
headed toward a terrible precipice, and we
know the bridge is out, and yet, we are
arguing with one another as to what the dan-
gers are in jumping off the train without
taking into, account what the inevitable end
result will be if we continue on the tracks.
What do I seek? An avenue, an ap-
proach to attain a goal which the world
seems to be crying out for-a goal that
may be just beyond the touch of our
fingertips. I am not unmindful of cer-
tain disadvantages that may be inherent
in my proposal and. I would not want it
to be put into effect unless our security
experts agreed that, on balance, it was
in our national interest. However, un-
less some means is found to break the
stalemate, this illusive thing called peace
may not be attained in our lifetime-and
who knows-how long this lifetime might
be under present world conditions?
RUSSIAN TRAWLERS IN THE
CARIBBEAN
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Florida [Mr. ROGERS] is recog-
nized for 60 minutes.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I will be
glad to yield to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. FASCELL].
(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, last
March 4 there appeared in the southern-
most newspaper of the United States
The Key West Citizen of Key West, Fla.,
a news story by Jim Cobb, supported by
photographic evidence of a Russian-
made fishing boat, the omicron 50, which
was reportedly hijacked by its two Cuban
crewmen. At this time, as a prelude to
the discussion which is about to take
place I would like again, Mr. Speaker,
to draw my colleagues' attention to this
incident and to refresh their memories
on the subject.
The headline was: "Russian-Made
Fishing Boat Is Brought Here; Hijacked
by Cuban Crewmen."
The story follows:
A new 50-foot fishing vessel, identified as
Russian-made and reportedly hijacked, dock-
ed here yesterday and its two Cuban crew-
man were taken into custody by immigra-
tion officials.
The vessel-the Omicron 50-is believed to
be a part of the huge Soviet-backed develop-
ment program of the Cuban fishing indus-
try announced last October by Premier Fidel
Castro.
It arrived under its own power about 8:30
a. in. The two Cubans were immediately
whisked off to Miami by immigration au-
thorities. Their identities were not released.
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 Congress of the 1niteb'tatO
3bouze of 3atpreoeutatfbeo
Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency l;
2+30 E Street, N W.
Washington, D. C.