THE BURMA-CHINA BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01009A000700010010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 129
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 1, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE BURMA-CHINA BORDER
CIA/RR-GR-53
July 1954
DOCUMENT NO. __...._ _.......
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C:~
DECLASSIFIED
NEXT RLVIEW DATE:
AUTH
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,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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11-ds nmate-iai contains information affecting
he _ratic. ?3.i Defense. of the United States
a i xiw ti meaning of the espionage laws,
1Ee 1 R. SC, Secs. 793 and 794, the t_ans-
~. ?s on nr revelation of which in any manner
.:.n unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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S - E 0ir=E _ T
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE BURMA -CHINA BORDER
CIA /RR -GR - 53
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
ppwwwolmm~
-E-T
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Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. The Northern Border Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Physical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. Peoples: Settlement, Economic Activities,
and Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Kachins (Chingpaw) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. Lesser Ethnic Groups: Lisu, Lu-tzu, and
Tibetans . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 30
III. The Southern Border Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A. Physical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Peoples: Settlement, Economic Activities,
and Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1. The Tai People . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2. The Hill Tribes: General
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3. The Wa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4. Lesser Tribes .
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Page
IV. Frontier Policies and Systems of Tribal
Administration, Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A. British and Burmese Administration of Frontier
Tribal Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1. British Administration 1886-1942 . . . . . . . 64
2. Postwar Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
B. Chinese Control of Frontier Tribes Prior to
1949: the T'u-ssu System . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
C. Chinese Communist Minority Policies . . . . . . 71
D. Autonomous Governments in the Burma-China
Border Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. The Tai (Thai) Autonomous District . . . . . 76
2. Other Autonomous Units . . . . . . . . . . . 82
V. History of the Boundary and Areas Currently
in Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A. The 1894 and 1897 Boundary Conventions . . . . . 84
B. The Undefined Northern Boundary .... . . . . . . 86
C. The Undemarcated Wa States Boundary . . . . . 89
D. Border Incidents and Claims, 1942-48 . . . . . . 91
E. Chinese Communist Territorial Claims . . . . . 93
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VI. The Current Border Situation . . . . . . . . . .
..
97
A. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
97
B. Transborder Trade . . . . . . . . . . .
.
101
C. Chinese Communist Penetration . . . . .
.
104
VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
107
Appendixes
Appendix A. List of Autonomous Units . . . . . . .
. .
111
Appendix B. Important Yunnan-Burma Mountain
Passes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
113
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . .
. .
115
Appendix D. Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . .
. .
116
1. Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . .
. .
116
2. Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
117
Photographs
Figure 1. The Salween River at 26? 10'N, looking
north . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
Figure 2. The deeply entrenched Salween River at
about 26?N, with scattered taungya
patches and terraces on the slopes. . . .
. .
13
Figure 3. The Salween-Irrawaddy Divide,
looking north . . . . . . . . . . .
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Figure 4. Kachin thatch and bamboo house . . . . . . . 23
Figure 5. A relatively permanent Kachin
settlement, as evidenced by the terraced
fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 6. A Lashi girl in native costume . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 7. A Lisu hunter armed with crossbow and
short sword or dah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 8. The turbulent Mekong in the Tibetan lands
of the Tibetan lands of northern Yunnan . . 37
Figure 9. Tibetans in typical dress of northern
Burma near the Sikang frontier . . . . . . . 37
Figure 10. A small elongated river basin surrounded
by hills that are partially to completely
devoid of forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 11. A narrow gulch opening into a small,
flat-bottomed valley, with scrub vegetation
on the surrounding hills . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 12. The Mekong River near Ch'e-li . . . . . . . 44
Figure 13. The city of T'eng-ch'ung and surrounding
paddy fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 14. A small lowland village (probably Shan)
a few miles west of Kunlong . . . . . _ . . . 48
Figure 15. Paddy fields along the Burma Road west
of Lung-ling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 16. An Akha (Kaw) village near Keng Tung,
characteristically situated on a ridge
crest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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Figure 17. Many of the frontier groups are animists
who erect shrines of this type to their
various spirits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Figure 18. A patchwork of mountain fields in the Wa
States near the Yunnan frontier. . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 19. A landslide blocks traffic on the Burma
Road near Lung-ling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 20. The Burma Road at its crossing of the
Salween . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Map s
Following Page
Burma-China Border (13127) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Burma-China Border: Ethnic Groups (13087) . . . . . . . 118
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THE BURMA -CHINA BORDER
Summary
The Burma-China border is one segment of the long frontier
that separates the free nations of South Asia from Communist China.
The area is one of rugged mountains and dissected plateaus inhabited
by a number of ethnic minorities who traditionally have been isolated
and nominally independent. Historically, the Burma-China frontier
has functioned as a buffer zone. Events of the past decade, how-
ever, have resulted in a drastic realignment of power; a strong and
powerful China now faces a weak and politically unstable Burma.
This situation has once again centered attention on the undefined and
undemarcated sections of the boundary and on the long-standing
Chinese territorial claims in the frontier region. The distinctive
characteristics of the region -- physical setting, distribution of
peoples and their modes of living, systems of frontier administra-
tion, and history of boundary disputes and current claims -- are
discussed in this report. The current status of transborder trans-
portation, trade and smuggling activities, and efforts of the Chinese
Communists to penetrate the frontier are included.
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Two frontier regions are delimited on the basis of physical
characteristics and distribution of ethnic groups. The Northern
Border Region, extending north from the 25th parallel, is charac-
terized by high north-south trending mountains, deeply entrenched
rivers and streams, and a minimum of level land. East-west move-
ment is difficult, and high mountain passes -- generally blocked in
winter by snow -- must be traversed in order to cross between
China and Burma. The population is sparse and, except for a few
concentrations in small valley areas, most of the people live on hill
or mountain slopes. Agriculture, largely of a primitive shifting
type, is the major economic activity. The hill-dwelling peoples
are in general not self-sufficient and depend upon valley towns and
itinerant traders to supply their needs. The Kachins are the major
ethnic group, and there are smaller numbers of Lisu, Lu-tzu, and
Tibetan peoples. Some of the southern Kachin and Lisu groups have
been influenced and dominated by the Chinese; to the north there is
a pronounced Tibetan influence; and some groups have remained
isolated and relatively independent from Chinese, Burmese, or
other outside control.
The Southern Border Region includes the part of the Burma-
China frontier south of the 25th parallel. The area is highly
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dissected plateau country, difficult to cross. A few small inter-
montane basins and elongated river; valleys are inhabited by Tai
people, the dominant ethnic group of the region. The Tai are pri-
marily sedentary agriculturists who grow rice under irrigation in
the basins and valleys. A number of fragmented ethnic groups
inhabiting the surrounding hills practice a type of shifting agricul-
ture. Although some groups have been dominated by the Chinese
and to a lesser extent by Burmese, British, and Tai, a number of
minority groups have retained considerable autonomy in the absence
of outside administration. Local trade between hill people and valley
dwellers is important, and Chinese and Shan traders ply their wares
in this region.
The systems of administration applied by Chinese, British,
and Burmese allowed the frontier peoples a limited amount of
administrative control through appointment of advisors or assistants
to the tribal rulers. The Chinese Communists have instituted a
far -reaching program designed to win support of border tribes by
a variety of superficially lenient policies and to control these
groups by fragmenting them into small, easily manipulated "autono-
mous" administrative units. By selecting and training pro-
Communist leaders and young people to implement their program
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the Chinese Communists present a facade of local rule, with
Chinese cadres* remaining discreetly in the background in the
role of "advisors. "
The Burma-China boundary had never been delineated prior to
the British occupation of Upper Burma in 1886. A series of Sino-
British boundary agreements followed, resulting in the demarcation
of much of the boundary by 1900. The boundary north of 25?35'N,
however, was left undefined because agreement could not be
reached as to its alignment. By 1914 the British established a de
facto frontier, which except for one short section followed the
Salween-Irrawaddy watershed. The Chinese protested this defini-
tion of the northern border and continued to claim, and to show on
their maps, varying amounts of territory west of the watershed as
belonging to China. A 200-mile section of the boundary in the wild
and unexplored Wa States area was left undefined until 1941, when
a Sino-British agreement delimited this section. The coming of
World War II, however, prevented formal demarcation on the
ground. The Chinese Communists, continuing ancient Chinese
claims, show on their maps the boundary north of 25?351N as
*As used by the Chinese Communists, the term "cadrett means
any politically dependable individual who performs certain tasks cal-
culated to further the aims of the Chinese Communist Party.
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undetermined and considerable territory west of the Salween-
Irrawaddy watershed as part of China. The boundary in the Wa
States section is also shown as undetermined, and territory west
to the Salween River is shown as Chinese. It is possible that
Chinese claims to Kokang, Namwan, and Keng Tung may be
revived.
Road repair and construction is a major Chinese Communist
objective in the frontier. Although there was a considerable
amount of smuggling from Burma to China during 1950-51, smug-
gling activities at present are limited. Legitimate trade between
Burma and China is negligible. Chinese efforts to penetrate the
Burmese frontier areas have thus far been limited to small-scale
border forays and reported infiltration of agents among the tribes
in Burma.
The buffer function of the Burma-China frontier is disappearing
as the Chinese Communists (1) extend political control over the fron-
tier peoples, and (2) open once-isolated frontier areas through im-
provements in the transportation system. The end result of the
many-sided Chinese program for minorities will probably be to
hasten the process of cultural assimilation of frontier peoples. The
undefined status of a part of the international boundary, lack of
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Burmese administrative control in the frontier, and activities of
Chinese Nationalist guerrilla units provide opportunities for Chi-
nese Communist intervention. Thus far, however, the Chinese
Communists have not fully exploited the situation, nor have they
utilized their "autonomous" governments to promote dissident
activities among adjoining minority elements in Burma.
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The 900-mile boundary between Burma and China is part of
the frontier that separates the free nations of the Indian Subcon-
tinent, including Burma, from the totalitarian colossus of Red
China. The border trends along the Himalayan highland mass,
some of the highest and most difficult mountain terrain in the
world, which has functioned as a barrier separating China and
Tibet to the north from India and Burma to the south. Great seg-
ments of the border have never been demarcated, and there are
conflicting territorial claims in some areas. Before 1939 the
disputed segments of the frontier and the undemarcated status
of much of the boundary were of little international concern, since
the power balance of Asia was maintained by a strong though be-
nign Great Britain, confronting to the north and east a weak, war-
torn China that for generations had exercised almost no control
over its outer frontiers. The kaleidoscopic events of the past 15
years have completely reversed this traditional balance of -power.
The newly born, weak nations of Burma, India, and Pakistan to the
south are now confronted by a new but powerful China, which is
gradually tightening and strengthening control over its frontier
lands .
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The Burma-China frontier is similar physically to other sec-
tions of the southwestern frontier of China.* The mountains and
highly dissected plateau lands of this region have tended to restrict
communications and major population movements. The region is
sparsely inhabited, with a complex and intricate pattern of cultural
distribution. Ethnic groups are scattered in a number of small,
separate areas (see accompanying map No. 13087). The cultural
level of some groups is primitive, whereas others are similar cul-
turally to the Burmese and Chinese. Most of the ethnic groups of
the frontier region are indigenous to central China, their present
location and fragmentation having resulted from the pressures of
an agressive, expanding Chinese people operating over many cen-
turies. None of the ethnic groups are culturally homogeneous. Some
elements of each group have intermingled and intermarried with the
Chinese, losing nearly all tribal identity, whereas others have re-
treated to inaccessible areas and resisted any form of Chinese
domination.
During most of the history of this frontier region, the border
groups have been nominally independent. The chiefs or princes of the
tribes and petty states often paid tribute to Yunnanese or Burmese
*See CIA/RR-G-8, The Southwestern Frontiers of China, which
covers the boundary with Kashmir and India from Afghanistan to Nepal.
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representatives, but little if any direct administrative control was
exercised by either nation. Until the present century, there was
no clear delineation of the limits between Burmese and Chinese
authority, and the lack of an official boundary was of no concern
to either nation. The British occupation of Burma led eventually to
a series of boundary agreements that resulted in the demarcation
of a segment of the Burma-China boundary but left a northern por-
tion undefined and a smaller section to the south undemarcated.
The Chinese Communist occupation of Ytinnan Province in
1950 came at a time when the newly formed Government of Burma
was being seriously threatened from within by various insurgent
groups. To complicate the situation, remnants of Chinese Nation-
alist armies fled in 1949 to the Burma border area, where they
operated as semibandit and guerrilla forces, harassing the local
people and providing the Chinese Communists with an excuse for
active intervention. For the most part, however, the Chinese
Communists have moved slowly in the frontier area, concentrating
their efforts on gaining the support of traditionally suspicious and
hostile groups. Initial Chinese Communist goals appear to be
(1) complete pacification of the border tribes, with pro-Communist
native leaders and Communist-trained native cadres providing a
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facade for Chinese administration and control, and (2) the improve-
ment of communications in the border area in order to facilitate
actual control and also to improve military capabilities.
For the purposes of this report, the Burma-China frontier is
divided into two regions on the basis of physical and ethnic charac-
teristics: (1) the Northern Border Region of parallel, north-south
trending mountains and deeply entrenched rivers, inhabited primarily
by somewhat primitive hill-dwelling Kachin groups; and (2) the
Southern Border Region of highly dissected plateau lands, with a
larger population in which valley-dwelling Tai peoples predominate.
The physical setting of each region, comprising terrain, hydrography,
vegetation, and climate, is examined with reference to the pattern of
settlement and as a barrier to communication. The various ethnic
groups are discussed on the basis of distribution, numbers, mode
of living, and contacts with other groups. Former types of frontier
administration are mentioned, but primary emphasis is on current
systems of administration, particularly the Chinese Communist type
of administrative control. The history of boundary negotiations and
the current status of territorial claims are examined. Current in-
telligence data on Chinese Communist activities, the status of the
transborder transportation net, and transborder trade and smuggling
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activities are included. Although reference is made to the insur-
i,
gent activity in Burma, including the problem of the Chinese Nation-
alist troops, a detailed analysis of this complex situation is not
attempted. Possible Chinese Communist moves in the frontier
region are discussed, but this study does not purport to evaluate
or predict the success or failure of such actions.
II. The Northern Border Region
A. Physical Setting
The Northern Border Region is an extension or subregion of
the great Himalayan mountain system, which stretches eastward
from western Kashmir for over 3,000 miles. The region is charac-
terized by a series of parallel mountain ranges trending north-south
and cut by river valleys, in which the Nmai Hka (the eastern head-
water stream of the Irrawaddy), the Salween, the Mekong, and (in
part of the area) the Yangtze flow in narrow, steep-walled gorges
(Figures 1, 2, 8, and 20). These great rivers converge in this
region and all four flow southward within an area about 65 miles
wide, beyond which they separate and eventually enter the ocean
thousands of miles apart (see accompanying map No.. 13127). In
the northern part of the region, some of the peaks reach elevations
of almost 20, 000 feet and are festooned with perpetual snow, with
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Figure 1. The Salween River at 26?l0'N, looking
north. Both terraces and "fire-fields" of the
Lisu are perched high on the slopes. Prominent
in the upper right is the Salween-Mekong divide.
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Figure 2. The deeply entrenched Salween River at about 26?N,
with scattered taungya patches and terraces on the slopes.
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glacial tongues reaching down into the craggy alpine valleys. To
the south, the elevations decline to between 8, 000 and 10, 000 feet.
The entire region is one of rugged mountains and gorges in which
level land is at a premium (Figures 1-3).
At about 27?40'N, two streams, the Nam Tamai and the Taron,
join to form the Nmai Hka. Within the triangle formed by these
rivers is the northern tip of Burma, an area of mountain ridges
dissected by numerous tributary streams and known as the Tamai-
Taron Massif. In the southern section of the massif, crestlines of
the ridges maintain 11, 000 - to 12, 000 -foot elevations. To the north,
elevations increase to 15, 000 to 17, 000 feet, and a cluster of peaks
in the northwest, along the Sikang-Burma border, tower up to 19, 000
feet.
The Salween-Irrawaddy Divide (Figure 3) is a very prominent
range that extends over 200 miles in this area; for a considerable
distance its crest forms the de facto Burma-China border. South
of 26?N, a western offshoot of the range forms the watershed be-
tween the Irrawaddy and Shweli, which for a short distance is fol-
lowed by the international boundary. The crestline of the Salween-
Irrawaddy Divide is only about 10 to 15 miles from the Salween,
whereas the distance to the Nmai Hka is 25 to 30 miles. On the
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Figure 3. The
Salween-Irrawaddy
Divide, looking
north. Hpimaw
Pass (25?58'N)
at the lower left
is crossed by a
regularly used
trail. Elevations
attain 12,000 to
13,500 feet.
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Nmai side of the divide, sizable tributary streams separate a series
of lesser parallel ranges that increase in altitude from the main
river to the main divide. A distinctive feature of these tributary
streams is that for about 75 percent of their course they flow south,
parallel to the Nmai, then turn west and enter the main river. This
abrupt turn is generally characteristic of the larger tributary streams
of the region, particularly in the north. The comparatively open
north-south valleys through which many of these secondary streams
flow are utilized as transportation routes and for cultivation in pref-
erence o the narrow, rock-strewn main river valleys. With the
exception of the Putao Plain and some small basins near T'eng-
ch'ung and Pao-shan at the southern border, the only sizable area
of level land in the region where sedentary agriculture is possible
is the middle valley of the Ngawchang, a tributary of the Nmai Hka.
To the east of the Salween River is the high, narrow divide
separating the Mekong and the Salween. The distance between these
two major rivers averages only 20 miles or less for over 200 miles.
Elevations along the Mekong-Salween Divide average somewhat
higher than those of the Salween-Irrawaddy Divide. Peaks of 14, 000
feet are found as far south as 26?N. Because of the extreme
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narrowness and consequent steepness of this range, east-west
communications along great stretches are nearly impossible
(Figure 1).
The climate of the Northern Border Region is dominated by
the southwestern and northeastern monsoons and is also influenced
by elevation. Precipitation is greatest during the period of the
southwestern monsoon, which lasts from June through September.
The north-south trend of the terrain tends to deflect the winds, which
change from southwesterly to southerly and sweep northward up the
great river valleys. In the deepest parts of the gorges north of 28?N,
beyond the reach of the moisture-bearing winds, there is an abrupt
transition from humid to .arid conditions. The lofty Salween-Mekong
Divide shields the Mekong Valley from the full force of the monsoon
winds, and consequently that valley receives less precipitation than
the neighboring Salween Valley at corresponding latitudes. The
driest months of the year are December through February, although
this is less true at elevations above 9, 000 feet, where considerable
snow falls during the winter. Most of the passes across the Irrawaddy-
Salween Divide are blocked by snow for periods of various lengths from
late December through April. Generally the permanent snowline is at
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about 16, 000 feet, and peaks of 17, 000 feet or higher have small
glaciers, at least on their northern sides.
Climatic conditions in this region can.be summarized as follows:
The lower valleys are moist and warm to hot, with.the exception of
the deepest parts of the river gorges north of 28?N, where dry, hot
conditions prevail; the middle levels are moist and warm to cool,
with frost first occurring at about 5, 000 feet; and the higher levels
above 9, 000 feet are moist, with a less pronounced seasonal vari-
ation of precipitation and temperatures ranging from cool to cold.
Vegetation in the Northern Border Region is stratified according
to elevation. South of 28?N, the tropical rain-forest vegetation
common below 2, 500 feet merges into temperate evergreen forest
consisting of oak, chestnut, birch, rhododendron, laurel, and other
temperate-zone trees at elevations up to 10, 000 feet. From 10, 000
to 12, 000 feet, stands of large coniferous trees, mainly silver fir,
predominate, with a dense undergrowth of rhododendron. Above
12, 000 feet, subalpine scrub vegetation merges into alpine turf at
14, 000 and 15, 000 feet. On the lower slopes and in the southern
parts of the region, open nonforested patches occur, primarily on
warmer southern and western slopes, as a result of the shifting-
cultivation practices of the hill tribes (Figures 1 and 2).
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B. Peoples: Settlement, Economic Activities, and Contacts
The Northern Border Region is sparsely inhabited. The
greatest concentrations of people are along the major river valleys
and in the southern section of the region. The hill tribes in this
mountainous area include the Kachins (or Chingpaw), the most
numerous group; the related but less numerous Lisu; and, in the
far northern section, Lu-tzu and Tibetans, The economy of the
hill tribes is based on shifting agriculture. The upland tribes are
generally not self-sufficient and depend upon itinerant traders
(usually Chinese) and lowland villages to provide additional food,
clothing, implements, and ornaments. The two commodities at
highest premium in the entire area are salt and cloth.
The valley-dwelling people in the Northern Border Region
include the Shan and other Tai groups, Burmese, Chinese, and
Indians . They live almost exclusively in the river valleys, plains,
and cities adjacent to the Southern Border Region. For this rea-
son, details concerning these groups are given in the section
dealing with the Southern Border Region.
1. Kachins (Chingpaw)
The Kachins are the most numerous and widespread
ethnic group of the Northern Border Region., "Kachin" is a
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generic racial name for several linguistic or family groups or divi-
sions and is widely used in the literature on this area, although the
term is disliked by the people themselves and its use is considered
an insult. The home area of the Kachins extends from 29?N to 23?N,
westward across northern Burma and into Assam, and eastward into
China as far as the Salween (see map No. 13087, attached). The
most cohesive and largest groups live north of 25?N and west of the
Irrawaddy-Salween watershed. The principal concentration of
Kachins in Yunnan is between 24?N and 25?N.
The most numerous and important Kachin group is the Chingpaw,
which is divided into several subgroups, including the Lahtaw of the
Nmai Hka country; the Lepai, who inhabit the southern part of the
"Triangle" (the mountainous area between the Mali and the Nmai
Hka, headwater streams of the Irrawaddy); and several subdivisions
located primarily west of the Irrawaddy. The Chingpaw tongue is
the lingua franca of all the Kachin groups. Besides the Chingpaw,
under the term "Kachin" are included (1) the Maru of the hill lands
of the Nmai Hka and its tributaries, who unlike other Kachin groups
eat dog meat and cremate their dead; (2) the Lashi, who are concen-
trated along the Ngawchang River; and (3) the less culturally ad-
vanced Nung, who live in and around the Taron Valley in far northern
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Burma. It is estimated that the total Kachin population of the
Northern Border. Region west to the Indian frontier is about
160, 000;. in addition, there are 120, 000 Kachins in the Bhamo
District and the Northern Shan States, and possibly 100, 000 in
China.
The Kachins are classified as a Tibeto-Burman people. It
is believed that their original home was in the eastern part of the
Tibetan Plateau. They entered Burma from the north about the
16th century and have pushed slowly but persistently south. The
dominant group, the Chingpaw, are culturally agressive and have
been able to absorb some of the weaker groups with which they
have come in contact. Although the Kachin groups are. united by
common modes of living and broad linguistic similarities, they
have never been politically unified. There have been numerous
feuds between villages and even between families.
Most Kachin villages are situated on commanding hill crests
or mountain spurs and consist of 10 to possibly 100 houses located
fairly.close together for defensive purposes. Historically, sites
were carefully chosen for their possibilities for defense and for
concealment from enemies, but the pacification of Kachin areas by
the British has reduced the importance of these considerations.
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The most distinctive feature of a Kachin house is its length;
houses 100 to 200 feet long are not uncommon. The houses are
raised 3 or 4 feet off the ground on poles. Split bamboo is used
for flooring and siding, and the roofs are heavily thatched
(Figures 4 and 5). Building a house is a major undertaking. To
complete one of the larger houses, even with the help of friends
and relatives,, may take several months. Each house is divided
into a number of apartments, or "fireplaces. 11 The rear entrance
is reserved for family use; strangers enter by the front door. Front
entrances are distinguished by projecting roofs, under which the
pigs and poultry are fed, the buffalo (if one is owned) is stalled,
the rice pounded, and weaving done. In the longer houses, small
doors -- actually windows -- in the walls admit light and act as con-
venient entrances to individual apartments. Strangers should not
enter by these side entrances. According to Kachin custom, hos-
pitality is extended to all, and a guest who conforms to the customs
of the family and village may remain for an indefinite period.
The basic Kachin economy, like that of nearly all hill tribes
of the border region, is taungya (taung, mountain, and ya, field).
often more descriptively termed ''fire-field" or ''slash-and-
burn" agriculture. The taungya process consists of first burning
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Figure 4+. Kachin thatch and bamboo house.
Figure 5. A relatively permanent Kachin settlement,
as evidenced by the terraced fields. The semi-barren
slopes in the background are typical of the region.
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the standing timber and undergrowth on a patch of forest land at
the beginning of the dry season (about November). When the rains
begin in May or June, the ash is worked into the soil and the ground
is prepared for planting a crop. Since mountain fields rapidly lose
their fertility, the plot is abandoned in 2 or 3 years and a new one
is burned out of the forest. Eventually the forests within a rea-
sonable distance of the settlement are exhausted (taungyas are
rarely used again), the village site is abandoned, new forests are
sought, and the wasteful, destructive cycle is repeated. Old aban-
doned taungya fields generally revert in time to dense scrub-jungle,
or ponzo, often composed of pure, almost impenetrable stands of
bamboo. Kachin and other hill villages seldom remain at the same
site for more than 10 years.
In some areas the Kachins practice a more permanent type of
agriculture (Figure 5), similar to that of the Burmese, Shan, and
Chinese. The major area of permanent agriculture is the middle
Ngawchang Valley, where Lashi groups have learned the art of
irrigated rice cultivation. Rice terraces are found on the alluvial
fans and on the gentler slopes at elevations up to 6, 000 feet.
Whether grown on patches of taungya or on irrigated terraces,
rice is the major Kachin crop. Maize, millet, sesame, yams, and
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beans are also grown, as well as a little cotton, tea, tobacco, and
sugarcane. Fishing and hunting are engaged in, and each house-
hold usually has its quota of poultry and pigs. Some groups raise
the opium poppy as a cash crop, and some Kachins are addicted to
its use, Although Chinese and Burmese officials have discouraged
poppy planting, unknown quantities are raised in the remote hills.
Traders obtain the opium, which by a long and circuitous route
reaches the outside world.
Among the few nonagricultural economic activities of the Kachins
are a little desultory gold panning (primarily in the Ahkyang Valley),
teak cutting, occasional road building, and service as porters and
guides. Because of the excellent fighting qualities of the Kachins,
some of the physically best qualified young men have been pressed
into military service by the British or Burmese.
The ubiquitous trader -- generally Chinese -- is an integral
part of the Kachin way of life. The trader is important to all the
Northern Border Region tribes, particularly in the more remote
areas farthest removed from communication with Burmese and
Shan. Chinese traders supply the Kachins with such necessities as
salt, cloth and clothing, ornaments, and utensils in exchange for
gold dust, animal skins, musk, medicinal roots and herbs, beeswax,
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and planks from a relatively rare tree, which the Chinese prize
for making coffins.
About 90 percent of the Kachins are animists who worship
spirits, or nats, whom they constantly propitiate to ward off evil.
Each village has its tumsa (nat priest), who officiates at all cere-
monies and acts that require sacrifices or offerings to the multi-
tude of vats. Village entrances are marked by small groves where
bamboo shrines to the nats are erected and sacrifices are offered.
Along village paths and in the village itself may be seen these offer-
ings, many of them some kind of meat, since most nats seem to be
confirmed meat-eaters. Prayer posts about 4 feet high, with the
bark removed from the top 15 inches, are found along the trails,
and bamboo stringers with bamboo stars attached are commonly
hung across roads and trails. Needless to say, it is considered
a serious offense for an outsider to damage or molest the shrines,
sacrifices, or religious symbols. The waste of food and other
goods used as sacrifices no doubt contributes to the poverty preva-
lent in Kachin areas. Most of the Kachins who are not animists
are Christians who have been converted by missionaries in north-
ern Burma, and there are a few Buddhists as a result of Shan
influence.
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Kachin dress is subject to considerable variation, but in
general the men wear baggy black trousers, a black or white
jacket, and a turban, which is often ragged and dirty. Kachin
males do not consider their costume complete without a sword,
or dah, which they use for--a variety of purposes. The women
wear jackets or blouses of somber hue, but their skirts are often
woven in colors and zigzag motifs resembling those of Central
American Indians. Shell ornaments, necklaces, and earrings are
popular, and a cane basket is often carried (Figure 6).
Kachin villages are governed by a hereditary chief, the duwa,
who rules with the help of the village elders. A duwa ordinarily
controls several villages, and in rare cases may have jurisdiction
over several dozen. Generally, the,functions and powers of the
duwa have been acknowledged by both the British and the Burmese.
Prior to the British administration, it was customary for powerful
duwas to demand and receive tribute from non-Kachin lowland vil-
lages as insurance against attacks and slave raids by the warlike
Kachins. Also, tribute (usually salt,, guns, or goods rather than
money) was levied upon passing traders and caravans that passed
through a duwa's domain. Powerful Kachin villages possessed
-27 -
S C g E-T
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Figure 6. A Lashi girl in native
costume. The Lashi are a Kachin
group.
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slaves until 1925-Z9, when practically all of the Kachin-held slaves
were released by the British.
Relationships and contacts between Burmese and Kachins have
never been overly friendly; each group considers itself superior to
the other. Kachin-Shan relationships are likewise said to be un-
friendly (although this is not always the case), and a Kachin
couplet often quoted is: "Thoughtlessly you fire a jungle; as
thoughtlessly kill a Shan. " Despite occasional conflicts with the
British,who have imposed restrictions upon the warlike. ways of
the Kachins, relations between the two are good, as evidenced by
the Kachins' loyalty to the British during World War II. Most
Kachins are anti-Chinese, and the depredations of Chinese troops
during World War II did nothing to allay this feeling. For their
part, the Chinese maintain their traditionally superior attitude
toward the Kachins, as toward all people of other cultures. The
Chinese have both a "polite" name (Shan-t'ou -- men of the large
hills) and a "rude" name (Ye-jen -- wild men) for the Kachins, as
they do for other border tribes.
The pacification and administration of Kachin areas by the
British and the contacts with other cultures, including western
civilization, are resulting in a very gradual cultural and social
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disintegration of traditional Kachin ways of living. Christian
proselytizing among the Kachins, though not extensive, has con-
tributed to their social disorganization. Since Christian Kachins
refuse to accept the duwa as a religious leader, they sometimes
ignore also the civic duties required by him. (No doubt some
Kachins have become Christians in order to avoid their civic respon-
sibilities.) The refusal of Christian Kachins to respect tribal taboos
not unnaturally creates tension and misunderstanding, with the result
that after conversion some Kachins leave the ancestral village. Since
the Kachins are no longer able to obtain slaves and have been pre-
vented from levying toll on passing caravans, poverty in Kachin
areas has increased. As a result there has been a gradual move-
ment to the lowland valleys, where agricultural possibilities are
greater and opportunities for nonagricultural employment are better.
This movement, if continued, may result eventually in adoption by
the Kachins of various cultural aspects of the valley-dwelling Bur-
mese, Shan, and Chinese.
2. Lesser Ethnic Groups: Lisu, Lu-tzu, and Tibetans
The lesser ethnic groups of the Northern Border Region
are culturally influenced by the Chinese in the south:-and by the
Tibetans in the northern part of their territory. As a result, various
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Figure 7. A Lisu hunter armed with
crossbow and short sword or dah.
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elements of a single ethnic group may differ considerably in their
economy, religion, language, and attitudes.
The mountain-dwelling Lisu are concentrated chiefly in the Sal-
ween Valley between 25?N and 28?N. Their territory has been slowly
extending westward to the Nmai Hka and recently has reached as far
west as Putao. A very few Lisu settlements are located in northern
Laos, in Thailand, and in the Shan State. The Lisu in Burma numbered
approximately 30, 000 in 1931, and as a result of natural increase plus
the gradual westward migration the current figure would probably be
larger by several thousand. No accurate Chinese statistics are avail-
able, but judging from recent press releases announcing plans for a
so-called autonomous Lisu area, the Lisu population in China is pos -
sibly double that in Burma. There has been some confusion as to the
relationships between the Lisu and other ethnic groups; some authori-
ties have included them within the Kachin family. The Lisu speak a
Yi-chia, or Lolo, dialect.
Several Lisu groups are differentiated, the most important
being the "Black" or "Independent" Lisu.* The Black Lisu are con-
centrated in the three Salween Valley districts of Lu-shui, Pi-chiang,
* "Black" generally designates the more conservative of two
elements of the same ethnic group. The Blacks are usually more
primitive and belligerent, live in isolated and remote areas, and
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and Fu-kung, which until 1949 had retained their native administra-
tion and had not been organized into Chinese-administered hsien
(counties). The Black Lisu have a reputation of robbing and some-
times killing Chinese traders who pass through their territory.
In the altitudirial arrangement of ethnic groups along the Burma-
China frontier, the Lisu are usually found at the highest elevations,
with their settlements 5,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level. Many Lisu
settlements are perched high on the mountains, several thousand feet
above the village fields in the valley (Figures 1 and 2). Modes of liv-
ing among the Lisu vary considerably, depending on the amount of
contact with valley dwellers, primarily the Chinese. The more prim-
itive Lisu practice taungya, eking out a meager existence by raising
maize, rice, millet, buckwheat, and barley on steep mountain slopes.
The Black Lisu are known to cultivate the opium poppy. Some sheep
are raised, and pigs and poultry are kept in the villages. The more
culturally advanced, generally the southern Lisu, have irrigated rice
terraces and use draft animals and farming implements. The Lisu
are reported to be very proficient hunters, although some of them
still use the ancient crossbow as their primary weapon (Figure 7).
have little contact With more culturally advanced peoples. "White, "
on the other hand, would designate elements that are in the process
of cultural assimilation by the more civilized groups.
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For a number of years, there has been an annual fall migra-
tion of Lisu from China into northeastern Burma to pan for gold
in the streams.. Most of these Lisu return to Yunnan in time for
spring planting, but each year a few remain behind in Burma.
Although the Chinese Communists apparently permit the Lisu men
to cross the passes into Burma, to assure their return in the spring
they forbid them to take their families.
Like most of the hill tribes the Lisu are animists, with an
admixture of ancestor worship as a result of Chinese influence.
Missionaries have operated in some Lisu areas in both Burma and
China, and it was through missionary instigation that some 2, 000
Lisu fled into Burma in 1949 as the Chinese Communists entered
Y tinnan .
The dress of the Lisu varies, but in many areas it resembles
that of the Chinese in being almost invariably indigo blue in color.
Men may wear wide bamboo hats and tight-fitting trousers, the
women tunics and long pantaloons.
Many Lisu in the southern part of their territory have been
greatly influenced by the Chinese. Contacts with the more civilized
lowland dwellers combined with the efforts of missionaries have
resulted in a gradual braking away from the traditional Lisu
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patterns of living. The movement of Lisu to valley sites, the
adoption of Chinese clothing, language, customs, and sedentary
agricultural practices, and increased employment in nonagricul-
tural activities are evidences of this trend.
The Lu-tzu inhabit the upper part of the Taron Valley and
adjoining areas of the Salween Valley. They are a transitional
and buffer group between the Tibetans to the north and the Lisu
and other tribes to the south and east. Estimates of the Lu-tzu
population range between 5, 000 and 17,000. Unlike the fairly
large and compact villages of the Chingpaw, Lu-tzu villages are
small, with only a few scattered huts of a crude log-cabin style,
situated on mountain spurs and often out of sight of one another.
The Lu-tzu practice shifting agriculture, growing maize as the
principal crop, and some buckwheat and rice. Most families own
2 or 3 head of cattle, and some raise sheep, pigs, and ponies also.
Chinese and Tibetan traders penetrate this area, bringing salt,
cloth, tobacco, alcohol, and various utensils, which they exchange
for hides, medicinal roots, and gold dust. Except for the traders,
the Lu-tzu have had .little contact with the Chinese. In the more
northerly part of their territory, however, where they have been
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in contact with the Tibetans, the Lu-tzu have taken on various
aspects of Tibetan culture.
The Tibetan lands are associated with the wildest, most
rugged terrain of the entire border region. The deep gorges of
the Salween, Mekong, and other rivers present very serious ob-
stacles to east-west communication, and in many places the only
means of crossing is by a flimsy rope bridge (Figure 8). The
number of Tibetans in the Northern Border Region is unknown. In
the sparsely, inhabited Irrawaddy headwater area, there are prob-
ably only a few hundred; on the China side of the border, the
number is somewhat larger.
Contrasts between the Tibetans and the other tribes of this
area are many. The Tibetans are sedentary agriculturists who
clear plots on the steep slopes of the main gorges or on level land
in the high tributary alpine valleys. Although Tibetan settlements
are usually above 10, 000 feet, some in the northern Burma-China
area are at elevations as low as 7, 000 feet. Tibetan houses are
well-built, flat-roofed wooden or earthern structures, which con-
trast sharply with the bamboo and thatch huts of the southern non-
Tibetan tribes, The main Tibetan cereal crops are barley -- the
principal ingredient of the national dish, tsamba (parched barley
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Figure 8. The tur-
bulent Mekong in
the Tibetan lands
of northern Yunnan.
Note men using a
rope bridge, the
only way of cross-
ing many stretches
of the rivers in
the Northern
Border Region.
Figure 9. Tibetans in typical dress of northern
Burma near the Sikang frontier. The yaks are
used for plowing.
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flour moistened with tea and yak butter) -- buckwheat, rye, and
maize. Cattle, sheep, yaks, mules, and ponies are raised and
utilized as draft animals, as sources of food and clothing, for
transportation, and as a source of income (Figure 9). Their
Buddhist religion and complex and elaborate systems of religious
and secular organization set the Tibetans apart from the Kachin,
Lisu, and Lu-tzu peoples.
Tibetan clothing is markedly different from that of the vari-
ous hill tribes of the region. A loose coat worn by both men and
women is tied at the waist so that the garment forms a volumi-
nous blouse in which a great number and variety of objects can
be carried (Figure 9). Knee-height boots are worn.
The zone of contact between the Tibetans and the Lisu, Lu-
tzu, and Kachins in the Northern Border Region is roughly at
28?N. To the traveler in the area, the first indication that he is
nearing Tibetan territory is the presence of mani (prayer) pyra-
mids -- piles of stone slabs'each inscribed with the Buddhist
invocation and prayer-flags along the trail. As of 1943, a
lamasery was located at Wei-hsi (27? 12IN-99? 14IE), the most
southerly outpost of Tibetan Buddhism in the area. Southeast of
Te-chin (Azuntze) on the Salween-Mekong Divide is a high
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snow-covered peak that is a sacred mountain to the Tibetans and
each year draws thousands of pilgrims: The usual pilgrimage
consists of a circuit of the mountain by the pilgrims twirling their
prayer wheels.
The major trade route from Yttnnan to Lhasa begins at Li-
chiang and passes through the Northern Border Region via Wei-hsi
and Azuntze. Caravans, which may consist of several hundred
mules or ponies, take such Yttnnanese products as tea, sugar, and
cloth into Tibetan country, where they exchange them for musk,
animal skins, herbs, and other Tibetan products. The two Sino-
Tibetan frontier towns of Wei-hsi and Li-chiang are the most im-
portant trade centers in this area for supply and exchange of goods
among local traders and inhabitants.
Sporadic clashes between Tibetans and Chinese have punctu-
ated the history of the area. The Chinese have never been able to
exercise much control over the Tibetan borderlands. Until British
forces were stationed at Putao in northern Burma, Tibetan raiders
frequently crossed the high passes from Sikang to plunder and pil-
lage the Irrawaddy headwater area and to take slaves.
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III. The Southern Border Region
There are both contrasts and similarities between the Northern
and Southern Border Regions. Each region is sparsely populated by
non-Burmese and non-Chinese ethnic groups who engage in similar
types of economic activities. Through a combination of factors, both
regions have functioned in the past as buffer areas separating Chi-
nese and Burmese zones of influence. Elevations are lower in the
Southern Border Region than in the Northern, mountain and hill
alignments are more broken and complex, and river basins and
plains provide some areas of level land (Figure 10). Kachins and
Tai are found in both regions, but the Tai are the dominant ethnic
group of the Southern Border Region as the Kachins are of the
Northern.
In the Northern Border Region very little land is suitable for
additional settlement, but in the Southern Region are a number of
small basins and plains that are relatively sparsely inhabited.
According to a fairly recent study, the Tai -inhabited basins in
southernmost Ytinnan have a population density of only 15 persons
per square kilometer, as contrasted with population densities of
about 1, 000 per square kilometer in some of the rice basins of
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a) cc
R+ (D
a)
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p rCj
0 0
U Fq
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Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces. l/* These comparatively empty
lands of the Southern Border Region would appear to offer oppor-
tunities for Chinese colonization.
A. Physical Setting
The Southern Border Region is physically part of the great
Ytinnan-Indochina highland block, which includes the Shan Plateau
in Burma and similar plateau lands in adjoining Yunnan Province.
Although the region is physiographically described as a plateau,
the landforms are hardly uniform. The comparatively level areas
of open undulating country and intermontane basins are intersected
by mountain blocks and belts of highly dissected country (Figure 10).
Average elevations are between 3, 000 and 4, 000 feet, and all but a
few of the highest summits are below 9, 000 feet. The ridges are
not as long or as uniform in direction as those in the Northern Bor-
der Region. The Salween and Mekong are the two major rivers.
The Salween, after swinging to a southwesterly direction for a
short distance at about 24?N, turns and cuts a deep, narrow trench
(not a gorge, as in the north) across the Shan State from north to
south. The river valley is in most places not more than 2 or 3
miles in width, and the surrounding hills rise sharply to elevations
*Arabic numbers refer to the list of sources in Appendix D.
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of 2, 000 to 4, 000 feet above the river level. The trough of the Sal-
ween River has tended to isolate the easternmost Shan States, notably
Kokang and the Wa States. Although precise information is lacking
for the Mekong, its characteristics are similar to those of the Sal-
ween. Furthermore, southern Yunnan west of the Mekong has simi-
larly been somewhat isolated from the remainder of the province.
Several subareas can be differentiated in the Southern Border
Region. A northern area extending from 25?N to Kunlong, Burma,
where the Nan-ting River joins the Salween, is characterized by
ridges and streams that trend northeast-southwest. The impor-
tance of three of these streams -- the Taping, Shweli, and Nan-
ting -- is that they provide corridors through the mountainous
border country. The Taping Valley, for example, was long an
important caravan route between Bhamo and T'eng-ch'ung. Where
the Shweli River forms the international boundary for a short dis -
tance, it is a braided, meandering stream flowing in a level valley
4 to 6 miles wide. Most of the other streams of the area, on the
other hand, are characteristically entrenched into the plateau
surface. A number of small hill basins (Figure 1.1) and long nar-
row stretches of river-valley land support sizable numbers of
people. The ridges are highly dissected and are interspersed
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Figure 11. A narrow gulch opening into a small,
flat-bottomed valley, with scrub vegetation on
the surrounding hills. The location is about
65 miles north of Lashio.
Figure 12. The Mekong River near Ch'e-li.
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with undulating limestone areas. Ridge elevations reach 7, 000
feet near the Salween, increasing to 9, 000 feet in Yttnnan.
A second area, which extends from the Nan-ting River south
to about 22?N and from the 100th meridian on the east to the Sal-
ween River on the west, consists of a homogeneous block of highly
dissected mountains, whose summits average 6, 000 to 8, 000 feet
in the Wa States and reach 10, 000 feet in Yttnnan. A few of the
river valleys widen in places to form elongated basins 2 to 4 miles
wide (Figure 10), and these are the only areas of level land. No
major routes penetrate this wild and remote area; the few native
footpaths generally follow the ridge crests.
The third, or southern, area is similar to the second except
that the degree of dissection is not so great, elevations of the ridge
summits are lower (6, 000 to 8, 000 feet), and there are more inter-
montane basins and elongated river valleys. Many of the main
ridges trend north-south and are connected by spurs, saddles,
and secondary ridges running in various directions. The plateau
thus presents a confused pattern of isolated plains and valleys,
with encircling and intersecting ridges. The largest basin
(approximately 8 to 10 miles wide and 18 to 20 miles long) is
centered at Keng Tung. A number of smaller basins occur in
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both Burma and Ytinnan. Basin floors are generally at elevations
s of 2, 000 to 3, 000 feet. The major stream of the area, the Mekong,
is entrenched at elevations of 1, 200 to 1, 600 feet, and the surround-
ing hills rise 2, 000 to 3, 000 feet above the river surface (Figure 12)
The pattern of vegetation in the Southern Border Region is
complex. Most areas are forested. Dense tropical rain-forest
vegetation at the lower elevations is succeeded by deciduous forests
at 2, 000 to 4, 000 feet. Above 4, 000 feet the deciduous forest is
replaced by evergreen or by semievergreen oak-chestnut forest;
above 6, 000 feet are evergreen forests of laurels, magnolias, and
rhododendrons. Bamboo forms a dense undergrowth in some of
the deciduous and evergreen forests. The predominant vegetative
type on the undulating limestone plateau lands and in the basins is
grass with scattered clumps of shrubs and trees. Below 5, 000
feet, however, great areas of hill land are in second-growth scrub
and grass as a result of taungya agriculture. Some hills, particu-
larly those near the Shweli River in the vicinity of the Burma-China
border, have been completely deforested and have only a light cover
of grass (Figure 10).
The climate in this region is controlled by the southwest and
northeast monsoons. Rainfall is heavy, averaging between 50 and
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100 inches annually; most of it occurs between May and October,
during the southwest monsoon. The driest and coolest months are
December through March. Temperatures seldom fall below 40?F,
and frost is unknown except on the higher mountains. The hottest
months are April and May, preceding the summer monsoonal rains.
B. Peoples: Settlement, Economic Activities, and Contacts
Both the number of people and the population density are some-
what greater in the Southern Border Region than in the Northern
Border Region. Although. the Southern Region is primarily a land
of steep slopes and rugged, dissected highlands, there are enough
areas of level land suitable for agriculture in the river valleys,
intermontane basins, and scattered plains (Figure 13) to support a
larger population. The most numerous and important groups live
in relatively permanent settlements in the valleys and basins and
practice sedentary agriculture. In the intervening highland areas,
scattered hill dwellers cultivate the slopes by the taungya method.
1. The Tai People
The Tai are the most widespread and important ethnic
group of the Southern Border Region. "Tai" is a generic term
applied to several peoples united by common cultural characteristics
and a common language, including the Siamese (or Thai), the Laotian
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Figure 13. The city of T'eng-ch'ung and surrounding
paddy fields. This is the westernmost Chinese city
of any considerable size in this area.
Figure 14. A small lowland village (probably
Shan) a few miles west of Kunlong. Highly
dissected hills rise to the north and east.
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Tai of Laos, and several Tai tribes of northern Vietnam, the Shan
of Burma, and various Tai groups in the Chinese Provinces of
Ytinnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Kwangtung. In all, there are
roughly 25, 000, 0,00 Tai-speaking people in Southeast Asia (includ-
ing China), of whom some 14, 000, 000 are in Thailand. It is believed
that the Tai were originally indigenous to central and southeastern
China and through the centuries were pushed southwest by the more
aggressive Chinese. An important Tai kingdom existed in western
Yttnnan for several hundred years until it was subjugated by Kublai
Khan in the 13th century. Subsequent Tai migrations to northeastern
Burma, Thailand, and Laos provided the nucleus for the present-day
distribution of Tai peoples. Despite the wide geographic distribution
of Tai-speaking peoples and the isolation of one group from another,
Tai dialects are mutually intelligible and communication is possible
at a "basic" Tai level.
The Tai who inhabit the Southern Border Region include the
Burmese Tai, or Shan, and various Tai groups of Yttnnan, the most
important and cohesive of which are the Tai Lu of the Mekong River
country in southern Yunnan.' Burmese and Yttnnanese Tai are
*The Tai Lu are described in greater detail in section IV.
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divided into several subgroups between which there is little essen-
tial difference. The more important areas of Tai settlement are
the major river valleys of the border region (the Mekong, Salween,
Shweli, Taping, and Nan-ting), elongated basins of the smaller
streams, and small plains and hill basins. The general distribu-
tion of Tai people is shown on map 13087. No population statistics
are available for the border region, but there are about 700, 000
Shan in the entire Shan State and an additional 35, 000 in the Bhamo
District, which is included in the region. Other Shan-speaking
tribes have been partially assimilated, and some Burmese-speaking
Shan who are enumerated as Burmese on census rolls consider them-
selves Shan. If these are included, the total Shan population of
Burma would possibly be doubled. Chinese population statistics are
very unreliable, but it has been estimated that 1, 000, 000 Tai people
live in western Yunnan.
Tai villages are mostly situated in the plains and valleys, with
a few on the lower slopes adjacent to the valley lands. A wall of
bamboo or banyan trees may separate a village from the surround-
ing fields. Villages are usually small, consisting of a dozen or so
houses (Figure 14); some of the larger market towns, however, may
contain 300 to 400 houses. As is common in the border area, houses
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are of simple bamboo and thatch construction; usually they are
raised on poles and animals are stabled in the space underneath.
A few houses may be of more permanent wood or earthern con-
struction, with tile roofs. The Buddhist temple and, the residence
of the tribal ruler, although not found in all villages, are the larg-
est and most ornate structures.
Nearly all Tai groups are sedentary agriculturists., with
rice the principal subsistence crop. All low-lying land is utilized
for paddies, and nearby slopes that lend themselves to irrigation
are terraced (Figur.e 15). Since the land of the basins and valleys
may be somewhat undulating, terracing is necessary in many such
areas also. In addition to the staple crop of rice, a great variety
of other cereals and vegetables are cultivated, including maize,
millet, beans, sugarcane, potatoes, and peanuts. The more im-
portant varieties of fruits grown are bananas, pineapples, oranges,
and mangoes. Cattle raising is of some importance, and, where
there is regular contact with the Chinese, pigs are raised for the
Chinese market. Buffalo are used for plowing the fields and
threshing grain.. Villages have the usual complement of 'scraggy
poultry. important cash crops include tea (particularly in southern
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Figure 15. Paddy fields along the Burma Road
west of Lung-ling. The inhabitants of the area
are Tai or a mixture of Chinese and Tai.
Figure 16. An Akha (Kaw) village near Keng Tung,
characteristically situated on a ridge crest.
Clumps of bamboo are commonly grown in or near
villages.
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Yunnan), cotton, tobacco, and lac.' Of the nonagricultural pursuits,
the most important are mining, forestry, and petty trading. Some
form of domestic handicraft is carried on in each village, including
bamboo craft, metal work, hand-loom weaving of cotton, and the
making of lacquerware.
An integral part of the economy of the border region is the
village market, where itinerant traders, tribespeople from the hills,
and the villagers gather to buy and sell. Markets are held every
fifth day, unless a Holy Day intervenes, and generally there is a
rotation between several villages. As in the Northern Border Re-
gion, the Chinese are very active traders. Formerly it was custom-
ary for Chinese caravans to cross the border during the dry season
to sell or exchange their wares at the Burmese market towns. The
Shan also engage in trading, but on a relatively small scale as com-
pared with the Chinese.
Contacts and relationships between the Tai and other groups
vary according to area and accessibility of non-Tai peoples. The
degree of Chinese influence on the Yunnan Tai varies, but in general
*Lac is a resinous substance secreted by a species of insect
and deposited on trees, from which it is gathered. After processing,
it forms the basis for shellac.
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a very gradual assimilation of the Tai is taking place. The process
is most rapid in the larger towns and in areas near Chinese settle-
ments, where intermarriage and adoption of Chinese clothing and
customs are most prevalent. The Tai Lu, who live in the basins
west of the Mekong in southernmost Yunnan, have been least influ-
enced by the Chinese. Chinese is spoken as a secondary language
by many of the Yunnan Tai, and a smaller number can read and
write simple Chinese. Chinese influence has been strongest on the
Shan in the Bhamo area, where most Shan speak Chinese and usu-
ally Burmese as well. There are various Shan-Chinese admixtures,
and the term Shan-tayok is applied to Shan-speaking Shan who have
adopted Chinese customs. The Shan retain a certain amount of dis-
trust of the Burmese, although there has been considerable inter -
mixing in the western areas of the Shan State. The relationship
between Kachin and Tai groups has already been mentioned (see
p. 29); contact between the groups has resulted from the Kachin
tendency to migrate south as a consequence of their destructive
agricultural practices. Relations between the Tai and other hill
groups, some of whom have adopted certain aspects of Tai culture,
are said to be friendly. . Contact between these groups has been
primarily for trading purposes.
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The religion of nearly all Tai is Hinayana (Southern) Buddhism,
with various degrees of animistic beliefs retained by different Tai
groups. The Tai east of the Salween especially still attach great
importance to the worship of the spirits. The village courtyard
that contains the Buddhist temple and associated buildings serves
as a social as well as a religious center.
Shan men usually wear broad-brimmed, Chinese-type hats,
wide baggy black or white trousers, and black slippers. The Shan
do not favor bright clothing. Many of the men tattoo the lower part
of their legs. Shan women also wear wide-brimmed hats, with long
black skirts and white blouses. It is common for both men and
women to carry burdens on their shoulders by means of a bamboo
pole with a basket suspended from each end. The dress of the
Yunnan Tai resembles that of the Chinese, described previously.
The Chinese are the only other important valley-dwelling group
of the frontier. Most of the Chinese are either itinerant traders or
merchants settled in villages and cities. The Chinese commonly
dominate the commercial activities of the larger towns. The only
sizable numbers of Chinese engaged in agriculture in this region
are in the North Hsenwi substate of Kokang;'a few small, scattered
Chinese agricultural settlements occur in other sections of the
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northern Shan States. The basins of T'eng-ch'ung, Pao-shan, Ning-
erh, and Ssu-mao, peripheral to the border area, are important
Chinese -inhabited agricultural settlements (Figure 13). Historically,
the Chinese have avoided the low valleys and basins of western and
southern Yunnan because of the prevalence of malaria there.
There are also a few Panthay, or Chinese Muslims, in the fron-
tier region. The Panthay are the famous muleteers of Burma, who
own most of the mule caravans that cross the frontier. Many of the
Burmese Panthay are descendants of those who fled Yunnan during
the great Muslim rebellion of the latter half of the 19th century.
2. The Hill Tribes: General Characteristics
The Southern Border Region hill tribes include the Wa,
Lahu, Lolo, Akha or Kaw, and small numbers of others such as
Palaung, Miao, and Yao. In the northern part of this region live
some Kachin and Lisu groups. With the exception of the Wa, there
is little difference between the various hill tribes as to modes of
living and contacts with outsiders.
The hill peoples do not differ significantly in culture and econ-
omy from their counterparts of the Northern Border Region. The
taungya system of agriculture is widely practiced, with dry-field
rice the principal subsistence crop, although some slopes are
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terraced and irrigated for rice growing. Fields may be at consid-
erable distances from the villages, as much as 2, 000 or 3, 000 feet
up or down the mountainside. Small quantities of cereals other than
rice are grown, some garden crops are raised, and domestic ani-
mals are kept. Cotton is grown for local use. As in the Northern
Region, opium-poppy growing has not been eradicated, and opium
represents an important cash crop to some hill groups.
Village sites are commonly on hill crests or protected slopes.
Although there are minor tribal variations in size and design of
houses, those of all hill groups are of bamboo, plank, and thatch
construction and are essentially similar in style (Figure 16). In
all the frontier lands, bamboo is widely used -- for houses, drink-
ing vessels, mats, flumes, and many other things. Clumps of bam-
boo are usually cultivated in or near each village.
Although Chinese and Shan traders penetrate into the hills, the
market held every fifth day in the lowland villages and towns pro-
vides the major opportunity for contact between the hill people and
the lowland dwellers. During the dry season, some tribesmen
from the hills migrate to the lowland towns in search of employ-
ment, Current reports from Yttnnan tell of hill tribesmen being
pressed into service in the extensive road-repairing and road-building
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operations of the Chinese Communists. Some hill tribes in Yunnan
are vassals of more powerful Tai groups. As is true of nearly all
the border peoples, some elements are culturally in a stage of
transition between traditional tribal culture and the more sophisti-
cated and civilized ways of the Tai and Chinese. The vast majority
of the hill tribes are primitive animists, and shrines, altars, and
sacrifices are common sights along village paths and near village
entrances (Figure 17). Only a few hill people have been converted
to Buddhism or Christianity.
3. The Wa
Probably the most numerous and cohesive and certainly
the most primitive hill tribe of the Southern Border Region is the
Wa. The Wa live in a compact block of territory south of Nan-
ting River to about 21?N and east of the Salween (see map 13127),
administratively designated in Burma as the Wa States. The Wa in
Yunnan are found south of the Nan-ting in the area adjoining the
Burma border (see map 13087). A recent estimate (probably too
high) gives a total of 400, 000 Wa, about 80 percent in Burma. The
Wa are classified into two large categories: (1) "Tame" Wa., who
live in the southern part of the Wa territory and have been partially
assimilated by neighboring groups; and (2) "Wild" Wa, who collect
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Figure 17. Many of the frontier groups are animists who
erect shrines of this type to their various spirits. The
shrines are commonly located in groves at or near the vil-
lage entrance.
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human heads and, not unnaturally, have remained very much iso-
lated in the northern and central part of the Wa area. The gathering
of heads is a religious custom connected with offerings to a harvest
spirit for the purpose of insuring a good crop. To what extent this
primitive practice is still observed is unknown; mere knowledge of
the custom has been sufficient to discourage field investigators. The
presence of the Wild Wa was the major reason that the international
boundary was left undefined and the area was unadministered for so
long.
The Wa differ from other tribes in several ways. Although they
practice shifting agriculture, the Wa use their mountain fields for
longer periods because they apply animal fertilizers to the soil.
Also, they terrace some slopes for growing wet-field rice. Wa
villages tend toward permanency, as reflected in larger houses of
more solid construction and larger villages, often of several hun-
dred houses (Figure 18). In the Wild Wa country, village sites are
chosen for defensive purposes and inaccessibility, and entrances to
the villages may be by means of long tunnels. The Wa are very in-
dependent, and each village tends to be autonomous. Where some
powerful chief controls several villages, the organization is regarded
as a confederation rather than as representing centralized rule.
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- 61 -
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Many of the Tame Wa are nominally Buddhists, but they have
retained a smattering of animistic observances; a few Wa have
been converted to Christianity. The Wa speak a Mon-Khmer lan-
guage, whereas other hill tribes belong linguistically to the Tibeto-
Burman family. As a result of the isolation of the Wa within their
own territory, numerous dialects have developed.
4. Lesser Tribes
The Akha, also called Kaw, inhabit the hills east of Keng
Tung. They number 40, 000 in Burma, and a few scattered groups
are also reported in adjoining areas of Ytinnan west of the Mekong.
The Akha construct excellent paths along the ridge crests, which
a traveler may follow for miles without descending into the valley.
Chinese-Akha relations are said to be friendly, and the Akha have
absorbed many Chinese customs. In the past the Akha have avoided
all unnecessary contact with the Shan and the British.
The Lahu inhabit a narrow band of territory extending from
23?30'N to about 20?N. They number 66, 000 in Burma and perhaps
50, 000 or so in Ytinnan. They are said to be excellent hunters, and
their alternate name, "Mus so, " means "hunter . "
The Lolo are a large group whose primary habitat is in south-
eastern Sikang and adjoining areas of Szechwan and Ytinnan. They
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are widely represented in southern Yunnan, with an unknown num-
ber in the border region. Although the Lolo of southeastern Sikang
are noted for their independence and aloofness from Chinese admin-
istration, those of southern Yttnnan have intermingled with both the
Chinese and the Tai.
A very few Miao, Yao, and Palaung are found in the border
area. The main domain of the Palaung is in the northwestern part
of the Shan State; the Miao and Yao have migrated southwestward
from their ancestral homes in Kweichow Province.
IV.. Frontier Policies and Systems of Tribal Administration, Past
and Present
The Governments of Burma and China have adopted various
policies and systems of tribal organization to control the tribes
inhabiting their common frontier. Present practices and policies,
together with their historical antecedents, will be examined, with
emphasis on Chinese policies, particularly since the accession of
the Communists to power in 1949.
A. British and Burmese Administration of Frontier Tribal
Areas
Until the British annexation of Burma in 1886, traditional Bur-
mese policy torward the frontier tribes was one of noninterference
in the internal administration of the particular tribal territory. The
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Burmese court was content to accept occasional presents, tribute,
or service in the Burmese army as tokens of suzerainty over out-
lying tribal areas. Historically, Burmese relations were much
closer with the Shan than with the Kachins and related tribes of
North Burma. Many young Shan princes and princesses were trained
at the Burmese court, and Shan princesses sometimes became Bur-
mese queens.
1. British Administration, 1886 - 1942
The British conquest of Burma, completed in 1886 with
the annexation of Upper Burma, did not basically alter the tradi-
tional relationship between outlying tribal territories and the Cen-
tral Government. The British objective in the frontier areas was
to create stable buffer zones to prevent encroachment on Burma
proper by the French (who were then active in Indochina), the Chi-
nese, and the Siamese.
In the Shan States, the British persuaded the Sawbwas (heredi-
tary chiefs or princes) to accept orders of appointment, or sanads,
which basically left with them the civil, criminal, and fiscal admin-
istration. The sanads did provide, however, for ''superintendents''
to advise the Sawbwas; one assistant superintendent was assigned to
each of the larger of the 33 Shan States, and one to two or even
three of the smaller states.
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The extension of British control in North Burma proceeded slowly,
owing to the difficulty of pacifying the Kachins and administering their
mountainous country. Administration was similar to that in the Shan
States; the Kachin Duwas (tribal chiefs) were given local administra-
tive powers in accordance with custom. Until relatively recent
times, large areas of North Burma remained outside any form of
British administration, and it was not until 1934 that the last large
unadministered block of territory, the Triangle, was brought under
British jurisdiction. British administration in most Kachin areas
was confined to the suppression of slavery and punitive expeditions
against warring Kachin villages.
The 1935 Government of Burma Act provided for the direct
administration by the Governor of Burma of the frontier terri-
tories, which were called "Excluded Areas" and were without rep-
resentation in the national legislature. These areas included the
Federated Shan States, the Kachin areas of North Burma, and others
predominantly inhabited by tribal peoples.
2. Postwar Developments
The Japanese occupation, 1942-45, served to quicken Bur-
rnese independence aspirations, which, however, were less developed
in Shan, Kachin, and other tribal territories. Postwar negotiations
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between the British and the Burmese culminated in the establish-
ment of an independent Union of Burma on 4 January 1948.
Independence did not at first radically change the administra-
tive relationships between the Shan States and the Central Govern-
ment. The system of advisors to the Sawbwas was maintained,
although the advisors -- now called residents instead of superin-
tendents -- were Shan civil-service officials instead of British.
The powers of the Sawbwas, although curtailed and reduced, still
remained basically intact. Changes included the creation of a Shan
State, similar to the old Federated Shan States but with additional
prerogatives, including representation in the Union Parliament.
(The Shan State has 25 seats in the Chamber of Nationalities.) Addi-
tional powers acquired by the Union Government were primarily con-
cerned with the collection of revenue (all revenues not specifically
earmarked in the constitution for the states belong to the Union Gov-
erment) and with judicial matters.
Developments since 1952 have considerably increased the powers
of the Government of Burma in the administration of the Shan State.
On 23 September 1952, a state of emergency was declared in the Shan
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State with provisions for the imposition of martial law.* In areas
so designated, the Commander -in-Chief of the Union Armed Forces
is granted supreme executive and judicial authority. Imposition of
martial law would obviously facilitate military measures against
insurgent groups. Closely following, on 25 October 1952, was an
announcement from the Sawbwas Association that the Sawbwas were
surrendering their judicial prerogatives, relinquishing their execu-
tive powers, and retaining only their legislative rights. Both of
these actions were designed to aid"the Burmese Government's mili-
tary ventures against insurgent groups and to strengthen Burmese
administration in the strategic and vulnerable border area.
In the Kachin areas of North Burma, a Kachin State was created
that includes adjoining lowland areas inhabited primarily by Shan-
Burmese ** The establishment of this multinational state necessi-
tated certain safeguards to allay the fears of each group that it would
*On 1 December 1952 the southwestern quarter of the Shan State
was declared to be under martial law, and the 21 sub states compris-
ing the area were consolidated into three districts. This arrange-
ment may be permanent.
**Total population of the Kachin State is estimated at 400, 000,
including about 205, 000 Kachins and 120, 000 Shan, Shan-Burmese,
and Burmese.
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be dominated by one of the others. For example, the 12 seats allo-
cated to the Kachin State in the Chamber of Nationalities are divided
between Kachins and non-Kachins. As in the Shan State, several
"assistant residents" are in charge of the hill districts, where
customary law, as contrasted with Burmese law, is usually applied.
The general freedom of action accorded local chieftains and headmen
under British rule has been continued.
Union Government policies in the Kachin State have been to keep
rather close control above the local or tribal level, apparently dis-
couraging any significant delegation of power to Kachin State officials.
Many Kachin leaders and Kachins in general mistrust and dislike the
Burmese, particularly since the recent political and economic ascend-
ancy of the Burmese living in the Kachin State.
B. Chinese Control of Frontier Tribes Prior to 1949: The
T'u-ssu System
The historical Chinese method of controlling non-Chinese fron-
tier tribes was to confirm or appoint native chieftains or trusted
Chinese officers as rulers of tribal territories and make them re-
sponsible for their domains as vassals of the Central Government.
This was known as the t'u-ssu system -- t'u-ssu meaning literally
tribal chief or sultan. The system became firmly established with
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a definite hierarchy of ranks and rulers during the Ming Dynasty
(1364-1644). Although the actual tribal chiefs were often appointed
t'u-ssu, army officers and the chiefs of other tribes who had allied
themselves with the Chinese were frequently rewarded by such
appointments. * Normally the t'u-ssu could be assisted by a Chi-
nese civil-service aid or ''secretary,'' who often wielded, if unob-
trusively, considerable influence in the administration of the t'u-ssu
domain. The t'u-ssu system thus was a compromise that allowed
nominal Chinese control while basically preserving traditional tribal
organization. The topography of the frontier lands combined with
the Chinese attitude toward the petty border tribes contributed to
this indirect and largely nominal method of control. The mountain-
ous terrain and lack of transportation routes connecting with the
main centers of Chinese administration effectively isolated the fron-
tier region and made penetration difficult. Furthermore, the rela-
tively sparse population and a lack of surplus food hampered the
bringing in of sufficient military and administrative personnel to
support direct administration. The Chinese regarded the tribespeople
*A 1944 Chinese study of the t'u-ssu system stated that one-third
of the t'u-ssu were of Chinese origin and another third of a tribal
origin different from that of the people they governed. If the tribes-
men under the jurisdiction of a native t'u-ssu revolted, a Chinese
was usually appointed after the revolt was quelled. 1/
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as culturally inferior ''barbarians,'' without social or political status,
and therefore of little consequence so long as they acknowledged the
suzerainty of Imperial China, paid annual tribute, and did not actively
oppose the Chinese or ally themselves with the enemies of China,
During the latter years of the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911), the
powers of many t'u-ssu were reduced and some t'u-ssu domains were
abolished.* This trend continued after the establishment of the Repub-
lic of China in 1912, although the ensuing war-lord rule made impossi-
ble any effective national policy until after 1928, when the Nationalist
Government began to consolidate its control. Although the Nationalists
pursued the policy of organizing Chinese-ruled administrative units,
de facto powers often remained in the hands of the t'u-ssu. The con-
tinued strength of the t'u-ssu system in spite of Chinese efforts to
uproot it was largely due to the basic distrust of the Chinese by the
tribespeople. This distrust and dislike resulted not only from the
traditionally superior attitude of the Chinese but also from long asso-
ciation with Chinese merchants and peddlers who were not averse to
swindling the primitive tribesmen. Chinese officials were often
*The t'u-ssu domains abolished were primarily in the interior
provinces; those in the frontier areas were comparatively untouched,
since Chinese officials apparently wished to retain frontier t'u-ssu
domains as buffer states. 1/
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oppressive and overbearing; most of them were underpaid and fre-
quently engaged in petty graft and smuggling to augment their sti-
pends. Resentment was also occasioned by encroaching Chinese
agricultural settlers who usurped the traditional agricultural lands
of the tribespeople. Such attitudes and actions are, of course, not
unique to southwestern China; similar conditions have prevailed in
the development of most of the frontier areas of the world.
It is interesting to compare the solution of the t'u-ssu problem
as envisaged by Chinese scholars and officals in the 1930's and
1940's with Chinese Communist policy toward frontier peoples and
problems. The scholars stressed five major points as leading to
a solution: (1) a strong central government, (2) improvement in
the class of frontier officials, (3) improved communications, in-
cluding highways and telegraph and telephone systems, (4) immi-
gration of Chinese in large numbers to the frontier areas, and
(5) education for tribespeople as well as Chinese, with the schools
providing Chinese political and cultural indoctrination. I/
C. Chinese Communist Minority Policies
Chinese Communist policies toward minority groups differ
significantly from those of the Chinese Nationalists. Basic objec-
tives have remained uncnanged, however. They are assimilation
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and Sinification of non-Chinese peoples, and political control by
fragmenting the minority peoples into small, easily managed units.
In contrast to previous regimes, however, the Chinese Communists
have sought to attain their objectives in a much more systematic
manner and through a much broader program implemented with
greater care.
Military control has been the first prerequisite to carrying out
the Chinese Communist minority program. Chinese Communist
troops garrison the major cities and towns and control the communi-
cations network, such as it is., in the Burma-China border area. The
direct control exercised by the Communists in the more remote
minority-inhabited areas is probably slight, but pro-Communist
political workers who are trained and sent to outlying districts have
undoubtedly spread indirect Chinese control. Perhaps profiting from
past experiences, the Chinese Communists appear to have used mili-
tary force with greater care in non-Chinese areas than in Chinese
areas. Also, to allay traditional minority distrust of Chinese methods
and motives, the Communists have given lip service to minority cus-
toms and cultural traits, promoted the growth of public education and
health programs, and subsidized Chinese-minority trade relations.
Moreover, basic Communist programs such as land reform, the
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marriage law, and other reforms distasteful to minority peoples
either have been postponed or have been put into effect at a much
slower rate than in other parts of China.
As the culmination of their policies, the Chinese Communists
have capitalized on minority desires for self-government by grant-
ing them the right to establish so-called "autonomous governments. "
The steps necessary for establishing an "autonomous'' government
are carefully directed and guided by Chinese Communist cadres. By
selecting and training local non-Chinese who have pro-Communist
sympathies or are susceptible to Communist influence -- many of
them idealistic young people -- to represent and administer minority-
inhabited areas, a fiction of non-Chinese control of the autonomous
areas is maintained. Actually, all decisions of an autonomous gov-
ernment must be approved by the next higher Chinese government
agency, and each autonomous government is firmly welded within
the Chinese administrative framework. The result of establishing
these so-called autonomous governments is that minority groups
have been fragmented into small, easily manipulated administrative
units, following traditional Chinese ''divide and rule" tactics.
Apart from any direct military opposition encountered by the
Chinese Communists in pacifying non-Chinese areas, other obstacles
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have hindered consolidation of control. Some of these obstacles are
mentioned in a series of reports from the Third Expanded Conference
of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the Central People's Gov-
ernment, held in Peking in June 1953, which were released to the
Chinese Communist press in September 1953. Although the reports
are general and represent summaries of conditions existing through-
out all of China, presumably the points cited would apply to the
Burma-China border area as well as to other. minority-inhabited
areas of China.
The lack of non-Chinese cadres or political workers to provide
the facade of native administration in each autonomous government
was cited as a serious obstacle to the regional autonomy program.
According to the report, "further fostering'' of "patriotic elements,
activists, and leaders who have ties with the masses, " is needed to
accomplish "reconstruction tasks. " Z/ Another problem mentioned
is lack of cooperation between Han Chinese* cadres and non-Chinese
cadres; the report indicated that some Han Chinese cadres tended to
"monopolize all tasks." The crimes of "Pan-Hanism" and "ultra-
nationalism, " according to the report, constitute another obstacle
* "Han Chinese" are Chinese by culture and language, as
differentiated from the non-Chinese peoples of China.
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to improving Chinese-minority relationships. Chinese press re-
leases have admitted that a "few'' of the non-Chinese tribes viewed
i
the creation of local autonomous governments as synonymous with
ridding the area of Han Chinese. 3, 4/
From reports in the Communist press and comments of persons
who have recently left China, it appears that the traditional hostility
between Han Chinese and non-Chinese is still strong and has not been
dissolved overnight by Communist gestures of friendship, brother-
hood, and promised equality of treatment. In the relatively short
time that the Chinese Communists have been in power, they have not
yet been able to adequately train the cadres needed to insure politi-
cal control. A considerable gap often exists between the policies
promulgated at the national level and the actual implementation of
those policies at the local level. Friction between Chinese and non-
Chinese becomes most evident at the local level, and traditional
attitudes and beliefs may often counteract the implementation of top-
level directives. That some of the tribal chiefs and other leaders have
not been beguiled by the Communist program is confirmed by a Chi-
nese Communist press release indicating that where ''unity of na-
tional minorities" was undermined, it was because "certain higher-
level personages among the nationalities . . were tricked by the
enemy plot.'' 5 /
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D. Autonomous Governments in the Burma-China Border Area*
Three autonomous governments were established in 1953 along
the Burma-China border, and a fourth is in the preliminary stages
of organization. These autonomous governments represent only a
small percentage of the total number that have been established
throughout China. Possibly 50 or so now exist at the hsien or higher
administrative levels, and perhaps several hundred have been organ-
ized at sub-hsien administrative levels.** Although approximate
areas and boundaries have been announced and are shown on map
13087, it is probable that these autonomous areas initially exist only
nominally, with a small nucleus of Communist and pro-Communist
cadres to symbolize the new order. The most important of these
recently created autonomous areas is the Tai Autonomous District
of southern Yfinnan.
1. The Tai (Thai) Autonomous District
The creation of the Hsi-shuang-pan-na (Sibsong Panna) Tai
Autonomous District in early 1953 was viewed with considerable
alarm in Southeast Asia, primarily in Thailand. This alarm resulted
*Details as to area, population, ethnic composition, and simi-
lar factors are contained in Appendix A.
**See CIA/RR-G-7, Autonomous Governments in Minority-
Inhabited Areas of Communist China, for a list of autonomous
governments as of June 1953.
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from (1) the strategic location of the Tai Autbnomous District adjoin-
ing Burma and Laos, and (2) the ethnic affinity of its people with those
in neighboring countries.
The name "Sibsong Panna, variously spelled and sometimes
hyphenated, is a regional-political term long used to designate a def-
inite Tai-inhabited area of southern Yunnan Province. The name
originally designated a union of 12 Tai tribes, each having its own
definite territory; the term later came to mean 12 valleys (panna) or
groups of valleys, or sometimes the "land of 12, 000 ricefields. "
Apparently no official boundaries were established for ancient Sibsong
Panna, so that it is impossible to determine whether the area of the
Tai Autonomous District coincides with it. For practical purposes,
there is sufficient similarity to consider the two areas as synonymous.
The area of the Tai Autonomous District has been variously reported
as 20, 000 to 25, 000 square kilometers (approximately 10, 000 square
miles), with the larger figure most commonly quoted. This area
compares with that of the State of Maryland (10, 577 square miles).
The physical setting of the Tai Autonomous District has already been
described.
The particular Tai group in Sibsong Panna is the Tai Lu. Other
members of this group are found in the Keng Tung area of Burma, in
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northern Thailand, and in Laos. Total population of the Tai Lu is
estimated at 400, 000, of whom about 100, 000 to 140, 000 inhabit the
Tai Autonomous District. As mentioned previously, Tai dialects
are mutually understandable and the Tai of Sibsong Panna are able
to communicate with Tai peoples living in other areas at a basic
Tai level. The Tai Lus are Buddhists with a strong mixture of ani-
mism: Reportedly, there are 2, 000 Buddhist wats (temples) in
Sib song Panna, of which about 10 are in Ch'e-li, the administrative
center of the area. 6/
The Tai Lu live in small villages in the low-lying river basins.
Their houses are of simple bamboo construction, built on poles with
space underneath for animals. Wet-field rice is the major crop,
although some dry-field rice is grown on slopes difficult to irrigate.
Garden crops (peas, maize, onions, beans, and sugarcane) and
tropical fruits (bananas, pineapples, and mangoes) are also grown.
In contrast to the custom in Thailand of raising vegetables and fruits
in small garden patches, the Tai Lu plant their crops in outlying
fields. Poultry and pigs are raised for local consumption. The
major cash crops of Sibsong Panna are tea, camphor, cotton, and
opium. Tea has long been the most important export item, and the
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Fo-hai district is the most important producing area. Salt is mined
and exported to neighboring areas.
The mountain-dwelling tribes -- the Akha (Kaw), Lolo, Lahu,
and Yao -- who inhabit the Tai Autonomous District probably num-
ber about 50, 000. Their way of life has been described previously.
The historical unity of Sib song Panna dates back several cen-
tures; although tribute was occasionally paid to the stronger Chinese
emperors, its status remained relatively autonomous. During the
latter years of the Manchu Dynasty, Chinese influence and admini-
stration encroached upon the area of Sibsong Panna east and north
of the Mekong, while the western area remained isolated and inde-
pendent. The semiautonomous status of Sibsong Panna as a buffer
state between British and French areas of influence was recognized
in the 1894 Sino-British boundary convention. In 1941, during the
regime of the Chinese Nationalists, Chinese administration was
extended to all of Sib song Panna with the creation of the five Chinese-
administered hsien of Ch'e-li, Fo-hai, Liu-shun, Nan-chiao, and
Ning-chiang. Although a superficial Chinese administrative organi-
zation existed and the hereditary tribal chieftains -- Chao Fah --
were under the nominal supervision of Chinese officials, actually
the chieftains retained much of the real authority and power.
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Initial Chinese Communist goals in establishing the Tai Autono-
mous District apparently were domestic and defensive in nature, in
keeping with Communist minority policies. At the ceremony mark-
ing the inauguration of the Tai Autonomous District, members of the
"people's government" pledged --
to learn from and follow the example of Han Chinese cadres
and people so as to lead the Tai people and people of other
nationalities in Sibsong Panna to carry out regional autonomy;
to smash sabotage activities of American imperialists and
agents of Chiang K'ai-Shek; and to strengthen defense of the
fatherland and construct a new Sibsong Panna under the leader-
ship of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao, and
the Central People's Government. 7/
That political control over the many minority groups in Sibsong
Panna is not yet complete is indicated by the lag in organizing local
people's governments in accordance with the "historic development
and historic relations among the nationalities. " In June 1953 the
Chinese Communists stated that by the end of the year some 12
"panna" governments would be established in Sibsong Panna, plus
other lesser types of administrative units. Recent reports indicate,
however, that a number of areas are as yet unorganized. 8/ The
customary Communist efforts have been made to foster agricultural
production, promote education and public health, and encourage
trade among the tribespeople.
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Of greater significance is the recent press announcement from
K'un-ming that the K'un-ming--Ch'e-li highway had been completed
as of 31 December 1953. The Communists have also announced
plans for improving the abandoned World War II route linking Ch'e-li
with the Burma border. Improvement of caravan trails in Sibsong
Panna to "speed up the exchange of goods" has frequently been men-
tioned in the Chinese press. One of the most important factors in
the isolation and relative independence of Sibsong Panna, and other
border areas as well, has been the lack of roads from Chinese cen-
ters of administration and commerce to these non-Chinese areas.
Improved communications will obviously facilitate the economic and
political integration of the Tai Autonomous District with Yunnan
Province and the rest of China, and the extension of a road network
to the Burma-Laos border will also improve Chinese Communist
military capabilities in Southeast Asia.
The ultimate object of the Chinese Communists in establishing
the Tai Autonomous District cannot be foreseen. Until the Commu-
nists feel that they have complete control and domination in Sibsong
Panna, it is unlikely that their announced objectives will change.. A
Pan-Thai movement developed in Thailand about 1940 whereby, under
Japanese sponsorship, Thailand gained some territory (returned in
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1946) at the expense of Cambodia and Laos. There is no evidence at
present to indicate that the Chinese Communists have instigated a
similar movement to unite the various Tai areas in conjunction with
their activities in Sibsong Panna. Nevertheless, the strategic loca-
tion of the Tai Autonomous District, the ethnic affinity with Tai
groups in neighboring countries, and the continued development of
roads into the area do offer long-range opportunities for Chinese
Communist designs on their neighbors to the south.
2. Other Autonomous Units
After the establishment of the Tai Autonomous District in
Sibsong Panna it was. announced in April 1953 that a Lan-ts'ang Lahu
autonomous unit had been organized. Its boundaries have not been
specifically delineated, but apparently this unit also adjoins the
Burma border (see map 13087). According to Chinese press re-
leases, Lahu tribesmen comprise nearly half the total population of
200, 000; the remainder are Wa, Lolo, Akha, and members of other
tribes. At the inaugural ceremony, particular stress was laid on
strengthening the "unity of nationalities" and consolidating the na-
tional defense of the fatherland. Specifically excluded from this
Lahu autonomous unit was the mountainous Wa-inhabited area near
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the Burma border. Announcement of a Communist-inspired ''auton-
omous" Wa state may be expected in the future.
In July 1953 an autonomous government for Tai and Kachin
tribes was organized, with boundaries coinciding on the west with
the Burma frontier -- roughly from 24?N to 25?N. The chairman
of this autonomous unit reportedly is a former Tai Sawbwa whose
prestige is being used by the Chinese Communists to give the appear-
ance of genuine autonomy and independence. At the inaugural cere-
mony it was announced that one of the central tasks was the development
of agricultural production. This area contains about 10 major river
basins, suitable for rice growing, which in the past have been by
Chinese standards comparatively underpopulated and underdeveloped.
The general area included within this autonomous unit is known as
the "Chinese Shan States. " By the terms of the boundary conven-
tions of 1894 and 1897, parts of these petty Shan States were divided
between China and Burma. The Tai inhabiting this area have been
influenced to a greater extent by the Chinese than have the-Tai Lu
of Sibsong Panna.
The most recent autonomous unit in the immediate Burma-China
border area is the Nu Chiang (Chinese for Salween River) Lisu auton-
omous unit, which in October 1953 was in the preparatory stages
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of organization. Parts of the area had already been organized into
smaller autonomous units at lower levels of administration. The
usual goals have been announced for this new autonomous unit --
development of agricultural production, trade, education, health,
national unity, and defense of the fatherland.
V. History of the Boundary and Areas Currently in Dispute
Prior to the Sino-British boundary agreement of 1894, the
boundary separating Burma from China had never been officially
delineated. Instead, the border area was a transitional zone where
Burmese and Chinese authority met and occasionally overlapped.
Many of the tribal groups inhabiting the border region were organ-
ized into petty states that paid nominal tribute to Burmese or Chi-
nese authorities and, in some cases, to both. After the acquisition
of Upper Burma in 1886, British administrators wanted to know the
limits to which their authority extended. Accordingly, the United
Kingdom and China in a convention of 1886 provided for a delimita-
tion commission to mark the frontier.
A. The 1894 and 1897 Boundary Conventions
Negotiations between the British and Chinese first bore fruit
with the signing of a boundary convention on 1. March 1894. The
southern section of the boundary presented no serious problems; the
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criterion commonly used in determining the boundary in this sector
was whether in the past the particular petty state had paid tribute
to China or to Burma. Some of the trans -Salween Shan States had
paid tribute to both Burma and China, but it was generally possible
to determine to which country tribute had been most regularly paid.
North of 25?35'N, however, the boundary area was unexplored,
and since the negotiators could not agree upon a frontier delimita-
tion, this sector was left undefined.
The 1894 Convention embodied some concessions by the British
in both the Bhamo and the Shan States areas, and these concessions
later came to be severely criticized, particularly from the military
point of view. An opportunity soon arose to modify the 1894 Conven-
tion, a provision of which had prohibited the Chinese from ceding
any part of the State of Kiang Hung (including much of the area now
included in the Tai Autonomous District) to a third power. Since a
portion of Kiang Hung was ceded to the French in 1895, the British
seized upon this as grounds for a revision of the 1894 Convention.
A new boundary agreement reached on 4 February 1897 realigned
the frontier, returning a minor state -- Kokang -- and the strategic
frontier post of Sima to Burma. The Leased Tract of Namwan, a
territory of about 60 square miles lying astride the route between
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Bhamo and Namkham, was now placed under the direct administra-
tion and control of the British. Although Chinese sovereignty over
Namwan was recognized, Article 2 stated that "in the whole of the
area China shall not exercise any jurisdiction or authority whatso-
ever, " and that the British Government "will hold it on a perpetual
lease from China, paying rent for it, the amount of which shall be
fixed hereafter. " 9 / Article 4 in the 1894 Convention was identical
with Article 4 in that of 1897 relative to the northern section of the
boundary, leaving "the settlement and delimitation of that portion
of the frontier which lies to the north of latitude 25?35' north" for
"a future understanding between the contracting parties when the
features and condition of the country are more accurately known. " 9/
Both conventions had provided for a joint boundary commission
to demarcate the frontier, and operations were carried out between
1897 and 1900. Boundary markers were set up for all of the bound-
ary south of 25?35'N except a 200-mile stretch of wild and unexplored
country in the Wa States area about which the boundary commission-
ers were unable to agree.
B. The Undefined Northern Boundary
The defining of the northern section of the Burma-China bound-
ary presented numerous obstacles. Foremost was the inaccessibility
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and lack of topographic knowledge of the area. The hill-dwelling
Kachin tribes of the area were given to raiding lowland villages-,
which made administration difficult and costly. Furthermore,
there was a dearth of knowledge concerning the history of. adminis-
tration in the area, Although it was known that Burmese authority
prior to 1886 had reached north only as far as Myitkyina, the Brit-
ish lacked information concerning the degree, if any, of Chinese in-
fluence in the area. In the discussions preceding the Anglo-Chinese
Convention of 1886, the Chinese had claimed the northern reaches
of the Irrawaddy River so as to allocate the river port of Bhamo to
China. The British did not recognize this claim but let the matter
rest until the beginning of negotiations leading to the 1894 Conven-
tion. In the interval the British explored a small section of North
Burma and came to the conclusion that the Irrawaddy-Salween
watershed should be proposed as the common frontier.. This pro-
posal was not accepted by the Chinese, and after some fruitless
negotiations the Chinese Minister in 1893 agreed that the boundary
north of 25?35'N should be left undetermined until more informa-
tion was obtained.
The 1895- 1914 period was marked by increased Chinese and
British activity in Burma north of 25?35'N. Several skirmishes
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occurred between British and Chinese survey parties and some
bloodshed resulted. After further rejections by the Chinese of the
Irrawaddy-Salween watershed as a frontier, the British informed
the Chinese Government in 1906 that they intended to regard the
frontier as following the watershed and to administer up to that
limit. Chinese counterproposals were not acceptable to the British,
and infiltration of northern Burma by both nations continued. The
British pursued their policy of recognizing the Irrawaddy-Salween
watershed as a de facto frontier and by 1914 had erected frontier
posts, to which the Chinese objected, as far north as the Chemeli
Pass at approximately 26? 11'N.
The only alteration in the British version of the frontier occurred
as a result of British surveys in the extreme north of Burma. It was
discovered that Chinese influence existed in the valley of the Taron,
a tributary of the Irrawaddy, and the boundary was altered on British
survey maps after 19 14 to show the upper Taron Valley as belonging
to China. This concession did not satisfy Chinese officials, who con-
tinued to assert that large areas of North Burma were properly part
of China.
From 1914 until the late 1920's, the situation along the northern
frontier remained relatively quiet. In this interval the British slowly
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strengthened their administration, particularly in the late 1920's
when expeditions were despatched to suppress slavery in the Kachin-
inhabited Triangle area. This activity by the British stimulated
Chinese interest anew, but an exchange of correspondence from 1929
to 1934 failed to bring about an agreement in principle as to the de-
limitation of the frontier. At about that time, Chinese maps, such
as the Chinese Postal Atlas and various school atlases, began show-
ing the maximum Chinese claim by a roughly east-west boundary at
about 25?35'N; this included all of North Burma within China.
C. The Undemarcated Wa States Boundary
The fact that the 200-mile section of the boundary extending
from approximately 22? 10'N to 23 ?30'N was left undemarcated by
the 1897-1900 joint boundary commission apparently caused little
concern for the next 30 years. The fierce Wa headhunters inhabit-
ing parts of the area effectively discouraged exploration and attempts
at administration. In the early 1930's, however, a resurgence of
Chinese nationalism led to considerable agitation to reassert former
Chinese frontier claims. At this time the Wa area assumed economic
importance because it was believed to contain rich mineral deposits.
Having sent an armed prospecting party into the area against Chinese
protests, the British felt that they should maintain some form of
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administration there, which necessitated demarcation of the bound-
ary.. They reached an agreement with the Chinese in April 1935 that
provided for a joint boundary commission. A 'Swiss officer, Colonel
Iselin, was selected by the President of the Council of the League of
Nations as a neutral chairman to head the joint commission, which
surveyed the area from December 1935 to April 1937. As before,
no agreement was reached. One benefit that resulted, however, was
a fairly detailed topographic survey of the area.
The impasse over delimiting the boundary might have continued
indefinitely had it not been for the seizure of east coast Chinese ports
by the Japanese, which caused the Chinese Government to plan the
construction of a Burma-Yunnan railroad from Lashio to K'un-ming.
The proposed alignment of the railroad was very near the undemar-
cated section, and the British intimated that their cooperation in the
venture was dependent upon a definitive boundary agreement. After
lengthy discussion the boundary was finally delimited by an exchange
of notes dated 18 June 1941. The Iselin Commission Report was used
as a basis for settlement, although both sides made concessions be-
fore final agreement was reached. The Lu-fang area, where mineral
deposits reportedly existed, was included in Burma; it was agreed,
however, that Chinese capital might participate up to 49 percent in
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British concerns working the eastern slope of Lu-fang Ridge. Nor -
mally, formal demarcation with the erection of boundary pillars
would have followed, but the Japanese invasion of Burma in early
1942 prevented any demarcation activities.
D. Border Incidents and Claims, 1942-48
Chinese Nationalist forces operated in many parts of Burma
during World War II and in several instances attempted to occupy
Burmese border areas. The Chinese were particularly active in the
Hpimaw area and the Ahkyang Valley of North Burma. During 1945,
incidents occurred in Keng Tung in the southern Shan States and in
the Kokang, Namwan, and Myitikyina areas. Most of the incidents
consisted of Chinese troops occupying an area and proclaiming to the
natives that the area was now part of China. Strong representations
by the British Government of Burma to the Chinese Government and
sometimes the use of force were needed to dislodge the Chinese.
Although some of these incidents were precipitated by bands of Chi-
nese deserters and border bandits, it was apparent that Chinese offi-
cials took advantage of the war situation to advance territorial claims.
Another series of Chinese, actions in late 1947 and in 1948 was
apparently designed to reassert Chinese territorial claims. A report
from the Chinese Ministry of the Interior in October 1947 announced
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that a survey team was then leaving for the Yunnan-Burma border
to replace missing boundary markers. Significantly, no mention was
made of Burmese cooperation in the venture. Supposedly the survey
team completed its mission in August 1948 when some 135 boundary
markers reportedly had been placed, although no further details as
to the location of these markers were forthcoming. Of more concern
was the announcement in November 1948 by an official of the Chinese
Ministry of the Interior that an area of 77, 000 square miles of North
Burma was properly part of China. The much-.repeated figure of
77, 000 square miles is greatly exaggerated; an area of about 22, 000
square miles is more nearly correct. The line defined by the Chi-
nese official was very similar to the one shown on the previously
mentioned Chinese maps. In early 1948 the Chinese also began to
press for a review of the status of the Namwan Leased Tract. Re-
portedly, the Chinese Nationalist Government informally questioned
the status of the tract and the Burmese reply pleaded preoccupation
with internal affairs to prevent it from giving full attention to the
matter. 10/ According to another report, 11/ the Chinese Nation-
alists refused to accept payment from Burma. Before any of these
Chinese Nationalist claims could be further advanced, however, the
Chinese Communists seized control of mainland China.
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E. Chinese Communist Territorial Claims
The present policies of the Chinese Communists concerning
the disputed boundary area do not significantly differ from those of
their predecessors. Chinese Communist maps, like Chinese Na-
tionalist maps, continue to show the northern portion of Burma as
part of Yunnan Province and the Burma-China boundary north of
25?35'N as "undetermined. " The most recent Chinese Communist
atlas (December 1953), however, now shows the boundary as strik-
ing west from 25?35'N to the divide between the Mali and Chindwin
Rivers, from which point it trends almost due north, following the
watershed to the Burma-India border (see map 13187). The area
of northern Burma now claimed by China is thus reduced by roughly
50 percent from previous claims. In the Wa States, the territory
now claimed has been enlarged somewhat. The reasons for these
changes in cartographic policy are unknown.
The Chinese Communists differ from the Nationalists also in
their portrayal of the undemarcated boundary in the Wa States area
between 22?10'N and 23?30'N. The Chinese Nationalist Government
signed a treaty with Great Britain in 1941 delimiting this section of the
boundary, which apparently settled the issue between British Burma
and China. At first it appeared that the Chinese Communists had
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accepted the 1941 agreement, but since 1952 Chinese Communist
maps have shown the boundary pushed far west to the Salween and
marked "undetermined. "
Other areas of potential dispute include Namwan and Kokang.
Under the British, the territory of Namwan was acknowledged to be
Chinese territory, leased in perpetuity to the British Government of
Burma for the payment of the nominal rental of Rs. 1, 000 annually.
Since Burma became an independent nation in 1948, the Burmese
have apparently not made the annual payment to establish their posi-
tion of successor to the British as lessee. As can be seen from the
accompanying map, No. 13127, the strategic location of the Namwan
Assigned Tract is important to road communications between the
northern Shan States and North Burma. The status of Kokang, a
small sub state of the Shan State of North Hsenwi, is similar to that
of the Namwan Assigned Tract. Kokang was recognized as Chinese
territory (the majority of its inhabitants being Chinese) by the 1894
boundary convention, but it was assigned to Burma by terms of the
1897 agreement. Remarks made by the Chinese Acting Foreign
Minister in 1945 indicated that the Chinese were not satisfied with
the status of Kokang.
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There is no information at present to suggest that the Chinese
Communist Government is considering opening negotiations with the
Burmese Government regarding any of these disputed areas. If
such negotiations are broached, however, the Chinese Communist
position would be much stronger than that of previous Chinese Gov-
ernments because of the reversal of the power balance.
The validity of Chinese claims is somewhat difficult to evaluate
and varies with the areas in dispute. The northern undefined bound-
ary appears to give the Chinese the greatest opportunity for making
good at least a part of their claims. This is a de facto boundary,
and there is no legal basis for the British and Burmese delineation
of the frontier other than occupa on of the area in the face of Chi-
nese protests. Since the British and Burmese have administered
the area for more than 50 years, it is probable that the indigenous
inhabitants do not desire a change, especially in view of their gen-
eral animosity toward the Chinese as a race, which was increased
by the behavior of Chinese Nationalist troops in northern Burma in
World War II. Chinese Communist exploitation of traditional Kachin
dislike of the Burmese, however, and discriminatory actions by the
Burmese Government against the Kachins and other tribes of north-
ern Burma could conceivably cause a change in sentiment.
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There seems to be no reliable historic or ethnic basis for the
extreme Chinese claim of all of northern Burma as shown on Com-
munist maps; but Chinese Irredentism might make out ?a case, and
final demarcation of the boundary might result in territorial gains
for Communist China. Specifically, in the history of early negotia-
tions, the British Deputy Commissioner for the Bhamo District in-
vestigated areas claimed by China. He concluded that there were
valid Chinese claims to a few mountain villages west of the Salween-
Irrawaddy watershed near the Ngawchang River. These claims were
based on the tributary status (through exchange of presents) of these
villages to certain village headmen in China, although it was appar-
ent that the headmen did not actually control the mountain villages
nor did the Chinese in turn exercise direct control over the head-
men. 11/
Chinese Communist claims along the southern section of the
Burma-China border have less validity. With regard to the unde-
marcated boundary (23?30'N to 22?10'N) in the Wa States area, the
protracted negotiations and the recommendations made by a neutral
chairman culminating in the 1941 Sino-British boundary agreement
seemingly would settle the question of boundary alignment, despite
the fact that the boundary was not formally demarcated on the
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ground. Repudiation of the 1941 agreement would appear to be the
only method whereby the Chinese Communists would have an offi-
cial basis to seek readjustment of the boundary. The question of
the. ownership of Namwan and Kokang also might be reopened on
the basis that the 1897 agreement was an "unequal treaty" made
at a time when China was oppressed by foreign nations. The Chi-
nese Communists thus could demand a revision of the boundary in
these areas on the grounds of "equity" and "justice.. "
VI. The Current Border Situation
A. Transportation
Overland communication between Burma and China is difficult.
The Burma Road is the only route that could support large-scale
movement of materiel and troops by motor transport. There are
a very few dry-weather motorable routes, including jeepable tracks,
which could support limited movements of men and materiel, but
all of these routes could become impassable for vehicles and diffi-
cult even for mules during the wet season, April through September.
Even on 'the Burma Road, landslides, washouts, and swollen streams
may halt traffic for days during the rainy months (Figure 19). In the
Northern Border Region, transborder communication routes are lim-
ited to mule-caravan tracks and coolie paths via difficult mountain
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Figure 19. A landslide blocks traffic on the Burma
Road near Lung-ling.
Figure 20. The Burma Road at the Salween crossing.
Old and new fields checkerboard the steep slopes.
Difference in elevation between river surface and
ridge crest is 2,500 to 3,000 feet. View towards
the southwest.
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passes (Figure 3), most of which are blocked by snow during the
winter (late December to April).* No railroads link Burma to
China; the nearest railheads are at Lashio and Myitkyina in Burma
and at K'un-ming in China.
In addition to the Burma Road (Figure 20), there are two minor
routes in the Myitkyina--Bhamo--T'eng-ch'ung area (see map
13127). Until World War II, an all-weather track usable by mule
caravans connected T'eng-ch'ung with Myitkyina via the relatively
low Kauliang Pass (8, 870 feet elevation). This track, which con-
nects at Lung-ling with the Burma Road, was made motorable in
1944, but its.condition rapidly deteriorated after World War II. A
number of recent reports indicate that the Chinese Communists may
be improving this route to make it motorable from T'eng-ch'ung to
the Kauliang Pass.. It has also been reported that the Chinese Com-
munists may be improving a track that leads from T'eng-ch'ung
westward to Bhamo.
South of the Burma Road is a route in various stages of comple-
tion that roughly parallels the Burma Road, connecting Yun-hsien
with Meng-ting (see map 13127). Parts of this route follow
*A number of the more important passes are located, named,
and described in Appendix B.
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the proposed alignment of a once-projected Lashio-K'un-ming rail-
road. If completed, this route would connect with a dry-weather
road leading from the Burma Road to the ferry crossing of the Sal-
ween at Kunlong, whence a trail leads eastward to the frontier. The
200-mile segment of the frontier in the Wa States area is practically
inaccessible; no routes except native footpaths lead to this area
from either Burma or China.
Several routes cross the border in the southernmost part of the
frontier area, many of which are reportedly being improved by the
Chinese. For over 2 years, the Chinese Communists have been
constructing a motorable road linking K'un-ming with Ch'e-li, the
administrative center of the Tai Autonomous District. This route
is reported to have been completed in late 1953; it is probably a
single-lane dry-weather road. From Ch'e-li, the Chinese are clear-
ing and improving an ancient pack trail that leads west via Fo-hai to
the Burma border, and late reports indicate that this route may have
been completed. Construction and improvement of a road leading
south from Ch'e-li to the Burma frontier and the improvement of
other trails leading to Laos are other Chinese: objectives in the re-
gion. A trail somewhat to the north, leading from Ssu-mao through
Lants'ang and Meng-mao to the Burma border, was reported to be
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under construction in 1951-52, although there are indications that
work was suspended in favor of construction in the Ch'e-li area.
The only major Chinese construction in the Northern Border
Region is the building of a motorable road that eventually will link
Yunnan with Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Its alignment follows in
general the ancient caravan trail from Yttnnan to Tibet (see map
13127). This route is now motorable to about 27?30'N.
B. Transborder Trade
Overland trade between Burma and China, except for short peri-
ods of expansion caused by war conditions, has been on a compara-
tively small scale. There are three types of overland trade:
(1) legitimate, (2) clandestine, and (3) the traditional limited amount
of barter trade between Chinese peddlers and traders and the various
border tribes. During the period 1946-48, legitimate overland ex-
ports to China amounted to only about 6 percent of Burma's total
export trade, and the percentage of imports from China was even
smaller, representing only 2 or 3 percent of the total.
The commodities exported from Burma to China in the years
immediately preceding the Chinese Communist assumption of power
in 1949 were rice and raw cotton; imports from China consisted al-
most entirely of textiles, principally cotton yarn. Legitimate trade
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declined sharply after the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists, par-
tially as a result of Burma's efforts to control trade so as to insure
supplies for domestic use, plus pressure by the United States to
reduce trade with Soviet-bloc nations. Several restrictive measures
were taken by the Government of Burma in 1950-51 to curtail the flow
of strategic materials to China. These included the prohibition of
the reexport of petroleum products and imported manufactured goods
in short supply in Burma, and restrictions on the issuance of transit
licenses, designed to limit transshipments to China. Actually, the
amount of legal trade since 1950 has been negligible.
During the first year of the Communist occupation of Yunnan,
widespread smuggling took place quite openly via the Burma Road.
In great demand in China during 1950 were tires, vehicles, petrole-
um and petroleum products, and automotive parts. It has been said
that during 1950 a truck could be purchased in Burma and transported
to K'un-ming, where its value doubled or even tripled. The compara-
tively easy flow of smuggled goods in and out of Burma was due to
some extent to the lack of custom officials and check points, but the
most important factor was the widespread bribery of custom and
police officials. Since 1951, however, smuggling has declined con-
siderably, because the Burma Government increased the number of
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check points, reshuffled border officials, moved elements of the
Burmese Army into the frontier area, and imposed harsher penal-
ties for bribe taking. Illicit goods can no longer move openly across
the border via the Burma Road but must be transported on the nu-
merous trails that crisscross the border. Large-scale smuggling
operations have thus been stopped, and the type and amount of goods
that can- be exchanged is limited. At the present time the major prod-
ucts smuggled from Burma into Ytinnan include raw cotton, cotton
yarn, medicines, scrap metal, and petroleum products. In exchange,
although a much smaller amount of goods passes from Yttnnan to Bur-
ma than in the opposite direction, Ytinnanese products offered are
chinaware, rice, vermicelli, and other locally produced goods.
Opium smuggling, scarecely a new enterprise in the border area,
continues to flourish, with traders smuggling their product to Ran-
goon and Bangkok after paying toll to various bandits, insurgent
groups, and officials. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla units oper-
ating in the border area reportedly are engaged in the opium traffic.
Very little information is available concerning Chinese Commun-
ist trade policies. It appears, however, that smuggling has been
encouraged and that petty traders have been allowed to continue their
operations among the border tribes. The old Ytinnan silver coins,
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long the medium of exchange among the border tribes in Ytinnan,
are being replaced by Chinese paper currency.
C. Chinese Communist Penetration
Little information is available concerning attempts of the Chi-
nese Communists to penetrate and infiltrate the border areas. Pri-
mary efforts appear to be directed toward the border tribes and
their subversion by propaganda appeals to tribal "unity. " This
campaign is part of the extensive Chinese program now being car-
ried on in minority-inhabited areas of western Yunnan, which has
resulted in the establishment of several so-called autonomous ad-
ministrative units (see section IV). From time to time there are
reports that Communist agents are working among the tribes in
Burma, although their efforts thus far have not been on a large
scale. Communist indoctrination of traders who cross and recross
the border has also been reported, and this method has probably
been of some importance in disseminating Communist propaganda.
There have been reports that agents disguised as traders have in-
filtrated into Burma.
Since 1950 several small groups of Chinese Communist mili-
tary forces have been reported entering Burma. An incident of
this nature occurred in July 1953 in the northern Wa States area,
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and a more recent Chinese Communist foray into Kokang has been
reported. None of these incursions has been of long duration or in
great strength, and no subsequent demands by the Chinese for bound-
ary rectifications have followed, as might logically be the case if
these invasions were part of an overall plan to force the disputed
border issue. The Burmese Government, not wishing to antagonize
its great neighbor to the northeast, has not publicly protested these
border forays. The combination of difficult terrain and lack of com-
munications in the frontier region lends itself to forays by small
groups. Except at established points of crossing, for most of the
length of the border it is possible for small groups to infiltrate with-
out detection.
A potential threat to the political stability of the Kachin areas of
northern Burma has been the presence of the renegade Kachin leader,
Naw Seng, in the border area. Naw Seng, a Kachin chief who in 1949
led a mutiny of Kachin elements in the Burmese Army and later fled
to Yunnan, reportedly has been receiving training and indoctrination
from the Chinese Communists. He apparently controls a force of
several hundred to perhaps 2, 000 men. Since his base of operations
shifts frequently, little accurate information is available as to his
present location and intentions. In any attempt to renew Chinese
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claims to northern Burma, such as organization of a Kachin state
embracing both Burmese and Chinese Kachin groups, the Chinese
Communists would most likely use Naw Seng and his followers. The
organization and training of militia forces composed primarily of
tribesmen, in the several autonomous areas along the border is a
potential threat to the security of the border region. The Communist
method of attaining their objectives through the use of puppet leaders
and forces is well established.
The presence of Chinese Nationalist forces and guerrilla bands
along the Burma frontier has been frequently cited as a possible ex-
cuse for Chinese Communist intervention to "protect" the border
inhabitants from Nationalist exploitation. Thus far, the Chinese
Communists have chosen not to force this issue, and the removal of
some Chinese guerrilla troops in recent months may somewhat alle-
viate the tense situation.
*After Burma submitted the Chinese Nationalist problem to the
UN in April 1953, a joint committee was formed composed of Thai-
land, Nationalist China, and the United States to arrange for the
withdrawal of the Chinese Nationalist forces. Evacuation began in
late 1953, and by March 1954 some 5, 000 troops had been removed;
efforts are continuing to bring about the withdrawal of additional
troops.
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VII. Conclusions
The traditional buffer function of the Burma-China frontier
region is coming to an end. This is.being. accomplished. by the
expansion of Chinese Communist political control, which, coupled
with the extension of modern transportation routes into the frontier
lands, is ending the quasi.-independent status and physical isolation
of the border peoples. .
The Chinese Communists have pursued the. traditional Chinese
political policy of fragmenting the frontier peoples into small, eas-
ily manipulated administrative units. In implementing this policy,
however, they have differed from previous Chinese regimes; Super-
ficially, the Peking regime has followed the.adm.oni?tion of Imperial
administrators of the early dynasties to '!.cheri=sh the feudal princes,
win the distant peoples with kindness and restraint. ". 1 / In contrast
to past practice.s, however, the Communists have used, military,
forces with great discretion in the process of securing control.
Furthermore, through the. establishment of so-called autonomous
governments, respect shown for minority customs, subsidization of
Chinese-minority trade relations, promotion of public education and
public health programs,. and the. widespread use of pro-Communist.
native leaders and young people ' to. implement their program, the
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Chinese Communists have been able to control the border peoples
politically with apparently little active opposition. The net result
of this subtle and systematic campaign probably will be to hasten
the process of Chinese cultural assimilation of non-Chinese peoples.
Although the barriers of mountains, river gorges, and dissected
plateau lands have in the past hindered major east-west movements,
'penetration of the frontier lands by small groups and trading cara-
vans has always been possible. The road construction and repair
promoted by the Chinese Communists will facilitate political control
of the frontier and enhance Chinese military capabilities against
Southeast Asian countries.
The boundary claims of Communist China are not new but rep-
resent a continuation of past Chinese claims. The most serious
Chinese boundary claim is north of 25?35'N. This segment of the
boundary has never been defined and is at present a de facto bound-
ary only. No Chinese government, past or present, has recognized
any definition of this boundary or relinquished claims to territory
west of the present line. If a formal agreement as to the delinea-
tion of this boundary segment is reached, the territorial readjust-
ments may be disadvantageous to Burma. Although the British and
Burmese have loosely administered northern Burma for a number
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of years, a possible case can be made for China west of the Salween-
Irrawaddy watershed. Other areas to which China may lay claim
include the Wa States, Kokang, Namwan, and the Shan State of Keng
Tung. It is doubtful that there is much justification for most of these
Chinese claims, but the balance of power is such that China's bar-
gaining power would be great if negotiations were opened.
The unsettled conditions and lack of administration prevailing
in much of Burma's frontier area, particularly the presence and
activities of Chinese Nationalist guerrilla forces, have presented
opportunities for Chinese Communist exploitation and intervention.
Thus far the Chinese Communists have not fully exploited the situa-
tion but have contented themselves with occasional small-scale bor-
der forays and the infiltration of agents among the tribespeople in
Burma. There have been reports that Chinese agents have talked of
"tribal unity" to minority groups in Burma, but apparently these
propaganda efforts have been on a limited scale.
Despite the somewhat strained relations between the Government
of Burma and leaders in the Kachin and Shan States and the general
distrust and dislike between these groups and the Burmese, there is
a counterbalancing factor of active dislike of the Chinese on the part
of most tribespeople and their leaders. At the time when Burmese
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prestige and power was lowest (1949-51), the Kachins and Shans for
the most part did not defect to the various insurgent groups.
So far the Chinese Communists have devoted most of ther ener-
gies to consolidation of control over their western Ytinnan frontier
areas, but an expanded and concentrated Chinese campaign to attract
the loyalities of tribal groups in Burma could prove effective, partic-
ularly in view of the failure of the Burmese to ameliorate Burmese-
minority relationships.
Initial Chinese Communist objectives in establishing "autonomous"
governments appear to be limited to securing complete control of tribal
territories, and little has been made of the ethnic affinity of these
groups with those across the border in Burma. Future moves by the
Chinese, however, to win over the tribes in Burma would presumably
use these minority peoples' governments as examples of "benevolent"
Chinese minority policies and their territory as bases for training
cadres and agents.
By Chinese and Southeast Asian standards, the frontier lands are
sparsely inhabited and undoubtedly could support a much larger popu-
lation, Many of the valleys are now malarial, but the Chinese public
health and land utilization programs may make possible an influx of
Chinese settlers into these comparatively empty basin and valley
lands .
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF AUTONOMOUS UNITS*
1. Name: Hsi-shuang-pan-na (Sibson Panna) Tai Autonomous
District
Date Established: January 1953
Administrative Capital: Ch'e-li (21?59'N-100?49'E)
Area: 25, 000 sq. km.
Population: 200, 000, consisting of "47 nationalities" or tribes
of which 140, 000 are Tai, with lesser numbers of Akha,
Lahu, Lolo, and Yao
Administrative Officials: Chairman Chao Khun Sin, a Tai
(variants of the name include Chao Ts'un-hsin and Chao
Chun Tsin); 5 Vice Chairmen, including 3 Tai, 2 Chi-
nese, and 1 Akha
2. Name: T e -hung Tai-Kachin Autonomous District
Date Established: July 1953
Administrative Capital: Meng-shih (24?27'N-98?36'E)
Area: 13, 000 sq. km. (estimate)
Population: About 400, 000, of which 175, 000 are Tai and
97,000 are Kachins
Administrative Officials: Chairman Tiao Ching-pan, a Tai
(also given as Tao Pin-han, presumably a former
sawbwa of Pao-shan); 7 Vice Chairmen, including 3 Tai,
3 Kachins, and 1 Chinese
*Data largely obtained from Chinese Communist press releases.
The accuracy of area and population statistics is questionable.
S-E--C-R-E-T
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3. Name: Lan-ts'ang Lahu Autonomous Hsien
Date Established: April 1953
Administrative Capital: Lan-ts'ang (approximately 22?55'N-
100?04'E)
Area: 10,000 sq. km.
Population: About 203, 000, of which 93, 000 are Lahus, with
lesser numbers of Wa, Akha, and Tai
Administrative Officials: Chairman Li Kuang-hua, a Lahu, and
6 Vice Chairmen including 2 Lahu, and one each Chinese,
Wa, Akha, and unidentified
4. Name: Nu Chiang Lisu Autonomous District
Date Established: Preparatory announcement made in October
1953; normally several months elapse prior to formal
establishment
Administrative Capital: Not announced
Area: 8, 000 sq. km. (estimate)
Population: About 100, 000; no information as to percentage of
Lisu
Administrative Officials: Chairman of the preparatory commit-
tee is P'ei Ah-chien, a Lahu; 4 Vice Chairmen, including
2 Lisu and 2 Na-khi
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IMPORTANT YUNNAN-BURMA MOUNTri1N PASSES*
1. Namni L'ka (28?21'N-97?48'E); elevation 15, 297 feet
A very high pass leading from northern Burma into Sikang.
Closed by snow December-April.
2. Yuragan Pass (27?47'N-98?26'E); 12,489 feet
The most important pass in this area that connects the Upper
Salween Valley with the Taron River Valley; it can be crossed
by mule caravans. Closed by snow January-April.
3. Maguchi Pass (27?21'N-98?44'E); 11,540 feet
The quickest route from the Salween to the Ahkyang Valley.
The trail is poor but is used by traders. Closed by snow
January-April.
4. Hg'amu Pass (27? 13'N-98?43'E); 12, 800 feet
Reportedly a route by which cattle and horses are taken from
the Salween Valley to Burma. Approach is said to be easy from
the China side, more difficult from the Burma side. Closed by
snow January-April.
5. Gigi Pass (27?04'N-98?45'E); 8,882 feet
At a considerably lower elevation than the passes farther north
and usable throughout the year, but comparatively difficult to
cross. Crossing from China to Burma, the Simi Pass (9, 833
*Only the more important passes are described here and shown
on the accompanying map, No. 13127. There are a number of other
passes, but they are in general difficult to traverse and are little
used. The passes described were selected on the basis of World
War II studies, supplemented by recent intelligence reports.
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f feet) must be traversed before trails to the the A:hkyang and
Nmai Hka Valleys are reached. Access to the Ahkyang Valley
can be had via Wachet Pass (10, 464 feet), which, however, is
blocked by winter snows.
6. Hpimaw Pass (25?58'N-98?42'E); 10,998 feet (Figure 3)
Regularly used by Chinese mule caravans from the Salween
Valley; a trail leads to the comparatively well populated
Ngawchang Valley in Burma. Closed by snow January-February.
7. Pa Wa Pass (26?36'N-98?23'N); 7,665 feet
A mule pack track from T'eng-ch'ung to the Nmai Hka Valley
and eventually to Myitkyina crosses through this pass, one
of the easiest to traverse and open throughout the year.
8. Kauliang Pass (25?25'N-98?09'E); 8,870 feet
A good all-weather mule track, made motorable during World
War II, from T'eng-ch'ung to Myitkyina crosses the border by
this pass, which is open throughout the year.
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GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Basic studies of this region, particularly the western Yunnan
frontier areas, are lacking. Although; a number of westerners,
primarily British, have traveled in and explored various parts of,
the frontier, the reports are generally, of a, reconnaissance nature.
Detailed,.and comprehensive studies, of small areas are almost
entirely. lacking. Reports on. ethnic groups are usually generalized
and often reflect conditions of 15 to. 40 years ago; very little infor -
mation is available. concerning -the effect of World War II and post-
war developments on the culture and economy of the frontier peoples.
There is little reliable current intelligence concerning Chinese
Communist activites in the frontier.
Topographic map coverage of Burmese. frontier areas is fair
to good, although the cazltural;data on most sheets are. out of date.
Topographic map. coverage is lacking for most Chinese frontier
areas, and the surveys used for compiling the available coverage
are old and, unreliable.. .
- 115
S -E-,C -R -E-T
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SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources
Information for this report has been obtained from a variety of
sources, which fall in the following general categories: accounts
by explorers, scholars, missionaries, or officials; special studies
compiled during World War II; official documents; topographic and
special-subject maps; and press releases from Communist China.
The writings of the botanist-explorer F. Kingclon Ward, which deal
principally with the Northern Border Region, provide useful terrain,
climatic, vegetation, and ethnic data. Reports and maps published
by the British Inter-Service Topographic Department during World
War II contain general information about the physical setting, people,
and economy of the Burmese frontier lands. Of considerable use
was the gazetteer Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia, with
its accompanying map, published under the auspices of Yale
University.
The recent study by Wiens I/ contains useful information on
the historical migration of ethnic groups into South Asia and on
Chinese systems of administration in frontier areas. This source
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is particularly valuable in that it makes wide use of Chinese-language
2. Sources*
1. Herold J. Wiens, China's March into the Tropics, Office
of Naval Research, Washington, D.C. , 1952. U.
2. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Back-
rg ound, No. 264, 5 October 1953, p. 19. U. Eval. C-2.
3. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Far
East, 17 September 1953, AAA-6. Official Use Only. Eval. F-2.
*Evaluations following the classification entry and designated
"Eva1. " have the following significance:
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
- 117 -
11
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
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10
5. FBIS, Daily Report, 17 September 1953, AAA -21. Official
Use Only. Eval. F-3.
7. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China
Mainland Press, No. 505, 3 February 1953, p. 23. U. Eval. F-2.
8. FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, 27 January 1954, AAA-6.
Official Use Only. Eval. F-3.
9. British and Foreign State Papers, 1896-1897, Vol. 89,
London. U.
25X1A
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 B URMAMGMINA-2QRDEFt.:1 000Z7HthC GROUPS
)
r
#4' TIBETAN TRIBES
on Chinese
Communist maps
S Mandalay
13087 2-54
Lashio ?
50
MILES
Putad
senwi
Hsipaw ?
Chinese
Akha or
Kaw
Kachin
Lahu or
Musso
ETHNIC GROUPS
'F Nu-chiang Lisu
Autonomous District
(to be established)
Pao-shan
Keng Tung'
Lu-Tzu
Palaung
THAILAND
Ethnic data based upon and simplified from a
map accompanying the gazetteer Ethnic Groups
of Northern Southeast Asia, Yale University, 1950.
Boundaries of autonomous units are generalized
and approximate only.
Ssu-mao
Sibsong Panna
Tai Autonomous District
Ch'e-Ii
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13127 _. 3-54
97 98
L ,a (R1mmaT
'utao '' /_;_
99
Pi.chin
Lu?shu;
Wei-hsl
SIKANG
ico
Li-chiang
yitkyifla .. ?? '
Lima
Lastio
98
Che
BURMA?CHINA BORDER
- . . - International boundary, demarcated
--x- International boundary, undemarcated
International boundary, indefinite
......... International boundary shown on Chinese
Communist maps
_...._._ Province (China) or state (Burma( boundary
I- I I Railroad
---.-- Selected all-weather road
Selected fair-weather road
- -- - --. Road under construction
Selected track or trail
Selected pass
Scale 1:2,000,000
0 20 40 60 80
Statute Miles
0 20 40 60 80
Kilometers
SECR7
101 102
c CH'ENG
HA!
4 Ning-erh
(P'u-erh)
99 ---- -- 100 101 102
GLOSSARY
chiang ------------------------------stream
hai -----------------------------------------lake
hka--._-_-_.__------ ,stream
hkyet_____---_----_-_---mountain pass
ho ------------------------------------stream
I'ka __-_---_--___--_----._mountain pass
nam --------------------------------stream
wang ------------------------------------stream
Some boundaries shown on this map are de facto bound-
aries (1954), not necessarily recognized as definitive by the
United States Government
Chen-
yuan
y yr f
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