GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NUMBER 58

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01005A000300090002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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ONIFI
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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR MR 59-2
July 1959
CONTENTS
The Katanga: A Key Region in the Evolution of Africa . . . 1
23
Morocco's "Land of the Free" . . . . . . .
.Three Book Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
New Political Map of Africa . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 49
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS 1
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
rJE'/,T REVIEW
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REVIEWER: 372044 1
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CO EIDENTI
Number 58
CIA./RR MR 59-2
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Page
The Katanga: A Key Region in the Evolution of Africa . 1
Morocco's "Land of the Free" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Three Book Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
New Political Map of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Maps
Following Page
Belgian Congo : Katanga (277141-) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Morocco: Ethnic Groups (278+5) . . ... . . . . . . . . 1+0
Morocco: Terrain and Transportation (28028) . . . . . . 40
Africa: Administrative Divisions (27738) . . . . . . . . 49
* The individual classification of each article in this Review is
given at the end of the article.
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THE KATANGA
A KEY REGION IN THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICA
I. The' Significance of the Katanga
Among all the areas in Africa that have recently achieved or
are moving toward independence, the Belgian Congo seems best assured
of becoming a self-supporting nation -- primarily because it includes
the Katanga. The economic viability of the country, however, would
depend upon the continuation of European managerial guidance. Adminis-
tratively the Katanga is the southernmost province of the Belgian
Congo, but geographically it is the beginning of Southern Africa.
Located in the approximate geographic center of Africa South of the
Sahara, the Katanga has presented several problems to the Belgians.
The region is not a truly integrated part of the colony, lacks easy
access to the oceans, and has been subject to unsuccessful European
separatist influences that have looked to Southern Africa for inspiration.
Instead of being overwhelmed by these difficulties the Belgians
have developed their resources to the point where the Katanga alone --
possessing only a fifth of the area of the colony, and a third and an
eighth of the European and native populations respectively -- contributes
more than one-third of the Belgian Congo's budget. Over the years
this contribution has enabled the Belgians to establish in the Congo
social services unequaled in other colonial areas of Africa. Much
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remains to be done along the lines of "investing in the people," but
any such work would be sharply limited without the wealth of the
Katanga.
No colonial power in Africa has ever surrendered a prize comparable
to the Katanga. The recoveries of Belgium after World Wars I and II
would have been substantially limited had it not been for the wealth
of the province. The Belgians are anxious to retain a share of this
wealth as long as possible, regardless of the political fate of the
province. The USSR and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat, on the
other hand, have appeared equally anxious to thwart this Belgian
objective. The USSR has denounced the Belgian practice of transferring
profits outside the colony; and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat,
in an unsubstantiated statement, implied that the population of the
Belgian Congo declined from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000 during the last
half century as a result of Belgian exploitation of ivory, rubber, and
"the world's richest mines of the Katanga."
The fate of the province is also being closely watched by the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Union of South Africa.
In their thinking, the implications of a Katanga dominated by Africans
are intensified by their feeling that the province is geographically a
part of Southern Africa, and that the political boundary between the
two would be no barrier to the spread of African nationalism.
II. Mineral and Metallurgical Production
Copper is the most important of the minerals of the Katanga. In
noting the importance of copper to Belgium and its colony, the salient
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facts are that the Katanga has been and still is able to produce
copper cheaply and has had a ready market during key periods of the
past half century. Between 1914 and 1917 the production of copper
nearly tripled -- from 10,000 to 27,000 metric tons.* By 1939,
production had risen to over 135,582 tons a year. From 1939 to 191+5
the Katanga produced 1,082,105 tons as against a total of 1,81+1,898
tons in the 29 preceding years. From 1946 to 1954 -- covering the
postwar recovery era, the Korean War, and the start of the Cold
War -- the Katanga's production of copper amounted to 1,603,174 tons,
or over half a million tons more than was produced during World War II.
A wide variety of factors influenced copper production between.
1948 and 1957 (see table). The low production of copper in 191+8-49
for example, was caused by a shortage of hydroelectric power that,
in turn, was the result of abnormally low rainfall; the marked increase
in copper production in 1950 was directly related to increased
exploitation of the Ruwe deposit, located some 8 miles northeast of
Kolwezi (see Map 27714). The rise in copper production since 1951
is explained by: (1) the opening of the Bia Hydroelectric Plant;
(2) the substantially increased production of the Prince Leopold
Mine; (3) the use of sulfide concentrates from Kolwezi to supply
the Lubumbashi Smelter, where the. installation of a second converter
raised output to a record figure; and (4) the introduction of modern
equipment and transportation facilities.
* All tonnage figures in this paper are given in metric tons.
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The extent to which the mineral wealth of the Katanga has been
exploited also suggests that here, at least, an "industrial Africa"
has begun to impose itself upon a "bush Africa." Of the many minerals
of the Katanga other than copper, cobalt is most important. During
the 19+8-57 period the output of cobalt made the Katanga by far the
world's major source of cobalt and the supplier of approximately
two-thirds of the world's total production. Recent developments
indicate that the chief mining company, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga,
is headed toward producing not only the highest grade commercial
cobalt metal in the world, but also the cheapest. Anxious to increase
cobalt consumption and possessed of adequate reserves for a great many
years, the Union Miniere recently reduced the price of cobalt signifi-
cantly.
The Katanga also possesses the chief coalfields of the Belgian
Congo. Ina decade, production has more than tripled as a result of
demands made by the local railways and the cement and metallurgical
industries. The increasing electrification of railroads may limit
coal production. The coal has a high sulphur content, catches fire
easily in the open air, and is therefore difficult to stock or to haul
over long distances. Current Belgian research is being conducted on
the possibility of utilizing coal as the basis of a synthetic liquid
fuels industry.
Production of other minerals depends on a wide variety of
factors. Silver and gold are found in limited quantities and are
associated with the copper deposits. The working of new gold deposits
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is dependent upon more hydroelectric power, the increase of which
has thus far saved gold mining in the Katanga. The future for the
production of tin is bleak. Relatively low prices, quotas on exports,
and increasing costs have retarded the development of the industry.
When these factors are considered in conjunction with the particularly
unfavorable mine location, which necessitates a large number of
transshipments, it is apparent why Katanga tin is mined at a loss
and production is declining. Zinc production, on the other hand,
has been increasing. In 1958, the imposition of zinc import quotas
by the United States and the methods used to arrive at these quotas
produced highly unfavorable Belgian reactions. The Katanga produces
a major share of the Belgian zinc supply, and the United States
action is claimed by the Belgians to cost them as much as $10,000,000
annually. Germanium, though present in only small quantities, is
significant because of its applications in the electronics and
chemical industries. Uranium production continues to be relatively
small. The manganese output continues at a relatively high level.
Ample reserves of high-grade ore and a modern plant (already amortized)
make this one of the most economically sound mining operations in the
Belgian Congo.
III. Hydroelectric Resources and Development
The exploitation of mineral resources was and still is the major
stimulant for the development of hydroelectric power in the Katanga.
Today, the province has the largest hydroelectric powerplants in
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Central Africa, together with well over one-half of the high-tension
lines in the Belgian Congo. Other regions in the Belgian Congo,
however, have many times the hydroelectric power potential of the
Katanga. In fact, it is these other regions of the Belgian Congo
that give the colony about one-fifth of the world's resources of
dry-stage hydroelectric potential, or a little less than one-half
that of the entire African Continent. The Katanga, however, is the
major industrial stimulus for large-scale hydroelectric development.
In the decade 1948-57 the Katanga nearly quadrupled, its production
of hydroelectric energy -- from 525,824,030 to 2,011,775,796 kilowatt
hours. Although the Katanga in years of low rainfall uses thermal
power to supplement hydroelectric power, the trend is overwhelmingly
in favor of hydroelectric power:. Thus, the production of hydroelectric
energy in 1957 was about 140 times that of thermal energy.
Four installations (centrales) in 1956 produced 1,292,940,500
kilowatt hours, or over 90 percent of the total hydroelectric output
of the Katanga. These installations are: Centrale Franqui and
Centrale Bia on the Lufira River, and Centrale Delcommune and Centrale
Le Marinel on the Lualaba River (see Map 27714). These installations
are located within the mineral-producing area. The Le Marinel plant,
with a potential totaling more than that of the other three installations
combined, sends power as far as Kitwe in the Copperbelt of Northern
Rhodesia. This will continue to be of great importance to the
Rhodesian Copperbelt until the Kariba Dam is completed.
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The major power consumer is the mineral industry, principally
Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, which also is the major producer.
Other major local consumers are the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au
Katanga (B.C.K.) and the cities of Elisabethville, Jadotville, and
Kolwezi. Electrified sections of the railroad consumed some 30,000,000
kilowatt hours during 1956. In 1958 the B.C.K. completed the
electrification of an additional 103 kilometers, making a total of
1415 kilometers of electrified railway in the Katanga. During 1959,
81 more kilometers of electrified line will be added.
The major external consumer, the Rhodesian Copperbelt, stabilized
its demand at 53,000 kilowatts in 1956. When the Rhodesian Copperbelt
can be supplied by its own internal source, the Kariba Dam, the power
now exported from the Katanga will be available for the increased
urban demand resulting from an anticipated rise in the African
standard of living. Indications thus far suggest that the Katanga
will have power enough to supply such increased needs during the
foreseeable future.
IV. Agriculture
In contrast to the mineral resources of the Katanga, its
agricultural resources are poor -- the result of a long dry season,
poor soils, a natural vegetation deficient in nutritive value, and,
to a much lesser extent, terrain. Except for the major river valleys,
that part of the province lying south of 08?S has an elevation of
more than 3,200 feet; but the land to the north is lower and permits
more adaptation to tropical agriculture.
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The soils of most of the Katanga are clayey silt, but large
areas of sandy soil are found (1) along the frontier with Angola,
(2) in the highlands north of Sandoa, and (3) in an interrupted
north-south zone 60 miles wide that stretches from Mato (08002'S-
21+?55'E) to the Rhodesian frontier (see Map 2771+).
North of the Dilolo-Mitwaba axis the country is grassland, but
to the south the vegetation consists largely of tall brush interspersed
with grassland. Large areas both to the north and to the south of
this axis are burned over periodically by the Africans to rid the
countryside of pests and to encourage fresh growth of grass.
large measure, this burning contributes to the haunting uniformity
of desolate landscape common to so, many parts of the Katanga.
Temperatures are remarkably uniform throughout the year in the
north, but vary noticeably in the higher south. Daily maxima are
usually in the high 80's at Kongola (elevation 3,000 feet) and
minima are near 70?F. Elisabethville at 4,500 feet has maxima in
the 80's nearly all year, but minima range from the low I+0's in
winter (July) to the low 60's in summer (January). Europeans find
this seasonal variation pleasant and healthful.
Rainfall is sharply seasonal. The long dry season occurs in
the winter and lasts about 5 months at Kongola and 7 at Elisabethville,
although both towns receive about 48 inches of rain per year.
Although many climatic factors are important in determining
what crops can be raised in the Katanga, the length of the dry
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season appears to be the most important. All of the Katanga has a
dry season of 160 or more days. The panhandle southeast of
Elisabethville has a dry season of 180 days per year. Because the
dry days are concentrated in a single dry season instead of being
spread out over the year, the effects are pronounced. By the end
of the dry season hunger among the natives is traditionally acute
throughout the Katanga.
The Africans have made partial adjustments to climatic conditions.
For many years prior to 1885; they raised maize almost exclusively;
but, in that year, manioc was introduced by one of the important
chiefs of the Baluba Empire, which included the Katanga. The people
themselves became known as the Bena Kalundwe or "manioc people."
Manioc was well received because it could be harvested late in the
dry season, when hunger was most acute. In addition to its ability
to resist drought, manioc gives fair yields on depleted soils and
has a high calorie yield per acre.
The chief crops that supplement manioc are maize, millet, and
sorghum. Maize is easy to cultivate and, like the millets and
sorghums, does fairly well even when grown under primitive conditions.
At present, maize is raised chiefly in. the western part of the Katanga,
whereas the millets and sorghums are raised in the eastern part. Maize
has one great disadvantage -- it is particularly difficult to store
because of its susceptibility to insect and rodent damage.
Storage is also a problem for potato growers, since the climate
of Katanga is not cold enough for natural storage after harvest.
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Yams have the added disadvantage of being relatively demanding in
their soil requirements. If storage problems can be overcome, it
would be cheaper to grow potatoes in the Katanga than to import them,
as is now the case. The amount grown would not have to be great at
present since they are primarily a European food, and Europeans are
relatively few in comparison with the number of Africans. If a
successful method of storing potatoes can be devised, their use
will undoubtedly increase.
The Katanga is a food-deficit area primarily because of the
increasing urbanization of the population brought about by the
development of its mineral wealth. The rural African who once
supplied his own limited needs has moved to the city and at the
same time has increased his food consumption.
Belgium is making a major effort to relieve the deficit. The
agricultural station at Keyberg outside Elisabethville is experimenting
with fruit, vegetable, and fodder crops that would be feasible to grow
under local conditions. Results vary with the species of fruit tree
or vegetable. Of the temperate fruits, only the Chinese peach and
the Rome Beauty apple seem promising. The results of experiments
with subtropical plants also vary. Thus far the quality of oranges
and grapefruit has been low, but mandarins and lemons of high quality
can be raised. Tropical plants such as mango and avocado suffer
during the dry season and can be grown successfully in favorable
places only. Strawberries, melons, and tomatoes show more promise
than do pineapple, banana and pawpaw.
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Fodder production is another problem. By reason of the
small food value of natural pasture vegetation, experimentation has
been directed toward increasing its nutritive value. Local conditions,
however, are unfavorable, and pastures -- even those that have been
improved -- cannot provide food enough-for an entire year of dairy-cattle
grazing. During the rainy season, low-value pastures have been converted
to fodder production in areas where the soil is suitable. Maize
fodder, for example, is a good rainy season crop and, when used as
ensilage, provides feed for animals during the dry season. Elephant
grass has also been raised with success. It is well adapted to local
conditions, is easily grown, and is well-liked by cattle. It is also
used for the regeneration of soils that have been overstocked and
eroded. Despite the demanding soil requirements, experiments with
sweet potatoes are also proceeding because they are of value in milk
production, and cattle like both the leaves and tubers.
Whether these experiments will substantially meet the needs of
the Katanga is problematical. In the near future the region will
probably continue to be a food deficit area but perhaps to a lesser
extent than formerly. Assuming progress in some sectors of the
agricultural economy, much still needs to be accomplished in the
agricultural education of the Africans.
V. Population
Those Belgians who years ago recognized that the African was an
economic resource have been richly rewarded. True, important gaps
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still exist between the productivity of European and African labor,
and African labor is not cheap considering its output. Nevertheless,
the records strongly indicate that African productivity is rising in
the most important segment of the economy, the mineral industry. Today,
the question is not whether the African is a resource, but rather how
soon his productivity can be raised to new heights.
The Katanga has an estimated population of over 1,630,000
Africans and about 30,000 Europeans, giving an average density of
3 inhabitants per square kilometer. Of the 4 districts in the
Katanga, only Elisabethville, the site of the capital, had an
average population density as great as 4 people per square kilometer
in 1956. Excluding Elisabethville district, only 8 of the 23
subdistricts in the Katanga had an average population density
exceeding 3 people per square kilometer in 1956.
High population-density areas occur as peripheral islands from
Dilolo eastward through Kolwezi, Jadotville, and E-lisabethville,
northward to areas north and south of Lake Moero, Baudouinville,
Albertville, and Kangolo, and then westward to Mani. In the center
of the Katanga is the large population island of Malemba-Nkulu.
Considering the mode of living, the Katanga possibly epitomizes
the transition of the African native from a bush to an industrial
society. Of all the provinces of the Belgian Congo the Katanga has
the highest percentage of Africans living within a relatively modern,
nontraditional society. Thirty-six percent of the population of
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Katanga Province lives in what the Belgians call nontraditional
centers as against a figure of 28 percent for the next ranking
province, Leopoldville. The mining centers of Kasai and Kivu are
farther down the scale. Apparently one of the principal factors in
this difference is the relatively easy acceptance of urban living
by Katanga wives, whereas others find the adjustment difficult and
retreat to the more protected tribal life.
The recent large increase in the number of children living in
urban centers of Katanga in relation to the number of men results
partly from increased birth rates, lower infant mortality rates, and
better school facilities; but it also indicates that the corporations,
notably Union Miniere, are succeeding in their effort to encourage
African workers to keep their families with them -- a factor basic
to the stability of African communities. Today, several Katanga
centers include second- and third-generation urban families.
Health is a problem throughout the Katanga: malaria, schisto-
somiasis, trypansomiasis, and leprosy are widespread. The vast
majority of those afflicted are Africans. Probably the best sources
of information for estimating the number of natives afflicted with
a disease are the mining companies or medical missionaries. The
doctor in charge at the hospital built by Beceka Manganese at
Kisenge estimates that about 65 percent of the people in his area
have malaria. A medical missionary in the Kasaji area, about 140
miles east of Dilolo, estimates that within his mission area 2 or
3 percent of the natives are suffering from leprosy.
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An improved health program will, among other things, result in
a lower death rate. Meanwhile, health conditions among Africans in
the Katanga leave much to be desired, and improvement is essential
if the problem is to remain a nonpolitical one. The Belgians evidently
realize this, for their are spending relatively large sums on medical
aid for the Africans. For example, in 1957 the Beceka Manganese,
with a net profit of just under 32,000,000 Belgian Congo francs,
spent about 6,000,000 Belgian Congo francs (about U.S. $120,000)
for medical-social assistance to Africans who were not employees of
the company.
VI. Defined Interests in the Katanga
A. Belgium
The lack of unity between the Katanga and the remainder of the
colony is a factor of major concern to the Belgians. This lack of
unity moved Maurice Robert, the noted Belgian geographer, to write
in 1923 that the Katanga would be lost to Belgium if more attention
were not given to its development. Ih the following year Dr. Walther
Kuhn, writing in the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, asserted that on
any economic map of Africa the Katanga should be shown as belonging
within the South African sphere of influence.
The idea that the Katanga was really a separate entity still
persisted in 1956. Some colons or white settlers, though definitely
a small minority, felt that geographically and economically the
Katanga had arrived at the point where its eventual destiny lay with
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southern white-dominated Africa. Although affiliation with Southern
Africa was not ruled out, reports from Elisabethville at that time
indicated that Belgian nationalism far outweighed any Katanga
secessionist sentiment. The thought was that the chief financial
interests would control the direction the Katanga took rather than
any extremist minority white group.
By early 1959 the people of the Belgian Congo had been promised
the chance to choose freedom at an indefinite date. The chief
financial interest, Union Miniere, with many years to go on its
mineral-concession lease from the Belgian Government, and desirous
of keeping a large measure of economic control, had already considered
the possibility of making an agreement with an independent Congolese
Government. Although the desire to keep the Katanga under Belgian
domination is strong, the desire to retain economic control over the
Katanga is even stronger. Although there has been some talk of an
alliance between colon secessionists and Union Miniere, no tangible
proof of this bond exists. In fart, the colon secessionists are
still thought to be playing a minor role in the formulation of the
Katanga's fate; Union Miniere, in cooperation with the Belgian
Government, is still thought to be playing the major role.
B. African or Congolese People
Although the Africans stand to gain the most of any group concerned
with the Katanga, the vast majority of them are uninformed about the
major political and economic issues relating to the future of the
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region. The issues at stake are largely beyond their comprehension,
but this should not obscure the fact that small segments of the body
politic are attempting to speak for the group as a whole. Thus far,
these segments have lacked unity because of their different tribal
origins; and Belgium has made little effort to change this compartment-
alization.
One Congolese faction, the Union Congolaise, which is predominently
Roman Catholic, advocates "gradual independence" through the attainment
of political, economic, and social maturity under European guidance.
The organization, however, is vulnerable to the charge that it is an
instrument for continued European control of the Katanga -- an
allegation that would be leveled at any African organization advocating
"gradual independence." The close relationship between the white-
dominated Roman Catholic clergy of the Katanga and the Union Congolaise
does not free it from criticism by the clergy and other conservative
elements.
The idea of "immediate independence" seems to be gathering
strength. Perhaps the foremost exponent of this policy in the
Katanga has been the Baluba Central, the General Federation of
Baluba People in the Central Katanga, which has now been dissolved
by the Belgians. This organization increased its strength by
attacking the Union Congolaise and the Union Katangaise. The latter
is a colon organization that advocates a federation of the eastern
Congo provinces that will have equality with Belgium. The Baluba
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Central has demanded the appointment of Congolese (native) district
commissioners and police, a demand not likely to be agreed to by the
Belgians.
The Baluba Central, however, must contend with other adversaries,
notably the Katanga tribal groups, who have formed a rival organization
known as the Confederation des Associations du Katanga (Conakat).
The role of Conakat, especially as it relates to the "immediate"
versus "gradual" independence line, has not yet been clarified.
C. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
The Federation is separated from the Katanga by the Congo-Zambezi
watershed but is linked to the Katanga by road, rail, and powerline.
The Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia directly adjoins the Katanga.
From Kipushi and the Prince Leopold Mine, the boundary of the Katanga
with the Federation is a mere turn in the road away (see Map 2771+).
Terrain and climate in the southern Katanga and the Rhodesian
Copperbelt are similar. Although the whites of the Katanga and the
whites of the Copperbelt differ in many ways, they also have much
in common.
Basically the whites of the Katanga and the whites of the
Federation Copperbelt feel a vague sort of kinship because both form
islands of white people surrounded by Africans agitating for independence,
with all that this implies. Out of a total population of 250,000, the
Europeans or whites in the Copperbelt number only 25,000. The reason
for the relatively large concentration of both whites and natives is
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the mines of the Copperbelt, which alone accounted for over 12 percent
of the world's production of copper in 1957. Just as the Katanga
provides the basis for prosperity in the Belgian Congo so the Copperbelt
provides the Federation with a basis for economic development. White
Rhodesians ask themselves, "If the Katanga is lost to Black Nationalism
can our Copperbelt be far behind?"
D. The Union of South Africa
The Union of South Africa like its neighbors to the north has
a far larger African than European population. The Union has adopted
the policy of apartheid, or separation of the races. Although many
of the Europeans within the Union do not agree with the apartheid
policy -- or do not think that it will work -- most of them are
convinced that if Black Nationalism is not restrained the day of the
whites in southern Africa will be ended. Representatives of the
Union stationed in the Katanga argue that if the African dominates
that province today he will be on his way to dominating all of
Southern Africa tomorrow.
These representatives say that South African strategy is to form
a so-called protective frontier of white-dominance that will include
the Katanga. Representatives of the Union in the Katanga preach this
doctrine and emphasize the tangible ties between the whites in the
Katanga and those of South Africa. These ties were-considerably
strengthened during World War II when the white Katanga youths could
not go to Belgium for their university education and were forced to
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go to the Union instead. So disturbing to Belgian authorities was
this trend toward closer association with the Union that it was a
large factor in the foundation of a nonsectarian Belgian University
at Elisabethville.
E. The USSR
The USSR may regard the Katanga as a special problem area apart
from the remainder of the Belgian Congo because of its mineral wealth.
This possibility is suggested by the fact that copper and cobalt are
in short supply in the USSR and the Soviet Bloc as a whole, whereas
they are the minerals that Katanga has in greatest abundance.
In the case of cobalt, the Soviet shortage is expected to
continue for several years. Not only is cobalt the alloy element
in shortest supply within the USSR and the Bloc as a whole but it
is also unavailable from the Free World as a result of trade controls.
Consequently, economy in the use of cobalt is stressed by Soviet
planners. Future requirements for cobalt cannot be estimated. Should
it become increasingly important, as a result of research and development
in the field of high-temperature alloys, the Soviet shortage may
become critical.
In the case of copper the USSR has tried to alleviate its chronic
shortage by substitution, by stockpile withdrawals, and by importation.
From 1953 through 1958, copper imports averaged nearly 70,000 tons
annually, a large part of which was obtained from the U.K., West
Germany, Finland, and Belgium. Currently the Katanga is the fifth
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largest producer of mine copper in the Free World. In view of the
dependence on Free World countries for copper supplies and considering
the Katanga's present production of about 250,000 tons of copper
annually, a potential Soviet interest in the political developments
of the region would seem natural. (SECRET)
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 Centrals
Le Marinel
entrale
elr mune
saKanla -200
KATANGA
KATANGA
140 i
Appro d For Release T2or ii
BELGIAN CONGO
ANGOLA ) `'?+~' ^.
O Copper mine, selected
O Copper and cobalt mine,
selected
o Manganese mine
A Coal mine, selected
^ Major hydro-electric power
plant
140-- Number of dry days per
year
~??- International boundary
---?-? Province boundary
? Colonial capital
ELISABETHVILLE Province capital
TTY Railroad
Road
Areas of highest population
density
1eAppMVed For Releas
Kingamyambo-N
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Kolwezi
4/
Kambove
Shamitumba
2
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CIA-RDP79-01065A000300Q9
Prit` l,~sp??~
K I V U
FEDERATION OF. RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
(NORTHERN RHODESIA)
iswbhi
toile du Congo
KEsEmETHVILLE
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200- Kit
2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-0100?A00030
1 To Beira
b rtvllle
'-UJOBURA 30
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W-'.
TANGANYIKA
Lake Tartganyika
-170
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
(NORTHERN RHODESIA)
Kasama
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MOROCCO'S "LAND OF THE FREE"
When the French turned Morocco back to the Moroccans in 1956 --
following 44 years of protectorate rule -- there appeared to be a
better-than-even chance that the diverse Moroccan elements would be
able to coalesce their varied interests and form a relatively stable
nation. Now, just 3 years later, the honeymoon appears to be over;
the unity achieved during the struggle for independence is threatened
once again by the ancient rivalry between highlander and lowlander.
Morocco is a mosaic of different peoples who speak diverse
languages and live in different physical and cultural environments.
Arabs, Berbers, Arabized-Berbers, and Berberized-Arabs make up the
vast majority of the population; but Jews, Europeans, and others
also contribute unique ways of life to the national scene. Many of
these people have submerged their differences and learned to work
together toward more or less common goals or, at least, have been
swept along in the current toward the development of a national
state. The Berbers living in the rugged Atlas and Rif Mountains,
however, have so consistently resisted amalgamation and refused to
relinquish their traditional way of life that the area in which they
live has come to be known as the "Bled as Siba," the Land of the
Free, as differentiated from the remainder of Morocco, the "Bled al
Makhzen" or Land of Government Control.
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A serious rebellion has recently been suppressed in the Bled
as Siba, and trouble can be expected to reappear. The timetable
for future eruptions cannot yet be foreseen; nevertheless, some
light can be shed on the probable role of the Berbers in the life
of the nation, and the reasons for their dissidence, by taking into
account their cultural peculiarities, their means of livelihood, and
the environment with which they must contend.
Background of Recent Berber Dissidence
Long-smouldering Berber resistance to the domination of the
central government flared last fall with the development of an armed
Berber movement. Various tribes, apparently loosely organized and
coordinated, began resisting the government in the mountainous area
from Alhueemas (Villa Sanjurjo) in the north to Marrakech in the
south (see Map 28028). When the rebellion appeared to be reaching
a critical stage, King Mohammed V -- to whom most Moroccans, including
the Berbers, profess both religious and civil fealty -- broadcast an
appeal for an end of the fighting. In his appeal, he brandished both
carrot and stick; he promised that the government would give immediate
attention to the needs of the area and would seek to improve the
standard of living of the tribal peoples. He also warned that unless
the insurrection ceased, "all measures prepared to restore order and
respect for law" would be used.
The king's promise of a more bountiful future and a subsequent
show of military strength has proved effective. Almost all groups
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have ceased fighting, and action taken by the Royal Moroccan Army
to contain the movement has had some success, but significant numbers
of hard-core dissidents remain unconvinced.
Economic and political first aid together with continued pressure
by the army probably will avert full-scale tribal rebellion, but the
situation remains perilous. There is considerable doubt that the
Royal Moroccan Army would prove effective if an all-out internecine
war developed, particularly since many of the members of the army
are Berbers and would either desert to the hills or be extremely
reluctant to fight their fellow Berbers.
One of the principal causes of dissidence among the Berbers is
the Moroccan Government's attempt to extend its control and to
centralize its authority by appointing Moroccans from such Arab
and urban centers as Casablanca and Rabat to nearly all official
government positions among the Berber tribes inhabiting the Rif
Mountains of northern Morocco and the Atlas Mountains, which extend
in a northeast-southwest arc through the whole country. The government
has consistently refused to appoint Berbers to positions of authority
.over these tribes, and instead has filled even local offices from
among the stalwarts of the ruling Istiqlal Party, a largely urban
and Arab assemblage with little or no support in the areas populated
primarily by Berbers. Berber tribes, long accustomed to independent
rule and fiercely proud of their time-honored social and political
codes, resent pressure applied by government officials to make them
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forsake their Berber customs. They believe that the officials have
little sympathy with or understanding of their tribal institutions
and that the forceful adoption of what they consider to be modern
or Arab ways will result in the gradual disintegration of the tribal
system.
Various measures now being taken to reestablish respect for
central authority, together with long-term programs aimed at removing
the basic causes of unrest, should eliminate or at least alleviate
popular discontent. The rebels' demands include local recruitment
of civil servants to fill local government posts; freedom from
reprisals for participation in the rebellion and the return from
exile of the rebel leader Abd al Krim; more adequate representation
in the central government; greater local autonomy; elimination of
taxes; creation of more rural schools; and various measures to relieve
the depressed economic conditions in Berber areas. However, even if
it were possible for the Moroccan Government to meet all of these
demands, it is unlikely that unrest would be completely eliminated.
The traditional tribal leaders will probably continue to create
difficulties in order to maintain their feudal positions, which are
threatened by extension of central authority and the reform of the
rural social structure.
Traditional Attitude of the Berbers Toward Centralized Authority
The present-day refusal of the Berber tribes to submit to the
rule of the central government is deeply rooted in the traditions
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of Morocco. In the past the tribes have been most vehement about
their independence. They paid taxes only when an armed tax-gathering
expedition was dispatched to their tribal areas, and refused to supply
the monarch's army with troops or in any way acknowledge his overriding
secular authority. Marshall Lyautey, the famed French administrator
of Morocco during the protectorate period, found that the most
effective method of governing the country was to allow the Bled as
Siba.considerable local autonomy. The French encouraged the separation
of the Berbers from the other Moroccans, and even attempted to
establish a Berber Bloc by fostering special laws for them.
Probably the most significant and spectacular Berber rebellion
was the so-called Rif War which lasted from 1921 to 1926; it is a
good example of the kind of guerrilla warfare the Berbers are capable
of conducting. The leader of the Rif rebellion was Abd al Krim.
Although now living in Cairo, he is the spiritual leader of the
dissident forces in Morocco today. The major factor underlying the
Abd al Krim uprising of the 20's was native opposition to the
establishment of a Spanish zone and to the regime that prevailed
there after 1912. The Rif War was a struggle between a relatively
powerful European nation and one tribal chieftain with no resources
beyond those of the limited area under his control. On the one hand
were the well-equipped armies of Spain; on the other, primitive Berber
tribes depending upon such weapons as chanced to come their way. By
the end of 1924, the situation of the Spanish armies was becoming
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desperate and Abd al Krim was pressing on toward the border of the
French-occupied zone. Within the French zone the successes of this
solitary chief were putting new heart into the yet unconquered tribes
and were beginning to impress the more restless elements in the
already subjected regions. When the unrest began to explode along
the borders of the French zone, France and Spain began a joint
large-scale counterattack. Abd al Krim was defeated but it took
the combined efforts of 3 marshals (including Marshal Petain), 40
generals, almost 1/2 million troops, and the use of aircraft and
tanks to bring an end to the Rif War.
Berber Characteristics, Tribal Grouping, and Livelihood
Moroccan population statistics must be treated with a great
deal of caution and skepticism, but it is probably not too inaccurate
to say that the Berbers, who are considered the original inhabitants
of Morocco, number about 6 million and constitute between 60 and 70
percent of the total population. They are of mixed stock closely
akin to the people of Sicily and southern Italy (Figure 1). Probably
no more than 5 percent of the present inhabitants can honestly lay
claim to pure Arab descent since the Arab incursions of the seventh
and eleventh centuries -- which converted the Berbers to Islam --
involved only a small number of Arab tribesmen. Among both Berbers
and Arabs, there has been some intermarriage with Negroid people.
The distinction between Arabs and Berbers is not primarily one
of physical appearance, but depends largely on linguistic and other
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Figure 1. A variety of costumes and physical characteristics
are found among the hundreds of Berber tribal groups in Morocco.
Within each group or community, however, a distinctive style of
clothing and certain physical resemblances are usually apparent.
cultural characteristics. The Berbers are distinct from Arabs and
Arabized-Berbers in having various dialects peculiar to them alone,
different cultural values, and a more egalitarian social and political
tradition. Until recently they also had a separate body of law. The
traditional distinctions, however, are rapidly losing their former
political and social significance. A central government that is
determined to extend its authority throughout the country, Moroccan
nationalism, and modernism are producing greater cultural homogeneity
among the diverse segments of the population.
The linguistic boundaries are also becoming less definite. The
Moroccan form of Arabic is the country's paramount language; it is
the language of government, commerce, and learning. As a result,
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the younger generation of Berbers are usually eager to learn Arabic
and may even have a feeling of inferiority about their own languages,
which lack a standard written alphabet and do not permit the same
freedom as Arabic in expressing abstract thoughts. In 1955, it was
estimated that only 25 percent of the total population was solely
Berber-speaking. On the other hand, more than 50 percent was thought
to be bilingual (Arabic and Berber).
Berber dialects themselves differ so radically from place to
place within Morocco that a member of one tribe sometimes finds it
difficult to understand a member of another. The Berbers of the
Rif area along the Mediterranean, for example, can barely understand
the dialects of central Morocco if they can understand at all. This
virtual tribalization of dialects can be attributed largely to the
absence of a standard written alphabet, the large size or isolation
of the areas involved, and the lack of sustained contact and commu-
nication between tribal communities.
Although there are some 600 distinct tribal units in Morocco,
the various Berber tribes fall into 4 major groupings on the basis
of linguistic and other cultural similarities: the Shluh, the
Beraber, the Djebala-Ghomara-Riffian group, and the Zenata (see
Map 27845).
The southern Berbers, the Shluh of the western Great Atlas and
of the Anti-Atlas, are estimated to number about 3 million. They
practice mixed farming, the exact nature of which depends upon local
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environmental conditions. In the southwestern part of the Shluh
area, agriculture, which is almost entirely of a subsistence nature,
is dependent on an elaborate irrigation system. Vegetables and
olives are cultivated in small family plots, and the food obtained
from them is supplemented with milk and meat from goats. Elsewhere
in the south -- in the Saharan and near-Saharan zones -- increasing
aridity has reduced the importance of agriculture and encouraged
nomadism. The tribes in these semidesert areas engage in riverbed
agriculture and also graze large numbers of animals. Their fortified
villages are entirely limited to oasis locations.
Farther north, in the higher elevations of the mountains, lower
temperatures and increased rainfall permit the Shluh to practice
intensive agriculture. Every possible patch of ground is cultivated.
Wheat, barley, almonds, grapes, and other fruits are grown. Irrigation
ditches, laboriously cut into mountains, water the vegetable gardens.
Normally, each village has a fortified depot for its stores, but
in some cases there may be only one for a tribe as a whole (Figure
2).
Another area inhabited by the Shluh is the high country above
7,000 feet, with its coniferous forests, high barren plateaus, and
deep gorges. Here ingenious irrigation techniques enable the Shluh
to grow barley and rye. In severe winters the widely scattered
villages may be abandoned temporarily while the residents move
down toward the plains.
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Figure 2. The village
generally occupies land
that is unsuitable for
cultivation in the Great
Atlas. Traditionally,
the buildings have been
huddled around a high
kasbah, the residence
of the chief and a place
of refuge against attack.
East and northeast of the Shluh, on the southern slopes of the
eastern Great Atlas and in the Middle Atlas, live approximately
500,000 Berabers (Figures 3 and 4+). Their dialect is relatively
uniform over the whole area, although Arabic is widely spoken among
the southern groups bordering the Sahara.
The dominant feature of Beraber life is a type of pastoralism
characterized by the seasonal movement of livestock between lowland
and highland pastures (Figure 5). Unlike the sedentary Shluh, who
adjust their agricultural activities to conditions in one place,
the Berabers base their economy upon the fact that pasturage in
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Figure 3. Faces such as
this are frequently seen
in the Middle Atlas area.
A hooded mantle of heavy
wool and a long cotton
band rolled as a turban
are standard articles of
clothing.
Figure 4. Berber horsemen
taking part in one of the
most popular events -- a
fantasia. The horsemen
line up and charge wildly
across the field, raising
a great cloud of dust. At
a given signal, they fire
simultaneously while brand-
ishing their rifles above
their heads.
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Figure 5. Sheep occupy an important place
in the life of the Moroccan Moslem, for
whom pork is forbidden. The wool is reg-
ularly clipped, spun, and woven; the hide
provides raw material for the leather
worker; and the meat is the basic food of
the country.
different climatic zones matures at different seasons. Some of the
Beraber tribesmen who own permanent houses and collective granaries
in the mountains move their herds to the winter pastures in the
valleys. Others have permanent homes at the base of the mountains
and send their herds up to the higher pastures in late spring. Still
others have houses midway between the summer and winter pastures but
spend most of their time in the pasture areas away from the permanent
villages.
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North of the Beraber country, and separated from it by the
expansive valley south of the Rif Mountains, is another area of
Berber speech and culture. This is the Djebala-Ghomara-Riffian
region along the Mediterranean Sea, which includes the mountainous
terrain swinging in a large arc across the northern part of Morocco.
Of this area, only the eastern part properly falls within the so-called
Land of the Free, the tribes to the west being in an intermediate
stage -- neither completely submissive nor openly rebellious in the
face of domination from without. The Djebala-Ghomara people have
been almost completely Arabized linguistically; nevertheless, they
are Berber in origin and culture. The Riffians still tend to speak
only their Berber dialect.
Of incidental interest is the fact that numerous Riffian Berbers
are not at all Mediterranean in type but have characteristics commonly
associated with northern Europeans. They are ruddy in complexion,
tend toward freckles, and generally have reddish beards and hair.
They also seem to indulge more frequently in feuds than any other
people in Morocco. An outstanding authority on life among the
Riffian people claims that, in the days before independence, the
Riffians were happiest when they had an opportunity to snap their
homemade flintlocks at the Spaniards or to thumb their noses at the
Sultan. When there were no foreign invaders to repel, they kept fit
and cheerful by indulging in tribal wars, feuds, and various punitive
raids.
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i
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-- --+--+--+---I WALVISBAAI
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AFRICA Administrative
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seat at.
Overseas I : I I I I I
Pretoria
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SOUTH AFRICA
Independent country Projected independence - 1960
Boundaries ore not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
BOUNDARIES
0 Soo 1000
Cape Town
T
TUTE
IL
1500
Demarcated ------ Undemarcated
S
A
M
ES
o 500 loo0 1500
River boaedo.lesthat have been agreed oveeoeA ffoved For R ease 206
0/04/17: CIA-RDP79- 1005A00 s
15 30 45
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