LETTER TO CRAIG HOSMER FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002800240004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 5, 1962
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
i
5 MAR 1962
Honorable Craig tiHosmer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Craig:
Thank you for your note of 17 February with which
you enclosed copies of your letter to the President and your
study on "Organization For Cold War. " As you indicate,
it does have implications for CIA and I shall study it carefully.
Your thoughtfulness in sending me your study and
related material is appreciated.
Sincerely,
J. a.gned)j 'JONR A. ifec?
John A.. McCone
Director
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee OX
iA - DCI w/basic
1-DDCI
1-ER
1-IG
1 - Leg. Counsel
OGC/I.C/GLC:jmd (26 Feb 62)
~-~ -/O36,.
PL.' T tAi t i 6, _ `3
Approved For Release," 002/02/27: CIA-RDP80B01676R0028b02464-4
ii,b 0-34
TATINT
 .CRAIG HosM pp roved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002800240004-4
`
18TH IPISTRICT,CALIFOgpllp COMMITTEE:
? INTERIOR AND
INSUL
Conan of the aniteb &tateo
31ouot of 3epregent4tibeo
44ington, 0. C.
AR AFFAIRS
JOINT COMMITTEE ON
ATOMIC ENERGY
February 16, 1962
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing copies of my study on "Organization for Cold Ware"
This document points up the vital need for better organization for cold war,
urges your immediate attention to the matter, and specifically urges you to take
the following steps without delay:
1. Establish a Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency on the lines
of a permanent cold war task force; and,
2. Establish a Command Control Information Center to monitor continuously
cold war operations of ourselves, our allies and the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Full details regarding these proposals are contained in the study. It is
furnished you, personally, because you are the only official of the United States
government possessing the broad power needed to establish these necessary manage-
ment tools for successful prosecution of the non-military conflict thrust upon us
by the international communist conspiracy.
Enc s.
Respectfully yours,
/s/ Craig Hosmer
CRAIG HOSMER, M.C.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Note to Correspondents: (1) These documents for release: NOON - E.S.T.
Monday
February 19, 1962
(2) The study also will be the basis for a speech in the
House of Representatives by the author on Feb. 19th.
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
ORGANIZATION FOR COID WAR
by
Reg. Craig Hosmer of California
.If Secretary Robert F. McNamara is running the United States' hot war effort,
who is running our cold war effort?
The-question is unanswerable simply because the United States has no real cold
,war organization for anybody to run.
The global struggle between our way of life and communism can range in intensity
from dropping thermonuclear bombs to dropping propaganda pamphlets. Its major seg-
ments in decreasing order. of intensity are general war, limited war, sub-limited war
and cold war. X
'U.S.. national strategy has been to deter Sino-Soviet leaders from general and
limited war. Our magnificently organized military establishment consistently has
implemented that strategy by maintaining such an overwhelming military retaliatory
,capability that communist leaders have not been free to initiate general war nor
successfully to pursue limited war.
As a consequence they have waged sub-limited war and cold war with intense
.ferocity.
Sub-limited war is exemplified by the strife existing in Vietnam today. Whether
consisting of guerilla action, rioting, other forms of civil disturbance or the revol-
utionary means by which Castro siezed Cuba, sub-limited war is no more than communist
military action by proxy -- inside the borders of a victim country, carried on largely
by that country's own citizens, with arms, munitions, organizational support and
ideological goals supplied by the international communist conspiracy.
Meeting the sub united war threat is largely a military and intelligence task.
For long we neglected it. Recant organizational and functional changes in United
States military operations in Vietnam evidence serious attention now is being devoted
to neutralizing communist sub-limited war efforts.
Success here will lead to further intensification of cold war, communismts last
remaining battleground. The blunt truth is that as yet we remain woefully unprepared
to contest communism successfullly on the cold war battleground. The communist still
continue making substantial cold war gains which reduce our influence and bring our
prestige into question in various parts of the world.:'
The basic method for fighting any war, including 'cold war, is to (1) formulate
sound objectives, (2) develope supporting strategies and tactics and, (3) create,
man and support the organization required for their attainment..
The problem of properly organizing our cold war effort as a major enterprise on
a scale for victory can no longer be neglected in public discussion. The fact that
Americans, long noted for organizational talents and suffering serious cold war set-
backs for over a decade and a half, have not effectively tackled this problem to date
must be a matter of considerable surprise even to the Kremlin.
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-I DP80B01676R002800240004-4
Past ineffectual efforts toward this end are evidenced by several reorganizations
of the national security machinery of the Executive Branch. The National Security
Council was established in 1947. Its composition and advisory status are well known.
Its duty is to assess national objectives, commitments and risks, and make recommenda-
tions to the President. The President alone has the broad power and authority required
to initiate, integrate and coordinate all the many activities which together fix the
nation's cold war posture. Once a Presidential decision on a given policy has been
made in this area, it is transmitted to the various departments and agencies for action.
In an attempt to coordinate operational planning of these various governmental
units, the 'Operations Coordinating Board was established within the National Security
Council structure. Although it had the virtue of producing inter-agency government
plans to implement policy, it was ineffective to carry them out because it lacked
authority-'td penetrate the many layers of government bureaucracy blocking quick and---
coordinated action. As a result the Operations Coordinating Board was abolished.
Shortly after assuming office President Kennedy indicated his plans to carry out
personally what the Board had failed to accomplish. He indicated he would maintain
direct communication with the departments a nd'agencies and keep himself well informed
on actions taken to carry out decisions. To assist and advise him in this endeavor
he selected a small group of individuals headed by his Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.
The dismal failure of the Cuban invasion' at Bay of Pigs is but one example of the
inadequacy of this latest attempt at cold warlorganization. The President simply does
not have the time to run the cold wnr effort daily with personal attention and his
advisory group does not have the authority to, so. In addition, the set-up fails to
provide comprehensive, up-to-the-minute intelligence, communications, briefings and
analyses on which effective cold war command decisions must retie.
Perhaps the failure of Presidents Trumaniand Eisenhower to establish an adequate
cold war organization is understandable. They were products of a pre-cold war time
and political environment which accepted peace and war as well defined and meaning-
ful alternative conditions of international life.
-In contra, Mr. Kennedy has come to political maturity in. an era. during which our
world has been characterized by desperate struggles between nations in the shadowy,
grey areas of cold war. In his 1961 State of the Union MQssage he evidenced an
appreciation of the necessity to operate successfully in these areas by saying,
"...before my term has ended, we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized
and governed such as ours can endure..."
Yet,(over a year later, not-with-standing several routine organizational efforts,
including recommendation of a Department for Urban Affairs, Mr. Kennedy has still to
come to grips with the vital problem of workable organization for cold war.-'/
It is not an insoluble problem even though it involves putting together into one
task force the foreign affairs activities of more than a score of separate depart-
ments and agencies. The task force concept is ideal for cold war purposes. It can
bring together the cold war operations of otherwise unrelated governmental units under
coordinated, efficient, integrated operational control. Further, it permits them all
an opportunity to contribute to long and medium range planning and take part in flex--..
ible responsVunanticipated opportunities.
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
? -3-
Inherent in the task force concept must be mechanics to insure that..our cold war
effort has balance consistency and completeness (1) in the overall sense, (2) country
by country, and (35 in the time dimensions: present, short range and long range.
Specifically it is recommended that the President act quickly to achieve the
following cold war organizational objectives:
1. Establish a Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency (STOP) on the
lines of a permanent cold war task force which will function to define our national
:cold war objectives, devise a series of operation plans for major functional and
geographic areas according to sound strategy and tactics, and, under the President's
authority direct. cold war operations pursuant thereto.
2. Establish a Command Control Information Center (CCIC) within the structure
.of STOP to assist in the continuing daily review and direction of cold war operations.
Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency: Headed by the Vice-President
of the ni`l ited States to give it maximum executive authority, this task force should
consist of highly qualified and responsible representatives from the Under Secretary
and Agency Administrator levels. of the major functional areas of.cold war-interest:
political, economic, information,-l,. cultural, scientific, military-affairs and the
like. STOP's hard core operating units might include, but need not be limited to
the following:
a. Chief, Political Affairs (Under Secretary of State): Diplomatic Activity
(State); Domestic Information Releases (White House Press); International Labor,
.Activity (Labor); Foreign Liaison (State/CIA/USIA/FBI).
b, Chief, Economic Affairs (Treasury Under:Secretary): Financial Operations
(Treasuiy/State/1 U efense ; Commercial Operations (Commerce/Labor/Agriculture);
Agricultural Operations (Agriculture/CommerceAiD ).
c? Chief, Information Affairs (Administrator, USIA): Overseas Psychological
Opera tions`(US'IA/C Peace Corps ; Scientific Operations (NASA/AEC/Nat.Sci.Founda-
tion/USIA),
d, Chief, Cultural Affairs (Assistant Secretary of State): Cultural erations
(State/USI7-/77 HEW ; Ideological Positions (Cabinet/USIA,klhite House Press),
e, Chief, Military, Affairs (Under Secretary of Defense): Military Posture
(Defense/'joint Chiefs ; Cold War Posture (Special Evaluation Panel/CCIC); Secret
Operation, Cover & Deception (Defense/CIA).
!sddition lly, STOP's effective functioning would require a small but skilled
permanent staff which might be directed by the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, The staff's function would be to assist in long range
planning, perform daily routine supervision tasks, help dissipate bureaucratic
inertia and aid the President and other national leaders to communicate clearly and
forcefully our national cold w ar objectives and policies at home and abroad to
people on both sides of the Iron Curtain whose beliefs and aspirations coincide with
our own.
Command Control Information. Center: The permanent staff also would operate the
Commsna Control Information Center serving as a central facility to monitor world-
wide activities for both long and medium range planning and day-to-day operations.
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 a
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
Information pertaining to our own cold war activities, those of our allies and of
the Sino-Soviet bloc would be displayed concisely and currently for easy assimila-
tion. The CCIC would analyze and evaluate progress of the cold war on a continuous
basis and constantly monitor the success of our programs.- It mightbe particularly
valuable in spotting opportunities for quick, responsive actions to forward U.S.
interests as they unexpectedly developer
Information gathered and evaluated by CCIC well might be transmitted by closed
circuit television and teleprinter systems so senior representatives of departments
and agencies can be briefed, issue and receive information and monitor daily act-
ivities without physically visiting the Center. It is estimated that approximately
80 specialists will be required to man Command Control Information Center on an
around-the-clock schedule. The most modern communications, display and briefing
equipment should be furnished CCIC.
The--organization and-procedures discussled here are intended only as a broad,__
skeleton outline of the management organization tools which are missing and must
be supplied if the gaps and deficiencies in United Stites cold war efforts are to
be closed.
Just as the President alone has the broad power and control of activities
necessary for cold war oper^tions, so does he alone have the power to initiate the
organization here suggested as fundamentally , required to exercise that power and
control effectively. He should act promptly 'and decisively.
The time in which he has to act grows shorter and shorter. Continued weakness
in our cold war posture can only result in a'progressive deterioration of our mili-
tary posture. The ignominious defeat suffered by France in World War II sprang from
her concentration on Maginot Line defenses. ;'The Germans ignored them with a by-pass
move through the Low Countries. Similarly, in the struggle with communism we cannot
safely concentrate only on its military aspects and our hot war defenses, leaving
our cold war ramparts essentially disorganized and inadequately guarded. -30-
2-0216
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Ap""proved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
'ot printed at Government expense)
ULLLL U oI4Ics th
Q
of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE O'7 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
Zonre5BionaL Record
Anatomy of the Cold War
SPEECH
OF
HON. CRAIG HOSIER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .
Thursday, September 7, 1961
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Amer-
ica's awakening to the vital challenge
thrust upon us by the international Com-
munist conspiracy is one of the most
significant and encouraging events of
our time. But merely to be awakened
to the danger is one thing. Handling
it intelligently and effectively is another.
This requires a broad general under-
standing of who we are up against and
what we are up against. It requires the
relinquishment of many outdated con-
cepts no longer applicable to the world
situation today. It demands original,
hard thinking to replace them with con-
cepts that are realistic in relation to
facts as they brutally are, not as we
might wishfully think them to be.
For instance, we must accept the con-
cept of a bipolar world in which the
U.S.S.R. and the United States represent
the poles. No longer is the world the
"family of nations" conceived by late
19th and early 20th century political
thinking. Nor do the so-called uncom-
mitted nations of today possess power
of sufficient strength, moral or physical,
to sway these poles.
We must regard the international
Communist conspiracy which opposes us
as first, the force described by Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, plus second, all the
considerable human and physical re-
sources enslaved behind the Iron Cur-
tain. The two are, in fact, in combina-
tion.
This discussion seeks to define and
analyze only some of the background in-
volved, only some of the strategy and
tactics applicable, and only a few of the
cold war techniques utilized to advance
Communist objectives. Necessarily only
a few, because altogether they are as
vast as the problem itself. Hot war also
is discussed. Necessarily because hot
war and cold war are interrelated parts
of the total conflict in which we find
ourselves.
COMMUNISM'S GOAL: WORLD DO'. ZNATION
The resolve of Soviet Comm Ist ead-
ers to extend their dominatiorf ,iki-
wide-with Moscow as the seat o at ,r
608986-81139
thority-has remained unshaken for over
four decades. There were periods when
it was expedient for them not to press
this determination because of some more
urgent problem, as in World War II.
But once they have dealt with a crisis,
the Soviets waste no time in renewing
their attack. There is current evidence
of a desire by Chinese Communists to
play a larger role in directing com-
munism's expansion. Their leverage is
growing as witnessed by the Communist
bloc's intense ideological struggle over
the peaceful coexistence policy. But,
and though this may not always be the
case, it is still Moscow, not Peiping,
against which the West principally must
calculate its dangers and erect its mili-
tary and nonmilitary defenses to thwart
the master plan to install a Communist
government in every nation on earth,
with all looking to Moscow for guidance.
COMMUNIST STRATEGY: TOTAL CONFLICT
Toward achieving its ends, Communist
dogma dictates utilization of any means
which are expedient, as long as the So-
viet revolutionary base is not endan-
gered. Military force is one instrument
for carrying out this policy, and the
Communists are inhibited by no moral
restrictions from using it to gain their
ends. To them, the important factor is
that inadmissible risks must not be
undertaken. To do so would constitute
adventurism, a serious deviation from
Communist ideology.
At the same time, if within the limits
of the risks which Soviet leaders deemed
wise to take, an opportunity presented
itself to strike the United States a blow
which would remove it as the chief ob-
stacle to the Soviet goal, Soviet leaders
would consider it a sin just as serious as
the other deviation not to take advan-
tage of the opportunity.
In short, Communist doctrine places
on Communist leaders a constant re-
sponsibility to proceed by the most ex-
peditious means possible and these may
range from dropping pamphlets to drop-
ping thermonuclear bombs. The degree
of violence to be selected is that which
can gain the most advantage with the
least proportionate cost under the par-
ticular circumstances existing at the
time of decision.
THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
Thusly Communists fight toward their
goal all the time over a spectrum of con-
ict which can span the full scope of
human activities-from sports competi-
tion to thermonuclear war. They have
no set time schedule for bringing this
conflict to a successful conclusion. The
Communists are patient, willing to accept
temporary setbacks if necessary. They
conceive the conflict as a protracted one
and their patience in waging it is based
on a confidence in the ultimate victory
promised by Marxist-Leninist doctrines.
It is obvious that the spectrum of con-
flict divides itself into two major seg-
ments according to degrees of violence:
military war and nonmilitary war-hot
war and cold war. In turn, each seg-
ment resolves itself into sectors based on
the same patterns of intensity.
Cold war in its present stylized spec-
trum ranges from scientific demonstra-
tions, such as space efforts, propaganda,
and economic competition, to military-
political-humanitarian foreign aid, to
presence of forces, as in East Germany,
to threats of force, such as Khrushchev's
talk of 100-megaton nuclear bombs, to
assistance to engaged allies, as was given
to Red China in the Korean war. In the
same style hot war ranges from police
action, to limited war, to graduated re-
taliation to unrestricted war. In a gray
area between hot war and cold war fall
such modern-day instruments of aggres-
sion as rioting, border incidents, and
guerrilla warfare.
Fundamental to U.S. survival is, first
recognizing we are engaged in this total,
protracted conflict; and second, devel-
oping an irrevocable determination to
win it. But that is only the beginning.
We must organize ourselves to fight it
as a major enterprise, on a scale for vic-
tory, with all the physical and moral
resources at our command. We must
never forget that the weapons employed
against us are varied and limitless. Sub-
version, spying, sabotage, and diplomatic
perfidy are but a few illustrations. We
cannot concentrate exclusively on de-
fending against just some of the weapons
of Communist attack, leaving the ram-
parts unguarded elsewhere. We are
faced with total conflict and we must
fight that conflict in all its totality-on
all the cold war fronts at all times, on
all the hot war fronts if ever we must.
Moreover, we can never expect victory
if we fight only defensively. We must
take the initiative, bring the fight to
the enemy's own home base in cold war
just as we are prepared to do in hot war.
Doing this involves risks and it in-
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002800240604-4
2' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD L t
volves escalating up the scale of violence WHAT WILL DETER THE SOVIETS? struction of life and property during two
whenever required. The risks so in- Determining what will deter the So- world wars, as well as a costly and hu-
volved must always be calculated against viets can be learned from the answer to miliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese
the risks of not taking action of suffi- another question: How much destruc- war. What would deter them is not nec-
cient intensity to achieve our purposes. tion to their homeland are Soviet leaders essarily what would deter us.
Often timidity is more risky, in the end, prepared to risk in order to achieve their Another factor which has bearing on
than boldness. In any event, our enemy ultimate goal if cold war methods do not our question is Soviet civil defense.
must be convinced we treasure our free- succeed or, in their opinion, they are too Until late 1953, the Soviets made no
dom, our way of life, and our country slow? preparation for civil defense in a nu-
sufficiently to take the degree of action obviously, only the Soviet, leaders clear war. Today their effort is the most
necessary for preserving them. Other- themselves can answer that question. It extensive to be found anywhere in the
wise he is left free to achieve his ends is doubtful if even they have arrived at world. The effort which the Soviet gov-
via the piecemeal surrender route of it precisely. It is likely that within lim- ernment has made in this direction indi-
bluff, bluster, and blackmail. its the answer will vary from time to cates it takes a realistic attitude toward
DETERRING HOT WAR time because of the Communist doctrine the possibility of Soviet participation in
The willingness and ability to fight the holding that whatever is dictated by his- a general nuclear war. However, its
hottest kind of war, if survival depends torical circumstances is true party line objective should not be misconceived.
upon it, feeds back into considerations at any particular moment and shall be There is no evidence of a newly acquired
regarding the taking of all kinds of implemented. benevolence toward human life amongst
actions less in degree of violence. This It is clear that Soviet leaders, if it can Kremlin bosses greater than amongst
western
is because the hottest kind of war is the be avoided, have no desire to become leaders in the ratio of Soviet to
western civil defense efforts. A char-
reference point from which decisions are involved in nuclear war, either growing acteristic of communise. is callousness
calculated for the taking of all lesser out of surprise attack or by escalation toward human life. Primary interest is
military and nonmilitary actions in rela- of limited war. Khrushchev often re- not in saving human lives per se, but in
tions between nations. fers to the deadliness and horror of gen- preserving the skills, so important to
During the Lebanon crisis the landing eral nuclear war in his speeches. A lead- Soviet industry and strength, repre-
of U.S. Marines and presence of U.S. ing Soviet military analyst, Maj. Gen. sented by them.
Naval Forces evidenced a U.S. determi- Nicolai A. Talensky, recently;' wrote a Nevertheless, assuming reasonable ef-
sary, and willingness to fight, if neces- widely publicized article pointing out the Never
he civil defense program, ef
sary, to keep the Communists from tak- futility of resorting to nuclear war to fc fver th e a
strike, If civil def of the th 50
ing over this part of the world. The decide political controversies. If e 8concurrently percent defense p with
Soviets, in face of this clear evidence of How accurately such expressions re- Soviet result It million first is of
e 50
the 160 Soviet
intention to resist piecemeal surrender, flect Soviet military philosophy and how million people stfhth this:
backed away. Put another way, they much they reflect the long standing So- population centers are largest evacuated to non-
nuefalealfallout pro-
were deterred from pursuing the course viet propaganda campaign aimed at nu- target
of aggression in this area they had em- clear disarmament of the West cannot, trget areas with tion reasonable from sn r r toetal o
barked upon. Had we not taken the risk of course, be determined. It would be min would - a be be cut factor fr from five. 50 million 10
of displaying this show of power, they dangerous error, in any event, to assume ionof
is s a lncould have achieved supremacy in the Soviet leaders would not make :a sudden Ten but, in million U.S.S.R. lives
experience, large g n number,
means
Mideast. The consequence of that would massive attack against the United States price
be to put us in a situation far more risky if their calculation of relative strength a a prohibitive or gcprithan proceeding as we did. By way of convinced them it could be done without to pay de in achieve even en a a crippling 195Prof. Warren
contrast, we failed to provide air cover serious risk of disaster to the Soviet rev- A study ma
Princeton for the Cuban invasion in the spring of olutionary base. W. Prof concluded that
lion
1961 even though the risk involved was Such a situation could arise if the rel- the Eason Soviet d the World War II Union
casualties, sufuffefered abou25 t million
ion
per-
small. As a consequence, Castro ative balance between forces'' suddenly
achieved even greater power over Cuba tipped in the Soviet's favor' through cent of total population. This followed
and the resulting situation is more risky some scientific or technological break- the purges of the 1920's and 1930's which
than before. through. It could arise should the accounted, by some estimates, for al-
The same principles apply to deter- United States allow its deterrent system most another 25 million deaths.
ring Communist leaders from attempting to deteriorate badly. It could arise if Physical damage of all kinds from
to achieve their goals by starting all- the U.S. position became so weakened Nazi military operations also was mas-
out nuclear war and attacking the United by repeated cold war and limited war sive. In addition to nonindustrial losses,
States. Our deterrent system must defeats that retaliation would be made the official Soviet historical review of
plainly be capable of inflicting unaccept- quixotic and unbelievable. Our only World War II estimates 40 percent of the
able damage on the enemy. If he be- security against surprise nuclear attack U.S.S.R.'s industrial capacity was totally
lieves we will use it for that purpose is balanced strength, which includes a destroyed, a figure generally accepted by
if he does attack, he will be deterred retaliatory capacity so swift, so certain Western students of the war's con-
from doing so. and so deadly it rules out the possibility. sequences.
The very success of a system deterring How deadly? Despite these huge losses of life and
all out nuclear war makes more likely WHAT PUNISHMENT WILL SOVIETS ACCEPT? the enormous damage inflicted on the
the resort to lesser violence in the form Soviet economy, the rate of production
of limited war and intensified cold war. One way of arriving at some under- in the U.S.S.R. by 1950 was greater than
standing of how much destruction Soviet
Thus skeletonizing limited war conven- leaders might be willing to exchange for at any time in its history. Even grant-
tional land, sea and air capability by gaining their objective is by making ing some increase on the value placed on
overexpenditure on deterrence cannot be historical comparisons. For one thing, human life by reason of improved living
tolerated. the standard of living is substantially standards, it seems reasonable to assume
Neither can the important third front, higher in the United States than in the that Soviet Communist leaders would ac-
nonmilitary warfare, be neglected if our Soviet Union, and the farther a civiliza- cept punishment at least equivalent to
overall defense posture is to succeed in tion progresses from its primitive begin- World War II in exchange for eliminat-
thwarting Communist ambitions. We nings, the more value is placed on hu- ing the United States as a checkmate to
can freeze to death in cold war as easily man life. Also, the continental United their goal.
as we can burn to death in a hot war. States has enjoyed nearly a century of WHAT PUNISHMENT MUST UNITED STATES BE
In any event, the cost of creating and stable government without suffering the ABLE TO INFLICT?
maintaining a deterrent force is ex- consequences of invasion or attack by Here then, is an absolute minimum
tremely high. For the sake of our na- outside military forces. During this limit for U.S. deterrent capability: A
tional economic health it is important period the Russians have had a very second strike ability to inflict damage
that money is not spent unnecessarily in violent nationwide revolution and civil equivalent to the combined effect of
this direction. war and have experienced extensive de- erasing 14 percent of the Soviet Union's
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
population and 41 percent of its indus-
trial capacity.
That these are damage equivalent fig-
ures and not the outline for a targeting
pattern must be understood. Aside from
the moral questions involved in threaten-
ing death to such large numbers of peo-
ple, over 29 million in a population of
some 209 million, the combination of
civil defense and natural dispersal over
81/2 million square miles of territory
make attempting it utterly impractical.
For this reason a deterrent system tar-
geted against population would not be
believable and would fail to deter. Fur-
ther, even if it were practical to carry
out a death threat against 14 percent of
Soviet citizens, there is no good reason
to believe Soviet leaders would not will-
ingly trade that many-or 15 or 20 or 50
percent or even more-if the deal guar-
anteed them world supremacy. Equally
clear is the physical futility of basing
deterrence on a major threat to the agri-
cultural economy of this vast land
stretching across two continents.
All this by no means implies that with-
in the limits of peacetime budgets a
steady, stable deterrent to Soviet button-
pushers cannot be achieved. In the final
analysis what Soviet leaders fear most is
impairment of the means by which they
seek to accomplish the Communist goal
of world domination. Their principal in-
strumentalities for exercising power on
the international scale are first, the
Soviet military establishment, and sec-
ond, the Soviet industrial economy.
Consequently, a positive U.S. second
strike capability targeted at crippling
these to an unacceptable degree will ef-
fectively deter. Moreover, these are the
targets within the U.S.S.R. particularly
vulnerable to nuclear impairment by the
present and projected combinations of
manned aircraft and missile weapons
systems making up U.S. strategic forces. _
U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY EFFECTIVELY
DETERS
U.S. capability obviously goes far
above that percentage. This is because
an adequate, flexible transportation
system is essential to any nation seeking
to exercise the role of a major world
power. It is a prerequisite for effective
utilization of military forces and vital to
bring in raw materials, supply power, and
move out the finished goods of an in-
fluential industrial society.
The Soviet transportation system is
characterized by an especially heavy re-
liance on railroads, 85 percent of all ton-
nage, compared to 50 percent for the
United States. About 10 percent is
moved on inland waterways and the re-
maining 5 percent by highways, pipe-
lines, coastal shipping, and air transport
combined. The estimated number of
major centers fed by the national rail
network is 160. Only 160 nuclear knock-
out blows need be pressed home against
this rail system at freely chosen, less de-
fended locations to fragmentize the
U.S.S.R.'s interdependent society into as
many cutoff and isolated segments.
It is clear that U.S. strategic
forces are fully capable of deterring
Soviet leaders from initiating nuclear
war. We possess the determination to
strike back without hesitation and the
608986-81139
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ' 3
capability of destroying that which they Communist cause is just and any action
know they cannot afford to lose. The to resist it is unjust. Thus, subversion
real question is how much more deterrent and sabotage of free world institutions
capability are we buying than we really are Communist instruments of peaceful
need? coexistence and revolts such as in Al-
DETERRED FROM HOT WAR, SOVIETS WAGE COLD geria and Latin America are encouraged
WAR under the guise of national liberation
Thus, deterred from quick explosive movements. These are deemed just acts
victory, the Soviets and their allies in in- the e fr wars, to be fully supported by
ternational communism have turned to th Kr et emlin.
s lend weight Mos-
measures
measures short of all-out nuclear war Recent contention that their current
advance toward communism's goal. cow's contention presently policy
While
While carrying on a general nonmilitary ti, on of poli pticaall-econ nsew mi effective y substitu-
offensive against the free world-aimed warfare at weakening its physical ability as well warfarpre for military force.
as destroying its will to resist-on a THE BERLIN CRISIS
geographical basis they are employing a The current Berlin crisis is a classic
three-prong strategy calculated to seg- example of Communist strategy and tac-
ment the free world and isolate its parts. tics in waging cold war to gain their
The prongs are thrusting: objectives. For months Khrushchev's
First. Over the pole through Iceland truculent belligerency built up tensions
and down the Atlantic-to be aided by over Berlin. Fear was fed on fear. Then
the large submarine fleet-for the pur- with dramatic ruthlessness he torpedoed
pose of cutting off Europe from North the Geneva A-test-ban talks and an-
America; pounced Soviet test resumption. He
Second. Down from the soft under- coupled this with terror talk of 100 mil-
belly, through the Mideast, into Africa lion million ton K-bombs-K for Khru-
and spanning the Atlantic to Cuba-to shchev. All aimed at creating worldwide
sever North from South America and Eu- hysterical fear in hopes of euchering
rope from the Far East; and
Third. Out from Communist China
through Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Thai-
land, Cambodia, the Malay Peninsula,
and hopefully turning the corner and
proceeding up the Philippines and Ja-
pan-to cut off the Americas from the
Far East and isolate India and Aus-
tralasia.
The importance which Communist
leaders attach to securing these geo-
graphical areas is evidenced by their will-
ingness to escalate considerably up the
scale of violence where they are con-
cerned. Limited war by proxy in Korea,
guerrilla fighting in Laos, the revolution
in Cuba, civil disorders in Iraq, the
Congo, and elsewhere, are examples.
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Peaceful coexistence is what Khru-
shchev chooses to call this present state
of affairs. We call it cold war or non-
military war. Khrushchev says it is
merely a form of intense economic, po-
litical, and ideological struggle between
the socialist camp and what he calls the
aggressive forces of imperialism. This,
he says, is a better way of achieving
world communism than war. But what
he means is that today it better advances
the Communist cause to proceed by non-
military warfare than it does by military
warfare-tomorrow it may be different,
if tomorrow's circumstances are differ-
ent. Even under today's circumstances
peaceful coexistence as waged by the So-
viets must be understood as neither
peaceful nor aimed at coexisting for
one instant longer than necessary.
Except for all-out war between major
powers, in the final analysis, it amounts
to a no-holds-barred conflict for world
domination played under Soviet ground
rules.
.
One of these rules is that the world is These are the stakes in the Berlin
divided into the peace zone-Communist crisis. These are the reasons why Mr. ,
territory-and the war zone-non-Com- Khrushchev intensifies the cold war to
munist territory. And the contest shall the hilt and threatens a nuclear holo-
be carried on entirely in the war zone. caust. They are also the reasons why he
Another is that all action to forward the will not go beyond the brink and start a
concessions which will give him control
of Berlin as a step toward control of Ger-
many as a step toward control of all
Europe.
Why the Kremlin plays this bold game
of nuclear blackmail is simple. It has
little to do with Communist ideological
abstractions and our resistance to it has
little to do with democratic idealism. It
is because Berlin is the political key.
West Germany is the industrial lock.
And West Europe is the economic gate
to the world.
To control the world by force requires
a superior economic-industrial base in
support of arms. To control the world
by economic domination requires a su-
perior economic-industrial base in sup-
port of an unfaltering flow of capital
goods and trade. By 1970 the estimated
value of all goods and services, gross na-
tional product, and thus the most com-
prehensive measure of productive ac-
tivity will be:
Billions
West Europe-------------------------
$800
United States------------------------
740
Soviet bloc---------------------------
630
Underdeveloped nations---------------
300
The Soviet Union now knows it can-
not surpass West Europe and the United
States in the industrial capacity needed
to support an arms race or a protracted
armed conflict.
The Soviet Union now knows it can-
not, even by the most stringent denial-
industrial growth without public con-
sumption-match the combined eco-
nomic resources of the United States and
West Europe.
But the Soviet Union knows that with
the industrial plant, economic resources,
scientists and technicians of West Ger-
many and West Europe it can control
the world
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 r
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
nuclear holocaust. If he does all Eu-
rope's industrial capacity will be reduced
to ashes. There will be no $800 billion
gross national product of Europe to
strengthen his empire. He must obtain
these assets undamaged, in running
order and with the people to run them.
If we but keep our cold war wits and
act accordingly, the crisis of Berlin can
be passed without loss and without dam-
age. Mr. Khrushchev will be relegated
to another way and another day to seek
his objectives.
COLD WAR
Unfortunately these cold war wits of
ours I have mentioned are, at this point,
neither sharp nor plentiful. Our enemy
has 40 years leadtime in knowhow and
experience in fighting cold war. There
are many things we must do and do
quickly, not only to surmount the crisis
of Berlin, but other crises to come again
and again in the future from aggressive
actions by our relentless challenger.
I have mentioned that we must actu-
ally recognize we are now engaged in a
conflict in which the stakes are freedom
and national existence itself. This, the
cold war, need not necessarily be a mere
preliminary bout to a hotter main event.
It could well be the main event itself and
the loser will have no second chance. I
have mentioned that we must develop
an irrevocable determination to win this
contest. Having developed it, we must
broadcast that determination to the
world and enlist the help of all men
everywhere who cherish freedom in this
great battle for its survival.
Americans are not unique in their de-
sire for freedom, only in their vast power
which causes people throughout the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
'
country and its resources. It' is not our
enemy. Country B is the poor country,
the horsemeat country, which) sometimes
cannot even supply its capital city with
food and fuel. Our enemy is ;U.S.S.R. A,
the international Communistlconspiracy
of an elite few who have enslaved coun-
try B and extort from it the wherewithal
to present the illusion of a large and
powerful society and the false image of
a new system to better mankind's lot.
In reality, country A is no stronger
than country B. This we must under-
stand ourselves. And to the people of
U.S.S.R. B, China B and all the other
B countries-the captive nations-we
must drive home that they have friends
outside the Iron Curtain who seek to
share with them their freedom.
WHOLE THINKING
As a people we tend to cling to a kind
of fragmentized thought process in in-
ternational affairs which categorizes
peace and war into two separable states,
which, in fact, no longer exist. We live
in a world which is neither at war in the
classic definition of the word1or at peace.
It is in conflict-a new and deadly kind
of conflict-and we must think in terms
of its totality and the wide spectrum of
actions over which it is being fought.
The Reds do not make this mistake.
They are realistic, if nothing else. Their
thinking is as total and integrated as
their objectives are clear and precise.
CRITERION FOR SACRIFICE AND EXPENDITURE
There is. however, apparent from this
fiasco one absolute criterion about which
as important as anything else toward
achieving understanding of what we are
against and how to go about combating
it.
In briefest form, these objectives can
be summarized this way: Ours, peace
and friendship in freedom; theirs, peace
and friendship in communism.
Only a word of difference-but they
are poles apart. One states a positive
objective, the other a negative one. One
states an indefinable objective, the other
a definable one.
Since Karl Marx first put pen to paper,
double meanings for stock words and
phrases have been standard tools in
Communist dialectic. I have purpose-
ly stated these objectives in these double
meaning words to reemphasize the
tricky business of Red rhetoric of which
we must beware.
Peace has come to mean, rather than
a state of tranquillity amongst nations,
a misty goal as legendary as the Seven
Cities of Cibola. In terms of relation-
ships between nations, friendship hardly
can be recognized as meaning what the
dictionary describes as a "mutual re-
gard cherished by kindred minds."
When Nikita Khrushchev came to this
country in 1959 seeking "peace and
friendship" he blew up a considerable
storm on this "sea of semantic dis-
order." Freely translated, this is what
he meant when he talked of seeking
"peace and friendship" with the United
States:
I seek a Communist United States of
America. Our dogma says capitalism
world to look to the United States for
leadership in the contest to preserve it.
These people, too, want to fight effec-
tively in the common cause. They, too,
have their worries, their doubts, their
fears that the time of freedom is running
short. But until the United States
moves, and moves decisively, as a world
leader should, others cannot be expected
to go it alone in these battles.
As such a call to nonmilitary arms I
recently introduced House Joint Resolu- conceptions about the implementation MORALITIES
tion 517. It is patterned after the decla- of our external objectives, we irrationally Further, Communist rationale places
ration of war following the Japanese tend toward the opposite extreme when no moral restrictions whatsoever on their
attack on Pearl Harbor, but declares there is no shooting going on. selection of these techniques and actions.
conflict rather than war. It states that This kind of inflexibility is not char- Starting with the premise that capital-
the international Communist conspiracy acteristic of the Kremlin. Not only in ism breeds wars and thus must be rooted
has committed repeated acts of non- expenditure, but right down to Khru- out and destroyed to achieve peace-
military aggression against us and our shchev's alternating smiles and frowns to anything, however immoral in and of it-
allies, formally declares the state of non- probe our weaknesses, there is exhibited self, when used to this end is moral.
military conflict thus thrust upon us, a quick effective flexibility. This, not- Lying, cheating, betrayal, murder-the
authorizes the President to employ the withstanding our fervent'', eagerness to entire list of perfidies-are thus ap-
entire power of the United States to accept a monolithic concept of the oper- proved weapons in the Communist ar-
carry on nonmilitary conflict, conclud- ations of the Communist apparatus. senal, to be used freely whenever,
ing: "and to bring the conflict to a suc- We must learn that what will be wherever, and however they will imple-
cessful termination all the resources of achieved, not whether it is achieved dur- ment its objectives.
the country are hereby pledged by the ing hot war or cold war, is the true By way of contrast, our own external
Congress of the United States." standard for our efforts and sacrifice objectives basically represent attainment
There are several important consid- during the protracted conflict. for all mankind of those enlightened pre-
erations that are often overlooked in dis- COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD OBJECTIVES cepts of morality, freedom, dignity of the
cussing cold war and how to wage it that COMPARED individual, inherent human rights, and
I now propose to touch upon. Now it becomes logical to examine so on that can hardly be defined other
INDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY what is to be achieved, and to compare than as: "The best and highest values
We must clearly identify the enemy. the external objectives of the Commu- which Western civilization have to offer."
There are two U.S.S.R.'s. Only one is nist world and our own. ! Perhaps real Because of the inherently nebulous
the enemy. U.S.S.R. B is the people, the understanding of the contrasts here is nature of our objectives, they are in-
608986-81139
breeds wars. Tear up your capitalistic Con-
there can be no argument--only under- stitution, turn communist, and we'll have
standing-which, again, it appears that peace. One doesn't oppose his friend's de-
the Reds possess and we do:not. sire. We desire to rule the world. Be
It is, simply: the efficacy with which a friendly-stop bucking us.
particular action will implement a na- On another occasion the Red dictator
tion's external objective should deter- summed up communistic objectives more
mine the amount of money and man- bluntly and less dialectically in the
power to be expended upon it-not the phrase: "We will bury you."
irrelevant consideration of whether the That is a clearly stated and certain
if ever there was one. The
ction is being taken in time of "war" objective
,
a
or time of "peace." clarity with which it can be stated is of
Our country will accept' every sacri- obvious value in the day-to-day, week-
fice in resources, men and money when to-week, month-to-month, year-to-year
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
5
capable of precise definition. As a con- own daily 5 to 7 p.m. metropolitan area sibility of nuclear war must be faced.
sequence, selection of techniques and evacuation problems. Second, hundreds of Russian military
actions to implement them can never be Civil defense is thus, in fact, a cold books and articles translated by the
accomplished with calculated precision, war weapon of equivalent value to say, Pentagon all reveal the U.S.S.R. thinks
And, because of the moral characteris- the DEW line-Pinetree line warning in such terms as a matter of course.
tics of these objectives, we are limited in systems and anti-missile missiles. But Third, a Johns Hopkins University study
selecting means to implement them contrast our "bit-thinking" relative ex- for the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
which in and of themselves fall within penditures on civil defense in comparison mittee warns that the United States is
the range of Western civilization's to these warning systems. Moreover, open to nuclear attack. Fourth, Con-
standards for individual and national civil defense is a moral type of action gress appropriated almost $45 billion for
morality. which is not denied to us. Failing to national defense, which included sub-
The advantage of precise objectives recognize its cold war possibilities, we stantial amounts for maintaining our
and unlimited choice in means in have almost completely neglected it and own nuclear arsenal operative.
achieving them is great. given our challenger a decisive advantage FEASIBILITY OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR
NEGATIVISM on this rampart of the total conflict. Mathematician Herman Kahn recent-
Nor During the hearings in 1959 the Joint
can the advantages of conducting Committee on Atomic Energy completed a 2-year study for the Rand
a negative campaign be underestimated. attempted Corp. and concluded that thermonuclear
It is always easier to criticize, tear down, to estimate the effect on the United war is feasible.
and destroy than it is to accomplish States should we suffer a surprise nuclear The facts and assumptions on which
constructive action. `match the way the attack totaling 1,500 megatons. It found Dr. Kahn reached his decision were cor-
prosperity issue is handled in that 60 million U.S. casualties would re-
political suit-one-third of our population-48 roborated fully during our Joint Atomic
campaigns-it is not so much a positive Committee hearings last year which took
promise of a chicken in every pot as it is million killed and 12 million injured. several days' testimony from expert wit-
a negative warning of "no chicken in the Yet, at the same hearings a Navy scien- nesses regarding the effect of a hypoth-
pot if you elect the other fellow in- tist testified that simple fallout shelters ecated nuclear attack on the United
stead of me." Millions of dollars of a giving protection against nuclear radia- States followed by our nuclear retaliation
certain toothpaste have been sold not on tion by a factor of 1,000 can be built at a against the attacker.
the merits of the product, but upon the cost of only $100 per person. These would Briefly, the most pertinent thermo-
demerits of having bad breath. The be sufficient, he estimated, to avoid two nuclear war facts are these:
slogan about "a thinking man's cigar- out of every three of the hypothecated Genetic effects: An increase in chil-
ette" is na postive appeal to the Intel- casualties. dren born seriously defective of about 25
ette is not there are too few of them fora In short, for just 1 year's cost of the
U.S. farm subsidy program, $6 billion, 100cof all from the current 5 r level of 4 per lectuals no
mass t to be-
rtagged as stupid for dragging shelters could be built that would pre- large penalty births itpwould have to be 100. is a
out somebody else's brand. vent 40 million surprise attack casual- paid through 30 to 40 generations. But
In short, the contrast between the ties-avoid 32 million deaths and 8 mil- it is far from annihilation.
Communist and the lion injuries. Coupled with workable
C objectives nd the free sree worlds between the
and terms
actions evacuation procedures, this 662/3 percent Medical problems: Bone cancer, leu-
of and of casualty rate could well be kemia, and other life-shortening effects
to implement them is simply this: upped to the 80-percent figure I have of internal and external radiation would
Communism: Clearly defined negative estimated for the U.S.S.R. civil defense amount to 1 to 2 years for lighter ex-
objective. No restriction on techniques program. posures and 5 to 10 years for heavier ex-
and actions for implementation. I leave posures. In any case, life will go on.
Free world: Nebulously dposi- you to your own speculation
tive objective. Restrictions defined e how far adrift in the sea of semantic dis- Economic recuperation: Assuming
tive s and actions Restrictions icons o tech- ttech order we are when we take civil defense casualties in the 60 million range and
Understanding our problem thus re- to mean only what the dictionary may semitotal physical destruction of the 53
quires ercognition that w start out with define the words to mean. I also leave standard metropolitan areas, expect full
there unavoidable handicaps : to your speculation how great a part recuperation; that is, restoration of im-
Fies imprecision handicaps
objectives; sec- our reserve forces, marking time in al- mediate preattack gross national prod-
most every city and hamlet of our coup- uct within 5 to 10 years. This is far from
ond, restriction on imnlemen+a+ion
;
Although the foregoing handicaps are vis the international Communist threat BETTER RED THAN DEAD?
unavoidable, there are very many courses if they were realistically put to work pre- Disposing of the depressingly cowardly
of cold war action that we are not re- paring an adequate U.S. civil defense and unrealistic "better Red than dead"
striated from taking, should be takin effort. philosophy requires us to get out of the
but, because of our gfuzzy con- A good deal of resistance to spending rut of the 1,500 megaton, mass-destruc-
but, use of our
are generally l against, con- money on civil defense as well as some tion Hollywood movie script--congres-at w cep io
not n taking of wh. Foe example: of the other necessary actions we must sional hearing's pattern for a moment
take for survival stems from those who and think about some other possibilities
CIVIL DEFENSE A COLD WAR WEAPON argue that thermonuclear war is neither should the Communists really decide the
Earlier the very substantial Soviet civil believable nor feasible, so basing any day has come to push the button.
defense effort was mentioned. It was efforts on the possibility of it occurring A wholly depopulated, totally de-
estimated to be sufficiently effective to are senseless. Resistance also comes for stroyed United States would serve only
enable them to reduce casualties by 80 others who argue that such a war would one Communist purpose: Elimination of
percent in case the Soviet homeland be so terribly destructive that we should the opposite pole of a bipolar world and
suff ers attack. surrender rather than fight it. In short, accomplish their one world, a Commu-
Thus Soviet civil defense constitutes they say, "it is better to be Red than nist one, objective. But it would be done
a major dulling of the deterrence capa- dead." It is now my purpose to expose at the price of denying to them a num-
bility of our retaliatory bomber and mis- the fallacies of these arguments. ber of things they could put to advan-
sile strikeback forces. That is, it makes BELIEVABILITY OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR tageous use. Recalling their attribute of
it less costly for the Soviets to initiate We may quite agree that thermo- whole thinking, we should at least con-
war and thus operates as a factor en- nuclear war is horrible to contemplate template other possibilities for action
couraging them to do so. This situation and that every intelligent effort should they may be considering in their stra-
also presents monumental possibilities in be made to avoid it. But it is feasible tegic thoughts.
connection with nuclear blackmail. This and unless we are willing to submit to For instance, they could utilize the
is adequately illustrated by hypothecat- nuclear blackmail and capitulate to the production of our machine tool factories,
ing a full-scale Soviet civil defense evac- Communists, we must so regard it. our steel furnaces, and certain of our
uation timed in coordination with an "or Within the recent past: First, the other industrial capacities. All, of
else" ultimatum, taken in context of our Rockefeller study concluded that the pos- course, assuming selected trained slave
608986-81139
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 w
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-l DP80BO1676ROO2800240004-4
6' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
labor survived to operate them. They do could look forward to the same fate suf- non-Communist governments. It is safe
not need our oil or chemical production, fered by their German counterparts fol- to say that those remaining unbroken
for example, but they would be glad to lowing World War II. Note many slave by the Kremlin are only those which ex-
dismantle the undamaged plants and doctors would be needed either, to tend pediency has not yet dictated the break-
haul them back for use in their own the few slave laborers left operating ing.
country as they did with so many Ger- plants and facilities of value to the Treaty violation, as practiced by the
man factories. I suppose quite an in- conqueror. Communists, has two facets:
ventory could be made-and probably INDIVIDUAL'S SURVIVAL TEST UNDER First. The conventional breach of ex-
has been made in the Kremlin-along COMMUNISM isting treaties whenever, because of
these lines. This hypothecation of mass murder changed circumstances, they no longer
HYPOTHECATED COMMUNIST ATTACK could go on and on. I think I have said serve its current purpose; and
Second. The .more Machiavellian
Assuming so, the Soviet move might enough as preface to the proposition practice of f deliberately seekking treaties
well be one calculated to induce sur- that all you need to do to estimate Your prainvctice ly s e ing re the
render with the least possible material chance of survival if the Reds ever took non-Communist involving immediate signatory co c sn exchange
damage and personnel casualties, then to over is honestly to answer the questions: for delayed Communist voided go about the business of mass murder Is what I think OK with the Commu- which are subsequently st cod by fors
and destruction on a selective basis after- nists? Is what I do any value in a Com- mal or informal treaty violation at the
ward. monist regime? time performance is called for.
It might go something like this: Think it over. Such Communist of perfidy is
Strike terror with a few nuclear IF THE REDS TOOK OVER: U.S. CASUALTY a regrettable Come unt of lomati perfi lis
bombs-the horrors of nuclear war prop- ESTIMATES that cannot safely be ignored. It must
aganda background already has been I have tried estimates for this from be recognized as a dangerous pitfall in
laid for that-but forego the all-out at- population employment statistics, and any and all negotiations between East
tack. Damage communication facilities when you include the family along with and West. It must be accepted as a
as little as possible so that where panic the employed person, which you must do, limitation on talks, conferences, and ne-
is created, it can be communicated else- and count about 10 million deaths from gotiations as a means toward achieving
where and infect other parts of the the initial bombs, nerve gas, germ war- a stable world order, based on respect
country. Delve into the unknown, it is fare, and the like, the total U.S. casual- for, and conformity with, international
always more terrifying than the known. ties start at a low of around 60 million law.
Strange, horrifying and morale cracking and run as high as 100 million dead Realistically citing the demonstrated
nerve gases might be released by infll- within 12 months following a Red take- disregard by the Communists of their
trated saboteurs and fifth columnists. over. pledges as one of the greatest obstacles
Shockingly hideous physical and psy- Americans have a personal stake in to success in substituting the rule of law
chological illnesses might be induced by this thing all right-it is their lives. for rule by force, former President Eisen-
germ warfare. Avoid destruction of Even if the Communists took over with- hower declared a basic rule for Western
Washington, D.C., so a Government will out firing a shot, there still would not be self-preservation in his 1959 State of the
exist to surrender as panic, terror, and a choice between being "Red" or "dead." Union message by saying:
hysteria mount in increasing crescendo The sooner we understand it the better. We have learned the bitter lesson that in-
to demand it. The price tag on surrender in terms of ternational agreements, historically con-
Then follow with a military occupation lives, freedom, and every`,' other way is sidered by us as sacred, are regarded in
to carry out what, for lack of a better much greater than the price tag on fight- Communist doctrine and in practice to be
name ing and winning the protracted conflict. mere scraps of paper. As a consequence, we
, I call selective genocide. Gene- can have no confidence in any treaty to
tide is defined as the systematic extermi- But, say some, there is ,a third alter- which the Communists are a party, except
nation of whole racial, political, and cul- native to fighting or surrender that is where such a treaty provides within itself
tural groups. Here we are dealing with open to us and should be used. It is the for self-enforcing mechanisms.
such a systematic extermination as it alternative of negotiation. We should self -enforcement pro-
inspection-Eisenhower called for are neces-
applies to: negotiate our differences with the Com- The cedures
First. Occupational groups which do munists. It is true that ordinary nego-
not contribute to the needs of the tiation is a third alternative. But only sary because the process of negotiation
Communists; in instances where both sides are will- and agreement inherently involves con-
Second. Nonproductive persons; and ing to negotiate, willing to forego some cessions. Unless matched by equivalent
Third. All persons philosophically of their demands as a price for peace- Communist bloc concessions any West-
hostile to the regime. ful settlement, and willing to keep the ern concessions can represent only steps
Selective genocide was carried out promises made. Although Communists away from, not toward, the goal of sue-
ruthlessly in Russia itself when the are willing to negotiate, they are seldom cessful conclusion of the protracted con-
Communists seized power. It happened willing to negotiate at any cost which flict for they would constitute a further
in China. It happened in Hungary. It involves foregoing their ultimate goal whittling away of an already weakened
is an accepted Communist power tech- of world domination. In fact, they Western position.
nique and would certainly be used if have, since the beginning, pursued a cal- Equivalency, however, is not meas-
they took over here. culated course of insincere negotiation ured by the paper magnitude of mutual
The pattern is all too clear. In the wherever it would forward that goal. concessions. Concessions by the Soviet
initial phases they send agents out to This is not to say that no negotiation at bloc must be self-enforcing upon them.
stir up resistance movements and march all is possible, but to warn that only is Unless this is so, they will never be
the nonconformists against preposi- it possible in those limited cases where honored to the impediment of the ad-
tioned guns and tanks as they did in some factor in addition to good faith vancement of international communism.
Budapest. That does a pretty complete, alone is present to compel Communists The quid pro quo of the agreement's
to keep their treaty promises. words is an illusion without this inher-
most and dirty job of getent eid of TREATY VIOLATION ent safeguard. Without it, no agree-
. antigovernment leader- ment "relaxing tensions" as a "first step"
ship. p They dump the ill, , the the aged, the Summed up masterfully by the distin- ward peace, as the emotional agree-
insane, all the military and like groups guished international lawyer, Adm. Ches- meat goes, is a step toward peace as the
into concentration camps where starva- ter Ward, the Communist philosophy on West understands it. It is a step toward
tion and disease soon eliminate them. treaties is this: peace as the Hungarian freedom fight-
Lawyers, ministers, teachers, farmers al- Communist dogma insists that promises, ors were savagely taught it.
ways go this way, too, when the Reds like piecrust, are made to be broken. Whom
take over. No bankers, insurance men, the Communists would destroy, they first INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS CONTRASTED
invite to coexist, and offer a nonaggression As the West understands it, the solemn
advertising executives, newspapermen, or pact. observance of international obligations
even file clerks would be required by the
Red regime, so they would be extermi- In its 40-year history, the Soviet Union is the backbone of international law and
nated, too. Scientists and engineers has signed over 2,000 agreements with underlies settlement of differences be-
608986-81139
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-IDP80B01676R002800240004-4
 w
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ' 7
tween nations without resort to war. ing our own defensive weapons stock- A personal illustration concerning this
As the Communists understand it, the pile. Revelation to the world of their last statement: While in Russia in 1959
timely breach of international obliga- total hypocrisy by firing off a series of I attempted to discuss the brutalities
tions is simply another expedient weapon tests-obviously in long preparation un- committed by the Red army in Hungary.
in their protracted conflict arsenal, and der cloak of the Geneva talks-was a No Russian ever heard of them, nor
international law is only a "shell game" small price to pay for the advantages would any believe what I said. Yet all
for playing on a worldwide scale. they gain thereby. would tell you for hours how the "brutal,
This is the basis of Stalin's observa- An obvious advantage is the jump it beastial, U.S. Marines aggressed against
tion regarding relations with non-Com- will give the Soviets over the West in the defenseless people of Lebanon at the
munist countries that: nuclear weaponry. A less obvious, but behest of Wall Street millionaires."
Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than perhaps greater, advantage calculated They also told me again and again that
dry water or wooden iron. by Kremlin minds is nuclear blackmail the United States was blocking a nuclear
And from the standpoint of Western in connection with the Berlin crisis. test ban treaty by demanding that it in-
concepts of morality, it is the basis for Coupled with the already high tensions clude inspection and enforcement proce-
the Senate Internal Security Subcom- generated by Berlin, "terror talk" of a dures to insure compliance. "The
mittee's evaluation: 100-megaton super-bomb plus new fall- U.S.S.R.," they told me with straight
You must be a liar, a cheat, and probably out in the. atmosphere is supposed to faces, "always lives up to its treaties."
a spy before you can represent a Communist generate such hysteria in the world that - SUBVERSION
nation in international diplomacy. You concessions to the Reds will come out of
must have no more regard for honor when negotiations over the issue.
you sign an agreement on behalf of your Aside from the quite apparent fact that
country than a forger does when he puts a the only way to handle blackmail is to
name on a check. resist it and the only way to surmount a
Communist contempt for international bluff is to call it, there is a more basic
law and decency is the theoretical and lesson we must learn from the 21/2-year
practical basis on which Red Army test-ban fiasco. It is: The moral issue
commissars, despite promise of safe con- is not the type of weapons which the
duct, arrested and executed the leaders of
the Hungarian revolution while ostensi-
bly negotiating an armistice.
NEGATORY PROPAGANDA
With the Hungarian example in mind,
we reach a point where negatory propa-
ganda can be defined and illustrated us-
ing the nuclear-test-ban issue as an
example.
By negatory propaganda I seek to
describe a technique aimed at negating
use by your opponent of a device or weap-
on of value to him by propaganda aimed
at creating such intense public opinion
against its use, that it is in fact denied or
negated.
BAN THE BOMB
For a period following 1945 the United
States, only, possessed nuclear capacity.
We had a weapon which could overcome
the Communist bloc's great military
superiority in terms of conventional arms
and armaments. As a consequence, to
deny us use of the weapon, and thus the
superiority, the Kremlin and Red agents
everywhere propagandized the world on
the alleged horrors which would stem
from use of the weapons. Many
well-intentioned non-Communists be-
came inadvertent allies of the Commu-
nists by taking up the ban-the-bomb
hue and cry. The propaganda did, in
fact, negate our use of nuclear weapons
in Korea. This cost us dearly in both
lives and effort.
free nations must stock in their arsenals
to preserve freedom and the rich heritage
of Western civilization. The issue is:
The morality of stripping those arsenals,
imperiling that civilization and relegat-
ing its millions of souls to mass murder
or to the slavery of the communes.
Whether we surrender in one lump sum
or are propagandized and blackmailed
into it on the installment plan, the result
is the same.
FREE WORLD PROPAGANDA
There are many who observe these
Communist propaganda efforts, their
successes, and say if only we spent more
money on our own propaganda overseas
they could be turned back. True, our
efforts can and should be stepped up.
But we must accept the fact that our
own propaganda efforts cannot, in the
short term at least, produce results as
impressive as theirs simply because
theirs is based on lies, exaggerations and
deceptions rather than upon truth.
Truth is by far the greater power, but by
far the more difficult and time consum-
ing to propagate. The standards of
morality by which we must gage our
actions limit us to the truth.
Further, as to areas behind the Iron
Curtain, we are under additional handi-
First, the Iron Curtain blocks com-
munication in both directions. Second,
neither world public opinion nor internal
Subversion is one of communism's most
potent cold war techniques and is prac-
ticed all the time, everywhere. What we
must keep in mind is that it is only one
of many techniques, however. Nor is it
even as potent a weapon for the Com-
munists, within the United States, at
least, as our own general lack of under-
standing of what they want and how they
are going about getting it. I recently
suggested that the President order a good
course on "Communism and How To
Fight It" prepared and taught to every
person in Government from himself on
down. Passing the course would be re-
quired before any Government employee
could draw his paycheck. The course
would also be available to the public gen-
erally. This step alone would obviate a
necessity many have suggested for in-
vestigating the State Department or any
other Department of Government-
where in my belief ignorance is a hun-
dred times more responsible for the inept
conduct of our defense against com-
munism than are subversion and dis-
loyalty. This ruthless, resourceful, de-
termined enemy cannot be combatted
effectively unless Americans know its true
identity and understand the way it
fights.
LATIN AMERICA
The real danger from subversion is in
less-developed areas, Latin America, for
instance, where communism is attempt-
ing to leapfrog the Atlantic and take
over countries both by infiltration of
existing governments and by seizing con-
trol of liberal revolutionary movements.
Each year hundreds of Latins receive
revolutionary training in Moscow and
are sent back to work ceaselessly to re-
place lawful government with regimes
dominated and controlled by interna.-
i
c opinion is an appreciable ractor in tional communism. In connection with
But while feverishly denouncing nu- publ
clear weapons, the Soviets mounted a the decision-mgking process of the Com- Cuba in particular and Latin America
massive effort to achieve munist masters. Third, even if you over- in general the following seven-point pro-
pro-
ffthem. come physical barriers to communication gram is suggested:
did so a by the early ch . This did Thenot y
their line or alter their efforts, with people behind the Iron Curtain, First. Take a firm stand against Com-
chanohange however, because denial alter the Wof there is still a psychological barrier to munist expansion, then tell and show
tuse because surmount. It stems from the fact that the world we mean what we say-that
the h of nuclear lwstill is West s ob-
tilt the weapons
balance of power b- most of the population has come to the Monroe Doctrine is not dead.
vious e
their way direction. adulthood since communism took over. Second. Declare the Western Hemi-
their gaps in public understanding and sphere to be a peace zone, and tell the
Their gigantic propaganda campaign knowledge exist which cannot be world we mean to keep it that way
raged on with consummate skill right up spanned by the kind of appeals effective through use of national power, if
until the recent moment when it became with Western minds. Their policy of necessary.
more advantageous to them to torpedo brainwashing from birth to death often Third. Declare all Communist war
the Geneva A-test ban talks and resume has so twisted truth and history that material, including fuel, as contraband
atmospheric testing than it was to keep counterappeals must be developed from and prohibit its shipment into the peace
the talks going and stall us from improv- that specialized frame of reference. zone.
608986-81139
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
 Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-2DP801301676R002800240004-4
8
Fourth. Use national power to send achieve victories instead of defeats in tions, cover and deception, informational back, jettison, or seize all contraband this area. and cultural programs, ideological posi-, military sent into the peace zone. ORGANIZATION FOR COLD WAR tions, psychological ical wevaluationarfare
and host of
Fifth. Adopt as U.S. Policy the oust- But, in contrast to our splendid or- others.
ing of Castro's Communist dictatorship ganization for hot war, we are almost
from Cuba, and enlist 'active support totally unorganized to wage and win All these operations must be tied to-
from anti-Castro and anti-Communist cold war. gether constantly-orchestrated like a
forces in Latin America to help us get It would be madness to attempt to symphony. Each must be run by man-
the job done. fight a military war without national agers who are themselves knowledge-
Sixth. Develop and expedite a tailor- strategy, without a top-level command, able in the political, strategic, and psy-
made information program for our without war plans, without offenses and chological nuances of nonmilitary war.
hemisphere which makes it clear that planned defenses, without mobilizing Command of these activities requires as
we will not tolerate guerrilla invasions the national effort and without appeal- great a skill as military command. We
and power seizures of Latin American ing to the patriotism of our people to must quickly train in our universities
countries by Cuban or other Communist work, to sacrifice, and to winJ Yet, with- and elsewhere the knowledgeable Amer-
a any of these things, we are engaged icans; new, strange, and deadly kind of fourth force in to officer our defense.d man this
forces, or Communist expansion of any out
kind. in
war which we are not winning. It is It should be reemphasized that
Seventh. Use our national power to our clear duty to establish the organiza- COMSTOP must not only defend against
the e and in the manner required tion we need to fight this kind of war, actions the Soviets mount in what they
to freee e the Cuban people and give them to mobilize our people and our resources, regard as the war zone, but must, if we
the right of self-determination. and to embark on the long, difficult road are ever to win, carry the fight into their
In order to implement the first four toward victory. peace zone. Within the Communist
points mentioned above I have intro- This effort involves economics, diplo- empire are countless areas of weakness
duced House Joint Resolution 524, de- macy, intelligence, science, psychology- and possible internal strife. Brig. Gen.
claring Communist arms and munitions all the phases of human activity short David Sarnoff in urging former Presi-
contraband in the Western Hemisphere of military operations between major dent Eisenhower to wage cold, war and
and making provisions to enforce the powers. The effort required goes far turn Moscow's own weapons against
ORGANIZATION FOR HOT WAR beyond the State Department or any world communism said: "Our potential
e'Our present military structure- other department of Government-far fifth column is greater by millions than
Army, Navy, Air Force-coordinated at beyond the formal government even-it the enemy's."
the Department of Defense and Joint sweeps across our whole society. CONCLUSION
The President alone has the broad Concluding a discussion of this nature
Chiefs of Staff level, represents an effect power and control over the wide range and extent by attempting a summary
tive overall organization for waging hot of functions which must be organized, would be futile. I have given little more
war. Because of its effectiveness it ac- carried on, timed, coordinated and than a skeleton outline of the dangers
tually deters hot war. Our military pushed to overall success to meet the we face and what we must do to sur-
leaders are skilled and knowledgeable. enemy and overcome it. At the top, with mount them. So I will reiterate only
They do the best possible job with the the President's daily attention, must be that we must constantly deter hot war
hardware and forces at their command. the national nerve center and command by being capable of fighting and winning
I do not agree with Maj. Alexander post. Call it the Strategic and Tactical it, if necessary, and we must declare
de Seversky's contention that the serv- Office of the President-STOP. Here at the nonmilitary war and mobilize all our
ices should be merged and overriding COMSTOP, in the White House itself, physical and material resources to win
emphasis placed on airpower for deliv- stopping communism must be a 24-hour- it.
ery of massive nuclear destruction. a-day operation for as long as it takes All this will take the highest and best
That would limit us to a choice between to win. our generation of Americans has to offer
nuclear holocaust and surrender-an Here are just a few of the activities its country. Let us take faith from the
inherently hopeless set of alternatives that must feed to and from COMSTOP: courage and wisdom of the men who
which would merely afford the "better National strategy and tactics, military founded our country and made her great.
Red than dead" propagandists more and nonmilitary strategy and tactics, If we, today, but possess equal courage
chance to spread their poison. With intelligence, political operations, diplo- ly believe we
properly balanced military forces we matic moves, labor and industrial mo- aand nd there wisdwisdomis-aand domestic I firm rm problem we
can control and deter all-out nuclear bilization, economic operations, finance, - no
war. Then, with proper organization agricultural and commercial functions, cannot solve nor foreign force we need
for nonmilitary war-cold war-we can covert and overt international opera- ever fear.
608986-81139
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4
CONGRESSIONAL tcMuvIU)
 ed For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDPA0B01676R002800240004-
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE' DIRECTOR
ov
Attached is a proposed note for your
signature to Craig Hosmer acknowledging his
note to you enclosing a letter he wrote to the
President which included his study on
"Organization for Cold War. " Copies of this
have been sent to DD/P and DD/I for their
thoughts on this but in the meantime it seemed
appropriate to acknowledge Hosmer's sending
this to you. Further, it may be difficult for
meaningful substantive comment to be given
which would be unclassified.
27 February 1962
(DATE)
B01676R002800240004-
D GN 54 10 1 WHICH RELACMES
BEM US10-101 ED, (47)
1 AU
 Ap
UNCLASSIFIEIT CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
7ID sly
IG 3944-Langley
,~.
2
2
DCI 3E14 Langley
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
T0!.
44-~
LD HERE T
FROM: NAME. ADDRES AND P
HONE NO. DATE
Legislative Counsel, 221 East 2 Feb 62
N C
A
F
ORM NO. Replaces Form 30-4
I APR 55 237 which may be used.
(40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-0-342531
 ppd.
ppr (40)
FORM NO. n~7 Use previous editions
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282
2-61 G I
wed
L S
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Legis. Counsel
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
LBK.irkpatrick 19
Feb 62
 App#6v6d For Release 2002/02/27 : ,CIQ-RDP80B01676R002800240004-4
QCongrego of ttt 1niteb Optateg
jouge of Repreantatibeo
Iasbington. M. C.
0
Approved For Release 2002/02/27 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800240004-4