RESEARCH AID PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CHEMICAL FERTILIZER SUPPLIES, 1949-74

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00928A000200080002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Research Aid
Peoples Republic of China:
Chemical Fertilizer Supplies,1949-74
A (ER) 75-70
August 1975
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People's Republic of China:
Chemical Fertilizer Supplies
1949-74
August 1975
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER SUPPLIES
1949-74
1. The Chinese fertilizer industry grew from only two plants producing
27,000 metric tons a year in 1949 to at least 40 large and hundreds of small
plants producing 25 million tons in 1974. Despite this expansion in output, China
has been the world's largest importer of fertilizer in recent years. Currently, the
fertilizer industry is configured as follows:
? Small plants now play an equal role in nitrogen output, using local raw
materials to produce aqueous ammonia and ammonium bicarbonate.
? Nitrogen fertilizer production in large plants has grown steadily, except
for sharp drops in 1961 and 1967. Growth was spurred in the mid-1960s
by the purchase of a large urea plant from the Netherlands, which
provided Peking with technology it subsequently copied.
? Phosphate fertilizer production is largely from small plants using domestic
rock; the few large superphosphate plants use imported rock.
? Production of potassium fertilizer is low, despite large natural salt deposits
in the western provinces.
2. Shortcomings in the fertilizer industry were highlighted by the poor
harvest in 1972, which convinced Peking that agriculture needed more fertilizer
and other inputs to help mitigate the effects of bad weather and allow agricultural
output to keep pace with population growth. Unable to rapidly expand fertilizer
production from domestic resources, China in late 1972 contracted for 13 of the
world's largest ammonia-urea complexes from US, Netherlands, French, and
Japanese firms.
? Upon completion in the next two to three years the imported plants
will provide 3.5 million tons of nitrogen annually.
? Imports of nitrogenous fertilizer will be largely eliminated.
? The rate of construction of new small plants (which has slowed in recent
years) will continue to decline, but they will remain an important source
of fertilizer - particularly phosphate.
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3. The huge expansion in fertilizer supply by the end of the decade could
result in rapid increases in agricultural output. However, the full benefit of the
increased supply will be realized only if complementary inputs such as advanced
seed strains and improved water control features are adequately developed. We
believe it unlikely that Peking will carry out these complementary tasks to the
extent required, particularly in agricultural research.
4. Agriculture is progressing with the aid of such inputs as water control
systems, mechanized farm tools, and agrochemicals. Because the amount of land
suitable for cultivation in China is limited, however, chemical fertilizer has been
and will remain the key to sizable gains in agricultural output.
5. This study surveys the present situation and. future prospects for fertilizer
supply in China and reviews production techniques, resources, and development
policy. Notes on the methodology used to make the estimates are presented in
the appendixes.
Fertilizer Supply
Background
6. China produced only 27,000 tons of chemical fertilizer in 1949,' the
first year under Communist control. The pre-Communist record of 227,000 tons
produced in 1941 was not surpassed until 1953, and output did not reach one
million tons per year until 1958. By 1960 a program using local building materials
and raw materials in small plants began to grow in importance. Fertilizer assumed
a central role in agricultural progress, and its output has subsequently grown rapidly
except in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
periods.'
7. Nevertheless, in the 1970s China has remained the world's largest importer
of fertilizer, purchasing more than one million tons of nutrient each year since
1967. The process of achieving self-sufficiency in fertilizer, and therefore in grain,
has not moved rapidly enough.
1. For a discussion of Chinese fertilizer reporting practices, see Appendix A.
2. For a detailed examination of China's fertilizer supply since 1949, see Appendix B.
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Present Supply
8. In contrast to gains of 14% and 17% in 1972 and 1973, China's total
fertilizer supply declined 7% in 1974 (see Table 1). The increase in domestic
production of chemical fertilizer in 1974 was negligible as increases in nitrogenous
and potassium output were offset by a sharp decline in phosphorus production.
Phosphate fertilizer production declined 11% (despite increased domestic mining
of rock) because of a reduction in rock imports. Disruptions related to the campaign
to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius caused transportation bottlenecks and coal
shortages. While output from large nitrogen fertilizer plants increased almost 17%,
difficulties with coal supplies held the output of small nitrogen fertilizer plants
to constant gains in 1974. Potassium output increased by about 7% during the
year.
9. Overall fertilizer imports fell 33% in 1974. Purchases of. phosphate rock
fell off sharply, as Morocco led world producers in quadrupling prices. Nitrogen
fertilizer imports for the year also dropped, as shipments from Japan scheduled
for the last quarter were postponed until 1975.
10. China has significant supplies of raw materials for the production of all
three major nutrient types. Coal is found in abundance throughout the country
and has been the main source of raw materials for the nitrogenous fertilizer industry.
Extensive oil-related gas deposits and natural gas fields in Szechwan Province are
increasingly being used as feedstock for plants that produce ammonia to be
processed into urea. Domestic phosphate deposits in many areas have supported
production, particularly in the small plant program, which provides most of the
phosphate fertilizer production. Extensive potassium supplies are available in the
Tarim and Tsaidam Basins in the far western part of China, but these areas are
far from major agricultural areas. Secondary sources of potassium have been sea
salt recovery operations.
Products and Plant Types
11. Small plant ammonia production began in 1958 from units with capacities
of 800 tons per year. These were later increased to 3,000 tons per year, and by
the mid-1960s large plants with capacities of up to 40,000 tons per year were
developed. The small plant program gained momentum with the development of
the ability to produce complete sets of fertilizer plant and equipment within China.
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Table 1
China: Supply of Chemical Fertilizer in Standard Units'
Total Nitrogen Phosphorus Potassium
1949 0.03 0.03 .... ....
1950 0.07 0.07 .... ....
1951 0.14 0.14 .... ....
1952 0.19 0.19 .... ....
1953 0.26 0.26 .... ....
1954 0.34 0.34 .... ....
1955 0.43 0.42 0.01 ....
1956 0.66 0.59 0.08 ....
1957 0.80 0.68 0.12 ....
1958 1.35 1.01 0.34 ....
1959 1.88 1.38 0.50 ....
1960 2.52 1.72 0.80 ....
1961 1.85 1.40 0.45 ....
1962 2.78_ 2.22 0.56 ....
1963 3.86 2.71 1.15 ....
1964 5.78 3.56 2.22 ....
1965 7.60 4.15 3.45 ....
1966 9.60 4.83 4.68 0.09
1967 8.10 4.04 3.89 0.17
1968 9.50 5.20 4.07 0.23
1969 11.30 5.90 5.15 0.25
1970 14.00 7.81 5.90 0.29
1971 16.80 9.50 6.95 0.35
1972 19.84 11.72 7.74 0.38
1973 24.80 14.65 9.73 0.42
1974 24.88 15.81 8.62 0.45
Imports
Supply
....
0.03
0.10
0.17
0.20
0.34
0.20
0.39
0.40
0.66
0.68
1.02
0.79
1.22
1.35
2.01
1.34
2.14
1.80
3.16
1.35
3.23
1.08
3.60
1.12
2.98
1.20
3.98
2.70
6.56
1.80
7.58
3.20
10.80
3.61
13.21
5.73
13.83
6.13
15.63
6.56
17.86
7.41
21.41
7.39
24.19
7.74
27.58
7.43
32.23
5.00
29.88
1. Appendix B presents notes on the derivation of the production series. The import figures were derived from
export data of major trading partners.
12. The quality of the output produced by this sector - primarily aqueous
ammonia and ammonium bicarbonate - has often been questioned by Western
observers, but the Chinese consistently have claimed that small plant output is
suitable for their purposes. There are, nonetheless, problems with the products.
Aqueous ammonia must be shipped in closed containers to slow the loss of its
already low - about 17% - nitrogen content into the atmosphere. Ammonium
bicarbonate, the main product, is unstable and cannot be stored for long periods,
particularly when not under cover. Neither fertilizer comes near urea's 46% nitrogen
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content and is thus of a lesser value per unit weight. Distribution also is a problem
because demand is highly seasonal.
13. Ammonium nitrate production has been divided between military and
industrial explosives and agriculture in its final uses. With a nitrogen content above
30%, it is a useful fertilizer despite physical properties that lead to caking through
absorbing moisture from the air and to spontaneous explosion under conditions
of high temperature or pressure.
14. Urea production began on a pilot plant scale during the late 1950s. The
high nitrogen content of urea and its relative ease of handling and application
in its prilled form make it superior to ammonium sulfate and the volatile ammonium
bicarbonate. However, the ability to produce prilled urea in commercial quantities
came only after the purchase of a large urea plant from the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands in the mid-1960s. This 175,000-ton-per-year facility, located at
Lu-chou in Szechwan Province, was examined closely by Chinese technicians; since
then a number of standardized urea plants, each with a capacity of 40,000 tons
per year, have been domestically manufactured.
15. Phosphate fertilizer production has not expanded as rapidly as nitrogen
production and is an important concern of the Chinese. Relatively little finished
phosphate fertilizer is imported. Instead, phosphate rock, predominantly Moroccan,
is purchased for conversion into single or triple superphosphate by large domestic
plants. Small plants, which depend on domestic rock deposits, currently provide
most of the phosphate fertilizer supply. However, many small plants do little more
than crush the rock before it is spread on the fields.
16. Potassium production in China is limited despite large potash deposits
in the western provinces. Two plants, both in Tsinghai Province, use carnallite,
a natural salt, to produce potassium fertilizer. In Fukien and other eastern provinces,
sea water is treated to obtain several salts, including potassium chloride and a
potassium-magnesium fertilizer.
17. Finally, organic fertilizers have been and will continue to be of great
importance in Chinese agriculture. Night soil is collected regularly, and hogs are
lauded in the press as fertilizer factories. Probably as a result of the decline in
supply in 1974, the use and production of organic substances is currently being
widely publicized and praised for its results.
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Development Policy
18. In spite of significant growth in fertilizer production throughout the
1960s and early 1970s, imports remained high. At the same time, application rates
in China were far below those of many of its neighbors. The inadequacies of the
domestic fertilizer industry were highlighted by the poor harvest of 1972, which
convinced Chinese policymakers that agriculture required more fertilizer and other
inputs to cushion the effects of bad weather. A population growth rate of 2%
necessitated rapidly increasing agricultural output. Beginning in late 1972, China
contracted for 13 of the world's largest ammonia-urea complexes from US,
Netherlands, French, and Japanese firms (see Table 2). The decision to seek
equipment abroad was dictated by China's inability to rapidly expand fertilizer
production from domestic resources.
China: Purchases of Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plants
November 1972 - May 1974
Number
Daily Capacity
Exporting
Period of
of Plants
Type
(Million Metric Tons)
Country
Construction
8
Ammonia
1,000
United States
1975-77
8
Urea
1,620
Netherlands
1975-77
2
Ammonia
1,000
Japan
1976-77
2
Urea
1,600
Japan
1976-77
3
Ammonia
1,000
France
1976-77
3
Urea
1,740
France
1976-77
Large Plants
19. Each of the 13 ammonia plants being imported will have a daily capacity
of 1,000 tons which will serve as feedstock to associated urea plants, each of which
will produce 1,600 tons per day or more. Upon completion in the next two to
three years, these plants will provide 3.5 million tons of nitrogen annually, more
than the 3.2 million tons of nitrogen produced in China in 1974. China recently
became the world's fifth largest producer of natural gas, and the urea plants will
use gas as feedstock.
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20. The prime motivation to import plant and technology was the inability
of China's agricultural sector to provide adequate harvests in years of unfavorable
growing conditions. The solution to the problem was to increase industrial inputs
to agriculture by greatly increasing the nation's capacity to produce fertilizer. Higher
urea production was seen as the necessary base of such an expansion because of
agriculture's dependence upon nitrogen and the economies in production, storage,
transportation, and application of urea itself. However, domestic shortages of
technology in equipment design, inadequate supplies of key materials - such as
stainless steel - and the limited capability of the machine tool industry worked
together to prohibit rapid increases in urea plant capacities. Prices of imported
equipment also began to look more attractive as world prices for fertilizer and
oil increased rapidly. For example, the eight complexes purchased from the United
States and the Netherlands alone cost less than the 2.2 million tons of urea imported
in 1973 at 1974 prices, yet they could produce twice that amount yearly.
21. Tightness in the world fertilizer market was an early factor reinforcing
China's decision to acquire imported fertilizer technology and equipment. In spite
of increases of 6.1% and 7.2% in production during 1972 and 1973, world stocks
of nitrogen fertilizer and phosphate rock were drawn on to meet demand. In its
negotiations for fertilizer imports, Peking faced rising prices and increased
uncertainty as to the availability of future supplies.
22. In late 1973, tremendous increases took place in the price of oil, a
feedstock for ammonia production. Consequently, urea prices moved up so strongly
that 1973 imports valued at $175 million would have cost $300 million in 1974.
The most important price effect on Chinese imports, however, was the quadrupling
in the price of Moroccan phosphate rock to $43 per ton in early 1974. Subsequent
increases to $68 per ton led Peking to cut imports drastically.
23. By late 1974 the Chinese were also experiencing' shortages of foreign
exchange, as their export sales fell off in the face of the world recession. Shipments
of Japanese fertilizer scheduled for November and December, involving 150,000
tons of urea and 60,000 tons of ammonium sulfate, were postponed to early 1975.
In addition, Peking requested delayed payment for ammonium chloride purchased
from Japan.
24. An easing of prices and product availabilities has characterized the world
fertilizer market in recent months. As a result, fertilizer imports by Peking during
the last half of 1975 will be obtained at sharply reduced prices, conserving foreign
exchange, which continues in short supply. Despite lower product prices, however,
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the imported urea plants remain a prudent purchase by virtue of their ability to
relieve China's need to import nitrogen fertilizer and its dependence on a fluctuating
world market.
Small Plant Program
25. Small plants have played an important role in the development of China's
fertilizer industry. An experimental program began in 1958, and 10 years later
small nitrogen plants accounted for one-third of the national nitrogen productive
capacity. By 1973, China had more than 1,400 small chemical fertilizer factories
producing 63% of total fertilizer output, 75% of the phosphates, and 54% of
the nitrogen fertilizer.
26. Savings accrue from reduced construction time, smaller investment, and
forgoing the necessity of transporting large quantities of materials. Construction
requires only one-third the time of large plants and is planned around local
conditions to utilize local building materials whenever possible. Also, using local
manpower in plant operations develops a large pool of trained workers.
27. The major benefits of the program derive from the location of the plants
close to end users and raw material sources. Using plants scaled to meet local
demand for fertilizer eliminates reliance on an already strained transport net and
helps solve the problem of moving bulky aqueous ammonia and ammonium
bicarbonate, which are susceptible to deterioration during shipping.
28. The wide distribution of small plants further reduces dependence on the
transport system through using locations near sources of raw materials. In addition,
plants and technologies may be varied in order to more adequately use materials
as they exist in a specific area. By early 1973, 44% of all small nitrogen fertilizer
plants had been switched to powdered coal and other local resources, releasing
coke and hard coal for alternative uses.
29. The small plant effort has used natural and human resources that might
otherwise have remained dormant and has assumed the major role in fertilizer
production. However, the rate of construction of new plants has slowed because
they already are widely distributed throughout the countryside.
30. There is little doubt that the small ammonia plants will play a smaller
relative role after the imported urea complexes come on stream. The output of
the 13 large plants alone will surpass total nitrogen fertilizer produced in 1974,
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of which half was provided by small plants. As the imported plants assume the
major role in the growth of nitrogen output, however, small plants are likely to
become the principal means by which the supply of phosphorus will be increased
in order to maintain the nutrient balance. By 1980 this would call for nearly
21 million tons of standard weight phosphorus fertilizer, an increase of about 150%
over present levels.
Prospects
31. The Chinese will not reach the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) goal
of a total annual supply of 35 million tons of chemical fertilizer this year. Domestic
output is unlikely to increase appreciably, and continued tightness of foreign
exchange will probably hold fertilizer imports in 1975 below the level of 1973.
However, oil income not diverted to plant and equipment purchases or used to
offset the growing trade deficit might boost imports slightly above the depressed
1974 level.
32. Recent Chinese attention to aid projects for Morocco may indicate an
interest in renewing flows of phosphate rock at reduced prices. In any case, domestic
output is being expanded to fill the gap, and compound fertilizer, in which the
Chinese have shown recent interest, may be sought to provide sufficient phosphorus.
The high level of Chinese purchases of Canadian potassium chloride over the past
two years is likely to continue in the future.
33. Emphasis in the Chinese press on the production and use of organic
fertilizer has been increased lately. The stress on organics suggests that there is
little official hope of any substantial increase in the supply of chemical fertilizer
over the short run.
34. Over the longer term, the key to increased output is the prompt
completion and bringing into full production of the 13 imported urea plants. The
first of these is expected to begin working in early 1977, with completion of the
remaining plants scheduled in 1978. Construction lags and a lack of sufficiently
trained Chinese technicians, however, may prevent a rapid rise to full plant
productivity. Nevertheless, the output from the new plants plus the expected
production from existing plants should enable China to produce 8 million tons
of nitrogen fertilizer by 1980, relieving the need to import nitrogenous fertilizers.
35. This massive expansion in fertilizer supply could result in rapid increases
in agricultural output by the end of the decade. The ability to fully utilize the
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increased supply of fertilizer, however, will depend upon the development of
complementary inputs. Without improved water control and advanced seed strains,
returns on unit fertilizer applications will decline. The most suitable of China's
arable lands are already under water control. Much of the remainder is either
unsuitable for such projects or, as in North China, will require large, multipurpose
works - high dams, extensive reservoir and delivery systems, and soil conservation
programs. Numerous labor-intensive agricultural construction projects have been
completed, but there is no indication that China is ready to undertake the large-scale
projects to the extent required.
36. China continues to import and to develop high-yield varieties of seeds.
Such strains require and respond to large doses of fertilizer. In addition to the
problems of wide distribution and acceptance by the peasantry, these seeds require
adequate water control if they are to be successful. Potential yields are unlikely
to be realized as fertilizer inputs are increased if these problems are not addressed
by the government.
37. The use of potassium fertilizer is likely to rise several fold by 1980.
Despite considerable native potash deposits, the transportation network necessary
to service the major locations in the western provinces can be developed only over
the long term. Thus, annual potash imports of 2 million tons may be required
by 1980.
38. The mixed performance of the fertilizer industry is in part a reflection
of the inadequacies of some of China's other large industries. In spite of the major
campaign since 1962 to push agriculture ahead with industrial inputs, certain sectors
of the chemical, machine tool, and metals industries have been unable to meet
the challenge. Large-scale production of prilled urea in China resulted only after
the purchase and copy of foreign equipment. Even then, only medium-sized plants
could be produced through the cooperation of these three industries. These
industries will again be tested in the decade of the 1980s after the imported plants
are in production. Maintenance of the accelerated growth rates of fertilizer output
brought about by China's acquisition of the plants will depend upon the ability
of these industries to provide additional large-scale chemical equipment for fertilizer
production.
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APPENDIX A
CHINESE PRACTICES OF REPORTING FERTILIZER OUTPUT
We believe that the PRC is currently
reporting the output of chemical fertilizer
in standard units rather than as gross
weight. In the late 1950s, when the Chinese
published detailed information on the
fertilizer industry, the output of various
types of fertilizer was usually expressed in
terms of these units. The standard unit
refers to the nutrient equivalent of three
basic fertilizers - ammonium sulfate
(20% N), super phosphate (18.7% P205),
and potassium sulfate (40% K20). For
example, one million tons of urea fertilizer
would be counted as 2.3 million tons of
Standard weight
Total'
194.0
Ammonium sulfate2
181.4
Ammonium nitrate3
12.6
Gross weight
Ammonium nitrate4
7.5
1. Kung-en jih-pao, Peking, 21 September
1957.
2. Jen-min jih pao, Peking,l6 August 1959, p. 7.
3. Residual.
4. First Five-Year Plan for Development of
the National Economy of the People's Republic
of China in 1953-1957, Peking, 1956, p. 48.
standard weight fertilizer because 2.3
million tons of ammonium sulfate contain the same amount of nitrogen as the
one million tons of urea. Data for 1952 illustrate the use of standard unit reporting.
The tabulation below shows that the figure for ammonium nitrate expressed in
standard units (derived as a ' residual) is consistent with the figure expressed as
gross weight (from the First Five-
Year Plan): The nitrogen content,
and thus the nutrient value of the
fertilizer, is the same in either case.
There is no direct evidence
that the Chinese have changed
this system, and recent statements
imply that it is still in use. For
example, Vice Premier Teng
Output
Nitro-
as Re-
gen
ported
Per-
Content
(Thou-
cent
(Thou-
sand
Nitro-
sand
Tons)
gen
Tons)
Standard weight
12.6
X
20% =
2.5
Gross weight
7.5
X
34% =
2.5
Hsiao-ping told a Peking audience in October 1974 that China's fertilizer goal is
60-70 million tons. * This level, which probably refers to 1980, could be reached
only by converting the output of the urea plants now being imported from the
West to its ammonium sulfate equivalent.
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Special Problem of Ammonium Nitrate
During the 1950s, fertilizer output was reported in two ways: including and
excluding ammonium nitrate. In Ten Great Years, for example, it was explicitly
excluded. Thus the output of ammonium nitrate was reported or could be derived.
Information on the production of ammonium nitrate for the years since 1958
is not available, and there is little information as to how output is divided between
military and agricultural uses. Most Western studies have assumed that ammonium
nitrate was included in the percentage increases and index numbers reported for
the early 1960s. We believe, however, that it was not included.
Few observers have accepted the Chinese claim that fertilizer production
increased 3 million tons in 1965. It was generally believed that an increase of
this magnitude was not possible. However, if ammonium nitrate were excluded
from claims for the years prior to 1965 but included in the 1965 total, an increase
of about 3 million tons is reasonable.
In addition, Chou En-lai's recent claim that fertilizer production in 1974 was
4.3 times that of 1964 makes little sense unless the data reported for the early
1960s exclude ammonium nitrate. An estimate for 1974 based on this assumption
yields a reasonable 1974 total. The alternative is to believe that 1974 production
fell nearly 5 million tons below the well-substantiated 1973 figure.
For these reasons, we believe that ammonium nitrate was not included in
the claims made for the years 1959 to 1964, but that it has been included in
the claims made for 1965 and subsequent years.
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF THE PRODUCTION SERIES
Detailed data, including output by large and small plants, are presented in
Table 3.
The following abbreviations are used in the documentation of the production
series:
CKHW Chung-kuo hsin-wen, Canton
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's
Republic of China
Chao Kang Chao, The Rate and Pattern of Industrial Growth in
Communist China, University of Michigan Press, 1965.
KJJP Kung-jen jih pao, Peking
JMJP Jen-min jih-pao, Peking
NCNA New China News Agency
SMCP US Consulate General, Hong Kong, Summmy of Mainland China
Press
TGY State Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years: Statistics of the Economic
and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China,
Foreign' Language Press, Peking, 1960.
TKP Ta-kung pao, Hong Kong
WHP Wen-hui pao, Hong Kong
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Table 3
China: Production of Chemical Fertilizer in Standard Units
Total
Nitrogen
Phosphorus
Potassium
E
l
di
xc
u
ng
Ammonium
Ammonium
Large
Small
Large
Small
Large
Small
Total
Nitrate
Nitrate
Total
Plants
Plants
Total
Plants
Plants
Total
Plants
Plants
1949
27
....
27
27
27
....
....
1950
70
....
70
70
70
....
....
1951
137
8
129
137
137
....
....
...,
1952
194
13
181
194
194
....
._,_
....
1953
263
37
226
263
263
....
....
1954
343
45
298
343
343
....
....
1955
426
94
332
418
418
....
8
8
1956
663
140
523
586
586
....
77
77
1957
803
172
631
683
683
....
120
120
1958
1,354
543
811
1,010
1,010
....
344
344
1959
1,876
543
1,333
1,376
1,376
....
500
500
1960
2,523
543
1,980
1,723
1,723
....
800
600
200
....
....
1961
1,850
400
1,450
1,400
1,380
20
450
338
112
....
...
1962
2,775
600
2,175
2,220
2,160
60
555
355
200
....
.
....
1963
3,857
834
3,023
2,708
2,608
100
1,149
501
648
....
....
1964
5,785
1,250
4,535
3,560
3,329
231
2,225
600
1,625
....
....
....
1965
7,600
....
....
4,150
3,802
348
3,450
690
2,760
....
....
....
1966
9,600
....
....
4,833
4,253
580
4,677
1,437
3,240
90
....
90
1967
8,100
....
....
4,040
3,450
590
3,890
1,300
2,590
170
....
170
1968
9,500
....
....
5,200
3,500
1,700
4,070
1,375
2,695
230
....
230
1969
11,300
....
....
5,900
3,800
2,100
5,150
1,500
3,650
250
10
240
1970
14,000
....
....
7,810
4,450
3,360
5,900
1,550
4,350
290
20
270
1971
16,800
....
....
9,500
4,750
4,750
6,950
1,620
5,330
350
50
300
1972
19,840
....
....
11,723
5,744
5,979
7,738
1,934
5,804
380
50
330
1973
24,800
....
....
14,652
6,740
7,912
9,729
2,432
7,297
420
50
370
1974
24,875
....
._?
15,810
7,905
7,905
8,615
1,615
7,000
450
50
400
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Notes to Table 3
Total Production
1949-51: Sum of ammonium nitrate and total production excluding ammonium
nitrate.
1952-54: Liu Chung-fan, "State Assistance to Peasants," KJJP', 21 September 1957.
1955-56: Chi Ch'ung-wei, "Industry Should Assist Agricultural Development,"
Chi-hua thing-chi (Planned Economy), No. 10, 1957, p. 7.
1957: Wang Kuang-wei, "Modernizing Chinese Agriculture," Peking Review, Vol. 1,
No. 5, 1958, p. 8.
1958-64: Sum of components.
1965: Peking Review, 16 April 1966 indicated an increase of 3 million tons. WHP,
12 February 1966 reported a 70% increase over 1964. The figures derived from
these statements are reasonably close, and our estimate falls between them. It is
assumed that chemical fertilizer totals began to include ammonium nitrate in
standard units in 1965. The reported 3-million-ton increase, therefore, is the
difference between total output in 1965 and output excluding ammonium nitrate
in 1964.
1966: Production increased 26% over 1965 (JMJP, 30 December 1966).
1967-69: Work stoppages and raw material shortages during the Cultural Revolution
resulted in lengthy shutdowns of many industrial plants and a 10% to 15% decline
in total output. As Red Guard activity declined in 1968, 'industrial output began
to recover and surpassed its previous high by 1969. It is assumed that chemical
fertilizer production dropped sharply in 1967 and followed the same pattern of
recovery as for industry as a whole.
1970: Edgar Snow, "Talks with Chou En-lai," The New Republic, 27 March 1971.
1971: Production increased 20.2% over 1970 (FBIS, 3 January 1972, p. B 10).
1972: Production increased 18.1% over 1971 (FBIS, 26 December 1972, p. B1).
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1973: Production increased 25% over 1972 (FBIS, 14 January 1974, p. B10).
1974: Production was 430% of that in 1964 (Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work
of the Government," Peking Review, 24 January 1975).
Ammonium Nitrate
1951: State Statistical Bureau, revised report for 1952.
1952-58: Residual. Derived as the difference between total production including
and excluding ammonium nitrate.
1959: The amount of ammonium nitrate used in industry was to be increased
(Hua-hsueh kung-yeh [Chemical Industry], 21 August 1959). The amount used as
fertilizer was estimated to be the same as in 1958 on the assumption that the
increase in production went to nonagricultural uses.
1960: Conservatively estimated to be the same as 1959.
1961-64: Production was assumed to have increased at the same rate as total output
excluding ammonium nitrate.
1965: Assume the same as 1964.
Total Production Excluding Ammonium Nitrate
1949-58: TGY.
1959: JMJP, 22 January 1960.
1960: Ekonomicheskaya Gazetta (Economic Journal), 10 June 1961. The Soviets
indicated the figure was taken from the Chinese press.
1961: Output in 1961 was 6.4 times the highest production prior to liberation
(227,000 tons in 1941) (TKP, 1 October 1962).
1962: Production increased 50% over 1961 (Peking Review, 11 January 1963, p. 3).
1963: Production increased 39% over 1962 (FBIS, 2 January 1964, p. ccc 9-10).
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1964: Production increased 50% over 1963 (China Reconstructs, February 1965).
Nitrogen
1949-54: Sum of ammonium nitrate and total production excluding ammonium
nitrate.
1955-56: Sum of ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulfate. Ammonium sulfate
reported by the State Statistical Bureau, Basic Indicators of the Development of
the National Economy of the CPR (in Russian), p. 39.
1957-58: CKHW, 30 January 1959, p. 11.
1959-60: Residual.
1961: Small plant production of synthetic ammonia was 5,000 tons, or 2% of
total nitrogen fertilizer output (KJJP, 15 June 1966). Small plant percentages refer
to total nitrogen excluding ammonium nitrate. Large and small plant nitrogen
production could be derived since one ton of synthetic ammonia yields four tons
of ammonium bicarbonate.
1962: Production was 60 times the 1949 level (FBIS, 13 March 1963, p. ccc 5).
Small plant production was estimated to provide a transition to later figures which
could be more accurately determined.
1963: Total nitrogen production increased 22% (TKP, 16 December 1963, p. 1).
Small plant ammonia production went up 66% over that of 1962 (NCNA,
22 September 1964). The 66% increase was applied to small plant nitrogen fertilizer
production.
1964: Small plant output doubled from 1963 (see source under Nitrogen for 1965)
and small plant ammonia production was claimed to be 10% of the total (NCNA,
22 May 1964). Large plant output was derived by assuming the same percentage
of nitrogen as for small plants.
1965: Peking stated (KJJP, 15 June 1966) that small plants accounted for 12%
of total nitrogen output. Because there was an approximate yearly doubling of
small plant nitrogen capacity since 1961 (KJJP, 15 June 1966), the small plant
total could be estimated. Large plant nitrogen output could then be computed.
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1966: On the basis of an approximate yearly doubling trend of small plant output
noted above, 580,000 tons was taken for the 1966 production. Assuming that
small plants accounted for 12% of nitrogen output as in the previous year,
production was derived for large plants.
1967: Small plants were continuing to increase in capacity during this period.
1968: With continued increases in capacity, small plants were claimed to account
for one-third of total nitrogen output (JMJP, 10 April 1969).
1969: Small plant nitrogenproductive capacity was claimed to have increased about
six times since 1965 (Peking Review, 13 June 1969). The figure thus obtained
was increased slightly to provide a smooth transition between the small plant
percentage shares given for 1968 and 1970.
1970: Small plant output went up 60% over 1969 and reached 43% of national
nitrogen production (Economic Reporter, January-March 1971, p. 21). Large plant
output was derived on the basis of this information.
1971: Total production was assumed to remain at approximately 56% of chemical
fertilizer, and small plant output was claimed to account for 50% of the national
nitrogen figure (SCMP, 15-19 May 1972, p. 210).
1972: FBIS, 26 December 1972, p. BI specified a 23.4% increase in nitrogen
fertilizer. Small plant production was estimated to have risen to 51 % of the total.
1973: Total nitrogen production was estimated on the basis of maintaining a
constant percentage of total chemical fertilizer. Small plants were estimated to
have contributed 54% on the basis of their synthetic ammonia production (NCNA,
5 January 1974, p. 13).
1974: Output of coal fell, affecting the growth of output at small plants. As a
result, total nitrogen production grew more slowly than in other recent years.
Phosphorus
1955-56: Residual. Derived as total less nitrogen.
1957-58: CKHW, 30 January 1959, p. 11.
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1959-60: Production was assumed to grow at a faster rate than that of nitrogen
because of its lower base figure.
1961: Residual. Small plant production was assumed to falll proportionately.
1962: Residual. As the small plant program was developing rapidly, it was assumed
to have provided a larger proportion of production.
1963: Residual. Capacity was estimated to be less than 1.2 million tons by the
Journal of World P & K, June 1963, p. 4).
1964: Residual. Capacity was reported to be more than 2 million tons (JMJP,
5 August 1964, p. 2). CHCW, 7 February 1965 claimed that 40% of total
production came from small and medium-sized plants. Small plant production of
phosphorus was derived by using small plant nitrogen output and total output.
1965: Residual. Small plants were claimed to have produced 80% of total
phosphorus (WHP, 2 October 1966).
1966: Residual. Small plant capacity was claimed to have increased by 760,000
tons in 1966 (NCNA, 17 September 1966). The increase in production was
estimated at two-thirds of that figure, based on assumed start-up difficulties.
1967: Small plants were assumed to have experienced a decline of 20% in output
because of problems in general with extractive industries.
1968: Residual. Small plants were assumed to have produced the same proportion
of the total as in the previous year.
1969: Residual. As conditions normalized, small plant production was assumed
to have returned to 70% of the total as in 1966.
1970: Residual. Small plant production was estimated on the basis of the percentage
role it played in 1973.
1971: Residual. Small plant output was derived from the claim that small plants
produce 60% of all chemical fertilizer (FBIS, 3 January 1972, p. B12) and the
small plant nitrogen figure.
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1972: Small plants were assumed to have accounted for about 75% of the total
on the basis of the claim for the following year.
1973: Residual. Small plants were claimed to have accounted for 75% of total
phosphate production (FBIS, 14 January 1974, p. B 10).
1974: Increases in the price of imported phosphate rock cut the purchases that
predominantly feed large plants. Small plant output is likely to have fallen less
as domestic rock deposits were utilized more intensively.
Deposits in the dry salt lakes of Tsinghai Province are the main source of supply
for potassium production, but are supplemented by sea salt recovery operations
in the eastern provinces. The nature of production techniques makes it particularly
difficult to estimate total output. The series presented here parallels recent British
Sulfur Corporation figures (Statistical Supplement No. 10, Nov-Dec 1974).
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