CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT
OCI NO.8546
31 July 1953
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
THE POSTARMISTICE SITUATION IN KOREA . . . . . . . . Page 6
The early phase of the Korean armistice is ex-
pected to proceed fairly smoothly. The subsequent
political conference is likely to 'become deadlocked,
however, and South Korean forces have threatened to
resume hostilities in early 1954.
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES . . . . Page 9
The political control system of the Soviet armed
forces makes it extremely difficult if not impossible
for any one member of the collegial leadership suc-
cessfully to use the army in a bid for supreme power.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO IRAN. . . Page 11
Recent Soviet conciliatory moves toward Iran
seem designed to prepare the ground for a general
settlement in which concessions will be used to
induce Mossadeq to conclude agreements favorable
to long-range Soviet interests in Iran.
ARMS SMUGGLING INCREASES IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN. . . . Page 13
A sharp increase in arms smuggling in the strategic
Kurdish tribal areas of northwestern Iran has followed
the widespread unrest caused by Prime Minister Mossa?
deq's agrarian reform decree and by the army's efforts
to disarm the tribes. (SEE MAP)
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EGYPTIAN ARMY DISCONTENT WITH MILITARY REGIME?S
LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Dissatisfaction within the Egyptian army, particularly
among the traditionally elite artillery service, with the
policies of the Revolutionary Command Council points up
the regime's problem of retaining the necessary support
of the armed forces.
ADENAUER?S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The prospects are now good for Chancellor Adenauer's
return to power as a result of the 6 September elections.
International developments, especially those affecting
the German unity problem, will have a strong influence
on the final result.
INDONESIAN POLITICS STALEMATED BY COMMUNIST-NATIONAL
PARTY COOPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Since the Indonesian cabinet fell on 3 June, attempts
to reconstruct the National Party=Masjumi coalition have
been unsuccessful. Only a departure from constitutional
procedure appears likely to get the government in motion
again.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
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On the eve of the Korean truce, the Kremlin strongly re-
affirmed the conciliatory post-Stalin foreign policies and
internal "liberalization" program. A lengthy TASS release in
connection with the 50th anniversary of Bolshevism quoted
Lenin on the. possibility of "lasting coexistence" and also on
the need of the West for trade with the Soviet bloc. Minimizing
Stalin?s role in party history almost to the vanishing point,
the review emphasized the recent theme of collective leadership
and warned that "the cult of the individual ... has nothing in
common with Marxist-Leninist concepts."
As an over-all statement of policy the TASS release does
not, however, reverse Pravda's 22 July editorial which was
antagonistic toward a To-power meeting as conceived in the
recent tripartite Washington conference. Pravda stated that
"under certain conditions" such a conference could have posi-
tive significance, but condemned the Western communique of
14 July as,having motives "which had nothing to do with
furthering peace or with the tasks of reducing international
tensions."
A further indication of Soviet preference for the propa-
ganda forum of a loosely organized four-power conference was
apparent in the 24 July Soviet press. This treated at length
the official British debate on the Washington conference and
played up Attlee's call for a higher-level conference to dis-
cuss all problems endangering world peace.
The specific Pravda comments on Germany followed the
standard propagandne, reflecting a feeling of weakness in
Germany and suggesting that the USSR is not willing to meet
Western demands for free elections. While the official Soviet
reply to the Western invitation for talks may be phrased less
_negatively, the USSR probably will continue to favor talks on
the entire question of a German peace treaty rather than the
embarrassing question of free elections.
Molotoves reported assurance to Japanese Stalin prize
winner Oyama that steps would be taken to re-establish normal
relations with Japan may foreshadow other overtures designed
to reduce Japanese distrust of the USSR. The Kremlin may cal-
culate that decreased US procurement orders for Korea following
the truce will have detrimental economic effects in Japan which
will increase pressure for expanding trade with Communist China.
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The USSR is likely to condition any serious political offer by
demands that Japan revise its military and economic arrange-
ments with the United States,
The 26 July announcement that L. G. Melnikov had been ap-
pointed Soviet ambassador to Rumania supports previous. indica-
tions that the now scrapped anti-Russification propaganda
campaign was a Beria creation. Melnikov had been ousted from
his positions of leadership in the Ukraine on 12 June on charges
of harsh Russification of that republic's western oblastsa His
re-emergence suggests that he was a temporary sacrifice to Beria.
On 25 July the Hungarians announced an amnesty decree
similar to those of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, but less
generous than the Soviet decree. The government also ordered
disbandment of all internment camps by 31 October and the
cancellation of all prohibitions of residence and deporta-
tions imposed prior to 25 July. These latter measures have not
been taken elsewhere in the Orbit and, if implemented, would
mark a significant relaxation of the regime's police policies.
There are also strong indications that the Hungarian state
security authority has been integrated into the Interior
Ministry in line with the recent Soviet and East German re-
organizations,
A reshuffle of the Albanian government has streamlined
the economic administration and is otherwise similar to recent
changes in Hungary and the USSR which were followed by an-
nouncements of more liberal policies. Enver Hoxha continues
as premier and party leader, but has lost the foreign affairs
and national defense portfolios.
There have been manifestations in Poland for the first
time of the current tactical moderation of internal Satellite
policies, In an important speech on 22 July, Premier Bierut
stressed the need for raising the level of agriculture and
announced that the government would provide more assistance,
equipment and supplies to private farmers and aid peasants in
financial difficulties.
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THE POSTARMISTICE SITUATION IN KOREA
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The early stages of implementation of the Korean armistice
are expected to proceed fairly smoothly. The political confer-
ence which is to meet in October is likely to become deadlocked,
however, and South Korean forces have threatened to resume hos-
tilities in early 1954.
President Rhee publicly stated on 27 July that his govern-
ment would not disturb the armistice while the political confer-
ence undertook "within a limited time" to solve its two principal
agenda questions: withdrawal of foreign troops and the permanent
status of Korea. Even during this period, however, his coopera-
tion might be lost through failure to obtain from the United
States a commitment of support for a resumption of hostilities
or a security pact guaranteeing immediate assistance in the
event of a Communist attack.
At any time, therefore, he miLght obstruct the truce imple-
mentation and violate the assurances given the Communists by
front-line provocation, hostile action against neutral nations
personnel, and further releases of prisoners.
Assuming that the armistice dloes not break down in the
three months before the political conference convenes, the
conference itself presents many complex problems. The questions
of the participants, the procedure and the agenda will be diffi-
cult to solve in themselves.
The UN must decide whether to invite all nations having
troops in Korea, to select certain representatives from among
them, or to invite all interested parties, for example, India
and Nationalist China. If the conference has a broad represen-
tation, the Communists may press for a multipartite Far Eastern
conference with the participation of the USSR and possibly
Eastern European Satellites and the Viet Minh, as well as
Communist China and North Korea. If UN representation is
restricted to those directly involved, the USSR may choose to
remain behind the scenes as at Panmunjom.
The question of voting procedure is closely related to that
of participants. Whereas the UN will presumably seek decisions
by a two-thirds or majority vote, the Communists are likely to
seek veto power over conference decisions.
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The Communists will probably try to use an "et cetera" in
the armistice agreement as a basis for discussing China's seat
in the UN and the status of Formosa. Several of the UN allies
favor such a discussion and are sympathetic to Peiping's position.
The Communists wish to avoid discussion of Indochina.
A comparatively minor but complicated question for the con-
ference is the status of prisoners who remain unwilling to be
repatriated after 90 days of Communist "explanations." The
conference can discuss this question for only 30 days, in which
time there is little prospect of agreement.
The 8 June POW agreement provides for these prisoners then
to be freed and assisted to go to neutral nations. Ambiguities
in the text will permit the Communists to try to block the
prisoners' change to civilian status, to seek their continued
detention as displaced persons, or to limit sharply the inter-
pretation of "neutral nations." The Communists may also bring
forward, in this period, the question of the 27,000 prisoners
released by Rhee in June. On various points of the prisoner
issue, the Communists are likely to get some support from
certain UN allies,
As regards the withdrawal of foreign forces -- one of the
two main agenda questions -- both sides have called for with-
drawal but neither has made specific proposals for its accom-
plishment. It is uncertain whether this question must be
resolved before that of the permanent status of Korea is taken up.
There seems little chance of an early withdrawal of Chinese
Communist forces, and in any case those forces would still be
disposed in Manchuria as a continuing threat to Korea. As
recently as 27 July Peiping suggested that some portion of the
Chinese Communist forces would remain in Korea to assist in
reconstruction. There;is no way that the UN can ensure a
Chinese withdrawal short of inflicting a military defeat on
the Communist forces.
As regards the principal question before the conference,
both sides are publicly committed to the peaceful unification
of Korea but there has been no sign of agreement on terms.
The Communists appear determined to retain control over North
Korea as a base for eventual control of the entire nation.
Rhee appears equally determined to press for unification under
his authority. Some UN members are believed to favor a trus-
teeship over Korea, which might be linked to a similar arrange-
ment for Formosa.
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The Communists might conceivably propose a coalition
government for all of Korea, using Soviet bloc assistance in
reconstruction as a bait. Although there is no prospect that
Rhee would accept such a proposal, the Communists might seek a
"united front" with anti-ghee forces in South Korea in an effort
to remove Rhee and induce acceptance of the offer.
Rhee has publicly and privately stated that his cooperation
will depend on the progress achieved by the political conference
in its first 90 days. The Communists have been assured that
there is no time limit on the armistice, and they will certainly
seek to avoid a time limit on the discussions. Rhee has been
promised that, if after 90 days of the conference, it is apparent
that the Communists are negotiating in bad faith, the United
States will withdraw and will consult with Rhee on further
action. The United States is not committed, however, to support
Rhee in a resumption of hostilities at that time.
It is most unlikely that agreement can be reached on the
main agenda questions in 90 days. The Communists are probably
confident, however, that their proposals will be regarded by
many of the UN allies, if not by the United States or South
Korea, as meriting further discussion. The United States may
thus be under pressure from three directions at that time.
The principal danger is that South Korean forces will take
unilateral action in the belief that the UN Command, despite
the latter's assurances to the Communists, could not afford to re-
fuse its support. Should the UN Command in fact withhold support,
South Korean forces would be no match for the Communists. Should
the UN Command provide support in such circumstances, many of the
UN allies could be expected to withdraw, and the United States
might find itself isolated in support of an unpopular conflict.
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POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
Real political control over the Soviet military organi-
zation rests with the apparatus of the party Central Committee,
which is subservient to the individual or group at the top of
the party hierarchy, The Soviet army at this time is believed
not to be an autonomous source of power. It would probably
not support the defense minister or any other single political
leader who was not firmly established as the indisputable
dictator. An indication that'any one member of the collegial
leadership was attempting to manipulate the army in a bid for
personal power would immediately be apparent to his colleagues
who presumably would deal with him as they did with Beria.
For 35 years Soviet political leaders have been develop-
ing and maintaining a system of checks and controls in the
military organizations, in order to ensure the loyalty of the
generals and their troops and forestall any military coup.,
The ability of the politicians to arrest and execute a large
number of the highest Soviet army officers in 1937 demonstrated
the effectiveness of the system.
Since, 1925, the main political organs within the armed
forces have been directly under the guidance, or actual com-
ponents of, the party Central Committee. Known as Chief
Political Directorates (GPU), they have the over-all mission
of political guidance of the military establishment along
policy lines formulated by the Central Committee,
According to the party statutes as revised at the 19th
Party Congress last October, the Chief Political Directorates.
of the army and navy are to function "with the powers of"
departments of the Central Committee. The merger of the
Ministries of the Army and Navy into the Ministry of Defense
in March .1953 was paralleled by the creation of a single Chief
Political Directorate for Defense.
Previously, from 1947 to 1950, when there was also a
single Ministry of the Armed Forces, the organization of the
main headquarters of the Chief Political Directorate was
similar to that of the central committee apparatus. Presumably
the political structure is much the same today.
On the lower levels, the GPU organization proliferates
in accordance with the subdivisions of the armed forces organi-
zation. On the level of the military district in the army
and of the fleet in the navy, there is normally a political
directorate which governs party activities. In addition,
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there is a political officer whose appointment must be approved
by the party Central Committee, On the next subordinate
level, party activities are directed by a political section.
Political work in lower units is carried on by a politi-
cal officer who is a member of the commanding officer's staff.
Here, however, there are also parity organizers to assist the
political officer in his work. While the political officers
and organs are subordinate to their military commander, they
can report outside normal military channels to the next higher
political headquarters, thus giving them a dual command channel.
The number of top-ranking officers holding party member-
ship has increased until today al]L the top leaders of the
Soviet armed forces are members. This clearly shows that
party membership and approval are necessary for a successful
military career, and gives the party additional leverage over
the command personnel of the armed forces.
Party members in the armed forces are all gathered into
primary party organizations or cells in their respective
units. While these organizations do not exercise direct
control over the administration or command of the unit, they
function under the political officer to assure the correct
orientation of personnel. In addition, but on a larger scale,
the Komsomol or youth organization performs similar functions
among lower ranks.
Within the over-all political organization of the armed
forces, the party also maintains its own checking and disci-
plinary system by means of party commissions. The highest of
these, to which all others are directly subordinate, is at-
tached to the GPU and is chosen by the party Central Committee
Lower commissions exist through the division, level and are
elected by party conferences convened only on Central Committee
order, These commissions have the power to review and counter-
mand decisions of lower party organizations in the armed
forces, ensure the implementation of party decrees, admit new
members to the party, and take disciplinary action against
existing members, including their expulsion from the party
ranks.
In addition to the political organization, the MVD, which
operates as the party?s most important punitive arm, maintains
special counterintelligence units on every staff down to and.
including the battalion with informant nets extending to the
lowest levels. The party's control mechanism in the MVD is
similar to that in the armed forces. These MVD units and the
political organs cooperate closely to :assure the Soviet politi-
cal leaders the complete loyalty of the armed forces,
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The recent Soviet offer to settle Iran's financial claims
against the USSR and the frontier disputes, together with other
diplomatic moves, suggest that Moscow is inaugurating a more
positive policy toward Iran.
The Soviet initiatives reflect interest in exploiting
Iran's deteriorating political and economic conditions and seem
timed, in part, to take advantage of US warnings that Mossadeq
cannot count on American aid as long as he shows no real desire
to find a solution to the oil question.
Since Iran became embroiled with the British, Moscow has
maintained an outwardly correct line, posing as Iran's dis-
interested and anti-imperialist friend while at the same time
continuing its clandestine support of the Tudeho The new
friendly Soviet approaches appear to be an effort to back
propaganda support for Mossadeq's stand with concrete deeds.
Soon after Stalin's death Moscow proposed to settle some
border disputes, appointed a top-level Soviet diplomat,
A. I. Lavrentiev, as the new ambassador to Iran, and concluded
a trade agreement with Iran, almost doubling the present
volume of trade between the two countries, bringing the new
total to over $100,000,000 annually. The USSR thus regained
the place it held in the 1930's as Iran's leading trade partner.
By these moves Moscow apparently has prepared the ground
for a general settlement of all outstanding issues, which
also include the disposal of Caspian fisheries property and
a possible revision of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty.
In any negotiations Moscow will probably attempt to
demonstrate that Mossadeq has an alternative to economic and
political ties with the West. Therefore, the Soviet negotiators
are unlikely to make extreme or unacceptable demands but
rather will seek to induce Mossadeq to conclude political and
economic agreements favorable to long-range Soviet interests
in Iran.
In negotiating a general settlement, Moscow's minimum
aims would center on its long-standing determination to fore-
stall the intrusion of Western influence in northern Iran.
The maximum aims of the Soviet negotiators would probably be
to achieve the expulsion of American military and technical
assistance missions from Iran, and to secure concessions en-
abling Moscow to extend its influence over Iran's economy,
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In pursuit of its aims, the Soviet Union can provide
funds, technical experts and equipment for Iran's oil opera-
tions in exchange for an Iranian commitment not to ship oil
to Western nations. As an added inducement, it might guarantee
Iran markets in the "popular democracies" for its oil products
as suggested by the Tudeh. On 13 July former ambassador
Sadchikov indicated increased Soviet interest in Iranian oil
when he said that the "expansion of cooperation between our
two nations ... is correlated with their most important vital
resources."
In view of the prospects for closer political relations
and expanding economic ties, the Tudeh is not likely to at-
tempt a disruptive coup in the near future. However, it can
be expected to use these signs of Soviet friendship as a
major propaganda theme to win popular support and to generate
enthusiasm for the cause of Iranian-Soviet friendship.
Friendly Soviet gestures toward Iran would probably
strengthen popular support for Prime Minister Mossadeq's
position. If he could reach an apparently favorable agreement
with the Soviet Union, and in particular if he persuaded the
USSR to return the gold, he could claim a victory for his
diplomacy.
This extra support would probably be sufficient to en-
sure the success of his plan to dismiss the present Majlis
through a plebiscite and hold new elections. With the present
increase in Tudeh capabilities it is likely that the party
could elect some of its followers to the new Majlis and even
win cabinet representation.
Moscow probably believes that Mossadeq's continuation in
power will best serve its long-range interests. While Soviet
policy may exploit more assiduously any opportunities offered
by the oil stalemate and the resulting; political and economic
confusion in Iran, an attempt to extract far-reaching conces-
sions by physical intimidation or to detach Iranian provinces in
connivance with the Tudeh appears unlikely.
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ARMS SMUGGLING INCREASES IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN
A sharp increase in arms smuggling in the strategic
Kurdish tribal areas of northwestern Iran has resulted from
the unrest caused by Prime Minister Mossadeq's agrarian re-
form decree and by the army's efforts to disarm the tribes
(see map, p. 14). While there is no apparent organized con-
spiracy among the Kurds to overthrow the Tehran government,
the current situation offers a potential threat to public
order and local stability.
The government attempts periodically to disarm the
tribes, although the army lacks the means of enforcement, es-
pecially in the remote sections. The increased trade in ille-
gal weapons, noted by both Iranian and American officials, has
probably been prompted by the desire to replace weapons confis-
cated by the army and by a fear that the government's security
forces cannot provide sufficient protection against marauders
and raids from other tribes,
In April the American consul in Tabriz estimated after a
careful study that there were about 5,000 rifles, shotguns and
automatic weapons,excluding sidearms, in all of Kurdistan. He
reported that 300 to 350 rifles per month are now entering
Kurdistan's illegal arms market along with an additional 100 to
150 pistols and automatic weapons. Three quarters of these are
supplied by an interconnected but unorganized network of dealers
who in turn buy from three large-scale smugglers in Tabriz. It
is significant that while the three major tribes in the area can
muster around 30,000 able-bodied men, they have only about 2,000
rifles even after many decades of arms smuggling.
Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that foreign
agents, particularly British and Russian, are responsible for
the illegal arms traffic, but the consul in Tabriz reports no
evidence to support this charge. Many of the weapons are prob-
ably obtained by sale or theft from the army. Others were prob-
ably left behind when the Soviet-sponsored Kurdish and Azerbaijan
republics were dissolved in 1946.
Tehran's security forces could probably control any armed
uprising at present. They recently demonstrated their ability to
do so when the Bakhtiari in southern Iran attempted to revolt
during the spring of 1953? Nevertheless, tribal unrest and
government vacillation will provide a continuous irritant and
greatly add to the security and administrative problems which the
government faces in the outlying areas.
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EGYPTIAN ARMY DISCONTENT WITH MILITARY REGIME'S LEADERSHIP
Dissatisfaction within the Egyptian army, particularly
among the traditionally elite artillery service, with the
policies of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) points up
the regime's problem of retaining the support of the armed
forces. This support is essential because the outlawed Wafd
party and certain elements of the Moslem Brotherhood, the only
effective political organizations in Egypt, are largely in
opposition to the regime.
During the past year, the officer corps of the army has
been shaken up as a result of the dismissal of some 500 indi-
viduals, approximately 12 percent of the total officer strength.
Ninety percent of the general officers and 20 percent of all
officers above company grade have been retired. Accordingly,
there remains only a limited number of experienced senior offi-
cers on whom the regime must rely to run the army.
The concentration of power within the RCC in a small clique
headed by Colonel Nasr, and the promotion to major general and
commander in chief of the armed forces of 33-year old Major Amir,
a member of this grojp, raises the question of the continued
loyalty of the army to the regime.
Colonel Nasr has stated that Amir is popular with the army
and that it accepts his elevation from major to commander in
chief. The only reaction within the army to date has been the
resignation in protest of the chief of staff of the air force.
However, there has been persistent evidence of dissatisfac-
tion within the army over the policies of the ruling group dating
from October 1952, when the RCC removed artillery Colonel Mohanna
from the three-member regency committee which was theoretically
ruling Egypt. The artillery has been particularly identified in
anti-regime activities.
When Mohanna and a group of artillery officers were arrested
last January, allegedly for plotting a countercoup, friction with
the ruling clique came to a head. With Mohanna's sentence to
life imprisonment in March, the RCC theoretically removed the
possibility that he can actively intrigue against the regime.
He retains considerable respect within the army, however, and
accordingly remains a potential leader of any army revolt against
the ruling clique.
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Evidence of the regime's continuing distrust of the
artillery is the reported transfer in May from Alexandria to
Gaza, on the Israeli frontier, of the commanding general of the
Northern Zone and his artillery commander. Both of these offi-
cers are described as sympathetic: to the faction still loyal
to Colonel Mohanna.
At a time of uncertain popular support for the regime's
domestic policies, it can ill afford to permit dissension within
army ranks, yet apparently is not able to suppress it.
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ADENAUER'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
The prospects are now good for Chancellor Adenauer's
return to power as a result of the 6 September West German
elections. There is a strong possibility that the opposi-
tion Social Democratic Party (SPD) will win a small plu-
rality, but Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union has the
better alliance potential and therefore the better chance
to form a government. Nevertheless, a third of the voters
still have no firm party preference, and international
developments, especially in regard to German unity, are
likely to determine the final election results.
In the 1949 national elections, the Christian. Democrats
won 31 percent of the vote to the Social Democrats' 29 per-
cent, The rest of the vote was divided among the two other
coalition parties, the German Party and the Free Democratic
Party, and a number of splinter parties. In the state
elections of 1950-51, however, the CDU lost considerably
while the SPD gained and began to emerge as the largest
single party. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea may have
been a significant factor, since the SPD was then, as now,
the leading advocate of efforts to reunite Germany and re-
duce world tension. Furthermore, the newly formed refugee
party, now called the All-German Bloc (GDB), cut signifi-
cantly into the Christian Democratic vote.
Although many observers expect a continuation this
September of the 1950-51 voting trend, the CDU appears to
have greatly improved its position over the past year, In
April, for the first time in three years, it began to run
ahead of the SPD in public opinion polls, and by a substan-
tial margin. This reversal coincided with Adenauer's trip
to the United States, which epitomi2,ed for West German
citizens the end of their role as outcasts. The economic
gains of the past year also bolster the prospects of the
government parties.
The one-third of the populace which polls reveal have
no firm voting convictions will be greatly influenced by the
shifting prospects for German unity and for Western inte-
gration. The outlook for unity, the foremost political goal
of West Germans, is now poor, but any concrete development
which offered a promise of free all-German elections would
swing much of the undecided vote to the SPD,
17
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Meanwhile, however, the general reaction to the 15 July
Allied proposal for four-power talks has helped Adenauer.
He seems to be getting some public credit for this offer,
and the independent press has ceased to attack him on the
unity issue, as it had immediately after the East Berlin
riots. By and large, the disturbances in East Germany have
redounded to Adenauer's benefit, Furthermore, the passage
of EDC by the Dutch lower house has to some extent revived
West German faith in the efficacy of Adenauer's Western
integration program,
Although the CDU appears un]Likely to regain completely
the ground it lost in the 1950-57L state elections and com-
pensate for the pull of the refugee bloc, a small Social
Democratic plurality would not of itself be sufficient to
throw Adenauer's party out of office. There are indications
that the refugee party expects to~be included in agovern-
ment with the CDU and one or more parties of the right, and
in recent months it has been realigning its foreign policies
to coincide with those of the present coalition. However, it is
also clear that given the right terms the refugee party
would be responsive to AnSPD'offer of a coalition.
Nevertheless, the Christian Democratic Union, with its
middle-of-the-road stand on most domestic issues, ts a more
natural ally than the SPD for the smaller parties. In the
absence of unexpectedly large reverses, it will probably be
able to form a new government under Adenauer somewhat
approximating the present coalition.
A big SPD victory might result in the formation of a
"grand coalition" under a more liberal CDU chancellor, such
as Karl Arnold, minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Such a victory might also give rise to an arrangement where-
by Reinhold Maier's "liberal" wing of the coalition Free
Democratic Party would join with the SPD and the refugees to
form a government excluding. the Christian Democrats.
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INDONESIAN POLITICS STALEMATED BY
COMMUNIST-NATIONAL PARTY COOPERATION
Since the Indonesian cabinet fell on 3 June, all attempts
encouraged by President Sukarno to reconstruct the National
Party-Masjumi coalition have been unsuccessful, largely be-
cause of the National Party's cooperation with the Communists
in obstructionist tactics, With the prospects of a viable
parliamentary cabinet receding, there are increasing demands
from moderate groups for President Sukarno to form an emergency
cabinet, a course which to date he has refused to take.
The moderate Masjumi, or Moslem Party, and the highly
opportunistic National Party are the two largest of the 18
political groups in Indonesia's appointed provisional parliament.
They do not work together effectively, but their combined
parliamentary strength represents a substantial majority; a
combination omitting either one would be highly unstable. The
last cabinet fell when the National Party withdrew its support
in line with its present policy of cooperating with the Commu-
nists, who are the third largest parliamentary group.
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Subsequent efforts to form a new cabinet have centered
on diverting the National Party from the Communists toward a
moderate position. Although the Idasjumi believes itself capable
of forming a government with the support of the Socialists and
several center parties, it has made no effort to do so, knowing
that without the National Party it would be short-lived, and
fearing that such action would drive the National Party irrevo-
cably into the Communist camp.
While President Sukarno and the moderate parties have
sought to achieve a National Party-Masjumi coalition, the
Communists have attempted both to maneuver the formation of
a government led by the National Party and to prevent the
formation of an emergency cabinet by the president.
The Communists are working through the National Party in the
cabinet negotiations, and through the leftist press and leftist
organizations in maneuvers aimed directly at the public. They
have seized, with some success, on popular resentment against
the Darul Islam, an active and fanatical Moslem terrorist
organization, to discredit the Mas,jumio Communist-organized
demonstrations and resolutions passed by Communist-controlled
groups have alleged that the Masjumi supports the Darul Islam
depredations and have asserted that only a non-Masjumi
"anti-terrorist, united front government" will take action
against dissidence.
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Actually, the Masjumi has unequivocally declared that
the Darul Islam is. an enemy of the state, With the increasing
possibility of an emergency cabinet being appointed, the
Communist press has now begun the line that "Indonesia must
be saved from a fascist cabinet."
National Party-Communist efforts to exclude the Masjumi
from a new government are looking forward to Indonesia's first
parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled for early 1954.
The government in power, with its responsibility for organizing
the elections, will be able to influence their outcome0 The
leftist bloc believes that only by excluding the Masjumi from
the government can it counter the advantage that will accrue to
that party from its identification with the Moslem faith, which
is overwhelmingly predominant in Indonesia.
President Sukarno continues to insist that a National Party-
Masjumi parliamentary cabinet is possible, and that a presi-
dentially appointed emergency cabinet is unconstitutional and
must not be considered. Most Indonesian leaders outside the
National Party-Communist bloc, however, believe that once all
possibilities for forming a viable non-Communist coalition
government have been exhausted, Sukarno, as the only alternative
to political chaos, will appoint a cabinet to govern until
elections are held.
Although the Communist Party will almost certainly be
excluded from the, new government whatever its form, party
tactics during the past two months have had a large measure of
success. By cooperating with the National Party, the Communists
have contributed to the creation of a political stalemate.
Only a departure from constitutional procedure appears likely
to get the government in motion again, and the adoption of such
a course may be used effectively by the Communists against the
moderate parties and possibly even against Sukarno in the 1954
election.
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