UPDATE OF EL SALVADOR HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001300010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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No. 0580
October 1972
Update of EI Salvador Handbook
Please replace the July 1970 edition of the EI Salvador Handbook with the
attached. Please retain the cover and dividers.
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Page
Location 1
Area 1
Climate 1
Topography 1
Natural resources 1
Human resources . 2
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth rates and trends 1
Income distribution 1
Main sectors of the economy 1
Transportation and communications systems . 3
Government economic policies and financial system . 3
Foreign trade . 4
Balance of payments and international reserves 5
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary 1
Structure and functioning of governmental system . 3
Political dynamics . 4
Security system . 6
Communist party and front groups 1
Insurgent movements and foreign support . 2
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Defense organization and manpower 1
Major weapons systems and logistics. 1
Military budget . 2
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Defense commitments 1
Economic and technical assistance programs 1
US investments . 2
Trade and trends . 2
IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA
EI Salvador ii
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EI Salvador, the smallest, most densely populated mainland country in
the Western Hemisphere, has been able to play a leading economic role in
Central America because of a competent entrepreneurial class and a rela-
tively rapid pace of industrial development. A high degree of internal
political stability and a decade of free elections have aided economic devel-
opment by providing a favorable climate for investment. Although govern-
ment manipulation of election results in 1972 and a serious but unsuccessful
military revolt that year marred a good record, these appear to be only
temporary steps backward. The party that has governed the country since
1961 remains committed to a program of social and economic reform- and
has made exemplary use of US assistance.
Salvadoran society, nevertheless, is still characterized by economic
extremes, with only a small middle class emerging. between the wealthy few
and the impoverished majority. The substandard living conditions of the
majority, contrasted with the ostentatious display of wealth by a few, have
for many years been a source of discontent exploitable by subversives. The
disruptive efforts of the small and illegal Communist Party and its front
groups, however, have been ineffective, partially because government
security forces have been able to counter subversive activities, but largely
because the government's reform program has made some progress on behalf
of the lower income groups. For example, progress in public health-
especially preventive medicine and environmental sanitation-has already
reduced the infant mortality rate and lengthened life expectancy. Another
factor lessening discontent is the fairly high degree of social mobility that
has resulted from the homogeneity of the population. Since most
Salvadorans are mestizo, Roman Catholic, and Spanish speaking, the class
structure has developed along economic, rather than racial or religious, lines,
thus facilitating the movement of families into the growing middle class as
they improve their economic standing.
EI Salvador's main foreign relations problem is with Honduras. The
difficulties stem from undefined portions of their common border and from
large-scale migration to Honduras of Salvadorans seeking employment. Fric-
tions have twice erupted into military hostilities (1967 and 1969). The two
belligerents have been attempting to settle their differences through negotia-
tion since the fighting ended in 1969, and both sides are optimistic about the
possibility of reaching a satisfactory settlement.
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EI Salvador, which is centrally located on the Central American
isthmus, fronts on the Pacific Ocean and has a coastline of 190 miles. It
shares a 110-mile border with Guatemala and a 210-mile border with
Honduras; portions of the latter are still in dispute.
The smallest of the Central American republics, EI Salvador has an area
of 8,260 square miles-about the size of Massachusetts. It has an east-west
dimension of 165 miles and measures 70 miles from north to south.
The climate is tropical with a dry season from November through April
and a rainy season from May to October. The rainfall ranges from 60 to 80
inches a year, more than 90% of which occurs during the rainy season.
Temperatures vary from 60 to 100 degrees F in the lowlands; mean daily
maximums are generally in the 90s. At an elevation of about 3,000 feet
temperatures are normally in the 80s with extremes of 50 degrees to above
90 degrees. Above 6,000 feet temperatures sometimes drop to near freezing.
Earthquakes occur frequently and range from mild shocks to destructive
tremors of considerable intensity and duration.
Topography
EI Salvador is predominantly a rugged highland interspersed with many
small upland plains and valleys; relatively wide lowland plains extend along
the coast. Several mountain peaks exceed 6,000 feet, the highest being 9,200
feet. Numerous lakes and volcanoes dot the landscape.
Principally an agricultural nation, EI Salvador raises a high percentage
of its food crops, such as rice, beans, and sorghum, and exports coffee,
cotton, and sugar. Forests cover only about 11% of the country; ocean
resources are exploited, and shrimp has been the third most important
export for over a decade. Small amounts of gold., silver, copper, lead, and
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zinc are known to exist; nonmetallic mineral deposits, mostly limestone and
marine salt, are commercially exploited.
With a population of 3,664,000 in mid-1972, EI Salvador has one of the
highest densities in Latin America-443 persons per square mile. During the
past two decades the birth rate has declined slightly, but a significant decline
in the death rate, especially in infant deaths, as a result of improved public
health programs and environmental sanitation has caused an average annual
growth rate in excess of 3%.
The population growth and the large percentage of people in the
younger, dependent age groups are becoming publicly recognized as draw-
backs to development. Emigration to neighboring Honduras, for many years
an escape valve, has not been possible since the 1969 hostilities and the
strained relations that followed. EI Salvador's family planning program,
although still in its formative stage, is the most vigorous in Central America,
and has begun to have some effect on the birth rate.
Approximately 32% of the population live in centers of 2,000 or more
inhabitants. The only significant internal migration is from rural to urban
areas; towns of 10,000 or more show population increases in excess of the
national average. The labor force is about 1,126,000; only about 4.5% are
organized.
EI Salvador is basically a mestizo country, with some 84% to 88% of
the inhabitants falling in this category. Between 6% and $% are white, and
about the same percentage are Indian. There are very few Negroes, and the
Negro admixture in the mestizo group is so slight as to be negligible. Spanish,
the official language, is spoken, or at least understood, by nearly all
Salvadorans. Knowledge of English, French, and German is common among
members of the upper and upper-middle class who travel frequently to the
US and Europe.
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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
EI Salvador's Gross National Product (on a purchasing power parity
basis) was $1.79 billion in 1971, second only to Guatemala among the
Central American republics; but its per capita GNP ($490) is below the
average of $700 per capita for Latin America as a whole, and in Central
America it leads only Honduras.
Since the boom years of 1962 to 1965 when growth rates averaged
6.8%, the economy has leveled off, as anticipated, to growth rates of 4% to
5% in the late 1960s. The conflict with Honduras in mid-1969 and the
subsequent closing of the Honduran portion of the Pan American Highway
to transit of Salvadoran goods dealt a heavy blow to the Salvadoran eco-
nomy. Nevertheless, the country appears to have exceeded its modest pre-
conflict growth rate of about 4%. This recovery, however, involved adjust-
ments in traditional trade and investment patterns. With the loss of the
Honduran market, imports and exports have shifted elsewhere. Private in-
vestors, whose inputs had peaked even before the conflict, are resuming their
activity but with greater caution as they attempt to assess the future of the
Central American Common Market and EI Salvador's potential.
Income is poorly distributed. An upper class of less than 1% of the
population constitutes an economic oligarchy; its members are quite wealthy
by Central American standards, live lavishly, and travel frequently. The
middle class-10% to 12% of the population-has an upper segment that is so
well defined that it is frequently considered a separate class. Some members
of the upper middle class have amassed fortunes approaching those of the
upper class. Most families of the middle class, however, have annual incomes
of $2,000 to about $10,000. Nearly 90% of the population has a family
income below $2,000 a year. About two thirds of the lower middle class live
in rural areas; some of them are migratory day laborers earning as little as 40
cents per day.
Main sectors of the economy
Agriculture, the most important sector of the Salvadoran economy,
accounted for about 27% of the GNP in 1971 and employed about 57% of
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the labor force. From 1962 to 1968 the agricultural sector grew at an
average annual rate of 3.9%, consistently supplying over half of the exports
(mostly coffee, cotton, and sugar) and a large portion of the raw materials
for the industrial sector. Agriculture has continued to grow, and EI Salvador
is now almost self-sufficient in foods.
There are some large, relatively modern farms on which the three main
export crops are produced. The bulk of the agricultural population, however,
lives on small subsistence plots and produces food crops such as corn,
sorghum, rice, and beans. These farmers are only marginally linked with the
money economy and use primitive, labor-intensive farming methods.
The major constraint on the growth of agriculture is the lack of
additional land; approximately 60% of the total land is devoted to crops and
pastures, and this percentage has remained virtually unchanged for two
decades. Mountainous terrain and a shortage of water have restricted the
expansion of the farming area, but considerable increases in yields have been
achieved by the use of fertilizer, giving EI Salvador a 25% to 50% higher
yield of most food crops than other Central American countries.
Although restrained by the thin natural resource base and a paucity of
trained workers, manufacturing and construction industries have grown
rapidly since World War II. Output from this sector grew at an average of
almost 10% per year during the 1962-68 period and by 1970 accounted for
20% of the GNP. Most manufacturing concentrates on satisfying the do-
mestic demand for non-durable consumer goods (mainly processed foods,
textiles, and footwear) and providing semiprocessed agricultural com-
modities for export. Expansion has been facilitated by the development of
electric power and transport facilities, government encouragement through
industrial development laws, and the long-standing Salvadoran tradition of
investing in domestic industries the wealth acquired from the agricultural
sector. The construction industry has received its greatest stimulus since
1962 by a stepped-up government program to provide low-cost housing. The
construction industry, furthermore, is a significant source of employment
for unskilled peasants who migrate to urban areas.
The electric power industry has developed rapidly during the past 15 to
20 years; installed capacity in 1970 amounted to 172,000 kilowatts, ap-
proximately two thirds of which is contained in hydroelectric installations.
An autonomous government agency owns nearly all of the installed capacity
and all major transmission facilities. Production in 1970 amounted to 740
million kilowatt hours, or 220 kw-hr per capita, The industrial sector
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consumes nearly half of the power output, with the remainder divided about
equally between residential, commercial, and public users.
Transportation and communications systems
The transportation system of EI Salvador is generally adequate for the
country's requirements; the telecommunication facilities, while incapable of
meeting present demands, are improving as the modernization program
progresses. The focal point for both is the capital city of San Salvador.
Highways are the most widely used means of transport in the country
and are of major importance to the economy. An adequate network of roads
connects the larger cities, producing areas, markets, and distribution points.
With about 5,400 miles of roadway, EI Salvador has .64 miles of road per
suuar-e mile of area-high by Latin American standards. Major highways,
including the Inter-American and littoral highways, are paved and well
maintained.
Two rail systems, totaling 374 miles, provide long-haul transport of
major commodities such as coffee, cotton, sugar, fertilizer, and petroleum
products to larger domestic markets and ports.
There are four seaports, three of which are used as links to overseas
markets; inland waterways, however, are of very little economic significance.
EI Salvador's only scheduled airline, TACA, offers flights to eight
countries. Another smaller line, AESA, operates nonscheduled cargo flights,
primarily between EI Salvador and Miami. EI Salvador has one modern
international airport that can accommodate jet aircraft and many smaller
private airfields used mostly for crop-dusting and other small private planes.
A nationwide radio relay system is nearing completion, enabling the
telephone to replace the telegraph as the major intercity means of telecom-
munication. Most families have a radio receiver, and AM broadcast service is
good and widely distributed; FM, however, is confined to the capital and to
Santa Ana, the second major city. Television sets have increased to 75,000,
and there are now four TV channels.
Government economic policies and financial system
For over a decade Salvadoran economic policy has been directed
toward raising the general standard of living through industrial development,
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agricultural diversification, financial stability, and a more equitable distribu-
tion of the national income. The mid-1969 hostilities and the influx of some
50,000 Salvadoran refugees from Honduras have sparked increased concern
for economic and social development and for an expanded public sector
investment program.
To accomplish its aims the government, especially since about 1965,
has devoted considerable attention to developing over-all plans for the
allocation of resources. The current plan sets out the broad objectives for the
years 1968-72 and is supplemented by a series of two-year plans embodying
short-term investment programs. Developing and maintaining the highway
network have been important considerations in planning since the 1950s. In
1965 and 1966 public investment concentrated on expansion of hydroelec-
tric and telephone facilities. The present plan emphasizes education, health
services, and the provision of water and sewerage facilities, all areas in which
there are still serious deficiencies.
For the most part the government does not attempt to inf-uence
directly the investment decisions of the- private sector, although permissible
credit expansion is channeled to those sectors that are assigned a high
economic priority. Under the Industrial Incentive Law the manufacturing
industry receives substantial fiscal benefits; the government has also made
loans available to industry through the Salvadoran Institute of Industrial
Development. Another credit institution, the Small Farmers' Welfare Ad-
ministration, provides a similar service to the operators of small holdings.
The government's chief fiscal objective is to maximize public invest-
ment while keeping deficits within manageable limits. Changes in the tax
laws have shifted the relative burden on tax sources. Export taxes and
import duties, still the most important source of revenue, declined from 43%
of the total in 1965 to 30% in 1972. Taxes on consumption, which formerly
furnished 25% of the revenue, now provide 21.5%, and income taxes-both
corporate and individual-now provide about 20% of receipts instead of 19%
as in years past. The Salvadoran Government, as a general policy, avoids
contracting external public indebtedness except for long-term development
loans. The external debt is small in relation to the size of the economy and
debt service payments run about 3% to 5% of the value of exports.
Foreign trade
Du-ring the 1960-1970 decade, exports amounted to an average of 22%
of EI Salvador's GNP, about average for Latin America countries. Since 1961
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exports have grown rapidly and have become somewhat diversified. The
outstanding development has been the rise in exports of manufactured
goods, mainly within the Central American Common Market area (CACM).
From 1961 through 1968 this type of export has risen at an average rate of
29% a year, from less than 11% of total exports in 1961 to 35% in 1968.
Textiles and clothing accounted for about one third of manufactured ex-
ports, while chemical products made up 20% of this group. The traditional
exports-coffee and cotton-which accounted for 75% of all exports in 1963,
declined to only 52% of the total by 1968 and remained at about that
percentage through 1972. Diversification within the agricultural export sec-
tor has also occurred as exports of shrimp, live cattle, rice, and sesame have
increased.
Imports amounted to about 23% of GNP during the 1960s. Capital
goods, especially industrial and construction machinery, were important
imports; agricultural machinery imports, however, have declined since 1964.
The value of imported fuels and lubricants fell appreciably from 1963 to
1965, leveling off thereafter at a relatively low level. The trend reflects the
increase in local refining and a consequent shift from the importation of
refined products to the cheaper crude oil.
Trade with other members of CACM increased at such a rate from 1965
to 1968 that by 1968 CACM was EI Salvador's major trading partner,
moving the United States into an approximate second-place tie with Western
Europe. The hostilities with Honduras in mid-1969 and the consequent loss
of the Honduran market and the closing of the Pan American highway were
partially responsible for the approximately 6% drop in exports to CACM
countries. In 1970 the US and CACM countries were tied as major suppliers
of EI Salvador's imports (29% each). CACM countries bought 30% of exports
and the US 19%.
The volume of trade between EI Salvador and Communist countries has
never been large. Imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were
negligible, and exports were mostly limited to surplus coffee.
Balance of payments and international reserves
The first half of the 1960s was characterized by strongly rising exports
accompanied by a related increase in domestic activity and imports. Over the
period there were regular deficits on goods and services but these were more
than offset by capital inflows, and the net international reserves increased
from year to year, In 1966 there was a marked deterioration in the balance
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of payments performance. Merchandise exports leveled off for the first time
in several years, while imports increased further. As a result, the current
account deficit rose from $13 million in 1965 to $41 million in 1966, and
although capital receipts increased, the net international reserves were drawn
down by $11 million.
Since 1966 the over-all payments positions has shown more improve-
ment. Merchandise exports recovered strongly in 1967, rising by 10% in that
year and by a further 2% in 1968, and imports leveled off. As a result, the
current account deficit was reduced to $23 million in 1967 and to $18
million in 1968. The over-all balance of payments was in approximate
equilibrium by 1969.
Net international reserves more than tripled from 1961 to 1965,
reaching a peak of $51 million at the end of 1965. They declined to $37
million at the end of 1967, but rose of $42 million at the end of 1968-the
equivalent of about ten weeks' imports. At the end of 1971 reserves stood at
$52 million.
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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary
EI Salvador obtained its independence from Spain in September 1821
and almost immediately became a part of the Mexican Empire. In June 1823
the Central American countries declared their independence from Mexico
and formed a confederation called the United Provinces of Central America,
a weak union that soon was plagued by bickering as the various members
attempted to dominate the confederation. By the late 1830s the confedera-
tion had begun to dissolve, and in 1839 EI Salvador declared itself an
independent republic.
Throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th, EI Salvador
experienced periods of dictatorial rule interspersed with times of political
instability when rival groups aided by supporters in neighboring countries
vied for control of the government. Attempts by one or another Central
American state to re-establish the confederation by force added significantly
to the unrest. During most of the country's history, ultimate power rested
with a small group of wealthy planters, closely allied with the military.
This pattern of control began to change in December 1948 when a
group of young army officers ousted the discredited military dictatorship of
General Salvador Castaneda Castro. Since then, younger, more progressive
military officers and the urban middle class have gained strength. Promising
to implement a program of social and economic reforms, one of the coup
leaders, Major Oscar Osorio, was elected president in 1950 in a relatively free
election. His government was only mildly reformist because Osorio and his
followers had to maintain a delicate balance between the powerful forces
committed to the status quo and the rising urban labor, professional, and
intellectual groups demanding change.
Osorio's elected successor, Lt. Col. Jose Maria Lemus, a weak and
vacillating president, was overthrown in a military coup in October 1960,
and asix-man junta, half military and half civilian, was established. Com-
munists and their sympathizers quickly gained influence in the government
and in various political, labor, and student groups. Alarmed over the in-
creasingly apparent Communist bid for power, army officers executed
another coup on 25 January 1961. A Directorate, composed of two army
officers and three civilians, assumed control of the government. It affirmed
its strong anti-Communist orientation, promised early free elections, and
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stated its firm intention of initiating a program of social and economic
reform. Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera, one of the two military members,
soon emerged as leader. The elections for a Constituent Assembly that were
held in December 1961 were widely described as the most honest in 30
years-if not in the entire history of EI Salvador. The Constituent Assembly
appointed a provisional president, retired the Directorate, and slightly re-
vised the 1950 constitution. The new charter was published in January 1962.
The Constituent Assembly then became a Legislative Assembly designated to
serve until June 1964. Rivera's election to the presidency in April 1962 for a
five-year term and his inauguration in July completed EI Salvador's return to
constitutional government.
Rivera was more successful than Osorio in promoting a program of
social and economic reform, because he was able to gain the cooperation of
some wealthy industrialists through business incentives. A minimum wage
was established for farm workers, a labor code was enacted, tenement rents
were reduced, the banking system was reorganized, and the tax structure was
reformed. Educational and health facilities were expanded, and considerable
attention was given to preventive medicine, especially country-wide vaccina-
tion campaigns and the expansion of potable water and sanitary facilities.
During Rivera's tenure a system of proportional representation for legislative
elections was established which, coupled with the freedom of the electoral
process, encouraged opposition participation and fostered a constructive
approach on the part of opposition representatives in the legislature.
The cabinet minister most responsible for encouraging Rivera to pro-
mote honest elections and for enforcing Rivera's decisions was the minister
of interior, Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, who succeeded Rivera in the presi-
dency in 1967. Sanchez, a less dynamic personality than Rivera, carried
forward the basic programs initiated by his predecessor but at a slower, and
at times hesitant, pace.
In electoral matters Sanchez did not live up to expectations; some fraud
was evident in the 1970 legislative elections, and in 1972 the government
resorted to ballot-juggling to give the official presidential candidate a
plurality. In the legislative elections several opposition slates were dis-
qualified on technicalities. Sanchez' successor, Colonel Arturo Molina, was
inaugurated on 1 July 1972, backstopped by a large legislative majority. But
he inherited a legacy of considerable ill-will and disillusionment on the part
of the opposition, and the preinaugural period was marred by an unsuccess-
ful revolt by part of the military. Molina will have the difficult task of
repairing this damage and rebuilding confidence in the electoral process.
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Structure and functioning of governmental system
The Salvadoran Government is composed of three branches-executive,
legislative, and judicial. Specific powers are delegated to each within a
system of checks and balances. In practice, the executive-as in most Latin
American countries-is dominant; since the early 1960s, however, the legisla-
ture has shown a strength exceeded in Central America only by Costa Rica.
The executive power is exercised by the president and the ministers of
state. The president and the vice president are elected by an absolute
majority of the direct popular vote for a term of five years. The president
may not immediately succeed himself for any reason. His fairly broad
powers derive from four major constitutional functions: commander in chief
of the armed forces, the conduct of foreign affairs, internal administration
and security, and maintenance of the sovereignty and integrity of the
republic. He is assisted by 1 1 ministers of state, each of whom heads one of
the governmental departments under the executive branch.
The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly is relatively strong and mature.
Since 1964 it has had sizable representations from minority parties, which
have generally acted as a constructive opposition. The legislature is unicam-
eral and consists of 52 deputies elected for two-year terms by a system of
proportional representation. There is no limit placed on the number of times
legislators may be re-elected. In addition to the normal legislative functions,
the Assembly has several important appointive powers (Magistrates of the
Supreme Court, Courts of Second Instance, and the Court of Accounts) and
a considerable voice in authorizing the contracting of loans.
At the summit of the judicial branch is the Supreme Court, which
consists of ten magistrates appointed by the Legislative Assembly for terms
of three years. They may be reappointed, the appointment becoming life
tenure if named for a third successive term. Judicial procedures are similar to
those of continental Europe in that cases are generally presented in written
form, similar to depositions, rather than argued orally. The legal system is
based on code law and depends very little on judicial precedent. Trial by jury
is authorized for some criminal cases, but has not proved successful because
of the lack of understanding of most jury members of their responsibilities
and duties. The courts are generally conscientious in the dispensation of
justice, but their effectiveness is limited by understaffing, a large volume of
paper work, and antiquated legal codes.
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The country is divided administratively into 14 departments, each of
which has a governor appointed by and solely responsible to the president.
There are no,legislative bodies on the departmental level. Each department is
divided into municipalities which have Municipal Councils that are elected
every two years by popular vote.
Political dynamics
The major political forces in EI Salvador are the "14 families," the
military, and the political parties. The "14 families" and the military have
controlled Salvadoran governments for well over a century. Political parties
have existed since independence, but until recently most have been no more
than personal followings of individuals. Only since about 1960 have parties
begun to acquire an ideological base and existence of their own apart from
the popularity of their leaders, and thus to emerge as a political force in their
own right.
The group that controls most of the wealth of the country, although
generally called the "14 families, probably numbers closer to 100 families.
This economic and social elite has consolidated its position over many
generations through intermarriage and business connections and has con-
sistently influenced, if not dictated, government policy. The most prominent
elite families are Alvarez, Duenas, DeSola, Garcia Prieto, Guirola, Hill, Meza
Ayau, Melendez, Melendez Castro, Quinonez, Regalado, and Sol. In addition
to extensive agricultural holdings in coffee, cotton, sugar, and cattle, these
families control nearly every banking, investment, savings, and insurance
institution in the country, as well as much of the manufacturing. Even
though governmental emphasis has been on social reform and welfare serv-
ices since 1961, the elite families have retained considerable power because
their contribution to the economic development of the country has been
needed to support the government'ss proposed reforms.
Most of the changes of power in EI Salvador's history have been
assisted, if not instigated, by the military. In the past, the wealthy, con-
servative upper class was able to purchase military support by offering social
position or financial reward to military men, most of whom were from
humble backgrounds. Through the years, however, the military has become
less susceptible to control by the economic oligarchy, and a professional
officer corps has developed as a source of power apart from any connection
with the upper class. The officer corps has done this by establishing tight
control over the entire military and police establishment and using force or
the threat of force as a weapon. Because of their middle and lower class
EI Salvador III - 4
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origins, Salvadoran military personnel have been more inclined to favor
social reform than military men in most other Latin American countries.
There is, however, a conservative element in the military that opposes most
reforms, anal the military in general has a tendency to distrust civilian
politicians, especially the Christian Democrats. The reformist nature of .the
government is, therefore, carefully controlled not only by the oligarchy but
also by the military.
There are six legally registered political parties, the largest of which is
the governing National Conciliation Party (PCN), a middle-road party
favoring social reform. The second largest, the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC), is also reformist but left of center. Although the PDC has performed
as a constructive opposition since 1964, many members of the military and
the oligarchy still distrust it, and its future depends largely upon the degree
of success these two power centers allow it. There are four small parties-the
rightist Independent Democratic United Front (FUDI), the conservative
Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS), the leftist National Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR), and the Communist-front National Democratic Union Party
(PUDN). The Communist party is illegal.
In preparation for the 1972 elections, the PDC, MNR, and PUDN
formed a coalition called the National Opposition Union (UNO), uniting for
the first time the leftist opponents of the governing PCN. Some of the PCN`s
conservative support, furthermore, was syphoned off by the emergence of
FUDI. Despite an energetic campaign, the PCN's presidential candidate,
Colonel Arturo Molina, was viewed with little enthusiasm, even by some
fellow officers and members of his own party. The UNO candidate, Christian
Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte, with considerable strength around the
capital city where he had served three terms as mayor, made the February
presidential race a close one. Many, in fact, believe that, in spite of official
figures, Duarte actually polled more votes than Molina. Neither, however,
won the required majority, and the legislature decided in favor of Molina.
The government, apparently alarmed, disqualified opposition slates
from several departments on technicalities prior to the March legislative
elections. As a result, the PCN emerged with 39 of the 52 seats in the
Legislative Assembly, leaving the UNO with eight, the PPS with four, and the
FUDI with one. Opposition parties, especially the PDC, now feel that the
government will practice electoral fairness only as long as the opposition
represents no real threat.
The government, for its part, felt the composition of the UNO necessi-
tated assuring a PCN victory. The government's two main pillars of support,
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the military and the oligarchy, little more than a decade ago had looked on
parties of the democratic left as Communism in disguise. This view had
changed gradually, and the left-of-center parties had gained a degree of
respectability. But the inclusion of the Communist-front PUDN in the UNO
coalition destroyed much that had been accomplished.
Taking advantage of the mutual disillusionment among political forces,
a group of dissatisfied military officers attempted a coup on 25 March 1972,
fashioning an ideological facade from the disputed elections. The rebels
gained an early psychological advantage by capturing (former) president
Sanchez, but by the end of the day the coup had failed, leaving over 100
dead and 200 injured. Most of the leaders managed to claim asylum in an
embassy and go into exile. Among those exiled was Duarte who, against the
advice of other PDC leaders, broadcast his endorsement of the revolt.
The encouraging progress toward political democracy made during the
decade of the 1960s received a setback, and President Molina will have the
difficult task of restoring confidence in the electoral process and resolving
differences within the military. EI Salvador's respect for democratic princi-
ples is not deep-rooted; throughout most of its history governments have
been changed more frequently by force than by ballots, and there have been
the usual electoral abuses found in most other Latin American countries.
This year's elections indicate that Salvadoran governments are not yet
prepared to place their fate in the hands of the electorate.
The right and duty to vote is extended to all citizens 18 years of age
and over; all voting is direct, secret, equal, and for a party slate rather than
for individuals. The three-member Central Electoral Council supervises all
matters pertaining to elections.
Security system
Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are distributed
among the National Police, the National Guard, the Treasury Police, the
Immigration Service, and the Customs Police-with part-time assistance of a
group called the Territorial Services and, unofficially, from the National
Democratic Organization (ORDEN).
agencies are, or t e mos par , s a e y civi cans wi ey c mand
positions held by army officers. The public security forces could probably
control disorders limited to a single geographic area, but would require
assistance from the army in quelling widespread rioting. Both the National
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Police and the National Guard have been trained by USAID in crowd
control. The National Guard has a military strike capability superior to that
of the army, as demonstrated in mid-1969 against Honduras.
The main police organization is the National Police, which has responsi-
bility for urban law enforcement as well as nationwide authority for criminal
investigation and traffic control. Its total strength is approximately 2,000.
Within the National Police is the Department of Investigations, which has a
Technical Section providina laboratory support to about 100 members of
the Detective Section.
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The 1,400-man National Guard has the dual function of maintaining
law and order in rural areas and of acting as a military reserve in times of
emergency. National Guardsmen served effectively during the hostilities with
Honduras in 1969. One unit of the Guard, the Presidential Palace Guard, is
respansible for the physical security of the Presidential Palace.
Other security forces are smaller and more specialized in their
functions. The Treasury Police, numbering approximately 700, are charged
with prevention of smuggling, detection of tax evasion, and control of
manufacture, sale, and import of alcoholic beverages. The Immigration
Service, about 350 persons, controls immigration and tourism; and the
Customs Police, about 250, collect import and export duties.
About 35,000 civilian volunteers belong to a very loosely organized
group called the Territorial Services. Each volunteer devotes several hours a
week to maintaining order in his immediate area. The Territorial Services
also assist with disaster relief, prevention of smuggling, and prevention of
subversion. Except for the patrol leaders, who may have pistols, the
volunteers are armed only with machetes. They are empowered to make
arrests but must turn their prisoners over to the National Police or the 25X1C
National Guard.
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Communist party and front groups
The Communist Party of EI Salvador (PCES) is estimated to have about
200 active members, perhaps 500 nominal members, and up to 5,000
sympathizers. About half the party members, most of the activists within the
front groups, and the majority of sympathizers are in the San Salvador area.
The PCES has from time to time cooperated with other political parties on
specific issues, but has had little influence within the political spectrum.
There are no known Communists in high government positions, and the
PCES has no leaders who have been rewarded with important positions in
the international Communist movement.
Although the PCES is relatively weak and inactive-and has been illegal
for all but a few months since its creation in 1925-it was one of the first
Communist parties in Latin America to attempt an armed revolution. The
unsuccessful uprising, which took place in 1932, cost thousands of lives. It
was crushed, destroying the party, its front groups, and the labor movement.
The Communists cautiously began to reorganize the party in 1936; their
efforts were most effective during World War I I, when they were allowed to
operate fairly openly. The party's strength and influence have fluctuated
since that time, but most governments have suppressed Communist activity.
On 8 March 1970, for instance, when a Communist running on the National
Democratic Union Party (PUDN) ticket won a mayorality election, the
election was nullified. Despite such restrictions, the party has shown remark-
able powers of recuperation and has been quick to use every opportunity to
spread its influence. In 1972 the PCES, having gained control of the PUDN,
allied that party with the PDC and the MNR in an electoral coalition called
the National Opposition Union {UNO). The coalition survived the election
only on paper, as the two non-Communist members considered the Com-
munist-front PUDN an uncooperative teammate. Alliance with the PUDN
also caused a resurgence of conservative distrust of the two parties of the
democratic left.
Until security forces occupied the campus in July 1972 and exiled a
number of subversives, the greatest success of the PCES had been at the
University of EI Salvador. The student front through which it seeks to
control the General Association of Salvadoran University Students
(AGEUS) is the University Action Front (FAU), which has affiliated organ-
izations in each faculty. Although FAU members are only a small portion of
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the total university enrollment, political apathy within the student body
made it possible for the FAU to control the AGEUS for a number of years.
In addition, the faculty was heavily infiltrated with PCES members and
sympathizers.
Communist influence within organized labor is exercised mostly
through two federations: the Salvadoran Trade Union Unity Federation
(FUSS) and the Federation of Unions of Workers in Food, Clothing, Tex-
tiles, and Similar Industries of EI Salvador (FESTIAVTSCES). Thirty-seven
of the 116 trade unions and about a fourth of all organized workers are
affiliated with these two organizations. Not all of the 37 unions, however,
are Communist-controlled. The Communist federations have had little im-
pact in labor affairs during the past few years, and their leadership is largely
discredited. An increase of from $ to 14 full-time paid activists, however,
indicates that there is no shortage of funds. There is also some Communist
influence in the most powerful teacher's union, the National Association of
Salvadoran Educators (ANDES), although ANDES is not Communist-domi-
nated.
Insurgent movements and foreign support
The only insurgent group is the Salvadoran Revolutionary Action
(ARS), aCuban-oriented clandestine organization. It is very small-probably
not more than 50 members-and, since its formation in early 1968, has done
little beyond unsuccessfully attempting two or three bank robberies. During
1969, ARS received some small amount of foreign assistance, probably from
Guatemala through the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) rather than directly
from Cuba.
Since 1960 about 150 Salvadorans have traveled to the USSR and
Eastern European countries, most of them for four or five years of higher
education. About 180 have visited Cuba-47 for training in guerrilla war-
fare-and four have traveled to Communist China. Most of these grantees
have had little to do with the PCES on their return, because the party
leadership is unwilling to allow them any significant influence, and because
the returnees feel intellectually superior to the older leaders of the PCES.
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Defense organization and manpower
Control of the armed forces runs downward from the president through
the minister of defense to the Armed Forces General Staff, which is the
planning and coordinating body for the armed forces as well as the unit
through which operational control is exercised. The top level advisory body
for military and security matters is the Group of Nine, which resembles the
US National Security Council. The Group of Nine is composed of the
president, the minister of defense, the subsecretary of defense, the minister
of interior, the director general of the National Guard, the president of the
National Telecommunications Agency, and the chief of the National Agency
for Special Services, who is also the chief of the Presidential Military Staff.
The armed forces consist of an army, a coast guard type of navy, and a
small air force. The army has 6,100 men, organized into four infantry
battalions, one artillery group, one cavalry squadron, one airborne infantry
company, one signal support company, one engineer support company, and
one medical company. The navy, concerned mostly with anti-smuggling
activities, has 155 men, and the air force has 185, including 36 pilots. All
male citizens between ages 18 and 40 must perform one year of military
service. Since most of the recruits are from the rural lower class and have
only one or two years of schooling, their training must include literacy and
vocational education as well as military skills. There are generally enough
volunteers to meet the needs of the Salvadoran military.
The army has only a limited capability to perform its mission of
internal security and defense against external attack. It could not suc-
cessfully counter an extensive and prolonged insurgency threat or defend the
country against a modern force of equal size. During the hostilities with
Honduras in mid-1969, the army made a very poor showing compared to the
better trained units of the National Guard.
Major weapons systems and logistics
The inefficient logistics system of the armed forces is one of the more
serious limitations on the country's military capabilities. With the exception
of MAP-supported units, the logistics system suffers from an overcentralized
funding system combined with a loosely organized procurement system
based on short-term, usually local, purchase, with little or no standardization
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of equipment. Transportation and communications are inadequate. Major
weapons systems are limited to four B-26 bombers, nine F51 Mustang
fighters, and four F4U Corsair fighters.
Militaryr budget
The military budget for the armed forces in 1972 is $8.7 million-about
6% of the national budget. The public security forces generally receive an
additional 4%. Military and public security funds usually amount to slightly
over 1 % of GNP.
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EI Salvador is intimately concerned with other Central American coun-
tries and with their mutual relationship within the Organization of Central
American States (ODECA) and the Central American Common Market
(CALM). The countries bordering on the Caribbean, especially the United
States and Cuba, are also of major concern. Other countries of Latin
America, the OAS, the UN, Western Europe, Japan, and the USSR affect
Salvadoran foreign policy in descending degree of influence. To Salvadorans
the remainder of the world is too remote to be of much interest.
EI Salvador has historically been an advocate of Central American
unity. Both the 1950 and 1962 constitutions authorize the executive, with
legislative approval, to reunite EI Salvador with other former members of the
Central American federation-provided the proposed state is based on
democratic principles and respects individual rights. EI Salvador is an active
member of ODECA, which has its headquarters in San Salvador, and of
subsidiary bodies of ODECA, such as the CACM and the Central American
Defense Council (CONDECA). EI Salvador aspires to leadership among the
Central American states and for many years has shown the largest volume of
trade within the CACM. Because of its own overcrowded area, EI Salvador is
an enthusiastic promoter of freedom of travel throughout Central America.
It is basic to Salvadoran foreign policy to act in concert with other Central
American states whenever possible and to support in principle any claim on
the part of another Central American state if it is not in conflict with a
Salvadoran interest. For example, EI Salvador has given support, as a matter
of Central American unity, to the Guatemalan claim to British Honduras.
Relations between the United States and EI Salvador are excellent.
Whenever Salvadoran interests have not been in conflict with US policy, the
country has followed the United States as principal spokesman for the free
world. EI Salvador broke diplomatic relations with Cuba on 1 March 1961,
the seventh Latin American country to do so, and supported the United
States during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. It has backed the
United States in other hemispheric and world problems, frequently con-
sulting Washington in advance for guidance. The United States has assisted EI
Salvador with loans, grants, technical assistance, and emergency relief and is
EI Salvador's principal source of aid; aid from international agencies, in-
cluding those of the UN, ranks far behind. EI Salvador has a good record of
repayment, and the Salvadorans are proud of this record.
EI Salvador Oct 72
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EI Salvador's major foreign relations problems have been with
neighboring Honduras. The dispute centers on an undefined portion of their
common border and the alleged mistreatment of a large number of Salva-
dorans who have migrated to Honduras. The border dispute led to armed
clashes in mid-1967, during which the Salvadoran armed forces made a very
poor showing. Over the next two years EI Salvador attempted to improve its
military capability and, in mid-1969, alleging that Honduras was mistreating
Salvadorans resident in Honduras, initiated armed action against Honduras.
(The spark igniting the hostilities was EI Salvador's loss of a soccer match to
the visiting Honduran team, following which a number of Honduran players
and spectators were subjected to various forms of violence. When news of
this reached Honduras, rioting broke out, resulting in considerable damage to
Salvadoran business establishments in Honduras. It was then that EI Salvador
announced that it would use force to protect the lives and property of its
citizens living in Honduras.) Salvadorans have been the object of some rather
mild forms of discrimination by Hondurans, mostly because of envy of the
accomplishments of Salvadoran immigrants and concern over their growing
numbers. Sparsely populated and largely unsettled, Honduras has for genera-
tions been attractive to Salvadorans unable to find employment or obtain
land in their own densely populated country. They have migrated to
Honduras by the hundreds each year, and by mid-1960 there were between
100,000 and 300,000 Salvadorans living in Honduras. About 65,000 of these
returned to EI Salvador after the outbreak of hostilities in 1969. The OAS
has managed to maintain acease-fire, but the rupture in diplomatic relations
has severely weakened the Central American Common Market. Chances for a
settlement during 1973, however, are favorable.
EI Salvador generally enjoys good relations with other American
republics, but it has received no significant aid from any of them except for
a few scholarships in education donated by Chile and a prefabricated health
center donated by Mexico.
EI Salvador is an active participant in the OAS and, in general, feels that
this organization, rather than the UN, is the proper forum in which to
resolve conflicts among the American states.
Relations with Western European countries and Japan are of impor-
tance mostly from the standpoint of trade. EI Salvador, like other Latin
American countries, feels a strong cultural bond with Spain.
The USSR is of concern to EI Salvador because of the potential
Soviet-sponsored subversion that could be directed through Cuba. EI Sal-
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vador, however, has no relations of any type with the USSR or any
Communist country, including Yugoslavia. EI Salvador recognized the USSR
in April 1945, but representation was never established, and no government
since that time has acknowledged or reaffirmed the initial recognition. Soviet
bloc countries have offered aid to EI Salvador, but none of the offers has
been accepted. Trade with bloc countries amounts to very little; EI Salvador
imports practically nothing from the bloc and sends it only six percent of its
total exports.
EI Salvador VII - 3
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VIII. US INTERESTS
EI Salvador is an original signer of the Rio de Janeiro Pact of 1947, the
inter-American treaty of reciprocal military assistance in cases of aggression.
To assist EI Salvador in attaining a capability to maintain internal
stability, the United States has had a bilateral military assistance agreement
with EI Salvador since 1955. Military assistance during the years 1960-69
amounted to $6.1 million. Training and equipment assistance under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) was suspended in 1969 because of the
hostilities with Honduras and the US desire to remain neutral; a limited
amount of assistance to both countries was resumed in February 1970.
US training and influence have been directly responsible for the up-
grading and reorganization of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. In 1965, with
US assistance, the armed forces began a major reorganization to produce a
less cumbersome command structure. Training courses at the Salvadoran
Military Academy and the Salvadoran Command and General Staff School
have improved. The former, founded- in 1868, has been significantly in-
fluenced by the United States since 1941 and is now modeled after the US
Military Academy. The Command and General Staff School is well respected
within the Central American area and regularly receives students from
neighboring countries, as well as from Mexico.
US efforts to persuade the armed forces to lower their sights with
respect to military purchases have been unsuccessful. The Salvadorans have
stated that if the US is unwilling to sell them what they judge to be a
minimum equipment package they will not hesitate to look elsewhere for the
needed items.
Economic and technical assistance programs
During the years 1946-70, US aid to EI Salvador totaled $141.6
million: $86.5 million in loans and $55.1 million in grants. From 1953 to
1961 US assistance amounted to only about $1 million a year and was
mostly in the form of loans for the development of transportation and
communications facilities. With the coming to power in 1961 of a govern-
ment committed to Alliance for Progress type reforms, US assistance has
been substantially increased and has been directed mostly toward improve-
ments in public health, education, tax collection and other administrative
reforms, low- and middle-income housing, and public safety.
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Direct private investments in EI Salvador amount to almost $90 million
and are concentrated in the manufacturing and petroleum industries. Neither
US nor any other foreign country dominates the Salvadoran economy, as
most of the investment in the country comes from domestic sources. In
1970, total investments amounted to about 12% of the GNP.
The United States has always been one of EI Salvador's major trading
partners, although the US share of EI Salvador's trade has not been as high as
that in several other Latin American countries. Around 1967 the United
States was replaced by the CACM area as EI Salvador's chief trading partner.
This, however, represented an expansion of trade with CACM countries
rather than a reduction of trade with the United States. Trade with Western
Europe has also increased during recent years, making that area the third
most important trading partner. In this area West Germany is the largest
customer for Salvadoran exports, but supplies only a small percentage of its
imports.
EI Salvador VIII - 2
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IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA
Chronology of Key Events
1944 (8 May) Resignation and exile of Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez, dictator since 1932.
1945 (1 March) General Salvador Castaneda Castro inaugurated as
president.
(29 November) Liberal Constitution of 1886 reinstated.
1948 (13 December) Castaneda ousted by coup; Major Oscar
Osorio emerges as head of ruling revolutionary council.
1950 (26 March) Major Osorio wins presidency in apparently free
elections.
(14 September) New constitution promulgated.
1952 (17 December) Communist party banned.
1956 (4 March) Lt. Col. Jose Maria Lemus, candidate of the
administration Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unifica-
tion, elected president.
1960 (24 April) Ruling party wins all seats in legislative elections.
(26 October) Lemus ousted by military coup, interim junta
promises free elections in 1962.
(3 December) US recognizes civilian military junta.
(8 December) Communist-front party (PRAM) legalized by
Supreme Court.
1961 (25 January) Six-man military-civilian junta of pro-
communist tendencies ousted by anti-Communist military
coup; new government promises land reform.
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(15 February) US recognizes new government.
(1 March) EI Salvador severs relations with Cuba.
(17 December) National Conciliation Party (PCN) of Col.
Julio Adalberto Rivera wins all 54 seats in Constituent
Assembly elections.
1962 (8 January} New Constitution promulgated by Constituent
Assembly; presidential term reduced from 6 to 5 years and
re-elections barred; also provides fora 52-member unicameral
congress elected for 2-year term.
(4 January) Constituent Assembly elects Eusebio Rodolfo
Cordon provisional president until 1 July 1962.
(29 April) Julio A. Rivera elected president without opposi-
tion.
(1 July) Rivera inaugurated for 5-year term.
(24 October) EI Salvador supports OAS vote to authorize use
of armed forces to enforce quarantine of Cuba.
1964 (8 March) Opposition parties participate in legislative and
municipal elections, winning 20 of the 52 seats and the
mayoralty of San Salvador. Elections apparently conducted
in a free and honest manner.
1966 (13 March) Opposition parties win 21 of the 52 legislative
seats; government policy of holding honest elections con-
tinues.
1967 15 March) Col. Fidel Sanchez of National Conciliation Party
elected president in an honest election. No legislative or
municipal seats filled this year.
(29 May) Salvadoran and Honduran troops clash in undefined
border area.
1968 (10 March) Opposition wins 25 of 52 legislative seats.
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(8 July) EI Salvador and Honduras finally exchange prisoners
captured during the 1967 border clash.
1969 (26 June) EI Salvador and Honduras break relations over
mistreatment of one another's nationals.
(14 July) Hostilities erupt. OAS with great difficulty obtains
cease-fire.
1970 (8 March) Governing party, the National Conciliation Party,
wins 34 of the 52 seats in the legislature.
1972 (20 February) Col. Arturo Molina, candidate for governing
National Conciliation Party, elected president.
(12 March) National Conciliation Party wins 39 of the 52
seats in legislature. Harassment of opposition more evident
than in recent past.
(25 March) Government thwarts coup attempt; leaders
exiled.
(1 July) Molina inaugurated president fora 5-year term.
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Holidays and Significant Dates
1 January
March/April
14 April
1 May
10 May
3 August
5-6 August
15 September
12 October
2 November
5 November
25 December
New Year's Day
Holy Week
Pan American Day
Labor Day
Mother's Day
Employees' Day
Feast of San Salvador
Independence Day (1821)
The Day of the Race (Columbus Day)
All Souls' Day
Anniversary of the First Declaration of
Independence (1820)
Christmas Day
8,260 sq. mi.; 32% cropland, 26% meadows and pastures, 31% non-
agricultural, 11%forested
Limits of territorial waters: 200 n.m.
Population: 3,664,000 (1 July 1972); males 15-49, 845,000; 520,000
fit for military service; 36,000 reach military age (18) annually
Ethnic divisions: 84-88% mestizo; Indian and white, 6-8% each
Religion: 97-98% Roman Catholic
Language: Spanish
Literacy: 50% of population 10 years of age and over (1966 est.);
elementary school year, late January to late October; high school year, late
October to late August; university, April to January.
Labor force: 1.126 million (est. mid 1972); 57% agriculture, 14%
services, 14% manufacturing, 6% commerce, 9% other; large pool ofnskilled
laborand shortage of skilled labor, but manpower training program effecting
improvements.
Organized labor: 4.5% of total labor force; 8% of nonagricultural labor
force
EI Salvador IX - 4
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Time differential: EST -1 hour (GMT -6 hours)
Legal name: Republic of EI Salvador
Capital: San Salvador
Political subdivisions: 14 departments
Type: representative republic
Legal system: based on Spanish law, with traces of common law;
constitution adopted 1962; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme
Court; legal education at University of EI Salvador; accepts compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction, with reservations
Branches: traditionally dominant executive, unicameral legislature
which is unusually independent for Central America, Supreme Court, Pres-
ident appoints cabinet
Government leader: President Arturo Armando Molina
Suffrage: universal over age 18
Elections: legislative and municipal elections every 2 ars; presidential
elections every 5 years
Next elections: legislative and municipal, March 1974; presidential
March 1977
Congress normally convenes on 1 June and 1 December each year;
length of session not specified in constitution
Principal political parties and leaders:
National Conciliation Party (PCN), governing party, advocates social
and economic reform, is pro-Western and anti-Castro; leaders are President
Arturo Armando Molina, Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, Enrique Mayorga Rivas;
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), major opposition party similar in
ideology to other Latin Americar- Christian Democratic parties; leaders are
Jose Napoleon Duarte, Abraham Rodriquez, Carlos Herrera Rebollo, Pablo
Mauricio Alverque, Roberto Lara Velado;
National Democratic Union Party (PUDN), a Communist-front party;
leaders are Francisco Roberto Lima, Julio Ernesto Contreras, Julio Castro
Belloso;
Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS), a rightist party; leaders are Benjamin
Wilfredo Navarrete, Rafael Antonio Carbello, Jose Antonio Guzman
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), leftist; leader, Guillermo
Manuel Ungo
Independent Democratic United Front (FUDI), ultra-conservative led
by General Jose Alberto Medrano and Raul Salaverria
Revolutionary Party (PR), Communist-front party, not legally rec-
ognized; leaders are Jorge Shafick Handal, Fabio Castillo Figureoa, Julio
Ernesto Contreras
EI Salvador IX - 5
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Communist Party of EI Salvador (PCES), illegal; leader is Jorge Shafick
Handal
Voting strength: February 1972 presidential election, PCN 43.4%, PDC,
PUDN, and MNR coalition 42.1%, FUDI 12.3%, PPS 2.2%; March 1972
legislative election, PCN 39 seats, PDC, PUDN, MNR coalition, 8 seats; PPS 4
seats, FUDI 1 seat
Number of registered voters in 1972: 1,119,000
Abstention (1972): About 31% of registered voters
Significant exclusions from voting: none
Extent of fraud: Some voter coercion and harassment of opposition;
some vote juggling; not as fairly conducted as elections of 1964, 1966, and
1968
Member of: UN, OAS, Organization of Central American States
(ODECA), and Central American Common Market (CACM)
GDP: $1.79 billion (purchasing power parity estimate), 1971,$490 per
capita; 79% private consumption, 9% government consumption, 12%
domestic investment {1970); real growth rate, 1970, 4.5%
Agriculture: main crops-coffee, cotton, corn, sugar, rice, beans; caloric
intake, 1,800 calories per day per capita (1969}
Major industries: food processing, textiles, clothing, petroleum pro-
ducts
Electric power: 172,000 kw capacity (1970 est.); 740 million kw-hr
produced (1970), 220 kw-hr per capita
Exports: $228.4 million (f.o.b., 1971); coffee, cotton, sugar, chemicals,
other manufactures
Imports: $249.2 million (c.i:f., 1971); machinery, automotive vehicles,
petroleum, foodstuffs
Principal trading partners: exports-CACM 30%, US 19%, West
Germany 27%; imports-CACM 29%, US 29%, West Germany 8% (1970)
Aid:
Economic-extensions from US (FY46-70), $86.5 million loans, $55.1
million grants; from international organizations (FY49-70), $99.0 million
Military-assistance from US fFY53-70}, $6.6 million
Monetary conversion rate: 2.5 colones= US$1 (official)
Fiscal year: calendar year
Railroads: 374 mi. all narrow gage; 284 mi. privately owned, 90 mi.
government owned
EI Salvador IX - 6
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I-lighways: 5,400 mi.; 750 mi. bituminous, 950 mi. gravel or crushed
stone, 3,700 earth
Inland waterways: Lempa River partially navigable
Ports: 3 major, 1 minor
Civil air: 8 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 141 total, 111 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways
4,000-7,999 ft; 1 seaplane station
Telecommunications: nationwide radio relay system completed;
extensive local telephone exchange improvements completed; 39,000 tele-
phones; 460,000 radio and 75,000 TV receivers, 58 AM, 9 FM, and 4 TV
stations
Personnel: army 6,100, navy 155, air force 185 (36 pilots)
Major ground units: 3 infantry brigades (2 with one infantry battalion
each and 1 with two infantry battalions), 1 artillery brigade, 1 cavalry
battalion, 1 airborne infantry company, 1 signal support company, 1
engineer support company, and 1 medical company
Ships: 4 patrol craft
Aircraft: 33 prop, 1 helicopter
Supply: traditional dependence on US has for the time being shifted to
Western Europe
Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 December 1972, $8.7 million; 25X1C
about 6% of total budget (does not include public security forces).
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 74 (EI Salvador)
General Survey (Jan 1972) and the following specialized sections:
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions (Mar 60)
Sec 23S Meteorological Organizations and Facilities (Jun 68)
EI Salvador IX - 7
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Sec 24 Topography (Jan 60)
Sec 25 Urban Areas (Jul 59)
Sec 41-46 (Ch. IV) Sociological (Aug 61}
Sec 57 Subversion and Insurgency (Mar 69)
Sec 64 Manufacturing and Construction (Apr 60)
Gazetteer (Oct 56)
N IS Areas 71-77 (Central America}
Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches (Jun 69)
Sec 23 Weather and Climate (Dec 69)
Map
The best available general reference map is: Texaco,El Salvador,
1:500,000, 1964
EI Salvador IX - 8
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