ZAMBIA HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001100030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Zambia
a Idbook
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Secret
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N9 92
No. 0597
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NTTNTG
document c'ontainc information affecting the national
n\eof the United States, within the meaning of Title
79:3 and 794 of the ITS Code, as amended.
inn or revelation ot its contents to or re-
an unauttiorized person is prohibited by law.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
I. GEOGRAPHY
Location
1
Climate
1
Topography
1
Natural resources
1
Human resources
2
U. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth rates and trends 1
Income distribution 1
Structure of the economy 1
Iransportation and telecommunications 1
Government economic policy and financial system 2
Foreign trade and investment 3
Balance of payments 4
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
History 1
Structure of the government 2
Political dynamics 3
Domestic political problems 5
Political parties 6
Elections
6
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7
Police
IV. SUBVERSION
Internal
1
External
2
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VI. ARMED FORCES
Defense organization and manpower 1
Military budget 2
Logistics 2
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Southern Africa 1
VIII. US INTERESTS
US policies 1
US government assistance 1
Resident US citizens 1
Trade with the US 1
US investment 2
MAP
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INTRODUCTION
Zambia, a landlocked country in south central Africa, has attained a
fragile political stability under its able and popular President, Kenneth
Kaunda. Although colonized at the turn of the century, Zambia remained
almost totally undeveloped, except for its rich copper deposits, until just
before Great Britain granted the country independence in 1964. Since then,
a determined government leadership has given high priority to an ambitious
economic and social development program. About three fourths of the
country's four million people remain tradition-bound rural dwellers, but the
influences of education and urbanization are beginning to have a significant
impact.
Zambia's mineral wealth gives the country a better base for economic
growth than most African countries, but for the indefinite future the
economy will remain vulnerable to the uncertainties of the world copper
market. Economic growth has been hampered by the lack of skilled man-
power, inadequate planning, and inflation. The government is trying to
diversify the economy, and has had some success in creating a small man-
ufacturing sector. But subsistence farming is still the occupation of most
Zambians.
Domestic politics are dominated by President Kaunda and his ruling
United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda has tried to ride herd
on disparate factions within the party. Despite his dogged attempts to forge
an acceptable balance of party factions, however, tribal infighting has
resulted in the desertion of various groups that have come to believe that
their interests could no longer be protected by the party. Political strains
have also arisen between the relatively prosperous people with cash employ-
ment and the poorly educated urban unemployed and rural villagers who
have few opportunities for a higher standard of living. Nevertheless, the
UN IP still enjoys the support of a popular majority, and Kaunda should be
able to keep his government and party in power, even if it becomes necessary
to engage in harassment or legal action to quash his political opposition.
Kaunda, who is devoted to the advancement of majority rule in south-
ern Africa, has gradually increased Zambian assistance to southern African
insurgents. This has occasionally prompted the white governments to under-
take economic reprisals against Zambia and to threaten possible military
retaliation. Although Zambia's white neighbors have not engaged in sig-
nificant subversive operations against Kaunda's government, the Zambians
remain seriously concerned over national security.
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The defense budget has mushroomed since 1969, although the slowly
expanding security forces still had just over 7,000 men in late 1971. The
government has concentrated on building an air and paramilitary defense
against cross border raids. The Zambian military appears loyal to the govern-
ment.
Developments in southern Africa have influenced Zambia's foreign
policy. Zambia's relations with Western countries, especially with the UK
and US, have cooled because the West has failed to intervene strongly against
the vvhite governments. On the other hand, Zambia has strengthened its ties
with Communist countries because they have supported the southern Af-
rican guerrilla movements and because such countries as Yugoslavia and
China have provided Zambia substantial bilateral assistance that in effect
supports Zambian political goals. By far the largest aid project is the
Tanzania-Zambia railroad, that is being financed and constructed by the
Communist Chinese and will free Zambia from its dependence on white-
ruled countries for access to the sea.
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I. GEOGRAPHY
Location
Zambia, an independent black-ruled southern African country, is
deeply involved in efforts to bring black majority rule to neighboring
white-ruled states. It borders the black African countries of Zaire (formerly
Congo Kinshasa), Tanzania, Malawi, and Botswana; the white-ruled terri-
tories of Angola and South-West Africa to the west and southwest, and
Rhodesia and Mozambique to the east and southeast.
Zambia is irregularly shaped and has an area of 288,000 square miles. If
superimposed on the United States, it would extend from Washington, D. C.,
to New Orleans.
Climate
Zambia has a tropical climate, with pronounced rainy and dry seasons.
Temperatures are strongly moderated by the relatively high elevations.
During the rainy season (mid-November through March) moist northerly to
northeasterly winds produce moderate to heavy rainfall. Temperatures are
generally higher during the rainy season than during the dry season (mid-
April through October). The highest temperatures of the year usually occur
in October.
Topography
The terrain consists mostly of flat to gently rolling high plains ranging
between 3,000 and 5,000 feet above sea level. The plains are covered by
open to moderately dense deciduous forests that have numerous grassy areas.
A narrow belt of low hills covered by savanna and forest extends across the
eastern part of the country. Hill areas are also found along most of the
Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique borders. Marshes occur in a northern
lake region east of Zaire and along the Kafue River in central Zambia. The
principal rivers are the Zambezi, Kafue, Luapula, and Luangua.
Natural resources
Agriculture?Al-though at least 75% of the population depends on
farming, only about 10% of Zambia's land is cultivable. About half of this is
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normally planted at one time while the other half lies fallow. An additional
10% of the total land area is used for grazing. Most agriculture is of the
subsistence type, although there is some cash-crop production?amounting to
6.4% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1968. Enough rice, cassava, sorgum,
and millet is grown to meet domestic needs, but most other food products
must be imported. Tobacco and peanuts are exported, but make up only a
small part of total export earnings.
Fuel and power?Zambia formerly depended on Rhodesia for much of
its power and for all its industrial fuels. Following Rhodesia's declaration of
independence, however, Zambia began to seek alternate sources. The most
important effort has been the development of domestic coal mining to
replace imports from Rhodesia. The government hopes to produce enough
high grade Zambian coal to enable the country to forgo imports from
Rhodesia in the near future.
Zambia has no known petroleum deposits. Most of the country's
petroleum needs are now obtained through a pipeline from Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, to the Zambian Copperbelt. The government plans to build an oil
refinery at the Zambian terminus of the pipeline to supply the full range of
the country's petroleum needs.
About 80% of electricity consumed comes from the Kariba hydroe-
lectric complex located on the Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River. The
Zambian Government currently is constructing two new hydroelectric
plants, one at Kariba on the Zambian side of the Zambezi and the other on
the Kafue River. When completed, perhaps in the mid-1970s, these two
sources are expected to have a capacity of 1,200 megawatts, sufficient to
meet Zambia's expanding consumption for many years.
Metals and minerals?Mining, predominantly copper, is the backbone of
the country's economy. In 1970 the total value of mineral production was
$943 million, with copper accounting for about 97%. Approximately one
Fifth of the non-Communist world's known copper ore reserves are in
Zambia?some 763 million short tons. Zambia also mines significant quan-
tities of coal, zinc, lead, and cobalt as well as small amounts of manganese,
limestone, silver, selenium, amethyst, gold, and gypsum.
Human resources
Zambia has approximately 4,250,000 people, about 99% of whom are
from Bantu-speaking Negroid groups. About 43,000 whites, 11,000 Asians,
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and 2,700 coloreds (persons of mixed ancestry) also live in the country.
Zambia's black Africans are divided into some 73 tribes speaking about 40
languages or dialects. Almost all Zambians can speak at least one of the seven
major languages, however, and a large minority possesses a working
knowledge of English, the official language. Population density is about 14
persons per square mile, and varies widely from area to area. A substantial
migration 'rom rural to urban areas is taking place; in 1971 one in four
Zambians lived in or near urban population centers along the north-south
railroad which bisects the country.
Although the labor force?persons between the ages of 15 and
60?consists of just over 2 million people, only about 350,000 worked for
wages in 1969. Almost 40% of the wage-earners were employed in the
industrial copperbelt. Most of Zambia's labor force possess few skills and
little education. Manpower surveys indicate that not until the late 1970s is it
likely that there will be enough Zambians with the technical skills and post -
secondary education necessary for many jobs. Zambia now must recruit
foreigners, primarily whites from Western Europe, to fill most skilled posi-
tions in the government and economy. The government has been trying to
improve the capabilities of its African population by expanding primary and
secondary education. By 1968, every 7-year-old in the country could enter
first grade. School enrollment and literacy-28% of the total population was
considered literate in 1968?were growing rapidly. Because preindependence
society was dominated by whites, many of whom sympathized with the
Rhodesian Government's refusal to accept majority rule, relations between
whites and blacks in Zambia occasionally become tense, and true interracial
cooperation is rare.
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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth rates and trends
Throughout most of the 1960s and into 1970, copper earnings con-
tributed significantly to economic growth. Between 1965 and 1968, the
gross domestic product (GDP) grew almost 50% to $1,310 million. Per capita
GDP was about $327. In 1970, rising inflation that had accompanied the
economic growth was at least temporarily checked, but copper earnings fell
as a result of declining prices and of a mine disaster which disrupted
production The government is promoting manufacturing and agriculture in
order to reduce the economy's dependence on copper.
Income distribution
There is a wide disparity of income between the white population,
regularly employed Africans, and the great bulk of Africans engaged in
subsistence agriculture. The average annual earnings of non-Africans in 1970
were aboui $7,115, reflecting both the predominance of non-Africans in
highly paid, skilled positions and the need for special inducements in order
to recruit qualified foreigners. The average annual earnings for regularly
employed Africans in 1970 were about $1,231, well above the approx-
imately $150 per capita income for all black Zambians. The gap between the
standard of living of whites and employed Africans is narrowing, but the
disparity between the living standards of employed and unemployed urban
and rural Africans is widening.
Structure of the economy
Zambia's modern economy is dominated by the copper industry. Cop-
per normally contributes about 95% of the country's export earnings. In
1968 it accounted for 42.5% of the GDP and over half the central govern-
ment's revenue. Trade made up 11.5% of the GDP and manufacturing 9.7%.
All other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, contributed less than
7% each. Despite its relative unimportance in the modern sector, agricul-
ture?mostly subsistence farming?provides a livelihood for over 75% of the
Zambian population.
Transportation and telecommunications
The transportation and telecommunications systems of Zambia are
among the best in independent black Africa. Railroads are the most
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important means of transport and carry the bulk of the country's export-
import traffic. Most of Zambia's 664 miles of railways form the center
section of the 2,900-mile Trans-African route connecting the Atlantic and
Indian oceans via Angola, Zaire, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Political con-
siderations have prompted the Zambian Government to seek an end to its
reliance on routes that cross white-ruled territories and it, along with the
Tanzanians and Communist Chinese, is now constructing a 1,100-mile rail-
road to the Indian Ocean at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Although highway transport is of secondary importance, it provides
essential feeder services to the railroads and is the only means of transport in
many parts of the country. The highway system totals about 21,110 miles,
of which 1,500 miles are bituminous, 3,120 are crushed stone or gravel, and
16,600 are improved or unimproved earth, which are often unusable during
the rainy season.
Excluding Lake Tanganyika, Zambia has 770 miles of navigable water-
ways, most of which are only of local importance. The principal navigable
waterways are the Zambezi River, including Lake Kariba, and the connecting
lakes and rivers in the north near the Zairian border.
Air facilities in Zambia consist of about 100 usable airfields and 30 sites
suitable for landings. The quality of the airfields is generally fair. Only five
have hard-surfaced runways, the most important of which are located at
Lusaka and Ndola. The government-owned Zambia Airways operates modern
aircraft and has a training and management agreement with the Italian air-
line, Alitalia.
The telecommunications system possesses a wide range of facilities.
Radio-relay links provide high-capacity facilities on all the domestic main
trunk routes, most of which parallel the north-south railroad. The radio-relay
links are paralleled on most routes by carrier-equipped open-wire lines.
Remote towns to the east and west of this axis are connected to the basic
network by radio-communication stations. The country will have complete
coverage of medium-wave AM radiobroadcasting with the completion of
transmitters now under construction. There is one FM station at Lusaka, and
television can be seen in Lusaka, the Copperbelt, and Kabwe. Zambia has
100,000-250,000 radios and about 17,500 television sets. It also has 48,650
telephones or 1.17 per 100 population, placing it just within the top fifth of
African countries.
Government economic policy and financial system
Economic policy?The government has repeatedly stated that its pri-
mary duty is to promote economic development that will raise and equalize
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the living standards of all Zambians. Economic development plans have given
priority to the modernization of agriculture, the promotion of food crops
leading toward self-sufficiency, and diversification of the country's copper-
oriented industrial sector. The government also has encouraged the replace-
ment of foreign skilled personnel with Zambians as soon as Zambian citizens
have received training for the job, even though they may lack the experience
needed to make them as fully competent as the foreign jobholder.
The government has decided that it must directly control the country's
economic life in order that Zambia's resources can be effectively directed to
national development. As a result of the government's nationalization pro-
gram, it owns at least a 51% interest in virtually all businesses in the country.
Land has been vested in the hands of the government, which in turn leases it
to individuals on a long-term basis with little restriction on its use.
In order to facilitate economic development, the government has taken
measures to regulate the labor movement and to end labor indiscipline and
declining productivity. Regulatory legislation has been passed and presi-
dential decrees have been issued dealing with wage levels and strikes. Labor
councils are to be established to give workers greater participation in nego-
tiations on wages and workers conditions.
The government is giving priority to rural development in order to
eliminate economic and social disparities between urban and rural Zambians.
Lacking the money and personnel for comprehensive programs throughout
rural Zambia, the government hopes to generate local initiative and self-
reliance. Direct assistance is concentrated on extension and credit services,
marketing facilities, and the distribution of agricul.tural tools and consumer
items. Small and remote settlements are required to consolidate and relocate
on good land within reach of government services to qualify for assistance.
Financial system?The Bank of Zambia serves as the country's central
bank and oversees the issue and redemption of notes and coins and the
administration and regulation of credit in the banking system. Commercial
banking facilities are provided by two government-controlled banks?the
National Commercial Bank and the Commercial Bank of Zambia?and three
foreign-owned private banks. In 1971 the government temporarily retreated
from its announced intention to nationalize the private institutions. The
Kwacha, which equalled $1.40 in October 1970, is stable. It is subject to
rigid exchange controls, but can be converted into other currencies.
Foreign trade and investment
Exports--In 1970, exports totaled $1 billion. Copper normally accounts
for more than 95% of total exports. Other minerals, tobacco, and timber
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make up most of the rest. More than two thirds of Zambia's exports go to
Western Europe. Japan is growing in importance as a market for Zambian
goods and rivals the United Kingdom as the largest single export market. In
1970 the United States purchased only $2.0 million worth of Zambian
goods.
Imports?The country's imports totaled S502 million in 1970. The
United Kingdom and South Africa were the leading sources of Zambian
imports in 1970 providing, respectively, about 23% and 17% of the total.
The large volume of South African imports is the result of a government
decision to give high priority to the replacement of Rhodesian goods, which
once accounted for over half of Zambia's imports. Imports from Rhodesia
were down to about 6% of total imports in 1970, and should fall even
further as Zambia develops its own sources of coal and hydroelectric power.
The Zambian Government has now begun a search for alternate sources for
goods now coming from South Africa, and South African imports have
begun to decline. In 1970, We United States was the third largest source of
Zambian imports, totaling $51.8 million or about 9% of total imports.
Foreign investment?The government encourages foreign investment
but prefers it to be in the form of minority participation in selected govern-
ment-controlled enterprises. The government now owns at least a 51% inter-
est in virtually all businesses in Zambia. It has announced that future private
investment will be subject to similar nationalization procedures whenever a
private firm reaches a certain size (so far undetermined). American invest-
ment, concentrated almost entirely in one of Zambia's two copper com-
panies, slightly exceeds $50 million in book value and $200 million in
market value.
Balance of payments
Zambia maintained annual balance-of-payments surpluses through
1970. Rapidly growing payments for international transactions were more
than compensated for by unusually high copper prices which boosted gov-
ernment revenues. A deficit was expected for 1971, however, because of a
fall in copper prices and a loss of production caused by a mine disaster.
Although production may return to normal by early 1972, world copper
prices remain unsettled. Consequently, Zambia's future balance-of-payments
position is unclear. The country's foreign exchange holdings totaled about
$386 millicn at the end of June 1971, the equivalent of about nine months'
imports.
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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
History
Most African Zambians are descendents of ethnic groups that entered
the country in several waves between the 16th and 18th centuries, probably
from a common eastern Congo homeland. Before the arrival of the white
man, the country sustained only a small population because of the tsetse fly,
scarce rainfall, and infertile soil.
Zambia's colonial history began in 1889 when Cecil Rhodes, a South
African financial and industrial magnate, received a Royal Charter from the
United Kingdom Government granting his British South Africa Company
economic rights over a large area, including what is now Zambia. The
company was made responsible for maintaining peace and order, with the
proviso that African rights would be respected and that the British Govern-
ment retained the right to supervise company activities.
The UK assumed full administrative responsibility for the territory in
1924, and created the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. The political
history of the protectorate was marked by strains between a small but
growing white population and Africans seeking an end to white colonial
exploitation. Copper mining, especially after the early 1920s, attracted white
immigrants who enjoyed a favored status and a relatively comfortable
standard 01' living. The mines and white-owned farms also attracted a large
number of Africans despite often harsh living and working conditions. Most
whites considered organized African efforts to obtain reforms as threats to
their way of life. By the mid-1930s, white Northern Rhodesians were openly
calling for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, then a self-governing
colony dominated by local white settlers.
In 1953, the UK and Rhodesian governments formed the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, incorporating what is now Zambia, Rhodesia and
Malawi. The federal government was dominated by white Rhodesians who
sought to safeguard their privileged status. Meanwhile, the Northern Rho-
desian Africans had already become politically conscious with the forma-
tion of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1950.
In 1958, Kenneth Kaunda and other militant leaders broke from the
ANC to form what eventually became the limited National Independence
Party (UN IF). As a prelude to Zambia's independence, the British dissolved
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the federation in December 1963 and, one month later, held general elec-
tions which swept Kaunda and UN I P to power.
Since the country's independence on 24 October 1964, Zambian pol-
itics has been dominated by President Kaunda and UN IP. Party and govern-
ment structures have been centralized to enable Kaunda to push his eco-
nomic and social development programs as well as to contain divisive
domestic factionalism among tribal and other groups. Kaunda's deep per-
sonal commitment to the advancement of majority rule into neighboring
white southern Africa has impelled him gradually to increase government
assistance to insurgent organizations working against the white-ruled govern-
ments. These governments have responded to Zambia-based guerrilla warfare
with increasingly frequent warnings that Zambia is risking severe economic
and military reprisals. The Zambian Government has been slowly expanding
ties with Communist countries, partly as a result of its dissatisfaction and
disillusionment with Western support of southern Africa.
Structure of the government
The Zambian constitution, promulgated in 1964, combines features of
the British and US governmental systems. It provides for a strong president
(who heads the cabinet), a unicameral legislature, an independent judiciary,
and a unitary system of provincial and local government. The concentration
of political power in the hands of UN IP, which considers itself the legitimate
arbiter of political activity, however, has restricted the ability of the legis-
lature or judiciary to function as independently of the executive as envi-
sioned by the constitution's founders. Moreover, sweeping security legis-
lation that was enacted in the late 1960s undermines some constitutional
provisions guaranteeing civil rights.
Executive?The president is both head of state and head of government.
He is elected by universal suffrage and holds office for 5 years or until
elections for the National Assembly, whichever occurs earlier. The president
can summon, address, or adjourn the assembly at any time. If adjourned, the
assembly must convene again within 12 months. The constitution places no
restrictions on the freedom of the president to organize the executive as he
sees fit.
Legislative?The National Assembly has 105 popularly elected members
and 5 nominated by the president. The members represent single-member
constituencies, approximately equal in population, and all Zambian citizens
over 18 years of age are eligible to vote. The term of the National Assembly
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is 5 years unless it is dissolved by the president, in which case new elections
must be held within 3 months. Debate in the National Assembly has been
occasionally lively, but because of the overwhelming majority of UNIP
representation in the assembly since independence, that body almost never
has voted against the wishes of the UNIP leadership.
Judiciary--The professional judiciary is appointed by the president and
may be removed only by the president after due cause has been established
by a special tribunal. In rural areas, most civil litigation and minor infrac-
tions of the modern penal code are handled by local courts in which tribal
chiefs enforce indigenous customary law over their tribesmen, subject to
minimal government regulation.
Local government?Local government is administered by a descending
hierarchy of provincial, district, ward, and village units. A variety of laws and
presidential decrees has been designed to ensure that guidelines established
by the UNIP leadership are followed. Within these broad parameters, how-
ever, President Kaunda intends that technically qualified civil servants,
traditional chiefs and village headmen, and other respected and prominent
local figures play a prominent role in the administration of government
policies.
The district governor is the lowest ranking official and a presidential
appointee. Subject to general supervision by provincial ministers and ulti-
mately the national leadership, the district governor directly oversees ward
and village operations. He has the personal responsibility to ensure that
appointments and, in the case of elected officials, nominees to positions at
the lower levels are politically and technically qualified.
Political dynamics
The ruling UNIP party led by President Kaunda dominates the political
scene. Most political competition in the country is among factions in UN IP
rather than between UNIP and other parties or special interest groups. The
composition of political groups both inside and outside UNIP is generally
characterized by an overlapping of rival tribes or closely related tribes and of
interest groups that arose from modernization. These politically conscious
groups?including party leaders, civil servants, labor leaders, students, and
semieducated and underemployed youth?are developing in the rapidly
growing cities, towns, and mining centers. The great majority of the popula-
tion, which still lives in rural areas and is largely outside the struggle for
political power, tends to be more responsive to traditional tribal authority.
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President Kaunda, the man most responsible for the maintenance of
Zambia's fragile political stability, takes an active role in directing all
national activities. His policies and style reflect an innate traditionalism, a
Christian upbringing by missionary parents, and a strong exposure to West-
ern political values.
Kaunda emphasizes government by consensus, in part to prevent any of
Zambia's disparate groups from dominating the others. The President con-
stantly juggles the membership of leading UNIP and government bodies so as
to maintain a balance of tribal, political and economic groupings that is
consistent with changing power realities and national needs. He tends to
tolerate lengthy palavers and considerable dissension in party and govern-
ment organs, and he prefers to guide his subordinates and the public by
persuasion, education, and good example. To win popular support for the
party and government decisions, he employs parliament as a forum for
making sectional and local views known, particularly on national develop-
ment policies. He also tries to distribute development funds to all areas of
the country and advocates local participation in their administration.
At the same time, Kaunda believes that the gradual establishment of a
one-party state is necessary to guide all political, economic, and social
activities in the country and to prevent debate and competition from getting
out of hand. Increasingly, the President believes that greater control by him
over UNIP and greater party influence in national affairs is required.
Infighting among UNIP leaders along tribal lines almost split the party in
1969 and impelled Kaunda to take decisive steps to consolidate political
power. In addition, he announced measures designed to discipline an unruly
rank and file in UNI P. He also has nationalized most businesses in Zambia
and has strengthened UNIP influence in local government, both actions
designed in part to increase the ability of the national leadership to imple-
ment development programs.
Loath to provoke widespread dissension, however, Kaunda is cautious
in the use of his growing personal and party powers. He has acted firmly
against tribal political factions that threaten to prevent him from building
national unity, and occasionally has taken arbitrary action against unpopular
minorities?most notably foreign residents, small religious sects, and opposi-
tion political parties?none of which has significant influence in Zambian
affairs.
Kaunda recently has stressed the need to mobilize the Zambian popula-
tion against security threats presented by Zambian dissidents or foreign
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agents organized by neighboring white-ruled countries. Parliament passed
unusually harsh security legislation in 1969, and Kaunda has ordered local
officials to maintain a permanent registry of all Zambian and foreign res-
idents and visitors in their areas. In 1971 the government announced plans to
build a National Service administered by the military. The National Service
apparently will be designed to produce an awareness of security problems
and, in the last resort, to act as a reserve popular militia.
Domestic political problems
Tribalism is Zambia's most contentious political issue, but President
Kaunda has been able to keep it a manageable problem. No single tribe in
Zambia wields a predominant influence in the party, government, armed
forces, intellectual elite, or in the economic life of the country. Conse-
quently, none enjoys a power base that could easily be translated into
political power.
Tribal politics currently focus on a Bemba tribal grouping under former
vice president Simon Kapwepwe. Blatant politicking by members of this
group antagonized most of UNI P's other political factions in the late 1960s.
Although President Kaunda willingly demoted Kapwepwe and his Bemba
cohorts in the party and government hierarchy, he rebuffed pressure from
the UNIP majority to remove the Bemba from all important positions.
Nevertheless, Kapwepwe resigned from the cabinet and UNIP in August
1971 to lead a newly formed Bemba-based opposition party. Kapwepwe was
unable to persuade other leading Bembas in UNIP to defect with him,
however, arid one month later the government dealt him another severe blow
by arresting virtually the entire national and local leadership of his party.
Kapwepwe, was allowed to remain free in order to prevent him from
becoming a martyr.
The most serious problem that Kapwepwe's defection could create is
the permanent disaffection of the Bemba population from UNIP. The
E3emba's desertion would reduce UNIP's once large popular majority to a
narrow margin and might make the government less able to manage tribal
and other problems. Although Kapwepwe himself was elected, his party did
poorly in the December 1971 parliamentary by-elections.
Since early 1971, many prominent Zambians in UNIP have begun
openly to debate basic national priorities. Moderates have argued that
extensive nationalization of businesses and other economic reforms have
given an already hard-pressed government more to administer than it can
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properly handle. Others, including Kapwepwe, have contended that the
government reforms are moving the country too slowly toward socialist goals
and that additional regulatory powers would enable the government to
overcome economic and administrative inefficiency. But most Zambians
have remained firmly loyal to Kaunda and to UNIP. To a large extent, the
debate has reflected little more than a realistic appreciation of the diffi-
culties that the country faces in achieving political unity and national
development.
Political parties
United National Independence Party (UNIP)?UNIP was formed in
1960 to unite all the political groups which demanded that Britain grant the
country early independence. Since universal suffrage was instituted in 1964,
the party has received the support of at least 80% of the voting population.
There seems little chance at present that the party will be voted out of
power. In many respects Zambia has been governed as a de facto one-party
state.
African National Congress (ANC)?The ANC is primarily a regionally
oriented party and draws its strength almost completely from the two tribal
groupings that predominate in southern and western Zambia. The party's
lack of positive leadership has reduced the ANC to little more than a
parochial obstructionist party which seeks to limit the powers of the central
government as much as possible.
United Progressive Party (UPP)?Support for the UPP comes almost
entirely from Bemba-speaking tribal groups living in northeastern Zambia
and the urban copperbelt. The party also has the backing of a few leftist
intellectuals who are attracted to the socialist leanings of UPP leader Simon
Kapwepwe. The government detained almost all UPP national and local
officials except Kapwepwe in September 1971, only one month after the
formation of the party was formally announced. President Kaunda appar-
ently hopes that this action will be sufficient to destroy the party without
having to move directly against Kapwepwe.
Elections
Under the constitution, all citizens 18 years old or over who previously
have been registered in their constituencies are eligible to vote. Election
procedures are designed to forestall any stalemate between the president and
the National Assembly. Elections for the president and the legislature are
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held concurrently, and each candidate for the National Assembly must
announce which presidential candidate he supports. Both names then appear
together on the ballot. Each voter must choose among the two-man slates
arid thus is effectively prevented from voting for a president from one party
and a legislator from another.
Elections for the full National Assembly were held in December 1968.
Seventy-seven percent of the registered voters cast valid ballots; of these,
UNIP received 73%, ANC 25%, and independents just over 1%. UNIP won 81
of the 105 seats, 30 of them uncontested. The ANC won 23 seats (mostly in
southwestern Zambia, where UNIP won only a few seats), and an ANC-
backed independent took another seat. After by-elections were held in 12
constituencies in December 1971, UN IP held a total of 82 seats, the ANP
had 21, the UPP one, with one independent.
The most recent local council elections were held in August 1970.
UNIP won a majority on all local government councils outside southwestern
Zambia and on about half of the councils in that region. Nationwide, 968
seats were at stake. UNIP won 832, 609 of them unopposed and the
remaining 223 against ANC and independent opposition. The ANC won 124
seats, and independents took 12.
25X1C Police
Police--The 7,800-man Zambia Police Force has primary responsibility
for internal security, as well as for normal law enforcement. The regular
police establishment of 6,370 men makes up the bulk of the force. Two
battalion-sized special units are organized to respond to serious security
problems. The 780-man Mobile Police Unit is responsible primarily for civil
disturbances which exceed the capabilities of local regular police units. Based
primarily in urban areas, the mobile unit is trained in riot control and related
problems. The 650-man Paramilitary Police Battalion is trained in counter-
insurgency warfare and is designed to be a rapid-strike force against limited
cross-border incursions and organized internal disturbances. It also assists the
Zambian Army in patrolling the frontiers and protecting vital installations.
The paramilitary battalion is better equipped, but not as well trained as the
mobile unit. Both special units, with army support, are capable of coping
with riots and internal disturbances unless the uprisings are widespread and
simultaneous. They probably could not effectively counter cross-border
raids by regular armed units from neighboring white southern Africa.
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IV. SUBVERSION
Internal
Zambia has many of the domestic social and political problems con-
iributing to instability that are common to African states. By the end of
1971, however, neither subversion nor insurgency had posed serious threats
to the government. The only severe violence in recent years occurred in 1964
when several thousand members of the fanatical Lumpa religious sect re-
belled. The uprising was put down with considerable bloodshed in a few
weeks, and most Zambians who remained loyal to the sect fled to Zaire
where they eked out a living as refugees. Many have returned, but they have
been required to disperse in small groups to minimize the possibility of new
disturbances. The bitter political rivalries that often plague Zambia have
evolved out of tribal and regional competition for influence at the highest
levels of the government, but the political factions that are engaged in this
competition have preferred to operate legally.
In poor and remote border areas, where people remain rooted in tribal
traditions, some small groups have been suspicious of government efforts to
extend its authority in their area and have at times considered defiance of
the central government. In the mid-1960s, the leadership of the Lozi tribe in
western Zambia toyed with leading a secessionist movement in order to
protect the Lozi paramount chief from the abrogation of special prerogatives
granted him by the British colonial administration. Most of the population in
vvestern Zambia supported the central government, however, and the Lozi
chief reluctantly accepted his loss of power.
Disgruntled members of one of the country's smallest and poorest
tribes, the Lunda of northwestern Zambia, have twice organized minor
armed resistance movements. The first effort, in the mid-1960s, involved
only about 15 men and never got off the ground. The second, organized in
1970 and probably operating with less than 200 men, has been given
sanctuary in neighboring Portuguese Angola. In May 1971 some of these
Lunda dissidents mounted a few cross-border raids, but the attackers found
little popular support even among their fellow tribesmen, and they appear
incapable of becoming more than a nuisance to Zambian security forces
along the border.
Several predominantly urban groups?notably industrial workers, intel-
lectuals, and poorly educated and semiskilled urban youth?occasionally
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show signs of unhappiness with the roles envisaged for them by the national
leadership. Small numbers of these groups have been responsible for sporadic
violent incidents, but, in general, they have not shown any interest in
opposing the government. Indeed, incidents of violence have usually been
the result of overzealous expressions of support for national leaders.
A recent exception was a student protest in July 1971 that was clearly
antigovernment in tone. Ten militant university student leaders wrote an
insulting letter that questioned President Kaunda's sincerity in opposing
white minority rule in southern Africa because he had banned demon-
strations against French arms sales to South Africa after an initial protest
had turned violent. When UNIP party leaders took it upon themselves to
discipline the ten students, a large part of the student body rallied behind
ihe militants, charging that UNIP was improperly intervening in university
affairs. The student protesters, who generally are opposed to UN IP's goal of
a one-party state, briefly closed the university campus before Kaunda sent in
troops and sent the students home for the rest of the term.
External
Subversive activities directed or abetted from abroad have increased in
recent years but do not appear likely to grow to serious proportions.
Zambia's white-ruled neighbors have tried to undermine Zambian stability
with modest assistance to leaders of Zambian opposition groups and oc-
casionally have been responsible for minor acts of sabotage. The Portuguese
have been the main source of training and small arms for the Lunda
dissidents living along the Zambia-Angola border. Although the Lundas are
insignificant by themselves, the Portuguese could use them as a cover for
attacks of their own.
Communist countries have gradually increased their official presence in
Zambia, but they seem more intent on trying to influence Zambian policies
than on subverting the government. The Chinese have gained a decided
advantage over other Communist missions in Zambia by agreeing to build the
high-priority TanZam railroad. Some interest in Chinese Communism has
developed in student circles, but the limited propaganda conducted by
embassy personnel or railroad construction teams has studiously avoided
criticism of Zambian leaders. The less popular Soviets are engaged in a
low-key effort to expand their influence. The USSR has shown a special
interest in the labor movement, although until 1971 the Soviets relied on the
East Germans to play the more active role in establishing contacts and in
making available a few scholarships for trade union officials. In 1971, the
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Zambian Government closed down the East German mission, probably
because of the East Germans' meddling in labor activities and of rumored
East German assistance to the opposition UPP party. The Soviets are also
interested in Zambian university students and have reached agreements with
the Zambian Government to provide a few teachers for the local university
as well as some scholarships in the Soviet Union. There is no Communist
party or Communist front organization in the country.
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VI. ARMED FORCES
Defense organization and manpower
The Zambian defense forces, including all components of the army, air
force, and special police units, total about 7,100 men. Its mission is to
ensure internal security and to defend the country against foreign attack.
'The defense forces would be able to maintain internal security except in the
case of widespread and simultaneous disorders, but it could not offer
sustained resistance to modern military forces such as those in white south-
ern Africa. Consequently, the government has given high priority to the
establishment of an air-defense system designed to deter its white-ruled
neighbors. Zambia has no organized reserve forces, but the government is
creating a National Service intended to serve in part as a reserve militia for
use against Zambian dissidents or foreign agents trying to foment trouble in
rural areas.
Military personnel are highly regarded by the Zambian population.
Most support the domestic and foreign policies of the government, but some
leading army officers resent the growing intervention of the government and
UNI P politicians in military affairs.
The army's personnel strength is 5,000. Its major role is to serve as a
reserve force to supplement the police in the event of major domestic
disorders. Protection of the national borders is generally considered to be a
secondary mission. Army units regularly patrol the country's frontiers with
white southern Africa, and the government is organizing one or two anti-
aircraft batteries to protect selected installations. The army has virtually
completed a program to replace foreign officers and technical personnel with
Zambians. As a result, the army suffers from a severe shortage of qualified
and experienced officers and technicians, and operational efficiency has
declined seriously?most notably in the areas of planning, logistics, and
military discipline. Army equipment is mainly of British origin and is in fair
condition.
The fledgling 700-man air force is equipped primarily to provide airlift
for the army and police. The air force has the capability at present of
transporting a 150-man company and its equipment to any place in Zambia.
The government is now trying to develop an air-defense capability, by
supplementing and replacing aging British planes with more modern craft. By
mid-1971 Zambia had purchased or ordered 35 planes and helicopters,
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primarily from Italy, West Germany, and Yugoslavia; and by the end of
1971, 70--100 Zambians had at least begun jet pilot training.
Military budget
The military budget for the fiscal year ending December 1971 is
estimated to be at least $70 million. The government began to conceal
defense and public security spending within the budget in 1970, and precise
estimates for defense expenditures are now unavailable. It is estimated that
defense spending represents 10% of the total budget and about 4.3% of the
estimated gross national product for 1969. Military budgets have increased
significantly since 1969 in response to growing apprehension over possible
armed attacks from white southern Africa.
L.ogistics
Until 1969, Zambia had been dependent on the United Kingdom for
arms, equipment, and training. Since then, the Zambian Government has
begun to diversify its sources of supply. The government has turned to Italy,
Yugoslavia, and West Germany for most of its sophisticated equipment,
including modern aircraft and antiaircraft guns. Zambia continues to rely on
British firms for most basic military items, but it has begun testing small
arms from various Communist countries and may consider switching its
source of supply for these items as well. Zambia has negotiated agreements
with Italy and Yugoslavia to provide training and advisory personnel for the
Zambian security forces, almost all of them assigned to the air force.
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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Southern Africa
The overriding concern of Kaunda's foreign policy has been the elim-
ination of minority rule in neighboring white-ruled southern Africa. Al-
though Kaunda would like to see peaceful, cooperative, international action
depose the white minority regimes, he actively supported southern African
insurgents after international efforts to topple the Rhodesian Government
had failed in 1965. Insurgents have been allowed to store arms and equip-
ment in Zambia, to transit the country, and in some cases to use Zambia as a
base for guerrilla operations.
Because of its support for Zambian-based insurgency, the government
has been faced with a mounting threat of economic and military reprisals by
the white states. Even after the government has reduced its economic
dependence on the white-ruled states by completing the TanZan railroad and
by other programs, Zambia will remain vulnerable to military and
paramilitary retaliation. Since 1966 over a dozen acts of sabotage have
occurred in Zambia, most of them probably committed by agents or sympa-
thizers of the white regimes. The white governments have warned Kaunda
that his support of insurgent organizations could result in strong retaliatory
measures.
Zambia's concern over southern Africa has shaped its relations with
Western and Communist states. Disappointed and disillusioned with Western
policies toward southern Africa, Kaunda and other Zambian leaders have
bitterly attacked Western governments, especially the United Kingdom.
Communis: China and Yugoslavia have exploited anti-Western themes and
have shown a willingness to assist Zambia in a number of development
projects. As a result, they have gained considerable good will, and official
relations have expanded. Kaunda abhors Maoist ideology, however, and most
Zambians remain aloof from all foreigners, thus seriously restricting the
ability of Communist governments to influence Zambian affairs. The Soviet
Union has kept its activities in Zambia in low key partly because the
Zambians regard it as an aggressive great power.
In affairs outside Africa the Zambian Government pursues a policy of
nonalignment. According to the government's interpretation, nonalignment
does not mean neutralism but the freedom to determine foreign policies
without being restricted by ties with any nation or bloc. In practice, the
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government frequently criticizes both the Soviet Union and the United
States and other Western governments for being insufficiently responsive to
the national interests or development needs of smaller states. Zambia con-
siders the United Nations an important forum because it provides one of the
best opportunities for smaller states?through publicity and diplomatic pres-
sure?to influence the major powers and because Kaunda believes that the
organization provides a moral basis for international relations.
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VIII. US INTERESTS
US policies
The US has encouraged Zambia to adopt foreign and domestic policies
that will promote regional political stability and healthy national devel-
opment. The US has cooperated with the Zambian Government on con-
structive peaceful approaches to southern African issues. American aid has
been channeled toward the development of Zambian transportation links
with other black African countries in order to reduce the country's eco-
nomic dependence on white southern Africa. The US has also encouraged
the Zambian Government to establish an economic climate favorable to
private foreign investment consistent with Zambia's insistence on a sub-
stantial degree of government participation in the economy.
US Government assistance
Because Zambia enjoys rich mineral resources, the US has almost
entirely limited direct financial assistance to regional development projects
and to emergency and humanitarian relief. The largest project involves
paving a Tanzanian section of the highway that connects Zambia with the
Indian Ocean at Dar es Salaam. The project is scheduled to be completed by
early 1972 at an estimated cost of about $40 million. The US also organized
a 4-month emergency air lift, at a cost to the US of $3.7 million, when
Zambia lost the use of Rhodesian railroads for petroleum products in late
1965. Bilateral aid programs provided Zambia with about $1 million annu-
ally until 1968 and with about half that amount since then. In late 1971
most bilateral aid was given in the form of grants under the PL-480 program
and funds ior refugee programs administered under UN auspices. In 1970,
UN agencies and the IBRD granted $11.7 million in assistance to Zambia,
about $4.7 million of which was contributed by the US.
Resident 1JS citizens
In 1971, 1,087 Americans were living in Zambia, including 17 US
Government officials and 62 of their dependents. Most of the remaining
1,000 Americans residing in the country were missionaries and their families.
Trade with the US
In 1970 Zambian imports from the US amounted to about $51.8
million, while exports to the US were $2.0 million. The US is the third
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largest supplier of goods to Zambia, ranking behind the UK and South
Africa. The value of imports from the US, primarily capital goods, has
remained fairly steady since 1966. In 1970 about 9% of Zambia's slowly
growing imports came from the US. Zambian exports to the US, primarily
copper products, which vary considerably in value from year to year,
reached a high of $33.5 million in 1967.
US investment
American shareholdings in Roan Selection Trust?one of two major
private firms connected with the copper industry?were estimated in 1970 at
$51.9 million in book value and $208.6 million in market value. These
holdings far exceed the total value of all other American investment in
Zambia.
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