LETTER TO JOHN A. MCCONE FROM EDWARD A. MCDERMOTT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002800150003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 14, 1963
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
*FEMA REVIEW COMPLETED*
Honorable John A. Mc Cone
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C., 20505
Dear Mr. McCone:
NOV141963
Executive Registry
As you will note from the enclosed memorandum from the President,
dated October 30, 1963, the guidance developed by the Committee on
Assumptions for Non-Military Planning has been approved. There
are also enclosed copies of:
(a) The President's- memorandum of January 9, 1963,
initiating the undertaking;
(b) The Committee's report to the President, dated October 24,
1963; and
25X1A
nm.L
as well as the valuable staff contributions fro
m We We are proceeding now to the next step--that of developing additional and
more specific planning assumptions to meet the needs of particular non-
military preparedness programs. I have solicited the views and require-
ments of the agencies having such assignments, and you may be sure we
1 ~ ,..
Shall o n to the Central Intelligence Agency for assistance as this
second phase roc"
proceeds_."
(c) The Guidance for Non-Military Planning, developed by the
Committee and approved by the President in the memo-
randum of October 30, referred to above.
We appreciated very much the contributions made initially by General
and later by his. successor on the Co i
Sincerely,
Attachments
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THE WHITE HQ_LLSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR
H on o r able... E.dwax d. A....McDermott
Director, Office of Emergency Planning
As we have discussed, I am interested in improving our planning for
the management of our resources and implementing the necessary
steps in the economic stabilization field during periods of national
emergency. Such nonmilitary planning must be based on assumptions
-which encompass the entire spectrum of possible conflicts, including
the possibility of general nuclear. war.
Pursuant to Section 301, Executive Order 11051, I approve the
establishment of an inter-agency committee under your chairmanship,
with appropriate level representation from the Departments of State
and Defense and the Central. Intelligence Agency, to provide assumptions
on which such plans can be based.
The. assumptions. developed by this committee should be used by various
Federal Agencies in.developing plans in the nonmilitary preparedness
fields. This will permit the departments. and agencies concerned to pro-
ceed with their respective nonmilitary preparedness assignments on a
-common and consistent basis.
Please coordinate the, wo'rk:of this committee with the staff of the National
Security Council.
/s/
John F. Kennedy
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
October 24, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Pursuant to your memorandum of January 9, 1963, the Committee
on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning forwards herewith
proposed assumptions for guidance in non-military defense pre-
paredness activities.
We have sought to develop assumptions. which are sufficiently
specific to be useful to the many agencies concerned, yet sufficiently
general not to require your frequent review as the facts on which
they are based-change, as they may be expected to do. In our judg-
ment, except when major changes in posture or policy occur, the
planned annual review of these assumptions will suffice to assure
up-to-date guidance at this. level.
We recognize that more detailed guidance is required as programs
are planned and implemented by the several agencies to which you
have assigned, by executive order, non-military preparedness
responsibilities.. Such. guidance, as. well as that required by State
and local governments and various elements of the private sector,
will be furnished by the cognizant agencies (chiefly, the Office of
Emergency Planning. and the Departments of State and Defense).
It will, of course, be reviewed by the Office of Emergency Planning
for consistency with the basic assumptions which you have approved.
The Committee feels that the rapid completion of such second-stage
guidance is urgently required as a follow-on to the basic assumptions
submitted herewith. Only then can, we achieve the improvements in
planning for the management of resources and the implementation of
necessary steps in-economic stabilization in which you expressed.an
interest in your memorandum of January 9.
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Recommendations
1.. That you.approve the attached submission as guidance
for non-military preparedness planning.
2. That you direct the rapid completion of auxiliary pre-
paredness guidance, coordinated by the Office of
Emergency Planning.
Respectfully submitted,
.COMMITTEE ON ASSUMPTIONS
FOR NON-MILITARY PLANNING
(Signed)
Edward A. McDermott,- .Chairman
Office of Emergency Planning
(Signed)
Jeffrey C. Kitchen
Department of State
? (Signed)
Thomas- D. Morris
Department of Defense
(Signed)
n. r intelligence Agency
Attachment
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GUIDANCE FOR NON-MILITARY PLANNING
INTRODUCTION
Various agencies of the U. S. Government have been assigned important
responsibilities for emergency preparedness planning. While advance
planning is needed for all emergency contingencies, the of nuclear attack on the U. S. imposes a requirement vital to the nation, sncy
survival -- the planning in advance of appropriate measures to minimize
the impact of such. attack and to promote rapid post-attack recovery.
The needs of the several agencies for guidance for non-military pre-
paredness planning vary widely. All, however, must take into account a
range of possible future developments. In the great majority of cases, avail-
able National Intelligence Estimates make possible realistic judgments con-
cerning these developments. In general, however, the estimates are such
that planners must take recourse to certain assumptions in order to cover
the range of possible contingencies. While. agencies may require additional
and more specific assumptions to meet particular planning requirements, a
set of general assumptions is needed as a common basis for the guidance of
emergency planning.
Although the purpose of this paper is to provide assumptions for non-
military preparedness planning, it is not possible to treat the military and
non-military aspects in isolation. For example, from a production.and
logistics standpoint, certain minimum civilian needs must be met in order
to sustain the military effort. Moreover, military requirements must be
established in the light of political objectives and, of course, political
objectives. depend in. part on military capabilities to realize them.
The assumptions. in this. paper reflect the. view that since it is not
possible to foresee precisely what situations. will arise, it is necessary to
cover to an.appropriate degree the entire range of possible crises. and con-
flicts, The most practicable way to do this is to isolate major sectors of
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the. contingency spectrum toward which planning should be oriented.
Naturally, unpredictable future crises would have their own peculiarities,
which would have to be taken into account and. which could be significant
in their effect. But for planning purposes, we believe that concentration
on major contingencies. will provide the most useful practical guidance.
While the estimates and.assumptions in this paper cover the next
five years, they are particularly applicable to the first two years of the
period, with their degree of reliability decreasing throughout the projec-
ted time period. In order to keep them current, they will be reviewed
.and updated as necessary to. reflect the impact of significant changes. in
.estimates, objectives or capabilities. At a minimum, this review and
updating will occur annually.
The. assumptions are set forth,.in the framework of three contingencies.
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CO1 T1NOENC Y_I_..(C.OLI3_- W1.B )
A CONTINUATION.. OF INTER NA mIo AT A T Tr
- _
NSI
WITH O CI
AS
O
L
v
CRISES OCCURRING-FIT rr xat).1~J.NU
HER.-SINGLY-OR-IN VARIOUS
COMBINATIONS
APPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS
1. International tensions are likely to continue throughout the next five
years, with occasional acute crises such as Berlin.and Cuba.
2. While intelligence is likely to provide at least a few days. warnin
such crises could erupt suddenly with no warning. g'
3. Localized warfare and internal wars. are possible during the next
five years in many areas, and are quite likely to occur in some. The pos-
sibility of U. S. involvement in any of these situations cannot be excluded.
4. U. S. participation in. such. conflicts could range from expanded
military and economic assistance programs, to military advisory and quasi-
combat functions (as in: Vietnam), to limited commitments of U.. S. combat
forces. When the U. S. does become involved in these conflicts, it should
not, for planning purposes, assume the availability of substantial direct
assistance from nations not directly involved.
However, under such circumstances, material resources from non-
Communist. areas, would remain. generally available to the U.. S. and its
Allies.
5. Continuation of international tension, and internal conflict in the under-
developed world.would require varying amounts of economic assistance, but
would not create a significant impact on the overall U. S. resource position.
6. Assuming a continuation of the current world tensions, economic
activity in the United States- would continue its upward trend, with the trend
line of gross national product rising from the 3 1/2 percent record of the decade to an. annual average rate of 4 percent towards the middle of the decade
of the sixties.
7. Direct controls over the economy would not be generally required to
meet situations arising under this contingency, although particular resources
or services might require special attention,
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CONTLNGEN.CY rr (LI TED. WAR
THE OUTBREAK (7F g-
-~I.TED W
U. S. GENERAL PIIB POSE C~1MBA IIVY_OL VIl~IG
A SUBSTANT IAL.SCAT E Ft RCFS O1V
APPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS
1. The outbreak of a limited war involving U. S. General Purpose combat
forces on.a substantial scale is possible during the next five years, although
it is less likely than a continuation of the current situation.as noted in. Contin-
gency I.
2. Such a conflict would be likely to evolve out of a tense international
situation that affords. warning of the impending crisis, although it is possible
that there might be little or no warning,
3. Such conflicts conceivably could involve. U. S. forces in combat opera-
tions in widely separated geographical areas simultaneously for an indetermin-
ate period.
4. Direct hostilities between the U. S. and non-Russian Communist
forces, especially in Asia, are more likely than a struggle involving Soviet
forces. The Soviet leaders are likely to be very cautious about usin their
own military forces. against Western forces, es eciall g
unless they should feel that some Western. action threatened the rote rit , y of
the- Soviet bloc. Should Soviet forces become involved directly with Western
forces, the. Soviet leaders, would probably use only that degree of force thought
necessary to achieve local objectives and they would seek to prevent escalation
of the conflict.
5. The possible use of tactical. nuclear-weapons in this contingency is not
excluded.
6. Material resources from non-Communist countries outside the areas
of combat would remain generally available to the U.. S. and its. Allies. In
some limited-war situations, however, there could for some resources be limi-
tations on,availability due to a desire to remain uncommitted.
7. Requirements for support of General Purpose forces, Army, Naval
and Air Force, will continue to be met from a combination of equipment, re-
placement spares, and combat consumables on hand, supplemented as necessary
by deliveries from industry during hostilities. Because of this combination of
assets in the Department of Defense, net military requirements cannot be com-
puted directly from force levels data. Civilian agencies therefore will look to
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the Department of Defense to compute that portion of the U. S. and Allied
military requirements, which must be satisfied by the civilian. economy.
8. Limited war involving U. S. and Allied forces, on.a substantial scale
could result in a situation where cooperative arrangements for mutual support
of Allied civilian economies would be a necessity.-,;- It is difficult to give an
.order of magnitude for this. assistance because of the infinite number of com-
binations of geographical, economic and political factors under which it mikht
be called for, but its impact on the: combined Allied resource position could
be appreciable.
9. Under conditions of a conventional war that does not include an attack
on the continental U.. S. , the. U.. S. gross national product growth trend, under
the impact of a war economy and mobilization footing,, would tend to rise mor
rapidly, as was the case in the years following the start of the. Korean war. e
10. The Government might he required to exercise controls over prices,
wages, salaries, rents, and the allocation of goods and services. It is assumed
that the President would request, and Congress would enact,: whatever additional
legislation might be needed in this regard, and that the public would accept man-
power, resource, and other controls necessary to cope with these situations.
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CONTINGENCY III (GENE
SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKES. ONTHE UNITED- -STATES
APPLICABLE ASS_1,T PTIONS
1. Deliberate initiation of general nuclear war by the USSR is unlikely
during the next five years, but it is.. a possibility.
2. Warning of general nuclear. war might range from several days alert
to as little as 15 minutes warning for areas of first impact. The possibility
of an attack occurring. without warning cannot be completely discounted.
3. Co-incident with the attack on the U. S. , the USSR would, as it con-
sidered appropriate, launch attacks by ground, naval, and air action. against
targets in Canada,. Western Europe, the United Kingdom, the Middle East,
and the Far East.
4. It is not possible to predict the precise character or pattern of probable
attacks, since the USSR has many options available, and since war could break
out under various circumstances. However, it is assumed that military facili-
ties supporting our nuclear retaliatory capability and centers of government,
industry and population would be the principal targets of nuclear attack, with
initial priority given to destruction of such nuclear retaliatory capability as
could be profitably attacked. The possibility of a small-scale nuclear attack
on the United States is very remote. The initial attack'.woul.d probably be a
heavy one, but emergency planning should take into, account the additional.
possibility that weapons might be delivered in smaller follow-on attacks
over the following days or weeks.
5. Availability of material. resources to meet overall U. S. wartime and
post-war requirements would be severely limited in. Europe, the Middle. East
and Southeast Asia. Resources. of Africa and Latin America would probably
be avail-able, provided transportation. were available.
6. The main problems following nuclear attack upon this country and over-
seas areas would be:
a. Survival of the population and emergency restoration and
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repair of essential facilities and transportation to sustain
survivors;
b. Reconstitution of free world military forces as necessary
to preclude or reduce further damage by the enemy and to
terminate hostilities in a manner consistent with U. S.
interests;
c. Reconstitution and rehabilitation of the fabric of the
national society and economy; and
d. Assertion of effective U. S. influence on the reconstitu-
tion of order in other areas of the world, including former
enemy territories., to the extent deemed necessary.
Within each of the above problem areas, there will be individual issues
of extremely high priority arising from the unpredictable details. of attack
and the resulting damage.
7. Initial operations of general war will be fought and supported largely
by forces and resources in being and in place. Pre-positioned. war reserve
stock for general war will be provided prior to D-Day and maintained for
those forces with missions in the initial operations of general war.
8. Under conditions of a massive nuclear attack on the U. S. , support
for Allied civilian economies. would be severely limited.
9. It is. assumed that a.-nuclear attack on this country would not prevent
the post-attack recovery of the United States, although effective management
of some important elements, of the economy might not be possible for several
months following the attack. It is, also assumed that damage to the economy
would be uneven, with the resources in some areas. escaping. damage. Re-
sidual national economic capabilities in the post-attack period would be
initially estimated by the National Resources Evaluation. Center and the National
Military Command System Support Center.
10. Extraordinary government controls over the economy would be
immediately implemented under this contingency.
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11. Considerable shock, panic, and confusion would prevail in a
nuclear attack situation. Negative behavior by a minority of the American
public would find -expression in such forms as hoarding, petty delinquency,
absenteeism, opportunism, selfishness and hostility. There would also be
present, however, strongly adaptive and constructive behavior on which
could be based the initiation of planned measures to restore and sustain the
morale of the American people.
Approved by the President,
October 30, 1963.
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THE . WHITE H_O...U.S.E
. WASHINGTON
October 30, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
I. hereby approve fora dissemination in the affected, agencies the. guidance
submitted to me on October 24, 1963, in the report of the interagency
Committee on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning. I would like this
guidance to be reviewed and up-dated annually by the. Committee.
As, the report recognizes, the agencies responsible for certain non-
military preparedness activities will need additional and more specific
planning. assumptions to meet their own particular requirements. These
additional assumptions, however, must be consistent with the overall
guidance I have approved.
With. this in mind, I.hereby direct that you, as. Director of the. Office of
Emergency Planning, coordinate the early preparation of such additional
guidance, with. advice as necessary from the: Departments of State and
Defense and the Central. Intelligence. Agency.
/s/
John F. Kennedy
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We Edward A. cDerm.
3 =ir.ctor, Office of Ernes gezu y
hjngton 25, D. C.
. ~. c Derr: %ott:
There is attached a revised emergency line of
for the Central Intelligence Agency'.
-aithfulty yo are'
`.arshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Leputy Director
LBK:drrn (6 November 1963)
Distribution: ut~,
Original an*r -'Adessee
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