OPENING REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE SEMINAR ON TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE WITH THE USSR MAIN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON, D.C. FEBRUARY 28, 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 28, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

p ed lF # 'Re1e 200t 1 9/{ I R_ DP'i , 79
0,0500120005-5
EP TMEN~ T ~O
F TAT
February 28, 1974
.NO. 74
StatiDept. declassification & release instructions on file
OPENING REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
B
THE
EFORE ON TECHNOLOGY EHANGE WITH THE USSR
MAIN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 28, 1974
It is my pleasure to welcome
to discuss with us and with each othyou State
ertthehtrading ofptechnologyd-
one of the key aspects of the normalization of US/USSR economic
relations. The expansion of civilian technological exchange with the
fort anCod
newarey a stship withnus
over the last few years. These economic motivations spill over and
become a significant factor in improving political relations, which,
taken all together, means detente.
The Soviet leaders, and this applies also to. the Eastern Europeans
and the Chinese, want faster movement in meeting the demands. of their
people -- and of their economic planners -- quantity and range of consumer and industrial products. oducts.d TheyihaVe
turned to us, to Western Europe, and to Japan forrdtheindustrial
technology they require to improve their labor productivity
transpochrtandatiodeveln and their energy supplies, and to up' their
grade their
as to produce for'
or their
domestic comsumers and for export to hard currency areas.
Nevertheless, in the face of their recognized needs, I expect
the expansion of technological exchange with the East to be gradual.
There are several reasons for this:
The Soviet shortage of convertible currencies and their
limited ability to rapidly increase their exports. Development of new
export resources and markets, after all, takes time.
-- The Soviet
centralized planningcandmdecisiont
makinwith its heavy reliance on
-seems
for the rapid introduction of new, and p' ticus r of flexibility
technology.
particularlybfly fore reign,
-- Their lack of personnel, both labor and supervisory,
Approved For Release 2000/09/06 : CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5
 Approved For Relea*2000/09/06 : CIA3RDP79-007900500120005-5
broad front of interrelated subjects. These will involve increased
economic, technical, cultural, and human contact as well as deepening
understanding and agreement on political and security issues. We
have learned over the past several years that this range of contacts
is not only interrelated, but is mutually reinforcing. It also
creates interests among a widening range of groups in maintaining
stable and mutually advantageous relations between the participating
countries.
The Eastern bloc's interest in including technical assistance
as a component of the deal and their clear preference for financing
the deal by re-exporting a part of the production to the U.S. firm
also poses problems, especially because of the general reluctance
to permit participation from our side in the management of the
enterprise. Some Eastern European countries -- Yugoslavia, Romania
and Hungary -- have undertaken joint venture arrangements with
Western firms primarily to overcome these difficulties. Poland is
currently developing legislationstoopermit a similar approach. We
favor such arrangements, in the belief that they offer a greater
potential benefit for the U.S. business and, at the same time, help
to create the kind of working ties between the U.S. and the other
side's economies which serve the purposes of detente and making
economic relationships work for both countries. As these ties develop
and expand, the number of people in leadership roles in the
collectivist countries who have a personal, vested interest in
stable, positive relations with the U.S. will increase.
In this context, I believe we will see a gradual easing of the
restrictions on technological exports to the East. The rate of
progress will depend in part on progress in other areas particularly
in the reduction of political and military tensions. We are all -
you, your government, and the leaders of the Socialist countries --
embarked on a learning process. Naturally, we will each, quite
properly, proceed with caution, but we will proceed.
I have earlier listed some of the possible obstacles I see to
a rapid expansion of technological trade with the East. There are
others -- obstacles with which some of you, at least, are already
familiar. The Soviet negotiators are often far removed,
bureaucratically, from the enterprises which will use the imported
technology. It may be hard for them -- and, of course, for you --
to pin down the significant details of what is wanted, how it will
be used, the work environment in which it is to be used, and so
forth. Perhaps one of the reasons for the apparent Soviet
preference for dealing with multinational corporations is the fact
that our MNCs can offer a combination of U.S. technology, which
the Soviets seem to prefer, with management representation from
Western Europe, where experience in working with Soviet enterprises
has developed over a longer period. In any case, as the level
of U.S.-Soviet technology exchanges increases, it will be all the
more important that we continue the exchange of views and experience
between industry and government which we are initiating in this
seminar today.
Let me say a few words about quid-pro-quos. We can point
Approved For Release 2000/09/06 : CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5
 ? Approved For Relee 2000/09/06: CIA-RDP79-0074000500120005-5
We became world leaders in technological innovation because
of our aggressive pursuit of that goal. Our corporate managements
embraced the challenge with enthusiasm and imagination. Our
universities responded through curriculum innovation and a high
level of basic and applied research without historical precedent or
parallel abroad. Our investing public provided the necessary risk
capital. In the last few years, the enterprise faltered and the
enterprisers went through a crisis of confidence. I believe that
we are regaining our earlier momentum. Government R&D funding is
rising, as is corporate investment. An excessive pool of unemployed
R&D scientists and engineers is rapidly disappearing. Exciting
new technological potentials are opening up. This is surely the
answer to the challgnges we face in the world marketplace and the
best answer, as well, to insuring our national security.
Approved For Release 2000/09/06 : CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5
 Approved For Release 2000/09/06 : CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5
STATINTL
74
'd I / /
0
la,e
Approved For Release 2000/09/06 : CIA-RDP79-00798A000500120005-5