BALANCING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF PUBLIC APPEARANCE BEFORE ACADEMIC GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: November 26, 1976
• Content Type: MF

DD/A ph-rI.stry
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STATINTL
2 6 NOV 1976
MM FUR; Assistant to the Director
TINTL
Deputy Director for Operations Training
Director of Training
Deputy Director for Administration
INPOMATIO : Deputy Director for operations
SUBJECT
Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
Appearances Before Academic Groups
1. The attached article from Counters makes unpleasant
reading. While it is highly tempting to hrough the
article on a point by point basis contrasting "what I said"
to "what they printed," I believe the article is more useful
as a vehicle through which to assess the risks and benefits
which may result from public appearances by Agency officers
before academic and civic groups.
2. As I noted in the memorandum prepared after my
visit to Austin, the attitudes manifested by try questioners
ranged frog "skepticism to hostility." The most difficult
questions for me to handle dealt with the usual bugaboos--
covert action, assassination, and the "rogue elephant"
conception of the Agency. These aspects of my talk are
hardly touched upon by Counters , instead, they feature
South Korea, which at the time felt was a minor part of ray
talk. (The line of questioning had been, "Why is it the CIA
is so frequently lined up with repressive dictators like
Park?" y response had been an attempt to outline historic
and geographic factors which have led the South Koreans to
take a harder internal line than we, a comfortable half-
world away, feel is necessary. I cited the number of assas-
siaation attempts Park has already survived, the resultant
"siege mentality" in Blue [louse and the great need for a
peaceful change of power in South .urea--something they have
never had.) The Counterspy distortions, if brought to the
attention of the out 3 K67-eans, could :mako the job of the
that much more difficult. This I regret deeply.
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Appearances Before Acadewic Grduus ILLEGIB
The point is, however, that any time an Agency officer gives
responsible answers to tough questions posed in a public
forum, the door is open for those opposed to the Agency to
twist what has been said into something of potential embar-
rassment to us. On the other hand, if we do not offer
responsible replies to our questioners, our public appear-
STATINTL ances may be counter-productive. STATINTL
3. aring about the Counterspy article, I
called in Austin to alert him. lie had had no word
of the article and said that he had seen nothing on my
appearance in the Texas Unive si newspaper. (A student
TATINTL reporter attended the talk.) reported that
Ur. Weintraub, who invited me to speak, had remained posi-
tive about my ap earance, and that no negative feedback had STATINTL
been received. also reported that ten to twelve
"high quality applicat ons" for CIA employment had been
received either from those who attended the talk or from
I H I IN I L those who had heard about it. (Two applications
STATINTL
cited sa a 1 were from black students at tie law
STATINTL
school.) W said he remained enthusiastic about
future appearances by Agency speakers and hoped to set one
up at either LSU or Tulane early in 1977. (I have alread
d an invitation to speak at USC in December.
M&e the Office of Personnel recruiter in the Los Angeles
area, has arranged this.)
STATINTL
4. 1 believe that the paragraphs above set the dilemma
quite clearly--my appearance in Austin has resulted in a
possible problem for the but has also brought
in some high quality appli.can s an mprovod some student
and faculty perceptions of what the Agency is like today.
S. I am perfectly willing to continue to snake appearances
of this sort and to do my level best to give the Counters
genre as little as possible to work on. If we continue nth
such appearances, I believe we must recognize that more
articles like the one in Counterspy are a distinct and
unpleasant possibility.
STATINTL
09M
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 ILLEGIB
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 ,? CPYRGHT.
Cau ,v r~' RsPY
v o t, 3, / S . 2.
Donan1? Gregg , ve Is. CIA. Cold
Ov r r?w Pe,:r1: By Steve McGuire
years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in
station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25
sounding such a warning includes being the CIA chief of
nam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for
Park like the one in which Diem was assasinated in Viet-
left it open whether the CiA would support a coup against
will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent
runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he
ing at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park
On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speak-
Korea. ,
Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and
The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a
trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on
Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with
"Policy Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney
foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was pre-
and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must
Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea
vailed upon to provide a meeting place.
information about coup attempts. Whether they will con-
ever, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage
the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with
South Korea's first peaceful change of government. Flow-
could then be a national hero and also be responsible for
best thing which Park could do would be to resign. tic
mation about the North. Gregg personally feels that the
depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence infor-
. Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in
Gregg had high praise for Lt. General James F. `Holly'
Korea. An article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal
recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as'
Korean War in'nine days, four days of 'real violence' and
mies. Hollingsworth claimed that he could end another
an. old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill com-
five days to clean tip. Gregg said he agreed with Hollings-
worth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the
WSJ article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth.
the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean
which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his
information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted
caught the South 'Koreans with sophisticated weaponry
Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once
Adii iral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his
denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S.
the Koreans were building a berth for the weapon. Sure
enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the
Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that
placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real
funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.
The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from
getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long
as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in
saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on
a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around
his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was
removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor.
Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the
CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked
why Richard Ilelms failed to tell the Warren Commission
about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that
Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the
attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise.
Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelli.
gence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kiss?
inger has been one of the CIA's most `avid customers'.
Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because
they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were
going to lose. The CIA was a major soul .e of information
during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was
only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became
involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide
reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was
a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action.
Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was
a major nuclear weapons base. lie said that the Mariannas
were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was
not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.
From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert
activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it,
the CIA `did their job right'. Apparently meaning that. the
radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of
Japan,'was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA,
employing one of their favorite techniques, provided sup-
port for moderate left opposition parties such as the
Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these
covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working
for the Department of Army and an employee of the
American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the
Japanese police.
Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in
Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was
Gregg suggested that aerial surveys be made to see if the head of Bien Boa section, but made no mention of
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Aeration Phoenix.
Regarding CIA involvement in the overthrow of
Allende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a
Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. govern-
ment's design for South America. It was essential that
Allende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World
ountries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist
governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests.
On international terrorism Gregg felt that Libya was the
`patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya
appears to be the country which is providing a substantial
part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists
throughout the world.
After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of
professors gathered in the plush surroundings of the Uiii
ersity of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don
regg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and
the hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign,
on??
"Sagittarius," he said. -
"I knew it,'a fire sign, a sign of adventure."
Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in'the
.LA. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in
that time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it
vas the thing to do at that time."
In -the midst of the polite clut-chat the C.I.A. gets down
to "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for
sian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow
he C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzi
quivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treat
lent. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia be more con-
enient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an
rrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he
pparently resists their blandishments.
Dr. Sidney Weintaub, who had invited Don Gregg to
peak at the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people
o remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet
nd interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been
Ontuttre,J from page 25
a carry out similar, if less ideologically
amplete, political actions.
Early in June 1972, acting on a series
if tipspolice trapped most key members
f the Red Army Fraction; Baader,
aspe, and another leader Holger
loins, were captured in a dawn raid on
heir Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin
as apprehended while shopping in a
lamburg store.
On June 15, Fritz Roderwald, in whose
ouse Meinhof had been hiding, called
he police inspector in charge of the Han-
ver Bauder Mcinhof Kommando (a
orce resembling American SWAT teams
n most German cities) and turned her
n. Rodenvald, a 33-year-old teacher,
awe to regret his decision and turned
approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer of a speaker
from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after Wein-
traub's arrival (Fall 1976). '
Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A.
office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "1 don't be-
lieve. we've met." No one escapes being asked: "Do you
think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal
answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons
The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion
session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an
"alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy,
'continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases
of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.
The less public process of establishing liaison with the
academic comtitunity engaged in foreign area studies also
continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers repre-
sent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A.
and the centers'are highly dependent upon an always uncer-
tain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement
even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would
accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and
students. That this might be morally wrong, that area
specialists should not be agents of a particular government,
and that they may be accordingly shut out of their coun-
tries of interest, is not brought up.
Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to
recruit where possible, "When you''get to the job hunting
stage give me,a call down at the Federal Building." In gen-
eral, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an
almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty.
In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA, through-
out its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This
includes both the `legal and illegal' acts which the CIA com-
mitted in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted,
the CIA is really in the `people business'. We know that,
and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which
people. u
prison conditions described as "inade-
quate" to "purposefully cruel."
One woman died from cancer because
prison doctors refused to diagnose her
symptoms. Holger Meins died from in-
adequate medical attention during
forced feeding after a long hunger strike
by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others
were subjected to "sensory deprivation"
-a new form of torture, in specialized
cells, preventing all human contact.
Many people have recurring hallucina-
tions from such treatment. Meinhof her-
self was in a sensory deprivation cell for
one six-month period and then again for
two weeks last Christmas, but by all ac-
counts had a tough mind.
But the RAF organized inside the
dozen jails the government sent them to.
Chancellor Schmidt's words after Mein-
hof s arrest when he called Mcinhof and
the Red Army. Fraction "the most serious
challenge in the 26-year history of our
democracy."
CounterSpy editor Winslow Peck, con-
tributing editor Philip Agee, and two
former Military Intelligence officers, K.
Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were
the first witnesses called by the defense in
Meinhofs trial last summer. They tried
to testify on the use of German soil for
the conduct of the war in Indochina. The
defense hoped it might mitigate the sen-
tences of Meinhof and her companions
who were moved to protest U.S. aggres-
sion in Vietnam. But the court's presi-
dent prevented the testimony and said it
would only assist the "terrorists " He
ver the reward money he received to the Meinhof continued to influence the further ruled that th,re could be no de-
l
lrike Mcinhof /r-]~ ~},JC{{ wLdRei e-QQ?Q/08f3s1 fi r(rlli~ ?P790~0+49& 67 Q@?5Q029t ?
-01
 4C1ASS Fl ED
^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET
? ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET (
SUBJECT: (Ophonol)
=y~'-:~
Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public_,
NTL Appearances before Academic Groups
FROM
EXTENSION
NO.
OTR 76-6852
DD/OT/OIR
DATE
26 November 1976
TO. (Officer designation, room number, and
}
ildi
b
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
ng
u
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
STATINTI
Director of Training
4
To 3 and 5
D
you are aware,
on
2.
is an influentially
capable briefer who does an
i
ll
b
exce
represent
ng
ent jo
3' DDA
UE yg
,;
the Agency. We have discussed
7D18 Hqs
` r
in some detail the briefing
d
-- -
that le
to the Counterspy
`.
article, and I am convinced
that Don's presentation and
5
subsequent answers to ques-
' A/DCI
tions were handled with
lF04 Hqs
candor tempered with the
6 - - - - -- -
necessary amount of dis-
creetness. It is suggested
that the benefits derived
---
from these orientation
7.
briefings far outweigh the
damage done by irresponsible
- - -
articles, such as the one
a.
appearing in Counterspy. It
is strongly recommended that
-
--
i
- -
we continue with the or
en-
9
tations, ensuring that we
critically select the briefers
--
-
- -
i
- - - -
cular
based upon the part
10.
situation and sophistication
of. the audience. This has
-
-
- --
-
-
11. -
been done in the past for
briefings provided by OTR
and will continue.
12.
1 - D/OP per DOA
w/att
?-~' DDA Subj ect
/att
13.
DDA:JFBIake:der
1 Dec
1976)
,f arr'y . 1. .water
Director of; Training
1.4.
STATINTL
15.
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TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INIT LS
2
3
1 76
4
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bbd
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
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DISPATCH
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San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS-Sunday November 21 1976 Page 7
Central Intelligence
Agency director
George Bush will be
the, principal speaker
at the annual meeting
and dinner of the
Greater San Antonio
Chamber of Com-
merce.
The meeting will be held
Dec: 14 in the Convention
Center.
Bush's professional car-
eer,spans industry, politics
and public service. Before
assuming his current post
at the CIA, Bush was the
chief of the U.S. Liaison
Office, Peking, Peoples
Republic of China.
He was the chairman of
the Republican National
Committee from January
1973 to September 1974.
In 1971 he was appointed
permanent representative
of the United States to the
United Nations.
Bush was U.S. congress-
man from the 7th District,
Texas, from 1966 to 1971.
Bush's career began
when he was commis-
sioned, at age 18, in the
U.S. Navy. From 1942 to
1945 he was a carrier pilot
with the 3rd and 5th fleets
in the Pacific Theater of
Operations.
After the war he entered
Yale University and grad-
uated in 1948 with a B.A.
in Economics.
lie worked as an oilfield
supply salesman in Mid-
land for three years and in
1951 formed Bush-Overby
Oil Development, Inc.
In 1953, he co-founded the
Zapata Petroleum Corp. in
Midland and a year later
the Zapata Off-Shore Co. of
Midland-Houston.
He resigned as president
of Zapata Off-Shore in 1966
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