RAILROAD TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES BETWEEN THE SOVIET FRONTIER AND WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000300140003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 27, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

SECURITY INFORMATION
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093A000.300140003-8
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAILROAD TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES
BETWEEN THE SOVIET FRONTIER
RUTH; HR 7 -2
~
aR't~:~~1?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
_U-S:
C ~..,,pper~
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DOCUMENrNo.
CIA/RR PR-31 NO CHANGE IN C`L; S
may i YaJ CLASS, CHANCED TO: T,
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAILROAD TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES
BETWEEN THE SOVIET FRONTIER AND WESTERN EUROPE
CIA/RR PR-31
(ORR Project 10-51)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of,
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Additional data or comments
which may be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to determine the major railroad
lines in use between the western frontier of the USSR and the Iron
Curtain and to establish their traffic capabilities. The report
will attempt not only to show the railroad lines currently serving
as sections of major east-west transport routes but also to show
those railroad lines which seem likely to be used as sections of
major and alternate military supply routes for east-west through
traffic in the event of war.
Quantitative estimates in this report are based on the capa-
bilities of the lowest capacity sections of the major railroad lines
west of the transloading stations along the western frontier of the
USSR.
The area. under review comprises all of Eastern Europe, including
Austria and Yugoslavia. Albania is not included, because its small
railroad system is not connected to the other Satellite systems and
can contribute nothing to Soviet continental transport requirements.
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CONTEMIS
Summary . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. History of Railroad Transportation in Eastern Europe
II. Administration and Operation . . . . . . . . .
1. Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Railroad System of Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . .
1. Basic Network -- Pattern A . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Existing East-West Through Routes - Pattern B .
a. Principal Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Bifurcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Alternate Line Sections . . . ... . . . .
d. Cross-Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Overlapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Potential East-West Through Routes -- Pattern C .
IV. Traffic Capacities of Pattern B and Pattern C . . . .
1. Pattern B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Pattern C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Transloading Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. E=mergency Traffic Capacities . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . .
Appendixes
Page
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Appendix A. Construction on East-West Railroad Through Routes
Planned or in Process in the European Satellite
Area, June 1952 (Table 8) . . . . . . . . . . 29
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Page
Appendix B.
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
Appendix C. -Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . .
35
Appendix D.
Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . .
39
1. Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . .
39
2. Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
Maps
Following Page
Railroads of Eastern Europe -- 1952 (North Sheet
and South Sheet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Eastern Europe: Principal East-West Railroad
Through Routes -- 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Eastern Europe: Potential East-West Railroad
Through Routes -- 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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CIA/RR PR-31
(ORR Project 10-51)
RAILROAD TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES
BETWEEN THE SOVIET FRONTIER AND WESTERN EUROPE*
Summary
The 12 railroad through routes which cross Eastern Europe between
the Soviet frontier and Western Europe have proved adequate, with few
exceptions, for all requirements placed on them since they have passed
under Soviet control, and they possess a great potential for expansion.
Whether these routes would be equal to the demands of Soviet
military operations in Western Europe cannot be estimated. In weigh-
ing the estimated traffic capability of these routes against any esti-
mate of requirements, it should be borne in mind that the logistical
requirements. of the Soviet Bloc for such operations would not be
restricted to goods originating in the USSR, since the requirements
would in part be met by Satellite sources of supply.
The maximum sustained traffic capacity of these routes -- the
level of traffic that can be supported indefinitely -- is estimated.
at 250 trains each way per day (TEWPD), carrying 225,000 tons** each
way per day.xXX
The maximum short-term traffic capacity of these routes -- the
highest level of traffic that can be supported for approximately 30
days -- is estimated at 287 TEWPD, carrying 258,300 tons each way per
day.
A maximum emergency capacity is believed to exist whereby these
routes can move about 936 trains per day, in one direction only,
carrying 505,200 tons of freight across the area. Such a movement
would be possible only with considerable advance preparation and is
limited to a maximum total of about 1,000 trains.
* This report contains information available as of 1 January
1953.
Tonnage capacities are given in net metric tons throughout this
report.
MXX The estimates of railroad capacities contained in this report
are believed to be correct within a 25-percent margin of error.
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The capacity of transloading stations along the Soviet frontier,
through which freight is transferred from the European standard-gauge
railroad lines to the Soviet broad-gauge lines, at present limits the
maximum sustained traffic capacity for movements crossing the Soviet
frontier to only 205 TEWPD, or 184,500 tons per day in each direc-
tion -- 72 percent of the total maximum short-term traffic capacity
of the existing Satellite railroad network. The existing transloading
facilities can be expanded without undue difficulty; and because the
transloading capacity can be readily expanded, transloading is not
considered to affect seriously east-west traffic capacity.
Expansion of facilities, both planned and already under way, is
expected to elevate the maximum short-term traffic capacity by 1955
to approximately 388 TEWPD, carrying 349,200 tons each way per day.
I. History of Railroad Transportation in Eastern Europe.
Railroads originally were introduced into Eastern Europe chiefly
for military rather than economic utility. The first railroads were
built not to bind Eastern Europe together but rather as defense meas-
sures which resulted in its division into separate areas. The frontiers
of four great empires lay across Eastern Europe in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and the newly developed steam trains were well suited to deliver
the increasing weights of military supplies needed at border garrisons.
Austria, lying between Russia, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire, be-
came the greatest railroad builder in Eastern Europe. Tsarist Russia
did little to further the economic growth of its border lands. Con-
sequently, the railroads in Bessarabia and in the Grand Duchy of War-
s;~Lw were chiefly of military importance and were not well developed.
The sparsest railroad system in Eastern Europe is in that part of
Poland which was taken over from Russia following World War I.
The railroads of several Eastern European states were developed
under more than one governing authority. The poor articulation of
the railroad systems inherited by Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland in
1919 can be attributed as much to the "tides of empire" as to the
dictates of geography. Yugoslavia, for example, inherited parts of
five different railroad systems when the country was formed.
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During the past 30 years, however, there has been considerable
railroad development, and few traces of the imperial pattern are now
visible in the Satellite railroad network, except in Poland, where
the old Russo-German frontier is as clearly visible in the railroad
network as if it were marked by a line on a map. The railroad net-
work in Silesia and Pomerania is uniformly dense up to the frontier
line of the old Grand Duchy of 'Warsaw. Immediately east of this
line the network is extremely and uniformly sparse.*
II. Administration and Operation.
When the Satellite railroads came under Soviet control in
1945, they were particularly ill-suited to meet the long-term stra-
tegic and economic needs of the USSR in Eastern Europe. Adminis-
tration and control were greatly complicated by the multiple owner-
ship of the railroads. There were eight separate state-owned rail-
road systems and scores of private lines to be dealt with in
controlling a combined system totaling less than 100,000 kilometers.
The several difficulties inherent in multiple ownership have
been solved for the USSR in different ways. All the private railroads
in the European Satellite countries were nationalized by 1949, leav-
ing only the eight state-owned railroad systems to be controlled.
The general control of transport ministries, which Communist political
domination of all Satellite cabinets had given the USSR, was too in-
direct and unwieldy -- sometimes too unreliable -- to be satisfactory.
To install Soviet personnel at all levels of the eight state-owned
railroad systems would have been impossible for several reasons, in-
cluding lack of trained manpower.
A short cut to efficient and complete Soviet control was found
in the relationship which existed between the military and the state
railroads in every Satellite country except East Germany: The organ-
ization in Czechoslovakia is typical. The best railroad brains of the
Czechoslovak Ministry of Transportation are reported to have been in
the Fourth Bureau of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army.
Through this bureau and through Czechoslovak Army representatives in
the Ministry of Transport, the Czechoslovak Army controls all rail-
road planning, operations, and information. The Ministry of Transport
* See the map, Railroads of Eastern Europe -- 1952 (North Sheet and
South Sheet), following p. 41.
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serves chiefly for administration and management. It has always met
all military requests immediately. A large group of Soviet Army
officers is working on the Czechoslovak General Staff, and some are
in the Fourth Bureau. Through the channels of the Fourth Bureau,
their demands can be quickly and-easily satisfied. /* One reason
why the USSR has refrained from putting large numbers of Soviet
personnel into operational positions in the Czechoslovak railroads
is that it is realized that hundreds of Czechoslovak officials
would be offended. J
Also in Hungary and Poland, Soviet Army officers are in opera-
tional positions necessary to support the military lines of communi-
cation from Vienna and Berlin to the USSR. Because East Germany has
no established military force through which to work., the USSR.con-
trols the East German Reichsbahn (State Railroad) through its eco-
nomic commission as well as through direct military supervision.
2. Operation.
Between World Wars I and II, railroad operation in Eastern
Europe was neither intensive nor efficient. Traffic was not heavy,
rolling stock was adequate, and turn-round time (the elapsed time
between one loading and the next loading of a car) was unhurried.
Equipment was primitive: few cars had, air brakes, automatic cou-
plings, or roller bearings. Block signals were used on few lines,
and centralized traffic control was used only in the great terminals.
Railroad traffic was then largely made up of domestic move-
ments in support of the several internal economies and the exchange
with Central and Western Europe of raw materials for finished products.
Less than 5 percent of the commerce of Eastern Europe was with the USSR.
Consequently, few railroad lines leading into the USSR were developed.
The layout of the total railroad network, although satisfactory
for westward traffic toward Central Europe, was poorly orientated for
the new eastward and northeastward traffic pattern imposed on the area
by the USSR. Topographical factors, such as the Carpathian mountain
range, would have made any basic reorientation of the over-all net-
work extremely difficult and expensive. Serious congestion points in
the network, where lines converged on the great; cities, caused many
dangers and inconveniences.
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix D.
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The physical condition of the railroads alone created a serious
problem throughout the Soviet Bloc. During World War II, all the sys-
tems suffered greatly from lack of maintenance and from abusive over-
use in addition to the enormous war destruction which had, by 1.945,
brought nearly all railroad operations in the area to a complete
standstill.
During the past 5 years the Satellite railroads have been
restored to good physical condition, and much has been done to over-
come their shortcomings. By 1949, nearly all the lines, bridges, and
workshops which were destroyed in the war were restored to service,
and rolling stock inventories were largely restored to prewar levels,
mainly by intensified workshop activity, although there has also been
new production. The railroad network has been altered extensively to
meet present requirements: hundreds of kilometers of new lines have
been laid in order to provide better connections to the east, and
bypasses have been built, not only around the great cities but also
around many secondary congestion points. New lines which have been
laid include the following:
a. Tomaszow Mazowiecki -- Radom, in Poland.
b. Vac -- Hatvan, in Hungary.
c. Craiova -- Caracal -- Bucharest, in Rumania.
d. Tecuci -- Faurei Bucharest, in Rumania.
e. Sofia -- Karlovo, in Bulgaria.
There have been technical difficulties with the Satellite
railroads, however, which have been harder to correct. These dif-
ficulties derive largely from multiple ownership. The wide variety
of types of equipment in use and the numerous working methods em-
ployed have greatly complicated all operations, particularly main-
tenance and replacement. Workshop procedures and dispatching
practices vary. Brake systems, signal equipment, and types of roll-
ing stock differ widely in each of the Satellites. In 1947, 140
different types of locomotives were reported in the railroad inven-
tory in Poland alone.
Considerable technical unification has been effected across
the whole area, without altering the framework of the various nation-
al railroad systems. The diversity of the Polish locomotive park,
for instance, is being reduced to the three standarized types cur-
rently in production in Poland. This trend toward standardization
has been reported in Hungary and Rumania as well, and at least some
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cross-standardization of rolling stock, air brakes, couplings, and
signal equipment has been achieved throughout the Soviet Bloc.
Operational procedures have been standardized gradually
throughout the Soviet Bloc, chiefly by abandoning established pat-
terns of work in favor of Soviet procedures. Every Satellite coun-
try has sent delegations of railroad technicians to the USSR for
training courses, and Soviet commissions have toured each Satellite
railroad system in the interest of coordination. The imposition of
Soviet methods on Satellite railroads, which has been going on for
about 5 years, is not concluded. As late as April 1952 it was report-
ed that the application of Soviet methods throughout the Czechoslovak
railroads was being pushed by Transport Commissioner Gireth and by the
General Board of Directors of State Railroads in Prague, who together
control actual operations. J
Certain economies have been gained by the adoption of Soviet
workshop procedures, whereby scores of operations, formerly needed to
inspect and service a locomotive, were reduced to 18 routine operations.
This regimentation into one pattern of such diverse railroad systems
as the East German and Bulgarian systems cannot have been achieved with-
out serious dislocations. Nevertheless, the reorganization has yielded
many economies, cemented Soviet control, and considerably strengthened
the entire Soviet Bloc railroad system.
The best measure of the success of Sovietization is reflected
in the figures showing the increasing volume of traffic carried. In
1951 the Satellite railroads produced approximately 90 billion ton-
kilometers of freight traffic, J which was approximately 60 percent
above the 1938 level of about 55 billion ton-kilometers. J This
increased freight traffic apparently was achieved with approximately
the same amount of physical equipment and manpower and was made
possible by increased efficiency at every level of railroad opera-
tions and by greatly intensified utilization of all equipment and
labor. Workers' productivity was increased by the introduction of
several types of competition. The Stakhanovite system has continually
elevated the work-load norms.
Similar intensification of output is going on in other fields
of the Satellite economies. For example, bauxite production in Hun-
gary has increased yearly from 3+0,000 tons in 1947 to 500,000 tons
in 1948, 530,000 tons in 1949, and 800,000 tons in 1950. Production
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for 1952 was planned at 1.2 million tons. Y Such increases in indus-
trial activity result not only in yearly increases in requirements for
railroad freight transportation but also In the production of input
items required for increasing railroad capabilities. There is every
indication that the Satellite railroads will continue to increase their
capabilities and that, if allocations are kept in balance, railroad
capabilities can be maintained at any level required by industrial
expansion.
III. Railroad System of Eastern Europe.
The combined railroad system of Eastern Europe has no prevailing
over-all pattern. The major railroad lines do not form a clearly
defined network, and there is neither north-south nor east-west polar-
ity noticeable in the total network. There are, however, several
small patterns: the grid of Bulgaria, the crescent of Rumania, the
northwest-southeast axis of Yugoslavia, and the radial spokes of Hun-
gary.
The over-all railroad network well reflects the geography of the
area: lines which skirt the mountain formations and follow river
valleys are prominent. The political structure of Eastern Europe
is also reflected in the network, the-most outstanding features of
which are the webs which radiate from the capital cities -- Berlin,
Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, and Budapest.
The economic life of the area accounts for other railroad centers,
such as Wroclaw, Katowice, Ostrava, Bratislava, Brasov, and Ploesti,
where heavy industry and commerce have developed focal points in the
network. These webs and focal points are united by several main
connecting lines and crosslines, and together these form the basic
railroad system of Eastern Europe. To this basic system, many
secondary connecting lines and crosslines have been added, giving
the total network, particularly west of the 20th meridian, consid-
erable density and many alternate routing possibilities.
Within the over-all network of railroad lines in Eastern Europe,
this report is concerned with three main patterns: (1) those 11 lines,
regardless of location, which are now most important to the Satellite
area; (2) the existing east-west through routes,formed by combinations
of local or area lines, which now connect the Soviet frontier with the
Iron Curtain; and (3) the potential east-west through routes across
the Satellite area as they may be expected to be by 1955. FQr
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convenience, these three patterns are identified as follows: basic
network -- Pattern A; existing east-west through routes -- Pattern B;
and potential east-west through routes -- Pattern C.
1. Basic Network -- Pattern A.
Within the total network the 11 railroad lines which form the
basic network, Pattern A, and which are currently most important for
binding the Satellite area together and for the volume of traffic
hauled are listed in Table l.*
It is significant that, although these are the most important
railroad lines in Eastern Europe, only four of these lines can be prop-
erly regarded as parts of east-west through routes: namely, Lines 1,
2, 3, and 6.
2. Existing East-West Through Routes -- Pattern B.
Pattern B represents the east-west through routes which can be
formed by currently available railroad lines. These routes are listed
in detail in Table 2** and are shown on the accompanying map, Eastern
Europe: Principal East-West Railroad Through Routes -- l952.***
a. Principal Lines.
Nineteen railroad lines enter the Satellite area from the
east, and about 30 lines cross the Iron Curtain from the west. The
difference is largely because of the fact that nearly twice as many
lines enter East Germany from Western Europe as enter Poland from the
USSR. Not all these frontier crossings, however, have east-west through
connections. There are only 12 routes -- continuous, connections from
east to west across the Satellite area -- and 4 of these are secondary
routes, currently carrying very little east-west through traffic.
Routes X and XI, which do not lead to the frontiers of the
USSR, have been included because they lead to Soviet-dominated Black
Sea ports, each of which can deliver freight in volumes comparable to
the average overland transloading stations.
* Table 1 follows on p. 9.
Table 2 follows on p. 11.
*** Following p. 12.
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Existing East-West Railroad Through Routes in Eastern Europe
Pattern B
1952
Route Alignment
I W Luebeck Bad Kleinen -- Guestrow -- Pasewalk -- Szczecin--
Runowo -- Chojnice -- Tczew -- Elblag -- Braniewo -- Kalin-
ingrad
II Oebisfelde -- Stendal -- Rathenow -- Berlin (Spandau) /-- Ber-
lin (Inner Freight Ring) Werbig -- Kostrzyn -- Pila --
Torun -- Ilawa -- Korsze -- Zheleznodorozhnyy ---Chernyakhovsk
III Helmstedt -- Magdeburg -- Potsdam -- Berlin (Southern Outer
Freight Ring) -- Frankfurt/Oder -- Zbaszynek -- Poznan --
Kutno -- Lowicz Warsaw -- Siedlce -- Lukow- Brest
IV Ellrich -- Nordhausen -- Halle -- Falkenberg -- Cottbus --
Guben -- Glogow -- Leszno -- Lodz -- Koluszki -- Tomaszow
Mazowiecki -- Radom -- Deblin -- Lublin Rejowiec --
Chelm -- Yagodin Kovel`
V Bebra -- Eisenach --- Leipzig -- Ru.hland -- Horka -- Wroclaw --
Opole -- Katowice --Krakow Przeworsk -- Przemysl -- Lvov
VI Cheb -- Prague Poricany -- Kolin - - Pardubice -- Prerov --
Hranice -- Horni Lidec -- Zilina -- Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas --
Margecany -- Kysak -- Kosice -- Michal'any -- Slov. N.
Mesto -- Cerna -- Chop
VII Fuerth -- Ceske Budejovice -- Gmuend -- Vienna -- Bratislava
Szob -- Vac -- Aszod -- Miskolc -- Szerencs -,- Nyiregyhaza --
Zahony -- Chop -- Mukachevo
VIII Linz -- St. Poelten Vienna -- Gyor -- Budapest -- Ujszasz ---
Szolnok -- Szajol -- Puspokladany - Debrecen -- Nyiregyhaza Zahony -- Chop -- Mukachevo
Footnotes for Table 2 follow on p, 12.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000300140003-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000300140003-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 2
Existing East-West Railroad Through Routes in Eastern Europe
Pattern B
1952
(Continued)
Alignment
IX Salzburg -- Bruck -- Graz --- Szentgotthard Szombathely --
Szekesfehervar -- Budapest -- Cegled -- Szolnok - Szajol --
Bekescsaba -- Arad -- Teius -- Brasov -- Ploesti -- Reni
X / Udine -- Gorizia -- Zagreb -- Koprivnica -- Gyekenyes --
Baja -- Kiskunhalas ?-- Subotica -- Kikinda -- Timisoara --
Turnu-Severin -- Bucharest Constanta
XI / Trieste -- Zagreb -- Novska - Belgrade -? Lapovo -:Nis --
Sofia Plovdiv -- Burgas
XII J Tarvisio -- Klagenfurt -- Vienna -- Prerov -- Dziedzice --
Zebrzydowice -- Katowice -- Czestochowa --- Warsaw --
Bialystok -- Vil'nyus
a. Route of secondary importance.
b. Spandau is a suburb of Berlin.
Because of its oblique axis, Route XII seems to be a route
unlikely to be much used for traffic across the Satellite area. It is
included because it is capable of carrying a large amount of traffic,
because it has virtually no overlapping,* and because several of its
sections are known to be important to intra-Soviet Bloc traffic.
This selection of routes is admittedly an oversimplification
of a complex pattern. Omitted from the map of Pattern B are the bifur-
cations (branching lines), the alternate line sections (line sections
* Throughout this report, overlapping refers to the inclusion of any
one section of a railroad line in more than one of the routes discussed.
S-E-C-R-E-T-
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000300140003-8
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