SUPPLIES OF IRON AND STEEL SCRAP IN THE SOVIET BLOC
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
34
Document Creation Date:
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 11, 1999
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 10, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0.pdf | 1.75 MB |
Body:
C1~4-RDP79-0.1.093A0003.0.00~0.003 ~~~~
,PR~?VISI~7NAL INTELLIGEN~E__REP~RT
SUPPLIES QF IRON AND _ STEEL SCRAP
-. ,,
~.
IN THE 50~1'IEfi ;BLOC
~,~LI
:; Clp/RR PR-20~
,.
~~ pecember 1952
b~CUfwEri`r No.
iVQ ~H~[~E~E IN,G 8. C]
~LAS~, CHAtJGED TO: T
ivEXt Fi~ViEW PATE: ~.~~,
DI lieu. ' un -~.~...
~'gTE;REViEWER: ODfi514
C~N~f,RAI. 1 NTELLIGENCE AG~N~Y
'4FFI~E QF. R~~EARCH__ AND REPdR~'S
- - - _ _ ,..
Appxov~d. Foy Reaease 1.9~9/09/D2 _:-.CIA-F~D~~9-01_Q93AOQ43
.. __ ~
'ease 1999/D9/02.
._
~~ App'rovedY Fa~Yel'eas~ ~~~~~t~/Q2 ~~`t ~~ -~~p'I~' , ~~~OE `QO~~~ 3+b
s '~A,~t~I~?C4
his ,material contains information ,afPecti~:g
'e Natignal I~e~~nse of _the United States
v,}Ithin ,the .mean,ixg of the ,espionage laws,
~'itle .18, USC,. Secs. 793 and '794, the trans-
rniss~~ or ~e~r fati~s~_whsJ~n~ny manner
to an unauthor~z~d person is prohibited. by law.,
- --t ~ _ -- -- - --_ -_
~pp~aved f ~r-Release -1 ~~9#flgi?7 : Goa-RDP79 b'~093A0~03IIU~3~J0?3-0
Approved For Release 199~/~~/p~IdCln~Ti P79-01093A000300030003-0
(~ ~~ C i Y t A~,
~__~,~_
sEe~~- FNFORMATI
SUPPZIES OF IRON ANn STE~~ SCRAP
IN THE SOVIET FLOC
CIA~RR PR-20
(ORR Project 70-51)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Additional data or comments
which may be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
CONFIDENTIAI.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
CONFIDENTIAL
Page
Table 1.
Use of Iron and Steel Scraps Scrap Rates~in the USSR
under the Third Five Year Plant 1938-lt2 '.
5
Table 2.
Use of Iron and Steel Scraps Estimated Scrap Practices
in the Soviet Bloc and the US, 1951-53
6
Table 3.
Estimated Requirements of Iron end Steel Scrap in the
sOViet BLOC ~ 1951 ~ a r ? ?
7
Table 1~.
Estimated Requirements of Iron and Steel Scrap in the
soviet Bloc, 1952
B
Table 5.
Estimated Requirements of Iron and Steel Scrap in the
Soviet Bloc, 1953 ...
9
Table 6.
Estimated Availabilities of Iron and Steel Scrap in the
Soviet Bloc, 1952 r
11
Table 7.
Estimated AvaiTabilities of Iron and Steel Scrag in the
Soviet Bloc, 1953 ?
12
Table 8. .
Sources of Iron and Steel Scrap in the US
13
Illustration
Following Page
Flow of Materials in USSR Iron and Steel Industry (Chart)
(Canfid~ential ). .. ?
2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
CONTENTS
P
S'tltl'Imary ? ? r ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ~ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? 1
I. Introduction . 2
1. Evolution of Scrap Uses ? 2
2. Sources of Scrap . . e . s . 3
II. Process of Estimation ? ? !t
IIT. Requirements . 6
IV. Availabilities ? . , . 10
1? USSR . . ? ? 13
2. Czechoslovakia 7.1-t
3. Poland ? . 11t
Lt. East Germany . ].~
5? Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
b. Rumania . . . 1
7. Communist China , . ? . 16
V. Exports . 16
VI. Stockpiling ? ? ?
16
Appendixes
Appendix A. Gaps in Intel7:igence , . 1?
Appendix B. Methodology 19
Appendix C. Bootees and Evaluation of Sources 27
F 0~1~lAt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
ONFIDE~I,gE
CIA/RR PR-20
(ORR Project 70-51)
SUPPL IFS OF IRON AND STEEL SCRAP IN THE SOVIET BLOC#
S ar
In 1952 and 1953, as the iron and. steel industries of the Soviet
Bloc increase production, their requirements for scrap metal likewise
will increase.. Over-all requirements of the Soviet Bloc for iron and
steel scrap in 1952 are estimated at 28,23,000 metric tons. Over-all
availabilities of scrap in the Bloc in 1952 are estimated at only 27,933,000
metric tons, and actual procurement probably will fall short of this amount.
The scrap supply problem is particularly critical in East Germany, and the
situation in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is serious.
Rumania and Communist China should fulfill requirements without difficulty.
Iron and steel industries themselves annually generate large amounts
of scrap, and additional amounts are generated by metalworking and fabri-
cating industries, but the annual requirements of modern iron and steel
industries for scrap greatly exceed the amounts annually generated as a
byproduct of their operations. The difference must be made up by scrap
recovered from disused or obsolescent equipment of various kinds. One
major source of iron and steel scrap since World War II has. been surplus
military equipment and the wreckage resulting from battle and bombardment.
Stocks of war scrap in the So viet Bloc have now been depleted to the point
where they are no longer important factors in the supply situation. Scrap
collection drives have been established in most of the Soviet Bloc countries
and have become an integral part of the iron and steel economy. In the
USSR the scrap collection drive of 1951 fell short of planned goals, Every
effort is being made by the Soviet Bloc to import scrap from the West,
but the amounts-obtained have been limited by strong Western demand and
Western European export controls.
It is concluded that although scrap metal will be utilized in the
Soviet Bloc at close to the maximum possible rate of supply in 1952 and
1953, the s~nly of scrap will not be sufficient to maintain the 1951
rates of increase in steel production in the Bloc (estimated at 1t, 763,000
metric tons). Therefore, to maintain the 1951 rates of increase, pig
This report contains information available to CIA as of 1S April 1952.
CONFIDE
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-F-C-R-E-T
iron production would have to be increased by the more efficient opera-
tion of existing installations and by the construction of additional
blast furnace facilities. It is not believed, however, that the in-
crease in pig iron production will be sufficient to sustain in 1952 and
1953 the 1951 increases in steel production.
I. Introduction.
In an expanding steal econorr{y such as exists in the USSR and the
Satellites the recovery of iron and steel scrap from disused or obsoles~
cent equipment is the hope for short-term increases in steel production)
Tron and_steel scrap and pig iron are complementary and interchangeable
raw materials. But scrap is a superior raw material in steelmaking be-
cause certain steps in the refinement process have already been taken.
Scrap is superior to pig iron not only for making certain kinds of
steel -- the highest grades of alloy steels az?e made in electric fur-
naces charged principally with scrap -- but also for saving 1 abor and
equipment in the production of steel of any kind. Each ton of scrap
used in steelmaking results in the conservation of between 3 and 1t
tons of natural resources. Approximately 2 tons of iron ore, 1 ton of
.coking coal, one-half ton of limestone, and small quantities of other raw
materials are used to?make 1 ton of pig iron. 1~ To extract, transport
and handle these raw materials requires far more labor and equipment
than to collect, transport, and handle the scrap that may be used to re-
place 1 ton of pig iron. Scrap, moreover, may be used directly in
steel production in open-hearth furnaces, which are comparatively easy
to build. The intermediate step of refining strictly rsw materi als intd
pig iron, on the other hand, requires blast furnaces, which are more
difficult to erect and which require certain types of machinery (such
as turboblowers) in critical supply in the Soviet Bloc.
1. Evolution of Scrap Uses.
For about the first 20 years of steelmaking by bulk methods
there was no need for scrap metal. The first such process, the Bessemer
proce$s~ used 100-percent pig iron, and, with the rapid increase of steed
~ Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix C.
~ For flow of materials in USSR iron and steel industry, see the chart
which follows p. Z.
~+ r 2 -
$-~-.C-,~-E-1
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A00030~~~~~AL
FLOW OF MATERIALS IN USSR IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY'
OTHER
SCRAP
SOURCES
22 tons
SCRAP
55 tons
SCRAP
10 tons
SCRAP
15 tons
SCRAP
8 tons
ANGANESE
ORE (40%)
1 ton
IRON ORE
(`~%)
137 tons
SINTER,
SCALE,
AND SCRAP
4.5 tons
BLAST FURNACE PLANTS
70 tons
of iron as pig or hot metal
OXIDIZING
ORE
FERRO?
ALLOYS
1.5 tons
STEEL MAKING PLANTS
100 TONS
of raw or crude steel
INGOTS
97 tons
FINISHING MILLS
70 tons
of finished rolled products
CONSUMING
INDUSTRIES
COKE
84 tons
PIG IRON
20 tons
SCRAP
11 tons
39 tons in
17 tons out
STEEL FOUNDRIES
3 tons in
2 tons Out
INGOTS,
BLOOMS,
AND BILLETS
HEAW
FORGINGS
As mined 162 4ons
aeneficiated 116 tons
COKE?
CHEMICALS
5 tom
CONFIDENTIAL
A~l~otl~~.t2For Release 19~'l0''~'?"CIA-RDP79-01`09~~(?(~994fl@003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
production during this period, large reserves of scrap accumulated. It
?was to take advantage of these reserves of scrap metal that the open-
hearth steel furnace was developed on a wide c?mmercial basis. This
development led in turn to increased dependence on scrap and a decline
in reserves of scrap.
This cycle began in the US with the building up of large reserves
of scrap in the period 1880 to 1900. Since 1908, when open-hearth
production overtook production by the Bessemer process, more scrap has
been consumed than generated in the US, ~ The present acute scrap
shortage in the US can in part be traced to the depletion of these early
Bessemer reserves of steel scrap.
The availability of scrap and the proportion of scrap used in tY~e
.open hearths, blast furnaces, electric furnaces,-and foundries have de-
pended on the prevailing smelting methods and conditions. Until 19lt0
the USSR used such a small percentage of scrap in open-hearth furnaces
that more scrap was generated than consumed. Since then, first in order
to meet the urgent needs of World War II and then to hasten the attain-
ment of the goal of self-sufficiency for the USSR, Soviet leaders have
placed great emphasis on the open-hearth process, by which the USSR
could most rapidly expand steel production, utilizing the large re-
serves of scrap available. The extensive adoption of this process in the
USSR has depleted these reserves rapidly and has created a critical situa-
tion in the supply of scrap.
`2. Sources of Scrap,
.~~
The sources of scrap metal are much the same in every country.
Scrap metal is divided into two principal categoriesa home scrap# and
purchased scrap. Hame scrap is the waste metal material generated in
a mill from all the casting, rolling, and finishing operations. From
every 100 tons of steel ingots produced, 15 to 25 tons of home scrap
are generated. ~ The largest identifiable source of purchased scrap
is the process scrap turned out by the metalworking and fabricating in>
dustry. Yn normal times, about 12 to 15 percent of-the total weight
of steel used in the metalworking industry becomes process scrap. Tn
wartime the proportion rises to 18 to 20 percent.
A~.so. cad-l~;d circulating scrap.
~ Also called dealer scrap, outside scrap, revert scrap, open market
scrap, and country scrap.
S-E-C-R~~-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
s_E-c-R-~-T
The retirement of rails and rail transport equipment contributes
a small but consistent stream of scrap for the mills. Railways are the
source of about 15 percent of all purchased. scrap.
The remainder of the purchased scrap generated represents the
toll taken by obsolescence, corrosion, accident, and other causes that
result in the retirement of iron and steel products :from actiTae seervice.
Scrap is recovered from shipbreaking, building demolitions, and detinning
operations. In the US the automobile junk yard :is an important source
but is not in the Soviet Bloc. Other sources of purchased scrap are city
dumps and farms.
In addition, there are two extraordinary means of acquiring scrap,
exploited only in times of necessity or when economically profitable.
These are the collection drive and the recovery of war scrap. The industrial
collection drive is an action to force plants and factories to contribute
scrap from obsolescent equipment. In reality, the acquisition of scrap
in this way will be offset by a shortage later, when the obsolescent
scrap normally would return to the mills. The household collection drive
brings in scrap that ordinarily might go uncollected, but in percentage
terms the contribution is small. War scrap and suro'Lus war equipment
were an important part of scrap supply in the USSR aa~d East Germany up
until about 1951.
II. Process of Estimation.
In estimating requirements it is necessary to know what scrap practices#
are used in each country for open-hearth, electric, and blast furnaces,
In the course of fulfilling the Third Five Year Plan (1938-1t2) in the
USSR, minimum and maximum uses of scrap were established, as shown in
Tabl? 1.~
# crap practice refers to the percent of scrap in a furnace charge.
~ Table 1 follows on p. 5.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-F-C-R-F-T
Use of Iron and Steel: Scrap ;
Scrap Rates in the IJSSR under the Third Five Year Plan
1938-1t2
Tyne of Steel
Open-Hearth Steel
Bessemer Steel
Electric Steel
e of Pi Iron
Open-ilearth ~-~ Iron
Foundry Pig Tron
Minimum 1Jse of Scrap
(Metric Ton per Metric ion of Steel)
0. ~ 11
0.039
0.807
Maximum Use of Scrap
(Metric Ton per Metric Ton of Pip; Iron)
0.050
O.OoO
In lieu of any definite information, scrap practice wastaken at
95 percent in electric furnaces in all Soviet I31oc countries, even
!though US practice is about 98 percent. Table 2# shows estimated onen-
hearth and b7_~st.-furnace scrap practices in the Soviet Bloc and the IJS
for the period 1951-53.
Table ~ follows on p. 6.
-s-
S-E-C-R-F-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved- For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-F-C-R-~'-T
lJse of Iron and Steel Scrap:
Estimated Scrax~ Practices in the Soviet Bloc and the LTS 7/
1951.-53
Country
Open-Hearth Furnaces
Blast Furnaces
USSR
50
5.5
Czechoslovakia
38
10.0
Pol and
~ 8
2.0
Fast Germany
85 a/
5.0
Hungary
5~. _
5.0
Rumania
5ft
5.0
Communist China
15
5.0
US
~6
3.5
a, 19 1, percent; 19 , 0 percent; 19>3, 75 percent.
III. Requirements.
The construction of new blast furnaces and the consequent increase in
the production of pig iron is the only way to laver scrap requirements and
maintain (or increase) steel production. Improved technology such as the
fuse of high-pressure tons in blast furnaces, already in use in the< USSR
at Magnitogorsk, will also reduce scrap requirements.
Estimated scrap reouirements of oven-hearth furnaces, electric fur-
naces, blast furnaces, and foundries in the Soviet Etloc for 1951 are shown
in Table 3;~; for 1952, in Table ~~; and for 1953, in Table 5.~'~-~ (Al-
though Bessemer and Thomas converters occasionally utilize scrap, the
.amounts are negligible.) Allowance ha.] been made far metal losses in the
smelting and refining of steel.
_~ Table 3 follows on p. 7.
~ Table ~ follows on p. 8.
Table 5 follows on p. 9.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
ooooovl~l
ooooo~-cam
~'"~ h- ~"r'1 'V of fV CO
? ? ?
OC~LN ri0 OO
M
O L1 O ~O r-1 ti rl N
t~ N 111 V1 ~ O~ T-- O~
c~0 M C\L M ll~ .-1 N o0
? ~:
O O ri i-1' ri O O O Lf~
[--~ N N
't7
O
CL
O ~U -~ tf~ O N O~ ri
N 1-+11 r1 Lf~ r-I CV .-~'
a~ r--I ~-I -~ O O O ~c:i
x"1000000 .~'
O ~O rl O M cY1 7' N
NNMNNrI~ O~
Nr100000 .~
? ? ? ? e ?
rIOCJOOOO r-I
U
.~
F~
O cry O [~ c~'1 ~'
~f]
cr.
-F~
M N 0 1.f1 V1 r1
~'
N
U
N
rl
L`- rl r--I O O O
. . ? .
x100000
O
0
r1
?
N
W
cd
O .~ 1-~l .~' L!~ M
~'
'Ltd
N
O ~ ~ ~fJ r+" 1111 r'1
r--I
~",
rl. O~ CT CO ~ rl ri
?
~O
~
. ?
.~ao0ooo
~
0
~?~+
>
ooo
u
o
ooa
o
o +
fti U
1 v1
o
N O~ 11`,
o
~
v1 v1 co
-~ N N
00
O
~
N ri r-I O O O r-1
act
~
?rl ~+
as
7 N r~-I ~ t' ~~y H
V] N O cd .~ ? '~
U
O ~ +'
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ?h
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
a~
8888N~~8 8 .~.~
r'1 CD -~' U10D N O H
? ? ? ? ? a ?
~''~ N N rl O O r-I cV ~O, .U
V
u o
~~
~ +~
a~ ~
~~+ ?~
t?nSootio 0
CD ~ M ~ 1.lt rl M , ~
o~~~.~a~~~~~
r~ ~ a t~
d~~~
~~~~o?
~~r~~~w
'~~~~~9~~(,~0,~00030003-0
Approved For F~elea~e
N! ~,
1999/09/02 n CIA-~t[~P79-01093A000300030003-0
z
~
~
~
?x o
~oz
o
a'
`
a
;
-I
r
rl ~ A
O N O~-7 ~ d\ r-i tf
~l
u
ri
[tl [
d lf~ M O~ N N 1.f~ p~1 (
T
1
oQ ~O N [~ 1.J1 N ~O M
'C1
~
I
O O ?r
i
F aG ~
N r-1 ri ~-I O O O O
d
[ra
dJ
U N U N N
~
~
A~p~Eo~n:n~~l
'
w
[n
w no coo '60
?eo o
N
r~ ri r+ ll1 ?rl ?ri ?
~
c
. r-t ~ ;-i o ~ ~
O
3
9
~
~ a~i v a~i 4 u a~i ~ p
zxz zz
I
w 9
U v
l
!ti
o
~ o a
aaa?o ~
~
na
I-I
~
,-1 rl ~
U ~ t?
t[1 0? r? r? 11
.
ZZZ
~
r-N
y
~
t
~ A
O O
C>a .ti ~
N
I C ~ ~
~
N E~
N P
pp .p
O O rm-1 ~ r~i .~Mt b O'
, aOMr"~Mri00 I
q
?rrol 't~ [d
~ ~ B
O
x'000000 ~O
~ ~d N
~
t
[
~
CJ
?r
~ W
0
6 :~,
~
A.
i
[nc~
~
A
~ F
W
(n
i~
O r-1 V1
r-1 r~ M r-i
O
+' .. y
r-I
4)
~ vJ O
~
p
~' ~~i ~n O O O ~ nl
~
~ ~ ~ ?
O
;>
~oc~H
~o00odri to
~ `
f##""
~ ~
E+I 0
~ ~
w1 ti b
t
~ ~ ~ a wi
~
' I y ~ Ln
n
~
2
i a
1
~ N
~ b t cr
l
U ~ H f~ rl
p
[d +~ t
O ~
`
~
.
,
~
I
~
`d
c~
[
-
I~ N O ~
`~
~
~
H ~~ ~
~ ? FYI y
:zl ~ r~ F+
rl U
[1T
[`
'~ N r
-I O O r~ U
O E= ri w
WI
I H
~~
[d ?r1 O
+~ p~
? ?
M 0 0 0 0 0 0 -~
~
tr. Ca A
~ 4
~~ ~~
W
'
i m
:n
o
1" ~ H
N co
a m ;~ '`'
a'
f; i. ~ m
~+
o n ro
~
W
-~
N
~O N M T M O 0\ N
?E~ -- W [[1
CL E=
m M't.r~ M ri N N [~
+~ [A O .~
a ~'~
0000000 0
~ o N ~ y
a
~
~ .a
'
N
.
0
ty
N
t N
ri TS r-1
~ O Eft N ~D O~ ? ~O
r-1 r-I rl O N M I
~ ?rl
r-I ~" r
1 ro
r1 rl cd +~ F,'
+r~~
~~rddi [d ?r!
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r-I I
r-~ ~ .L" ~ N N
'
`~ U
N
~
A
E
fY, F a
0000000 O
~
C>~C
7
r
-1
~
~
'~',
1 ~ chi ~ ~
r-i r
`i
N > `~ ~ ~ M
4
W
\
cd I
0 O O tf~ ~ ~ 0 cz7
r
7
> ?
W
i ~ Q`
~
lA~ r~ [~ O M CO D~ M
.,.
r
~
r
4
v) -N C
~^ w
?
' [~-~ N O C\i aD
r"1 CY
,
~
~
ro
N [d
.
~ r
i E
[n
O
U
00000 00 N
O a~ U La },~, 0 +'
O
ri
NP W O
U i.
~,~
~
[n ~ W c7 tJ 'O ~ O
r-i ~~d +~ (r1 ?rl y Q
~
O +~ N [d r-i U W r-1
rn f. ?r?1 W Q.
N
r
O
l
N
O Lf~ ~ L1\ N ~O ~ Lr~
(
y
[
d
O U O E~ ~~ ~C N E
Ll. r
l 6
M N O~ N B~ rl O O~
[n O f0
d
N
?
rir-ir1000 O
`
p
p
~7
v]',#.
N
~ ~~
~
nro ?.~
~
p
.
~
b
ri
G,
+~ ~
N
O
~
+
-' ~
O
W W F
i
~
~
,
+
a.na~
oo...
N +~ f; O C H k ro
?
V1 - U ?ri ?rl O O to N ?rl
?rl r01
N N L' rl td N r-i 4 tr d0
~ ~ ~ m ~
~
~
> ~ ~
.-i ~
~ +~ ~ 9a Oq
x +~ ~ 1~E=- [q E r~
O
0
o b
7 ~ ~C
- A
-~ R. ~ q G ~ k m 0
r
H
'
C
r
1
-I
i O ?ri ..~i
d N O t-i
~
Approved For F~
eleas
~i~~/ : ~I
;R~79-0109
3A000300030003-0
nvawx v
roA.+~ v?o Nw an~.,a
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel. Table $ indicates the sources of scrap
and the contribution of each source of scrap to the US iron and steal
industry.
Table 8
'Sources of Iron and Steel Scrap in the [1,S 1~
Percent of Total
Sources Purchased Scrap All Scrap
Home Scrap S5
Purchased Scrape !t5
Process Scrap 1~0
Rails and Rail Equipment 15
Obsolescent Equipment, etc. !ts
Zbtal purchased Scrap 100
Total All Scrap 100
1. USSR.
In the USSR there has been an intense nation wide effort for the
last several years to make a sufficient supply of scrap available to the
iron and steel industry. 11/ If scrap requirements, both far home con-
sumption and far foreign commitments., are to be met in 1952 and 1953, it
will be necessary for Glavotorchermet (Main Administration of Procurement,
?rocessing, and Sale of Scrap Metal) to intensify its activities.
After World War II the available supplies of scrap were plentiful.
They consisted mainly of war scrap from the USSR and East Germany as well
as scrap obtained from the wholesale dismantling of plants in East Germany.
Now, however, war stocks are depleted, and the dismantling has virtually
ceased.. In 1951 the supply of scrap was so short in the USSR that mills
in the Ihepropetrovsk-area were forced to suspend open-hearth production
-13-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C -R- E'-T
temporarily. 12 The 1.951 Soviet scrap collection drive was not fulfilled
according to plan. 13/ In the future it will be necessary to increase
the collection drive efforts. The USSR will not be able to rely. on im-
ports and war scrap to fill any substantial part of the scrap requirements.
2. Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak iron and steel industry probably will be able
to obtain sufficient quantities of scrap metal to maintain planned levels
of production in 1952 and 1953. Regular sources of supply are app arently
sufficient to fulfill requirements, although the government has instituted
scrap collection drives# and trade agreements f'or importing scrap. A
large portion of the necessary imports has been supplied in the past by
the USSR and East Germany. 1!t In the fut~zre, Czechoslovakia must rely
on the USSR for imports of scrap metal, particularly in view of the in -
creasingly strict embargoes on scrap shipments to the Soviet Bloc by
Italy, Western Germany, the Western Zones of Austria, Switzerland,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, all former sources of supply for scrap.
If the iron and steel industry of Czechoslovakia is unable to make gro-
per use of the Soviet iron ores which are now being substitued for high-
grade Swedish ores, shipments of which to Czechoslovakia have been reduced,
the scrap situation in Czechoslovakia will become increasingly more
serious. 15/.-
3 . Poland.
Poland+s iron and steel industry will not suffer any loss in
Manned production in 1952 and 1953 for lack of scrap metal. 'Although
the Polish government has made an assignment of responsibility-for the
procurement of scrap metal, few data were found to substantiate evidence
of an intense scrap collection drive. But in 1'952 and 1953 the necessity
of replacing declining imports from East Germany may focus attention on
the need for nation-wide efforts to dbtain sufficient scrap metal for
the iron and steel industry. 16/
11. East Germany.
If the USSR relaxes the present scrap requirements levied against
~ Supervising agency -- Salvage Raw Materials (Sterne Suroviny), a
national corporation.
~ Central Office for Waste Utilization and Salvage and the Central
Committee for~Scrap.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
East Germany, the supply in East Germany will be sufficient in 1952 and
1953. Itp to the present time, Soviet policy has been to call on East
Germany to fulfill any scrap deficiencies existing elsewhere in the
Soviet Bloc. The USSR has demolished some East German factories solely
for the salvageable scrap metal. Continuance of mandatory e~orts
at the present rate will seriously disrupt the economy of the East
German iron and steel industry. 17/
A German source in 19J~? estimated that in East G?rmany there
existed a war scrap metal reserve of 4 million to 5 million metric tons?
At the same time a Soviet source placed the reserve at 6.5 million to
7 million metric tons. Tn either case t~se reserve is now exhausted, tai~h
the possible exception of about 500,000 metric tons of sunken ships along
the East German coast. 18/ In 1951, scrap collection drives collected
600,000 metric tons of scrap metal. It is possible that this amount
will be collected during 1952, but it is doubted if the figure will be
met in 1953. By the end of 1953, however, the East German government _
hopes to have a sufficient number of the new low-shaft b1a st furnaces
in operation to eliminate imports of pig iron and paortially relieve-the
scrap shortage. 19/
H~~?
Hungary cannot sustain iron and steel production in 1952 and
1953 without importing at least 50,000 metric tons of scrap. In the
bast, Hungary+s scraz~ imports have come principally from East C.rermany,
the TJSS;~,, Austria, and Bulgaria. 20 Imports from East Germany, Hungary+s
1 argest external source of supply, will decrease markedly during the
next year. 21 Some scrap will come from Lebanon. 22 There are in-
sufficient data to indicate whether a scrap collection drive exists.
6. Rumania.
Rumania- will be able to sustain operations at planned production
levels through the use of internal sources of acrap metal. Rumania im-
norts about 10,000 metric tons of scrap a year from Bulgaria. Small,
amounts also came from Lebanon.
~ un by the Volkseigene Handelszentrale Schrott (F~eople-Owned Scrap
Trading Center ).
- 15 -
S-F-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
China has a relatively greater surplus of scrap metal than any mf the
countries in the Soviet Bloc, and the supply is entirely sufficient for
the iron and steel industry. In addition, stocks of war scrap from Korea
are readily available and -are being utilized in D4anchuria and the Soviet
Far East. Reports do exist, however, of repeated Chinese attempts to
import scrap through Hong Kong. 2!~
V. orts.
Except for important strategic reasons., the Soviet Bloc does not
export scrap. The Finnish-Soviet Trade Agreement fors 1952 calls for the
shipment of 20000 metric tons of scrap from the USSR to Finland. How-
ever, the delivery of the scrap is subject to the understanding that the
steel produced will be returned to the USSR. The Finns expressed sur-
prise that the USSR had an exportable surplus, and they believe that the
scrap will come from East Germany, not from the USSR. 25/?
VI. Stockpiling.
Stockmiling of scrap metal against future strategic needs is not
done anywhere in the Soviet Bloc. The supply situation is so critical
that it is impossible to stockpile without a loss in production. The
aggregating of scrap stocks at the mills is not t;o bey considered stock-
piling.
- 16 -
S-F-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-'P
APPENDIX A
GAPS IN IN TFLLIGFNCE
Although reporting on East Germany, Czechoslo vakia, and Poland is
relatively good, information on Hungary and Rumania is sparse. Intelli-
gence reports on scrap metal activities in Communist China are almost
,totally lacking. On the USSR there was one good report. Import-export
information was spotty and incomplete. In no case gas the coverage
sufficient for all the needs of the report.
Further and more complete coverage on the following items would
be an aid in formulating requirements and availab:~.lities in all Soviet
Bloc countries; production data on pig iron as used for open-hearths,
converters, and iron foundries; raw steel data far open-hearth,. electric
furnace, converter, and steel casting production; information about scrap
practices in blast furnaces, open hearths, electric furnaces, and
foundries; data on recovery of metallics from slag dumps; and figures
showing the amount of available scrap by source: and the ability of that
source to fulfill requirements.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
The requirements of the various Soviet B].oc countries for iron and
steel scrap have been derived for this report from estimates of iron
and steel production and of scrap practices in those countries. These
estimates in turn are based on such information as is available for
those countries, both as regards their iron and steel industries as a
whole and~as regards individual steel mills. To arrive at the availabili-
ties of iron and steel scrap in the Soviet Bloc, it was necessary for the
most part to draw analogies from US availabilities and modify them with
such ad3ustments as were possible. The sample computations below show
the methods used in arriving at scrap requirements and availabilities in
1952 for all the countries of the Soviet Bloc.
I. Scrap Requirements, 1952.
A. Open-.Hearth Furnace Scrap Requirements.
1. USSR.
a. Steel production (ingots and castings) _ 33,300 million
metric tons.
b. Open-hearth steel is 86 percent of the steel production.
(0.86) (33.300) ~ 28.600 million metric tons.
c. A scrap practice of 50 percent is used for open-hearth
furnaces. (0.50) (28.600) ~, 1lt.300 million metric tons.
d. Zhe allowance for melting losses for open-hearth scrap
is 8 percent. (0.0$) (1lt.300) 1.100 million metric
tons.
e. Total open-hearth scrap .(c plus d) ~ 15.00 million
metric tons.
2. Czechoslovakia.
a. Total scrap required 1.115 million metric tons.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
b. Scrap for open-hearth furnaces is total scrap less
electric furnace scrap, {1.115} - (0.133) 0.982
million metric tons.
3. Poland.
a. Total scrap required in 1951 - 1.~'S0 million metric
tons. -
b. Total scrap required in 1952 based on an increased pro-
duction from 2.300 to 2.l~00. (1.250) (2.00) = 1.305
~.~
million metric tons.
c. Scrap for open-hearth furnaces is 77.6 percent of the
total scrap required. (0.776) (1.305) 1.013 million
metric tons.
4. East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Communist China.
a. Percentage of the total steel production which is open-
hearth steel.
Percent
East Germany ~31.T.a
Hungary 93.0#
Rumania 9 ~~.0~
Communist China 9l~.6#
b. Open-hearth scrap total arrived at by the same method
as used for the USSR but with the following scrap
practices.
Percent
East Germany ~
Hungary ~.
Rumania 54
Communist China 15
B. Electric Furnace Scrap Requirements.
No allowance made for. Bessemer or Thomas converter steel production.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T.
F~l.ectric furnace steel is 6 percent of the steel produc-
tion. (0.06) (33.3) -.2.000 million metric tons.
b. A scrap practice of 95 percent is used for the electric
furnaces. (0.95) (2.00) 1.900 million metric tons.
2. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Communist
China.
a.
Percentage of the total steel production which i:s electric
furnace steel.
Percent
Czechoslovakia
~p
East Germany
7.2
Hungary
7.0
Romani a
5.0
Communist China
5~ j~
b. Electric furnace steel scrap requirement arrived at by
the same method as used #'or the USSR, with all countries
using a scrap practice of 95 percent.
3. Poland.
a. Total scrap required.: 1.305 million metric tons.
b. Of the total~scra~ needed 7.65 percent is required by
the electric furnaces. (0.0765) (1.305) : 0.100 million
metric tons.
C.
Blast Furnace Scrap. Requirements.
1.
US5R.
a.
b.
:Pig iron production = 2lt.500 million metric tons.
Scrap for blast furnaces, using a 5.5 percent scrap
practice. (0.055) (21.5) _ 1.350 million metric tons.
2.
Czechoslovakia.
a, Total scrap required for iron and steel making _ 1.~i00
million metric tons..
- 21 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01093A000300030003-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
b. Of the 1952 scrap allocation, 8.9 percent is far blast
furnace requirements. (0.089) (1.1~) : 0.125 million
metric tons.
3. Poland.
Hlast furnace scrap total arrived at by the same method as
used for Czechoslovakia, on the basis that 2.115 percent of
the total scrap required (1.305 million metr3.c tons) is re-
quired by the blast furnace.
!t. East 4ermany, Hungary, Rumania, and Communist China.
Blast furnace scrap total arrived at 'by tine same method as used
for the USSR but with the following acrap practices.
Percent
East Germany ---~--
Hungary 5
Rumania 5
Communist China 5
D. Foundry Scrap Requirements.
1. USSR.
Assumption is made that the foundry production increased
directly with steel praduction between 1937 and 1953;
1937 foundry scrap required was 2.222 milliofi metric tons
for a steel produotion of 17.630 million metric tons.
(33.300)(2.220) _ !