INLAND WATER TRANSPORT IN THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000100100002-5
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• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 7, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFOIATION
CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCT
Office 9f Research and Reports
?Provi0ional Report No. 13
(CIA/RR I R-10)
INLAND DATER TRANS FORT IN THE USSR
7 January 1952
This document is a working pater, The data and
concluxims contained he it do not .necessarily
represent the final position of OR2 and should
be regarded as provisional only and subject to
revision. Additional data or comment tzich may
be available to. the user is solici :add This
report contains information available to ORR as
of 1 'DDcerdmr 1951.
WARNING
WIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFOI iATION AFFECTING 2!E
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN TitE
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793. AND 794 OF THE
U6 S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REV o
ELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO 09 RECE:I PT BY AN UN-
AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
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SuMary e 0 O e a 0 e 0 O a 0 0 0 0 0 e O O 0 a 0 O 0 0 0 0
Io Introduction e e. o o. e e o e. o o e e e o 0 0 0 0 2
1a Ieorte of Inland Water Transport . , . a a o a 2
2a Historical Development ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 3
3a General Description of the Freaent Inland Waterway `.
System a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 ~6
IIa Volume of Traffic . 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1 +v e l i a r a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0
2 0 World War II O O O O O O 0 O 0 0 0 e O 0 O O 0 0 0
30 Postwar o O O O a o a o a O 0 O O. a a O 0 0 O O O
III, Present Capabilities O O a e. 0 0 0 a a 0 O O O O O O
1o went, Seasonal'Availability., and Condition and
Inland of the Network and rbrt L acilities , . a 9
2a I n l a n d Water Fleet 0 9 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 13
ao Sizo, Condition, and Distribution 0 6' 'a 0 0 0 0 13
b0 Maiftenaar e and ffieienty of Operations o 0 0 14
Materials and Manpoor Dsquirec nto
Carrying Capacity 0 o e 0 a 0 0 0 a 0
16
18
a p Total o a 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y1~8
ba By Areas' 0 0 0 o a o 0 0. e o a o 0 a o 0 0 0 18
C, By Specific Commodities . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
IV0 ,tsntial Capabilities o 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
1o Now Construction o o o- o o a o o o o o o a a o o o 20
20 Foreign Acquisitions 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
3a Diversion of Traffic to Other Means a o a o . . 0 21
as "improved Maintenance and Rapair and Increased
Efficianoy of Operations o 0 0 0 a 0 0 a a o 0 0 21
VVI
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V. Limitations, Intentions, and V inerabilities o 0 0 0 a a 21
la Limitations o a a a a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a a a c a 21
20 Intentions 0 0 a o a 0 a a 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 22
3a Vulnerabilities o o a o 0 o a 0 0 a o 0 0 O's 0 0 0 22
a.0 peacetime a 0 a 0 0 o a 0.0 0 0 a 0 a o 0 0 0 0 22
bo W a r t i m e 0 0 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Appendix A0 Gaps in Intelligence
24
Appendix Bo Sources o 0 0 0 o a a 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 25
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C IA/.RE PR? :40
S..ESC-R,-E T
SECURITY INFO MATION
TNAt WATER TRANSPORT IN THE USSR
Inland water transport in the USSR accounts for only about g percent of all
ton-miles of inland freight traffic, This distinctly secondary role is, how..
ever, not a new development,, The relative importance of inland water transport
in the economy of the USSR has been, declining steadily for many years despite
continuing efforts of Soviet planners to increase the share of domestic traffic
carried on inland waterways.. Nevertheless, despite the relatively small porgy'
tentage of total traffic which it carries, inland shipping is essential'to the
Soviet economy for the movement of such bulk cargoes as construction materials,
.coal, and timber, The waterways, furthermore, provide virtually the sole mode
of transport in some areas, particularly in Siberia,
The total length of the Soviet inland water system is about 75,000 miles.,
In the west the Volga and Pieper-Bug roiites are the longest, while in Siberia
and the east the Ob, the Irtysh, the Lena, and the Amur river systems comprise
the major routes. The physical characteristics of the system impose certain
restrictions which cannot be oaslly overcome. For example, except in the west,
all major river routes run north and south, while the main lines of traffic
lie east and west across the USSR. Furthermore, large sections of the inland
water system are frozen for several months during; each year,, thus limiting their
year-round availability.
The USSR has numerous.plans for the large-scale expansion and improvement
of inland waterways,, The Volga and its tributaries are receiving the most
attention, with numerous dcm and canalization projects reported currently under-
way,, The Volga-Don Canal, now scheduled for completion in 1952, will, when
finished, bring about a revolutionary change in Soviet inland water transport by
enabling vessels to move freely between the Caspian and Black seas,
While traffic data are generally sparse, it is possible to establish
reasonably accurate figures for certain key years. In 1913 the inland water
system hauled 37,,1 million short tons, and in 1937 the figure had risen to 73,5
million short tons, In 1945, however, l,ecause of the wartime destruction of
vessels and canals the volume of traffic declined to 39.8 million short tons,
The 1950 Plan called for the movement of 100,9 million short tons, and fulfill.
ment of the Plan for 1951 required a 15-percent increase above 1950. The 1950
Plan t ms about 90 percent Fulfilled. No traffic breakdown by area is available
for 1950, but in. the past the Volga River usually has handled 25 percent of the
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total inland water traffic., and the Volga System in its entirety close to 50
percent,
The Soviet inland water fleet is genera ly of poor quality largely as a
result of the low level of efficiency among the workers and the poor condition
of v yssoi repair and maintenance facilities. The fleet consists principally of
barges of 300 to 800 grass registered tons (GRT), although on the larger rivers
such as the Volga some vessels of as much as 12,000 GRT are being.operated.
Most of the dry cargo barges are constructed of wood,,w'.nereas tanker barges
usually are constructed of steel, Tugs are extremely important in Soviet inland
water transport. operations, since they furnish the propulsion of a large part of
the Meet,, Tugs aaxige from 30 to 1,500 horsepower, the *ia jority of them being
from 400 to 1,000 horsepowe ,
The USSR is acquiring relatively little inland water tonnage from abroad.,
and little inforr. Lion is a'railable on domestic construction,, The major foreign
sources appear to be the Satellites and Finland,,
The material and manpcw&r requirements of tho Soviet inland water system are
considerable. It has been estimated that in 1952 t).-ie finished steol requirements
of the inland water fleet will total 401x.,300 metric tons, while the petroleum
requirements of the inland water fleet in 1952 are estimated as being 335,200
metric tons. Completely re.-Liable data are not available for the number of people
employed in Soviet inland water transport, but it has been estimated that 292,000
workers were- employed in 1930,,
I.troducti
1~ Itn a~9t c? of Wand A Pater Tr z~,s rt.
Inland water tzransport in the USSR ranks second to the railroads in
:importance in inland' transportations At present the system handles only about
$ percent of all ton?m .lea of inland freight traffic, but this relatively small
percentage of the total does not reflect the true importaazce of inland water
transport to the economy of the country Inland water transport, for example, 9
is an important medium for certain bulk: goods,, such as construction materials,
oral,, coal., and o: pecially timber,, Certain areas 9 moreover, particularly in
Siberia.., are almost entirely dependent upon waterways for the transport of goods,
2
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During peacetime the waterwa of western USSR have a great potential
value which is slowly being exploited. Their full utilization would relieve
the rail network in B1ropeaan. USSR of the burden of much 'hulk freight, such as
coal, lumber, and ores, thereby increasing conoiderably the oapa.bilities of
the rail system to carry other key co.modities. The strategic significance of
such shifts in traffic should not be overlooked. On the other hand, the
economic and strategic significanco of a large number of navigable Soviet rivers
in Asia is sharply limited by the fact that they are virtually all north-south
lines of ccrnYnanication, whereas major traffic movements in this area are east.
west. This disadvantage is compounded by the fact that the rivers flow frcxn
south to north into the Arctic Ocean area and are unusable in large part for
many months of the year bicause of ice conditions.
F the strategic point of view, Soviet inland shipping is important
because of its capabilities for supporting Soviet amphibious operations across
short stretches of water against nearby areas. "there am mmb-'ouaa iao s around
the Soviet periphery where large numbers of aat~all craft constitute a major
addition to the ocean-going fleet. In the .tic, for oxtiple, attacks could
be supported by large numbcars of craft drawn from the extensive waterway routes
converging in the Leningrad-Riga area. In the Mack Sea the fleets of the
Dnieper and the Don could be utilized saga Anst Turkey. In ~ the Caspian the ex-
tensive inland water fleet could support 'operations against Iran. The inland
water fleet available in the Far East, though probably much sana1ler than that
in the west and south, could, for example, constitute a very Important
addition to Soviet capabilities for water transport over the short distance to
Taiwan, This fleet also ccruild be usefully employed in operations southward along
the Chinese coast.
2. I ot2ricaal De a
In terms of traffic the inland waatercray system of the USSR always has
played a secondary role to the rail system, In the period before 1917 the
importance of inland water transport steadily declined as the rail system
handled an increasing proportion of total traffic, and the downward trend has
continued under Soviet coast: 'ally For example, by 1937 the inland waterway
system teas' carrying slightly more than twice its 1913 traffic, while the rail
lines were carrying four tines as much as they had in the sauce year. Inland
waterwava received little real attention during; the early years of the Soviet
regime,, Not until the Four h Five Year Plan (194,6-50) did transport by inland
waterways receive over.-all detailed attention. Before that time, major canal
projects had been carried on, but fleets and facilities had been relatively
neglected, At present, rail lines still carry about 11 times the amount of traffic
carried by the inland water y system'. and there is little prospect that this
proportion will change apprc;ciably in the near future, unless there is a greatly
accelerated progr&a to emphasize the role of inland water transport, The following
table shows the development of the inland waterway network in thcs UaSR and the
vessel inventory:
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Table I
Development of Land Waterways in the I3SR
(Excluding tho Caspian Sea)
1913, 19371, 1940, and 3950 (Plaza).
Navigable Waterways 44,740 52?506 60,000
(Milos)
1950
L
71,5OO
Artificial Waterways N, A. 1.9780 N. A, N,,A,
(Miles)
Total Cargo Shipped 37.1 7.13 73,0 10009
(Million Short Tons)
Number of Self. 59302 N? A, 3 9012 N0 A0
propelled Vessels
Total Horsepower 1,039 2N0A, 723 a/ 912
(Thousands)
Number of Non-self- 23,149
propelled Vessels
01088 Tonnage 23,675
(Mllion Short Tons)
11. A. 9,635 / N,A,
N,A0
a. 1939
8,060 i/ 79000
30 ~~Ascr' ~fi 2f
_tLh q tTa..5~`o
The European sector of the USSR., comprising, about o iequarter of all
Soviet territory., contains more than half of all river routes and accounts for
about 90 percent of all Soviet inland water traffic, 2/
Footno references in ar~bic numerals refer to sources listed in
Appendix B,
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Barges constitute the major part of the, inland water fleets On the
Volga# barges gene ?aally rcngo from 1,000 to 49no0 gross registered tons
(ciRT) although barges up to 12,000 GRT are in use,* Barges on some of the
Siberian rivears range up to 39000 GRT, On the wholes however, these
unusually large barges a+r not numrouzsfa and the inland water float is made
up predominantly of WwJlw craft from 300 to 000 ORTo The smaller water
w utilize large numbers of craft from 80 to 250 ORT, Most genera:4lcargo,
use a constructed of wood, whereas tankor barges we generally of stool
aonstaruct . Q Tugs are usually t4iee3. ,ven8 the shallow doptho of the
waat was making screw propulsion impr~ctic sable o Tugs range from 30 to
1,oSOO horsepower, the larger units being used for long-distance operaationss,
The hore weer of most t sga, hot sir, varies between 400 and 3.,000& whiles
an the less important route the tugs may be of only 30 to 2S0 borsopower0
Little is actually known of tblo technical details of self-propelled river
stoma which fora only a Mall minority of the Wand water craft4
The Volga is the most important river of the USSR. The Volga itself
carries about on uartor of all Soviet river traffic, and the Volga 'system
accounts for nearly one-hall' of all such traffic, The Don already it
the leading route for grain transport, and its strategic importance will be
groatly enhanced by tho Volga-Don C2naal, now under construction and scheduled
to handle principally such traffic as lumber oil, and building materia1ao
The Z a ey River its a main route connecting the Northern Sea Route with the
interior of the USSR. The Lena River is another artery of traffic important
to the. Northern Sea Route. The Eolnssaa River in the northeastern section of
the USSR is of vitaa1 importance to the newly developed ipdustri'c e . of that
region. The coal and timber of that strea, for example., eloped on the Eo1
River for transport to the industrial complexness of the Soviet Far East. The
Amur is the leet& g river of the Far East and providan a main route of traffic
for the Soviet Far Eastern industrial develap ntt , The Amur, furthers rep
is of particular importance to the shipyards and steel mills at Koi k
and to the oil refineries at Khabarovsk.
The Wand water fleet is under the direction of the ?ttnisstry of the
River F2oet, which has five chief Directorates, each responsible for a
particular phase of operations. Each Directorate is subdivided into
Shipping Adrinisst~-ations, of which there were 20 in 191570 W
IIa Volume of Traffic,
Zewaro
Before World War I, Russian inland wsatorw were responsible for a
8ignificante although decl iinge portion of all traffic, In 1913,, inland
water traffic totaled 37,1 r-sillion short tonne idiereaas the railroads hauled
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1146 million tons. S/ Before 1917, inland waterways usually carried slightly
mare than 25 percent of all inland freight tonnage. Because of the re-
latively long hauls., furthermore, the ton-mile performance of waterways was
well above 25 percent of all traffic, / After ~Jorld War Is, inland water
traffic continued to decline in importance in relation to other means of
transportation, particularly railroads. (Table 2 includes a comparison of
the performance-of inland waterways in the USSR, excluding the Caspian Sea,
in 1913, 1937,, 191400 1945, 19147, and 1950. 1/ Table 3 shows the seasonal
variation of inland water traffic and the vo urn of leading commodities
carried by Soviet inland waterways in 19350 )
2e world liar II.
The share of - total inland traffic carried by inland waterways. during
1rorld War II rose to 144 percent in comparison with 8 percent In the prewar
yearsa The increase in the share of total traffic carried by inland water-
ways probably reflected tl-s enormous declines in railroad traffic resulting
from losses of rail equipment and territory,, rather than an actual increase
of tonnage carried by the inland waterways. The great destruction resulting
from World War II precluded achievement of the ambitious plans that the USSR
had for expansion of inland water traffic. In 19143, for example, tho plan
was for the system to carry 160 million short tons of freight, as compared
with 73x8 million tons in 19370 During the' war., however, Soviet inland harbor
facilities in the western and southern sections of the USSR suffered extensive
damage In addition, losses of vessels and barges were tremendous, A Soviet
comdesion, appointed to investigatee war losses, stated in September 19145
that the Germans sack or seized 14,280 cargo ships, passenger craft, and
tugboats and 14,029 barges. 2/ With allowance for some probable exaggerations
of losses claimed by the Soviets, it is a well-established fact that9 despite
the appreciable number of craft received as reparations after the ware the
substantial not lose of inland water craft greatly retarded inland water
transport development, (See -Table 20 LO/)
Inland water transport is operating in the USSR at reasonably high
levels, but the dates indicate that present traffic could be greatly increased
if the USSR devoted necessary resources to that and, One of the few avmailablee
summaries of traffic for a postwar year is contained in Table 2. It will be
seen that while traffic had recovered somewhat by the and of 1917 from the
very low levels of 19145, . the actual reported performance in .19447 still was
about 50 percent below the planned goals set for 1950 (100.9 million short
tons), The plan for river transport in 1951, =cording to a press statement
of tho Minister of the River Floet, contemplated a 15-percent rise above
1950 traffic,,
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Inland Water Freight and Passenger Traffic in the USSR
(Excluding the Ca?psan Sea)
1913, 1937, 1940, 1945, 19470 and 1950 (Plan)
1950
19l7
S
Fz
Total Volume Carried and Towed
MULlion Short Tons
37.1
73.8
73.0
39.8
51.1
100.9
Billion Ton-Miley
19.8
22.7
24,3
13.0
1793
33.8
Volume of Principal Goods Carried
and Towed
Unha
Million Short Tons
N.A.
39.1
44..0
23.1
N.A.
56.9
Percent of Total Freight
2J. A.
53.0
60.2
58.0
N.A.
56.4
Million Short Tons
5.8
8.7
10.5
5.4
N.A.
10.5
Percent of Total Freight
15,6
11.8
14.3
13.5
B.A.
10.4
Million Short Tons
6.5
4.7
5,6
N. A,
NN,A.
6.3
Percent of Total Freight
17.5
6.4
7.6.
N.A.
11. A.
6.2
Pa~aesar_sra
Total Number Transported.
Aflliona
16.2
N. A.
73.0
38.5
48.0
73.0
a YO ~c ~. p
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Table 3
Monthly Traffic in the ASR
in the Most Important Inland Wathr,,born Cc odities
(' ciuding the Cariplan sea)
1935
. .. _ ~.,
- ,..~ ~.. ..
__ ...,~ ~.~. ...
Thousand Short Ton-m
Timber in
Timber in
Total
Ja n.uary;~W ^ch
97
7
44
106
254
April-tom
60100
2,206
,O6
2
1
,
3305
14 806
June
6,300
1,822
1,664
665
2,056
22,507
July
6V445
1,513
1,072
520
2,391
12,243.
ALIMW t
6,115
1,775
1,067
876
2,294
3.2
127
Soptomber
4,U5
1,456
857
384
2
039
,
651
9
October
1,920
1,263,
969
773.
,
2,528
,
7
451
rove nbber
218
290
54,1
183
977
,
2
209
December
5
8
23
45
,
52
Total
all'=
., = '
ja24
54Q22
Iks,.%l
UM
a. The document from which this table was taken 6tated that figures were
oxpre d 'in mill-lo-km of toms., It is bolieved that this is an error of
is ns1ation and that ~o nY was moat.
b. ra gligib1e,
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r as w IY "0
ill0 P writ C~a, .lit3~ao
19 Dctent Seasonal AvailabiUty, and Condition and Capacity of the.
No wor P -rt rem UQEav -
The total navigable length of the inland water network in the USSR
is about 70,000 mt].ea, Much of the syatens, however, is closed by ice for
4 to 6 months a year, The navigable lengths and navigation seasons of the
major Soviet waterways are shown in the following tablet
Table !s
Major Inland Water
of the USSR
ly
9
Route
Navigable Length
(Miles)
Navigation Season
Volga River
2,003
Late Apr to Mid-Nov
Moscow-Volga Canal
103
Late Apr to Early Nov
Rama River
756
Late Apr to Late Oct
Oka-Moscow System
669
Mid-Apr to Early Nov
Mariinakiy Canal System
358
May to Nov
Baltic-%ite Sea Canal System
575
May to Nov
Northern Dvina System
863
Mid-May to Late Oct
Dnieper-Bug Route
1,253
End of Mar to Early
Ob River
20309
Dec
Late Apr to Late Oct
Irtych River
2,459
Early May to Late Oct
Yeniaey River
1,967
Apr to Nov
Angara River
18130
Apr to Dec
Amur River System
2,037
May to Nov
Kolyma River
0
Late May to Early Oct
~9
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. . leap !11 ~- Yi
The condition and capacity of the river ports is believed to be a
mater of considerable co:corn to Soviet authorities, and the freight.
handling capacity of these ports has been called the "imakest phase in
Soviet inland waterway tr nsport." JJ/ The best available informatics on
selected major Soviet river ports is indicated in the following table:
Table 5
Se1?c ted Major Soviet River Ports*
Location
Astrakhan Volga River
(right bank)
46022%N
18oOSOE
G6or a kiy Volga Rive
(left bank)
56o20 aN
440was
Irkutsk JA ara Rive: _'
(both banks)
52017'N
1040M OE
Major port for transfer of oil,, lumber,
cotton, and fish from Caspian roadstead
fleet to river vessels; 76 percent
machanized in 1916; connection to railroad;
shipyards; accessible to 12,000-ton river
barges but not to. Caspian Sea vessels;
major oil storago facilities; port reported
rebuilt0
Major port for oil, grain, cement, salt,
machine tools, and finished industrial
products; 87 percent mechanized in 1946;
connecfiion"to railroad; shipyards; port
reported rebuilt; probably accessible
to 5,,000-ton barges,
Ebrt handles gain, coal, and' probably
finished industrial products; road junction;
connection to Trans-Siberian Railroad
Shipyard; river depths off harbor, 90
to 13 foetp
major aver port in "to pea- s ne as HiRng acloquate,
mechanized cargo faiiliti 3s, reil connections, and an annual volumes of at
least 300,9000 tons or a t-'ace volume of majg)r importance for the respective
area; in the Asiatic USSR it is defined as a Principal port with an annual
tonnage of at least 100,0 O tons or a trade yo1ue of major importances
without necessarily havin? good port facilities"
aA Capacity of barges is Ivan in gross reg istored ,ton:s0
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Table 5 (continued)
Selected Major Soviet River Ports
1 habarovsk Amur River
(right bank)
480288N
2,350051E
Kiev
Dnieper River
(right bank)
50027 IN
300301E
Kuban a River
(right bank)
45002ON
39?W eE
Krasnoyarsk Yonisey River
(both banks)
56ooleN
920500E
Kuybyshev
Volga River
(left bank)
53012BN
5poogfl E
IIninrrad Nova River
(both banks)
59a56 1N
560151E
Oil and coal port; road connections;
connection to Trans-Siberian Railroad;
shipyax de; river base for Amos flotilla;
major oil storage facilities; atccoesible
to seagoing vessels of 2,000 tons at
high water,
Major port and trade center; conncctim
to railroad; base of Dnieper fleet;
shipyards; warehouses; river depth about
9.8 feet off harbor.
Oil and grain port; connection to roads
and railroad; terminus of pipe line
from Maikop oilfields; shipyard; river
depth off harbor probably regulated
at 3.6 feet.
Grain, lumber, and coal port; good road
connections; connection to Trans-
Siberian Railroad; shipyard; accessible
to boats of 9-foot draft at full water
levels,
Major port for lumbar, oil, construction
materi aals, grain, salt, and fish;
connection to railroad; shipyards;
accessible to 8,000?ton barges,
Major exporting port; connection to rail.
road; shipyards; major timber storage
facilities; modernization of port
planed.
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Table 5 (continued)
Selected Major Soviet River Earth
Location
lama Riwor
(left bank)
S8? ?N
56Q15tE
Moskva River
(both banks)
Oil port; 80 percent na hanized in 19!61
connection to r ..lv cd; hipy ;
probably aaecosa lb1o to 1,5000-ton bargee4
C*ntr . port of Volga system; probably
ccraplotely rech sad; connection to
rai:lrcaad; oiipyardag accecciblo to
8 0OOO ton bmrge c o
55Ol5?N
370371E
Novosibirsk Ob River
(right bank)
55?02 ON
620562E
Saratov
51030 IN
146?Q59E
Volga River
(right bank)
Shcherbakov Volga River
(right bmrslc )
56?020N
380510E
Stalingrad Volga River
(right bank)
148 4o3 N
44c3o?E
Major port; completealy mechanized in 1946;
road connections railroad junction;
etation of Thane-Sib arian Railroad;
traane thipp1ng point for cargo from Aitat
rer,Lon; tranel'er point beten rail and
ship; Shiny ; +c:cos b1a t chips
drawing is to 645 iaae
Major oil., lumbar, ; ..sin., coals, and fish
port; cone etion to railro ; chipyarda;
accessible to 8,,000-ton baLrgyes,
Major oil,, grain., and building material
port; cony ction to ra llro ; shipyards;
accesalble to 80000-ton barges from t to
Maaco olga Canal side and 3,000 -ton
barges from MMiddlo Vo1ga4
Major lumber and oil troisahi ping point;
85 percent r hmnized in :19146;
connection to railroad; ahipy de; port,
reported rebuilt.
-12
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Table 5 (continued)
Selected Major Soviet River Parts
Yakutsk Iona Hivor
(left bank)
620o3ON
1290143?E
Zaporozhlys l ni" r River
(left bank)
Oo oN
35?11?!
Inland Water Fleeto
Port handles grain, coal, lumber,
pa obably also metal area and metal
prpducts; shipyard; accessible to oc anm
going vessels; trade volume expected to
roach about 1 million tons a year,
Major grain port; connection to railroad-
shipyard; harbor installations designed
for annual, transshipment of 1 million
tons could be expanded to 5 miMon;
prewar quay length about 8,850 ft;
port reported rebuilt and moderniaaed;
river depth maintained at 4,5 feet off
harboro
ao Size. Condition, and Distribution,
1hae inland water Met situation in the USSR is su i arized in
Table 6. In addition to the tonnage covered by the table., the Caspian fleet
consists of 119 ships over 1,000 QRT totaling 320,927 ORT,. The fleet is
divided -as follows s 27 cargo ships, totalling 44,030 GRT$ and 92 tankers.,
totaling 276,9597 GRT, 35/
Massy of the ,self-propQ ld vessels are old and of the stern - or
side-wheeling t7 s and as many burn wood., their operations are notably
inafficiontc? That tho gene ?al condition of the entire fleet may be poor is
suggested by frequent Soviet press demands for more and better maintenance
On the other hands the probable attainment of the Fourth Five, Year Plan for
the construction of inland water craft would mean that about 30 percent of
the self-propelled fleet and over 40 percent of the barge fleet would now
b8 under 5 years old and presumably., therefore, in good condition.
Imo 13-
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b, Maintenance and .ficiencyof Operatic xs 0
Frequent criticism by the Soviet press and radio indicates that
although there has been some improvement, the.quality and quantity of
maintenance in they inland water fleet are, in general., extremely poor. The
poor maintenance stems from two principal causes, The first cause is the
low lave1 of training among the workers] the Second is the generally poor
condition of repair and maintenance facilities. Although the USSR is dotted
with ship repair yards of varying sires and oaapabili.tiess, provious studies
indicate that thcig efficiency usually is very low*
Operating efficiency also in low, For oxaardplee, ss ccording to a
press releases Mi.nisstasz' of the River Fleet She kov stated in March 1951
that traffic does not move according to schedule and that more efficient
cargo handling at ports could have increased the quantity of freight hauled
in 3.950 by 1 million metric tons, The Minister also observed that Soin
cargoes hauled by rail and road could move more profitably by water, This
observation is confirmed by other, press reports.
Table 6
Distribution of the Inland Water Fleet in the USSR (by Basin Groups)
19392 19h5, and 1950
T of Vessel
Se3f13ed
Totaal. Horsepower
,moo - Basin 2F2u
Northern Central Southern Eastern
European European European USSR Totaal
USSR USSR USSR. Siberia) USSR
Thousands 13900 381,0 .83,O 120.0 723
Bement of
Total Horsepower 1902 5207 1105 164,6 100
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Table 6 (continued)
Distribution of the T 1 nd Water Meet in the USSR ( ] a min t ou )
19391, 1945, and 1950
MUM of V00901
1
Total Horsepower
Thousands
Porcent of
Total Horsepomr
1VO manned)
Total Horsepower
Thous aaaads
Percent of
Total Hars?po ^
Tomed
1939
Total Tonne
houssands
Fbreent of Total
Tonnago
Northern
ESaro an
ussft
Central
Eurol"an
-- USSR
Southorn
Europe
USSR
Eastern
USSR
boric)
Tot C
. USSR
113.0
295,0
53mO
15lrO
612
13.5,
48.2
8.6
24,7
100
17L0
12200
12400
19210
912
1911
46.3
i3a6
21,0
100
2,2OQ4
5902000
3800
h6000
i s06O
2703
6203
?4.7
5.7
100
vise
-? ou sr ? .ri.aw~
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Table 6 (cont3.nued)
Matribution of the Inland Water Met in the UDR (by Basin coups)
1939, 1915, and 1950
Basin Group
Northern Central Southern Eastarn
European European European USSR Totes
USSR USSR USSR Siberia) USSR
Total Tonnage
Thousands
6950
2, 33000.
330-0
645.0
4,OO
Percent of Total.
Tonnap
17
5803
802
l6,1
100
195 il
Totes: Tonnage
niouaands 1,365Q0 '
3#870.0
77000
995,0
7,000
Feent of Totes.
Tonn 1945
55.3
.10
162
100
Materi.aiis gnd 14!Wowar 92uiremantso
Tables 7 and 8, which follow, contain estimates of the steel and
petroloum respaire nts of the Soviet inland water fleet as based on extrety iy
general aasasumptiOn1A
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Table 7
Estimated P`inia hcd Steel Requirements of to Soviet Inland Wafter Fleet
(P:xoluding the Caspian Se)
.9iE9@52
Thousand Metric. Tons
Now Construction
1949
260,7
6206
.32303
1950
26701
68,7
33508
19551
23'1.4
74,3
.3114
3.952
323,8
80,5
W4.3
Table 8
Estimated Petroleum Requirements of the Soviet Inland Water Fleet
(B=Iuding the Caspian Sea)
1949-52
Thousand M tric Tans
U49
1_950
1951
19 2
Diesel Oil
1011,6
9,2
100
1,18,3.
126,2
Fuel 0.1,
1
141 ,7
1
9
9
158.5
11197
166a
IMbeas and Grease
1606
17,8
19.3
2009
Total.
266 1
285,5
309.3
335.2
On the basis of estimates of conception by vessel the peacetime
(1949) petrolet' n requirairents of the Caspian Sea fleet have been calculated
to be 5440906 metric tons annually, The 1941 2'lan, A6 which contain, the
mot detailed material ilablo bon the ma ,power situation in Soviet inland
water transport, stated that employment in 19hl totaled 256,916 personso
It has been estimated that the number of people employed in inland water
transport totaled 292,0l0 workQ m in 1950,
a 17
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a. lbtaa1.
wwwftm"
surfing that p:d traffic gods identical with capacity
"rations.,, a rough estimate of the present capabilities of Soviet inland
ester trap port can be made. Traffic goals for 190 called for the hauling
of 100.9 million short tans of iVoigit over an average distance of 335 miles
form total of 33o8 billion ton-ralleaa The capabilities of sang transport
a ystem8 hoist, depend largely upan the resources which are applied to its
and the USSR has clearly failed in this respect to capitalize completely on
the potentialities of its wattrwaya and their port rarca s;
b0 Ar"? 0
Te- following table illustrates the relative traffic potential
of tho major river areas in the USSHt
Table 9
P .aanned Cargo ' ,arnowar in the USSR
By Major River Basin Groups
1950
JE~tid9 Vo a K tFa
Northern
Eastern
Southen,%
190 Plan
(BiULon
T,an
24014
3098
3.59
2005
Tot 1 33076
1950 Plan
(Percent
of i sal
/1.5
711.08
10.7
64o
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Specific Co tditieeto
The following table giving the volume of traffic in the USSR
for s ific Joey comodities in 1935 illustrates the relative importance
and geographical distribution of these commodity movements in river traffic.
lid.th the o=option of movements in curtain limited sectors, it is probable
that this pattern is typical of present-day traffic0
Traffic in Major Commodities
o? Some of the More Important Waterways in the USSR
1935
Thousand Short Tone
Amur
Drsiopor
Don
Irtysh
Kama
Nova
Northern Dvvinaa
Ob
Oka
Onega (Lake)
Shekana
Sukhona
Svir
Volga
Yanisey
Timber
in
Rafts
Timber
in
goy
Mineral
Building
Materials
Grain,
Oil
Total
Cargo
I26
6
866
163
280
$2A
323
11 ,0 0
A,
2,800
106
310
62mo
831
2
361
X
1
1,087
59955
250
0
19
271
7
33
169
Is 2203
17
0
9b0
,
1,642
6,518
273
119
97
-003
7,122
K
b
1
126
X51
7 8
242
27 00
,
2,350
889
168
134
3
1,202
626
i
25
I
00
1,320
773
6
15
1.1
1a370
672
1,206
1440
12
900
2,370
V71
1,771
5
1,187
31
?
18012
97
77
w
~
,
a cludes o
r cargoes riot enuirarated,
be Information not available or negligible amount of ti.?affic,
19 -
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IV. Potential ',",a bilitios.
1. law nstruct~ion
The actual present capabilities of the USSR for construction of
Inland water craft are unknown. Although the USSR has major, plans for the
construction and improvement of waterways and canals, few data are available
on actual progress toward Plan fulfillment. Xost of the Finn projects cones
corn the .uopoan area, but waterways in central and eastern USSR also a
under development. Of the rivers, the Volga system probably is receiving
the most attention, with numerous d_ms and canalization projects planned to
increases its navigability. Lacks also are schoduled to bo improved or on-
laar,ed on this route. The it nych Canal project to link the Don River W1th
the Caspian Sea is under way, a 225-Mile section from the Don having, boon
completed before World Jar .II. Although its ult? ato cc pletion is believ d
to be an important objective of Soviet inland-water ray planning,, there is
little evidence to indicate that completion of this canal is considered. to
be a major Soviet construction project at this tame,.
The Volga--Don Canal project, a long-horn.de d goal of Soviet inland
waterway planners, apparently is receiving much attention and may bs
completed before the originally planned date of 1955. Completion of tUs
project may bring about a revolutionary change in Soviet water transport,
since ships will be able to move freely from the land-locked Caspian Sea up
the Volga fiver, over the Don, and into the Black Sea. It is possible to
make ?ouly the mast genera, estimates as to its ultimate capacity, but Lander
present plans the route will aa11cv the passed of vassolc up to UGS feet
in draft. a/ The 600 rni.le--long T ktnanian Canal project, which will f urn1sh
water transport and irrigation for the important aagr mi- tural area of the
Turkmen S$R, is another important objective of Soviet inland rater planning
currently receiving considerable attention in the prase, aalthouea the ca nt
Of work acamploted is not known,
2?. lw, Asx~uisitino.
Wsstorn -opeaan yards are constructing very fear ill craft for
the USSR? Finland is making the major portion of its doli.veriea unrderhe
reparations program,, but I`Inniah shipyards also have sec-ae straight cc ercial
contracts for the construction of vessels for Soviet account, These ships
are tugs, fishing craft, and a few asma.ll cargo boats. The Satellites aro,
delivering vessels of sor ewlxat the some types as Finland, with possibly more
emphasis upon small cargo boats. Acquisitions from all fomi. n sources may
total as much as 50,000 G= annu lly,
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In wartime the opportunity for the USSR to se substantial
quantities of vessels f=n ovorrazn territories might be groat, but it is
believed that in most instances such vessels would be employed where
found rather than transported to the USSR. The poss1bil,i.tieo of foreign
acquisition for the Caspian fleet are slight. The Caspian Sea is land.
locked except for the mall craft able to peso through the upper Volga?
The TSR, according to the Fourth Five Year Man, is concerned
with diverting traffic to, rather than away f u, the inland water systtm.
During World War II, diversion of traffic also was toward. rather than
away from, inland waterways. The share of traffic carried by inland water
rose during; that. reriod from the prewar S percent to a reported 14 percent.
probably because of the proportionately gaater damrer which the railroada
suffered. 29 Qa the basis of World War 11 experience, it appears that in
the ovorat of war there might not be any considerablo diversion of norm -1
wat'rway traffic to tether media of transport,
Caspian Sea traffic is limited almost entirely to bulk cargoes,
and rail lines a ound the area are so few that it is consldrsrod impossible
for any substantial amount of Caspian traffic to be diverted to other media,
In addition, the shortage of tank cars would sharply restrict the rli.vereion
of large shipments of oil from Caspian tankers to rail linos.
fro bnrvvee a acid R
Tfaintonance is at an extremely low lovol in tho Sovlc3t inland vats.
way riystera, but it is probable that there ' -111 be improvement during peacotim3..
if past trends axed future goals are any 7,uide. (er'ationn iikourias are not
satisfactory at present. It is proboblo that,, during paacetinc , efficiency
will improve scnnowhat. In' wartime, present opcrati.ng levels would ba
maintained only .hash the exercise of such extreme aeasuro as outright
military control., r osy ,the-cls ck operations, + xtensivta overloading of ships,,
possibly the diV'vrs,IOn of sldlled labor from other fiolds, and savers
penalties for such malpractices as accidents, absentooism, and personal In.
efficiency?
V. T.imt tatio . Tnten1IQe ar d srabili.tiesa
The Soviet inland 'waterway system is not of aufficiexxt importance,
to ovor?aU Soviet transport capabilities as to constitute a limiting factor
on az bid course of national action which might be conton.plated by the
SR. There are certain aspects of griet unbend water trans} onto however,
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which are noteworthy for their retarding, effect within a narrower frame of
reference, The physical cha.racteristics of much of the Soviet river ,system,,
particularly in Asia, for examples impose restrictions on its utility as a
major means of transport and, in effect, prevent the t}SSR from achieving
certain possible objectives Ecept in the western USSR, virtually all
major Soviet rivers are north-south lines of corm unication, while the major
lines of traffic movement are e4 st-west lines, especially east of the Urals,
Consequently' the rivers in the central and eastern areas cannot be employed
as alternatives to the Trans;-Siberian Railroad to relieve the traffic burden
on that line either in peacetime or in an emergency caused by wartime dis-
ruption of this major transcontinental route. Their value in the economic
exploitation of the Sovis t North is limited, moreover, by their direction of
flow, from south to north, The preponderance of river traffic in the central
and eastern areas consists of raw materials being ::hipped out of the area to
industrial centers elsewhere in the Soviet t1on, if the direction of flow
of the rivers were toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which is available for
year-round service, the streams would be far more useful,, Flowing into the
Arctic Ocean, they deliver downstream traffic into an area closed by ice
conditions much of the year. the barri-3rs set by the topographic features
of, the inland waterways are obviously impossible to overcanie except to a minor
degree and at a very slow rate. Possibilities for oxp nsion and incroasod
efficiency of the system are discussed elsewhere in this study,;
2. 1 g,
The operations of the inland water fleet do not reveal any
significant conclusions as to Soviet intentions except in the narrow and
immediate sphere of improvement in capaabilitiems. The m jor conciusicn of
strategic significance which might be drawn from present inland water trans-
port policies is that plans to increase capacity of the inland weir routes
may be tied into some long-range overall plan to free the rail lines of as
much responsibility as possible for the transport of relatively unessential
bulk commodities, thereby assuring greater mobility and fleiari.bility for the rail
movement of high.-p4riority traffic.
3. Ymeraabi1i.tia4.,
a. Peace vim.e.
Although the hest is a source of equipment and, to some extent,
vessels, the volume, of deliveries from the West has been relatively small, and
the complete closing of this source probably would hove only a minor retarding
effect. Since the system itself is entirely within the boundaries of the USSR9
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there are practically no measures which the West can take against it in
peacetime.
by Soda ? e.
Most of the vital sectors of the Soviet inland waterway system
are in the area west of the Urals and possibly are more accessible to attack
than are the Asiatic waterways. Severance of the traffic flow on the Volga
would be particularly serious for the USSR because this river and Its
tributaries are by far the most important waterway system of the USSR. In
the east, Amur River shipping presents a major vulnerability. In the event
of decisive attacks against this waterway, the industrial complexes along
that river would be seriously hindered. The extensive use of locks and
sluices in many areas,, moreover, makes the entire system highly vulnerable.
A determined and prolonged campaign by air and mine attacks against
Caspian shipping could damage seriously the Soviet potential for oil trans-
port. In view of the absolute essentiality of this traffic, any serious
reduction would be a major blow against the Soviet military potential.
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APPENDIX
A
GAPS XN INTELLIG 1XE
On the wholes knowlodge of inland water transport I much logo complete
than is kno?,aledge of rierchant shipping, the primary reason being that iv
land water traffic, fleets, and facilities are-much less susceptible to
foreign 8urv`eillance than are merchant shipping operations. Furthers ores
there is much less interest in the operations of the Soviet inland water
floest on the part of intelligence collectors, The important role which
merchant gypping plays, however, in support of domestic activ1ties
contributing to Soviet military capability is sufficient reason for the
expansion of Intelligence coverage and the study of Inland water transport:,
Much organized information is needed on such topics affecting capabilities
as vessel annual output and network construction levels, traffic diversion,
improved maintenance,, and operat xg efficiency, lhnpozrer data are nee d d in
general terms, Intelligence on labor outputs availability, and requirements
also are of considerable significances in estizamting actxaaal. or potential
transport performance,,
One over-all gap in intelligence of very great importance is the almost
complete abaenoe of accurate and up-to-date information on all aspects of
Caspian Sea operations (fleet, traffic, and ports). For this reason, Caspian
ian
Shipping has, been anentioned only infrequently in the foregoing discussion.
That the area in of vital and increasing importance,, however., is illustrated
by the fact that the USSR maintains more than twie o as much tanker tonnage in
the Caspian Sea tham in the enure oceangoing fleet.
Thore are a nurlber of to xtccs of importance concerning Soviet inland water
transport in general on which intolli once can be said to be fa ,r aa1Vic ugh
in need of conside rable exppansion, beans these topics are fleet and port
facilities, administration and organization, basic fleet statistics,
meaintenance, and operating efficiency,
Ana's of available Soviet data does not afford a clear view of what
the inland water transport syotem actually is doing or what it is capable of
doing? Without such information Vier* can be no clear idea of-either
tho
present importance of the Inland water fleet or what ,tan be expected of the
system in the future. The lack of data regarding performance during World (car n.
for eiplo, causes a gap in the &nowlod?o of the potential ability of the
? yotem to contribute to wartime operations. The lack of data on present traffic
performance lianas the ability to assess current operations in .the Egli` of
at achievements and future p1 4
2Z
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SOURCES
"USSR-InIandWater Transporv ~4~ ~ TECO .g am , The 26,
Section 33, 15 Dec 1949. P"UmI ary, subject to revision0
20 wTranspor ation and Cc mdcations.'" S , ~ ~n a ,rr~~t9
chapter VIII, Jul 1947.
3. ON I Serial No. 52-50, 6 Aa 1950,
40 ' Ug'.e~=a =fl ?HMX o No. 26, Section 33, 15 Dec 194%,
50 O
6., H 1wak, Vwgutin, Feigin, EcMmic oral F~v off' a USSR, 19-9,,
/4
70 No, 26, Suction 33, 15 D 1949?
091 Serial No,, 520.50, 6 Jul 1950. WSR and
90 Iatchell, I trin, Ui.ator+r o , 1949,
100, oa3 In1 ?n4a2, Po; 26, Section 33, 15 Dea 3.949.
12. ONI Serial Io0 52.50, 6 Jul 1950.4. USSR MCI Sa d $ ate? t. o
"IcT
13. "importation and oammmicat3ons,a l ? I3
a
Chapter VIII, Jul 19470
24.
~ ~,~tn~ a ~ mA?tee ram ~ No, 26, Section 33, 15 Doc 1949,
15- ONI Serial Noy, 5-4-51, 27 Feb 1951, ~~ S Qt g srt.haazi F3c t
16, FDB 291, 29 Doc 1950.
17. an2 No0 26, Section 33, i5-Dec 19490
38, .OIL Serial 110. 52?.50, 6 Jul 1950? I tancl Sys t~ !aZ Wa
190
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