PRELIMINARY BASIC INVENTORY OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE USSR (TASK FORCE I )

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000100030003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 31, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL ITITELLIG`ICE AG `' ICi
OFFICE OF M ARCII J\ND REPO=
PRELIMINARY BASIC INVENTORY OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
CONCERNING THE USSR (TASK FORCE I)
THE ELECTRON TUBE INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
0
31 May 1951
NY,
Noe: r: has not been coordinated with the intelligence orgy zatiorn
of the Departments of State, the Arnim, the Navy, and the Air Force A
preliminary worldng paper, it contains Information available to CIA as of
.1 January 1951
wDATE:
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LJ
"CLA5S(h~
'E=
, D_:
CHANGED TO: TS 5
DOCUMENT NO.
"OF J, -
7 . q 0-
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~u IN
1..
Introductory .......
a. Importance of the Induatry......,,.,..e.e0......90 0..... .ago* 1
b. General Description of the Industry ...............?.....,... 2
2. Development of the Industry ..................4...............,?e 3
3A Technolog 1'.....s..w......- ...................o.......??.?~....++ 5
4. Organization ..........Y..?..4er..4.?..44......e....r.....r.?..0 6
5. i1AQgU..i.i- nth....m.. .w...? .............e.....e4e...eos.o..Miss v
ao Cii ....r.......o..o...s.....e.-..o...oe.....s.o..o.?.o J
b. ELporb.....4......?.......e....s.....?-...r-...o-..s.?.e..~r, r7
Cc ~i].it~Z`~s.e.......o...+..-.......?.?-.s...~............e..+ 7
"Od~ula~On+..r......o+.....srr...?...4.....r.ros.o......e.....e ?4+~
a. 1950 Tube aroduction.....?.......?...........a..4so.r...o..
b, Regional Production ..........-...-....Y............4...r... 18
Cc Trends .................?................................w... 18
d. Stocke.. .................................................... 1s
e. Externa]. Source ......o-.........r.s4....?.o.e..e....4os..e 19
7. Input use and Requirements ................e.................... 20
ae Principal Raw .Llateris.ls .................................... 20
b. Fuel ~ and Power Requirements........... ? ? 4 .. ? ...... 4 .. a ..... 21
0. TTransport...
r~ansport ..................... .. r - ................. 0 ..... Y ? 21
do Manpower...?.e.?. ................??.e..w.....o......e..e... 22
So Ceancausiona..........4......4.....-- .............er..........4. 23
a. Capabilities .........................................4..... 23,
b4 Vulnerabil.3.ties...s?.4-....-.?..........4..?.....e..eos94.. 24
GSA Intentiona.,...??e...e.r.?......?...........r.s.?.,.,,..o4s 24
25X1
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THE ELECTRON TUBE INDUSTRY M THE USSR
1. Introductory.
a, Importance of the Industry,
The electronics industry has since 1935 become an important factor
in the economics of industrial countries. The 1950 output of the US
electronics industry, including telephone equipment, was about $3 billion
at factory prices.
Starting with World War II, the need for an increased volume of
rapid oaMmiznications, plus the development and use of direct military
weapons, have made military electronics material a leading article of war.
During World War II, US production of military electronics totaled about
$7.5 billion. From the beginning of the Korean war to June 1952? US
military electronics contracts are to total about $8 billion, As an
illustration of increased military applications for electronics, the
factory value of electronic equipment requirements in several military
aircraft schedules is greater than the total value of airframes.,
Its great importance to present military operations, together with
its past low output, makes the Soviet electronics industry a primary
intelligence objective. Soviet intentio a with respect to military else-
tronics clearly indicate lesser quantities and simpler devices than are
considered necessary in US planning. However, this field represents a
major industrial effort for the Soviet econmW,, The obviously high
priorities and tight security measures which the USSR has applied to this
industry support such a conclusion.
The leading factor determining the productive capabilities in the
industry is the production capacity for tubes and for critical components.
In a complete basic intelligence study the production of electron tubes
deserves first consideration, since this is the most imp etant factor in
determining industrial capabilities for electronics and represents the
most apparent shortage in the Soviet electronics program.
Effort and time required for expansion of tube. production is the
greatest in the electronics industry. During'World War II, for example,
US. tube facility expansion totaled $89 million, or 40 percent of all radio
and radar expansions, the greatest sum for any segment of the industry,
Postwar British and US evaluated intelligence has stated tubes to be the
limiting factor in Soviet military electronics. A background of intelli-
gence efforts exists, although production to date has been superficial
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General Description of the Indus.
The electron tube is a device which provides the nags for the
conduction of electricity through gases or in vacuum and which is intended
for use in the detection, amplification, generations, or control of elec-
trical signals. Electron tubes comprise a wide variety of production
categories and are required in large quantities for the operation of all
electronic equipmebt, In the US)net prices range froau 3S' cents to $2,500
for each tube. Although tubes are usually described as a single product,
there are three broad categories,, for which the facilities and methods
are not interchangeable s receiving tubes and allied types, produced in
large n mberes with automatic equlpanent; special purpose and transmitting
tubes, produced in smaller numbers; and cathode ray tubes, requiring special
facilities and methods. In order to measure exactly output and input, a
further breakdown of categories would be necessary. During World War II,
for emple, production was based on 32 classifications, including 6
classifications of receiving tubes, 7 of cathode ray tubes, and 19 of
special purpose tubes. In determining the output of the Soviet tube
industry and the input factors involved, a knowledge of the distribution
among product categories is important,
In a civilian econa like that of the US or Western Europe., the
consumer product market provides an extremely large requirement for radio
receiving tubes. By cc rison, the requirements for transmitting special purpose tubes are very small, although the value may be quite and
significant. In the ease of a heavy military program with no production
of consumer items, this distribution is shifted heavily in favor of greater
quantities of special tubes. The following analysis of the US tube industry
in millions of units and dollars is an illustration.
Receiving Tubes Special kurpose Tubes CR Tubes
1944 . A136 40 29
201 84 5.3
2W) 1.3 33
0,25 0.27 7
Disregarding the effect of T7 an CR tube 'levels, this analysis shows that
the typical US distribution pattern was as follows:
Civilian Eeon
1111ta
Econ
Total Tubes
100
100
100
100
Receiving-type Tubes
M
_T J
'?
Trans, & Sp? Purpose
Tubes
3
21
17
77
CR Tubes
0
6
1
10
The analysis also shows that the value, and therefore the relative amount of
productive effort, for a given total quantity of tubes is different for a
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military economy as compared with a civilian econorzr. In the former
the value per million tube is 207 times the value of the latter,,
A review of reported production schedules at several Orbit tube
plants indicates that the pattern of distribution more closely approaches
the US wartime pattern than it does the civilian pattern, In addition
to confirming the low proportion of Soviet effort devoted to civilian items,
the review also indicates that the Soviet tube program is about twice as
valuable as that of the US per unit of outn t,0
The manufacture of electron tubes is complex and depends on the
adequate supply of the following:
(1) Technical and supervisory manpower,
(2) Special technical plant machinery; in particular, special
glass-working equipment and scaling machines, grid machines, exhaust
machines, and test equipment.
(3) Specialized fabricated and raw materials, especially ductile
refractory metals, strategic mica, borosilicate glasses, refractory in-
sulation.,and special chemicals,
(4) Semi -skilled personnel in large numbers, especially with a high
degree of manual dexterity.
The princical applications for electron tubes arc as follows:
g)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
7
(8~
Production of radio. and television receivers.
Replacements in existing services and receivers.
Production of military communications equipment.
Production of military radar and counter-measure equipment
Special military devices (missile controls and VT fuses),
Professional broadcast, comminications, and sound equipment,,
Industrial electronics equipment.
Mary depot stocks and strategic stockpiling,
2, Developmmt of the d.Lld .
Radio communication was first employed in the USSR by Professor
Popov in 1900 and more extensively in the next several years by the Russian
Na'vSro Russisn.produccd radio equipment was employed in World War I
Under German.sponstrship, some early tube work had been started before. the
revolution. The present industry was established in 1923. Electron tubes
were produced in small quantities at Leningrad during the 200s and early 30es.
Reports indicato that transmitting tube techniques were quite good, although
work on the smaller receiving tubes was somewhat ineffective?
The foundation for the present Soviet tube industry as an effective
manufacturing program was started in 1935 under the direction of the
Glovesprom of the T.l mi.stry for Electrical Industry. This program was
implemented by means of technical assistances manufacturing equipment, and
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production supplies furnished under a contract with the QS firm RCA.
Facilities were delivered from the and installed by 1938 in order to
provide production capacity for receiving tubes, transmitting tubes,, and
a limited 1wel of cathode ray tubes. The expansion program provided for
a theoretical capacity of 30 minion tubes per year, divided between the
Svotiana plant No, 211. in Leningrad and the Radiolampa plant near Moscow.
This output was never realized from the lI production units supplied,, By
3.940, the maxiswn annual production rate attained was 8 million tubes.
Following the German attack,, the Leningrad plant machinery and
personnel were evacuated to Novosilbira k' and most of the Radial
facilities were evacuated to Tashkent with small departments elsewhere. It
has been estimated that about 50 porcent of the effective machine capacity
was lost during the ovaacuation, mostly in crossing Take Ladoga. The Soviet
production of tubes in 19143 and 1944 was about I,, won tubes per year.
During World War II, the US ,euppllsd unctor Lend-lease more than two- tbirda
of the Soviet tube requirements., as well as considerable military caammmiea.
tiou equipment. Soap shipments of tube machinery., especially grid lathes
and stem machines., were made. However, most of a $16 million category for
tube machinery included in the last Lend-Lease protocol was not shipped,.
During the war, the US alao supplied nearly all of the tungsten and.
molybdenum metal products required in Soviet tube production,,
factors:
The immediate postwar period was notable f'ar the following four
a. y of the evacuated personnel returned to Leningrad and
caw, there tube plant operations were reestablished. In addition,
equipment and organizations were maintained at the major evacuation
plants at Novosibirsk and Tashkent.
b. &tsensive removal of technical plant equipment was effected
at the AEG, Sieaaen-FRal ako, and Tel funkom tube plants in GerMUV and
Czedioslovakia, and at the Tungeratm/UILCO plant in Budapest. l&zch of this
equipment was reported as installed at the Svetlana plant, at the Radiolampa
plant, at Gorki,, and at Novosibirsk,,
c. In October 19146, additional equipment., manufacturing data, and and a
group of 250 to 500 technicians, engineers, and scientists were evacuated
from German companlea to the USR.
d. A program was carried out consolidating the equipment obtained
from Germany and the US,, as s :mgr atitag the German technical personnel and
technicians, and reorganizing facilities and production schedules. The
Svetlana plant at Leningrad and the Moscow piss emerged again as the major
Soviet produce,.
Fromm 1947 through 1950 ninny facilities were added and increased
production scheduled. By the end of 1950 it was certain that Me Soviet tube
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industry was operating at a scale larger than anything previously
planned. Despite considerable increase in the output of tubes, 1950
production of civilian radios rema.:i.ned at a relatively. low level and
civilian stocks of raplacemeat, tubes were very scarm,
3. Tec~hnol
?
With some reservations, the Soviet technology is not greatly different
from that of the US. Receiving tubes, generally following US design, are
produced by methods similar to those in the US, using the ean2e basic types
of automatic plant machines. Transmitting tubes appear to be a nixtuie
of US, Soviet, and German designs, and in general are made in job lots,
probably in facilities not heavily mechanized. Cathode ray tubes are produced
in limited quantities, with methods and facilities not at all comparable to
those in the US.
The folloriing four major differences are indicated between the Soviet
and US tube industries:
as The labor input is greater In the USSn in similar tube categories
as a result of the Soviet tendency to produce more of the pax is in the tube
plant., lower skill, inferior quality control, and inadequate super-
vision, In some cases, the more limited voles a probably precludes the use
of labor-saving automatic equipment.
b. On receiving tubes and allied types, the Soviet industry employs
molybdenum grid wire instead of less critical and cheaper alloys,
c. The Soviet distribution between product categories results in a
higher proportion of special tubes and transmitting tubes, more comparable
to US experience in ,Vorld War IIo In terms of real factory value it is
estimated that Soviet output is twice that of the U.S per million tubes of
all kinds.
4. Organization,,
The Soviet electron tube industry is administered by a Directorate
of the I;inistry for Communication Equipment industry? This Directorate,
whose headquarters is In I,bscow, also controls the manufacture of electric
lamps and related supplies. Plans and schedules are established by-the
Directorate, apparently with the assistance of stated requirements from
other Ministries and Directorates. Sales and deliveries are arranged to
enterprises and stock accounts of other Ministries, as well as to equipment
manufacturers of the Ministry for Communication Industry. Military repre-
sentatives are resident at tube plants, apparently performing functions of
inspection, engineering, and expediting. Stringent security measures am
observed.
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a. Civilian,
Reasonably adequate information exists for providing an estimate
of civilian tube requirements in-the USSR. Domestic civilian demand for
electron products has been maintained at a low level, approaching only a
fraction of the industryfe output.
Consumer demand for radios has been limited by high prices, The
retail prices of Soviet radios range from 40 percent to 160 percent of the
average industrial worker's monthly pay. This compares with the two popular
price ranges in the US of 6 percent and 13 percent. It is noted that the 900-
ruble Soviet table model sells In Egypt at $40.50 wholesale and 080.60 re-
tail,
Effective systems for adequate coverage in the fields of broadcasting
and telecommunications have been established in the USSR, utilizing the
barest minimum investment in labor and materials. A major portion of the
coverage is obtained through the use of wired radio outlets and comrmnlty
telephones. In addition to conserving materials, this system fits in with
the need for tight Soviet control over the dissemination of information.
There are no statutory controls or restrictions against the individual
ownership of radios and no choice of stations.
In 1950., it is estimated that the USSR produced 750,,000 radios
averaging four tubes each and 25,000 TV receivers averaging 21 tubes,
The tube requirements totaled 3.5 million tubes. Three million replace-
ment tubes were required in 1950 to maintain existing civilian and corms
mercial installations as follows:
(1) For 3.5 million radio receivers, 2,6 million tubes.
(2) For 9 million loud speaker outlets, no tubes.
3) For an average of 15,000 TV receivers, 50,000 tubes.
1}) For 20,000 audio amplifiers at wired radio centers,,
2009000 tubes.
(5) For 5,200 civilian and administrative communication stations,
including 3,500 lore-power transmitters and 160 broadcasting transmitters,,
10,000 tubes.
(6) For industrial electronic equipment, 50,000 tubes.
An estimated additional. 0.5 million tubes more required in 1950 for the
production of audio amplifiers, telephone and telegraph equipment, and pro-
fessional and industrial equipment.
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As outlined above, total 1950 Soviet civilian tube requirements
Production of radio and TV receivers 305 million
Replacement tubes 3.0
Production of coi tiunications and
Industrial equipment NO Total million.
The possible range in civilian tube requirements is believed to be from
5.5 million to S million.
The total Satellite civilian tube requirements are estimated at
105 million tubes, the Satellite 1950 tube production being estimated at
16.5 million tubes, Some of these 6 million surplus tubes -mere consumed in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany for military equipment, and most
of the balance was exported to the USSR. Although the USSR exports tubes to
Poland and East Germany, as -tell as some to Rumania and Bulgaria, the USSR
has received an estimated 2 to 4 million tubes per year more than it has
exported to its Satellites. The export of electron tubes by the. USSR, is a
negligible factor in economic warfare and in securing essential importca
C. Muit, ro
;'military tube requirements may be divided into three categories;
(1) operating and spare tubas required for military electronic equipment
being produced; (2) operating tubes required for special large-scale
pro%; cts for expendable equipment, such as proximity fuses and missile
guidance controls, if such items are in quantity production; and (3) rte.
plaoemeit tubes for military depot stocks and strategic stockpiling,,
In this study, no consideration has been given to tubes required
for expendable equipment, although it -till be seen later 'that they could
possibly be a factor of large magnitude.
No valid intelligence exists for determining the Soviet rates of
production of military electronic equipment,, from which military tube
requirements could be estimated. However., there are three possible
approaches for estimating military tube requirements. The first approach,
based upon available Soviet statistics (subject to considerable error).,
is as follows:
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(1) From a reviear of 37 major apparatus plants, it is estimated
that 90,x? people are a nrloved in Soviet electronic apparatus factories.
(2) At an estimated average output of X1,500 rubles per year Pei,
employee, the total apparatus output is calculated at 3.4 billion rubles.
(3) Subtracting a figure of 0,6 ,, j.1) jOn, rubles to cover the
civilian equipment outlined in paragraph a., above., the military equipment output
is estimated at 2Q8 billion rublo ..
(4) T rionco In the electr a c industry Indicates that tube
requires nts are valued at 7 percent of the equipment output valueo There-
fore
.trequirements for tubes are calculated at 290 million rixbles. The net
price of a Soviet.-made receiving tube averages 7.5 rubles; the average net
price for all classes of tubes is calculated at 20 rubles per tube. There-
fore,1950 tube requirements for military equipment may be calculated at
10 roil pion tubes.
Second, an estimate of 1950 military equipment tube requirements
may be made through comparison with the US industry:
(1) Since the US electronic apparatus industry in 194.4 had 250,000
employees and the Soviet industry in 1950 had, 90,0000 uorI,ers, a labor pro-
duct:ivity ratio of 40 percent, would indicate that the 1950 Soviet production
we 15 percent of that of the US industry in 1944.
(2) In 1944, the US electron a equipment industry required
100 million tubes per year, excluding proximity fuses.
(3) Assuming that the Soviet industry in 1950 devoted 75 percent of
production to military purposes, military tube requirements can be calcvlated
at .75 x .15 x 100 million., or 114'3 million tubes par year.
Third., some very approximate guesses on 1950 production rates for
military equipment indicate requirements of at least 6 million tubes per
year,, as illustrated below:
Airborne corsnunication
600,000
Airborne navigation sets
400,000
Airborne radar and I"F
600,000
Ground and ship radar
400
9000
Marine come unieation
.
300.,000
Ground com ,ication sets
700,000
Control, radio graves,
special
2, 000
, 000
Military II & D
,
1 C0011000
64000,0000
Based on the above approaches., it is estimated that the 1950
requirements for electron tubes to meet Soviet production schedules on
military electronic equipment are . million tubes. This estimate is
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subject to a 3.do range of error,, possibly from a minimum of 6 million
tubes per year to a m%ximum of 25 million tubes per year, the latter in
the event that significant production program for expendable items
existed.
No information is available to justify an estimate of basic
military needs for replacement and stockpiling tubas at this time,
Certainly two million tubes per year, at the rr stp could cover
maintenance requirements for Soviet equipment in Korea and for the Soviet
and sow of the US equipment in Communist China..
Therefore,, since confirmed evidence indicates a shortage of
civilian replacement tubes in 1950, it is assumed that the 1950 re-
quirements for stockpiling more planned at the r aximum availability less
the civilian and military equipment requirements. This would permit a
considerable increase in socks.
In the event of a general waur$ production of civilian radio
equipment could be halted, and norm-milltary tube requirements would be
limited to these essential to necessary- maintenance, Although military
requirements cannot be calculated from estimates of equipment and opera.
tional plans, it is believed that a reasonable predfctton can be made based
on a historical approach. For comparison, the following data represent
slightly more than a four-fold increase in military tube requirements over
the Soviet consw.s,tion in 19144; the rate for the armies and air forces of
the Orbit countries is two-theses that of the 1944 rate of consumption of the
US Army and USAF; consumption for the Orbit navies is ono.?aixth that of the
1944 US Navy rate 0
Annual requirements, Orbit navies 12 million
Annual requirements, armies and air forces 48
Essential civilian requirements 6
Total annual. Orbit requirements in se
of a general Isar 66 million
The method used in arriving at the above estimate is as fo7lous:
(1) US tube requirements - senthl.y averages (1944) (in millions)
Class
ArzV & Navy
Int.
USSR Portion of
3Aid
Total USAF E41
Reeg, 140 3.7 14 2o1 2,0
Trans 2.70 0075 0" 80 0.55 O
.
CRT 0 12 036 Q45 - .O
1)-~ 003
~ ~yu7 102 a ~4~
-9a.
O's
0010
Wp
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~2) Estimated. UK ri>nthly production (1944) 1.8
3) Estimated USSR monthly production (1944) 004
(4) Average monthly requirements, USAF & Arny 6,1
Average monthly requirements, US Navy, 5.5
Average nxanthly requirements of UK 3.2
(of which l08 was UK production,, 1.4
US production)
Average nz n hly requiroments of USSR 103
(of which 0.4 uas USSR production, 0,,9
US production)
(5) An estimated breakdown of 1944 monthly requirements of the
Total 10300
Civilian; replacements 0100
Artcr and Air 10000
Navy 200
(6) Probable change in USSR Navy requiramentag
a) Uore units o
b) Greater use of electronics 0
(c) Comparison of 1931 USSR and 1944 US Navies%
USSR, us
Major combatant vessels 5 20O
Minor combatant vessels 2,500 10,000
Planes 4,000 25,000
In event of a general, war., it would appo&r that the navies of Uo
Soviet Orbit countries in 1951 Mould be about one- quarter of the moximum
size of the US Navy. The tube requirements per unit would be lose in viea;
of the simpler electronics equipment on Soviet vessels and loss ' dispe lion
of supply bases,, Therefore requirements arc estimated at L,0 m:Mion tubes
per month,
(7) Probable change in USSR Arrzr and Air. Force r8quiramea?aU:
(a) A larger military force (in general Omar),
(b) Increased use of electronicsg
1. All tanks and SP guns have radios .- instead of
20 percent.
2u Military planes equipped with ooimmication sets.,
ADF, navigational-aid receivers; bombers, and sexr,
fighters have radar?
Vast net of BN ground radars
1 , Increasing numbers of FC radaro
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(8)
(a) Suggested factor for tube requirements (equipment
plus stocks) 1. x 1924 4.4 million,
Soviet Orbit monthly tube requi- nts, estimated from the
historical approach, would be, in case of general war, as
follaI7s:
Navy 1.0
Army &AF 11,O
Total Nil
Essential Civ (2 13 of current replacement rate)
5.5 million
Estimates of military tube requirements are subject to wide error and
varying interpretation. It is believed that current Soviet tube production
is adequate for civilian requirements plus mwrent military requirements and
will permit a sizable increment in stocks. In the event of a generatl war,
Soviet military requirements would increase greatly, perhaps as much as six--
fold. Therefore ,a large stockpile is needed,and expansion of tube-producing
facilities must be continued if Soviet intentions are to prepare for it general
war, rather than to prepare for limited military operations and national defense,
do Substitutes.
No substitutes as such are possible. The only way in which requirements
might be reduced is through a curtailment in plans or.in uses. This would mean
less electronics and less tubes per basic function; both of these principles
are observed in Soviet military equipment and civilian radios.
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6, Production,
1950 Tube Production.
Somewhat vvll-confirmed infozmation of a general nature is available
on the six major tube plants in the USSR, permitting the pin-pointing of
locations and approximate estimates as to size and general production pro-
grams* These plants are as follows:
Plat
Location
1950 Production
Svet] ana No, 211
Leningrad
8
million
Elektroiampy No, 632
Moscow
3.5
1adiolampa No, 191
Fryaz:ino (Shchelkovo)
6
Tube Factory No, 61? (& 509)
Novosibi.xsk
5
Tube Factory No, 191
Tashkent
3.5
Svirl diozavod No, 326
Gorki.
1,0
Al]. of the above plants produce transmitting and special tubes, in addition
to standard receiving types/ The proportion of special tubes is higher at
Novosibirsk, Svirl, and RadiolaMPA than at the others/
Other tube or lamp facilities of lesser magnitude than the above plan
have been -reported at perhaps 12 locations a Leningrad.,
~-binsk Sv+erdlcrvsk Ufa Tibilisi PY lishchi Riga.. Lvov, ,~Ci.ravad9
Ufa,, , Y , Iazany, Tirga/Prokopyevsk, and
Tck, Their combined output is estimated to be about two million tubes,
Total Soviet 1950 output is estimated at 29 million tubes, although a range of
from 25 million to 50 mill ion tubes is considered possible,
In this report the estimate of theoretical production capacity will, not
be used because it is a misleading factor in the tube industry. Given the con-
dition of heavy and increasing demand, the actual production is normally
considered the effective capacity., even though certain machines or sections of
plants could in time increase production without additions. A discussion of
Soviet tube and lamp plants folly,
(1) Svetl No, 213. .E els Prosioekt and V. Ibrrinakogo Pro nnkt
orWn_ lamp producer, is located 5.5 kilometers north of the Neva River, just
to the right of the main Leningrad to Viborg highrany. It includes sawn old
and four postwar shops, plus storehouses and an administration building., Total
floor apace is about 850,000 sq. feet? The plant director is Galedin; employees
total about 5,000, including a number of German engineers and scientists.
The original plant, built in 1908, was equipped as a modern
tube factory in 1937 and 1938 by MA. All important .quip sent, together with
about 1,000 key personnel, were evacuated to Novosibirsk (No. 617) in 19941;
about half of the major machines were lost. Starting in 1945.. Svetlana was
w 12 -
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xresquippcod with plant facilities from, Germany and the TJS, Pr?> a r.r equipment
remained at Novosibirsk, although maaauy of the personnel .maturated to Leningrad.
After 2947, as Soviet-mad o tube and lamp vc.chinery also was installed.
Various reports provide a good general knowledge of the installed
machinery, although no detailed information is available relative to the su -
beraa and types of basic tube and lamp machines. The principal product lines
are general service incandescent laws, airport and high-pm ar lamps, fluores-
cent lamps., receiving tubes and allied types, mcdiua pe ar transmitting tubes,
high. poawer tra ni tting tubes, and X-ray tubas, It would appear that about
one-third of the plant production was devoted to lamps and two-thirds to tubes.
Est of the tube parts are produced in the plant, but part or all of certain
items are shipped into the plant,, as aas listed below:
fr~ti on of the produces tungsten and molybdenum ti r a major
production requirement is received fr rm Ikloscow - partly frcm
kta.?0lamp zavod No. 632, partly from Soviet imports,
(b) Technical glass is produced and bulbs are blcmn at Svetl ,
but a significant amount is shipped in, both as bulbz and a a glass rod and
tubing.,from the Kalashnikovo glass plant.
(a) Mica tuba spacers are supplied by the Mica, Trust PI=t at
Petrozavodak and by m ca fabricating plants No% I and 2 in LLenineracia
lamp production was eatimted at 8 to 10 million in 1946
and 15 million in 1947, 1950 output is. estimted at 20 million electric lamps
of all typos and S million tubas Of all types, including 800,000 erocia1
purpose and transmitting tubes,
(2) 11adio No0 191 F sumo Uoecov Oblast. This plant, believed
to be the asaecon rges u - uc ~ijy as'VeM as then ear design
and d lopment center (with its associated Design Bureau), is a cc ail cau?-
prised of three resin multistory factory buildings, an aditd i straation building,
and a llor shops, located 4 miles north northeast of the enter of .Shchelkovo
or about 23 miles northeast of the center of TToscov:. The original factory,
founded as a tube works in 1934 and equipped with sorio RCA equipment in 1937
and 1938, was dismantled in 1941. Fquipauent and some personnel were evacuated
to Tashkent; some. smaller departmntss were movod to other locations, including
Ufa,
The number of personnel engaged in producing lamps and tubes was
reported as 5,000 in 1941 and as 2 .,000 in 1946, As full effort has been
indicated since 1948 on tubas oral.y, current employment is estimated at 4000.
From May 1945 through 1,947, tube anufactt~ring machinery, test equipmr>ent, and
optical equipment were installed and put into operation at Rad--to1ampa. Equip-
ment was received from German tube and television plants, Zeiss-Jemi from
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A enbach in Czechoslavakia. ; Eton. Sien ns tube works in Vienna, from
T'gsrau AT-TLCO ins, Budapest; and From US leicaso, R ther good reports
indicate that all of the evacuaated Tuugsrn l J IL,CO mach aiaerry and all of the
10 to 5d US Lend- ase grid l thes were brought ,o Radiolnmpaa tiQ effective
capacity of the UILCO and US machinery combined wou d be 6 to 8 million tubes
per year., P. oduction in 1.950 is estimated at 6 m llion tubes, of a all typos.
If these units, plus equipment from Geean plants as well, were installed and
in operation at is iolampa, the production capacity would be considerably
l"9or than this cst te. the possibility must be coansidered that RadWxmpa
may ham been used frame, 14.5 to 1,917 as a "staging area" for special tube
maachanery, and that sew of this vast group of equi. nt ravy have been ssezrc.
t-o- other Soviet tube plants. No :tamp a, anufactmre is indicated sinnce =bhP .r.,
From 1.916 to l91t8, the associated Design Bureau opezwbed as a
gathering port for German electronics personnel, including topflight tuba
1'F no Very little use=ful information effecive af` er 191x8 has been sooua It
is c uiite certain that the Design Bureau 3s en .ged in electron optics work
and military television and guidance control de elo ent, as well as on general
tube researcho. 1Radiol ampa No. 191 Is believed to be produciag cath< -ray,
tran> itt:;x , an.d special.-.purposo tubes, in a addition to s? ane rd receiving
tubes.
(3) IU Ionin Elektrol (MY Zavod M ; 632 1 Elektrozavofdskmya,
Ste lip on ~. cr?
T=s p snr," c mu~orca~T p~ucr' d Qr
o C o our iv ions the former YKuibyshev ocsabi , cc aa.w n,u area of 30
acres annd includes a =ftr of four- and fivo ory brick buildings 1-b is
located slightly :Less tlhan fouzxr nibs northeast of the center of Moe' COWQ
Unlike other plants nor engaged in electronics? MoK*rola povy 632
was not greatly dislocated during World War 11 and has boon an efficient s nuu
fad turixng enterprise since 1946. In 191;55, this 'p:tan;t establi hed a recei g
tube dement with personnel. aan arc iip nt divearted from lamp production, .
fix;ans.tt: tube production was begun in 1917 and cathodo--rayp tube production
in l to 1918.
Factory No. 632 has been txhe m jor Soviet papliery of refractory
metals for a nu er of years. Tho Soviet ca city to produuce ductile hard
metales (tungsten, molybdenaumau, and tantalum) has been quite i adequate; impor
In 1950 were hear, A nor, metals a pansi on was added to'X1e'ktro2mVovy No. 632
in late 1919; tantalum production wae started in3 early 1918. a Wire and metal.
products are shipped to otb r lamp and tube producers.
The plant director i s G.M. T t?O. 1oono totaled 6,000 to
7,000 in 1.911 In 1950, oamp1cyyees were estimated at8,000, with 5,000 worms
an lamps and r fated products, 2,000 on to s, a . 1,000 on metals, special
ma.ch-.ines, and other products.
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3,950 output at Elektrola spovy Zavod 632 is estimated at
85 million electric lamps of all types and 3,5 million tubes of all types,
primarily standard receiving tubes but also standard transmitting types and
acne CR tubes,
(4) Novosibirsk Elektrolimp4Z Zavod No. 47, Krasgr kt -This posibirs , plant was estabUshed in JAte 1941 as an evacuations
dings of an agricultural college by the transfer of machinery
and 1,000 I my personnel from the Leningrad Svetlana plant. By 194 4., the plant
employed several thousand people, producing three to four million tubes per
year, including all major categories, 'Although many of the key personnel
returned to Leningrad at the end of the war, this facility was maintained and
expanded. In 19h4, the buildings used were considered temporary, but one 1948
report mentioned new construction, As recent information is scarce, further
study is needed to pinpoint the present location and structure.
There is evidence to indicate the production program is pro-
domainantly military, including special-purpose types. German specialists
were sent to Novosibirsk, to were the German manufacturing data for centimeter-
frequency metal-ceramic and klystron' tubes. Little information exists to
permit a firm analysis of detailed production programs,
The plant director is reported as Dzhuk, who had I?Ck training in
the US in the late 30's. Total personnel is estimated at 4.,000 to 5,000. 1950
production is estimated at 5 million tubes, including a high proportion (in
}
l
f
o
va
ue
special-purpose types,
(5) Tashkent Electric Lam Factory No. 191 10 Uzbekistanska ul
w
Taohkent. Th a ory was a he a nun r o ace neous ex ing
b We in 1942-401 with lamp and tube equipment, evacuated from Moscow
presumably, mostly from Itaadioiampa. Wartime personnel were reported to be
about 2,500,and products were ri rily lamps and transmitting tubes, The
plant was reorganized in 1,9146-47 and automatic machinery added. There
probably also was some consolidation of floor space, Recent details on facili-
ties are not available. The total number of employees is now estimated at
2,1t00o
Lamp production increased in 19147. Production of glass receiving
tubes was initiated in 19147, with a considerable increase reported in 3949.
Production of transmitting tubes, possibly including tubes for Soviet., early-
warning radars, has been continued' There are indications that lap production
has become of secondary importance:
For production material, refractory metals and parts are obtained
from Nos 632, Mosccscr, and mica from the I Ica Trust fabricating plant at Irkutsk.
The source of glass has not been determined9
The 1950 output is estimated at 3 million ].amps and 305 million
tubas, primarily glass receiving tubes and medium and large transmitting tubes,
15 r~
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(6) Svirl Radiozavod No. 326, Gorki, The location of this plant,
believed to be iiffiliatod with but no a part of Lenin Radiozavod 197, has
been pinpointed. It was reported as producing radios, components,. meters,
and tubes during World War II, with 2,000 employees,
Current information is scant. There are quantities of tubes
labeled Gorki, which are presumed to be made at this plant. German tube
specialists were sent to the Gorki area. Unconfirmed reports state that
German equipment for special tubes., small resistors, and capacitors was
sent to this plant,
Radiozavod No. 326, possibly in conjunction with sections of
No. 197, is believed to be a potential source of important military tubes
and components. Further extensive intelligence effort is required, both
in research and in collection, to unearth more information about this plant.
Tube output in 1950 is estimated at one million., a figure subject to wide
error.
(7) Other Possible Soviet Tube Producers. In addition to the six
major plants Hi tied., various repo Rs have d tube operations at other
locations. In general, the information, although superficial, indicates that
the total contribution to the supply of tubes is not great from such sources.
The 1950 output is estimated at 2 million tubes.
The following list outlines the probable status of such suppliers:
(a) Vaists Elektrotechnila. Fabrikn (VU), 19 Brivibas Gotve,
Riga. 'a fairly large producer of civilian radio equipment, telephones, and
military ccimunications equipment, is located in two factories in Riga. The
total company personnel is about 5,000. The Brivibas Gotve factory includes
a department producing lamps and tubes, largely for local consumption.
(b) Sverdlovsk Tube Plant, Sverdlovsk (or Kamensk)., Two
references indicate the possibility of a small production of tubes, using.
some equipment evacuated from Germany. Confirmation is required.
(c) Electric Lamp Plants, Lvov, Two associated factories.,
started after -7orld War II3 are engaged in producing, lamps at an estimated
rate of one million per year. There is no evidence of tube work as yet.
(d) Elektrik Zavod A.S. Skorokhodov, Leningrad., is a large
manufacturer of electric welding and industrial apparatus; it reportedly
produces a small number of welding tubes,
(e) Elektrostanze Padio,Factory No. 325, Kirovobad Armenian
SSR. The source of one report believes that the plant makes radio tubes;
this needs confirmation.
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(f) Radio Tube Factory, Rybinsk, Yaroslave Oblast, There are
brief references in German World Vlar II intelligence reports to a plant at
that time, but present operation is doubtful,
(g) Soich Lamp Plant, Tirga/Prokopyevsk0 This plant has 1,500
employees and produces special lamps for mines. No tube work,,
(h) Ryazan Electric Lamp Factory No, 33, ul, Yamslenya, RWazans
Ryazan Oblast. This plant raa completed just prior to 1?orld War II,, Since
the war it has been producing bulbs, lamps, and Class ampules, Miniature
radio (panel) lamps were in production in 1949. The plant area was prohibited
to prisoners of war,, Indications are that this is a sizable operation,
possibly up to 2s000 employees. The size and type of work indicates possible
conversion to small tubes,
(i) Tube Plant, Ufa,, Some of Radiolampa 191 equipment waa
evacuated here during World liar II, Very little current information exists
on this plant, other than indications that operations are continuing, probably
on special tubes and not in large quantities, It may have received Gerwai
technical porsonnul and equipment after the war? Further intelligence
effort is required,
(j) Tube Plant, TW isi, Several references indicate that post-
rjar activity does not include lamps or tubes but is probably centered on
cor>mnnications equipment. German specialists my be conducting some
ex-
perimental work on special tubes.
(k) NIIISS (Liilita?y Research Institute) l'~tishchi, Moscow
Oblast, 1s' engaged on circuit work, field testing? and development of micro-
wave radar, Some experimental model: shop Mork on special tubes possibly is
being conducted.
(1) Radio Tube %ctory, Torrok, Confirmed information
fragmentary in nature indicates the existence of a plant at Tormk. It is not
believed to be a large producer. In view of Down plans for postwar re-
arrangement at 11ovosibirsk Plant No, 617, it is considered likely that sections
of No. 617 formed the base for the Tomsk plant, Further intelligence study
is required.
(8) rtant rti?inn Plants~, Although the Soviet tube industry,
as is generally true of the arger European tube manufacturing complexes,
tends to establish each major plant as a self-sufficient entity, certain
pro daction parts are purchased from other plants.
Glass and envelopes are produced at several tube plants.. Other
important sources of glass and glass parts include the Elektrokolby Zavod in
Stalinakiy Rayon, near Plant No, 632; the Zapruduya Glass Factory, and the
October Glass Plant, Kalacknikovo, Kalinin Oblast.
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In addition to the major refractory metal plant at Eloktrolanipovy
Zavod 632, and minor shops at one or two tube plants, the Ogrednevo plant
(northeast lbscow) is reported as a tungsten sire supplier?
Clear mica sheet and block are processed and fabricated for the
entire tube industry at two principal plants t the Mica Plant,, Irkutsk, and the
Klima Mica Plant, Petrozavvodsk0 There are tuo smaller factories in Leningrad.
b0 Reagional Production0
--ccao +A w
The leading tube--producing area nom appears to be the Fdbsco orki
region, where nearly 40 percent of the Soviet capacity is located, Second in
magnitude is the Leningrad area,, with over 30 percent; before World War II,
most of the tube capacity was situated in Leningrad. The remaining 30 percent
of installed capacity is aprcad throughout the Uaa1a,9. the Tashkent, and the
Novosibirsk areas0
CO Tic
(1) Soviet tube production has increased six-fold from the estimated
1945 rate of. 5 miil.lion0 Expansions of facilities reported as being started
or in process its the 1947-1949 period at Svotlana, Radiolampa,, Lbscow Plant
No0 632, and Novosibirsk ,No0 617, will permit a continuing increase beyond
the 1950 figu ea There has been no current information on more recent ex-
pansions, but brief notes in the Soviet press relative to the recent pro.
duction of special factory equipment (specifically., automatic grid lathes
and automatic tube and lamp processing machines) indicate that the ansion
of productive facilities is still undeniay0
(2) Potential additional capacity for tube manufacture exists
in the diversion of facilities and staffs from the production of lamps. This
was done extensively in, the US during World War U. T a the USSR., this has
been illustrated by the postwar changes at fl ektrol ampovy Zavod 32 and at
Tashkent 1910
(3) It is believed that the USSR is capable of doubling its tube
capacity from the 1950 figure within 2 years by these tuo methods if
necessary0
d0 Stocks,
No data are available regarding total morking conditions or stockpiles,
However , a comparison (necessarily approximate) of past production., imports;,
and consumption indicates that total stock (strategic and depot) was about
30 to 40 million tubes at the end of 19500 In 1951, stocks can be expected
to increase by 15 to 20 million tubes?
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e. Ibcbornal =e.0 0
(1) The foUouinc tube production in the Satellites is sI?nificant:
a I Iun ary - 10 mi ui on in 1950
b)} Czechoslovakia - 3 million in 1950
c) East. Germany * 2a5 taillion in 1950
d) All othors a- 1 million in 1950
Of the 6, 5 million tubes in otxceas of the Satel.l.ites v military
and civilian consusVtion, it is eati r. ated that over 70 percent is exported
to the USSRQ
Production is oontinuinr to increase in the Satellites,,
(2) Before 1950, total expo-~ts of tubes by non-Orbit countries to
the Orbit'ras estimated at 5 mil .ion; so= of these were shipped directly
to the USSR., but most went to satellites and to China. It is believed that
this trade was curtailed appreciably in 1950, primarily due to increased Jowl
demand in the no bit countries.
(a) Principal suppliers of tubes: to the Orbit and China
have boon the US, UK, Netherlands, Gerrnsr r Ita.1,y, Franco.. and Austria,,
Currently this trade is probably Limited to the Nctherl. ouch, Austria, Gerii ny,
and Italy.
(b) The tube Industries of Germany, Netherlands, Austria,,
France,, Sweden, and Italy,, which are p otentia1.ly available to the USSR in
casts 77eatorn Europe is ovorrsn, are currently "Ming between 45 and 50
million tubou per y*car. Some oxp ion is planned in view of the combined
p TO ? nd civilian television demand, Subject to some reduction in Western
European capabilities resulting from materials cut-off., the Soviet Orbit could
almost double its tube capacity through the acquisition of a?opean facilities
.
(c) Western export control measures have been fairly effective
In stopping the quantity shipment of special military and ultra-high
frequency tubes to the Orbit. .Except for recent US action, no restrictions
have been placed on standard tubes a This accounts for the rather 3a rge
numerical figures relating to tube trausactions0 Currency proble and a heavy
Western Europe demand for tubes since mid-1950 have probably been .gore'
effective than administrative controls in curbing exports to the Orbits,
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7a Inmit Use and R+eauire V&eao
a4 PrincAM_L b1 aw Mat .
Principal raw materials required in tube manufacture are divided
into two categories. Major items, for 'which the tube industry share in a
negligible fraction of total industry consumption, are as follows: cold-
rolled steel strip, electrolytic copper, synthetic resins,, and nickel sheet
and wire, There is a longer list of specialized foraaa. of materials, for
which the tube industry in a major or sole user or which entail a difficult
technology in preparation. Those items are tungsten rod and wire; molybdenum
rod, wire, and sheet; zirconium metal and compounds; tantalum; technical
glass; nickel tubing. and cathode sleeveas; high- quslity muscovite mica block
and sheet; diamond dies; tube getters; oxygen-free copper; refractory in-
sulation I3"UU alumina and block talc),,-, special glusswto-rotal
sealing alloys; emission-coating chemicals; fluorescents-coating chemicarls;
mercury; rare gases; and rare-earth metals, A number of the items in the
above list are potential supply bottlenecks in the Orbit, as well as good
indicators of tube manufacturing levels,, Four have been selected for
study to date:
(1) Metallic tungsten, includ. its fabricated forms of wire,,
rod, and ribbon, In in ve short supply in the USSR. Basentiall,y, this
is not a raw material (ore) problem but one of difficult technology and
expensive plant equipment.
Four Soviet producing plants are known to date,, and possibly
there are others of smal1 size, One plant in in Lcnin ad, and three are
in Moscow. Although two of these have been expanded since 19479 total out-
put is entirely inadequate. In 1950,, Orbit imports,, principally from
Sweden and (through Switzerland) from,. Austria and possibly the Netherlands,
may have exceeded total annual requirements.
Estimated input factors for tungsten (the data being per 1,000
tubes or lamps) a are a
Wire, under .,010"
Heavy wire and rod
1,200 motors
Large TW~es LAMB
800 meters 1,500 meters
33 lbs,, ..
Total 1950 tungsten requirements for this industry would be
60,000 pounds, 30,000 for tubes and 30,000 for Limps, or about 190 million
maters,
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(2) Metallic molybdenum, including its fabricated forms of wire,
rod, and sheet, is produced in the same facilities and is subject to the
same comments,
Input factors (the data being per 1,000 tubes) are:
0 7;uben Large Tames bmmu
Wire, under .010" 5,000 meters -.~. (not
Heavy wire, rod, and sheet 45 lbs. used)
Total 1950 metallic molybdenum requirements would be 40,000
pounds, or 150 million meters, virtually all for tubes,
(3) Strategic block and sheet mica (muscovite, better than good-
stain quality, in sizes of No. 6 and larger) is required for tubes in the
amount of 10 pounds per 1,000 tubes. At 1950 production rates, 300,000
pounds per year are required for tubes,,
An ample supply of raw material is indicated in the long-
developed workings of Siberia and the nor iestern part of the USSRRa As
in the rest of the world, the splitting, handling,, sorting, and gr aching
of this material is a bottleneck. Only two major fabricating facilities
exist - one at Irkutsk and one at Petrozavodak -. although two lesser
factories are located in Leningrad. A further study of the two major
plants is planned as a measure of Soviet electronics programs and with
respect to vulnerability. There are no Indications of sign:#,.ficant imports
of mica by the Orbit.
(4) Suitable diamond dies are essential to the manufacture of
wires used in tubes and lamps, ma- well as for fine nickel wire (atomic
energy) and electronic resistance iaixe. Die-.atones, and especially
diamond dies, are imported on a large scale. Further study is suggested
in connection with economic warfare possibilities,
b. Fuel Power Requirements.
No analysis of fuel and power input factors or requirements has been
conducted, although the means for this are available, both from US and from
USSR data, Further study is recommended on the consumption of electric
power; gas, manufactured or bottled; and hydrogen., oxygen, carbon dioxide,
and nitrogen.
c. Text.
No basic consideration of transport in important in this industry
with the exception of its qualifying effect upon the production and shipping
methods relating to blown glass bulbs. Further study of transport is planned
in connection with technical glass supplies.
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d.
(1) As indicated from an analysis of individual plants, total
employment in 1950 in the Soviet tube and lamp industry is estimated at
31,000,. with 20,000 working on tubes and related parts and 11,000 on
lazapn, This total of 20,000 is consistent with the estimated figure of
908000 employed in the electronic apparatus industry; it is also consistent
with the production figure of 29 million tubes when related to US data and
considering relative productivity.
Most reports on Soviet tube plants indicate y, 8-hour
shifts, with plant operation usually on two or three shifts. As is normal
in this industry, the third shift. is generally small,
(2) For the large proportion of plant labor., little or no initial
skill is required. The best source is a plentiful supp]~y of younger women.
Manual dexterity and routine skill are attained on the job, and productivity
is low for the first several months; so it is important to maintain the
same labor force, once it is trained. A small nucleus of highly skilled
key labor is required, especially as assembly leaders, exhaust operators,,
and glass operators. This latter factor is important, since it precludes
the establishment of manufacturing units in a number of widely separated
locations;
(3) Managerial, engineering, and scientific personnel are required
in about the highest proportion of arty industry. Lack of experienced fac-
tory engineers and supervisors, in particular, has limited Soviet caps.
bil3tiea in tubes. There are indications that both the supply and the
competence of such personnel have improved since the war.
In the field of electronics, Soviet scientific personnel have
rated high for many years. As far as research and advanced development are
concerned (as opposed to actual production and operation), the USSR must be
.considered well qualified.
German technical personnel have been used extensively since the
war. The number of German tube technicians, engineers, and scientists
evacuated to the USSR to work on tube projects and related programs were
estimated at from 250 to 500.
? (4) Labor input requirements for the tube industry have been estii
mated for various countries at..
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Inds
Labor.
Machine Time
US
100
110
UK
109
1A
France
205
1,6
USSR
4.0
1.8
Since the direct labor input in the US for 1,000 tubes of a
Soviet mix would be about 250 m wr-hours, the input per 1?000 tubes in the
USSR is estimated at 1,000 'men?hoursa . For the 29 million tubes produced
in 1950 this indicates a direct labor requirement, of 12,0worr?kerss.
Adding 60 percent for all nondirect labor, the calculated requirement
checks closely with the 20,000 estimated count,
As new automatic equipment is installed and higher production
levels are reached, it is anticipated that the Soviet labor input ratio
will decrease appreciably.
& Conclusions.
Capa iee0
The annual Soviet production of electron tubes (estimated at 29
million for 1950, with expansion in output continuing) is adequate to meet
Soviet requirements for civilian consumption plus current military require'.
menta and will permit a large increase in.strategic stockpi,l.eso In the
event of general hostilities, it is, believed that the USSR tube production,
supplemented by Satellite capabia.itiea, can be expanded adequately before
stocks are dissipated in order to meet essential civilian plus military re-
quirements based upon an adequate use of conventional Soviet electronics
items?
If the Soviet armed forces were to plan extensive application of a
wide scope of more complex military electronics items. were to compete with
the US in a variety of such tactical uses,, or were to plan large operational
use of proximity fusses, the Soviet Orbit tube industry would not meet re-
quirements, Such courses of action would be limited at an early stage, It
must be noted at this points however, that there does not appear to be any
firm indication that the Soviet armed forces do contemplate the use of com-
plex electronics systems on a scale cceiparable to that of the US0
Key factors limiting future expansion of supply in the USSR include
(1) the availability of key technical factory personnels which would l5xaft
the effective rate of expansions (2) the inadequate domestic supply of a few
specialized materials, such as tungsten and molybdenum metal products., and
23
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 Approved F,r Release 2002/0! A-RDP79-01030.00100030003-2
diamond dies; and (3) to a degree only, the rate at which new special
machinery can be constructed.
b. V erabia ities.
Under conditions of cold iyar, the steps (if possible) to be taken
to restrict Soviet tube supplies would be as follows:
(1) Effectively prevent the shipment into the Soviet Orbit of
tungsten and molybdenum metal products (preclusive buying and export con-
trols), of diamond dies (embargo), and of electronic test equipment (embargo),,
At present, this is not done effectively by certain nations.
lamps
(2) Embargo shipments to the Orbit Of all classes of tubes and
(3) As a hampering step, restrict the export to the Orbit of
technical data,
Under conditions of general tear, the steps would be to prevent the
acquisition of effective tube facilities in Western Europe and to destroy
a number of selected industrial targets in the Orbit. No analysis has been
made to date of the time before a pinch would be felt,
Intentions.
A reasonably accurate knowledge of actual and potential
su
li
,
pp
es
could be used as a good indicator of probable intentions and courses of
action. A firm estimate on the extent of stocks would be an indication of
timing in preparing for general hostilities, in that large tube stocks are
not otherwise needed. A more exact knowledge of the type distribution in
supplies would indicate tactical kinds of military equipment and probable
courses of action. A knowledge of the magnitude of supply would indicate
the relative dependence of Soviet armed forces on electronic warfare and
would indicate probable strategic courses of action,.
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