OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES, FAR EAST/PACIFIC BRANCH INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 11 WEEK OF 20 JULY - 26 JULY 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000500010003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: PERRPT

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OFFICE O 'V REPORTS ASQD ESTIMATES? {'I OCUMJENTNO. Z
FAR EAST/PACTFIC BRAN
CE NO CHANGE IN CLASS. -,
U~CLfiiG:fi~iEfJ ~W
INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 11 CLASS. CHANGrD TO: T
Vd.EEK OF 20 Y .~ 26 JOLT 1948 NEXT REVIEW CA rti:
RATE. H` - EVIEWEf: 37'',044-....
SECTION I- SUMMARY Or FAR EAST TRENDS AND DEVELOP~NTS
The US proposal for increased Sino Japanese trade with particular
reference to its relationship to the China Aid Program can be expected to
elicit a vehement reaction in China (page 3),
Chinese Nationalist Government fear that all Korea will fall into the
Soviet orbit and its consequent desire to keep the US in South Korea until
an adequate native security force Is established has motivated recent Chase
pressure on Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik to support the South Korean regime
(page 4).
The Department of Stat`a holds that Siam-Japanese trade is not inimical
to US-Siamese trade (page 4)o
The shipment of arms and ammunition to: Malaya has become a major issue
in Australia and has resulted in unusually swift consideration by the Labor
Goverrnt of mans to circumvent bans Imposed by left-wing labor unions
(page 5)0
A recent Soviet broadcast beamed to Japan implies that only 200,000
more Japanese rea ,in' to be repatriated-as contrasted with US and Japanese
est .m antes of 6O0~000, thus leaving 400,000 su oeounted .for (page 5) d
Although SCAP's suggestion that the Japanese adopt legislation for-
bidding strikes by goverhment workers may a rt an impending labor crisis
harmful to Japanese economic recovery, leaders of the affected unions are
bitter over the implications of the suggested restriction of presently
legal activities (page 8) m
x ~~ subceedisag seetLon~ of th 0, Wee y, this a]a~; rmarg
notations are useds
(1) Double asterisk (**) -plaoed at beginning and end of in-vor-
a ation based solely on "S/8 distribution:" series,,
(2) Single asterisk (e) to flag item containing "S/S distribution"
series*
(3) "A" s "B". or "C" --importance:, in BAN' is opinion, of the item,
with "A" representing the most important o:nes?
State Dept. declassification & uWinsfructions on file
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Swan (contimkod)
Tho' Chinese National Government remains in a precarious situatioft
.(page 8)9 although during the past week there have been no significant
now developments threatening its overthrow, The military outlook for
Nanking is very gloomy (page 8). Financially the Government is believed
to be hopelessly insolvent (page 8).
Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, may risk an attempt to capitalize
on possible dissension d,thin the Burmese Communist Party by offering to
include an snti-inourrootion Communist in a reshuffled cabinet (page u).
Continuing disturbances in Malaya may reduce rubber exports in the
near future (page U),
The President of the Frenoh--sponsored central government in Indochina
admits weaknesses of his govornment (pagall).
The extensions by the Philippine Government of the deadline 'for arms
surrender are raising doubts as to the .success of amnesty (page u).
A recent Australian-Chinese agreement on Chinese businessmen in
Australia may represent a modification of the "Mite Australia" policy'
(page)2)o
r-41- r WA
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-3-
SECTION II. DEVELOPMENTS IN SPETIFIED AREAS
Increase in Sino-Japanese trade su Bested bV Department of State "A"
~wrtw in ww+ wi wwrw rw smwwo.ew
The Department of State has advised US Embassy Nanking that arrange-
ments for increased Sint-Japanese trade would be desirable. It believes
that some of the requirements for reconstruction projects under the China
Aid Program to be paid for from RCA funds, e.g. railroad construction or
other machinery and spare parts, probably can be obtained at lees cost and
greater speed in Japan than in the US or other available sources. In
addition, increased trade on open account might take the form of China ex-
porting to Japan an increased volume of salt, sugar, Fruits, Tung oil, egg
products, minerals, and a portion of wheat bran from ECA wheat milled in
China; for its part, Japan could ship timber, rayon yarn, textile equipment
and miscellaneous goods.
The Department believes that the crux of Sino-Japanese trade is iron
ore and coking coal. Japan can compensate for Kailan (coking) coal by
supplying Shanghai with boiler coal and presumably mining timbers for
Kailane In addition, redevelopment of iron ore resources in Hainan could
be explored. The Department recognizes the hostility of China to Japanese
economic development and states that it should be stressed to the Chinese
that iron ore and coking.coal chipped to Japan would be a Chinese self-help
measure, in that these commodities are required for the manufacture of
specific steel products needed for approved reconstruction projects in China.
The expansion of Chinese exports of iron ore and coking coal to'Japan
would be of major aid to Japanese economic rehsbilitatitane Moreover,,
availability of coking coal and iron ore in China would loosen the Japanese
necessity to procure these commodities from USSR-controlled areas, e.g.
Sakhalin and would correspondingly reduce the probability of the Japanese
economy becoming Soviet oriented. Nonetheless,, the proposal for such
increased trade, since it envisages expansion of Japanese heavy industry,
can be expected to elicit a vehement reaction in China which would undoubtedly
stir up further the already noticeable Chinese resentment against the China
Aid Program.
Generally, expansion of Sino-Japanese trade would stimulate economic
progress and stability in the Par East. Increase in economic stability
would mean concomitant improvement in US security interests. Japanese and
Chinese economic rehabilitation would decrease the possibility of economic
unrest being exploited by Communist interests. In addition to being a
stabilizing factor in the Far East economy such trade would lessen the
drain on US aid funds
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GJNMM (00nt:9 d)
Chinese ~Ta~i..ontaliat Government f?ean that all Korea wi.1l 'al ixat S.cavi. ~~~
_.~.1_ -._._~.....
Cl uese ' 'ationalist Gove rna nt fear that all torea will. f?411 into t
Soviet orbit and 'its corsoquent desire to keep the US in Sou'bh Korea until
an adequate native eeourtty force is established has rtot .vated recent 'thin=s
pressure on Kim Zoo and:Kim Iyu Sik to support the South Korean rog ? This
pressure s and btedly a contributing factor in the i seen statement by
the two politiotaxne td oh denounced the establiebmeait of a eparate regime
in North Korea to a stop toward civil war* The Chinese Consul Gendral in
Seoul , is reported to have delivered a message from Chiang Eai-shek to both
Kim?s., and to RhO'e Sy n, which took the tvo Kim to task f"or a ? erp14 -to
deal with the C u .s ce controlling North Korea and threatened to disavow
all tbree, loaders s if they did not join forces in attempting to make the new
South Korean Government a success..Although rise claims that he is agreeable
to including the two .R3.me in his goverznt, he has said that their rent
rather w=ale and piouely6worded st ,te eent does not oons.tituto a sufficient
disavowal of their previous North Korean ventures - owpite China's generally.
weak international position,,it can continue to exert considerable influence
an South Korean politics due to Chiang's long standing association with
present-day Korean political leaders through the exiled Korean. Provisional
Government in Ck g ng8 and China's present strategic p6sition on the UN
Temporary Cession on Korea?
Siam-3a sae trade . , ld not inimical 'to lS iameao trdc cAc
The Department of State, in. reply to a warning by + .be Anbaesaeior to
Sion of possible oonfliots inherent in the proposed revival of Siau' Jaapenese
trade bySIAP, has stated that the,'developmnt of SiJapanaso trade io not
necessarily inimical to US trade interests in Siam because: (1) to conorve
scarce .dollars, Japan is being enocuraged to ; increase pur?ehasos. from non-
dollar areas; (N) revival o2 Japan'c+ interna' .onal trade is imperative olLder.td rehabilitate Japa&e ebozs which is being. atv intxined by the tZ at
a high smiual stoat; (3) At Is not anticipated that the d4Vblopment of Sims.
Japanese trade will interfere Frith 'US atra ;ic stockapil3n.g of. ru r and
tin; and (4) I Siam can secure goods more advantageously in Japan, the
resultant ,savunge should enable SiaZ ? to purchase goo&e most aconomieally
obt rood i.n the US and other countries, thus stlastula'ting e k. *lure. of
trade move niso
Ths ]?apart mutts position is represented as entirely in accord with tho
US objective of fostering the general-development of international trade on
a multilateral basis and permitting equal acoess by all countries to markets
as well as in line with the US supported IT'O Charter . and the General A yee?.
meat on Trade and Tariffs,,
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GEMMIAL (continued)
Ski nt of arms and ammunition to 1tala becomes - or issue In Australia,
The shipment of arms and eumlmanition to Malaya has become a major issue
in Australia and has resulted in unusually swift consideration by the tabor
Government of means to oiroumvent bang imposed by left-+wing labor unions o
Informal requests from Malaya apparently have already been made in view of
the Government*s announcement that it will use Air Force planes and naval
vessels to transport any arum it may decide to ship# thug oirctmventing
union bans.
*Be
The SYDNEY MORWING HERALD has reported its view that the present die.
orders were planned at a Maroh 1948. meeting of the Indian Communist Party.,
held in Calcutta and attended by Australian Communists. According to this
report, events in Burma and the outbreak of widespread sto
25X1C
a
es in th
pp
g
e
Australian coal fields were timed to coincide with the Malayan uprising.
being; directed through the maritime unions, mentioning the possibility that
Ernest Thornton, Communist Secretary of the Australian Federated Iron Workers
and Eliot V. Elliott, Communist Secretary of the Australian Seamen's Union
are key figures In the chain of direction, The. Seamen's union has already
proclaimed its intent to impohe a ban. on shipments of arms to ll laya, a
development which has been given prominence by the Moscow radio.
The present situation in Malaya, coupled with the hostility encountered
by Uo?fthon Ball's recent goodwill mission, could result in a reorientation
of Australia's attitude toward the nationalist movements. in Southeast Asia.
Australia's instantaneous reaction of support for the UK has already been
compared with her opposition to the Dutch in Indonesia. However, it should
be noted that in the ease of Malaya Australian interests, own about one
quarter of the Malayan tda? mines and that Singapore is still considered by
the Australians as vital to Australia's security*
Rr
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Industrial production i.n:lex continues u;,irrard curve. Preliminary fiCures
'for-April s,iow i,ra c ax;,anose 3.n us-Lr_fa ~rod.ueti on index has "C"
reached its i?.: ':est i)ol.nt since of .'.o Occupation: 49.7 (the
.base period 1930-34 r 100). This coripares t't'th an index of 49.3 in 71aroh
1948 and is a 23.0 percent improvement over the . ;>ril 1947 index of 39.9.
USSR's Juaanose repatriation f'i.?urose A 20 July Soviet broadcast to Japan
a:,:os groat 2a. ns to erj rc con" `r orts re;ardlnC Ja'1 ano se 11017s in the T4T3"
USSR. The broadcast included the stutvnent: "It is sufficient to point out
that the Soviet poo.,1e have never even thought of us;nG the 200,000 Jap:tnase
os
to fulfill the post-liar Five Year Plano" This a atement ce ;iln y in,
that only 200,000 Japanese rorsatn to be repatriated which is a vastly dif-
f'srent fl-'Lure from the a_pproxi.:nately 000,000 w ich ITS and Japanese officials
claim are still in ITSOR-dominated areas. The difference of 400,000 between
the fiGures is hard to reconcile. Should the Soviet broadcast have disro-
Carded Japanese still in Saldialln and the I uril es the difference would still
be over 200,000. It is possible that the USSR may have been advi sine Japan
as to the maxintun number of nationals she may expect to have returned. The
"difference" ragy be accounted for by a combination of the followi nG,:
(a) deaths in POI carps; (b) need for a l:;borirV; force; (a) hostaG,,es for
pangs future "good behavior", (d) denying; Japan trained field and General
rank officers; (e) holdout troops in 17,unchuria who were never sent to
S?j boriaa
SOAP su,;,;ests ler,al ban on strikes by Jataaneso ;ovornmont w^ror1cers4 General
as siv- ;est:o in a letter to Tre:a:ter Ashida th:ut Japan's ;Tationai.
Public Service Law be revised to '.sotiiall.4o Government om_)loyeos -vrl:.o resort
to strikes and other :t{ s,>uto tactics w iich tend to impair the efficiency
of government ol)orat,'.onsa The tirain,; of this stop indicates an intention
to avert by early action the re-occurrence of labor troubles between the
government an? the o iloyees of state--run instrumentalities (railways,
corirnanieations, and certain co-;riodity nonopl es) Where throats of a gen-
eral strike have t-Ace before necessitated SOAP intorventiona
In rocponse, the Jaapanese' Govicernrient has: (1) cancelled its acceptance
of the mediation efforts of the Central Labor I elati.ons Board and (2) begun
drafting a revised law preparatory to call tng a s eci aal session of the Diet
to consider its passaag a.
Pressure to brim; government emp1oyeesv gages more ne,&i ' into line
with those of private industry has only recently made possible the consol-
idation of the government employees' struggle with government. The disunity
evident at the time of the Ll?arch co::ununi cations workers crisis when the
government railway workers union (GRVU) under moderate leadership accepted
the government 2920 yen wages standard, ended in June when leftists gained
control of the GItJU and swung it into line with the other government workers'
demands for a 5200 yen wage basep The govern nt on July 16 accepted
mediation of those a~rage de "ands but it insisted that the demands are beyond
the ability of the goverment to meet within the recently passed budget
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J_'__ (Conte)
which had boon balanced at SCAP's insistence in torus of a 3791 yen wage
bases Chiefs of the affected unions are bitter o er the imp cations of
SC4P2 s letter and ohargo that the govornr nt, in reversing its acceptance
of mediation, is ignoring luborts present legal rightse
K?RBA
Rod resentations by Wash Y on to 1!osoovrt have failed to bri= about
ernes o the. Sol. a o" roan a ec -ric ~av r rocs anq As axr ioipated, '"C?
ie mm.~na In M, re-ply' to the Us note of June 2 , has reitoraated its
position that all nationalized industries in North Korea, including oleo-
trio power stations, are under the direction of the Peoples Coy . y t oe of
North Korea and, that further negotiations conoerning electric power should
therefore be conducted directly with that oornmitteob This course of action
is politically impossible for the Wo since direct negotiations with the
Peoples Co -ittee of North Korea would amount to de facto US recognition
of the Soviet puppet government in North Korean
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a
01
National Government remains "B"
unimproved. The low state of morale is attested by recurring rumors that
high Nationalist officials have engaged in peace discussions with the
Communists. There are increasing indications that the National Government,
no longer confident that it can improve the situation in Manchuria and. North
China, is giving serious consideration to a removal to South China. 8owevrmr
such a withdrawal probably would precipitate military and political disinte'
gration throughout Nationalist China. For the moment ache of the principal
Nationalist leaders appears ready to participate in a move to force Chiang's
overthrow. This reluctance is partly based on the fact that Chiang's
Government is the recipient of U8 aid, in which they hope to benefitt and
partly on their tear of piecemeal destruction in the event that the National
Government breaks up. In addition, they realise that despite Chiang's
great lose of prestige he still holds in Chinese politics a unique position
of leadership which none of then can match. Some of then remain hopeful
that he can be persuaded to delegate authority to competent and forceful
administrators who will give the Government new vigor.
The mtl outlook the Btu; o LI xgr ent rep ma . Pessimism "A"
in high Nationalist circles compounded with the unrelieved low morale of both
the populace and the troops militates against effective employment of avail
able resources. Current widespread Communist military activity throughout
North and. Central China is seriously threatening the government at Nanking.
Despite the fact that the Communist forces in.Manchuria, their best, have
been uncommitted for over three Months, the Nationalists have lost an esti-
mated eighteen divisions in the same period. In North China the Communists
will probably continue to harrass.Nh Teo--yi at widely separated points,
forcing him to shuttle his first-line troops from place to place thus vitiating
his strength, until additional, powerful Communist forces can be brought to
bear upon Puna area from the north and the south. Fu will then be forced to
retire once again into Suiyuan leaving Peiping and Tientsin to the Communists
or to attempt some sort of an accommodation with the Communists. In Central
China, the long-term Communist move to Isolate the large body of1ationalist
troops deployed along the Lunghai railway by stopping all overland comimzni-
cations with base areas-to the south is moving to fruition. The Communists
now threaten to isolate the large Nationalist military center at Seuchou as
the Chinghsien-gaifeng area and Sian have .pr viouely been isolated. If
successful (and indications are that they will be), the Communists should
then be in a position to carry the war southward into the Yangtze Valley in
force.
lnsovvenos of the National _Goyernmt o In an effort to arrive at a "A"
settlement of the substantial Chinese indebtedness to the Export-Import Bank
the latter has requested the Central Bank to furnish a complete and accurate
financial statement listing all the Government's foreign exchange assets.
T
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Such a statement.is expected to reach Washington this week. It is believed
that the Chinese will not attempt to misrepresent their position by sub-
mitting padded figures as the US is in a position to verify various holding
accounts; also China looks to the US as the only country that might help meet
the crisis. This statement will undoubtedly reveal that the National Govern-
ment is hopelessly insolvent. Not only is their foreign exchange exhausted,
but there are literally stacks of unpaid foreign bills for which the Govern-
ment banks are responsible, and unable to meet.
As the revelation of the Governmentee financial weakness reaches the
Chinese public, as it surely will sooner or later, repercussions on foreign
exchange notes and domestic prices are likely to have most serious conse-
quencee.
S e s rs t s &a AP and Reuters have ee
s e by the Shanghai Newspaper Guild as the result of a long smouldering
rate dispute. The US-owned "Evening Post" and the British-owned "Worth
China Daily News" immediately published notices that they would defy the
Guild and pay the higher rates demanded by the news agencies. About a year
ago, the agencies converted their rates to Chinese currency at open market
rate and at the Guild's Insistence adopted rates based on COL index. As a
result of the phenomenal decline in Chinese currency and the index link the
agencies are now receiving a zero US$10 monthly for large peas and as low
as $3 for small papers, instead of the original charge of $200 and from
$50/100 respectively. Since the Guild controls newsprint allocations to
all papers Chinese publishers feel they are not in a position to defy it.
There is a possibility of the low rates being enforced by the Guild in an
effort to drive foreign agencies out of China.
"Cs
"Ca
stockaoilin,m? n=oses should be a specific undertaking of the Chinese Govern?4
sent under the China Aid Act, according to State Department instructions to
the Ranking Embassy. The Department had desired to incorporate such an
undertaking in an amendment to the Bilateral tAgreement, but in view of strong
Chinese Foreign Offices objections to this course, has now instr4acted the
Embassy to obtain it in the form of an exchange of notes, and if this is not
possible, the US interpretation of the agreement on this point should be
presented to the Chinese Government in the form of an aide-memoire for purposes of the record. This interpretation includes "the promotion of the
inoreseed production of such materials within China, and the removal of any
hinderances t6 the transfer of such materials to the USA,"
a farom_Chiana. f
A, Rre1udee t. o ( e era , t a u u p ion Q X UScri_flcis_m Jan
y, e , is indicated by a double attack. from the ICUT organ CM MG YANG JIH
PAO on the TA K NG PAOas editor who is accused of being a "fellow traveler,
communist mouthpiece, and anti.-US." The TA KUNG PAO has been a leader in
anti-US building up Japan movement.
"B"
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SECT
e in "C"
Nanking and Shanghai is seen in a reliable report of greatly increased buying
of clothes and other personal items by these persons.
The Na,,,ji,QeldVt Rerports from Nanking announce that the legislative "H"
Yusn has approved a CR $900 trillion budget for the last six months of 1948.
Although the budget for the first half of this year was set at CR $96 trillion,
the Government spent ON $240 trillion. This deficit was met primarily by
printing press money. The now budget, which is based on June prices, will
also end up unbalanced unless the Government can curb the inflation and reduce
military costs which now amount to 80%.of al): expenditures. Although the
Government hopes to meet the new budget by increasing taxes and customs
revenue and disposing of Government. owned property, these measure are expected
to prove grossly insufficient as in previous efforts.
S
~~ ~~ ~n [ gel] n Rat) Wholesale Price of Mies
DA
72
-
wn" rket
p+'i "
o
This week (23 Jul 48)
CR $480,000
CR $7,300,000
000
5
00
GN $ 35,500,000
000
000
30
Week ago (16 Jul 48)
(23 Jun 48)
480,000
000
480
,8
,
2,550,000
,
,
14.500e000
Month ago
Year ago (23 Jul 47)
,
12,000
41,000
350?000
,;, = p_ -- - - --
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BITRrA
Government may offer cabinet post to anti-insurrection Communist. UB"
There are indications that Prime Minister Thakin Nu' s Leftist Unity Plan
and offer of amnesty may have created some dissension within the ranks of
the insurrectionary Burma Communist Party (BOP). Goshal, possibly sec aid
to Than Tun in the Burmese Communist hierarchy, is reported to be willing
to accept the Government' a offer,, while Than Tun favors fighting to the
bitter end. Although the insurgents 0ould be weakened by any defections
within the BCP, the insurrectionary-minded faction with the aid of dacoite
would still be capable of carrying on prolonged guerrilla war?are, and thus
continue to keep Burma in a state of turmoil. Nevertheless, it appears that
Thakin Na, who has agreed to remain as Prime TTinieter at least until the
Parliament convenes on 15 August, may risk an attempt to capitalize on an
dissension within the BCF by offering to include an anti-insurrection Camanist
in a reshuffled cabinet,
TIA' LAYA
Continuing disturbances reduce rubber !aorta. There may be a re- "B"
duetlon in its yon rubber exports the near future as a result of the con-
tinuing disturbances. Desxdte stringent precautionary measures British offi-
cials fear that the violence may soon spread to Singapore and further threaten
the fsalayan economy. The undiminished seriousness of the situation is indicated
by: (1) the transfer to T alaya of troops from Hong Kong and the I.IK; (2) the
outlawing of the 11.alayan Communist Party and several of its affiliated organi-
zations; (3) the registration of all Ualayans; and (4) the promises of the.
Labor Government to undertake all necessary measures to restore lair and order.
FR: 10H IIDC'CIMA
General Xuan admits weaknesses in his do-vernment. General Nguyen--fan- "B"
Xuan, prey ent o e 1rent --sponsor provisional central government of
Vietnam, apparently is aware of distinct weaknesses in his regime. He is
reported to have stated, during a recent press conference, that his govern-
ment cannot function properly because: (1) the 5 June Franco-Vietnamese
Agreement has not yet been ratified by the French Government; (2) sufficient
funds to organize the necessary government services are lacking; and (3) the
resistance cannot be crushed by military means, inasmuch as the friendship
of the Vietnamese would be lost even though the French might regain military
control, President Xuan argued, hover, for continued confidence in both
former Annamite emperor Bao Dal and French High Commissioner Bollaert in their
efforts to satisfy Vietnamese aspirations and at the same time to maintain
French rights and interests in Indochina.
PHILIPPDfS
Extensions of deadline for army surrender raise doubts as to success
of amnesty.. Presiders Quin o'a ac on extending to 31 July the period of
grace during which Hukbalahap and PK'I (National Peasants' Union) members may
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d12-0
PHILTP1 TTTi S (continued)
present their arms raises serious doubts as to the ultimate success of
amnesty. c uirino acted after the Huke fal.ed to appear for scheduled mass
presentations of arms at same 36 registration stations located throughout
central and southern Luzon.
Luis Taruc (ifuk leader and Congressman from Pampanga. Province), appears
optimistic concerning eventual presentations of arms and attributes the current
delay to inadequate communication, poor transportation due to the rainy season,
and too much emphasis on "surrender" of vreapons. (The announced ocedure
calls for legal licensing of firearms which have been registered.) On the
other hands Philippine law enforcement and intelligence agencies are much
less sanguine. These circles doubt the Nuke' good faith and believe that the
dissidents-hoping for assistance from the T!,11, during anticipated hostilities
with the'TIS-are using the period of grace to reorganize for further armed
violence.
There may be those among the Huk Comm-mist leadership who will refuse to
accept air terms from the Government. iiovever,, available evidence suggests
that the hesitancy of the rank- rnd-file Huk membership to present their arms
and accept amnesty is more likely due to Government inaction on.measures to
correct agrarian abuses and the Huke' fear of retaliation by private lando?ner
armies-knovm as "civilian guarde"---and by the Constabulary. Unless same
means is devised for overcoming this basic distrust, the Government wil.l'be
forced to extend the period of grace beyond the present 31 July deadline.
Australian-Chinese agreement may r
esent modification of "bite
Australianp . A recent Australian-Chinese agreement wh ch 8pp earn
to be a m fication of the "s'Ihite Australia" policy provides that Chinese
businessmen may remain in Australia for 7 years on condition that they
bring a starting capital of 500 pounds with them. If they wish to employ
a Chinese assistant required capital is 1000 to 2000 pounds. The assistant's
period of residence is limited to five years but the agreement provides that
this may be'extended for another five upon application to the Australian
authorities.
SECRET
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