WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION WEEKLY WORKING PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400050001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Relent 1999/09/02 : Cl -RDP -01090 OO400050001-2
~ - T1,RII EUROPE DIVISION
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AIM REPORTS
CEI'!TRAL I,'TELLI^..NCr ACE,";CY
DIVISION
For week ending 21 November 1950
22 November 1D50
NOTICE': .7ORI INcam.PAPEH
This document is a workinC-apaper, not an official
issuance, s4nce it has not necessarily been coon.
dinatod with. and reviewed by other components of
O/RR0 It represents the formulative thinkinG of
one group of analysts in O/RR and i s do s ignod to
provide the riediu x for transmitting their informal
views to other intelligence analysts of the US
Government who arc working on similar or over-
lapping problems. It is intended for the use of
the addressee alone, and not for further dissemina.
ti on
NOTE. This publication is bein" sent to all
recipients of the D/WYE ,Weekly Esti-hate,
which has been suspended*
COPY FOR:
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. U
ECLASS:FIED
ASS. CHANGED TO; TS S C
NEXT REVILVY DATE:
OATEN ,-' f REVIEWER: 372044 .
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"TSTRRI1 EUROPE DIVISTOTT
For week ending
21 November 1950
The Austrian Government will continue to resist
current Soviet at..empts to a n centre over secu
n s tra ve a n d ~ aa~ or one o varnmen n e
ova zone o occup .ono nTtive measures which the
Government has been forced to initiate against Austrian
Communists and Communist police officials as a result of
the October disturbances have furnished the Soviet element
another occasion to atteipt to undermine Austrian authorityo
Orders from the Soviet element treat it must approve changes
of personnel in the Austrian security forces in the Soviet
zone represent the most serious Soviet effort to date to
put pressure on the Austrian Government6 Soviet military
comanders also have recontly interfered in the administra-
tion of local government by efforts to prevent recruiting
and personnel changes, as well as by efforts to block legal
proceedings a- ainst Communists, There have been a few new
arrests of minor local Austrian officials,
Since 1945, Austrian tactics designed to counter
Soviet probing for Austrian weaknesses have generally'
followed the pattern of protest, slow and doubtful compliance,
and then independent action when Soviet pressure relaxed o In
the present Austro-Soviet i--;asso, however, the Government _
is resisting Soviet demands because it cannot afford to risk
the collapse of Governviental authority over its security
forces in eastern Austria. The Soviet stand has never been
so categorically defined as in the current situation, parti-
cularly the Soviet element's isistence that it must have
specified controls over the Austrian Police in its zoned
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SECRE, T
Despite the fact that there i s no firm indicatir'n of Soviet
intentions, there is some evidence that the USSR is unv:illing
to -lainta'n Its position on the police issue in the face of
firm Aust 'ian opposition, strongly supported by the ."extern
Powers.
The USSR may not yet be ready to take steps in
Austria that would j`eopardi ze the quadrioa rti to status quo
and thus threaten a partition of the coizntryo A coat nua ion
of the successful Soviet econoile exploitation of Austria
depends in a large meaeure on an economically united Austria
In ac:c3iti.on, Austria continues to he a valuable avenue for a
considerable volume of extralegal trade in str..te.-ie materials
for the Soviet orbi t0 ~'ili tari ly, a pax'ti tion of Austria
wou'd not imv)rove Soviet capabilities for either offense or
defense agalrst the West or YuCoslaviao
MINCE
? ~???. d. Rx W"%;L1V.ER
French 'ntrans Bence may soon a me a on e ! of
German defense units to be crea:.ed,a France as stronuly
opposed the establishment of German tivisions, which are
favored-by US military authoritieso 1.7ith German heavy
industry, however, safely linked with that of France and
other :VestfLrn .powers under an international authori-..y, the
French would be more disposed to make concessions to the US
plan - f or the rearma~nccn t o f Germany
The key to France's attitude on Ger.-iany lies in Its
strong desire to promote the political, economic, and military
unification of Europa e This has been evident in successive
French propo$ala for the strengthening; of the Atlantic Pact
executive -iaehtnery, closer tier between the US and the ?rrC,
the Schuman Plan,, and the Pleven Plan for a PuroAean Army.
The French have i nsl a ted on the i ntaZ;ration of German units
in a ruropcan army not only from fear of a resurgent Germany,
but from the belief that Europe must be unified as a bloc if
i t i s to he a force i n world politics, The successful es tabli sh-
mont of a workinti authority and supra-national assembly, under
the Schuman Plan would partially satisfy the desires of the
French, and .w,otald probably; enable them to accept German re-
armament much as proposed by the US while they continue to
press for an inte;,rated ruropcan army,
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S E C R E T
FRENCH AND SPANISH NORTH AND NE ST AFRICA
The Moroccan nationalists will continue their attempts
o e erat of . Labor (CGT) from the Moroccan Communist Partye
if they succeed, they will increase their bargaining power with
Protectorate authorities, who taight find it propitious to make
minor concessions In an effort to pacify the natives. Moroccan
nationalists have long been agitating for permission to form
their own labor organization, as the nationalists in Tunisia
have done? but tho Protectorate authorities have been adamant
in refusing to countenance such activity Native unions con-
tinue to be proscribed, although natives have been allowed to
join the existing Frenoh