WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES DIVISION WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400040017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 26, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

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WESIT N EUROPE DIVISION
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND FSTINA r.S
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOL. VI].: -- No ,4
For week andlng 25 July 1950
26 July 1950
NOTICE.- VJORKINCr-,PAPER
This document is a working paper, not an official
issuance, since it his not necessarily been coor--
d.inated with and rev .e wed by other components of
ORE. It represents trio f orniulativ!e thinking of one
group of analysts in ORE and is designed to provide
the med1urn for transmitting their Informal views to
other intelligence analysts of the US Gove?eytunent who
are working on similar or ovPeir1appi.ng problerr.s-, It
is intended for the use of the addressee alone? and
not for furtheer d.i. s ir..nation,,
AUTH./ H
DOCUMENT NO. -
J(7 1ANGE IN CLASS. C3
cCLASSWFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT RcVItW DATE: -
REVIEWER: 372. ~..,.`
..~a..~.
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V 1
WESTERN E LOPE DIVISION
EEI ,Y SUT.1.IA,? Y
VOL. VII ,,., rho ? 4
25X6A
For week ending
25 July. 1950
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SECRET
25X6A
The Korean situation has made France see the
nocessi.tor crre er of s on .ts part in tic cf ease of
western Europe; t ev m so cad to increased French demands
for prompt and substantial US ald. The French are beginninc
to draw a lesson from the Inability of the US to stem the
North Korean aCgrossion promptly, and French military leaders
now believe that the immediate training of a large French
army is i.nporat1ve. The new attitude appears in the Assembly's
approval of Premier Plevenzs proposal to increase the 1951
military budget by 60 billion francs. The military consider
Pleven's proposal as only a small. part of the new expenditures
France will have to make for defense. There are red orts that
some officials favor extending; compulsory military service
from one year toLv:'o. Such a movo would put a severe strain
on the economy, so there have boon suCgestions that the U.`.
double the 1-1DAP grant for 1951 over the amount for 1950.
Despite US assurances,, however, many Frenchmen are not con-
vinced that arms shipments to western Europe will continue as
scheduled-, they believe that the SYDAP Is already 1a ; in-r,
These suspicions will increase French efforts to obtain US aid
FRENCH AND SPANISH NOR M11 AND Y"rLST AFRICA
B they end of June the Stockholm. pease et .t .on vvas
well on t h e w to :comL-n~-~o :,.16:7r uccass ,.? rea m ands ."~~.
TQV oe that ? "the CCoimunis s eve -7s-e-ff ire r on~ ~ ortk~ "r'i.ca in
many months. Not only have a considerable number of Europeans
'been taken In, but even some outst;andin4; native nationalists
are findinC tho peace appeal i.rresi.stible and are thus beix;
maneuvered into helping; the Uo .unis is drive an enteri.n~ wedge
into the nationalist movement,
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S Za
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S E C R E T
.Farhat H;achcd, President of tho 'Anisian nationalist
labor union, while at tho Budapest meeting of the Comnaur,i;a t .R
domi.natod '":orld Federation of Trade Unions ('.`'F ti), joined. i.n
a declaration with Lassen Sadaoui, President of the `1i nisian
C01211uni.st UUnion,, calling on all the union me ,-fibers of Tunisia
to sign the peace potiti.on. Ilached has since given ev.denc;e
of breaakirt , with the 111FTU, but hass not disassociated himself
from the pe tit ion .
in Algeria., Ferhat Abbas, ltcador of the nationalist
party,, Democratic Union of the Algerian rtaanifesto (UUIWA), has
signed the Stocldiol,'! petition, despite the fact that he is
himself anti-Con nunisfc; and the ' MA news er only pap a a- few weeks
ago was denouncing the Algerian Conr:,unist; in a series of
scathing editorials.
Only in French r. orocco, wwwhat0e the Istlgl&i.
(nationalist) Party has recently taken a militant stand
against Corr uni.sri, has the petiti.oxn failed so far to obtain
the signature of any top nationall s , leader,. A good many of
the l.ovaer-rankin Istiglal mom'bers have si nod, however,, and
Allal el Fassi, head of the Istiglai, has admitted privately
that it Is "difficult to declare oneself against 5peacetr: and
has sugCosted that the US should provide a line of posy;. tt.ive
propaganda to fight- this nzoverient.
rieax,vrhile, all Conu:itua1at; papers are civin the
campaign first priority and are be inns to identify the
struggle for, "pcacet' with native a irat~ion` for nfi, ndence
assertin- that only by boinr. independlert can t orth.Afr.i,
oscape the horrors of another var.
a Communism will suffer a serious iac,.ic.al defeat
_
Tunisia, if i' n~zt onto i, j:- a ~Trnican o i~ra s an "o-
U?.I'r , v~ wi thdraws from the con, muni s,1,--domirja ted '"lor ld Federation
of Trade Unions, . as now appears likely. The '1F T'.:i affiliation
of the UGTT,, the most powerful labor union In Tun1oia, has
enabled the, lunisiari Cozxnnnunllst Party to oxcreiso Influence out
of proportion to its tactual strengt;h~,
A recent article in Mission,, the IYco~-De;straur.
(nationalist party) organ, prosuzi 1.fal.7` writ te by Farhat Iiach.ed
President of the UGTT, i sharply critical of the 7' TU, charg-
ing it particularly with being :?end away from the lannternaitiona1
trade union ideal by a "par+tisan spirit which continually
grows stronger," The article also cryptically announced the
calling of a special session at.' the National Counell, of the
UGTT. The special session is expected. to be follovwrod by a
vigorous cd1tc~air~ial c,aa pa.1gn arapiifying the UGTT's complaints
against the WL' Tl{
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S E C R E T
The U(,TT has been thought for some tirle to be out
of sy::7pathy with the FTU's Communist orientation, and to
be retaining Its membership only for opportunistic reasons,,
The tirn ng of the open attack was surprising, however, a,s
Farhat Hiaeh.od had just returnees--in tho company of Hasson
'daotal, President of the Corunist labor union in Tunisia?
from a meet:T.r, of the Executive Comnittee of the TTU at
dap es t.
Apparently taken aback by Hached's article Sadacul,
in a rather weak robuttal, pointed out that all resolutions
adopted by the Executive Co: ii t tee had been by unanimous vote,
Including the vote of iiachcd.
B Overrhelrain nationalist antagonism to the French
reform rogr. a.ra or -~hc 7:"iu~3 s oz~e hies o~?re ia~ e v 1 ` of
B Ee !.9r ~un I 1.?' ;our ens , "or~a L3 beral) Party in
opposition to t;ho go].l c3 e s af' Tiabib '?r~ur bib rT D
loaderc~~a*~hib~a a,; tried to stci asursum
publl cly supported aa. d
e
credit for the reforz a prog.r?z~ 1, s hi ch pro vl de for a gradually
increasinC participation of 'Danisia:ns in the ~ overniient of
the country, but leaves ultimate French control substantially
undirnini shed.
Salah Farhat, Secretary General of the Executive
Cormiiitteo of the Old Destour, has accused Bourghiba of
comprorn in Tunisian sc roreignty and rerzouncin3- Tunisian
demands for independence a The sovon-point statement of aims
recently announced by Bourghiba, though calling for more local
self-governincnt, implicitly accepted the continuance of French
hegemony and the concept of the French Union
The growing isolation of Bead hiba from the resin
stream of nationalist opinion may eventually result in his
dis lacer. nt as head of the Neo--Destour Party. For the time
being, his activities are producing confusion in. the ranks of
Tuni.ajan nationalists, as yell as a dramatic reversal of the
relative positions of U lie two nationalist parties,. The, Old
Destour,, which lost most of its strength several years ago
because of its conservatism, now finds itself, as tho upholder
of demands for complete indoendence, in a moe radical
posture than the now party,.
Outside of Tunisia, most North African nationalist
con i ent has been critical of Dourghiba for negotiating with,
the French on any tea. zs short of. indepeendo.ncc a
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SECRET
ITALY
Premier De Gas-peril a. al for national unity In
view of the gra~rc n4ernat;,.onaj-si.Ell" at on it oh e 'the rend
toward tho farriia ti on of a s in;r jte. par ty (Christian Democratic)
Goverrr.~rlente Should, however,, Fomita.'s Unitary Socialist
Party (PST1) be brought into the. Cabinet, there miC~i.t be an
appreciable woakenin of Italyts support for the NATO. At they
saz,.-m time, the presence of the Liberals and 71ona.rchists In the
Government would further delay action on needed socio-econc o
roforrars and thereby impair the popular pouitiorr. of the govern--
mont.
In a recent speech to the Christian Democratic Party
directorate, Do Gasporl stressed the need for a campaign of
national solidarity to protect the nation's peace, Indopen--
dence, and security. Iii' also urged the directorate to Invite
those parties outside the ovorrr-,.cnt which support its pro-
17estc.rn policy to participate in this campaigns With the
hij'her de Croe of discipline now in the Christian Democratic
Party',, De 1'asperits plea will undoubtodly restrain for the
tixtie be-'MG various elements within the Party..--particularly
Do so t ti ' s militantly r eforrni s t left-win?, Group-from pushing;
.further their demands that the Party assume sole rosponsibility
In the C vorrinent
if, however, the Primes.11n1ster sought to brim,;
Rozrcitols 1'SU, the .Liberals., and tho L?onarchists into the Govern-
r ont, he would run Into considerable difficulties. he PSU has
reatedly declared Itself opposed. to the Governmcnt as con ti-,
toted, and would probably talk; an even firmer position If the
Liberals and Monarchists rvero to be given Cabinet posts.
hx.rthermoro, it would require all of De Gasperi's adroitnes8 to
br:>,'inC all three parties into the Government without weakedn:.n?;
t- lyt s adherence to the PIATO. A harmonious participation of
these three parties in the Govcr=rzmcnt would tend to offset the
lass in presti?,e which the Government would be bound. to suffer
when it shifted its attention from aocio-economic reform to
national defense
A Should International tension continue to pour and
,r qw
World War ZIT eta a7~ ?r 3rz nt t ta~,.TS ro35EM3nt will- e
_aced tvjfl-_T 0 j. u t cask of tininG and effectjn7, the
dissolution of the Corrnnun1st Party (PCI) o To outlaw the party
.at this time would unnecessarily incre&so popular reactions
favorint
k_j - the PCI4. On the other hand, to delay such action =t1l
h R^
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the outbreak of war, would confront the Goverrraont with the
full Coan uni s t problem simultaneously with the problems of
mobilization and military operations, and would seriously
disrupt any Italian war effort,.
As a consequence of Korean developments, even
moderate elements have joined the political Right to demand
that the PCI be outlawed. The Comnunists, consequently, have
been careful to moderate their activity and statements so as
not to encourage public support for such demands. The Govern-
ment for Its part, has expressed the intention of dealinC with
any "fifth co1tin" or subversive efforts within existing laws;
at the same time the Government has been makin pro'! i:ni.nary
reeves toward the formation of a national front which would
include all political elements save the extreme Loft and Right
(see article above).
Nevertheless, should the international situation
continue to deteriorate, the outlawing of the PCI ?,rould become
virtually a political and military necessity. With this
eventuality in mind, the r"iniater of Interior has reportedly
ordered the Rome Chief of Police to prepare secretly the
documentation of Cormunist criminal actions against the
Government preparatory to the presentation of charCcs to the
judicial authorities. At the same time, Cabinet approval has
been given to strengthening the Carabiniori
? It is probable that, in the event of dissolution,,
the PCI would not react with an all-out Insurrectionary
effort, preferring not to expo4so its paramilitary and under-
ground organizations until Soviet military operations had
begun, or were about to be-in, Novortholessg there would
be widespread civil disturbances and violence, which the
police, with some assistance from the army, would be able to
contain.
The PCI leaders would probably attempt to escape to
a Satellite state (possibly Albania) and conduct clandestine
operations from there d The masses of the PCI would probably
be ordered to join and support N?nni's left-winz Socialist
Party (PSI), which the Italian Government mi.rht find im-
possible to dissolve as a whole
It is likely that the dissolution of the PCI would
improve Italyts internal security in case of war; nonetheless,
the Communists and their s;, npathizers would still be able to
hamper Italian czar efforts considerably,
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