WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 68

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300060004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 28, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF WORTS MID ES MATES
TRA113FORTATION GROUP
Weekly Intelligence Summary No, s8
SECTION 1. SU ARY OF TRENDS AIM D , .OPMENTS
25X6A
`Czechoslovakia is continuing ,ts efforts to obtain air transport
equipment and spare parts from Western sources at all costa.
(1 No. xo a7
Substantial changes have oooutred in the ro0ting of Cseohoslovak
import and export traffic as a, result of political oon,siderations4,
inoludiag consequences of tIe WestErfrn counterblo4kede and the desire
of' he USSR and Poland to develop Stettin and the Oder River as ini
portent gateways to Csechoalov kis. (Item No. 5, B)
An analysis of the 1949 railway plan for the Soviet Zone of
Germ" Y is included as an annex to this week's issue.
CLASS. CHA F-W i
AUTH -(' 006514
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25X6A
ii. Ozeohoslovekia is continuing its efforts to obtain air transport
equipment end spare parts from Western sources at all costs, The
Paris offios of a US export firs; raaently re3e oted an order, received
Eras an agent alaiinthg to represent Czeoboelovak airlines, for spare
parts sufficient for twenty-.fig ne aircraft. A Dutch trvak loaded with
aircraft parts and carrying a false bill of lading has been seised by
US occupation ems authorities at the Czechoslovak border. The Czecho-
a'lovsks have even sham an interest in purchasing, presumably for
selvage, a US C-41 attached to the US Legation in Budapest which was
badly damaged in' s repent larding at the Budapest airfield. (Secret)
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SURFACE TRANSPORTATION.
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3. Substantial changes have occurred in the routing of Czechoslovak
import and export traffic as a result of political considerations, iri-
eluding oonsequencbs of the Western counterbiookade and the desire of
the USSR and Poland to develop Stettin and the Oder River as important
gateway8-to Csechoslovekia. Although Czechoslovak traffic through
Hamburg has sharply declined from 1948 levels, it does not appear that
this reduction has been compensated by correspondingly increased
activities at Stettin, and no great progress has been made in overy-
coming,the natural obatacla s to the development of the Oder route..
Meanwhile. Osechaslovak traffic through. Trieste far exceeds the volume
at Hamburg. (Secret)
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'LAN FLT as c BUM
-xzvux
civet transport policy ih Ease ern Clc nany? d.'ter rour years of
oec ' stibn, continues to ' directed primarily toward a program for
th a t eixplbitatioI of the German trat spoitation 'systems rather
than loh term rehabilitation to its former c , ilitiesa The 1949
Trans b t Plan, r eportedly' approved by the Soviet Military Admninistra--
tion (STMA), does not inntoate any Soviet intention to undertake the
rehabilitation of the German railway system on a scale extensive
enough 'td be of major strategic significance or to reveal any prepare..
tion for Soviet military action. The plan, in fact, will probably
increase the already severe strain imposed on the Soviet Zone railways
in aoco modating the oombIned occupational and civilian transport re-
quirements of the areao
The Increased volume of freight traffto contemplated for 1949
under the plea indicates that substantial thOreaaee in industrial
production over the 1948 level are anticipated for the Soviet Zone.
Despite the consequent increase in transport r:equtreaments, however,
the S&.-approved plan makes substantial reductions in many phases of
the. rail ,y budget estimated by the German Economic Commission (M%)
to be neceeesry for the Soviet Zone economy? It appears that the
Sovtet-oontrol.l ed rai.lway#' will be expected to 1nCrease their capacity
prinOipal ly 'thrdugh more intensive .use of equipment, rather than
through extensive improvements in line facilities or substantially in-
creased rolling stock .nventories. It is pos$ible, moreover, that
the approved itn,rovements will not be fully r lisad, in view of past
Soviet tactics in tacitly approving German requests for restoration.
proleote without actually pr chiding, means for the necessary materials
to be obtained. On t3. other hand, lifting of the oounterbloOkade
should. facilitate the achievement of the 1949 program by making avail-
able again sources for many component parts now in short supply in
the Soviet Zone, and by generally increasing East-West trade in Germany.
The Soviet Zone program, 'with respect to railways, includes three
sections of particular significances
(1) the planned volume of freight traffic;
(2) approved capital expenditures
(a) new rolling stock
(b) improvements in the right of way,,
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The 1949 fry. ? it traffic plan calls for an estimated 22 percent
&,nprease over -this 194a erformance in railway tonnage hauled. Thus,
iwdustrial production levels contemplated for the Soviet Zone during
1949. are +dxpected to result in an estimated 109,F5 million tons of
frbif ht originating within the Zone and an additional 18 million tons
imported freight to be moved over the Zoneaa transport network,
Of this total, 222.5 million tons, the railways are scheduled to haul
an. estimated 106.3 million. At the beginning o f .1949,howo? er, the
Retohebahn's average ser iooa'b1e freight -oar inrbntory of 68,000 units
was estimated by German experts to be capable of moving only 96
million tong per year, This pabilitty will be eo e*hat increased by
the. use of rolling stook from outside the Soviet Zone, rrom branch at4
plant spur lines, and from rise oonstruation. A. total ope*ating
inventory of about 71,b00 unita..?nas estimated by German exports as being
required to fulfill the 1949 railway freight plan. Another means of
increasing the present capsoity of the.railways would be to make more
efficient use of available rolling stook by. decreasing the average
freight oar tuzh-around time. It is unlikely, however, that this time
will be rc3duoed appreciably below the planned average of 4,4 days.
The following table sets forth tho SMAWappre dappi.ta1 expenditures
planned fot the Soviet Zone railway system during 1949, as well as .a
oomparisoa%,,bf these expenditure) with similar figured for 1948 and 1936.
tdunde al loclated to the construction of rolling stock and motive. power
and t* improvement of the ri Ott of way represent almost half, of the
approved total budget of l57.3 'rei 1l a on marks, snit , it, 1s in these two
categories that the greatest tncfaasee over 1948. expbnditures have
been authorised,
(Table bn Page 6)
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A roved C ital Expenditures for Soviet Zone Railway System for 1949
Amount Approved
1949 (Cost in
1,000?000 o)
Percentage
of 1948
Amouflt
Percentage
of 1936
Amount
Manufacture of new
rolling stock
50.5
2500
140
Right of way; repair &
re-laying of tracks
23.2
141
33
Expansion & repair of
looomotive & oar plants
19.9
110
600
Repair of railway stations
16.9
150
35
Repair and construction
of bridges
15.3
64
600
Repair of railway opera-
tional workshops
11.9
110
1000
Repair & installation of
signals & safety equipment
10.2
120
132
Electrical installations,
administrative bldga. & a se.
4.1
46
49
Construction of living
quarters
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With respect to rolling stock and motive power, the plan contem-
plates the construction o' out 4,000 frea ht cars, 150 passenger cars,
and a few special purpose cars, the conersion of 100 locomotives to
coal-dust burning types and, apparently, the purchase of 10 Danish
locomotives. Although the proposed construction of 4,000 freight cars
accounts for about 80 percent of all funds allocated to rolling stock
and motive power, this is a relatively small number of new cars, in
view of the deplorable condition of the present car park. Even if the
4,000 oars are actually constructed, it is probable that they will
little more than counterbalance the number of freight cars retired as
over-age or irreparable. It is noteworthy, however, that this is the
first instance of Soviet approval for the construction of rolling stock
intended for use on the German railway system. An additional 20
million marks have been allocated to the expansion and repair of loco-
motive and car plants.
The future of the locomotive situationwhich has been critical,
is particularly obscures due to the fact that there is no indication
a German request for or Soviet approval of funds for new locomotive
construction (other than the Danish locomotives mentioned above).
Moreover, there are conflicting reports concerning Soviet intentions
with respect to locomotives- Unconfirmed reports state that the SMA
has approved the early return of 350 locomotives from the locomotive
brigades maintained by the USSR. On the other hand, several months ago
the SMA directed that 685 locomotives presently in the Zone be labeled
as "trophy" locomotives, These would presumably be removed, by the
Soviets at some future date as war booty. In any case, it is probable
that the shortage of locomotives will remain one of the most critical
factors affecting the prospects for fulfillment of the S14A transport
plan.
Improvements to the riht of way proposed by the DWG amounted to
over 77 million Deutschmar1 s. ,IA approvsa.l, however, was granted for
projects amounting to only 23 million marks of this total. Repair and
,mprcvemr:ent of 97 kilometers of trackage within stations and marshall-
ing yards is believed to have been a,paproved, in addition to the restora-
tion of double-trackage on the following 79 kilometers of lines
Section
Kms.
Juterbog Bhzig
24
Wittenber e Ludwigalust
20
.Berlin-Grunau'l{o"nigswusterhausan
7
Magdeburg-Buckau.Caalbe
15
Dre >den-F rnaa
i3
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Completion of all of the foregoing projects would restore double-
trackage or, only a small portion of the dismantled eeotions in the area.
The double-tracking projects which are specifically mentioned in
the plan account for less than 60' percent of the total right of way
budget, leaving an additional 10.7 million marks or approved expendi-
tures un4acounted for. pile at least half of this sum is allocated to
"miscell neoue items" of lose than 50,000 marks each, which presumably
do not ceaver any important projects, it is possible that some of this
capital %vi11 be devoted to double-tracking projects which were not
apecificslly identified in the railway budget for security reasons.
(1t is believed, for example, that short double-tracking projects are
also planned on the lines Halle-Eisleben and Senftenberg-Ruhland.) In
any even't., it is apparent that the program approved by the SU does not
oontempl to any extensive rehabilitation during 1949 of the German rail-
ways under its control,
Recent unconfirmed reports indicate, however, that a more sub-
etenttal:reetoration of double-trackage on certain key lines, in addi-
tion to the projects outlined in the SMA approved transport plan, may be
attempte4 during 1949. It is possible, of course, that some of these
additional projects may be Included in the balance of almost five million
marks approved, but not specifiaal y accounted for, in the plan. These
projects;. however, like those idea ified in the SMA program, appear to
be relatively isolated inprovemen a and do not assume any pattern of
major military significance. Eve if the projects were all completed,
for inst xicee, there v uld still no completely double-tracked East-
West line across the Soviet Zone prom the Polish border.
Top priority has reportedly
track service on the Berlin ring.
balance of the seeoond track on th
(A considerable portion of the li:
status.), This will increase the
Berlin area into the southwest ge
on given the restoration of double-
Ito same report indicates that the
Berlin Erfurt line is to be restored.
e was never reduced to single-track
apacity for rapid movement from.the
tion of the Soviet Zone., The line
' n gle-track and there are no indlcs
west of Erfurt, however, is now .s
tions that this portion, which ex~teride to the American Zone border, is
scheduled for' improvements
In the Dresden region, orders have reportedly been issued to re-
lay the second track on the lino running southwest from Dresden to
Plauen, located near the northeast section, of the American Zane, On
the other hand, the re-laying of the second track running north from
Dresden through Grossenhain and .'lsterwerda to Berlin, which has been
reported on various occasions, is now understood to be temporarily
postponed because of insufficient rail production.
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1O NTiAL
Rewlaying of the second track on the line running southeast out of
Dresden into Czechoslovakia (Dresden-Pi.rna), on the SMA approved plan
for 1949, together with the restoration of second track on the lines
out of Dresden outlined above, would provide increased capacity for
movements from Czechoslovakia and the Bast to points in the southwestern
sector of the Soviet Zone located only a short distance from the
American Zone boundary.
In view of the limited improvement in the Soviet logistical
potential iihieh the unconfirmed projects would bring, it will be impor-
tant to observe closely whether the official transport plan is actually
expanded and the additional projects undertaken. Any intention to
utilize the Soviet Zone rail system for major military operations; how-
ever, would probably be foreshadowed by a red.isposition of rolling
stock, preparations for certain essential bridge construction, and other
indications, (Secret)
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