SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300050004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 26, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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26 December 1950
SU'iMARIE.-3 OF' TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
USSR
1, Although the USSR still values UN membe.rshi,
Soviet withdrawal may occur: (1) if the UiSR estimates that
this action would destroy the UN as such, or (2) if Chinese
Communist aggression in Asia eventually results iri UN counter-
action which would impel the USSR to withdraw. In this
eventuality the USSR would probably have expanded the re-
cently created World Peace Council and could organize under
it an "International Brigade" to provide military opposition
to UN action against Communist aggression.
(Page 3 )
2, soviet strategy in Greece TurkeyT Iran: and the
Near East (Arab States and Israel) has remained essentially
unchanged since 1945. The tactics implementing this strategy
have varied from time to time and from country to country
according to the existing situations which were susceptible
of exploitation along these lines.
(Page 4 )
EAjTERN EUROPE
POLAND
3, To better its ability to detect and destroy devia-
tions from Government or Communist Party dictates, the Polish
Governrr;mw it has issued a resolution the result cf -which will
be to draft the entire population into a Soviet system of
mutual spying and reporting.
(Page 6 )
J DFCLAS7 4 ~' - u
GLASS, Gi- MICET
NEXT r EVVEW DATE:
DAT(
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~ONF-~ENf
SPECIAL ARTICLE
4. The effect on the internal stability and policies
of the USSR of a struggle for power following Stalin's death
is directly related to the length of time necessary; for
resolution of the struggle and the degree to which the ex-
istence of this struggle becomes evident outside the tap
leadership. Of the possible alternatives, the most likely
is that such a struggle will remain a family affair within
the Committee. Therefore, little change in stability or
policy should be expected, even though a temporary period
of relative isolation might occur pending resolution of
the struggle.
(Page 7 )
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U S S R
Circumstances affecting possible Soviet
decision to withdraw from the UN
Although the USSR still values UN membership,
Soviet withdrawal may occur if the USSR estimated that this
action would destroy the UN as such. The Soviet estimate
would be that its withdrawal would effect an increase of
neutrality or "third force" sentiment in some countries,
particularly Asian and Arab, to the extent that they would
also withdraw from the UN to avoid taking sides in a formal
break between the Western and Soviet worlds, This Soviet
action would represent a final diplomatic attempt to split
off a number of nations that might otherwise join in a
UN action against aggression and become committed to side
eventually with the US in a war with the Soviet Union.
Barring such circumstances, the USSR probably
still attaches considerable value to UN participation for
obstruction and weakening of anti-C?mmunist action, for
divisive tactics to prevent development of a strong Western
coalition, and for propagn.nda issued under UN auspices.
The Soviet attitude with respect to UN action in Korea has
indicated a Soviet desire to avoid a formal challenge of
the UN by claiming that only "volunteers" have entered
Korea and by attacking "intervention" in Korea mainly as
being US and not UN.
It is alsp possible that Chinese Communist ag-
gression in Asia may eventually result in UN counteraction
which would impel the USSR to withdraw from the UN. The
Kremlin must realize that a spreading conflagration in
Asia, progressively involving Korea, Indochina, Hongkong,
Burma, or Thailand, could not be accepted indefinitely by
the UN without some type of counteraction. In supporting
Chinese Communist aggression, the USSR must be willing to
risk eventually having UN measures taken against China that
would impel the USSR to withdraw.
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In the eventuality of withdrawal from the UN, the
USSR would probably have expanded the functions of the re-
cently created World Peace Council so as to have a Communist-
dominated rival. organization. The purpose of the WPC is
presently described in Soviet bloc propaganda as being to
"assist" the UN in fulfilling its functions, The Peace
Council is not now an organization of states, but it
.provides a framework for such an organization, and in the
meantime furnishes the propaganda advantage of claiming to
represent large groups of manpower, including colonial and
dependent peoples not represented in the UN.
The World Peace Council could also perform an
effective function in that it could organize not only
political but also military opposition to UN police action
against Communist aggression. For example, Soviet spokes-
men have recently drawn an analogy between the Korean war
and the Spanish civil war and have referred to the "In-
ternational Brigade" in which volunteers from many countries
participated. In time a Soviet-sponsored "International
Brigade" may be organized which could provide large-scale
military opposition to a UN force and could also claim to
be an international "peace" action. In line with Soviet
strategy to wage undeclared war, this. device would permit
a, large commitment of troops from various Satellite
countries and from "peace" organizations under the guise
of fighting for "peace" without any formal commitment to
global war. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Soviet strati y and tactics in
G . rari~and the Near Ea
reeceTurkeV,
Soviet strategy in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the
Near East (Arab States and Israel) has remained essentially
unchanged since 1945. Soviet objectives include the rounding
out and safeguarding of its control over the Balkans through
the conquest of Greece; a double-barrelled approach to Turkey
through Greece and Iran; control of the Dardanelles; extension
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of Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean; and the
constant improvement of the USSR's position with respect to
the all-important oil resources of this area. In general,
this strategy has recognized the fact that Communism could
only achieve successes in the area if accompanied by direct
power thrusts from the Soviet Union and its orbit. In order,
however, to make such thrusts feasible without an immediate
expansion into general war,,this strategy has been mainly
divisive in nature -- aimed at splitting off the countries
in the area from the West (primarily the US and Great
Britain), their principal support in times of trouble, and
from one another.
The tactics implementing this strategy have
varied from time to time and from country to country ac-
cording to the existing situations which were susceptible
of exploitation along these lines.
The failure of the Greek guerrilla campaign has
been accepted by the USSR as a temporary setback, but the
remnants of the guerrilla forces remaining in the Soviet
orbit constitute an important reservoir upon which to draw
when and if the USSR should decide that conditions in' the
Balkans are favorable for a resumption of the guerrilla
war, perhaps supported by "volunteers" from the Satellite
armed forces. Meanwhile, Soviet strategy with respect to
Greece has aimed at strengthening the Communist Party by re-
building its underground apparatus and reestablishing a
broad popular support through the infiltration of leftist
political parties, labor unions, cultural organizations, and
the Greek National Army.
Improved relations between Greece and Yugoslavia
provide the basis for charges of planned aggression against
Albania and could be utilized to justify simultaneous (but
not necessarily similar) action against both countries at
some future time.
Soviet strategy in regard to Turkey has been limited
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largely to recurrent threatening gestures at the Dardanelles
and the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan. This is
largely due to the relative stability of Turkey and the lack
of any substantial Communist "fifth column." The Soviet
view is that, for the present, Turkey must wait on the success
of flanking movements into Greece and Iran.
Soviet strategy with respect to Iran has been one
of intermittent pressure and conciliation, combined with
more or less-continual aid to local subversive groups. In
past months the USSR has been pursuing an official policy
of conciliation in order to promote pro-Soviet sentiment
and intensify anti-Western sentiment. The signing of the
Soviet-Iranian trade treaty will facilitate economic pene-
tration of Iran, possibly aid Communist subversive activities,
and afford the USSR propaganda opportunities of which it will
take the fullest possible advantage.
In the Near East the USSR has endeavored to maneuver
itself favorably with respect to both Israel and the Arab
States. While making covert approaches to the Arab States,
the USSR has continually proposed or voted in the UN for un-
workable z"solutions" to the Palestine problem, evidently
calculating that Israeli and Arab resentment would be directed
principally against the Western powers.
Communist activity in the Near East takes the foria
of a long-range program aimed at preparing a solid founda-
tion for - exploiting the eventual opportunities which
are confidently expected in this area. (SECRET)
EASTERN EUROPE
POLAND
Polish Government sets up new bureau to repress people
Under the guise of improving the functioning `of
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SECRET
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the Government the Polish Council of State has issued' a
resolution the eventual result of which will be to draft
.the entire populAion into a Soviet system of mutual
spying and reporting. The resolution creates a new Bureau
of Letters and Complaints having criminal jurisdiction
within the Council of State.
Once in operation, the Bureau. will enable the
central government to detect and destroy more efficiently
any deviation from its or the Communist Partyts dictates.
The Bureau is required to take corrective action within one
month on all criticisms in the press of "defects in the
state rncchine," and will supervise the general implementa-
tion of the resolution. The Central Committee of the Polish
Communist Party has described in detail the duties of its
members and the members of the many Communist-controlled
mass organizations in utilizing this decree. The Commun-
ists will be the chief agents for detecting administrative
shortcomings in the Government and deviations from stated
doctrines and directives by the population.
The immediate effects of this resolution will be
dismissals from and purges of Government offices. The
long run result will be to create a nation-wide s-
,9,7 net
with neighbor reporting on neighbor to the Security Police
and growth of the daily, crushing oppression and. terror
under which Polish citizens live. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The effect on the internal s~ttab:iliwy and policies of the
USSR of a struggle for power following Stalin's death
For the purposes of this article it is assumed
that, following Stalin's death, the USSR will be ruled by
a committee within the Politburo composed of at least
Molotov, Malenkov, and Beriya. However, this period of
committee rule is unlikely to be of long duration. Once
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Stalin's stabilizing influence is removed, jealousies,
rancors and disagreements are almost certain to appear. A
struggle for power within the committee will probably re-
suit.
The question of how seriously such a struggle
might affect the internal stability of the Soviet Union and
consequently Soviet foreign policy, is directly related to
the length of time necessary for resolution of the struggle
and the degree to which the existence of this struggle
would be evident outside the existing top leadership. The
problem, therefore, must be reduced to several possible
alternatives.
During the period of committee rule, particularly
while the committee members maintained a united front,
Soviet police' would probably remain unchanged. Subsequent-
ly, the degree to which policy might be affected would de-
pend on how smoothly an aspiring dictator could resolve a
struggle for power within the committee and assume full
power. Thus, a smooth and easy transfer of power from
Stalin to the committee and then to an eventual successor
such as Molotov or Malenkov would leave Soviet policy
virtually untouched. Similarly, the regime would remain
stable and even in the event of disunity and a struggle for
power among the leaders, the general stability would not
be lessened so long as the authority of the Politburo re-
mained unshaken. If, however, as a result of a struggle,
the leaders were obliged to seek support in the Central
Committee or in the lower echelons of the Party, Soviet
policy in terms of strategy and ta:;.ctics might accordingly
be affected in one or more of the following ways:
1. In the period before any single member of the
Politburo was able to secure full. power for himself, a
transitional phase might develop during which short-range
policies would undergo some modification. The leadership's
divided and uncertain exercises of power would necessarily
preoccupy the various Politburo members with the domestic
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situation and the effect which internal events might have
upon their individual positions. There would probably to
an even stronger tendency to assess international affairs
in terms of their impact upon the domestic situation. During
this transitional phase, Soviet policy might reveal a trend
toward increasing "isolationaism" without, however, necessari-
ly bringing about any more conciliatory attitude on the part
of the Soviet Government.
2. If the struggle between factions in the Party
hierarchy for control of the regime became particularly in-
tense, there might be an effort to obtain mass support from
the Party and Government rank-and-file, or even from beyond
the borders of the USSR. Such an effort would be directed,
above all, toward the Communist governments of the Statellite
orbit and might lead to policy differences in the Soviet
Politburo over the degree of national independence to be
allowed the "people's democracies." Titoism would be
further encouraged by a split in the top Soviet hierarchy
over this issue, and the eventual result might be a dis-
integration of Soviet control over the Orbit countries.
3. Once the struggle had been decided, the Soviet
regime or any regime replacing it might find itself so
weakened that the present aggressive policies would be at
least temporarily inexpedient. In this case, policies might
be changed in order to postpone internal and external
tensions and obtain foreign assistance and credits for re-
habilitation purposes.
4. 14hatever results from the transition of power
following Stalin's death, it is inevitable that a new leader
will bring to his position a personality different from that
o Stalin, and a capacity which may or may not be equal to
the responsibility he assumes. It is, therefore, conceivable
that his personal inexperience, his less seasoned judgment,
or his more youthful impatience or fanaticism might lead to
a serious miscalculation. If, after such a miscalculation,
no retreat were possible without considerable sacrifice of
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IDENTIAL
prestige or damage to the interests of the soviet regime,
World War III might result.
5. At this time the most logical possibility is
that any such struggle will r6main a family affair within
the committee, with one member, probably Malenkov, emerging
the victor. In this event, little change is anticipated
in the internal stability of the foreign policy of the
U3SR, expect for a temporary period of relative isolation,
while the struggle is being resolved. (SECRET)
ON1TDENT1AL
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