SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300050003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 19, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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19 December 1950
SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
la The latest shin the Soviet Union's diplomatic
and propagande. ca ai n to forestall a West German ,s ntribu-
tion to Wes'ern. defense are; (1) passage of a law by the
East German Parliament providing harsh penalties, including
death, for all German "warmongers", and (2) presentation of
notes to Great Britain and France accusing them of violating,
respectively, the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 and the
Franca-Soviet Agreement; of Friendship and Mutual Assistance
of 1944,
EASTERN EUROPE
HUNGARY
(Page 5 )
2. In imale,mentatin of ,point: of the Warsaw Peace
Aneal ("We call upon all parliaments to enact a law fear
the protection of peace, defining criminal responsibility
for the propagation, in any form whatever, of a new war"))
the Hungarian National Assembly on 8 December passed a peace
defense bill. It provides that anyone instigating war or
disseminating war propaganda is guilty of a felony against
the peace and is subject to a maximum of 15 years' im-
prisonment and confiscation of his properties.
Since last spring there have been frequent arrests
for warmongering and stern warnings have been issued against
the spreading of war rumors. Usually the warmongers are
accused of being agents of the West and the VOA and BBC are
alleged to be the principal sources of the rtunorsb
On 14 December the Rumanian Parliament passed a
tJMENT NO.
0 N
U DECLASS
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CcWIO ENT LAL
similar law for the defense of the poacei The Czechoslovak
Parliament will convene this week to consider a corresponding
bill. Undoubtedly Albania, Bulgaria, and Poland will follow
suit. (RESTRICTED)
3 . Hungarians are e x p e c t e d to close the British In-
formation Service. In a speech before. the National Assembly
on 5 Decembor, Erno Mihalyfy, head of the Institute for
Cultural Relations, referred to the "unfriendly tone of
certain news bulletins issued by Western Legations in
Budr.,nest" and added that "they send these bulletins to many
people without being asked." The British Minister inter-
prets this as a possible indication that the Hungarian Govern--
ment will close the British Information Service which daily
distributes 10,000 Bulletins. The 'aritish Bulletin pulls
no punches in international news presentation, while the U.S.
Bulletin, as a result of a warning in May 1950, has omitted
everything overtly derogatory to Communism, Hungary, the USSR,
and the Satellites. Thus it is possible that action will
not be directed against both the American and British publi-
cations at this time. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4. The.l9l Hungarian udget shows an absolute_ n-
crease in both total and military expenditurFess. Outlays
are to increase 12 billion forints to a new high of 29.6
billion and military expenditures are approximately double
those announced in 1950.
(Page 7 )
POLAND
5. Western diplomats in Poland may soon have their
activities drastically curtailed because of the trial revela-
tions by a former British Air Attache of some US, British,
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COtf1tENTIAL
and French intelligence collecting techniques.
(Pago 7
RUMANIA
6.
The Rumanian For,3i2n Office threat that US courier
visas will be granted on a strictl5w_ reciprocal basis t if
MR,,L menued will drasticall.y reduce the US Legation's opera-
tional effectiveness.
F INL =
(Page 9 )
7. Moscow propaganda .attacks on proposed inclusion
of Social Democrats in new Finnish cabinet are incre?,si,
as negotiations between Agrarians and Social Democrats on
a joint economic policy near completion. Despite these at-
tacks, a coalition government of Agrarians and Social Demo-
crats plus representatives of Swedish and Progressive Parties
will probably be formed.
(Page 10 )
8. The trend toward decreasing , the scoR : of responsi-
bhilit of irzdivi dual economic ministries in Eastern Euro e
is further 11evealed in the recent amendment to the. Hun ri.an
Constitution which provides for the splitting of old ministries
and the establishment of new ones.
(Page 11 )
9. The Communist Parties of astern Europe are ex--
endin much effort to Jain co_n.trot of the minds of the
children of Eastern .Europe. th .~t~Vh~?the successofthis ef-
fort can not beceurat~sauc3. Opposed to the Communist
CONFIDENTIAL
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programs for the children are two institutions, the Catholic
Church and the family. Because of the effectiveness of these
two resistant forces will gradually be lessened, unless the
Western world is able to take counter-measures, the Commun-
ists undoubtedly will achieve a notable degree of success
in the field of communizing the children within the next ten
years.
(Page 12 )
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USSR
Recent developments in Soviet c wag
t, forestall West German rearmament
The latest steps in the Soviet Union's diplomatic
and propaganda campaign to forestall a West German contribu-
tion to Western defense are: (1) passage of a law by the
East German Parliament providing harsh penalties, including
death, for all German "warmongers",. and (2) presentation
of notes to Great Britain and France accusing them of violat-
ing, respectively, the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 and
the Franco-Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Mutual
Assistance of 1944.
The East German "anti-warmonger" law, which is
clearly intended to apply to West as well as Bast Germans,
states that anyone propagating acts of aggression or recruit-
ing Germans to participate in belligerent actions is liable
to punishment, including prison terms and, in extreme cases,
the death penalty. Peace offenders are defined as anyone
who advocates inclusion of Germans in aggressive military
blocs or their recruitment into foreign military formations.
The law is obviously designed to intimidate the West German
people and their leaders in order to prevent them from par-
ticipating in Western defense.
The East German "anti-warmonger" law is the type
of legislation recommended by the Warsaw Peace Partisan's
Congress of 18 November 1950.. Hungary and Rumania have
passed similar laws, but 'East Germany is the only one of the
three Satellites to provide the death penalty. Immediately
after the passage of the law, the East German propaganda
machine named the editor of the US-licensed Berlin news-
paper Tagesspiegel "number one warmonger." This may well
mark the beginning of a highly publicized official or, at
least, semi-official list of West German "warmongers." The
Communists may even attempt to kidnap certain West Berlin
and West German leaders in order to place them on trial under
the new law.
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The recent Soviet notes (presented in Moscow on
15 December) to Great Britain and France accuse the two
nations of violating agreements with the USSR (Anglo-
Soviet Alliance of 1942, Franco-Soviet Agreement of 1944
Potsdam Agreement) by: (1) sponsoring West German rearmament,
and (2) concluding alliances and participating in coalitions
directed against the USSR and "other peace-invin.g states."
(The text of the note to Great Britain is believed to parallel
the note to France in all important respects). The notes,
c%refully timed to coincide with the Brussels meeting of the
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty
nations, are obviously intended to increase dissension
among the Western Powers over the question of West German
rearmament. The USSR may believe that these notes will in-
fluence France and Great Britain to insist on the pcxstpone,-
ment of a decision as to how and to what extent to rearm
West Germany until after the Four Power Conference, which
the USSR has proposed and which the Western Powers are dis-
cussing.
The Soviet note to France states that the French
Goverment is preparing a, military alliance with West Ger-
many and that "it is clear that this fact creates a serious
threat to peace ,To embark on this road is to reconstruct
German militarism, a thing.to which the Soviet Union and
the peoples of Europe who have borne the weight of German
aggression cannot agree," The note states the "position
of the French Government is not only contrary to the Potsdam
Agreement regarding the demilitarization of Germany, but is
also manifestly contrary to the Franc,-Soviet Agreement of
10 Dec ember, 1944.," The note accuses France of violating
Article 5 of the 1..944 agreement through its entry into the
"group of North Atlantic powers, a group which is directed
against the USSR," In connection with this note, it is
perhaps significant that the U,`:3SR, in a reference tsa its
note of 3 November :1.950, emphasizes its proposal to convene
a Council of Foreign Ministers to "consider the question of
execution of the Potsdam r tTreoraent for demilitarization of
Germany," but makes no mention of a conference to settle
the German problem as a whole. (SECRET)
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EASTERN EUROPE
HUNGARY
Hun arian t 5l budget reflects
increasin- militar ex enditures
The 1951 Hungarian budget shows an absolute in-
crease in both total and military expenditures. Total
planned outlays are to reach a new high of 29.6 billion
forints, an increase of 12.15 billion over 1950. Overt
military allocations are to amount to about 14 percent of
the total in 1951 as compared with about 11.7 percent in
1950, but in absolute germs, the increase over 1950 is
about 100 percent. "Investments", as usual, receive the
largest allocation amounting to about 40 percent of the
total or 1.1.7 billion forints. This brings outlays for
investment, as stated in the budgets, to about two-fifths
of the 5 Year Plan's total in the first two years, depart-
ing from the general plan investment schedule in that the
allocations usually run considerably lower in the earlier
years of the plan than at the end.
Although inflationary pressures exist in Hungary,
it is extremely doubtful that a major portion of the in-
crease is a result of inflation, and it ay be safely pre-
sumed that a large part of the increase will be devoted to
the support of the enlarged Hungarian military force and
supporting industry. In +ddit1.on, the 2.4-fold increase:
in the Ministry of Finance allocation is reportedly largely
to secure commodities for stockpiling. (SECRET)
POLAND
Western diplomats face restrictions in Poland
Western diplomatic representatives may soon face
drastic curtailment of their activities because of the revela-
tion by a former British Air Attache to Polish Security Police
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of many Western intelligence collecting techniques. At the
present time Western envoys, though closely watched by the
Security Police, are still free to travel in Poland.
The former British Air Attache to Warsaw, Henry
Turner, is on trial before the Warsaw Civil Court on charges
of helping a Polish citizen escape from the country. Having
completed his tour of duty in Warsaw November, 1949, Turner'
returned to Great Britain and resumed civilian life. Last
May Turner returned to Poland as assistant purser on a
British tramp steamer with the intention of clandestinely
spiriting a Polish woman out of Poland on board the vessel.
He was caught by the Polish Security Police whale carrying
out his plan.
During the trial Turner's testimony has been de-
voted largely to the subject of intelligence collecting
techniques of Western diplomatic establishments but there
was little emphasis given the actual charge against him.
Turner has: (1) described at length the attaches' techniques
in observing and reporting rail traffic, troop movements,
location and layout of airfields, and harbor insta.lations,
(2) asserted that because of freedom of movement in Poland
attaches' were able to obtain much valuable material, (3)
told of the system used by Western attaches to pool in-
formation and coordinate activities, (4) described use of
civilian members of diplomatic staffs, to whom special jobs
of intelligence collecting were allocated, and (5) stated
that the RLF and USAF courier plane flights serving the
Embassies from Berlin were used for aerial reconnaissance.
Turner's admissions were pointed up in a bitter
follow-up editorial in TTrvbuns: Ludu4 Communist Party Organ,
which emphasized that the unrestricted movement of Western
diplomats in Poland and their continuing social relations
with Poles were the primary factors enabling the Western
diplomatic "espionage net" to operate in Poland.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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RUMANIA
New Rumanian restrictions threaten
US mission! so erations
The Rumanian Foreign Office announcement on 8
December that hereafter US courier visas would be granted
on a basis of strict reciprocity wi..ll,.if implemented,
drastically reduce any effective operation of the US
mission in Rumania. This move, which would limit US courier
visas to about one in six weeks, was prompted by a two-
week delay by the US in issuing visas to Rumanian couriers.
The day before this announcement the Rumanian Foreign Office
representative had proposed a regular process in the grant-
ing of these visas, by suggesting that if Rumanian couriers
were promptly granted visas, US couriers could be issued
visas every other week. When the authorization for the
visas did not come through instantly, however, his announce-
ment of "reciprocal" measures was accompanied by charges
that the delays were all on the side of the US, despite
the record, which shows that in every instance since 3 June
the Rumanian Legation in Vienna has delayed US courier
visas from as much as ten days to two weeks.
The now restriction is another step by the Rumanian
Government in its accelgrated anti-Ije stern campaign, which
in the past year has seriously reduced the ability of
Western missions to carry out their duties efficiently.
The closing of US and UK information offices in March of
this year was followed by a flood of other measures, includ-
ing the imposition of travel restrictions which placed
most of Rumania out of bounds to US officials, the elimina-
tion of Western contacts with the people by intimidation
of the populace., arrests and accusations directed at Western
personnel, reductions of mission staffs, and refusal of visas
to Legation replacements and, to couriers.
Under this constant harrassment, the US mission is
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finding it increasingly difficult to operate, prompting the
US Charge to suggest calling for a show-down on the whole
matter of US-Rumanian relations. Although the vindictive
tone assumed by the Rumanian bureaucrats toward US officials
in the present case suggests that Rumania might well pre-
fer to have relations severed rather than yield on the
courier issue, the US staff is encouraged by the firmness
of the French who have successfully resisted a Rumanian re-
quest that the French Legation be cut to six French per-
sonnel. Moreover, the fact that subsequent to the US-
Rumanian conversation of 8 December the US has granted the
Rumanians the visas they had desired provides the opportuni-
ty to work out more regular arrangements for courier visas,
which 'would at least temporarily alleviate the tenseness
of US-Rumanian relations, (CONFIDI ITIAL)
Finnish 11 ion cabinet wil x~ cla b be f_,9 rmed
de i_M~e Sov et _Manda attr.cks
The Finnish Social Democrats and Agrarians are re-
ported to have nearly completed negotiations on an economic
policy which both parties.will support in a broadened cabinet.
Moscow radio, in the meantime, is applying its usual propa-
ganda pressure in the hope of keeping the Social Democrats
out of the new cabinet, According to the Soviet propaganda,
economic differences between the parties are secondary to
the nefarious aims of the Social Democrats, who, abetted
by the Conservatives, want to enter the government in order
to propagandize against the peace movement, to wreck re-
lations with the USSR and the peoples' democracies, and to
force Finland into the camp of the Anglo-US warmongers.
Vaino Tanner, whose intransigent attitude toward the Soviet
Union from 1939 to 1944,resulted in his conviction as a
war criminal, is being attacked as the Social Democratic
ringleader of Finnish reaction, US Minister to Finland,
Cabot, and the-US Ambassador to Sweden have been accused of
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conspiring with the Tannerites. Their objective, it is im--
pliedj is an anti-Soviet government in Finland.
The volume and vociferousness of Soviet propaganda
on this subject is an indication of Moscow's bitterness
against the Social Democrats, who have succeeded in holding
the Communists in check in Finland. The Finns, however, have
strong nerves and are not likely to succumb to Soviet
attempts to dictate internal Finnish policy by these methods.
At present a coalition cabinet which would include Social
Democrats and. Agrariims plus some Swedish and, Progressive
Party representatives will probably be formed. Premier
Kekkonen is reported to favor the inclusion of two or three
Communists in the new government in order to placate the
USSR The opposition of the other parties to the inclusion
of the Communists, however, makes it unlikely that a
coalition cabinet could be formed on this basis. (CONFIDENTIAL)
GENERAL
Creation of now economic ministries
narrows scope ofauthorit2
The trend toward decreasing the scope of responsi-
bility of individual economic ministries in Eastern Europe
is further revealed in the recent amendment to the Hungarian
Constitution. The amendment provides for the splitting of
the Ministry of Heavy Industry into a Ministry of Foundry
and Machine Industry and a Ministry of Mines and Power;
it replaces the Ministry of Social Welfare with the Ministry
of Health; it :stablishes a Ministry of Foisd. Limiting
the sector of the economy for which each Minister is re-
sponsible is intended to bring more efficient administra-
tion and increased security through greater compartmentaliza-
tion of knowledge and authority.
Similar reduction of the scope of activity of the
economic ministries has occurred in the other Eastern European
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satellites. In Poland, a bill is under consideration which
would establish a Ministry of Chemical Industry (formerly
the prerogative of the Ministry of Heavy Industry); the
Ministry of Construction would be abolished and its functions
allotted to a Ministry for Industrial Reconstruction and
a Ministry for Urban and Settlement Construction. While the
economic ministries in Bulgaria were already comparatively
numerous, a Ministry of State Supply and Warehousing was
added in November. A reorganization of the economic
ministries in Rumania took place at the end of 1949. In
Czechoslovakia they have been so organized that the creation
of new ministries would be an easy step.
With the extention of government control over the
sectors of the economy still in private hands and with the
accompanying growth of the bureaucracy, there will undoubted-
ly be further divisions of the ministries in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, with the increasing industrialization of the
Eastern European economies, there will be a need for a
greater number of specialized ministries. The compulsion
to imitate the Soviet Union's extensive government structure
is probably a motivating factor in this breakdown of
ministries. (RESTRICTED)
Effectvenosoof C ommunist ,youth orosrams
The efforts of the Communist Parties in Eastern
Europe to gain control of the minds of the children are
being successful, though precisely to what extent cannot be
accurately determined. Necessarily of a long range nature,
the pro ram is just beginning to gain momentum, and the
full effects will only gradually become apparent. An
analysis of the present degree of Communist control over the
activities and training of children, the magnitude of the
Communists' strivings to win over the children, and the
forces opposing the program will give some indication of the
progress already made.
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All children in the Eastern European countries
from approximately seven years through adolescence are en-
rolled in mass youth organizations; in Poland Ognisko (The
Hearth), in Bulgaria the Septemvriiche, and in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Rumania, and Albania, as in the USSR, the Pioneers,
These organizations, in addition to ideological education,
provide organized play groups and early training for a trade,
profession, or military service. They also offer the child
personal responsibility and independence from family disci-
pline, both of which serve to break family ties and weaken
family influence. In essence these organizations are
factories for the mass production of young Communists. The
more intelligent and mature children are likely to be
skeptical but silent about the program. The less intelligent
the child, the more likely he is to participate genuinely
in the organizations' activities and to accept the teachings
of Communist ideology. Children from families of low economic
standards are particularly susceptible to the material ad-
vantages that go along with membership in a youth group,
In addition to the use made of the children's
organizations, Communist ideology is spread through the
educational system, Although education is available to all
children, the Party is making every effort to increase the
proportion of children with a proletarian background in the
schools. A. good ideological record, a good report on
Party work, and a proletarian social background are at least
as iimportant for entrance into the ynnnasium or University
as intellectu.-,l ability. Higher education, which has al-
ways been esteemed in Eastern Europe, is being offered more
and more only to those students who conform to Communist
ideological and political standards.
Opposed to the Communist youth programs are two
institutions, the Catholic Church and the family. In pre-
dorrrinatly Roman Catholic countries such as Poland, where the
Catholic Church is closely identified with nationalism, the
Church's resistance to the Communization of the youth is a
strong force, though not one which will be able to continue
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effective opposition indefinitely. For example, in Poland
the Church recently instructed parents to continue rel.igitus
teaching at home if their children were being deprived of
it in the schools. This particular instruction ties in
with what has been a traditional and successful form of
keeping the national culture alive in Poland, that is,
clandestine home teaching of Polish history, traditions,
and beliefs. This parental instruction, more than anything
else, has retarded and will continue to retard the process
of Communist indoctrination of the youth.
In countries such as Rumania and Bulgaria, where
Roman Catholicism is not the predominant religion, the
opposing force of religion to the Communization program for
the children is much more limited. Roman Catholicism is a
minority religion in these countries and has no effective
influence outside of the small circle of its members. In
fact, on the lower levels of the Catholic hierarchy in
these countries, the parish priests are gradually going over
to the Government.. The Orthodox Church, to which the over-
whelming majority of the population belongs in Rumania and
Bulgaria, was early subordinated by the Communists who in-
stalled cooperative leaders and have since enjoyed their
active support. This has fac.J_litated the Communist in-
doctrination of the children since the Orthodox leaders have
not opposed the Party's programs for the children. Family
ties and influences thus provide the only strong resistance
faced by the Communists in the Balkan countries to tha)ir
programs for the ideological training of the children.
In Hungary, wher:: the population is approximately
two-thirds Roman Catholic, the Communists face resistance
by the Church to their progr~:ms for the children, but it is
not as fervent and strong as that, found in Poland. As the
oppression by the Communist regime becomes more appar?nt
in all aspects of life, religious fervor and. support of the
Church against the Communists will become stronger,
The Communists in Czechoslovakia, because of the
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distinct difference of religions in Bohemia, where there is
a large Protestant group, and in Slovakia:.a, which is Roman
Catholic, have been faced generally with a less difficult
problem. The Protestants, who fervently dislike the Catholics
have tended to go along with the Communists, thus facilitating
the implementation of the Communist programs for the children.
In both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, family influences also
seem to be less powerful than in Poland, but stronger in
Czechoslovakia than in Hungary.
Unless the West takes steps to counter the Commun-
ist youth program, such as continuing wherever possible the
information programs, exploiting the popularity of Western
culture and the desire for knowledge of any kind about the
non--Communist world, and endeavoring to aid the Satellite
peoples to preserve their national culture, the Conllnunists
will achieve a notable degree of success in the field of
communizing the children within the next t en years. The
present opposition forces of Church and family influence
will continue to weaken and become less influential as
time passes. (SECRET)
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BEN?IAL
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