SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 21, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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21 November 1950
. 3UNLMARIES' G l'RENDS AND DEVELOPiviENTS
The new Soviet-Iranian ;20jnill.on trade treaty
represents an 2conom:ic political and psychological victorZ
for the U33R in a move to counteract Western aid to Iran
and thus Western influence. While economically Iran will
receive some benefits, they were won at the price of cer-
tain concessions.
(Page 5 )
2. Increased Communist pressure on the Indian-
Tibetan border aromas will undoubtedly accom anj Chinese
Communist efforts to extend effective control over Tibet.
Communist infiltration and influence have increased there
recently.. Soviet and Chinese Communist Propagandists have
already claimed some of these border areas as Chinese
territory and have charged that US~UK "imperialists" are
attempting to use them as bases against the Peiping regime.
(Page 7 )
3. `he Sov et Union failing to fulfill the re-
irem.nts of the livestock lam has issued a drastic
decree designed radually tjminate; xivate ownership
of livestock, increase socialized livestock at a rapid
rate, and maintain, if not increase) Government procure-
ments of meat and livestock products.
(Page 9
4. The Soviet Union is continuing its campaign of
a t t r i t i o n watt re .,ard to West Berlin's via ilit and k e
ability of the West to retailiate against Soviet blockade
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measures. For example, during; the past year the U'a:SR has
attempted with some success to have five estern ?:Turopean
countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland)
transfer their telephonic communications terminals from West
Berlin to the Soviet Sector. By these actions the USSR is
apparently attempting to isolate the West Sectors of Berlin
from communications with Western Europe and to increase the
importance of the Soviet Section in the European communica-
tions nt to the detriment of. West Berlints economy. If the
USSR succeeds in its effort (which the US is attempting to
nullify) to have Western European telephonic communications
routed through East Berlin, West Berlin communications will
be more dependent upon Soviet controlled facilities and the
West will lose a counter blockade measure in the field of
communications .
EASTERN EUROPE
AL 31LNIA
5. The cloying andsealing of the Llbantan Legation
robably will riot mate~rialli affect the ahead bad rely--
tions between the two countries because it is not a definite
diplomatic break.. It is more in the nature of retaliation
for provocative. Albanian border incidents, and earlier
Albanian treatment of the Yugoslav representatives in Tirana.
which had necessitated the closing of the Yugoslav Legation
in Albania in May.
HUNG: ARY
6. three way conflict resultina yfrom different
IDENTIAL
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C4NF1 ENTIAL
SECR"~ . ..
viewpoints of. Hungarians= -Jest Germans and HICOM has caused
temporary, suspension of negotiations on the 1951 trade,
reemento Western division on East-West trade policies
has allowed the Germans to assume a position closer to that
of Hungary than to that of the Tripartite nations.
(Page 10 )
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
AND PROP':G1,ND . ANALYSIS
7. The USSR's decision to abandon the planned World
face Con rest~in Sheffield and to hold its instead, in
TJ~'arsaw represernt,s an outstandin tactical victory for the
West. The conditions under which Moscow ordered the last
minute change prove conclusively that: (1) the British
action caught the Peace Partisans completely by surprise;
(2) the IJSSR is not willing to risk a Peace Partisans.meet-
ing unless the proceedings can be controlled to Moscow's
advantage; and (3) the success or failure of the Peace
Movement is an important element in Soviet foreign policy.
(Page 11)
8. Recent Chinese Communist d' lomatic moves and
propo, ands, have irritated the CTov,rnments of India,_ Burma,
and Inconesira.. .nd haveincreased public uneasiness in
thesese countries with rspect t o . - t h e loner torm ob;j~ives of
Communist China. This Chinese Communist indifference to
South and Southeast `sign sensibilities may be expected to
continue, and to lead to a very gradual stiffening of the
attitude toward world Communism, of the majority groups in
these countries.
(Page 13 )
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
9. Althou h Chinese Communist troops have intervened'
inKorea thUSR has notet shown a willing. ness to pre
cipitata_,gjobal warfare or to expand the Korean conflict
beyond limits subject to a reasonable degree of Soviet
control.
The fact that the Communist leaders did under
take an intervention in Korea reflects a greater possi-,
bility of overt Soviet or Satellite aggression elsewhere.
Nevertheless, such action cannot be considered likely in
the near future, since the Kremlin is probably aware that
its instigation of another international crisis at this time
might explode into global war, which it is still believed
the U3SR wishes to avoid.
(Page 15 )
CO rFIDeNrin4
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Soviet-Iranian Trade Treace represents
as V i for USSR.
The new Soviet-Iranian $20 million trade treaty
represents an economic, political and psychological victory
for the USSR in a move to counteract Western aid to Iran
and thus.s?lestern influence. While economically Iran will
receive some benefits, they were won at the price.of certain
concessions. Politically, the treaty will work to Soviet
advantage. The USSR has been provided with a potent propa-
ganda appeal and Iran has already begun to follow a policy
of greater friendliness to the Soviets, as is evidenced by
the termination of the VOA and BBC relay programs in Tehran
and by greater restrictions on Americans travelling in
Northern Iran,.
A virtual Soviet monopoly over the agricultural
exports of the northern provinces of Iran will increase the
economic ties of that country with the USSR. Iranian trade
with the West will be curtailed, with Soviet exports of
cotton piece goods replacing, at least to a considerable ex-
tent, those of the US and the UK. While Soviet agricultural
purchases will provide a stimulus to the economy of the
northern provinces, Soviet exports of cotton piece goods -
depending on their price - may serve to depress the domestic
textile manufacturing industry, especially in central Iran.
Tabriz commercial circles are skeptical as to the commercial
advantages and are concerned over the effect on local textile
markets. Moreover, it is doubted that Iran can export the
quantities of foodstuffs specified, especially rice, in
view of the fact that there remains little surplus of the
l~zerbaljan crop for export this year. Under the agreement,
the USSR may take up to 60.,000 tons of rice out of an esti-
mated 70-850,000 tons available for export..
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While the USSR seems to have made concessions in
the treaty negotiations, they may be more apparent than real.
On the other hand, the extent of Iranian concession is in-
dicated by the fact that Prime Minister Razmara signed the
treaty before the arrival of a Soviet negotiator to discuss
the problem of Iranian gold held by the Soviets.. Previously
he had maintained that no agreement would be concluded be-
fore that question was settled. Razmara did indicate later,
however, that actual implementation of the treaty would de-
pend on the outcome of the gold negotiations. The Soviet
fnbassador did finally agree to an Iranian proposal that
trade be conducted through Government-established companies.
This, however, was only an informal and verbal assurance
which does not appear either in the present protocol or in
the 1940 treaty to which it is annexed. Whether the USSR
lives up to this oral commitment remains to be seen.
The agreement has been acclaimed in Iran as
inaugurating an era of increased friendliness with the USSR,
and hope is expressed that it will end tension between the
two countries, The Iranian Government had already ended
Western radio programs distasteful to the Soviet Union and
has replaced the propaganda minister who was considered to
be pro-,`.erican, Similarly, Soviet anti-Iranian broadcasts
have noticeably slackened. However, the Soviet Union does
not appear to be willing to make any concrete concessions
to Iran. Although the USSR is participating in a boundary
commission.(the establishment of which was likewise hailed
as contributing to a relaxation of tension between Iran and
the Soviet Union) Soviet border posts in the disputed area
were strengthened just before the commission began its sur-
vey in northern Iran,
The USSR may be expected to take full advantage of
the good-will engendered by the signing of the trade treaty
for publicity and propaganda purposes not onl in. Iran, but
throughout the Near and Middle East. (SECRET
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Communist Dressure onnria}i border ++A"
ons_s_ncreased
Increased Communist pressure on the border areas
between Tibet and India, and even on India itself,.will un-
doubtedly accompany Chinese Communist efforts to extend ef-
fective control over Tibet. Soviet and Chinese Communist
propagandists have already claimed some of these border
areas as Chinese territory and have asserted that US-UK
"imperialists" are attempting to use them as bases against
the Chinese Communist regime -- the same charge used to
justify action against Tibet. Communist infiltration and
influence have also increased there recently, although the
remoteness of the region precludes full or accurate informa-
tion.
year ago the authoritative Soviet publication,
NOM Tirries, claimed that Ladakh, Sikkim, and Bhutan has been
"seevered from China in the past by Britain," (See D/EE Wkly,
17 Jan 50). The official Poole+s Ukly in Peiping re-
cently stated that Sikkim was Chinese territory and Chinese
Communist maps are reliably reported to include Nepal and
northern Burman as part of China.
The US and UK have been accused of establishing
bases in Kashmir, Nepal, and Sikkim in order to attack the
Comrmini.st regime in China. These charges have been leveled
by Moscow and Peiping especially during the past month. It
is claimed, however, that in Nepal the local Communist Party,
"warmly supported" by the population, is working to defeat
the "imperialists" and the "clique of usurpers" who form
the government. Various reports suggest that Nepalese
Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, northern .ssam and Burma.
Chinese Nationalist maps also showed 77,000 sq miles of
northern Burzaa Chinese territory.
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Communists have been trained by their Indian comrades and
that agents have been infiltrating into the mountain king-
dom. The present revolution was first described as a
"bourgeois" but "antifeudal" campaign with which the Nepal
Communists were willing to cooperate in a united front. More
recently, however, Moscow had decided the reform movement
is merely another 11impc,rialist" device to gain control of
this strategic region.
Covert Communist activity has also been reported
from Kashmir, especially from Ladakh, the eastern Buddhist
section. Sheikh Abdullah, head of the Kashmir Government,
and Indian Communists both favor the establishment of an
independent state. Sheikh Abdullah is reported to have pro-
Soviet and pro-Communist leanings and Moscow recently re-
ferred to his "progressive gov.rnment.11 An independent
state on Chinese Communist borders would certainly be more
susceptible to Communist pressure and subversion and would
weaken the defenses of both India and Pakistan.
The undemarcated Northern boundaries of Burma pro-
vide a, semi-legal basis for the claim that it is Chinese
territory and for exerting pressure on the Burmese Govern-
ment, Reports indicate that Chinese Communists have been
actively developing roads in the wino Burmese border area,
have induced some Kachin tribesmen to go to China for educa-
tion and indoctrination, and have crossed northern Burma
in advancing on Tibet. The Jino--i.sss.mese border is also not
clearly defined and Communist centers and subversive activi-
ty have been reported from remote sections of Assam.
India itself is being subjected to direct diplo-
matic pressure from Communist China, in addition to propa-
ganda and covert activity in the border regions. Peiping
has charged India with unfriendly action in closing a
Chinese Communist cultural exhibit which depicted US "im-
perialists" killing Chinese children. This followed
closely the deliberately brusque rejection of Indian sug-
gestions on Tibet and the official statement that Tibetan
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affairs were no concern of India's. This approach clearly
indicates that Peiping regards no non-Communist government
as its friend..
The Soviet Union, however, has continued to pur-
sue an officially friendly policy toward India. This tactic,
combined with.Peiping's rebuff, will be to Soviet advantage,
since close relations between Communist China and non-
Communist India will be discouraged,. while Soviet-Indian
relations are unaffected. (SECRET)
LS) _R siren. thenn its food _su~uly potential
The Soviet Union, failing to fulfill the require-
ments of the livestock plan, has issued a drastic decree
designed gradually to eliminate private ownership of live-
stock, increase socialized livestock at a rapid rate, and
maintain, if not increase, Government procurements of meat
and livestock products. These drastic measures for in-
creasing livestock numbers and at the same time providing
for increased Government meat procurements were written in-
to an order under the apparently harmless title of "Wintering
of Livestock."
Collective farms are forbidden to slaughter
collectivized livestock except for required deliveries to
the state.. This will facilitate a rather rapid increase of
socialized herds and will decrease private holdings by forcing
farmers to slaughter their own livestock to obtain meat for
their own consumption.
Normally, the collectives consume or sell on the
free market about 75 percent of the meat from slaughtered
livestock, with 25 percent delivered to the Government.
A greater proportion of these deliveries is to be
made with hogs, thus giving further emphasis to increasing
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cattle and sheep numbers.
The Soviet Government has strongly hinted in the
past its desire to eliminate personally-owned livestock.
Besides using the subtle method of forcing the collective
farmers to consume their privately-held livestock, the
collectives are crdered to step up purchases from the col-
lective members and urban workers. Thus without forcing
outright acquisition of all non-collective livestock, the
Government will eliminate this sector by purchases, forced
slaughtering and the old method of taxation.
Although this decree is proclaimed ostensibly for
the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the current
three ' Tear plan for livestock numbers, it may well be that
heavily increased meat procurements from the collectives have
retarded any natural increase in numbers.
If the decree obtains the desired results, the
Soviet Union will have greatly increased its potential for
emergency procurement and for building sizeable stockpiles
of livestock products. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Peace Co Truss shift from Sheffield to Warsaw
is tactical victory_for._West
The USSR's decision to abandon the planned World
Peace Congress in Sheffield and to hold it instead in Warsaw
represents an outstanding tactical victory for the West.
The conditions under which Moscow ordered the last minute
change prove conclusively that: (1) the British action
caught the Peace Partisans completely by surprise; (2) the
USSR, is not willing to risk a Peace Partisans meeting un-
less the proceedings can be controlled to Moscow's advantage;
and (3) the success or failure of the Peace Movement is an
important element in Soviet foreign policy.
The fact that Moscow waited until literally the
last minute before ordering the switch of the Congress from
Sheffield to Warsaw (despite various indications that the
British might keep out some of the key delegates) shows that
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the USSR placed a, great deal of confidence in the British
sense of "fair play" and in Anglo-Saxon traditions of free
speech and freedom of political action. This is even more
surprising since the British Government had refused to issue
visas to an advance party of Congress organizers who, as a
result, wore forced to meet in Prague. Moscow's failure to
consider the possibility of such extreme British action in-
dicat;s the extent to which the Soviet Government is relying
on the West to "dig its own gave" by following its well-
advertised philosophical and political concepts, and how
effectively the USSR can be outmaneuvered if the West de-
parts from such tactics.
Moscow preferred to admit publicly that it had
been outwitted. by the British action and to risk a tremendous
loss of prestige for the Peace Partisans Movement, rather
than take a chance on a rump Congress in Sheffield which
might have had the features of real debate and differences
of opinion. This was underlined by the elaborate security
precautions during the one-day session at Sheffield City
Hall when Peace Partisan guards sought to prevent admission
into the hall of any but known sympathizers.
The shift to Warsaw involving extensive new
preparations and tremendous expenditure of funds, and the
strong emphasis which Soviet and Satellite information media
gave to the circumstances surrounding the change demonstrate
Moscow's determination to salvage the Peace Partisans Move-
ment despite severe setbacks. It was Moscow's eagerness
for success of the :Pence Movement in the West, and the need
to identify the "Movement" with Western symbols, which first
influenced the Communists to schedule the Congress in Shef-
field and which then blinded them to the obviously impending
action of the British.
The role of the Peace Movement in Soviet foreign
policy which stated quite frankly last summer by Leontyev in
Voprosv filosof is "The champions of peace have set them--
solves a great objective -- to render impossible a new world
war. The task is truly a great one, for never in the history
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of mankind have the masses of the people possessed sufficient
power to prevent war, to hinder the plans of the ruling, ex-
ploiting classes, which have always and everywhere been the
organizers of war....It is now not merely a question of the
imperialists tlosingt their soldiers in the course of the
war; they can lose their soldiers even before the war starts."
Moscow, apparently, is willing to devote all of its propa-
ganda facilities to achieve; this goal. (SECRET)
Inertness of Chinese Congunist d.jplomacy "B"
:and _p i y and s
Recent Chinese Communist diplomatic moves and
propaganda have irritated the Governments of India, Burma,
and Indonesia., and have increased public uneasiness in these
countries with respect to the long term objectives of Commun-
ist China.
Typical examples of, Chinese ineptness are: Peiping
appointed a mediocre ambassador to Indonesia whose principal
qualification for such an assigrun.ent was his long record as
a faithful propagandist for Chinese and world Conununism.
Immediately upon his arrival in Djakarta,, the Ambassador gave
a public address in which he violently condemned "criminal
American aggression" in Asia.and called for a united community
of overseas Chinese, with clear implication that the ?verseas
Chinese should be united to help China itself "crush once and
for all reactionaries and imperialists." When the American
Ambassador protested. this breach of diplomatic courtesy, the
Indonesian press, which is frequently anti-American, gave a
nearly unanimous verdict against the Chinese Ambassador,
More recently, the Chinese Embassy has again become embroiled
in difficulties with Indonesian authorities over the establish-
ment of Chinese consulates in various Indonesian cities,.
A somewhat parallel' situation was created in Burma.,
with the arrival on 5 September of the Chinese Ambassador to
that country. The Chinese community in Rangoon responded on
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this occasion with a display of organized strength which
prompted a Burmese daily to comment that "Rangoon was
turned temporarily into a Chinese community." Burmese
suspicions were aroused also by the Chinese Ambassador's un-
necessarily large staff; by the presence on his staff of a
person suspected of subversive activity, who had fled the
country within a year previously; and by discovery that the
Chinese diplomatic party had secretly brought radio trans-
mitters into Burma. As a result, the Burmese authorities
set up a special branch of the police to watch Chinese ac-
tivities, and ordered registration of all Chinese in Burma.
In India, the Communist Chinese Consul in Bombay
decorated the Chinese booth at a Children's Week Exhibition
with pictures purporting to show Chinese children "being
massacred by Japanese and American irrmperialists." When the
sponsors of the Exhibition ordered the Chinese exhibit
closed, the. All-China Democratic Women's Federation blandly
handed the Indian ' nbassador in Peiping a note expressing
the "surprise and indignation felt by Chinese mothers at
this rudeness." Communist Chinats brusque rejection of the
Indian Government's recent notes protesting the military
penetration of Tibet is an obvious further example of
Chinese Communist indifference to Indian sensibilities.
Deep-seated anti-Western sentiment throughout most
of South and Southeast Asia, predisposes the Governments
and peoples of this area to assume an attitude of tolerance
toward the emergence of any regime in China which is firmly
anti-colonials and therefore anti-Western. This attitude
will not change rapidly. On the other hand, it is highly
improbable that the Stalinist-dominated Government of China
will alter its present undiplomatic handling of international
relations and propaganda. If the overall balance of forces
in the world does not greatly change in the next few years
a gradual stiffening of attitude toward Communist China may,
therefore, be expected in most of the countries of South and
Southeast Asia. (SECRET)
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Evidelag o.f.Soviet intentions with ros ct
to__the Korean conflict
Although Chinese Communist troops have inter-
vened in Korea, the USSR has.not yet shown a willingness to
precipitate global warfare or to expand the Korean conflict
beyond limits subject to a reasonable degree of Soviet con-
trol.
The presence of Chinese troops in large numbers in
Korea, tha massing of several hundred thousand additional
troops in Manchuria, appearance of Soviet-made jet fighters
in the air over the Yalu River border, reports of recently
initiated or accelerated defense preparations in Manchuria
and China, and the increasingly warlike tone of Soviet and
Chinese propaganda, all afford indications of a more militant
disposition. Furthermore, the USSR has alleged that Japanese
troops are being used in Korea and that the US is secretly
negotiating a military alliance with Japan. In this connec-
tion, the recent publication of the text of the Chinese-
Soviet, treaty of mutual assistance (in the Journal of the
USSR Supreme Soviet after recent formal ratification) may
be .significant in view of a key provision that one nation
will come to the aid of the other in case of an attack by
Japan, or any nation allied with Japan. Some observers in-
terpret such indications as evidence of an intention on the
part of Communist China with direct of indirect support from
the Soviet Union to resort to the extensive use of armed
force against UN forces, and possibly against non.-Communist
countries in other areas of the Far East,
There exists, indeed, a distinct possibility that
Communist China will commit itself in the near future to
all-out intervention in Korea. However, the USSR can
scarcely overlook the very real danger that such a commit-
ment would ultimately result in World War III, So far there
is no evidence that the Soviet Union itself is taking any
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extraordinary precautionary measures for coping with an
outbreak of general hostilities in the near future, in
spite of its evident support of the Chinese action.
The recent speech of Politburo member Marshal
Bulganin asserting that the USSR does not have "weak
nerves" or "cannot be scared with threats", as well as the
militant Soviet and Chinese propaganda line and the threaten-
ing Chinese military moves may be designed to emphasize that
the Soviet bloc is not so unwilling to fight that it can be
progressively faced. down wherever there develops a conflict
of interests between East and West,
Regardless of the number of troops Communist China
has actually sent into Korea, there has as yet been no ir-
revocable commitment on its part to any course of action.
Cothmnunist China does not state whether or not its troops
will drive the UN forces out of Korea; that it will negotiate
on the Korean question; or, whether it has limited objectives
in intervening in Korea, or that it will not be content un-
til a Communist regime is restored with complete control of
Korean territory. Thus, the. sum total of what has happened
so far in the Far East is that the USSR and Communist China
have created a real fear of general war. This they did
without jeopardizing to any substantial degree their free-
dam of action, either to: (1) proceed further with military
operations against UN forces aimed at driving there out of
areas they now hold; (2) hold the present positions of
Communist forces in North Korea; (3) abandon those positions
leaving North Korean Communists to fight on as best they can;
or (4) enter into negotiations. In the present situation,
the Commmunist. allies are free to calculate the advantages to
be gained by any of these moves, adjusting their actions, if
necessary, to the US and UN reaction to any given situation.
The reaction of the UN is probably of utmost im-
portance. Having sent Communist troops into Korea without
evoking any violent reaction up to this time, the USSR and
China may calculate that the scope of Korean military opera-
tions can be extended still more without substantial risk.
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CONFIDENTt/(,
If the UN reaction to an extension of these operations
were to approve the bombing of Communist bases and supply
lines north of the Yalu River, it does not necessarily
follow that Communist China would become immediately in-
volved in an all-out war with the West or commit its forces
to an all-out intervention in Korea, which would probably
result in a general war. The Communist leadership can make
as much or as little of UN offensive action as it desires,'
The decision of this leadership to embark on all-out war is
likely to be the result of a cold-blooded decision,'and it
arnears probable that by intervening in Korea, Communist
Chine. had to reckon with retaliation and indeed. expected
that its subsequent course of action might at some point
provoke an attack on Chinese territory. This does not mean,
however, that, the Chinese intervention signified an accept-
of, or invitation to general war with the West.
The fact that the Communist leaders did undertake
an interventio " in Korea reflects a greater possibility of
overt Soviet o'atellite aggression elsewhere. Never-
theless, such action cannot be considered likely in. the near
future, since the Kremlin is probably aware that its in-
stigation of another int3rnational crisis at this time
might explode into global war, which it is still believed
the USSR wishes to avoid. (SECRET)
CONFIDENTIAL
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