WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 43-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA 24 OCTOBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200060004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 24, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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424674
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Latin America Division, ORE, CIA
24 October 1950
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
NORTHERN AREA: In the Caribbean area, revolutionary activity by the Legion
appears unlikely (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: In Colombia, petroleum legislation may be improved (no 2).
SOUTHERN AREA: In Argentina, Per6n is again bidding far Latin American
labor support (90 2). In Bolivia, ?concede prospects have been improved
by an agreement between the government and the tin mining inclustry,
relaxing former exchange regulations (p. 3); but there is renewed MUR
plotting against the government (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in 4
DOCUMENT NO.
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 43-50 24 October 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
le CARIBBEAN AREAs ActjLbL
Caribbean Legion revolutionary action appears unlikely
at this time despite recent reports of accelerated movements by Legion
leaders and of a plot to attack the Dominican Charg4 in Havana. D/LA
believes that the Legion does not have the strength, the government
support, nor the arms required for a successful foray against the
"dictatorships" at this time. Moreover, a token invasion attempt by
the Legion mould be inopportune because, besieee failing any major
objective, it would evoke wiclespread criticise because of the critical
stage of US-USSR relations and of the recent OAS stand on Caribbean
revolutionary activities* Similarly, only irresponsible embers of
the Legion could consider implementing a plot to assassinate Dcminican
Charge Bernadine, as the probable result wield be an even more serious
setback to Legion prestige in the area.
2* COLOMIA: jlerPtelealeLeelalgionMavetajmeMed
President Gomezos request of last week that petroleum com-
pany executives make suggestions as to a revision of petroleum legis-
lation provides further indications of his sincerity in his expressed
desire to encourage foreign capital investment in ColoMbia and may
well result in an improvement in operating conditions for petroleum
companies* It is true that the possibility of improved operating con-
ditions for petroleum companies in Colcmbia may not be of direct -
strategic importance to the US (NSRB study: "Areas to which access
by the US in war is essential or desirable as a result of US defi-
ciencies in resources of vital materials", 24. Aeon 1950, lists
Colcebian petroleum as less than 2% of US requirement in time of
emergency). Hcerever, any improvement in oil production would be con-
ducive to general economic development in Colcmbia and, therefore,
would probably favor the US interest in Colombian stability*
30 ARGENTINA; laaex?aameeleejlije_teorektiejeaerseeeepSia
The Argentine CGT's (Confederacial General de Trabajadores)
roundup -- at government expense -- of labor representatives from
nearly all the Latin American republics for the annual Peronista Loyalty
"circus" may mean that Per is reconsidering the formation of a third
force labor movement in Latin America. The new large-scales Hemisphere-
wide bid for labor approval the first in two years -- follows Per6nes
strong pronouncement of July that the "third position" would guide his
government and the CGT in the sphere of international affairs. Pewees
bid is probably calculated to appeal primarily to non-CIT and non-CTAL
eebor elements. Inasmuch as the CGT is not likely to join the Western
Hemisphere regional organization of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the extent to which Per6n does elicit approval
or support of his labor program will adversely affect the movement
toward ICFTU unification of non-Communist labor groups in Latin America*
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Weekly Contributions, 0/LA, 43-50 24 October 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
One effect of significant adherence of Latin American labor groups to
the Porn program would be the further division of non-Communist labor
elements which could result in advantages for Communist objectives in
Latin America.
44 BOLIVIA Tanzs___Egasaceps2amat,,e,
The recent agreement between the government and the tin
mining industry relaxing the former stringent exchange regulations is
considered highly satisfactory by the mine operators ane improves
Bolivies short-term economic prospects by stimulating tin nroCuction.
The agreement will terminate the "partial sit-down strike which,
according. to Ambassendor Florman, the mine owners have been staging
in protest against the forme regulations. As tin prices increased
from 77 1/2 cents per pound prior to the Korean War to $1.11 1/2 per
pound on 17 October 1950, Bolivia should now be able to take the fullest
advantage of the sorely needed opportunity to market larger quantities
of tin at better priceso
50
Renewed MNR_Eletung
Renewed NUR plotting presents a significant threat to the
hard-pressed Urriolagoitia government in view of the disunity and
increasing political activity of the army. Further, the reported
meeting in Uruguay of recently resigned Chief of Staff, Col. Ricardo
Rios Kesel, who still commands some army sunnort, uith tNR chief,
Victor Fat Estenssoro may indicate that a joint army-CNR revolutionary
attempt is in the offing. Nevertheless, the majority of the army is
believed to be loyal to the government, ane as long as it remains so,
the government, desnite its weakness, should again be able to display
its surprising powers of survival.
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Weekly Contributions, D/A, 43-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 64-50
iie
24 October 1950
(NmEcE -- Colonel Magloire's election as president involves
no significant change in his dominance over the Haitian govern!.
ment. The economic and financial situation has improved.
OamMunism continues to be a negligible factor in Haitimaaffairs.
The military situation is basically unchanged. Foreign relations
have been increasingly satisfactory, particularly vis-a-vis the
Dominican Espana.
--US security interests are favored by the political
stability of Colonel Nagloireos generally popular, economically
responsible, anti-Communist government.)
47.21.20-1
Colonel Magloiregs dominance over the Haitian government continues
unchanged, although his eleCtion as president on 8 October technically
provides a return to constitutional government. Mhgloire, after ousting
Estim4 from the presidency in May, baa been governing through a military
junta from which he resigned only in order to become presidential candidate.
The junta will remain in Dower until a new constitution can be written and
Magloire is formally inaugurated as chief executive. The juntas activitiee
have been generally Well received to date. Some resentment has possibly
resulted from the wholesale removal of Bstirgos partisans from government
positions and their replacement (largely by friends of Nhgloire and his
close associate, Major Prosper), and acme complainta have been made by
intellectuals regarding the inability of Haitians to abide by democratic
processes. However, the fever of the business community has been won by
the junta os willingness to appoint capable civilians to influential posi-
tions, by its cautions economic policies, and by its initiation of public
works projects which will reduce unemployment created by the closing of
the Bicentennial Exhibition,
0/LA estimates that the Haitian government, under Colonel Magloirees
domination, will remain stable and generally popular in coming months.
a2age Haitian economic and financial situation has improved in recent
months. An exceptionally favorable world market for coffee, a rising mar-
ket for cacao, !a. heavy demand for sugar, and a satisfactcary market for sisal
have greatly increased the valve of Haitian exports. Concurrently, revenues
from export taxes have increased, and unusually heavy buying by importers
(in anticipation of war shortages) has provided unexpectedly large import
tax receipts. The junta government, therefore, has been able to reduce the
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Woolci.y Contributions, WU, 43,-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memoranffam 64-50
24 October 1950
treasury deficit considerably (from $1,800,000 in April to $279,000 in
July) and to increase its cash account with the National Bank (free $1,375,-
000 to $10914,000 in the same period). Moreover, it has initiated relatively
sound economic and financial policies, in contrast to the graft and irres-
ponsible spending that characterized the Betim4 administration. It closed
the Bicentennial Mxhibition -- not a profitable enternrise e- in June and
has since been liquidating justifiable major claims connected therewith.
It has, in effect, withdrawn the $3,000,000 defense loan undertaken by the
Estimi administration, at the same time planning more useful expenditures
in the form of a public works program for the city and harbor of Cap Haitione
This program, and various small road building and agricultural projects,
will increase employmente
D/LA estimates that the economic situation will continue to be favor-
able in coping months.
tAlitearz
The armed forces, which are adequate to maintain internal order, con-
tinue to be loyal to Colonel ?declaim. The ouster of President Batime
in May placed military leaders in direct control of the government, illus-
trating the relative solidarity of the army and its strong influence over
political developments. Under the military junta, increased attention is
being paid to necessary military maintenance problems, while the plans of
the Estimd administration for large-scale purchases of military equipment
-- plans motivated largely by civilian schemes for personal profit -- have
been abandoned. The army has obtained an increased approprintion for the
cooing fiscal years but the additional funds will probably be used for
more necessary maintenance and construction purposes.. The small Haitian
coast guard continuos to benefit from improved operations and training
resulting from the efforts of the US Naval Training Mission.
D/LA anticipates no change in the military situation during coming
months.
,&,h2tviza
Communism remains a negligible factor in national affairs. Although
the newspaper La Nation (organ of the Communist-influenced Popular Socialist
Partys sueeessed by President Estimd in November 1949) was permitted to
resume nu. ication in July, this slight Communist gain is outweighed by
Colonel Magloire4a anti-Conmunist attitude and firm political control.
The PS!' itself, which was also suppressed by Estim6, has not engager in
political activities and probably will refrain from doing so.
Under the leadership of Colonel Magloire, Haitian foreign relations
have been increasingly satisfactory. Fallowing the forced resignation of
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Weekly Contributions, 1)/LA, 43-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 64..5d
24 October 1950
President Retimi in May, the Magloire-dominated government was accorded
rapid internatinnal recognition and has shown that it intends to recognize
Battles international obligations. /t has taken definite steps to improve
relations with the Domincian Republic, which had deteriorated due to
Dominican complicity in an anti-Estimd plot (D/LA Weekly, 4 Apr 50)u There
is every indication that the Magloire government will remain friendly to
the United States and will support the US in all major international issues.
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