INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 6

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020046-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: February 8, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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i.N~~R1' ATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CROUP
? _ L SD,MMAR!' NO. 6
For week ending 8 February 1949
Thai Internationa Week
_-
The Rhodes armistice talks have entered their fifth week with little
progress to show. As ECOSOC opened its eighth session, it faced its
largest and most significant agenda to date. A first move of the Soviet=
reconstituted WFTU has been to call an All Asiatic Trade Union Conference
in Peiping
1 FTU launches driy! t~ or anl. Asian lab_or.. The decision of the
World Federation -or Trade Unions, now meeting without British, US or
Dutch representatives, to hold an sil Asiatic Labor Conference in Peiping
next May reflects the mounting interest of the USSR in organizing Middle-
and Far Eastern labor into a cohesive force supporting Soviet foreign
policy aims. Reported adoption of" a $1,500,000 budget to finance travel
and propaganda expenses incidental to they Conference highlights the
importance attached to it by the WFrU Communist leadership, The timing
of the Conference may be an attempt to counteract the announced intention
of the Government-sponsored India National Trade Union Congress to convcns
a May session of Asian labor in order to organize a non-Communist labor
federation (the WFTU is reportedly anxious to 'unify" India?s labor organi-
zations, now divided between the pro-Governrlent unions and the Communists).
To prepare for the Peiping Conference, apparently to be under the direction
of the Soviet WFTU Assistant Secretary General, a WFTU delegation will
shortly proceed to India, Burma, Pakistan and possibly other Asian countries.
A simultaneous decision to effect early affiliation of Japanese trade unions
suggests the wide scope of projected WF1 U activity in this area.. The
Federationes organizing efforts in the Orient will be paralleled by those
of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and Inter-
national Students Union. These two organizations have increased their
membership in Southeast Asia to seven millions through personal contact,
relief activity and the publicizing of colonial and dependent area problems,
and are likely to make additional gains at the forthcoming Asian Youth Con-
ference in Calcutta.
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# Prospects for current, FCQSUC session, The proposed establishment
-of an :conomic Commission for the Middle Fast (FOIE) and the discussion
of President Truman's inaugural offer of American scientific at:d tenr.nicul
aid to under-developed areas will bring two important problems before the
current session of the UN Economic and Social Council., A centre1 issue
in the formation of EC ME will be the question of participation b r Israel,
which strongly favors postponement of the item until the next sef lion
**in order that it may become an original Commission member.** the
relatively low position of the EGME item on the agenda will result in delay
and possibly postponement, but an alternate solution may be to amend the
Commission's proposed terms of reference to provide for the autonittic
admission of Israel and Transjordan when they becomo 1fl members. Whatever
the final solution, it will undoubtedly entail a good deal of political
maneuvering to overcome Arab antipathy, although i*~ is difficult to see
how Israel could be permanently excluded from a Middle Eastern regLonal
commission.
Two agenda items on economic development an 6 technical assisteace will
provide the framework for consideration of President Truman's "bold new
program" of aid to under-developed countries (R'Po:tnt Four" of his ii.augeiral
speech). This program, if effectively implemented through the UN Ir ac-
cordance with the President's avowed intentions, ray prove to be, one of
the most important contributions to the prestige a)f that organizatio:a and
a major long-range factor in US security.
China?ss seain the UN. The progressive extension of Communist r,--le
in China combined with the steady disintegration of the Nationalist Goornm
met must in the not too distant future raise the question of Chinese
re resentation in the UN.. In view of Chins.' s status as a permanent mesnher
of the Security Council, this would be a natter of major significance.
With the confusion attending the shift of the Nationalist capital from
Banking to Canton, the present Chinese delegation is already experiencing
great difficulty in communicating with its Government Dr. Tsiang, the
SC representative, foresees the prospect of a Communist regime claiming
to speak for China in the UN, but anticipates that the present Government
will maintain its claim to be the de lure government of all China even if
forced to take refuge in Frormosa# If a. coaliti(an were formed, however,
it would be difficult to refuse to seat its UN representative; but while
two rival governments continue to divide authority, the present SC incum-
bents occupy a favored position under SC Rules of Procedure. Rule 17
provides that any SC representative whose credentials have been questioned
may continue to sit with the same rights as other :t-epresentatives until the
Council has decided the matter, :''.t would thus require seven votes to unseat
him. As, however, the power of the Nationalist Government approaches the
-point where it becomes unable to fulfill its international obligations,
the UN will find it increasingly difficult to continue the fiction that the
old Government speaks for China.
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Tripc1itanian_attit~ude toward Italian trusteeship. The willingness
with which the Tripolitanians would accept the return of Italian rule will
depend on both the attitude which the UK takes toward facilitating the
return of Italian troops and the ability of local Arab leaders to reach an
understanding with the Rome Government. If the growing sentiment for
Italian trusteeship, largely arising from Italy0s alignment with the West,
results in UN award of Tripolitania to Italy, it Is unlikely that the
British would carry out their previous threat to abandon the area without
awaiting Italian occupation. The vacuum resulting from adherence to this
policy would enable the Arabs to establish a local regime which oould wage
guerrilla warfare when the colony was "captured" following the landing of
Italian forces. Even if the British remain until the trustee assumes
control, Arab resistance would also increase should it become generally
known beforehand that the UK will not use its own forces to re-establish
Italian authority.. On the other hand, if the British gradually turn the
colony over to incoming Italian administrators, police and troops, the
transition will be facilitated,,, although sporadic disorders may be expected
in any case. Were extreme measures of repression employed against such
resistance, serious repercussions could be expected throughout the Middle
'Fast
There apparently is a divergence of opinion between the prominent
Tripolitanian spokesman, Beshir Saadawi, and the local Arab leaders over
whether to negotiate with Italy. Saadawi, reportedly intending to remain
in the country only if his goal of independence is achieved, is continuing
to hold out for this solution. The resident leaders, aware of the noces3ity
of maintaining an escape hatch which would permit their continued unmolested
existence in the colony should Italian trusteeship materialize, are more
desirous of compromise through agreement with Italy. Thus motivated by
self-preservation, the local leaders may overrule Saadawl and seek a nods
vivendi with Rome which would limit Italian immigration and landholding
and would permit Arab participation in the government. In such an event,
they will reportedly counsel the people against resistance, thus lessening
the probability of guerrilla warfare.. The local Arab leaders would be
still further encouraged to adopt a cooperative attitude by the likelihood
that the General Assembly,will insert in any Trust Agreement a proviso
calling for independence in ten years and by the fact that Trusteeship
Council supervision will safeguard the rights of the local population.
A India presses for SC follow-up on Indonesia. The Indians, as the
driving force behind the New Delhi Conference, are intently waiting to
see whether the Dutch will comply with the SC Indonesian resolution and,
if not, what the Council prcposes to do. Prime Minister Nehru and Bajpai
of the Foreign Office have recently emphasized the importance which they
attach to the Security Council e s following through in the Indonesian case
Should the Council fail to do so, the UN would lose prestige throughout
Asia, and renewed agitation for independent action by the Asian Conference
participants would be the probable consequence.
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