INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100010001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1948
• Content Type: PERRPT

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INTZEPATIONAL ORGAMIZMIONS GROUP
max SIIIMARY NO.
For week ending 14 December 190
Ilgekternatioeal yews
Before adjourning its longest seaelon to date, the pri General Aseembly
took "interim" action on Itirgba and Palestine, two iteme which will un-
doubtedly come before the Assembly aealn. Cver Soviet bloc opposition
the OA recommended r he ecognition of t Seoul Gmernment as the only legitimate
Korean administration and extended the life of the ur Korean Commission.
This Commission will supervise troop vithdranal and attempt a rapprochement
between the northern and southern regimes, rn its final. hours, the Assembly
passed a watered-down Palestine resolution establishing a three-power
conciliation commission. After approving the Declaration of Human Rights
and the Genocide Convention) the GA postponed until April consideration
of its only remaining major problem the Italian colonies. Meanwhile, in
Washington, the ambassadors from the five Western Union powers and Canada
opened discussions with the US on the Atlantic' Pact, AS the third UNESCO
Conference ended in Beirut, UNASCO emerged with a new leadership and a
more Pro-Western orientation.
GAnnable to relieve East-West tension. The Paris GA was dominated
throughout by extreme tension between the lieatern Powers and the Soviet
bloc, which the UN has conspicuously failed, to relieve. Although the
ideological isolation of the USSR, as evideneed by the voting record, as
more pronounced than at any previous session, the GA again demonstrated
its powerlessness directly to shape the couree of world events. Where,
however, military forces outside the UN were evailable to contain Soviet
aggreesionithe Assembly could, as on Greece rid Yorea, add to them t'r,.e
backing of world opinion. The GA, rejecting Ssr,riet views, also gave its
approval to the Western thesis on atomic weapons and -conventional armaments.
The Slav bloc's concentration on dilatory tactics succeeded in prolonging
the session and retarding its progress, but, despite the almost uniforri
rejection of its every proposal, the USSR gave no sign of intending to
quit the UN.
While the UN seemed to have no pat solution for the worldgs difficulties,
/the indisputable fact remains that so long an the top representatives of
the great powers meet to exchange epithets the subjects of these powers
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fIrri not compelled to excean. eve-thine MOTO lethal. The GA served to bring
-ha dangere to world peace ender e merciless searchlight. During the
eeeery months of talk at the Peleie de Cheillot, core constructive discussione
e.te uneearwee ;)etween eh. vrkiii,prv leedere of the Western world lookene to-
ee,!d ehe formation of e vest np71nror eerie of Atlantic powers under the
e-mestj the UN Ceerter. eeee reeiorel neets are designed to perfore the
feneticn which, it had orieinalle Open hewn!, would he carried out ir, a UN
' e forne, The Aeeenele detetee any have helped to expose the need for
'h-s alternative.
rciee,rn1 i Mott minute GA adoption of
ee almost oompletele eeeteclepteri resoluticm on Palelatine reflects Ameenbly
eeeillineness to defier 4e in the 1947 partition resolution) the terms
afly solution which would work only if imposed by the UN and'a conseenent
deeision to pernit the situation to work itself out along the lines of the
existing Israeli felt eceopplle After events had pretty well run their
course in Palnetine, the GA finally midopted a simple resolution calling on
Arabs and Jews to conciliate. This action was predicated on the belief
that military and political realities in the Poly Lard would lead the
contending parties to aore eedpe viwen0. Such realities are (1) the
demonstrated military power of inraad; (2) the absorption by Transjordan
of Arab Palestine; and (3) the seaknees and disunity of the Arab League.
The estinate of the situation given to the Commons by Winston Churchill
ahould also exert some influence cm a few of the pro-Arab diehards. '
i?low that the Assembly has anted the chances that the Security Council
7ay recommend Israeli admission to the DN arm inproved. While final 'action
on. its application mupt await the recenvening of the CA in April, the moral
effect of a favorable SC recameendatien might aid the work of conciliation.
A ?,9 action ep.Iedeeeplalikely. The erecipitoue breaking off, by the
Netherlands, of Indonesian negotiations greatly increases the poscibility
that the dispute will be refereed to the Security Council. An SC meeting
can hardly be avoided des-cite the preenutch Belgian representative's-
presidency. With the SC achednled to Worm about 16 December and the
complexion of the Council due t chanee in favor of the Republic on
1 4anuary, it would seem advanteeeoes to the Dutch to have SC consideration
completed prior to that time.
Because of the seriouspese ef' the situation, the Council probably will
not repeat its previous flhot-potato' treatment by which it, plaeued by more
urrent problems, repeatedly toeeed the matter back to its Good Offices
Committee. Despite **representations now being made in Paris by Netherlands
officials** an SC raiority ray he erpeeted to advocate a moderate resolution
both reaffirming the etetee ouo linos and stremethening the Comnittee's
lememittmr*
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funotions to include conciliation -- a solution far short of the reported
**Indonesian desire for an injunction against further Detch'opolioe action*
and for arbitral powers for the present Good Offices Committee.** illarring
a French or Soviet 'veto, such a resolution would gain the seven votes re-
quired for passage. Strong opposition to any SC action will no doubt be
voiced by Franco and Belgium, but a French vet0 Is only anticipated on some
strongly proeHepublican resolution. Meanwhile the Soviet-Ukrainian position
regains an enigma. In the past, the Slav bloc has abstained on the ground
that the resolutions did not go far enough. As the upholder of all anti-
colonial nationalist aspirations, the USSR will probably advocate some
strong anti' Dutch action which will, as before, fail to receive the requisite
another of votes.
...eLyeamteti_SLORuMitmeorkmore closeleAthelegtemIlmerg. The UN
Fducationel, Scientific and Cultural Organization is emerging from its
Third General Conference with a new leadership and with a set of working
programs reflecting the more coordinated participation of its Western
members. The election of the energetic, practical-minded Jaime Torres-
Bodet (Mexico) as Director General, in place. of the quixotic Julian Puxley
(UK), new affords Western UNESCO members, long critical of Huxley's isolated,
idealistic "projects", an opportunity to harness the Organization to
activities more related to Western policy objectives. Representative of
this new trend are the Conference's instructions to the new DO: (1) create
a cultural liaison service among Middle tastern nations; (2) establish a
UNESCO regional office in the Western Hemisphere; (3) work more closely
with the Military Occupation authorities in Germany and Japan towards
distribution of UNESCO publications; and (A) establish effective liaison
with labor elenents in countries requiring educational reconstruction.
Furthermore, by replacing Czechoalovakia with Italy on, the Executive Board,
the Western members of UNESCO have effectively reduced the capacity of the
tastern European members (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) for Obstructing
these aims. .
Leamestnel_'orSkEtitennitisetantline qemegel. Discussions being
held in London between representatives of the VS, UK and France concerning
the Humphrey Committee report on the retention of certain German industrial
plants originally scheduled for dismantlinf have 'encountered French resistance
on the familiar grounds that an increase in German productive capacity
represents a threat to French security. British objections, based primarily
upon considerations of political relations with France and other IAPA members,
have been less vigorous. Although the US has reiterated that it favors
continued destruction or delivery of plants in the "prohibited and restricted
industries" not necessary to meet agreed production levels and that it does
net at present favor raising the 10,700,000 ton ceiling on German steel
production, it has not completely allayed trench fears, especially in
srimittor-
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regard to the latter.. This is indicated by France's uneillingness to
wee to the retentioninrmany of more than one-half the number of
steel plants.resommended WI the ROn report as adviedble to inplenent the
European Reacerery Program. Amite initial %position to the Himiphrey
Committee proposals, hOneVer, the RN and Franca are willing to retain 119
and 121 plants re-Speottenly as Igainst the MA request for 10, plants.
In mite of the strength and. persistenoe of French fears of future German
aggression the extent of agreement solar attained on the question of
plant retention matt_to_indioate_that aobotantial-acceptaRgeOtthe
VS position nee-be obtained as a result of fnethee_pegot3atiene,
Metric co offenekta.
The Latin American Congress for Peace and Democracy, scheduled for Mexico
City in ',Urinary 1949, is the first organized response within the Western
hemisphere to the call for national congreases in support of "lasting
peace and democracy" issued at the August meeting in Wroolau of the Soviet
-
oriented World Congress of Intellectuals. Its integral relationship to
Communist strategy in other parts of the world is indicated by the
prominent organizing roles assigned to the Argentine Communist Ricardo
Erquin,liaison for the Cominform on the International Committee in Defense
of Peace, and to the Czech diplomat, Adolf ID:Meister. These two, currently.
associated in Paris, laid the groundwork for &Latin American "Cominfore"
in secret discussions with the Argentine.Communiet leader Vitorio Codovilla
during the 194/ 'UNESCO Conference. The participation of MAL leaders in
preparations for the impending Congress (reported In LA Weekly, 7 December
1948) lends substance to the report that the Congress will set up local
. labor "committees for peace and democraey" to promote the Communist objective
of denying oil and other war materials to the US and UK. However, it tan
be expected to deal with rattere extending beyond such regional objectives
and to call for support of a Soviet-aponsored disarmament program against
continued "Anglo-American warmongering."
e 0 e
geruaelem_seme.MmArlen. With the CA apparently-milling to
accept any facto settlement agreeable to the Arabs and Israelis, some
solution of the thorny Jerusalem problem short of full internationalization
may eventually occur. **As the US Come General in Jerusalem points out,
the first requisite for an effectively internationalized Jerusalem is a
strong international police force and the UN appears unwilling to provide
either the force or the necessary fteris. Recognising UN unwillingness to
coerce either Arabs or Jews into accepting this plan, the Consul General
suggests, as a practical &elution, (1) dividing the city into permanent
Arab and Jewish areas to be incorporated into Trensjordan'and Israel;
(2) demilitarizing Jerunalem; (3) allowing a Jewish corridor to the coast;
(A) establishing a UN commission in Jerusalem to protect the Holy Places,
mediate any disputes and supervise common services; (5) passing an SC
- 4 -
4Fratirr"
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re/foliation calling for iralediato sanctions nigainst any party violating
The above* provielcas.40 inch a solution right appeal to Israel, which
has long opposed internationalisation of *Investor, and right be acquiesced
in turlransjordan. 21.4011 howovor? be apposed by thn Tatiman and Uose
states favoring fal international control over a city atm* symbolia,
significance.
MP 0-
Nnaa....q...WILI-dadang. The recent recnomic Commission for ksia
and the Per vast muumil Clesiferenoe at Lapetono? Auttralia provided three
eignifioant development,: (1) repetition of tlIwl Asiatic effort to secure
US backing for a Narshall Plan" for Asia to be developed by ECAPt; (2)
another clash between Ottani and anti-eolorda power which come to.
head over the Beating of the Indonesian Republic; and (3) repeated Soviet
efforts to exploit this cleavage by using ECAFE as a sounding board for
anti-imperialist, anti-US propaganda. so far, MATE activity, not yet for
the most part beyond the discussion stage, seems priterily designed to
secure US financing of a sizable industrial development scheme. The Asiatic
countries, pointing to the Marshall Plan for Europe, are insistent upon
obtaining similar US economic aid and their !snevvers will continue to
plague the US. There is some danger that US inability to allocate at
least some of its resources to the Asiatic nations will result in increased
anti-Western sentiment among these oeuntries and give credence to the Soviet
EWE propaganda line that the imperialist Western nations seek to keep the
Asiatic ccononly in a Naemi-colonial" state.
5
S.V.G.Afte/T?-?'
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