COMPREHENSIVE PRODUCTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 2, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Appro 709/-01082A000200100008-
Table of Contents
tion 0 6 6 0 0 0 0
a t9 9906000000 0
The Plan . 0
Geographical Scope 0
Basis for Sub-regional Groupings
Fields of Investigation
*0
4,
Paq;s1
O01.40 00040 0004 00000
O0890004 9004 40000490 4
O000044 00004000000 7
? 0 9 0 .4400000
O 9 0 S 9 4 9 0 0 0 0 6 9 0 9
...... 000 9 90040 008 12
Appendix A (in two parts)
PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL IN TW, PAR EAST
Introduction to AppendixA.. 000008 84 00004 0000
Appendix-A-lt Vulnerability of areas in the
Unfriendly to the United States 9 fa 0 8 0 0 6 ao
1. China and Korea ......... o 6 CC 0 o 0 0 4 o
25X6A8-029
O0O 04 0 0 4 ? 08004
O0000004000000
O0001040004004
o. The Philippines . OO9 a a 4.4899*484089
Burma, Thailand and Indoohina 6 o o
Mala a and the East Indies east to
Far East to Control
25X6A E
3.
4,
5,
004*00640?00
1270 E- 0 0 08 0 o
6, Western Paoifio north of the equator ....
Y. South Asia! India, Pakietan, Ceylon and Afghanistan 0
Appendix A-2s Capabilities for exoroising and denying control of
the Far &5t 000000?0?00006680000900000
Group Is Prospeots for USSR control of all or part of the
Far Eastern region
As Areas oriented toward the USSR: China and northern
Korea 008? 0 4.?09 00400004 00,?
St Areas oriented toward the US: Southern Korea, Japan,
the p201440608, Thailand, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghani-
stan n CC 6 0 0 0 0
Areas o mixe&orIontatlons Burma, aalaya, Indonesia
Area
Area
Area Cs
Group US
Group III:
Group iirst
Area As
Area Bs
Area Cs
and indoohina 00 400 90000900
Prospects of Chinese Coisrunist oontrol of
non-Soviet areas of, Asia., . . 0
Prospeota for continua:Olen or develovent
in non-Communist areas 0
Prospects for creating individual and
opposition to Commmnism
Areas oriented toward the USSR . 0 . Ci0
Ar as oriented toward the US. n 4 o
Areas of mixed orientation 0 CC 00040
09000
China and
of instabil
000rdinated
Special Regional Estimate: Regionalism 0 4 o a o
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP7
8-0
:t3
15
16
17
17
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
24:
26
27
35
oy
55
35
35
53
, Approved For Release 1999
-01082A000200100008-0
Appendix B
POTENTIALITIES OP THE PAR EAST IN A INAa 3ITUATION
Istrodustion to Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . v q , . ', C, C t , -;.0
Area Is Area of present.Soviet domination or influenc . r. 0 43 o 42
Area IIs Northeast Auia complex . . . . . , . . . . ,E
Area III Presently neutral or friendly areas . . . Et ! 3 e o r n SO
Area IVs Potentially Soviet-dominated areas
apaAal Regional Estimates Far East stratsgio matoriats
laValitigatiOna o00 00000,000 ,000 00,.0 0 G. 0
Map
Country groupinga of Far Eastern areas Facing Page 7
""alle211111166'
40409einiii*
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
604444a"11.
Approved For Release 1 . FAIRDP-74-01082A000200100008-0
-.3-
-----
DRAFT
COMPREUEVSIVE PRODUCTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ON THE FAR EAST
INTRODUCTION
This plan represents an initial statement of United States
National intelligence production requirements on the Far East?
Insofar as it is possible to identify total requirements, such a
statement can serve as a comprehensive guide. By means of this
guide, intelligence agencies can formulate individual and coor-
dinated production programs leading to its fulfillment? The scope
of this paper is not restricted by existing production capabilities
of United States Government intelligence agencies, nor by present
availability of source materials neither can its full implementation
be achieved within any brief period of time? Nevertheless, it is
hoped that the dissemination, disoussion, and periodic revision of
this comprehensive intelligence plan will lead to an integrated pro-
duction effort by all United States Government agencies concerned
with the production of intelligence on the Far East?
CONITOTIAL
...=11111161=---
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
? Approved For Release 1999/4$0:22AMME*1082A000200100008-0
CONFIDENTIAL
In additions this program furnishes broad guidance for determining
intelligence collection requirements, The flow of intelligence feau
the field thereby can be synchronized with the needs of the producing
components of intelligence agencies.
CCOCEPT
The perspective within which the Far East is related to United States
security interests is a world setting within which the general objective of
United States intelligence is discernment of the role which the Far East
is assuming, and is likely to assumes in the development of the world
situation. Prom this perspective there has developed a concept for pro-
duction of national intelligence on the Far East, Essential portions of
this concept are voted below from a recent staff study to the NBC:
b, Significance of the Far East
The Far East is a region of large material and human
resources possibly capable of being controlled and organised by an
unfriendly pomor in such manner as to pose a crucial threat to the
security of the United States, This possibility yeas recognized
by Japan and planned in termtief the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. It is probable that Czarist Russia long recognized, and is
aellost certain that the USSR now does recognize this possibility,
Should the Far East region be eventually harnessed by the Soviet
Union and employed in coordination with its Eurasian potentials,
the United States would be confronted with a possibly decisive
Approved For Release 199
1082A000200100008-0
? Approved For Release 1999/09/21-5CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
disadvantage either in armed conflict or in a prolonged struggle
on terms Short of War* From the standpoint of United States
security it is therefore essential to determine What measures
are and can be applied by any power to gain contra of the
Far East, and "hat is the nature of the potentials to be controlled*
co Control in the Far East
Most of the Far East is in a state of major political,
socials, and economic transition, Attendant disarrangements
have permitted the groeth of a. general susceptibility to
manipulation on the part of the region's predominantly illiterate
and unsophisticated populations, subject to deprivation and un-
certainty, and desirous of improving their conditions* There is,
moreover, the particular susceptibility of those abler individuals
Nilo, released by the makening of customary pocial mechaniams,
seek expression, status, and power, and frequently' idehtigr their
aims with nationalistic or progressive goals* Taking full advantage
of these circumstances is a vigorous international communism admittedly
devoted to acquiring dominatioa of the Far East as part of its
objective of world domination* The dynamic nature of commuaism,
its ability to exploit professedly nationalist movements, the
constantly' shrinking portions of the Far East not under its power,
and the difficulty of retrieving, by democratic methods,
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
eq.) or
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : 1082A000200100008-0
DRAFT
any area once lost to it, all indicate the inportanee of
estimating the remaining prospecto for increasing or
lessening control in the Far East by either side in the
US/USSR struggle.
do Potentials of tis Far East
An assessment of the lumen and material potentials of
the Far Fast is of continuing moment to whomever rosy hope
to achieve a position of influenee.or control over all or
parts of that region, On the basis a an enduring eterld
struggle between the United States and the UM, on terns short
of vons, the respective contenders must moognize and totrive to
attain, within whatever limitations their principles impoces
those e3emente of human and material power in the Far East
vfnieh will ultimately help to weigh a world balancie in their
fa,voro Since, Weaver, the threat of war awe/ exists, it
is more urgent to take immediate and oontinuing stook of
existing potentiale for partUtation in war by all or parts
of the Far &etc, Crt particular importance to United States
St:it:amity in this respect is the question of the growth in the
Far East of a comprehensive war?making complex independent from,
but in support of other centers of Soviet power.'
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09,2f :-CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
amilermegeNOP
111,1,Ff
MLW
From the foregoing concept and from analysis of factors and
trends during the past years the following principal considerations,
from a standpoint of national security, have been determined as
essential in governing the planning and production of national
intelligence on the Far East:
a. Possibilitiea for control in the Far East, to include:
(1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to
control unfavorable to the United States.
(2) Capabilities for the acquisition, exercises
and denial of control in the Far East by parties to the
US/USSR struggle.
b. Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peaces
including:
(1) Investigation of the possibility of the formation
of a comprehensive war-making complex in the Far Bast,
independent from, but in support of other centers of Soviet
POW ell
(2) Concurrent and continuing assessment of the
existence or emergence in the Far East of eaements of
power employable by the major contenders in a protracted
world struggle on terms less than war.
Based upon the above considerations, comprehensive analysis of
national intelligence for the Far Fast requires a multiple approach.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
25X6Aument Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
' Approved For Release 1999/09/2U:CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
4131 gah?
44=901011.111ri
DRAFT
This approach tnvolves examination of political, military, economic
and other forces in the region as a whole and its sub-regional
segments to icentify the significance of these areas and of developments
within them an they appear in a regional perspective.
GEOGRAPHICAB SCOPE
Comprehensive intelligence estimates required by conditions
and develoyments centering in the Far East and of strategic signifieb
canoe to ths United States, 9reolude a definitive, exclusive geo-
graphical definition of "the Far East." In general, however, concern
for the possible potential for self-suffioiency in the Far East, and
for broad military, economics and political considerations, requires
attention to the areas betveen 600 East and the International Date
Line (excluding those portions of the USSR lying west of 1000 East).
Some considerations nigh; even require concern for a larger area, and
many for a smaller aaeo
This type of area coverage is dictated specifically by the need
to consider particularly the economic) potential of eastern Siberia
and the industrial and military potential of South Asia, insofar as
these may be essential to strategic evaluation of the Far East region.
The need to consider eastern Siberia in forming a strategic evaluation
of the Far East does not preclude consideration of this area in
Approved For Release 19
DP79-01082A000200100008-0
' Approved For Release 1999/09/21 ? CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
DRAFT
estimates concerned primarily with the rest of the USSR; nor does the
need to pansider South Asia with the Far East exclude need to consider
this area with the Middle East. Likewise, concern for conditions and
developments centering in the Middle East or the USSR may require attention
to pertinent factors in the Far East. The end result of this type of
approach for all regions of the world should be au integrated estimate
of the United States global security position.
BASIS FOR SUB-REGIONAL GROUPINGS
For purposes of analysis the countries of the Far East must be
arranged incurious adbereglonal grouping'. These are determined by
the implications for the individual areas of vulnerability (see
APPOIldilka), political orientation (see Appendix A-2) and the
potentials for economic integration (see Appendix: B)0
Appendix Al is essentially an amusement of culneraility
of the Far East to control unfriendly to the United States based on
analysis according to tentative stratcAiRsropfmi
NiKEAwithin the Far Eastern region.
I;
blitenonboo
Appendix h-2 is devoted primarily to consideration of internal
and external political intellieenee estimates. The. common denominator
in this field of investigation is political orientation.
Approved For Release 199 DP79-01082A000200100008-0
?
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 1082A-000200100008-0
Mgr
25X6A
Appendix B has other area groupings as tba basis for development
of specific area and regional projects, These area groupings are
developed according to preliminary estimate of thetr actual or potential
economic integration and to assuaptions (or conclusions) regarding
vulnerability. of particular countries to unfriendly. control (Appendix.
A-1) and the prospects of eontrol in particular countries as Indicated
by their political orientation - appendle: A-2), Thus, one vrea
groepingsin Appendix B .actual and potential-intogtion of
the. Soviet Far Bast 'with China (ineluelingilanchuria) and northern
25)4E076
United etates policy for tha Far Mast currently is being re-ermined
from the perspective of the region ae autwle and its relation to United
States securdty. Analysis ofths pertinent problems involving United
State v security in each country requirea examination in a regional context?
It is believed that the groupings deveribad above will, in the fieal
analyeiso permit comprehensive assesseant of the region and the countries
within, the region which is necessary to evaluation of the interests and
problems affecting United States national. eacuritir in the Fr 3w
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/
-17/082A000200100008-0
T1I! siatejs
The above major spheres of investigation suggest Amur general types
of intelligence estimates:
(1) pomprehensive Estimates for the Ion
(An assessment of relationships of 221t_sipa......_e factors in their
1:20.213ja significance - Illustrations: "Strategic Importance
of the Far &st' OR 17-49; "Isplications for United States
Security of Developments in Asia" - 126-397.)
(2) xv?..eitemizve Estimates for a Selected Area _or
(An assessment of muij1e--fotore within a selected area or
aom... with due consideration foviegionai as vela as area significance
Illustrations: "Probable Developments in Chine" - ORS 4549;
"Vulnerability of a Comm:list Government of China to External and
Internal Pressures" - ORB 72-49).
(3) Re Estimates.
(An assessment of a single factor ina riasz.ial perspective -
Mustration: "Vulnerabilitiee of Communist Movements in the Far
East", 1/1,4094.)
.1.14rist es
(An exhaustive anal,ysis confined to a .61'jyake aul_ct. within a
_area or couno as typically performed by basic research
units within the IAC Agencies.)
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA- MA0,00200100008-0
ISIAFT
FIE= OF IHVESTIGATXON
in general accord sith the concept for national intelligence
on the Par Shot, individual fields of investigation are set forth
in Appendices under the f011osing najor headiness
bosU Possibilities for Control in the Far East
00.).10 Venerability of areas in the Far East
to control unfriendly to the United
States.
(4)-2, Capabilities for exercising and
denying control of the Phr East
Potentialities of the Far East in a war
situation.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
? Approved For Release 1999/09/2 .it-01082A000200100008..0
rem
APPENDIX A
(in two Parts)
POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTROL IN TEEM EAST
Introduetion
In the long run the magnitude of the Far Eustis atrategic significance
to United States national security rests in the degree to which the major
components of the region may comprise a self-contained war potential
capable of being brought under control of a pouar unfriendly to the United.
States. Insofar as thia control peemitv development and exploitation of
such a mar potential, the consequence could be critical and decisive in
any conflict involving the United States. (Cf. ORE 1749). The pre-
eminent objective of Soviet policy is world domination. Pursuant to
this end, the USSR now is believed to be employing all available social
tactics and parer pressures, including strategic deployment of Soviet
forces and use in combat of indigenous armed forces, to manipulate and maneuver
into control of all of the Far East. Conseqpent to existence of this
objective and to the significance that would attend Soviet success in the
Far East, it becomes essential to determine extent of the prospects for
friendly and untedeeuily control of the Far East and to identify forces
whereby prospects for control by the USSR can be decreased and contra
denied.
/t is proposed to estimate the prospects for control of the Far Seat,
friendly to the United States or those favoring the USE, byte? general
approaches to the problem: (a). an area by area examination of vulnerabillties
to forces of unfriendly contra (coveriag political, economic, sociological?
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/0 1082A000200100008-0
DRAFT
psychological and military considerations) with particular regard for
interdependence of the suheregioaal areas in resisting such control;
and (3) a regional examination of the forces of control (friendly or
unfriendly to the United States) that are amenable and that mey become
available within the region. Philo the approach involved in an assesexent
of vulnerabilities under (a) is apparently negative, it is, nevertheless
considered sound because a true assessment of vulnerabilities -frill Emmett
feasible positive meaeures for reducing the vulnerabilities or for
exploiting factors of strength or invulnerability. This concerted
application of ter approaches to determination of prospects for control
i.e., through (e) vulnerabilities and (b) capabilities for exploiting
vulnerabilitiet frequently involves concern for identical factors in
both approachea; but methods of employing these factors in developing
assessments vary in accord mdth the type of approach.
Both approaches take cognizance of the fact of incompatible differences
in objectives and methods of the Soviet government and the United States
mhich tend to impose severe limitations on the measures and counteremeasuree
available to the United States,
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
mno cwrPRT
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 ak-ADP79-01082A000200100066-20
APPENDIX A-1
VULNERABILITY OF AREAS IN THE FAR PAST TO CONTROL UNFRIENDLY TO THE US.
The concept of "unfriendly control" herein is a control that favors the USSR.
Actual Soviet control might vary in nature and in degree from effective indirect
influence to military occupation or outright incorporation. In whatever degree the
control of an area were unfriendly to the US it is apparent that the USSR endeavors
to exploit such control for its own purposes.
In extending its control or influence over areas of the Far East, the USSR cen
be observed to employ the following general types of measures, separately and in
combination:
(1)
Political, sooiologioal, and psyoholoeioalo
Exploitation and perversion of nationalistic ambitions and of internal
Crictions growtno out of legitimate or rabricated and induced economic
and political grievances.
(2) Economic.
Penetration, pressure and control.
(3) Armed force
Employment oc4 threatened use of military or unconventional armed force by
Soviet or indigenous Communist troops or personnel.
In a period not involving hostilitiee between the US and the USSR, expected
emphasis would be on (1) and (2), above, but not to exclueion of (3) as it involves
use of non-Soviet indigenous armed forces. Under conditions of general hostilities
involving forces of the US and USSR the emphasie would be on (3), supplemented by
(1) and (2). It must be recognized, hmever, that, in effect, even now the USSR
is employing armed forces to obtain its objectives, even though the preponderance
of such forces is non-Russian indioenou forces, occasionally oiven inducement or
moral support by the threat or encouragement resultino from the proximity of Soviet
armed force.
Approved For Release 199942082A000200100008-0
pr,
Approved For Release 1999/09/21.; q1A-FDP79-01082A000200100008-0
For assessment of the vulnerability of each strategic ares, one or several
general intelligence investigations may be involved according to the complexity of
the subject and depending on the availability of timely studies. Moreover, the
__?
following list of genual fields-of investigations is only tentative? Eaoh suggested
field necessarily will be subjected to more detailed analyeis as the production pro-
grams progress It is likely that such analysis in the light of intervening develop-
ments will require revision of the list.
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
Vulnerabili of China and Korea to extension and consolidation of Communist
oontro 0
Problem: To assess the prospects for extension and consolidation of
Communist control in China and Korea.
Approved For Release 1999/09/716M1M979-01082A000200100008-0
4?1?1????,?????? iLwT
' Approved For Release 1999/094,V : CIA-RDP79-01082A0 a
00200100008-0
Scope; An assessment of the Soviet and non-Soviet Communist capabilities
for extending and consolidating Communist control in the sub
regional mainland area of China and Korea in relation to non-
Communist vulnerabilities, taking into account the political,
economic, sociological, psychological and military strengths and
weaknesses of opposing groups. A summation of subsidiary country
assessments available or in process ole' production.
2. 13.1111,1=bilnY...a.--thfiXa...,a1MLAW,11:-....taLl ..e231?arettUL-at-b-Liat?illfluencit
Q.L.S9ntEgle
Problem; To assess the vulnerability of the offshore island chain to direct
or indirect Communist penetration.
25X6A
Scope; Assessments of the vulnerability of this strategic are to Soviet
measures of control short of war and, alternatively, in a war
situation should be made under varying assumed conditions of US
and Soviet influence or control in adjacent areas listed below,
and would be based on similar assessments of the individual
components of the island chain. Alternative assumptions under
which assessments should be made ares
(a) Continuation of the cold war under the following conditions;
(1) Alidue quo continues in all adjoining areas exceptT&F
effective consolidation of Communist control in China.
(2) Southern Korea comes under Communist domination and
strong Soviet influence; all of China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan come under CCP control. Strong Communist trend
in SEA and steedy weakening of Ilestern powers position
in that area.
(b) An active war under conditions (a)(1) and (2), above.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
5X6A
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
?Approved For Release A9911)5/27 . - /J-01082A0M90100008-0
- 19 -
25X6A
a- Pk........1e1telP,111Meetee-A.CaleetteetIVIEsiell.
Problem; To assess the vulnerability of the Philippines to direct and indirect
Soviet penetration.
Scope; The assessment should cover vulnerabilities both prior to and after
an assumed outbreak of US-USSR hostilities, and should have due re-
gard for all measures of penetration available to the USSR.. Bach
of the following assumed situations should be covered specificaly;
(1)
(2)
Independence of southern Korea maintained, Japan Wed the Reeikeue
still under US occupation, Taiwan under non-Communist Chinese
control, and Hong Kong still under effective British control up
to the outbreak of hostilities; and
Southern Korea and Japan under Communist domination and aligned
with the USSR; China, Hong Kong and Taiwan under firm CCP control.
with free Soviet military and economic access thereto. In
addition the assessment should consider the effect on the con-
clusions in situation (2) of:
(a')
esceneaneyen eovietTenfluence,in
1. Burma, Thailand, Indochina
ii. Indonesia-Malays, as welleand
(b) US withdrawal from the RyUkyes.
3.ttgleepar.....B_RX:Ma,_5_1114..k4n4?....M14adaghtla tans ion.
Problem; To assess the vulnerability of this principal food surplus area to
direct or indirect Soviet penetration.
Scopes Assessment should cover vulnerabilities of this sub-regional area to
to all measures of Soviet penetration both in an extension of the
cold war and in a period of generel active hostilities involving the
US and USSR under each of the following assumed situations existing
prior to or at the outbreak of such hostilities.
ae China comes under early CCP consolidated control; the
1.42 is maintained in Hong Kong, southern Korea and the offshore
island chain, established authority in Burma and Indochina
remains in tenuous control.
b. Same as a, above, except that southern Korea comes under Communise
domination, CCP control extends over Hong Kong and Taiwan, US
occupation forces are withdrawn from Japan pursuant to a peace
Approved For Release 1ataia11ikr4ARADP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 16 ...94:3CTAI:RDP79-01082AdeldA100008-0
treaty by the end of 1950, but the present degree of US
influence in the Ryukyus and the Philippines is maintained.
a. All US influence in China and Korea and the offshore island
chain is eliminated.
The need for separate country studies would depend on assessment
of available material.
4. Vulnerability of Malaya and the East Indies (east to 1270 E) to Soviet
DIEEEL2a-
Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the Asiatic source of essential
strategic materials to direct or indirect Soviet penetration.
Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet
penetration under each set of assumed conditions listed below and
should have particular regard for the effect on US accessibility
to the essential materials of the region. Alternative assumptions
under which assessment should be made are:
25X6A
a. In a continued "cold war" with present US control maintained
in the offshore island chain, China under consolidated CCP
control, growing instability or growing Communist influence
in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, and continuation of the
present situation in Malaya, Indonesia, and South Asia.
b. Following an *Itutbreak of US-USSR hostilities with all China
under consolidated Communist control, the US eliminated from
Japan, US bases maintained in the Ryukyus and the Philippines
increased instability or unfriendly control in Burma, Thailand
and Indochina, and continuation of present situation in South
Asia.
c. Same as a and b? above, except for significant increase of Soviet
influence or control in soath Asia.
Approved For Release1 litiRDP79-01082A000200100008-0
amilmammaiiimamimmiamm 1.41,JT
.Approved For Release 1999/(:19/i+ :tIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
b. Soviet control of, or predominant influence in all eastern Asia.
6. Vulnerability of the Western Pacific north of the equator.
Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the Western Pacific (north of the
equator) to Soviet penetration.
Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities in time of US-USSR
hostilities only, but should include consideration of all measures
of Soviet penetration. Specific areas covered should exclude the
Asian offshore island Chain and the Aleutian Islands, Assessment
should cover the following assumed situation:
a* Firm non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain
and the Aleutians;
b. Continued non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island
chain but US control of the Aleutians eliminated; and
c. Soviet control of both the Asian offshore island chain and the
Aleutians.
7. Vulner2.12111.1_21outh Asia
Problems To assess the vulnerability of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon
and Afghanistan) to Soviet penetration.
Scope; Assessment should cover vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet
penetration both in a continuation of the present "cold war" and in
a situation of open US-USSR hostilities under each of the following
assumptions:
a. Strong Soviet influence in eastern Asia not appreciably ex-
panded beyond present limits.
b. Strong Soviet influence or control established throughout
China (including Taiwan), and in Indochina, Thailand and Burma.
c. Western control substantially eliminated from the mainland of
eastern Asia and the major offshore islands including Indonesia.
Approved For Release 19991/6-11D11171082A000200100008-0
*Approved For Release 1999/09/P79-01082A00V2i9M00008-0
APIENDIX A-2
CAPABILITIES FOR EXERCISING AND DEN/IMG CONTROL OF THE FAR EAST
Any of four general conditions affecting the US security position in Asia is
possible under complete or partial control by a porer or power* friendly or unfriendly
to the US, depending on the degree of control and the political orientation of the
=trolling force
(1) Capability for independent, direct offensive threat to US national security,
based on a self-sufficient mar-making coeplea, consequent to complete con-
trol of the Far East by a power unfrtend.4 to the US and its marshalling of
the Far Eastls war potential? (It is estimated that only the USSR has a
capability for realizing this potential within the practical future ? Basis
for estimate of the probability of Soviet realization of this potential is
provided in Groep I, belawo)
(2) Positive denial to the US of elements of major strategic interest without
posing a capability for independent, offensive action against US national
security, consequent to limited control by a power or powers unfriendly to
the US? (Only the USSR and/or China is capable of creating this condition
which is less critical than that under (1) above, Basis for estimate of
the degree of attainment of this condition is provided in Group II, below,)
(3) Incidental denial to the US, and to both friendly and unfriendly porera:
of elements of strategic advantage, consequent to conditions of instability,
(Group III, below).
(4) Positive availability to the US and denial to powers unfriendly to the US
of elemente of strategic interests, consequent to maintenance of stability
and development of the will and ability for individual coordinated opposition
to Communism in Far Eastern areas. (Group IV)0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
' 'Approved For Release 1999/09pLiediATP79-01082A000200100008-0
- 23 - 1.1.1.1.i
The approach to determination of the potential for control and denial depends
partly on political orientation of the areas* Because the strategy and problems of
expanding Communism differ with the general political orientation of various countries,
but are relatively similar in countries of similar orientation, the countries of the
Far East are grouped in three political groupings for purposes of setting up these
fields of investigation. These areas have been grouped according to estimate of
political orientation up to 31 December 1952 or at the prior outbreak of hostilities
(according to ORE 17-49):
(1) Areas oriented towards the USSR: China and northern Korea0(Area A)*
(2) Areas oriented towards the US: all of the independent and common-
wealth nations (except China and Burma). (Area 8).
(3) Areas of mixed orientation: Burma and all of the colonial areas.
(Area C)0
It is estimated that the USSR, possibly with the instrument of China, is the only
power unfriendly to the US possessing any potential for bringing the war-potential
of the Far East under single, centraized control* Consequently, intelligence pro-
duction designed to determine "Capabilities for exercising and denying control in the
Far East" can be focused on two principal strategic considerations --
(1) policies, objectives and capabilities of Communism (Soviet and
indigenous).
(2) limitations restricting attainment of these objectives.
Proceeding with this approach, the following investigations should be conducted,
leading to: (a) determination of the prospects for unfriendly and friendly control
of the Far East as this control may produce any of the four conditions outlined above,
and (b) identification of forces whereby prospects for unfriendly control can be
decreased and prospects for incidental denial to the US of strategic advantages can
be minimized*
Approved For Release 1999/0910*****WW9-01082A000200100008-0
'Approved For Release 1999/091rrife~79-01082A0913pA100008-0
GROUP I
PROSPECTS FOR USSR CONTROL OF ALL OR PART OF THE FAR EASTERN REGION AND
IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.
AREA A - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea).
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
SoviAtzolicisttcAlsstate and caEabilities
a. Subject - Soviet ob ectives and policies in China.
Problem - To identify Soviet objectives and policies for attaining those
objectives in China.
Scope - This area of investigation is directed at analyzing Soviet political,
economic, and military aims, tacties and strategy in China:
including consideration of methods and pressures employed, intent
towards political, economic and military integration of the area
with the Soviet Far East, strategy in employment of China as an
instrument of Communist expansion throughout the Far East, and
distinctions in Soviet intent in China proper and in the areas of
Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang that separate China proper from
the USSR.
b. Subject - Soviet objectives and policies in Korea
Problem - To identify Soviet objectives and policies for attaining those
objectives in Korea.
Scope - Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and
probable political, economic, psychological and military
pressures exerted by the USSR on these several areas: and the
effectiveness and significance of those pressures in achieving
Soviet control of the northeast Asian complex as a self-contained,
direct offensive threat on US national security. Concemashonld
be given to the distinction betreen control that enhances Soviet
ability to pose an offensive threat to the US and control that
merely denies to the US access to strategic materials of the area,
AliwbomemPrim
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
'Approved For Release 1999/09/416GANX79-01082A0ORM00008-0
- 25
c. Subject - Soviet ca bilities for attainingtgfective control of a) China
t_20Ei_b Manchurial_1121074 and-ROgii_and (C) orea.
Problem - To estimate the degree to which the USSR is and may be able to
gain effective control of these portions of Northeast Asia.
Scope - Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and
probable political, economic, psychological and military
pressures exerted by the USSR on these several areas, and the
effectivenss and significance of those pressures in achieving
Soviet control of the Northeast Asian complex as a self-
contained direct offensive threat on US national security.
Concern should be given to the distinction beteeen control
that enhances Soviet ability to pose an offensive threat to
the US and control that merely denies to the US access to
strategic materials of the area.
2. 'Limitations on Soviet .22EREin
a. Subject - InherentPlimitiK factors in Soviet e23ansion
Problem - To identify and assess the force of inherent factors limiting
pursuit of identifiable Soviet objectives.
Scope - This field will be explored by several studies designed to identify
and evaluate the force and effectiveness of factors that
inherently impede both Soviet and native Communismos progress in
gaining control and dffective consolidation of China and Korea
as parts of the northeast Asian complex. Particular concern should
be given to - problems that confront the USSR in its endeavor to
gain practical, though not apparent, subservience of Communist
China; effect of economic inadequacies and dependence as elements
denying or retarding Soviet development of political, economic
and military integration of a self-sufficient Far Eastern complex;
administrative and technical inadequacies; factionalism; forces
of moderation (particularly political, sociological and psychological
that may produce a moderating or obstructionist effect upon
executive plans for Communization of the areas within the northeast
Asia complex; and resistance movements and organizations (armed
or otherwise).
b. Subject - Potentials of US strength for active opposition to Soviet measures
-____--, _ _ _
2DEEEETT-
Problem - To determine effectiveness of US exploitation of elements of
strength with object of attaining neutralization of Soviet
:r rrnn
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
25X6A
Approved For Release 1999/09/2"fr eMr79-01082A000200400008-0
- -
capabilities at least, and, at most, of obtaining active
alignment with the US of forces of power in opposition to
Communism in the northeast Asia complex.
Scope --This field of investigatIon should be in two phases (1)
identification of factors (particularly political, economic and
psychological that can be brought under US control), and (2)
assessment of effectiveness of exploiting these factors by various
available means.
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
1. PolieleaLobjective5Aekcapabilities of the USSR and native Communist moveats
eet
Easi TrrZCTiiaErlr-
r_?,.../..?????...??.?*A?????* ,????????.1.0.1+.4..m. ?
a. Subject - Soviet objectives and policies:.
Problem - To identify objectives of Communism and methods employed in pursuit
of those objectives.
Scope - Country-by-country assessments of political, economic, psychological
and military methods employed by the USSR towards the end of
destroying the existing governments of these areas. Particular
concern should be given to Soviet and Communist tactics and
strategy as they (a) are directed at decreasing existing
political and social stability, and (b) employ direct Soviet
attacks, the force of indigenous Communist movements, and the
instrument of other Far Eastern native Communist movements
(particularly Chinese).
b. Subject - 25% ca ab lities for reorienting and communiein the independent
areas o the FEEJE-Witi-40 &lima .
Problem - To estimate degree to which these areas may be caused to incline
to the USSR.
Scope - Country-by-country, and where appropriate, subregional assessments
of Communist capabilities for exploiting elements producing
USSR-inclination and of native capacity for counteracting their
vulnerabilities b7 controls and/or reform. Emphasis should
include political, economic, psychological and military vu1nerabili/7
of these areas in their independent positions and in their re-
lationships among other nations, and capabilities for eliminating
the elements of vulnerability.
Approved For Release 1999/QQ71 ? scia4Dr79-01082A000200100008-0
'Approved For Release 1999/09/
9-01082A0002a00008-0
2. Limitations on Communist ca Abilities in these areas
M?10.104:0,1,,l01?1?11.111..
a. Subject - Inherent limitin factors in Commun st expansion.
? , _
Problem - To identify and assess the force of factors limiting pursuit of
Communist objectives.
Scope - Country-by-country studies, and several subregional studies (see
below), designed to identify and evaluate the factors that
impede effectiveness of Communist endeavors to reorient these
areas to the USSR. These will deal with political, economic,
social, religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and
military (internal security) factors that limit effectiveness
of Communiet endeavors. Certain regional studies also should
be done on Chinese participation in Far Eastern Communist
movements as a limiting factor; and religion, particularly
Islam and Catholicism, as limiting factors's
be Subject - Potentials of US stretigth.
Problem - To assess US capabilities for attaining friendly neutrality of these
areas at least, and at most their active Alignment with the US
as a positive force in the Western conflict with Communism con-
sequent to existence of the foregoing limiting factors.
Scope - These studiee? country-by-country and, where appropriate, areawise?
should (a) identify factors of strength limiting effectiveness
of Communism within each country and areawise, (b) consider
alternatives available to the US, to the area and to the countries
for exploiting the factors of strength and decreasing the factors
of vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness of various courses
of coordinated action designed toetrengthen the individual and
collective will and ability in their opposition to Communism in
concert with the West.
Area C - Areas of mixed orientation (Burma and the colonial areas of Malaya Indonesia
and ridociJ
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
1. Smkt_Elicies______Letartives feLsa2abilities in.colonial areas and Burma.
a. Subject - Soviet objectives al14.221.19ies
44111m4POWNWP
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
'Approved For Release 1999/094NR41111141M79-01082A0002N100008-0
- 2 -
Problem ? To identify Soviet objectives, policies and methods.
Scope ? Country and area studies emphasizing Soviet methods of enticing and
increasing the USSR orientation of these indecisive areas, with
particular concern for identifying Soviet methods of creating and
exploiting vulnerabilities, and Soviet techniques of applying
direct (by the USSR) and indirect (by instruments of the USSR, as
Overseas Chinese ) pressure. Differences in objectives, policies
and methods as they apply to different areas also should be
identified?
b. Subject ? Communist capabilities for orientin to the USSR areas of mixed
or en at on.
Problem To assess capabilities of Communists for gaining control and USSR
orientation of these areas.
Scope ? Country-;by-country, and where appropriate, subregional assessments
of (a) vulnerability of these areas to Communist pressures, and
(b) capabilities for counteracting their vulnerabilities.
Emphasis should include political, economic, psychological and
military (especially internal security), vulnerabilities in
their independent positions and in their relationships among
other nations, and capabilities for eliminating the elements of
vulnerability.
20 Limitations on Communization of these areas and US ? otential for etre hen the
.apo togn ng rgnmmntt t toperm ava a ity
their resourcesat least, and of creat -1-thaniri foririndent
ost? with the est at most.
a. Subject ? Inherent limit' fact_m_earsin ist exun ansion,
Problem ? To identify and assess the force of factors limiting pursuit of
Communist objectives.
Scope ? Country?by?country studies, and several subregional estimates,
designed to identify and evaluate the factors that impede
effectiveness of Communist endeavors to orient these areas
to the USSR. These should deal with political, economic, social,
religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and military
(internal security) factors that limit effectiveness of Communist
endeavors. Special concern should be given to the native
characteristics and force of nationalism withparticular concern
for the nature of any association between nationalist movements
and Communism and for factors that encourage or discourage that
association. Subregional studies should include assessment of
cultural homogeneity and Islam as limiting factors, and of the
Approved For Release 1999/0916166Sfiasimagoi-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : 1A-RDP79-01082A0004200400008-0
interdependence of these areas among themselves' and with
other Far Eastern areas.
b. Subject - Potentials of IStxmAh:.
Problem -
To assess effectiveness of various courses of action available to
the US in the light of the foregoing limiting factors and other
potentials aimed at strengthening the alignment of these areas
with the US and of developing within them the will and ability
for independent and collective opposition!) in concert with the
West, to Communism within their area") and the Far East.
Scope - These studies, country-by-country and areawise, should (a) identify
factors of strength limiting effectiveness of Communism within
each country and areawiee? (b) consider altennatives available
to the US, to the area and to the countries for exploiting the
factors of Communist vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness
of various courses of coordinated action designed to strengthen
the individual and collective will and ability in their opposition
to Communism in concert with the West. Particular concern should
be given to means available for exploiting nationalistic ambitions
of these areas as a means of creating the will to oppose Communism,
and the requirements for creating within them the ability effec-
tively to oppose Communization within their areas and the Far
Easto
mintimmottmmi
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
miiimmoilegimus
Approved For Release 1999/09/21-: dA:RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
GROUP II
PROSPECTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF CHINA AND NON?SOVIET AREAS OF ASIA AS
AN INDEPENDENT FORCE IN THE FAR EAST AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
1. Policisetlee2tixstemlaerabilities of Chinese Communism.
a. Subject ? Chinese Communist objectives and policies in China.
ormakonvolownwe v.eaerw.ftwoftepaawymowro..oag?wavvram....
Problem ? To identify Chinese Communist objectives and policies for control
of China.
Scope ? Estimates of the objectives of the Communist government of China.
To include the basic demographic, economic, military and
political considerations which determine the problems of China
under any government; the theory of the "New Democracy" the
transition stage of the Chinese revolution; and the CCP2s great
contribution to the theory and practice of international
Communism. Concern should include consideration of China's
intent tu relations with the USSR, and of evidence of China's
subservience to or independence of the USSR, and of China's
policies towards Western nations.
be Subject ? Chinese Communist objectives and cies in Asia.
Problem ? To identify objectives, policies and methods of the Chinese Communist
government towards the countries of Asia.
Scope ? Investigations of the intent and methods of the Chinese Communists
in Asia with particular concern for their pursuance of their
announced objective to aid in the Communization of Asia. Chinese
methods, particularly as they employ overseas Chinese residents
and manipulate native movements, should be identified? Special
concern should be given to China's intent to control these
governments either as an instrument of, or as independent of the
USSR?
c. Subject ? Capabilities of the Chinese Communist evernment to gain and maintain
irMEERTIFORFErainirEg77-----
Approved For Release 1999/09/2r: Ca-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
siii~0100 Le Jees
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 ?PtIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Problem -
Scope
To estimate the capabilities for the Chinese Communist government
to gain and retain effective control of all of China.
- Studies of ability of the Chinese Communist government to gain
and maintain popular support, to bring under its control the
essential political, economic and military (including inter-
national security) forces, and to exploit these to a degree that,
with possible accompanying Chinese effectiveness elsewhere in
Asia, will create positive denial to the US of elements of
strategic interest without posing a capability for independent,
offensive action apainst US national security. Concern should
include capability for independent, offensive action against US
national security; also capability of the Chinese to pursue
their interests (as identified in "a" above) in Manchuria,
Mongolia and Sinkiang, as well as the other border areas of Tibet,
the northwest and Taiwan, with special concern for any conflict
of interest that may exist between China and the USSR in these
areae.
d. Subject -
Problem -
Scope
Capabilities for the CommunilLevernment of Chinal2A1Atmlaml
To estimate capability of the Chinese Communist government for
bringing about creation of Communist governments in other areas
of Asia*
- A group of studies directed at estimating effectiveness of Chinese
methods ("b", above) in creating capability for bringing Communist
regions into control of other Far Feistern areas, Special concern
should be given to identity and appraisal of resources available
to the Chinese, and to vulnerabilities within the areas to
Chinese exploitation of these resources,
2. Limitations on Chinese Communist control of China and on China's capabilitzla
a. Subject - Limitin factors in Chinese Communist consolidation of authority
controland commuli-iglac?Mira:?
Problem - To identify and estimate the force of factors that inherently
limit Chinese Communist capabilities for Communization of China,
Scope
- Assessment of the effectiveness of limiting factors in the
Communization of China. Particularly to be considered are the
nature, extent and effect of China's economic inadequacies and
dependence; administrative and technical inadequacies;
Approved For Release 1999/09/flii!tiMID79-01082A000200100008-0
1vr prAALnl
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 ;AIA-RDP79-01082A00162bliA 00008-0
factionalism; government foreign policy, particularly vis-avis
the USSR, as this may create a limiting factor; resistance from
forces of moderation and traditional basis for regimentation;
obstruction from neighboring areas that may restrict Chinavs
success to sources of support (esp. financially) upon which China
habitually has depended*
b. Subject -Limiting factors in capabili ctliaTt2_21aaaulls_latsliarla
out as ern areas.
Problem - To identify the factors and forces in Asia that impede progress
of Chinese Communists in pursuit of their announced objective to
aid in Communization of Asia.
Scope - Countrr-by-country and area estimates of the forces in Asia that
tend to or do impede Chinese endeavors to promote establishment
of Communist regimes throughout Asia. Particular concern will be
for political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological,
and geographic factors. Estimate of the force of overseas Chinese
should be included, and also consideration of the general anti-
pathy- for Chinese as a vital limiting factor.
c. Subject - Potentials for US exploitation of weaknesses.
Problem - To assess effectiveness of various courses of action available to de-
crease Chinese capabilities for stimulating Communism in Asia.
Scope - Studies, based on identification of factors limiting Chinese
capabilities (potential US strengths) and factors favoring Chinese
capabilities (local vulnerabilities), directed at setting up various
courses of action available for exploiting local strengths and
eliminating vulnerabilities and assessing effectiveness of these
various courses of action designed to produce the will and ability
for independent and collective action by these areas, in concert
with the West, for preventing development of Communism in their
areas. Concern should be directed primarily at eliminating
weaknesses and exploiting strengths, and at creating the will and
ability for native action. This will require consideration of
nationalistic ambitions, economic requirements, anti-Chinese senti-
ment in southeast Asia, internal security capabilities, agri-
cultural dislocations, etc* Forces of concern should be primarily
political, economic and psychological. Various forms for application
of military force also should be considered.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
urif?19110110140.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 ;.C.36-BDP79-01082A0002-001V0008-0
GROUP III
PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUATION OR DEVELOPMENT OF INSTABILITY IN NON-COMUNIST AREAS
AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.
(Policies and objectives supporting capabilities to be investigated and estimated within
this group are the same for the USSR and China as those covered by Group I and
Therefore, additional concern for peM69f and objectives required by Group lit is
confined to the Metropolitan Powers
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
1. Subject - Policies objectives and capabilities of the MsLK,20.itan Rivers
in tfiWIF colonial areas oT1i Far tamt07---
Problem - To identify and assess effect of policies, objectives and
capabilities of the Metropollen Powers in their cdnnial areas
of the Far East.
Scope - Estimates of the nature, effectiveness, capabilities and possible
consequences of the policies and activities of the Metropolitan
Powers in their colonial areas of the Far East.
Subject .p..:912221s for continuation or development of instability in non-
Communist areas and implications thereof.
Problem - To determine the probabilities of existence of instability that
creates denial of the US of access to its strategic interests
in the Far East.
Scope - Analysis of the existing causes, significance, origin and natures
and prospects for development of instability under conditions
of --
Soviet instigation
Chinese Communist instigation
local native Communist instigation
indigenous political, economic and military inadequacies.
Particular concern should be devoted to methods available for
neutralizing the elements of instability, whether by counter-
4voimmosnivi
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
-iur 'LLatA
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 :?CA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
acting Communist instigation, by reforming internal factors
producing instability, by application of external assistance,
or by adjustments in international relations. Elements of
instability to be considered should include political (internal
and international), economic (internal and international, e.g.,
dependence on international trade arid/or foreign economic aid),
administrative and technical, military (both internal and
external factors), psychological and social.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 FerriT79-01082A000200100008-0
sabilioNSIIMP hA 101
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 :-Cibt.-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
GROUP IV
PROSPECTS FOR CREATING THE WILL AND ABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COORDINATED
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM Iff FAR EASTERN AREAS.
(In the following it is assumed that presently - in Area A there exists neither the
general will nor ability to oppose Communism; in Area B there exists the general will
and a partial, though uncertain, ability; in Area C there exists an uncertain and
unsteble will subject to vacillation and manipulation, and a generally non-existent!
though possibly, potential ability dependent on internal adjustments, external
assistance, and intraretional adjustments and coordination. Considerations of
policies are adequately provided Ip Groups I, II and III above).
Area k - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea).
25X6A
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION
1. Subject - Prospects for develo ing within this area latent elements of
potential resistance an o nouns gev4lopmea-R"EATillements.
Problem - To identify elements of potential resistance and to ascertain
methods of creating new forces which might counter apainst the
Communization of these areas.
Scope - A group of investigations designed (a) to identify and assess
Intellectual, cultural, psychological, religious and other
sources of potential resistance to the Communization of China
and northern Korea, (b) to determine methods available to the
West for exploiting resistance to Communization of China and
Korea, and the Communists independence on outside relations,
and (c) to .assess the efficacy of various courses of action,
both in and outside the Area, for decreasing the effective con-
trol of the Communist regimes and increasing internal opposition
to the Communist rule and Communization of these areas.
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION
1. Subject - Prospects for strengthenimthe U@Isr9cliKity 91 WrlawAtd_acam
maintain their independence of,
?Id to Trabiffir5"-apic-Fitr6i1-6T-Coriff-uririrTlin. - ?
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
4.4110?1141110111ftm LitA FT
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: elkiRDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Problem - To assess the potential and to evaluate alternative courses of
action for strengthening the will and ability of non-Communist
areas to develop effective Inernal control of and external
opposition to Communism.
Scope -A group of country-by-country, and subregional studies directed
at (a) determining capabilities in terms of strengths and
weaknesses in administration; political conditions; economic
factors and forces; geographical location; racial, religious
and population factors; internal security capabilities and
external military potential; and sociological, cultural and
psychological factors, (b) identifying requirements for
strengthening these capabilities (as these requirements may
dictate internal country action, regional action and coordination,
and US participation), and (c) assesaing the value of various
courses of action designed to strengthen the will and increase
the ability for controlling and opposing Communism.
Area C - Areas of mixed orientation.
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION
1. Subject - Prospects for creating the will and abilit ,for individual and
coordinated opposition to Communith the 65176ffirareas-ind7
Burma,
?????111101=?11?0.1.1.111.
Problem - To determine the requirements for creating the will and ability
of independent and coordinatedcontrol and opposition to
Communism, and the effectiveness of various courses of action
to this end.
Scope - tikof the colonial areas will be based on assumption that
25X6A
may be expected to be oriented
towards the US, the native population of Indochina, Indonesia
and Malaya, will be nationalistic, will prefer neutrality, and
will determine their orientation according to apparent national
self-interest. Inability of these colonial populations to
achieve their aspirations for national identity through relations
with the respective governments: of France, the Netherlands, and
the UK can result in their inclining to USSR-orientation."
(ORE 17-49, p.7)0 Assuming that genuine endeavors to satisfy
nationalistic aMbitions of these colonial peoples is prerequisite
to creation of the mill to resist Communism, these studies will
be concerned with the effect of various possible treatments of
nationalisms and with the nature, extent and deficiencies in
Approved For Release 1999/09/21111MM-01082A000200100008-0
Li)AFT
Approved For Release 1999/09/217 ellA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
capabilities that are and may be consequent to probable
developftents in these areas, including the need for supporting
the colonial areas in Europe aid their colonial peoples ia
Aaiao Particular concern should be devoted to estimates of
requirements for creation of a capability whereby these areas
could themselves exert internal control and external opposition
to the communization of Asia,
410.?
dileoMPWRFP
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
_MP A-FT
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 :-Ci*RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
apcial Regional Estimate REGIONALISM
Far Eastern regionalism may develop either in opposition to or in support of
Communist expansion. These possibilities deuld be examined in the following terms:
FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
le Subject - Potentialities for Pacific area anti-Communist joint action.
Scope
- This investigation should initially assess the differences
encountered in working out a Pacific Security Group as con-
trastive with the Atlantic Pact, considering the lack of
homogeneity of population, lack of mature long-established
democratic government, political heritage, economic integration,
lack of geographical contiguity, and rivalry for leadership.
The paper would then give consideration to the centripetal forces,
such as anti-Communism, historical and cultural ties, and common
security interests
Development of Pacific security grouping should be considered
under three forms:
(a) self-initiated and Asiatic-led anti- or non-Communist
regionalism, independent of western power support, and either
adopting a neutral or positively anti-Communist stand; (b)
the latent and actual susceptibility of non-Communist Asia
and the Pacific Area to a US-induced security group with
support from the UK. (The relationship of the metropolitan
powers and the"former" colonial areas should be explored?
Point IV and other possible US inducements would be indicated);
and (c) as a substitute for a joint security grouping, the
possibility of security developments on a semi-bilateral
basis between the US or UK and various Asiatic/Pacific non-
Communist governments with the long-run respec"t of one
grouping brought about under the pressure of common security.
2e Subject - Communist reEionalism under China'sjeadershi.e?
Scope
- This investigation ehould explore the actual advance towsirds
formation of Communist regionalism as well as Chinese ambitions
and intentions. The Chinese Communists may be expected to
attempt integration - politically, economically and militarily
of those areas having Communist or Communist-dominated govern-
ments such as the Democratic People's Republic of (northern)
Korea? The Chinese will exploit for purposes of communization
and integration all the propaganda value in "colonialise lee
Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and to a lesser extent in Burma?
The same "line" may be adopted in regard to the Republic of
(southern) Korea and Japan. "Feudalism" may be exploited
TT 1fl11,
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
'DAP Ovorimm
briAliT
Approved For Release 1999/09/217 ft-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
to expand influence in the Philippines and possibly Thailand.
Chinese Communists will have certain economic apons which
may be exploited to assist local native parties as in Japan.
Assess the potentialities of exploitation offered by Chinese
colonies throughout Asia.
The full picture cannot be fully depcited without consideration of
USSR reaction to the expansion of Chinese influence and without
stating the stages of deterioration of US prestige and strategic
influence as Communist regionalism progresses.
It may be considered necessary to consider the degree of opposition
the Chinese may expect to meet in individual countries either
of purely native origin or inspired by hopes or assurances of
UK or US support*
Secondary Int..5sest Proasns
1. Subject - E21152AllIti2ef Pan-Asianism
Scope - The ultimate development of Pan-Asianism under strictly Asiatic
sponsorships despite broad centripetal forcess cannot be antici-
pated for so long as the forces of Communism and anti -Communism
are principal contendere for support in Asia. This investigation
should be one of continuing interest Although of low priority.
2. Subject - Moslem-influencedanti-Communist alliance in Asia and Middle East
Scope - Estimate of the potential and force of the Moslem world as a
force of opposition to Communism.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999incial?RopP7a_ni082A000200100008-0
DleIFT
- 40 -
APPENDIX B
POTENTIALITIES OF THE FAR EAST IN A WAR SITUAliON
In a war situation, the potentialities of any given area
or region may be assessed in terms of the extent to which (a)
the area needs physical and human resources, is self-sufficient
in resources, or has excess resources; (b) the area needs mili-
tary support, cah support itself, or can also give support to
others. Intelligence proauction on the Far Kast as a whole, as
well as particular areas within the Far East, is planned with
respect to these two major considerations. This assessment
should show to what extent surplus resources in any one area may
be available for s4pplying resource needs in other areas, and
even, in a qualified manner, how far war potential in any area
may be available for supporting another area, Special interest
is attached to the degree to which, concretely, the Far East as
a whole, as well as each particular area within the Ear East,, is
capable of taking part in war in economic independence from, but
In support of either the USSR or the US in the event of conflict
between these major powers which would embrace the Far East.
In these investigations, four key area breakdowns have been
made:
Area I: China proper, taanchuria, northern Korea and the
Soviet Far East. Elements of this large sub-
regional area of East Asia have in ommon the fact
tnat they now are under either the domination or
* By a "war situation" is meant a situation, such as the present,
in which the outbreak of hostilities is an ever-present threat,
or an actual state of hostilities.
wir ni71.^0VM
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/04/2V 4CrktiP79-01082Akehl00008-0
the direct influence of the USSR. Subsidiary
areas of investigation in this series will
attempt to aetermine the economic integration
and potential of those "Curtainfl2gReAtries.
Area 11: 25A6Area designated as "Area 1,
Elements in this
sub-regional area constitute the natural com-
plex of northeast Asia. This series will examine
the consequences of any or all these countries
coming26Adift. the influence or domination of the
213NRA.
25X6A
Area Ill:
25X6A
Elements in this sub-regional grouping
are at least neutral toward thi5A8Aat the present
2.5.X619k, if not friendly to it
investigations will be
made (a) to determine the extent to which the
potentialities for excess resources in one or
more of the countries in these areas might be
made available for meeting the needs in the other
countries, and to which, in this sense, the three
areas together might be mutually self-supporting;
and hence (b) to assess the strategic value of
this combination of countries tc the US in the
event of war.
Area IV: The USSR-dominated area of Asia ("Area 1") plus
certain countries of Southeast Asia selected on
the basis of "vulnerability" studies (See Appen-
dix A-1). Individual studies will attempt to
determine the net strategic Gain to the U.WR of
selectee areas of Southeast Asia and the net loss
to the US.
A special regional examination of the extent to which the
USSit and tne US are dependent on the Far East for strategic mater-
ials is also planned0
based on the foregoing four sub-regional area groupings and
one regional field of investigation, five general fields of in-
vestigation are established. %be general breakdown of investi-
gation of these five fields is set forth hereafter.
Approved For Release 1999/091/rientr79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/0
Akti4A, I
79-010821-M65200100008-0
AtiaLA OF PRESENT SOVIET DOMLNATIuN OR I.WFLUENCE
PRObLEM: (1) To estimate the existing economic development
and integration in the area comprised of China proper, Manchuria,
northern horea and the soviet Far East, and the possibilities for
further development and closer integration; and (2) to estimate
the capability of this area to develop war-making potential,
economically independent of European USSR and able to support the
USSR in any general conflict embracing the Far East.
1. Power clas_sill.2.912.1Ltia1
Problem: To determine the existing power capacity of the
area, its adequaey for current needs and the
possibilities for expansion of capacity to meet
the needs of a mobilized economy.
scope: An examination of the power facilities, their
adequacy for support of ourl-ent-economic activity,
the existing area integration of the separate
power systems and the possibility of expanding
area capacity both by closer integration and by
adcition to facilities.
2. Fu_l_.Ava_lj._Abements
Problem: To determine the present fuel production of the
area and to assess the possibilitj of increasing
production to meet the needs of a mobilized
economy.
astas:
An analysis of curi.ent fuel requirements and addi-
tional requirements that would result from mobi-
lization; an analysis of production and reserves,
and of the conaition and capacity of production
installationsand equipment; an assessment of the
possibility of expanding output of fuels to support.
a mobilized economy; an analysis of the: availability
of substitute fuels.
3. The *trate,ic Materials Position
Problem; To determine the strategic materials position of
the area and the degree to which area supplies
are adequate or can be expanded to meet the needs
of a mobilized economy0
wn-ri o1mril4WM
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
TtertiNa Narr9
Approved For Release 1999/0 . - -01082A0M200100008-0
- 43 -
Scope A survey of the supply of such strategic mater
ials position of the area and the degree to
which area oapplies are adequate or can be ex-
panded to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.
4. The Food Position
Problem; To examine the food eosition of the area and to
determine the extent to which the area can be
independent of food supply from outside sources.
Soope: An analysis of production and consumption of
basic foodstuffs and the extent to which surplus
and deficit areas can be integrated for self-
sufficiency in food.
5* PNWAISEADAISLITS.,92 ArPA
Problem:
To deteemine the adequacy of the manpower re-
sources of the area to support a mobilized economy.
Determination of the size of the population and
the labor force, the distribution of workers by
occupation and indusery, the possibility of ex-
panding the labor force by immieration or other
means, the maximum number of workers than can be
employed in the militare sector of the economy,
and the availability of managerial and technical
skills.
6. Existin Industrial Plant and_LEciatEts for Industrial
OVO opmen .
Problem:
cop
To examine the industrial plant in the area in
order to assess present and probable future in-
dustrial potential; to identify weaknesses which
exist in the present state of Industrial develop-
ment and which may effecL the expansion of in-
dustrial output.
An appraisal of the nature, condition and capacity
Of industrial plant; an assessment of the degree
of expansion possible; an analysis of specific or
general bottlenecks to present and future output
or expansion.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/0M~N~IN/00-01082A0002110100008-0
- 44 -
7. Inland -Transpertation
Problem: To determine the extent bo which the transpor-
tation network in the area is now or can be made
adequate to support a war potential of the
character indicated.
A comprehensive survey of existing railroads,
waterways and roads; seasonal factors affecting
their capacity; mobile equipment and facilities
for maintenance; the present degree of integra-
tion of the transportation network and its adequacy
to support the present economy; an estimate of
the possibility, through closer integration and
further developments of the network's adequacy to
support a war-making potential.
8* ....9,1a1:11_21.14.219.21ELA4EPARE
Problem: To determine the shipping tonnage currently avail-
able to the area and the possibility of augmenting
shipping to meet the needs of mobilization of the
economy.
?)WpC0.: An estimate of the dry cargo and tanker tonnage
currently operating within and to the area; a
description of the national control of this tonn-
age and an assessment of that part whiah would re-
main available in the event of war; an assessment
of shipbuilding capacity of the area and of the
availability to it of shipbuilding capacity else-
where.
90 Existi * and Possible ,,Fubure Trade katterns
Problem: To determine the amounts character, and direction
of foreign and intra-area trade with particular
reference to specific commodities necessary to
the development and support of a mobilized economy.
scope: An examination of the extent to which intra-area
and foreign trade can eliminate weaknesses in the
economy that may prevent maximum industrial out-
put; a specific estimate of the degree to which
expanded trade with European USSR may solve pro-
duction problems and an estimate of the possibility
of such an expansion taking place; similar esti-
mates with regard to other areas of the Far East
and the U3 and western Europe.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/0
P79-01082Addita100008-0
10. Assessment of the Area?81J2122:bilities for War Mobilizajion
Problem:
To assess the degree of present integration of
productive factors; to assess present and poten-
tial economic development and particularly the
extent to which the area is capable of support-
ing a mobilized economy and developing an in-
dependent war-making complex.
50.22V An analysis of the existing and potential degree
of economic integration through a consideration
of integration of transportation and power net-
works, intra-area and foreign tra6e, industrial
patterns, and level of industrial development.
The study will identify weaknesses and bottle-
necks which will or may limit this potential.
An estimate (quantitative, if possible) of the
present and future ability to mobilize a war
economy which would be eeonomically independent
of European USSR and could support the USSR in
any conflict embracing the Far zast.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
5X6A
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/01 ./21 ? CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
1"1?1=11,110maiir
25X6A
Tho Effect of the AlArment
doiiiinaEjj iioll ,the klr-maki
To determine
l'atages arid
the anmen
atzda rela
thern 4oroa w
t,noo.e
froLi an econos ci viewpoint tho
di3advantages .1,11F.3t would ref.;ult
t of 6outh Aorea with (.:;viet-domix-aect
klf,p to t,he area's war-mAkIng )(:)tt-tn-
amisiitiosomm
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/1404aF'79-01082A0002094(4)008-0
Scope: An analysis of the South Korean economy and u.n
assessment of the degree to which it could add to
the war-making potential of Soviet-dominated Asia
under the asstrapt,ons: (1) that Japan is excluded
frail.: that area, and (2) that Japan is included
6, The Effect of the Alisixt?ent of Taiwan with Soviet-mmi-
n-Vcorririi-Tn-1116-rid r-m-a-EWTZTtTe-n-na-1-6-irqri-TIEiF:.LTA'iea.
Problem: To determine the economic advantages and dis-
advantages that would result from alignment of
Taiwan with Soviet-dominated Asia with particular
z,eference to the avea.'s war-making potential
Aqua: An analysis of the economy of Taiwan and an assess-
ment of the degree to which it could add to the
war-ai.king potential of Soviet-dminated Asia under
the assumptions: (1) that japan is excluded from
that area, and (2) that Japan is included,
25X6A
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09121 :139Upp79-01082A000200100008-0
Mk FT
25X6A
- 49 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Approved For Release 1999/09/2L; ariP79701082A000200100008-0
DhAPT
- -
AREA Ill
PRESEMILM NEUTRAL OR ..pRi4puz1 AREAS.
25X6A
25*661em: To determine the extent to which the re
is capa-
,
e now or in the foreseeable future of mobilizing and supporting
a war economy independent from the US but to be used in -support
of the 'US in any conflict embracing the Far East.
1- trate&aterialsosition
Problem: To analyze the current and potential supply of
strategic materials in their relationship to the
area's capacity for illobilization.
A survey of the present production, the possi-
bilit4s for expansion, and the present pattern
of consumption of such strategic materials as
rubber, fibers, petroleum, ferrous and nom,
ferrous alloys; an analysis of their adequacy
for the support of a mobilized economy within
25X6A the area.
2.
Problem: To examine the area's food position and to do7
termine the extent to which it is or could become
independent of food supplies from outside sources.
Scope: An analysis of production and consumption of basic
foodstuffs on a country-,by-country basis and a
determination of the ektent-to waich the area as
a whole is now self-sufficient in food or can
become so.
5. M4pipowerAwoources
Problem.: To determine the adequacy of the manpower re-
sources of the area to support a mobilized economy.
A survey of manpower resources by numbers, age,
sex, and occupation; an analysis of labor force
and of numbers available and suitaole for the
armed services; a final analysis of the manpower
resources as to numbers and skills (both manager-
ial and technical) in relationship to the re-
quirements of a mobilized economy.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
.t?
Approved For Release 1999/09K00.01111~79-01082A01a0000100008-0
4. The Industrial Position
Problem:
To determine the extent to which the present
and potential industrial plant of the area can
provide the industrial base for a mobilized
economy.
Scope: A survey o25 present and potential industrial
complexes an analysis of the
extent to which these plants can be supported by
the raw Materials available domestically or in
other parts of the area; an appraisal of the factors
limiting industrial output of these countries and
their possible combined effects which would result
from attempts to expand industrial output of the
whole area,
5. Intra-area and Overseas Shi2pinie.
Problem: .To determine the shipping tonnage now serving the
area and to assess the shipping requirements in
the event of mobilization and the possibility of
their being met.
Scope: 4 comprehensive survey of the tonnage now serving
the area as to type, nationality, and the reutes
on which it is emploeed; a study of ports, ship-
building, and ship-repair facilities; an assess
,-
went of the probable changes in shipping routes
and tonnage requirements that would result from
an effort to maximize industrial output, with
final determination of what role the shipping?
factor would play in such an effort.
6. Assessmenteef the. Cuabilities_for ear ;eobilization
Problem' To assess the degree of present integration' of
productive factors; to assess present and poten-
tial economic development and particularly the
extent to whieh the area is capable of developing
an indepeneent war-making 'complex.
An analysis of the existing and potential deeree
of economic ineeration through a consideration
of the area's Integration of strategic materials,
food suppls, manpower resources, shipping facili-
ties, and industry; a study of the weaknesses and -
bottlenecks which will or may limit the potential
of the area; an estimate (quantitative if possible)
of the present and future ability of ale area to
mobilize a war economy malice would be econceically
independent of the 116 but used in support of the US
in any conflict embracing the Far East.
Approved For Release 1999/09/44i442129-01082A000200100008-0
" Approved For Release 1999/029-01082A00R20.100008-0
AhEA IV
POTENTIAI!JASoy IET-DOM1Ji LAiL Au
',Problem: To appraise the degree to which the mobilization.
potential of boviet-dominated Asia could be increased by the
absorption of selected areas of Southeast Asia, under the
assuiilption, (1) that Japan is excluded from oviet-dominated
Asia, (2) that Japan is included.
NOTE: besignation of the particular studies to be under-
taken in this category is dependent on certain
conclusions expected to be derived from preliminary
work on Sub-Oategories A, and U, as well as on
regional political, considerations.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
.41
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000213919,11008-0
silltw Ji
V -- siaLREslonal Estimate
FAR gAm pTAATk;Gic 14A.T4iiikbp 44vi4TwitT4Ns
Problem: To estimate the dependence of the USSR and the US
respectively on the Far East to meet normal and emergency re-
quirements for strategic raw materials.
WIE: The project below illustrates the proposed treatment of
the studies in this category. The following strategic materials
may be covered in individual projects:
Strategic Iineza1a Materialpjepta miner,4s)
in Agar-a47-
Manganese Fibres
Tungsten Cocoanut and palm oilji sesame,
liAolybdenum rapeseed and tung oil
Antimony hubber
Graphite Petroleum
Mercury Castor oil
Zino Shellac
Copper
Lead
Nickle
Bauxite
Chromium
Mica
Example: The Extent of U3 and USSR pseendence_on_the Tin he-
-
8ourilre?WirTa=?
Problem4 To determine the extent to which. the U6 and the USSR
is each dependent on the tin resourceS of the Far East.
Scope: An analysis of the normal peace-time and emergency re-
quivements of the U5 and the USSR for tin; an analysis
of the -sources of supply of tin available to the US and
the USSR; estimates of tin stockpiles available to the
US and the USSR at present and a schedule of probable
future tin stockpiling actigities of each country; al-
ternatives to or substitutes for tin in the industrial
processes of each cuuntry; an appraisal of the. extent
of dependence on Far Eastern sources of tin by the U$
and the USSR.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
25X6A
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100008-0