Staff Study Series No. 1 SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE 23 JANUARY ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000100030011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 23, 1949
• Content Type: IS

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SIGNIZILA rC
A. Effect on STS Uj=gt s (Suz inry)
The conservative victory in Japan's 23 January elections can be expect-
ed to favor US shortie security interests there,, since the Govorrcnent's
increased parliamentary stability should hasten economic recovery. Despite
expected friction botrreen the Government and SCAP., Japanese conservative
interests win maintain their basic orientation towards the US. Long-range
interests are less anon served., horever, since the conservative triumph
will both increase the threat of left-wing and right-wing extremist activ-
ity and make m q of Japan's Far Eastern customers hostile to the revival
of trades thus increasing the subsidy costs necessary to mintain the US
position in Japan, The likelihood of quick international agreement on
peace terms is also diminished.
B. o1iucal o d.
In contrast to the two previous national elections since the surrender
of Jqn, the 23 January election vas held as a result of Japanese initia-
tive r Even since the resignation of the Socialist KLTAYAL""A Coalition
government (a grouping of Socialists, Democrats and People's Cooperatives
formed after the 1947 elections) in February, 194 8., YOSHIDA's Conservative
Democratic-Liberal Party had tried to bring dissolution of the 1947 Diet.
A new coalition of the same parties, under the leadership of Democratic
Premier ASIJIDA, succeeded to poor instead, thus postponing dissolution.
The ASHIDA regime was characterized by a growing rift between its right-
wing Democrats and left-wing Socialists and the exposing of political
Footnote
(1) The first (llay? 1946) elections were called to form a Diet acceptable
to $CuiP since most Diet members at that time had been selected for elec-
tion in 1942 by wartime Premier To j o. SOAP influence me even mbre appar-
ent in the second elections (April 1947). In February, that year.. Goneral
MacArthur told Premier Yoshida that a now legislative boor was needed to
inaugurate the new Constitution, scheduled to come into force on 3 May.
The timing of SOAP's advice provided an outlet at the polls for the anti-
government feelings ofleftist labor elements, tahose general strike had
been forestalled by the, SOAP ban of 31 January.
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029.
RANK OF PARTIES
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
1947 ELECTION AT GUSE OF
RESIII~S 4th DIET
0
r4
a a
11
8 2 b
t3
Peoplets Cooperative - 2, Minor Parties -
(3)
3. Independents)
scandals which. finally necessitated the cabinet's resignation - both factors
favorable to the groom of YOSIIIDAts strength0 Then YOSHIDA succeeded ASHIDA
as head of a new coalition (Oct. 191.,0 , he declared his intention to dissolve
the Diet at the earliest possible date., not only to take advantage of his
party's increased popularity and the discredited position of the opposition
"center"s parties but also in order to resolve his embarrassing minority posi-
tion (152 out of 466 seats - see graph). His opposition did everything possi-
ble to delay dissolution not only because many members feared that their Diet
careers would end but also because they felt each day in office reduced
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YOSHIDA's pa;ularity. As a consequence of the opposition's successful
employment of delaying tactics and the necessity of pushing SCAP's anti-
strike legislation through a special session, YOSIIIDA was forced to wait
until 23 December to dissolve the Diet.
C. Pre=electian trends.
Vhen the campaign for the 23 January elections officially began on 27
December, most Japanese politicians had been actively anticipating elec-
tions for at least six months. As early as April, SCAP took the Diet to
task for failing on several occasions to muster a quorum in the Lower House
due to the absence of members busy "mending fences" in their constituencies,
By September, the still unscheduled election was foremost in the minds of
all party leaders and the desire to appeal to the electorate colored almost
every Diet activity during the fall sessions.
Two major trends were evident during the pre-election period. First
was a decline of the "center" parties of the KATAYALA and ASIIIDA coalitions
both in parliamentary strength and in popular support. Socialists, Demo-
crats and People's Cooperatives alilc lost individual Diet members through
purges of public office-holders tainted with support of wartime activities,
disqualifications of persona involved in political malfeasance and defec-
tions of party members. The Socialist Party which had emerged from the
1947 elections with a plurality of 113, had lost 32 seats by the close of
the 4th cession.. The Democratic Party, organized as the advocate of "middle-
of-the-road" policies and the key component of the coalition dropped from
126 to 90 seats. The People?s Cooperatives lost 2 out of 31 seats,
During the same period, popular support of the "center" parties fell
correspondingly. A measure of this loss may be attributed to the inability
of the coalition governments to mitigate appreciably the economic hardships
suffered by the average man. At the same time, growing disharmony among
coalition members and lack of discipline within the component ;parties
brought about a decline of public faith in the center parties. Public
scandal, however, was the most damaging single factor, Mile all parties
except the Communists suffered from the publicity attending the Showa Denko
expose and other investigations, the number and position of "center" parties
figures involved aroused public indignation.
The decline of the "center" parties contributed to the second major
pre-election trend - a tendency towards political polarization. Parties
of both the extreme right and left showed increased strength in the period
between elections. The Democratic-Liberal Party, inaugurated in Harch 1948.
as the nucleus of an eventual single-right-wing group, made notable gains.
Despite disqualification of a sizeable number of Democratic-Liberal Party
members in consequence of purges and hoarded goods investigations, Democra-
tic-Liberal Lower Houso strength grew from 132 seats in April., 1947 to 152
SEC
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seats in Decembor, 1948. The Democratic-Liberals considerably strengthened
intra-party unity and energetically extended local organization during the
same period,
On the extreme left, the Communists did not make notable gains In parlia-
mentary affairs. Their influence in trade unions9 hom,vnr, did rise notice-
ably from the low point of Communist prestige in the spring of 1947 when the
Japanese people acquiesced in the best authoritarian tradition to the SCAP
ban of the general strike rkich the Communists had been planning. For a
time the Communist position in important trade unions vas seriously threat-
ened by "Democratization Leagues" of Socialists and independent anti-Com-
munists who banded together in an attempt to seize trade union lea 7 rship.
By the summer of 1948, however, the Communists had recaptured key positions
in leading trade unions. They attracted numerous dissident civil servants
to their ranks through outspoken opposition to the SOAP-directed restric-
tions on Government workers rights. By redoubled efforts in private indus-
try, they exploited. dissatisfactionamong industrial o f workers er ~e maintained
their self-assured position as aggressive
ests.
On the fringes of the Socialist Party's left-wing and the Democratic
Party's right-wing some minor elements actually defected to the Communists
and Democratic-Liberals respectively. More'important than these defections,
by
however, was the instability within the "center" parties caused
polarizing forces. On the right, pressure for merging the with the Democratic-Liberals, led by the Taiyokai Faction within the Demo-
cratic Party - some of whose members had seceded from the Democratic Party
in December 1947 and joined the Democratic-Liberal Party in March 1948
increased considerably. Election of IINUIcAI Ken to succeed ASHIDA Hitoshi
as president of the Democratic Party also favored development of a right-
wing coalition. On the left,, a number of dissidents withdrew from the
Socialist Party. Some of them remained independent, but one group which
included an important leader of the Japan Farmers' Union, KURODA Hisao, set
up the Labor Farmer Party. This new group avowed orthodox Socialism but
associated itself with individual Communists on numerous issues.
D. A a1 yg trends..
The election results indicate that the tendency towards polarization has
advanced much further than anticipated, Premier YOSHIDA'e oonservative govern-
ment gained a clear-cut victory for the extreme right, His Democratic-Liberal
Party won 264 seats, a gain of 112, to win majority control. This means estab-
,lisluaent of the first single-party government since the wars end, elimi-
nation of coalition cabinets and increased governmental stability. The sheer
weight of Democratic-Liberal gains indicates a considerable resurgence of
conservative forces in Japan. A tally of the total conservative vote that
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may be anticipated on matters of issue as opposed to party strategy' shows
that conservatives in the Diet outnumber their opponents 3 to 1.
On the extreme left, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) achieved unexpected
success despite the measures taken by the Occupation and the Japanese Govern-
ment to curb its influence. The Communists jumped from 11th to 4th largest
Diet party, adding 31 seats to their previous 4. Communist share of the
popular vote rose from 3.7% in the 1947 elections to 9.5%. The fact that
the Communist Diet gains far outstripped the increase in popular strength
can be attributed to the provisions of the election law which has been in
effect since March 1947. This law provided for a multi-member medium size
constituency and the single entry ballot. Since each voter had only a
single vote the Communist, by putting up only one candidate in the district
in rich they ran, benefitted by the concentration of votes mere the
'"center" parties, especially the Socialist by entering more than one candi-
date suffered from scattered support. 'While the concentration of the Com-
munist vote in urban areas indicates that the JCP'a greatest strength lies
in its appeal to industrial workers.. clerks and intellectuals, successful
election of JCP candidates in predominantly rural prefectures - . some candi-
dates were listed as farmers - is a significant indication of the first
successful Communist wooing of the agricultural vote.
Communist gains climaxed a long and vocal campaign, designed to take
advantage both of the frustrations of Japan's post-war position and the
economic hardships faced by the average Japanese. Besides the broad popu-
lar appeal of direct and virulent JCP attacks on currant high taxes and
the past record of ineffective Government anti-inflation measures, the
C ommunist campaign beat the drum of nationalism in a manner intended to
place anti-occupation sentiment firmly behind the Party. The Communist
Party's high degree of organization, their word-of-mouth-type of publicity,
and their apparently adequate fixazci al resources of undetermined origin,
an proved highly effective.
Perhaps the most significant Communist gains were in constituencies
where trade union strength was predominant. Several Socialist local
chapters had gone over to the JCP in the wooks preceding the election. It
is eviJent that the Cormunista have rallied to their banner large numbers
of workers disatisfiod with the restrictive labor legislation which the
government has implemented at SOAP "suggestion". The sweep of Communist
victories in Chim also created anxieties which were useful to the JCP.
CHIANG' N resignation on the eve of the elections, gave dramatic support
to claims that the MP t as best qualified to guid Japan to close future
friendship with the t?Ner China".
The Japanese electorate vent far towards repudiation of the "center"
parties. The Socialists, who less than two years ago were able to namme
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the Premier because of their ranking position in the Lower House, lost 63
seats out of Ill, leaving them only 13 places ahead of the JCP. Not only
were Socialist Party president 1ATAYAL!A Tetsu and former right-wing
Socialist leader NISHIO Suehiro defeated, but oven leaders of the moderate
left-ring, such as NATO Kanju, his wife KATO Shizue and NOL ZO 1bsao, were
rejected. Had the loss JA Socialist representation been confined to the
elimination of the Party's factional left and right wings, the election
might have been followed by the Partyts resurgence as a capable and respon-
sible opposition to the extreme rightist Democratic-Liberals. But the
crushing nature of their defeat raises serious questions as to the ability
of the Socialists to recover their position for some years.
The Democrats retained '/0 of their former 90 seats. This may be
explained in part by the affinity of their basic conservativism with that
of the successful Democratic-Liberals and in part by the habits of Japanese-
voters who place greater reliance on candidate popularity than on party
platforms. The fact that the Democratic-Liberals won a clear making
majority, however, effectively eliminates the Democrats' anticipated bar-
gaining power. Furthermore, the weakened position of the Socialists makes
further cooperation between the "center" parties pointless and may be
expected to strengthen the disaffection of those rightist Democrats mho
abhorred socialist principles and only reluctantly cooperated with the
Socialist Party.
The People?s Cooperatives dropped from 29 to 14 seats, thus contribut-
ing their mite to the decline of the "center" parties. This small loss,
however, is more significant when considered in relation to the decrease
in the number of successful candidates running on independent and minor
.party tickets. It is too early to say so flatly, but the trend awey
from the multiplicity of party and individual representation, which typi-
fied the 1946 elections,, suggests a developing political sophistication on
the part of the Japanese that will spell the doom of minor parties and
independents.
Eo P robable, charogteroft new t oyornm .
YOSIIIDA's position in the new Diet is excellent. Since the newly
elected Representatives will serve for 4 years, YOSHIDA can be confident
.of decisive control for a long enough time to prepare and implement a
government program with reasonable chance of success. Any postralection
maneuvering among the Diet members may be expected to add further strength
to the Democratic-Liberals as independents seek safety in their fold. A
number of Democrats, known to favor consolidation of conservative parties,
may also be added to the Democratic-Liberal ranks. YOSIIIDA has already
suggested a conservative coalition with the Democratic Party as amole.
This tactic would smooth the path to eventual merger by a judicious offering
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of cabinet posts to the Democrats, while avoiding for the present the
difficulties of "digesting" a potentially fractious group that might., in
car with younger Democratic-Liberal elements already agitating for
greater self-expression, upset Party harmony.
YOSIIIDA refused to indicate his admi:adstrationts policy as long as the
last Diet was in session and prolonged debate by opposition parties could
delay the impending elections, Nevert Bless, the general outlines of the
program which his new government will attempt to carry out are fairly clear,
YOSHIAAMe Party advocates the development in Japan of a governmentallyr-
guided ec nomy based on competitive free enterprise, but allowing of some
cartolization in the interest of benefits. The !OSIiIDA government
may be expected, on the one had, to develop increased foreign trade and
promote foreign investments in Japan, and on the other, to take stronger
measures against labor, There will be a definite attempt to undo such
limited efforts towards nationalization as the State Control Bill. passed
during the KATAYAMA regime, a relaxation of Japanese implementation of the
purge within the framework of Occupation requirements, pressure for a
reduction of government costs and an attempt at moderation of taxes aimed
at big business. The governmental stability produced by the elections
should also permit YOSHIDA to implement the US-directed economic stabiliza-
tion program.
Strengt ening of the JCP Diet position may be expected, through nwrking
arrangements with minor left-wing parties. Attempts to farm a front with
the Socialists in the Diet probably will not succeed. Nevertheless the
Communists are in a position to dominate the "opposition". Since the
Socialists are now unequivocally in the opposition, however much they may
attempt to dissassociato themselves from the Communists., they will be
placed in an embarrassing situation should they ignore any JCP stand on
behalf of labor and opposed to the Government, Despite appreciable gains,
the Communist remain essentially a minority group and can exploit their
increased strength primarily for its nuisance value alone. Their increased
prestige, however, may be expected to add materially to the Communist capa-
bilities outside parliamentary channels, especially in labor.
F. Effect on US see tv interes g.
In the short run, the Democratic-Liberal victory in Japan probably
win promote implementation of the recent nine-point U3 economic directive.
Friction between the Government and SOAP may be expected to increase since
YOSIIIDA is likely to differ with SCAP over the manner and moans of effect-
ing Japanese economic recovery., especially with regard to the extent of
controls, YOSHIDAas triumph.. in view of the known coolness in his personal
relationships with SCAP officials, places the Japanese Government in a
much stronger position vis-a-vis the occupying forces. Neither of these.,
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developments,, however,, are likely to alter the basic orientation of the
YEA Government and associated Japanese conservative interests tovrds
the US.
forces In Japan - the business,, financial and landed Interests,, as well as
the bureaucracy - will seek to retain as much of their privileged position
the growing conservative strength in Japanese politics that conservative 25X6_
In the long run., the conservative triumph may harm US security inter-
ests and tmy increase the cost of maintaining the US position on Japan.
The increasing polarization of Japanese political parties into extreme
right and extreme left may well be accelerated, thereby increasing the
threat of extremist action by either ring. From the left, violent reac-
tion ageInst the conservative gov0-rnm3nt may develops, drawing strength
from the fact that an~y government's ability to solve Japan's economic
difficulties is limited by forces beyond Japanese control and further,
that any improvement in Japan's'international economic position Trill not
be reflected immediately in improvement of the lot of the average Japanese,
left-wing extremist will attack any program of economic development
advanced by the conservatives as unjust in its allocation of cost among
the various elements within Japanese society, They may further be expect-
ed to magnify their propaganda attacks on the alleged subservience of
conservative forces to US imperialist aims,
On the right,. it could be unwise to ignore the possibility :implied in
as possible in the traditional pattern of Japanese societ
in the conflict between extreme left and right has been seriously impaired,,
if not eliminated.
ability moderate elements to provide a' oad and s z uence
International repercussions adverse to US interests may also be ex-
pected. Japants former enemies,, associated. with the US in the Par Eastern
Commissiaz; in establishment of Japants post-surrender status and in mutual
protection against a revival'of Japanese aggression,, my be expected to
view with Increasing alarm implications of US policy which might threaten
their own security. Revival of trade with these countries may well be
retarded. by local fears of .Japanese economic and military resurgence
associated with previous conservative do mimance in Japan, V ithout trade
revival,,the cost of US economic subsidization will be correspondingly
Increased,
The conservative resurgence will make it increasingly difficult to
secure international agreement to a Japan peace treaty satisfactory to
the US. The trends evidenced by the elections render even more difficult
the task of obtaining international acquiescence to,, not to mention support
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of measured which it be necessary to take in Japan in the protectiaax
of US security interests.
The election results imply for the US an increased burden of respon-
sibility for supervising Japan's post-war development. The fact that
Japanese conservatives offer temporarily increased stability cap be
expected' however,, to bring pressure for a reduction in occupation
.strength to parallel the anticipated diminishment of internal needs both
for US security forces in Japan and for large-scale SCAP direction of
activities. Maintenance of the US position in Japan can be expected to
become increasingly difficult. The conservatives' use of US-underwritten
democratic institutions to make their coup will only underline the diffi-
culties of the position.
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