INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 53 25 May - 31 May 1949

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CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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9
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December 12, 2016
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June 13, 2001
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8
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Publication Date: 
May 31, 1949
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08 . CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 PAR EASTA'ACI I, aPArCH OFFICN OF REPO. TF;AIi 1,`1ATES CEN TRAL IN TELL' GE NC E AFENCY 14oRrinG PAPER YOTICE: This document a werkii.g paler, NOT an Zfficia.1 CIA issuance, ecid ,rmt mseriIy been coordinated with ot'ler 077 prod1).cing c,,apon- ents. It represents ourrent thiDling by one group of specialists in CIA, sad is ,)eoigned for Ilae by others engaged exa simile. or overlapping The opinions e,cpressed hrein flay be revised bear: final and official publiation, It ie intended solely for tne infoemati in of the ad,iressee mnd not for further dissemin.tion, COPY FOR: Chief, B FE ..?. DOCUMENT NO. ---- NO CI-IANG5 IN CLASS. LI fl CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SO (y) nECLAS5IFIED NEXT REVD.% DATE: AUTHI R 70- # 'N REVIEWER: 372044 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES, CIA FAR EAST/PACIFIC BRANCH INTELIaGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO 53 25 May - 31 May 1949 SECTION I. SUMMARY OF FAR BAST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS While the USSR proposal of Japanese peace treaty discuenion before the CFM offers ammunition to the Japanese Communist Party, the reaction of oonservetive Japanese elements has been unfavorable (p. 2). The puppet regime of northern Korea, playing on Repeblinan fears of the growing power of Communism in Asia, is sponsoring a "unification" drive. Thus far, response from southern Korea is limited (p. 2). Some five weeks after the initial Yangtze crossings, the Chinese Communists have orowned their conquest of the valley with the capture of lexaghai. Failure to destroy Nationalist forces in the area, home ever, has kept their victory from being complete (p. 3). Meanwhile, the escaping Nationalist defenders have scorched or removed many of the valley's port and transportation facilities (p. 4). A difference of opinion between the Frenoh and Bao Dai' e Vietnamese supporters regarding implementation of French agreements with the ex Emperor may delay establishment/of the provisional government (p. 6). Jose Laurel, VacionaIista candidate for presidency of the Philippine Republic, has outlined his intended campaign platform (p. 7). The marginal notations used in suooeeding sections of this Weekly ("A", "B", or "C") indicate the importance of the items in BAFE opinion with "A" reprceenting the most important, Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 2 SECTION II. DEVELOPMENTS IY SPECIFIED AREAS GENERAL KOREA - ?????????MAMINI? Northern regime promotes "unification" front--On 17 May, Radio Pyongyang 1-7-o-irreposal from various southern korean political and social groups for a joint North-South conference of political gre.us for the purpose of promoting unification of Loma. The proposed me ting -erne held subsequently in Pyongyang on 26 May and officers were ,amed to draw up a preqram for the preparation of an inaugural convention of the "Democratic Front for the Attainment of Lnification for the Fatherland." This program is to be submitted to the second meeting of the preparatory committee early in June. Following the completion of US troop withdrawal from southern Korea during the next few weeks, the pressure of rising Communist power in Asia rill be increasingly felt by the leaders of the Koreen Republic. The northern puppet regime may well be anticipating an increased will- ingness on the part of southern politicians to make their peace with ApproviUhlAI ed For ForRelease 2001/08/26: CIA-RDP79-01.1101ffit 25).16 er - Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 diriiiiiiilimi - 3 - with the north through the convenient instrument of a "unification front." This latest Communist-sponsored frose movement is probably designed as an opportunistic vehicle for southern Koreans who may wish to board the northern Korean bandwagon, At prosent, the move- ment is receiving support in southern Korea only from the underground Communist front organizations. Both Kim Koo and Kim Kiusic, who went to Pyongyang in 1948, have issued statements characterizing it as a Communist fraud. CHINA 1iliy Situation?With the occupation of Shanghai on 26-26 May, the Ghthece Communists oompleted their current offensive in the Yangtze valley. Within 36 days after initial crossinge, they occu- pied Nanking, Hangchow, Hankow, Nanchang and Shanghai, thus securing all of the valley's large cities with the single exception of Changshas The Communists failed in another mselor objective, however; they were unable to neutralize the Nationalist forces defending the valley. "A" atm222.1 After being delayed temporarily by an unexpected Nationalist defense in the northern section of Shanghai, the Communists outflanked the lightly-held Government positions north of Scochow creek, forced their capitulation and completed the occupation of Shanghai. Meanwhile, other Communist units drove west across the mouth of the Whangpoo River to occupy Woosung and cut the Nationalist retreat route. This move came too late, however, to prevent the escape of large numbers of Nationalist troops, sho joined the Nationalist evacuation fleet moving south toward Taiwan and Fukien, after destroying military supplies and installations. South China: PAI Chung-hsi, who was not subjected to a direct attack at Tre701777;73-able to MOW almost his entire force south from the l'ane- tze towards Rwangsi, his home province. The Communists contieued to fo?low cautiously in his make, but so slowly that it appeared PAI woead reach defensive positions near the border of Kaangei before they overtook him. PAI is expected to fight in defense of his native province when the Communists finally move into position to attack. Further east, Communist General L/U Po-cheng's troops were quiescent in southern Kiangsi and northeruestern Fukien for a second week. Nationalist claims that they had reoccupied Nanping, 85 miles upriver from Foochow in Fukien were countered by Communist accounts of successes further to the north where Ningpo, an old treaty port in Chekiang, was reported taken. Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 - 4 - Northwest China: Despite confliotinn reports, it now appears that the Communists have, in fact, occupied Sian, the capital of Shensi, and that the Nationalist troops of ITV Tsung-uan have withdrawn eouthwerd. A Peiping report states that l)EVG Toh-huai will be joined by UXEH Juna- ohen in an offensive in this area. It is as yet unclear whether the eventual direction of this strengthened Communiet force will be south to Szechwan or west into Kansu. Nationalist Demolitions:--Not sinoe the Soviet sack of nanceuria has "517;77077Firwar damage as extenetve as that of the past fortnight in. the Yangtze valley. Retreating 4tionalists destroyed or removed. port and transportation facilities as well as river and ooeun shippirg, They scorched the largest shipyard in the Par East, Xiangnan dockyard in Shanghai. Warehouses, warves and oil-storare tanks in lower Pootung were also damaaed by shell fire. The destruction inflicted on the Nanking railroad statien and adjoin- ing piers and ships in the latter part of April was the firet indication that the Nationalists would not abandon the Yangtze area in the save quiet manner as in North China and Manchuria, On 16 May, the port of Treekare was reportedly crippled by the destruction of most of its feoilitios when 24 vessele wore scuttled in the harbor. Shanghai, howeeer, suffered the neat. Deetruction of the Ydananan dockyard, on 22 May? eliminated facilitiee eapablo of beildieg some 100,000 tons of shipping a year and repeieing hundreds of smIll veseels. Many ships in the Whangpoo ',deer were burned? scuttled or cast adrift by the Nationaliet defenders. In addition, the Nationalistc reportedly destroyed military installations at and around the Kiaegran eirfield as well as shipping facilities at Woosung? near the mouth of the Whangpoo. The Nationalists seemed primarily interested in preventing tle Communists from inheriting intact the extensive shippinn, port facilitirs and niii- tary supplies in the Yangtee area and little effort was made to destroy large factories and utilities? Local currencies to re lace G. Y Th.e 'variety of currency an non- ommun ot Cline 'oday re cote he fragmentation of the economy that has followed the disintegration of cent-mi authority. Since the gold yuan has become almost valueless, local areas have been left witheut an ade- quate medium of exchange and are now taking upon themselves 'he tack of creating a new circulating medium. If tho present trend of events continuee, each non-Communist province will have its awn monetary unit and trade between provinces will be handicapped both by the lack of uni- form currency and by provincial efforts to maintain the valu, of local currency by prohibiting the export of specie. Approved For Release 2001768/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Cole Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 mweN4WP,m. ?15 In the southeest, delegates from Steohwan, Sikang, Kweiohoye and Yunnan are meeting to consider plans for political and economic auto- nomy. Plans for exclusion of the gold yuan, establishment of a joint treasury for the area and issuance of a silver certificate currency have beendimmed. Meanwhile, as a temporary measure, individual municipalities are contemplating issuance of local currency. In Chungking, the mayor is backing a plan for the municipal bank to issue silver notes against deposits of silver. In Foochow, the Chamber of Commerce is reported te have issued a local ourrenov,with silver backing. In Sinkiang, silver has been replacing depreciated paper currencies. Because of its scarcity, however, silver alone does not provide the pro- vince with an adequate circulating medium and the banks have supplemented the circulation of silver by issue of silver notes, purportedly redeemable in specie on demand. To prevent a drain of specie from the province, a ban has been imposed on the export of silver. To the extant that this ban can be maintained, trade between Sinkiang and other regions will tend to fall into a barter pattern. It is unlikely that provincial and municipal silver notes can long circulate at face valuee The banks do not have large enough silver reserves to provide the basis for any considerable circulation of paper money. The inability to muster sufficient reserves derives from two factors; first, the scarcity of the metal in the provinces and second, the extraordinarily high reserve ratios which are now necessary if the paper currency is to maintain its face value. In fact, with the present low ebb of confidence in the stability and security of local government, it is doubtful that a reserve ratio of much less than 100 percent would be adequate to maintain the face value of such ourrency. NEWS NOTES Cabinet falls--Resignation of HO Ting-chin and the attempt a; appointment irtfrreriEez: colorless Kuomintang elder, as HO/s successor mark a further weakening of the Nationalist political structure. Although HO may remain as minister of National Defense, his resignation as Premier evidences hie unwillingness to continue at the head of e hopelessly feeble and divided administration. Nomination of seventy-two-year-01d CHU. former President of the Judicial Tian, indicates virtual exhaustion of Acting President LI's political resources* Meanwhile, right-wing Kuomintang leaders oon- tinue their efforts to restore CHIANG Kai-shek to open control of the National Oo-ernment? possibly through creation of a new policy-making Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 aliffent.m 6 ,a body which mieht give some appearance of Kuomintang unity. MANG still remains somewhere in the Taiwan-F000howeAmoy district, however, apparently awaiting the further loss of prestige which 1I,s regime will suffer when it flees Canton. At that time, CHIANG may heed the pleas of his closest associates and resume presidency of whatever remains of the Nationalist regime. USSR curtails activities?During the past weekend, the Soviet Consulate in 'shanghai was closed, activities of the Shanghai office of the offi- cial Tess News Agency were suspended and Ambassador Rosohin, only toe dlelomat to follow the National Government to Canton, departed for Heeg Kong en route to the USSR. INDOCHINA Division over Auriol-Bao Dai agreements--A conflict of opinion has arisen be en of ioials a the ,rench Overseas Ministry and the Viet- namese who are supporting Rao Dai as to ratification of the 8 March Auriol-Bao Dai agreements by the French Government. According to the Vietnamese Governor of TonUin, Bao Dal 11111 remain officially inactive until after formal French approval of the agreements, an action which the Vietnamese anticipate at an early date. In contrast, officials of the Overseas Ministry in Paris have indicated that the agreements will not be submitted to the French Assembly for approval, but will serve instead as the basis for negotiation of a formal treaty. The French timetable for implementation of the Bao Dai experiment is based on the theory that the ex-Emperor did not sign the agreements as a chief of state but merely as the "most representative element of Vietnam." Thus, officials in Paris do not wish to "impose" these "in- formal" accords upon Vietnam before a "freely-elected" government has been established. Instead, they wish Bee Dat to create a "provisional government" which will operate until the formation of the French- envisioned 'popular" government. At that time, consideration will be given to a permanent treaty incorporating the June 1948 Bate d'Along pact, the 8 Mardi agreements and supplementary conventions treating with details. The target date for completion of this treaty is 31 December 1949. It is stressed that France considers an enlargement of its 8 ?larch concessions a distinct possibility. Latest reports from Bao Dai ''s secretariat indicate he will announce a small provisional cabinet soon after final French Assembly approval of a bill permitting unification of Cochinchina with Tonkin and Annan. However, Bao Dal's plans seem to be based on the expecte-tic of early ratification of the 8 March pact as well. They may possibly be deferred indefinitely when it becomes apparent to him that the French schedule does not include this ratification. Approved For Release 9-01082A000100020008-0 "RN , 25X1 C Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 PHILIPPINES Nacionalista alatform to be dictated bi Laurel?Shortly after his sslece on as e aolona.ista arty nominee for President, Jose Laurel stoted that his personal ideas would form the basis of the Partys platform. In a press statement issued on 23 May, the day after his noeination? Laurel defined these "personal ideas." He again denied that he was anti-US and stated that he favored continuation of friendly US-Philippine relations on a basis of mutual advantage and reciprocity. However, he insisted that certain agreements (presumably military and trade treaties) should be revised. Laurel hinted that Philippine foreign policy wouldbe nationalistic, with greater emphasis on relations with Asian countries. In considering internal policy, he specified the economic situation as the most important problem and warned that the Philippines may face a severe economic crisis within the next five years unless "radical remedies are emphatically applied." Laurel attacked Quirino's policy regarding the Huks and said tha problem should be more carefully studied and whatever policy adopted should be "relentlessly implemented to the bitter end." He said his administration -would concern itself with the welfare of the sommon people and include more liberal plan e for the dis- position of public agricultural lands The ineffective legislative session, which concluded on 20 May with- out action on any major issues, as well as the record of political bickering within the Quirino administration has given Laurel the opportunity to develop an effective platform during the coming months. Prospects for Naeionalista success in the November elections, moreover, are strengthened by the continuing split in the majority Liberal Party. 2i131: Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 25X1C Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020008-0