INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 55 8June - 14 June 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000100020006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 14, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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FAR EAST/'ACI,FIC 1 RANCH
OFFICE OF REPOR'T' AND i?S'1'fl ATES
CE17TRAL INTELLIGENCE ACENCY
NOTICE: This document i:3 a working paper, NOT an
Official CIA isauancep :,.,d has not necessarily
been coordinated with other ORE producing compon-
ents. It rep ?ecents cur:rent thinking by one group
of specialists in CIA, a:-,d is designed for useby
others engaged on simile,.- or overlapping studies.
The opinions expressed herein may be revised before
final and official publications It is intended
solely for the inforsaation of the addressee and
not for further dissemination.
Chief. B/FE
DOCUMENT N0. NO HANCE IN CLASS. C7
DECLASSIFIED
ASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATI IGViEWER, 372044 1
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OFFICE OF P.EPOfTS AND ES7.TMA.TES, CIA
FAR EAST/PACIFIC BfAPICIt
INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 55
8 June - 14 June 1949
SECTION I. SMI.'tARY OF FAR EAST TRENDS AND DEVELOPI.'ENTS
US attempts to gain international status for Japan suffered
another setback when the Paris ITU conference voted against seating
the Japanese delegation (p, 2).
The YOSHIDA Government appears to be planning a purge of leftist
union members in government employ in the course of impending SCAP-
orciered mass dismissals (p4 2).
The fairly serious and protracted border clash ir. Isolated Ongjin
peninsula while presently quiescent, has led to a urmakening; of the
Republic of Korea's security forces (p. 3).
The shift of CCP "soldier-heron" C17BI and LIU from combat commands
to administrative tasks in the Yangtze valley may indicate that the
Chinese Communists are becoming more concerned with future peace than
present warfare (p. 4). '.'6eanwhile, the reenforcenent of the Nationalist
position in Taiwan by troops evacuated from the mainland has compounded
the confusion there and Communist infiltration of the island continues
(p. 5).
Mile Bao Dai still faces problems in the selection of his cabinet.
French militarists and coloni.,ls in Indochina continue to hope for a
vigorous suppression campaign which will restore firm French control
(P. 6).
The unexpected resignation of Senator Tanada from the Qiutrinista
faction of the Liberal Party during the recent convention may further
weaken Quirino's position in the November presidential race (p. 7).
The marginal notations used in succeeding sections of Chia NYee ly
"B", or "C") indicate the import.noe of the items in B/'E opinion
with "A" representing the most important.
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ICU membership for Japan blocked---The US received another major set-
back in its attempts to gain fu international status for Japan on
10 June when the Paris conference of the International Teleoormiunica-
tions Union voted 24 to 23 (with 7 abstentions) against seating the
Jananese Government delegation. This action followed previous con-
ference efforts to admit SCAP representatives as observers and Japanese
,.elegation Members as technicians, a status which the ITS could not
accept without abandoning its position that Japan was entitled to full
rights of IT`U membership. To avoid compromising this position further,
the SCAP representatives will now attach themselves to the US delegation,
and the Japanese members will not participate,
Despite the fact that Japan wns admitted to full membership in the
ITU without opposition at the plenary session of the conference in
Atlantic City in. 1947, France, as host nation, refused last April to
extend an invitation to Japan on the ;grounds that S :Ac'''s approval of
Japanese membership was first subject to consideration by the Far Eastern
Council (V C). The Commonwealth nations generally supported this view,
questioning not onlr the ler?ality of SCAP's authority over Japan's
external affairs, but expressing concern over US attempts to "short-
circuit" the FEC. The US held that Japanese participation, in interne-
tional affairs was necessary for proper development of responsible
government in Japan, and that in the absence of specific FTC policy
or US directive, SCAP had acted within its broad, executive povier provided
by the "flasio Post-Surrender Polidy". It is this view which was opposed
by the 10 June conference vote. That the Commonwealth nations were
strongly opposed to the US view presages difficulties in implementing the
policy of progressive Japanese resumntion of international responsibilities
pending peace treaty negotiations and emphasizes once again the conflict
batween the national interests of the US and its Western allies in the
Pacific. That the Soviet Satellite bloc was surprisingly quiet on the
question of Japan's participation indicates the probability that tho
USSR is vraryr of nullifying the propaganda effect of its recent peace
treaty proposal for Japan.
JAPAN
Government firm s aimed at "Subversives'"--The YOSHIDA Government has "B"
Indicated its intent to use the US-direoted employment reduction program
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of the continuing incidents appear to have only local sippifioanoe.
There is no question, however, but what border incidents have a
definite part in the overall northern Korean plan for neutralization
of southern Y.orea's capacity to resist, Border raids and battles are
designed probably to accomplish the following northern Korean ob jeo ti ves *
(1) to test the capabilities of southern defenses; (2) to disorganize
and disperse defense oonoentra';ione along the two main invasion. routes
into southern Korea; (3) to force a concentration of Korean security
forces along the 38th Parallel, leaving the Pepublic?s interior exposed
to guerrilla activity; (4) to maintain an atmosphere of fear in southern
Korea; (5) to give combat experienoe to northern Korean troops; and
(6) to forestall an invasion of the north,
Gl>l INCA.
CCP oorrtand shuffle--The rece, t assignment of leading Communist military "B"
figures to highs pro itioal positions may indicate that the Comnunist High
Command now believes the military phase of the revolution is all but
finished and of less importance than political and economic aspects of a
peaceful future. Appointments of top-rank oor sanders CHEN Yi and LIU
Po-oheng to senior positions in Shanghai and Nanking, appear normal and
logical since these sectors must of necessity operate under martial law
for the present. While additionally reflecting the known Communist lack
of accomplished administrators, these appointments also reflect a desire
to exploit the vast prestige of these leaders and In some degree to re--
ward them for past accomplishments. The Communist Party may also .vish
to separate these tremendously popular soldier-heroes from direct oomriand
of their combat troops.
I
CUEN and LI tI are expected to remain in charge of the lovK-r Yangtze
valley at least through the consolidation stage. In view of the need for
trade, the Communists also may have decided to exploit these leaders'
reputation for being native-minded Communists, relatively tolerant of the
West. While unity of political and military policy in the lower Yangtze
valley thus is assured, the region may .yell emerge as a semi-independent
entity under CII:N and LIU, taking only general direction from central
Communist headquarters
For this purpose both men are excellent choices and each has demon-
Fetrate3d considerable past administrative ability in organizing military
governments in his respective area during the period when military control
from Yenan was loose and generalized. Since they remain available for the
planning stages of any new operations, moreover, their absence from active
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ference which will be held in the near futahre,, The Party acanea,rs to
nave net difficulty in reaching a decision on such controvx:rgial issues
as the support of incentive wage payments as a means of increasing
pr cluction, the suppression of Communist activity and the course of
action should the Government lose tl'ac bank nationalization case,; now
pending decision by the Privy Coxrncil.:
In addition? Labor Party leaders are faced -with dissection a.nor ''kin
their foll.oz?ers,o growing from, a :'eeling that some leaders have lost
touch with their labor background. As an exa* ple1 two left-wing
m{zrabei s. E. J. Ward and Donald Careron-both of whore have recently
lc: G Influence in, the Labor Party-appear to be leading a "l.te3ck-to-
l movwrnent with the support, of left-wing tuitons and Carrnunists.
111:R lately incurred the wrath of Labor Party officials by openly co: A
ram and was publicly rebul-F:rd
dir irig the C: rtsrntaert?s irnigration prop
by. Prime Minister Chifley:. Nevertheless, Warrlwas trobal,ly voicing
fears of + cons .de rfxblc: section of labor which remains ,n.trxronistio k ":
c campaeti tion by tmi graun.t workers
L. a anwhile, the Liberal and Country pe rties are still, deadl%:ake d. .ta
their efforts to verge and present a. unified opposition in the cor_ln ,
general election. T h e , principal hrax vier is still the s t e of Victor_; a
where an attempted Libere.l'Country Party coalition failed to win the
orao, era'tion of all elemennts of the former Country Party,,
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