ISRAEL AND IRAN IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 19, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL IN1 T'EI,LIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 19, 1975
SUBJECT: Israel and Iran in Sub-Saharan Africa
Neither Iran nor Israel have extensive economic or
political Lies in black Africa. Iranian activity in the
area is increasing, however, while Te,l Aviv is seeking only
a limited diplomatic comeback following the severance of
its relations with almost all of the black governments as
a result of the October war. Iranian involvement centers
mainly on matters pertaining to its long--term security and
development needs. Both Iran and Israel have substantial
interests in white-ruled South Africa.
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I. Israel and Sub-Saharan Africa
Tel Aviv's Eroded Position
Israel's position in Africa has not recovered since the
Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 when practically all black
African states severed relations with Tel. Aviv under Arab
pressure. Today, only five governments south of the Sahara
maintain formal relations with Israel: South Africa, Lesotho,
Swaziland, Malawi, and Mauritius.
The October war completed a deterioration in Israeli-
African relations that had been tinder way for some time.
In the 1960s, the Israelis could counL on black African
support for their position on the Middle East at the UN
and in other international forums. At that time, most
African states had been independent for only a short time
and Israel's modest technical and military training assistance
were valuable in helping them undertake military and economic
development efforts.
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By 1970, however, Israel's own interest in Africa was
waning, and roan' African countries were finding it increasingly
difficult to jusLify their ties with Tel. Avid in li.clhtt, of the
growth of strong pro-Arab senLi.ment in the UN and the Organiza-
Lion of African Unity. Israeli aid no longer matched the
attractive promises of assistance that had been coming from
the Arabs particularly Libya and Saudi Arab.-La. Such promises
coincided with growing African disenchctnt.ment with Israel's
refu:-cal to return the occupied territorios--helped along by
constant Arab diplomatic efforts--and with increasing Arab
support on issues of major importance to the Africans,
especially ?Lhe termination of white minority rule in southern
Africa.
Contact Points Remain
Not all of the black African states that broke relations
with Israel have sevr-red official contacts, however. Tel Aviv
maintains interest sections in third-country embassies in at
least three such states, Kenya, Ghana and Ivory Coast. From
time to time contacts occur between high-level Israeli and
African officials, particularly at the UN.
Israeli private investment and commercial activity has
decreased substantially in black Africa since the Octobcr
war. There is still enough' of this activity, however, to
give Tel Aviv a toehold in several. countries, notably Kenya.
On the other hand, Israel has phased out nearly all its
formal assistance and the few remaining programs may be
allowed to expire.
Limited Comeback Sought
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The Israelis recently have taken another look at their.
African policy and seem to have concluded that relation
with black Africa are now of only secondary importance.
African-Arab Solidarity
Tel Aviv realizes that any comeback in black Africa will
be slow, if not impossible, as long as African-Arab relations
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paucity of aid the Arabs" have provided to help overcome
sharply hic;her energy costs. At the same time, however,
Arab-African cooperation probably has been given a new boost
by Arab support, particularly from Algeria, for world economic
reforms that would benefit, the less developed African states.
Israel and South Africa
In trying to woo at least some of the Africans back,
Tel Aviv also faces the hurdle of its close identification
with whits-ruled South Africa. Black Africa's rupture with
Israel has led to a definite warming of ties between Tel Aviv
and South Africa, which has an affluent Jewish community.
Within a few months after the October war, Israel upgraded
its mission in Pretoria to embassy status.
In the past two years, Tel Aviv'has made it vigorous
effort to expand commercial ties with South Africa. The
Isra`li_s also are showing strong interest in South Africa as
a potentially lucrative arms market. Israel's exports to
South Africa more than doubled from 1973 to 1974. The trade
balance, however, remains favorable to Pretoria, which exports
sizable quantities of minerals and foodstuffs to Israel.
II:. Iran and Sub-Saharan Africa
Iranian Interests
Although sub-Saharan Africa is not yet a high priority
region for Iran, Tehran is beginning to devote greater atten-
tion to the area. Iran now has diplomatic relations with
22 African states, arid opened several new embassies in Africa
during the past year. Its most. extensive ties are with South
Africa. In black Africa, Tehran is concerned primarily with
the countries of the Horn of Africa, the island states off
the east coast, and selected West African governments.
Iran's interest in Africa is determined to a large extent
by its security concerns in the Indian Ocean and by its search
for reliable sources of raw materials. The Shah is especially
eager to develop sources of uranium for Iran's ambitious
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nuclear energy program. The Shah is also seeking to enhance
Iran's prestige, in the Third World by establishing closer
ties with the. less developed African countries.
To date,. Iran has provided little grant or. loan assistance
to African countries and trade br'Lween 'F .bran and Africa is
slight. In order to secure maximum be:i.c,-)"it from its modest
aid activities, Iran favors bilateral projects over collabora-
tion with other governments in regional aid projects or with
intcrnational aid 3nst.itutions. Less than one percent of
Iran's total imports cone from Africa, three-fourths of which
are from South Africa. Less than two perc:erit of Iran's non-
oil expor4:s are destined for Africa.
Irrn and South Africa
South Africa is of primary impo::tance to Iran because of
the depth of their shared economic and strategic interests.
Collaboration between the two govercments has increased
steadily since they established official ties in 1970.
Tehran keeps relations with South T,frica at the consular
level, however, in order to minimi,te- criticism by black
African and Arab states.
The Shah recognizes that South Africa, as an Indian
Ocean littoral state and a regional naval power, has a security
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the two naval services. Iranian naval ships visit. South
African ports-- including stops for overhaul--and mi.lit:ar
officers exchange visits.
Iran has impor'..ant links Lo South Africa's petroleum
and steel. industries and transport sys-cem. Pretoria's over-
riding concern is access to Irztniari crude oil. This concern
has motivated South Africa to provide Tehran with some technical
assistance, including the equi.ppinc, and partial staffing of
a mining college in Iran. Tehran provides roughly 40 percent,
of South Africa's crude oil needs, and has a 20 percent
interest in a major South African refinery.
Tehran looks to South Africa as a source of enriched
uranium. Last April, Pretoria announced that its pilot
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uranium enrichment plant had clone into operation and that
SouLl1 Africa would proceed with a large-sca, ile, plant chat
could be producing enriched ur,..u)ium for industrial use
The Horn and Africa's Island States
Few governments in this region are favorably disposed to
close ties with Iran. Nevertheless, Tehran tries to monitor
political affairs here closely and is alert to opportunities
to influence events towards a moderate course.
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Iran has good rel~tt::ions with Sudan and has granted that
government' aid in the form of a $54 million credit for the
purchase of oil.. Sudan's location on the Red Sea is a key
factor in the Shah's willingness to give help.
The overthrow of I(ai.le Selassie in }~thiol:ia and Soviet
activities and influence, in Somalia are vi.cw cd. by the Shah as
particularly ominous devee.lopments. Teh:-an may be expected
to keep a close watch on what happens to the former. French
naval base at Diego Suarez in the Malagasy Republic that
Paris relinquished last May. The present Malagasy government
has barred all. foreign warships, including those of Tr.an,
from Madagascar's ports.
Iran's ties with Mauritius, some 500 miles (:,art off
Madagascar, have been growing though formal. relations between
the two countries do not exist. Prime Minister Ramgoo].am
shares the Shah's interest in promoting greater economic and
political cooperation among the countries of the Indian Ocean.
Britain's recent decision to terminate its defense agreement
with Mauritius and to close its communications facility on
the island by mid-1976 could encourage closer Mauritian-Iranian
relations. Iran currently supplies the island with most of
its petroleum products. ,
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West Africa
Several West African countries have been' singled out for
attention by the Shah either because of their mineral resources
or because they produce crude ail.. Senegal and Iran recently
formec:i a joint venture firm that plans to establish a port.,
an oil refinery, and a phosphate mining co:mnplex. The $250-
million project is to be financed largely by Tehran. Iran
will. supply the refinery with three mill.ipn tons of crud,:
oil per year, while Senegalese phosphate ore is to be shipped
to Iran for processing. The Iranians have held economic dis-
cussions this year with Ghana and Guinea concerning possible
investment in uranium exploration and bauxite mining, but the
projects are still in the talking stage.
Gabon and Angola, which is scheduled to become independent
in November, have also drawn the Shah's attention. The two
are respectively the second- and third-ranking oil producers
in black Africa after. Nigeria. Gabon, which recently became
OPEC's 13th member, also has important uranium deposits.
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