MINUTES OF 13 OCTOBER 1983 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: (1) FUTURE OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE (2) INTEGRITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300031-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 25, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXCOM 83-013
25 October 1983
25X1
25X1
M~NIORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
-FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Minutes of 13 October 1983 Executive Committee
Meeting: (1) Future of Economic Intelligence
(2) Integrity
1. -The Executive Committee met on 13 October 1983 to
discuss the "Future of .Economic Intelligence," a paper prepared
by the DDI, and to review IG findings on cohabitation overseas.
Messrs. Fitzwater DDA); Stein (DDO); Hirsch (ADDS~I')? Gates
(DDI); Taylor (IG). Robert Magee (D/Pers) and (OP)
were present for the discussion on cohabitant-ion.
Future of Economic Intelligence
2. After surrflnarizin the D1 paper on the future of economic
25X1 intelligence (attached), corranented that. it is apparent
more precision is required in defining the role of DI analysts
25X1 and DO intelligence collectors; a persuasive
case can be made for stronger DO collection in resource rich and
advanced economies than in the Third World; and the DO needs to
er_sure that country ODs are responsive to economic tasking. He
said that a coordination mechanism between the DO and DI for
economic intelli ence is in place; he questioned whether it is
25X1 working. then observed that just as the Agency had
carefully defined its narcotics responsibilities, an-objective
review will be necessary to assess its role in support of the
economic policy formulation process. State, Commerce and others
have the primary domestic and foreign economic policy
responsibilities. It may be appropriate to encourage a SIG, NSC,
or other high level review of the economic decision-making
process. As to reeorrgnendations in the paper on overseas
staffing, Mr. Briggs concluded that the assignment of DI or DO
officers for economic collection overseas perhaps should be
considered last among a number of alternatives .for strengthening
CIA's economic intelligence capabilities.
3. Mr. Gates said that in considering the future of
economic intelligence the committee faced three .areas of
concern: (1) CIA's role in exploiting economic intelligence,
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particularly in what it collects; (2) the sharing of this
information with U.S. business; and (3) sharing intelligence with
allies. He noted that CIA gives more economic data to
governments which are economic competitors than to American
businessmen. Mr. Gates then observed that as for CIA's role., it
would be a waste of time for the SIG or other policy forum to
review the USG economic policy formulation process. Commerce has
only 40 people in economics work; economics has.a low priority at
State; INR. has no capability. CIA, as much by accident as_by
intent., is doing far more economic analysis than any agency in
'the government, with 0 people working on-all kinds of economic
issues. As a result of the Agency's unique skills, the
policymakers' dependence on the CIA is an accomplished fact.
Mr. Gates concluded by saying he has tried to focus the DI's,
economic work strictly on international economic security issues,
for example the debt crisis in important countries
4. interjected the observation that with all of
the concern over technology loss and ways to solve technology
transfer problems, it appeared even more worthwhile for the USG
to look at-the respective roles of the agencies involved in
economic affairs.- Mr. Gates. agreed that logically this should be
done but as a practical matter little. can b~e;:done because the
domestic side of the economic policy apparatus is ineffective.
He added that by limiting C.IA's role to international economic
security issues, the Agency avoids .involvement in highly
politicized domestic issues.
w 5. Mr. Stein said that he can define his Directorate's CI
responsibilities narrowly. Although Bob Gates can define his
economic responsibilities as security related, Nir. Stein added,
it is difficult to hold to such a strict definition in the D~J.
The DO has a problem knowing. what economic information to
collect. He noted that the clandestine service (CS) can be put
out of business if it is~unleashed on the economic target.
Mr-. Gates added. that both Directorates can be put out of
business. Mr. Stein went on to say that -the DO is iri the
business of recruiting spies and in order to do so it must have
specific economic requirements. He emphasized that the pragmatic
approach may be to get overt collectors more involved, for if
this is not done, the CS would be pushed td engage in overt
collection.
6. Mr. Gates next pointed out that 40 to 45 percent of the
economic requirements are short-term, high-priority, such as
those related to summit meetings. During FY-84 and FY-85 the DI
will add a number of economic positions, as has the DO
By FY-85 the buildup will come to an end. Mr: Gates said he elt
that a handful of senior people should get together to size the
economic problem, decide what data bases are required, and devise
an economic strate for the Agency.
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sharing information with the business community, pressures to do
so will grow. Agency policy should be to respond to appropriate
requests, but not take the initiative in supporting the private
sector.
7. After summarizing the discussion,) )agreed that
an internal working group should be formed under the DDI's
auspices in order to review and make recommendation on what the
A~enev should do in the economic intelligence area.' He also
Integrity
25X1
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. )informed the .Executive Committee that the
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DDCI had asked the Committee to consider the recommendations in
the EA Division IG re ort on cohabitation with foreign nationals
25X1 to determine whether -on close and recurring
relationships--requires revision and also to remind field
installations of Agency policy on cohabitation. He observed that
if the regulation is to be effective, Chiefs of Station must
report all cohabitation cases and Headquarters' responsibilities
have to be clearly defined. Jim Taylor noted that the IG has come
across cases where cohabitation is affecting operational
security. COS' have difficulty in dealing with cohabitation
because the close working environment at Stations complicates
taking disciplinary measures related to employees' personal
lives. He added that, in the view of the DDCI, a close
association with foreigners reflects poorly on the professional
conduct of A~enc activities. John Stein agreed and pointed out
25X1 that was written to strengthen security. When an
employee has a oreigner.living in the employee's quarters
control is jeopardized and compartmentation suffers.
9. The session concluded with Mr". Stein agreeing to
complete a draft book cable on cohabitation by Monday,
17 October. The DDA and D/Pers were given the responsibility for
25X1 recommending changes in Both the cable and
regulation will be coordinate wi the Deputy Dir?~ectors.
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