PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R006700090002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved
Approved
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Attached for your information are
extracts from the Congressional
? Record covering the executive
session of the Senate yesterday on
the "assassination report." We
have underlined some of the more
important statements.
0 C- '..1
FROM:
OLC
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FORM NO
I FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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:sNoveviber 20, ',roved F oci4KTEMSAPAY641241:16' cilic8F8a16A3
stimulate purchase of potables in returnable
containers.
The council's action in Montgomery is, Of
course, only a skirmish won in a war in which
the bottling and beverage industries have
shown no inclination to surrender. But, in
conjunction with other recent engagements,
it is progress.
The Environmental Protection. Agency last
week took the first procedural step to require
a 5-cent deposit on all beverage containers
sold under federal auspices, which would
have an obvious impact on the Washington
area. And the Maryland Court of Appeals in
March upheld an ordinance passed by the
town of Bowie in 1971, requiring the manda-
tory deposit.
There appears to be developing a wider
feeling that disposable containers represent
a ridiculous wastefulness and a lack of aes-
thetic concern for our own backyards. The
arguments of the bottlers and soft-drink
purveyors do not hold water, and they would
do well now to get cracking on the the con-
version' back to returnables instead of trying
to impede the effort by rhetoric and litiga-
tion.
No serious argument has been made that
elimination of throwaways would involve no
difficulties. But the point is that these would
be temporary and worth the economic divi-
dend in conservation. One recent study, by
the Maryland Governor's Council . of Eco-
nomic Advisers, said that weaning ourselves
from disposables would create 1,500 jobs in
the state, would produce $1.1 million in new
tax revenue, and would reduce highway litter
in the neighborhood of 30 per cent.
Throwaways are a problem, as we have sal
before, that is not so intractable as many o
our urban knots. We trust that Mr. Glamor
will see it that way, this time around. An
in a time of scarce household money, eve/
in Montgomery, the savings to the consume
of drinks in returnables over throwaways
amounts to 60 per cent.
CULTURAL NOTE
This tidbit is offered to any sociologist or
urban anthropologist who has been too busy
nil/mg out forms for foundation grants to
get around to field work. It means something,
we think, perhaPS something of coruscating
insight.
A proud municipality in our area spon-
sored a Halloween dance for its "Older teen-
agers" at the community center. The town
will be left anonymous, to spare it possible
embarrassment, but also because we suspect
Its experience was duplicated in other
suburbs. The following description comes
from the town newsletter.
"Despite the presence of Some 10 chaperons
and 3 policemen, the men's toilet was stopped
up with paper and the room flooded, and
empty beer cans, bottles and cartons were
strewn over the parking lot area. Considering
that an estimated 300 young people Were
present during the evening, except for the
problems noted above and a messedsup gym,
floor, the dance was characterized to be about'
as orderly as expected in these days and
times."
The comingling of tones in this brief di
patch?of fatalism, ennui, frustration, and a
sense that the town may have gotten off
with lesser ravages than anticipated?should
speak eloquently to the trained investigator
of current social phenomena.
NOTE
In the RECORD of November 11, 1975,
the first paragraph of Mr. BAYII'S re-
marks on page S19668 are incorrectly set
forth. In the permanent. RECORD. the
Paragraph will be printed as follows:
EXTENSION OF REVENUE SHARING
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I wish to
express my concern about the need for
early action to extend the revenue shar-
ing program. I believe that most Mem-
bers of Congress and concersed citizens
agree that the revenue sharing program
has been successful, and it is my percep-
tion that the program will be reenacted
with little opposition. The questions are
when Congress will act and how much
money will be allocated to the program.
CONCLUSION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING 0.LPFICER (Mr.
GLENN). The period for the transaction
of routine morning business is closed.
CLOSe,e) SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GLENN). Under the previous order, the
hour of 9 a.m. having arrived, the Senate
will go into closed session, not to extend
beyond 1 p.m.
The Chair now directs the Sergeant at
Arms to -clear the galleries, close the
doors of the Chamber, and exclude all
those not sworn to secrecy.
(At 9 a.m. the doors of the Chamber
were closed.)
PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING 010.V.WER (Mr.
GLENN). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am
about to make a unanimous-consent re-
quest, and I do so with some fear and
trepidation because of the numbers in-
volved, and that number in relation to
the closed session which the Senate Will
now undertake.
I think it is a very bad precedent to
have more than two people here at any
time from outside the Senate, but on this
occasion, in view of the situation which
has 'developed, I ask unanimous con-
sent?and this Is not to be considered a
precedent?that the following members
of the staff of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence be accorded full
privileges for the period of this closed
door session of the Senate.
Before I list their names, again, they
will have to be sworn in by the Sergeant
at Arms and pass that test:
William G. Miller, Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz., Jr., Curtis Smothers, Charles
Kirbow, David Aaron, Joseph Dir.
Genova, Richard Inderfurth, Robert
Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael
Madigan, Elliot Maxwell, Walter Ricks,
Burton Wides.
Mr. ALLEN. Reserving the right to
object?and I shall not objects?will the
Senate be given an opportunity to ex-
U006700090002-0 S 20623
press itself during thiS session on the
advisability of releasing the names of
CIA agents who may have been involved
in assassination plots?
Mr. MANSFTELD? The leadership
would never think of foreclosing any
right, privilege, or prerogative of the
Senate, and the answer. would be in the
affirmative.
Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further objection?
. Mr. ALIEN. I thank the distinguished
majority leader,
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, on the
point that the Senator from Alabama
has just raised, when will it be possible
to have a discussion on that particular
question, I ask the majority leader?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Under the agree-
ment reached, the session cannot go be- -
yend 1 o'clock.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Then I Wonder if there
could be- a period of at least 15 minutes,
something at the beginning, to lay out
some basic legal questions about this -
that Senators could then be mulling over
hi their mind as they are listening to
the rest of the presentation and then,
perhaps, some further discussion at the
.end?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would think so,
and I am sure that the chairman of the
committee and the ranking Republican
member of the committee would he will-
ing to give that consideration.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. May I just say, in the
interest of orderly presentation, the
chairman and the vice chairman had
hoped to present the report, during
which these questions to which the Sen-
ator from Michigan refers will be al-
luded to, because they have been care-
fully considered by the committee, and
then after that, of course, any discussion
concerning the question that the Senator
raises would be entirely appropriate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Senator from
Michigan has some questions that he
would not just expect the distinguished
chairman to allude to, but to address
himself to.
Mr. CHURCH. There will be plenty of
opportunity to do that.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. TOWER. The way that we agreed
on it yesterday is that the time should
be equally divided 'between the Senator
from Idaho and myself.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right.
Mr. TOWER. And then on a rota-
tional basis we would yield to people on -
our side in turn.
The presentation by the chairman and
the vice chairman should not take an
extraordinarily long time and each
member of the committee, I think, ought
to expeess himself briedy and I think
there will be adequate time for colloquies
and questions on this matter on the part
of the Members of the Senate that wish
to participate. .
Mr. CRIFYIN. Including--
Mr. PASTORE. Reserving the right to
object?
Mr. SPA.RKMAN. Just a question.
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S 20624 ? WNGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE Novem,-ber 20, 1975
Mr. PASTORE. Reserving the right. to and minority counsel, who have a gen- suggested thateat some point in the pro-
object?oral overview, and they do, not in. de- ceedings this morninge-if the Senate de-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, There is-are- tail. This was to preserve the secrecy of sired to engage in. debate, these- special
assistants. for the members. of the. com-
mittee might be dismissed. I do-not object
to that, but r think, in any case, the- chielt
counsel for the Democratic side and
deputy. counsel_ for the Republican side
should remain.
Mr. SYlVIING-TON. Will the Senator
yield?
Mn MANSFIELD: I yield. .
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is my under-
standing that the-committee-felt the re-
port should be published. Is that correct?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes. The committee so
voted and then reconfirmed. its vote fol-
lowing receipt of a Presidential letter
asking that the report remain concealed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Was that decision
by the committee unanimous?'
Mr. CHURCH. That decision wee taken
without a dissenting vote. There was one
abstention.
Mr. SYMINGTON.: That. being. true, I
hope. we- do not. chase It:is- cer-
tainly- my intention, if the committee
works this many. months, speaking- pet,-
sonally- for- myself, whatever the com-
mittee thinks should be done with. this
report am going to be for, and I hold
myself under no obligation not to be for,
cauRca. thank_ the. Senator
very much.
? Mr. - MANSFIELEe Mr. President, in
view of the- fact that 15- minutes have
elapsed under the time schedule', could
the Chair at this time act ors my request
that these additional staff members. be
allowed?
Mr. ROBERT C. Byaa. Mr. President,
reserving the right- tce object, and T shall
not object, reluctantly; because if the
subject is this complex that we have to
have this-number of staff- people- on the
floor I do not know how a person-like-my-
self can understand it, I askurianimous?
Twill' not object. Go ahead:
? The PRESIDING OFFICER., Ls. there
-objection?'
Without objection, it is so. ordered:
Mr. ROBERT C_BYRD. Mr.. President;
I ask unanimous consent thatparagraph
numbered 4 of rule 36-, page- 55- of the
Senate Manual, be printed in the REC-
ORD at this-point...
There- being no. objection, the para.-
. graph was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, ELS follows:.
Any Senator or officer of the ;.5coto e who
shall disclose the secret or confidential busi-
ness or proceedings oi the Senate. sh.L11 be
liable, if a Senator, to suffer expulsion- from
the body; and if an officer, to dismissal from
the service of the-Senate, and to?pani-thment
for contempt.
Mr. MANSFIELD: May I emphasize
the fact that this is not to be considered
a precedent, the idea of having such huge
staff numbers, comparatively speaking.
in a closed session-.Now the time- is equall r divided be-
tween the chairman and the vice chair-
man of the committee.
Me. TOWER. Mr. Pres dent, I ask
unanimous consent that tin time on the
presentation of the select a 'ketraittee re-
port be equally divided betw ;en the Sen-
ator from Idaho and the S ma tor from
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quest pending.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to- the
Senator..
Mr. PASTORE: I was wondering, could
we not set a- time limit insofar as. the
presentation, -because none of us know
here what is going. to develop;
The PRESIDING 0e10.10ER. Could the
Senator speak up, please? We do not have
a loud speaker system.
Mr. PASTORE, If we go from 0-until 1,
I think what-we- ought to do is set aside
an hour or an hour and a half in.. the
beginning and then we can, resume the
talk about the:legalities- involved and the
procedures to- be. followed- because; after
all, here we are in the- dark.. We do, not
know what is going to, develop_ until we
hear it and I think that is what we ought
to do. We ought. to set aside- an hour and
a. half or an hour of the first 5 hours..
What is it, 5 hours?
Mr., MANSleit,LD. Four hours.
Mr.. PASTORE_ Four hours.,
; Then. we- take it from. there, and then
we can. have l5 minutes or 20 minutes.
Mr. MANSIeestin. Make. it, the Test
hour to give them a chance to explain.
Mr. PASTORE. That -is right..-
Mr. SPARKMAN...Will the-leader yield
for a question.a. -
Mr. MANSPIE.LD. Yes.; arid then. to
the Senator from North Dakota-
, _ Mr. SPARKMAN. I. merely want- to _
ask, the leader read off quite- a Tong list
of names_
Mr. MANSFIELD. Too long a. list..
Mr. SPARKMAN. Are they a part of
the Senate?
Mr. MANSFIELD. They are not a part
of the Senate.. They are attaches. at,
tached to the. Select. Conunitteen
Mr. SPARKMA.N. ;They are a part of
the committee?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes_
Mr. SPARICVIAN: I thank the Senator.
Me.. YOUNG. My question, along the
same line, I can see. where some. staff
members are, neceesary, but I cannot
understand why and I would like an exe
planation, of why so many. There- will
probably be more staff members than
Senators.
Mr. MANSFIELD.. Will the Senator
yield?
There are 11 members on the commit-
tee and it allows them each an. assistant,
plus the Democratic counsel and the Re-
publican counsel. Just like. the umpire
made a decision based on his judgment in
St. Louis last Sunday with which some
people found fault. The leadership has-
done the best it could and. it has re-
duced it from about 25 down to 13,
Mr. YOUNG. I am not going to object,
butt think there will be. bigger press cov-
e7age this way than if we let the press
Mr.. MANSFIELD. I agree.
Mr. BAKER. I might say, for the re-
surance of our colleaguee,, there is an-
ot ler reason to want them. here; That is
in the interest of security_ We broke the
fl' down into compartments. One cone-
pa ?tment did not know what the other up, we would all appreciate it.
cor martment was working on. So there Mr-. MANSFIELD. You are doing great.
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0Hua? - D - 0 krei ' .
61) 666 R 00090002-0
Is 110 staff menthe,. excent t'd -e en"^eit-
the proceedings. It seems to me we need
at least this niany in order to have a
full presentation. While I agree with, the
majority leader that.. it. is unfortunate, I
believe, it is essential.
Mr, CHILES. Now they will have. it all
put together for them?
Mr. BAKER_ This is put, together in a
printed book that wilt be placed on the
desks. Members of the committee in a
drafting session have approved the draft.
But in order to elaborate or. extend on
any point in there, we will need rep-
resentatives front the several drafting
groups. ?
Mr. CHILES. Will they all be here at
one time?
Mr. BAKER: Eleven of them.
Mr. CHURCH. May I say in further-
ance of. what the distinguished Senator
said?
Mr. PASTORE: May we take our seats
so we can talk?
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Let us turn the-
microphones on.
Mr. CHURCH. This has been an ex-
traordinarily diligent committee. Mem-
bers have, for 6 months; sat through end,
less sessions he the most intensive inves-
tigation of the assassination issue. r have
never served on a committee where there
was such fidelity of attendance on the
part of the, membership-. These commit-
tee. members should not only have the
right, but have expressed the- the. desire,
to participate in this presentation. Be-
-cause of the breadth' of the material
covered, each one-has assumed a respon-
sibility for a particular chapter if highly
technical questions arise. For that rea--
.son, the committee members feel the
need to have their own staff assistant
sitting with them.
Mr. MANSFIELD: Time is- 'fleeting.
Could. we get a judgment?
Mr. CHTLFS.: Can I ask one more ques-
tion? I can understand the explanation
.of the need to have the staff members
for the answering of questions: I wonder
if at some stage when the questions are
answered so to speak; if we get to a point
where we want some debate,.. could_ they
then be excused? It would, seem- to me
that there might well be some time that
we would just want to' have the- Senate
here if we were going to have a debate.
Mr. .MANSieneLD. The answer, I would
assume, would be in the affirmative, or
at least that woulti,be my (minion.
Mr. TOWER. I think any Senator
would be within his rights in trying to
promulgate a consent request to exclude
staff.
Mr. CHURCH. I think in that situation
the chief counsel, the Democratic- and
Republican counsel for tile committee,
ought to be allowed to remain.
Mr: STENNIS. Can. the Senator speak
a little louder so we can. hear?'
The PRESIDING OFFICER_ If we
might all keep that in mind, please do so.
I am having trouble hearing up, here. We
do not have a loudsneeicer system. If,
during this discussion, we can all speak
November 20, 1075 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 20625
? The PRESIDINGs'AppeavedvRbviRekiasec%101303429, :ICIIIABRDS84-41)6780ROOS70909a062-Arntnittee to name
objection, it is so ordered. not thought possible when we first un- in "f"-teport tnae-dffiTials wh-o- were- re-
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I be- dcrtook the investigation, spoil-R-51e for the assassination plots is
neve the Senator's request is renresen- The committee also decided to recon- beyond serious doubt.
tative of the bipartisan spirit which has firm its earlier decision summer tS> The only time this right was chal-
guided the committee from its origin, make the report public. This yote was alp lengeTis it wain an ME hour attempt
Mr. President, I reserve to myself such unanimous, with one abstention. Our to exclude-Ttiertatirriatiie froth. tise-re-
time as this initial presentation may re- reasons-for feeling so strongly about the peiefelheeran. Qt the committes to
in-
quire. right of the people to have access to this elude that name waseatrongissarpheldeny
Mr. MUSKIE. I wonder if it would not historic document are set forth in sum- the_ Federol _district %Ult.-
be helpful for the Senator to speak from 0 ort. Earlier this week, the U.S. district
re .ort.
the well, facing the Senate. we could We believe the pub ic is entitled to court had occasion to review whether
all hear him better. know what the instrumentalities of their the inclusion of the name of a certain
Mr. CHURCH. May I inquire of the Government have done. We believe that former official in the report violated any
Chair if those assistants whose presence our recommendations can be judged only of his constitutional rights. Judge Ger-
has been requested might enter the in the light of the factual record. We be- hard Gesell found, in his opinion that the
Chamber and assume their places? hove the truth about the assassination only right even conceivably at issue was
[The Vice President assumed the charges should be told because democ- the right of privacy. He then concluded.
Chair at this point.) racy depends upon an informed elec- after having heard full argument in
Mr. CHURCH. In the summer of this torate. Truth is the very anchor of our camera in which the CIA and its general
year, the Select Committee on Intelli- democracy. counsel were represented, and after tale-
gence took up the investigation of U.S. We wrestled long and hard with the jug public arguments in open session,
involvements in alleged assassination contention that the facts disclosed in this that?
plots against foreign leaders, continuing report should be kept secret since they A former government official has no right
the task begun by the Rockefeller Corn- are embarrassing to the United States, of privacy vis-a-vis the Congress where his
official conduct is under review.
mission. We concluded that despite any -tern-
ho select committee asked for thi porary injury to our national reputation. The court decided further?
clos-a session today to c escri our find- foreign peoples will, upon sober reflec-- This is not, as the Court views it, a case or
ings ancrconclusions to our colleigh-Es tion, respect the United States more for " exposure for the sake of exposure alone.
becore making this interimnsport avail- keeping faith with its democratic deals
abfe-W-fhe American people later this -than they will condemn us for the mis-
The court ruled in this case that "the
ciTternoon. conduct revealed,. We doubt that any public interest greatly outweighs any
We
private interest of the plaintiff." The
other country would have the courage to will turn to the contents of the
court found the standard the committee
make such a disclosure, and I personally
reports in a moment, but, first, I would
like to express my gratitude to Senator
applied in determining whether to in-
TOWER,believe this to be the unique strength
elude certain true identities to be, in the
of the American Republic.
whose constant attention to his
. Our decision to make the report public words of the court, "responsible criteria."
responsibilities as vice chairman has
been of invaluable assistance to the co Now let me turn to the substance of
was reinforced by the fact that portions
corn- report. An of you have a copy before
of the story had already been told. In-
mittee. And to all other members of the you, and from time. to time we may have
nuendo and misleading piecemeal dis-
committee who have worked so hard. occasion to turn to certain parts of it.
closures are unfair to the individuals in-
The same expression of appreciation has It is organized as follows:
volved; nor are they a responsible way to
been earned by members of the staff, in
connection with this report, whose names Part, introduces the committee's
lay the groundwork for informed public I ask unanimous consent to have printed work, explains why the report must be
policy judgments. In short, the rumors
made public, and summarizes the events
at this point in the Racos..e. and allegations about the assassination
There being no objection, the names of
examined in the body of the report.
plots must be put to rest. Any effort to
Part II explains several key concepts
k
staff members were ordered to be printed keep the truth from the American public
in the RECORD, as follows: - could only' have the effect of increasing which are necessary to understand the
the corrosive cynicism about Govern- events reviewed in the report, such as
William G. Miller, Frederick A. o.
ment, which is such a threat to our so- the nature of covert action, the basic
lines of authority in the CIA, and the
Schwarz, Jr., Curtis Smothers, Charle it td
s
ay. o
y e
c
Kirbow, David Aaron, Frederick Baron, doctrine of plausible denial.
Also without dissent, the committee
David Bushong, Elizabeth Culbreth, Part III sets forth the facts and testi-
agreed upon clear criteria for determine
Ithett Dawson. mony relating to the assassination oper-
Joseph Dennin, Joieph DiGenova, Rich- nig wIC In ? ividua s OU e identified
ations and the level at which they were
ard Inderfurth, Loch Johnson, Robert VEtneir true names in the report.
Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael e were exceedingly careful. We asked authorized.
Madigan, Elliot Maxwell.. theettchntntstraticatand-flia Cl:Eaiead- Part IV contains the findings and con-
Paul Michel, Andrew Rostal, Gordon the renal-7E10r the purpose of comment: elusions of the committee.
Rhea, Walter Ricks, Patrick Shea, Jack nig milhisrnsarticular question. Afeter Finally, part V. outlines the maim-
Smith, Greg Treverton, Burton Wides.
ieng-t-hy discus-SIT:Sir and anDlieeitioneof men.dations of the committee.
Mr. CHURCH. Never have I known a the committee's standards, we agreed to During the course of its investigation,
group of harder working men and Unlit _reference for more Than one-half the committee addressed four broad
women, of the names requested to be deleted bY questions.
This committee has heard over 100 thandirTinistraEion to a titl or in some First, dirl the United States or U.S.
witnesses. It has studied thousands of cases, a psetic onym. owever, some pub- officials instigate, attempt, or aid and
documents and amassed a record of sworn lie officials and some ot the per-go-Hs abet plots to assassinate foreign leaders?
testimony almost 10,000 pages long. We whom trie Agency atihh Second, did U.S. officials assist foreign
have spent months drafting and redraft-
T6 ?-17,--nicarcangt certain -Underworld dissidents in a way which significantly
lag this report to make sure the evidence
fignres, were so central tht,e_..rePlart contributed to the killing of foreign
was stated fairly, and completely. Meeting that we concluded their true identities leaders?
o-SYtadeitTrONvir :
first in a subcommittee composed of shwn be Third, where U.S. officials were in-
Senator TOWER, Senator HART of Col James Madison recognized the right o- volved in assassination plot or other
rado, and myself, and then in the full of freely examining public characters killings, were their activities uthorized,
comniittee, our descriptions of the assas- and free communication thereon as the and if so, at what levels of ou:- Govern-
only effective guardian of every other
sination plots are all carefully docu- inent?
right. And, as the Supreme Court stated:
ment and we have done our utmost to Fourth, even if the involvem mt of of-
meet the requirements of Senate Resolu- The power of the Congress to conduct
' fiCialS of the U.S. Government it assassi-
investigations Is inherent in the legisaltive
tion 2.i. to determine the full facts about nation activities was not exonssIy au-
the probes into departments of the Federal process. That power is broad. It comprehends
the matters we investigated. thorized. did those officials perceive their
I am proud to say that the committee Government to expose corruption, ineffi- actions to be within the .scope of their
adopted this report by unanimous ioteelenc i?
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more, lid high-
S; 2062 Approved Fo
er authorities exercise. adequate control
to prevent such misinterpretation?
Richard Helms, who had been involved
in an assassination plot before he be-
came the Director of the CIA, issued an
intraagency order banning assassination_
once he became Director in 1972. William
Colby did. the same in 1973, and told the
committee:
With respect to assassination, by position
Li clear, I just think it is wrong.
ratele&1428010Thalt29 RECCAMP843:61118tM67000965072atitber.2 O, 1975-
the opportunity arose. In. the AlvaAsH. Presidents orother periOis above-the- governi
operation, the- CIA gave active support mental agency or agencies involved.
The committee's findings and conciue
sion.s are set out in part IV of the report,
beginning at page 255. Its- findings re-
garding whether officials of the,U.S. Gov.-
ernment were involved in assassination,.
attempts. appear at pages 255 through
257.
Senator TOWER and I have-agreed, to
'divide the initial presentation, and in or-
der not to duplicate what he intends to.
say, I would like to address the remain-
der of my time to-an outline of the find.-
lags and conclusion& of the committee..
The committee's investigation estab-
lishes once and for all that assassination
Is an abhorrent practice that must never
again be undertaken in times of peace
by the U.S. Governmeet, Our view that
assassination: has no- place in America's
arsenal ia shared by this. administration..
President "Ford,. when he asked this. com-
mittee to study America's involvement in
ases,ssination?stated:
I am, opposed: to political. assassination.
This administration has not and will not:use.
such, means as instruments of national
Witneseee who. testified before the
committee- denounced assassination', as,
immoral, described it as impractical; and
reminded II& that an open society, more
than any other, is particularly vulnerable'
to the risk that its own leaders may- be
assassinated?something of which we
hardly need to- be reminded, I should
think.
Now let me turn to our findings with
respect to, the- plots themselves. Turning;
first to theLumurnba case; we have, con-
eluded that officials of the U.S. Govern-
ment formulated a- plot to' assassinate
Patrice Lumumba, and took steps in fur-
therance- of that plot; including- the ?de-
livering of lethal biological substances to
the Congo. This Nation had no involve-
m-ent, however, in Lurnumba's actual
death, which occurred at the hands of
his Congolese enemies.
In the Castro case, the committee has
found that officials of the U.S. Govern-
ment initiated and participated- in a se-
ries of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro
and other members of the Cuban leader--
ship. Plans to assassinate Castro with
poisoned cigars, exploding seashells-, and
a contaminated diving suit did not ad-
vance beyond tile laboretory phase. An-
other plot, however, in which the- U.S.
Government used underworld figures,
reached, the stage of peoducing ,poison
pills, procuring potential tssas.sins within
Cuba, and apparently del vering the pills
to the island itself.
Yet another episode in Tolved a Cuban
who initially had no in ention of en-
gaging. in assassination, I ut who filially,
agreed, at the sitgeee.tenn. ofetee el7W1,
to attempt to asses'en.W9,MIA.V! Caerb?Re
and encouragement to. a- Cuban whose Let me just digress here a-moment to
intent- to- assassinate Castro was- known, explain., that the committee- was very
and provided him with the -means for " careful- not to make findings- where the
carrying out the assassination. evidence- was insufficient, or where it
The overthrow of Rafael Trujillo was . was conflicting, or where there were gaps
clearly an objective of U.S. foreign- pol-,.. which we were unable to fel because we
icy. American officials offered- both en- were reaching back 13 years into a world:
couragement and weapons to dissidents ee secrecy.
in the Dominican Republic known to- . In those cases; however, we set out the
have the intent to assassinate Trujillo. evidence so that Members of the Senate,
The United States was- not involved, the American public, and historians in
however, in the actual assassination., the future might have an. opportunity to
Similarly, American officials offered know what this committee found in con-
encouragement to a group of Vietnamese nection with the evidence and make their
generals plotting the overthrow of Ngo own appraisal of. each case.
Dinh: Diem. However; the assassination In fairness to men now dead who can-
of Diem and his brother Ngo. Dinh Nem not speak up for themselves-, only irethose
was neither planned- nor suggested by situations where the evidence was con-
officials of this country. elusive; did the committee make findings,
Our investigation has- established that So, if I may repeate the committee
officials of. the U. Government offered makes four other major findings,
encouragement to the Chilean dissi- The first relates to the committee'&
dents, and plotted the kidnaping of ability to make a finding that the a.ssas-
Gen. Ren?Schneider, but no' U.S-. offi- sination plots were authorized by the
cial planned, or encouraged Schneider's Presidents or other- persons- above- the
murder. Certain high officials did know, governmental agency or agencies in-
however, that the dissidents planned to volved
kidnap General Schneider, anclethe-pos- The second explains why- certain: offi-
sibility that, he would be killed. should dial& may have pereeived that according
have been recognized as a- foreseeable to their judgment and experience as-
risk of the kidna,nin sa,s.sination was. an acceptable course of
In addition to these five cases, the action,
committee has received, evidence: that The third criticizes-Agency officials for
ranking Government officials discussed, 'failing: on. several occasions. to. disclose
and may have authorized the: establish- their plan& andactivities to superior au,
meet within the-CIA of a generalized as- thorities- or for failing to do- so with
sassination capacity known as the. Ex- sufficient-detaie and clarity._
ecu tive. Action project. The fourth. criticizes administration
The question of the level at which officials for not ruling out_ assassination,.
these- plots were authorized or known" particularly after certain. administration
officials had become aware of prior assas-
plex one, not susceptible to easy answers, about in the U.S. Government is- Ft coin-
sination plans and the establishment of -
Our conclusions-concerning this issue are a general assassination capability.
As explained at pages 262eand 263, we
set forth, at length in part 4- of the re-
could find no hard evidence that asses-
summarized at pages 5 and 7 of the
port. Those findings are introduced and.
sina,tion was seriously considered or
in-
urged in the high councils of Govern-
report,
and summary section- of the
ment outside of the CIA. The- minutes
report, from which I now quotes
of the National Security Council: and
The picture that emerges from the evi-
special- group meetings, however, con-
dance Is- not a clear one; This may- be. clue
tam repeated exhortations. foe action
to the systeirr of deniability and the- conse?
quent state of the evidence which,even after Silk% as, getting- rid, of Lumuraba. and re-
our long investigation, remains. conflicting- moving Castro,. While -as-sassination may
and. inconclusive. Or it may be. that, there not have been explicitly' authorized by
were in fact serious shortcomings-in sys- the Presidents- and, their . advisers-, their
tern of authorization so that an activity such -
strong. expressions- of hostility to- cer-
ise asassination could have been undertaken. tale foreign leaders created. environ-
by an agency of the united States- Govern-
ment in which it was likely' that some
an-environ-
merit, without express authority.
CIA_ officials would perceive- assassins-
The Committe finds that the system of ex--
ecutive? command and control was so am- tion as- a permissible course off action._
big-lions that it is difficult to be certain at We have found that the plots to- as-
what levels assassination activity was known sassinat.:- Lumuruba and Castro were
and authorized. This situation creates the clearly authorized by the Deputy Direc-
disturbing prospect that Government officials tors for Plans, the head of the CIA
might have undertaken the assassination covert-action arm.. The plot to assas-
plots without it having been uncontroverti-
lily clear that there was explicit authorlza-
sinate. Ltunumba had the approval of
,
tent from the Presidents. It Is also possible
Allen Dullesewhowas the Director of the-
there might have been a successful 'pinus--
Central Intelligence Agency when the-
ible denial" in which Presidential authorize,- assa.sisheetion plot- in the- Congo. took.
tion Was issued but is now obscured. Whether place..
or not the- respective Presidents knew of or There is- considerable' evidence- that
authorized the plots, as chief executive of-- Dulles may himself have- authorized the
ircer of the United States, each must bear plot to kill Castro. althoughe there is no-
of his subordinates. ultimate resp-osibility for the activities-
evidence-, that. hes- successor, John. Mc-
The Committee- makes-four other- major
Cone, was aware-of the assassination, at-
findings. The first relates to the Commit- tempts against Castro. that- took place
t?'3'8stidtlioAttz,?1ttaAtWartiott4 dnrin his b8"ari-evpirec-tot' of the-
eaae, 0 0 9
November 2'0, 1.975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 20627
? We have no solid evid.ence that eicer
president 'Eisenhower cAp4roive0
nedy were aware of any U.S. assassins-
tiou plots. One witness did recall a
statement by President Eisenhower at
the NSC meeting that left him with the
impression that President Eisenhower
had ordered Lumumba's elimination, but
other persons who attended that meet-
ing testified that they did not recall ever
hearing President Eisenhower order his
assassination.
Our investigation has also raised seri-
ous questions not only about knowledge
and authorization of the assassination
efforts at the Presidential level but also
about whether officials of the CIA suffi-
ciently informed their superiors in the
agency and officials above the CIA about
their activities.
In the final analysis, the tragic events
Investigated by the committee were in
large part a result of the system of exec-
utive command and control which
created the risk of confusion, rashness,
and irresponsibility in the very areas
where clarity and sober judgment were
most necessary.
Whatever can be said in defense of the
original purpose of the doctrine of plau-
sible deniability, the extension of the
doctrine to internal decisionmaking was
absurd.
The democratic process is undermined
by any doctrine which insulates elected
officials from information on which to
base their decisions. According to some
witnesses, the extension of the plausible
denial doctrine to internal decisionmak-
ing required the use of circumlocution
and euphemism in speaking with Presi-
dents and other senior officials. Failing
to call dirty business by its rightful name
may have increased the risk of dirty
business being clone.
Ultimately, Presidents must be held
responsible for determining the nature
of major Government activities and for
preventing undesirable activities from
taking place. High administration of-
ficials had a duty to make clear to their
subordinates that assassination was im-
permissible and to inquire further when
they received indications that assassina-
tion was being considered by some of
their subordinates.
Just as Presidents must be held ac-
countable, their subordinates through-
out the Government had a concomitant
duty to disclose fully their plans and ac-
tivities. This sets a demanding standard
but the committee supports it. The fa-
ture of democracy rests upon such ac-
countability.
I might suggest, as all Senators know,
that nothing is more fraught with peril
to the foreign policy of a nation than
assassinations. They have set off great
wars including, as Senators will remem-
ber, the First World War, and thus the
need is evident for clear command, con-
trol, and complete accountability within
the executive branch.
The committee's long investigation of
assassination has brought a number of
important issues into sharp fOcus:Above
all stands the question of whether as-
sassination is an acceptable tool of
American foreign policy. Recommenda-
tions on other issues which relate more
RteiW.-enZ00,a404/29.7g,t
ge_nerally _to covert actioaniiiimome av_e will adigoidtgliva ao, our future.
tk-al 07KIRP bYst of our past.
completion of our continuing investiga- [Applause.]
tion and the issuance of our final report. Now, I should like to recognize the dis-
But the committee has received sufficient tinguished Senator from Texas who
evidence to be convinced that an ab- serves so well as vice chairman of the
solution prohibition against assassination committee.
should be written into law. Dana?lanWER. I yield myself such time
It would be irresponsible not to do all as I may FiiinTii?e.
that can be done to prevent assassination Mr. President, I compliment the dis-
from happening again. A law is necessary tinguished Senator from Idaho, the
to deter specific conduct, to strengthen chairman of the Select Committee, for
the will of those who want to resist tug- his very good summation of the contents
togs to engage in such conduct, and to of the report. He has worked very hard
express the values of our Nation, to make this report a reality and has
The committee, therefore, recommends earned the gratitude of the Senate in the
the enactment of a law that will provide Process.
criminal sanction against the assassina- I have just a few comments in ampli-
ton of foreign. leaders, as well as any flcation of the chairman's presentation.
conspiracies or attempts to commit such While I agree with him substantively on
acts in time of peace. everything that he said regarding the re-
The proposed law is contained in ap- Port, we may have seine degrees of dis-
pendix A at page 289 of the report. It agreement on matters of foreign policy,
is sometimes asked whether assassina- but I will not open the foreign policy de-
tion should be ruled out absolute's?, such bate here today.
as in a time of truly grave . national The select cotruniatomes before the
emergency. Adolf Hitler is often cited as Senate today for conealaralelallallIRJ9
an example. Of course, the cases which official disclosure to ahenlinlaihanal...aaane
the committee investigated were not of Ma-on matters of very mytannallsanal
that character at all. Tra.gically, they re- inaportance. If Tag-Feen apparent since
lated to Latin leaders and black leaders the first surfacing of allegations of U.S.
of little countries that could not possibly involvement in assassination attempts
have constituted a threat to the security that this Senate inquiry would have a
of the United States. profound impact on the future coarse
The only time when Mr. Castro per- of our intelligence organizations and
matted his island to become a base for their activities. This report will be the
Russian missiles, the only time during first public document to provide an in-
which it might have been said that he depth review of some of the workings of
had become a threat to the security of intelligence-related aspects or our nae
the American people, was the one time tonal security apparatus.
when all assassination activity, plans, Along with some other members of the
and plots against his life were stood select committee, I initially expressed
clown, strong reservations against any detailed
So we are not talking about Adolf account of the evidence received by this
Hitler or anything of that character, nor committee?not because of any partisan
are we prejudicing actions taken in a consideration but, rather, for fear of
grave national emergency when the life permanent damage to the. Nation's se-
of the Republic in endangered. In such curity and the continued effectiveness of
cases, the President has constitutional our intelligence agencies.
powers to act to defend the Nation; and While I accept and respect the jurIg-
he is answerable to history, to Congress, ment of my colleagues, T. am compelled
and to the American people for the ac- toastaAearay continuing concerna -
ton he takes in emergencies of that i?om or.fuu pubircosure.
extreme character. The ultirriaerect of the reporrmay.rie
The committee's sentiments are aptly for the American public to appreciate
summarized in the epilog to the report that quick, seemingly easy answers, such
which appears at page 285. as assassination, are not the most eltfee-
The committee does not believe that Live way to rid ourselves of those with
the acts which it has examined repre- wheal we are engaged in ideological
sent the real American character. They combat.
donet reflect the ideals which have given Careful public examination of the en-
the people of this country and of the tireate:lorttaiso should provickacsneDer-
world hope for a better, fuller, fairer sPective-16i evaluation of the views of
life. IThaiFiaTiattatrolarirtairatialiii-r
pL.0 the
We regard the assassination plots ascifi.Erike..75..Anralaifalr.a.Thataal...a.Par.ialrfasa from.
aberrations. The 'United States must not ti1M.9_ic,.._tc.r,6rlition at the 'feet isf the
-
adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means much maligned and too often maligned
are as important as ends. Crisis makes it ifitalligaralratserfriffitlfillSatIlaratfullYa-trie
tempting to ignore the wise restraints public will begin to wiTale, as the select
that make men free; but each time we committee has, with the real problem?
do so, each time the means we use are the absolute necessity for instrumentali-
wrong, our inner strength, the strength ties of the U.S. Government to have
which makes us free, is lessened, secrets and discharge their obligation to
Despite our distaste for what we have protect the people's right to be secure,
seen, we have great faith in tais coun- with the assurance that the American
try. The story is sad, but this country Public and Congress stand behind them.
has the strengths to hear the story and It may be that baring these reprehen-
to learn from it. We must remain a sible activities is necessary to achieve
people who confront our mistakes and this result.
resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, It is a very difficult problem with
?
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1Vmber "
S 20628 Approved For Re -
cSRIPHOV62 KR-00H666i7000900ove 20 197
02-0 -
/1YeALCPAE19.
which to Wrestle. We might raise this em. - As a matter of fact, we have been involvement in asisassination plots ad-
rhetorical question: At what point must so diligent in this activity that I suspect versely reflect on the present CIA lead,
the people's right -to know be subordi- that all 11 members of the committee ership or on the great number of its high-'
nated to the people's right to be secure, have allowed- some constituent business ly disciplined, dedicated, and enormous-
to the extent that an effective to slide a bit. We May be rewarded for ly loyal employees. I sincerely hope that
i
genee-gathering capability can make that later. . we have not placed the CIA or our other
them secure? . . One aspect of the plots which has be- intelligence apparatus in a position which
Before turning to the results of our come clear to me is the historical con- would, in any way, erode or threaten our:
investigation, I should like to say an- text of the times in which they occurred. necessary covert efforts or our highly:
other word concerning public release of :America in the post-war period was en- sophisticated and sensitive
the report. The President sent a letter gaged in a battle against the spreading methods.
to 'every member of the select commit- infection of communism in what. have As the chairman noted, the task bee
tee, asking that we not make the report been called the "back alleys of the world." fore our committee has been difficult andi
public. His concern is not to conceal Soviet influence was increasing in .the carrying out these responsibilities has'
from the public any activities of his ad- emerging new nations that were former- been painful. We have worked diligently
ministration. Everything we looked into ly of colonial status. In the summer of in our efforts to provide the Senate and
occurred before this administration 1960, shortly after the Congo gained its the American people answers to the hard
came into office; so it is because of no independence from Belgium, Patrice Lu- assassination questions. I believe thaz,:
concern with the President's- own skin mumba threatened to invite the Soviets to the extent possible, this report pro'
that he made this requet of us. Rather, into the hastened Belgian withdrawal. vides those answers.
he feels that public release will cause When Fidel Castro came to power in Mr. President, I think I would he remies
serious harm to the national interests Cuba in 1959, his appearance was gen- if I did not allude to the fact that the
and would endanger certain individuals. .erally acclaimed, but it became increas- report of the select committee -which
I fully understand and accord a great ingly clear over the next 12 months, as the Senate is considering today is 'very
deal of weight- to the President's con- ? Cuba signed a trade agreement with the unique as to subject matter. But it has
cern.
Soviets and then nationalized industries, something in common with most well-
. -?
The President; in the concluding para- that Castro's presence and influence 90 prepared Senate documents. It would not
graph of his letter, sharpened the corn- miles off our shores constituted a clear have been possible without the dedicated
mittee's problem by stating: . and present danger to the United States. Work of the staff. I think we have beer
I am sure the select committee will recog-
It is understandable, then, that as to especially fortunate on the select com-
.
nize the enormous responsibility it has to-see ? each target, of assassination that this mittee in assembling a most able ara:
to it that serious damage will not result to committee studied, we found that the well-trained group of capable people li-
the United States by the publication of this President of the United States viewed all levels of positions. The excellence 0:
report. and will recognize also the duty those targeted with extreme hostility, our clerks, secretaries, researchers, am
which I 1.1Eve to emphasize the disastrous Commenting further on the matter of professional staff members is exceede;
consequences which eau- occur by publica7, Cuba, and I shall not go into the assassi- only by their willingness to work lon4
tion. nation plots, because my distinguished long hours furthering the committee:-
. Since receiving the President's letter, colleague from Idaho has already sum- investigative efforts and accomplishim:
the committee has made greada marized these, I would expand further, the formidable paperwork which a.ccom?
in accommodating most ot his stated however, on the Castro matter. The au- ,parlieS a major investigation. In no aree.
objections. In the law instances in which thorization for the plots against Fidel of the committee's work have these quail
-
the 1pgjie of the report- misfit have Castro appears to stein from a document ties been more evident than during tie
-revealed sensitive sources or methods, discovered by the CIA only last week investigation of the various assassins.
the--ciihimitt-ee has deleted entire-13r' :?Iitafi and delivered to the committee last Fri- tion allegations and in preparing the re
references. day evening while the -staff was in the port submitted today.
-the committee has always intended process of proofreading the galleys of I should like personally to thank ever.
to omit such references, and on, con- the report, woman and man on our staff who sacre-
cern in that regard has been heightened This document makes it crystal clear ficed personal time in order that the ole.
by the President's remarks. The dele- that Allen Dulles approved the thorough jectives of Senate Resolution 21 could
tions were based on the judgment and censideration of the elimination of Fidel be Met; The preparation of the repo!'
advice of a longtime CIA employee who Castro in December of 1959. Prior to the has been a bipartisan staff ?effort, and :
worked for several days with a member receipt of that document, it had not been know that I express the sentiment of ab
of the staff in receiving the report. This entirely certain whether Allen Dulles ap- of my colleagues on the committee when
expert also pointed outeseveral places in proved or knew of the planning against I extend our appreciation to the entire
the report -which may have unneces- Castro. In light of that document, the staff for a splendid and, perhaps, mom:-
sarily risked the life or livelihood of a only question remaining is whether the mental piece of work.
CIA employee or agent by divulging his individuals who were directed to consider ' Mr. CHURCH. 41.r. President, this re-
name. In each instance, we weighed the the plan somehow exceeded Dulles' order port, as I earlier mentiOneleisethe ree
risk for .netential harm trthe'indiviaual by contacting undenvorld figures. It is pert, of your comnefifee. The re,oltiO4n -
,
which might restilrinils or Tier name my strong personal conclusion that the by which the committee waseefepte ',.'erea
cre used. The committee then decided CIA -employees vvtho received the order to_uxiciertake,thii-investigation delega:,e7d
Nvlietherto-crelete- the name, to proVide from Dulles to plan for eliminating Cas- to .the_cenimiltee, the authority to teene
an alias, or to leave the individual's tro need not have returned to him at such reports as, in the judgment of _the
name ifftlie that point, even assuming that they did conneffffee, were warranted:-This?rep.or:,
=rig ?.'ttitlie?report itself: In gen- not. In the highly disciplined CIA, I hear3 The-gl-F,hatilreS" ti mambo!meniT)ers of
eral, I believe the report. fairly repre- would expect employees to go forward ta committee, fll orhose signatures
sents what happened. Some of the wit- with an order for consideration until appeliTec tliaTof PitiLie :timer
nesses, I personally believe, did hat tell they came up with a plan which they on -the DemocritiTrsitie, who was unable.
the whole truth, and others concealed were confident would succeed. to attend many of the hearings because I
what may be the truth. On the whole, After these many months of investiga- of his illness.
history should record this investigation tion, I concluded that in each of the cases I should like, first, to lefer to Senator
as an honest effort by a hard-working studied, assassination Was an improper Beer, the ranking Dene:cratic Member,
committee. and reckless tactic, one which did not for any remarks he wou d like to make.
The select committee, pursuait to Sen- serve our national interest. I concur in Then other members of the committee
ate Resolution 21 and the necessity to the committee's recommendation that may have some cornmer Is, after which
there be legislation to outlaw further as- the floor will be open tx general que*-
-iomplete the work begun by the Rockee
-:
long sassina lion efforts against foreign tons and debate. eller Commission, spent . many ?
whirs over the last 8 months conducting leaders. Senator HART, is thert anything you
our investigation into the alleged as- My second and more general conclu- would care to say?
:ossinatIon efforAtiodoicersin*gia-s4inas3*-khe
29 !tiAa-ttbist 4CitIMOtioo6hobi616)2.1b NART. No; except
November 20, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 20629
Ft& RptfAd Ft3164'121l'. tlAi-kbP5floorpguyeteotimijmod assassination
Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator
very much. ?
? I also wish to join the others in com-
mending our chairman and our vice
chairman for their work in the devel-
opment of this historic report.
In my opinion, we need a CIA; we
need the best intelligence-gathering
agency in the world, and we must make
certain that we continue to have it.
To have a CIA, it must operate in
secret. This is a very grievous conces-
sion for a democracy to make but one
'which must be made if it is going to do
its work. _
What bothers me about what has been
developed in this report is that our in-
telligence operations are not only secret
but they ? have been unaccountable; as
we tried to sort through the facts of these
allegations and pin down what hap-
pened, it came to be like trying to nail
jello to the wall.
Practically everything said in direct
testimony was contradicted by somebody
else. The documents often contradicted
one another or there were contradictions
in the same document.
As you read this report you will find
that running through the whole CIA and
the Government sti:ucture that was sup-
posed to control these very Sensitive and
explosive matters was the doctrine of
plausible deniability, the theory that if
something was exposed everyone is re-
sponsibility ought to be in a position
to deny it.
I think you will see by the documents
that it does not work. It ends up with
a principle of implausible deniability.
We put our top officials in a position
where they either ultimately have to ad-
mit responsibility for an operation or
worse they have to lie about it, as we did
in the 13-2 incident, as we did initially
in the Bay of Pigs, and so on. It is a
theory that does not work. It is humiliat-
ing- and it undermines American confi-
dence in its own Government.
SO I would hope, as we consider this
report, we would see how we can
strengthen the CIA. Equally important
we must consider how we can also make
certain that from here on out should
there be questions about responsibility
for an operation, the record, privately
and secretly, but clearly, disclose who did
it, why, and who is responsible.
Not only is this required because de-
mocracy most have that kind of ultimate
accountability but, I think it can help
increase the sobriety and restraint of
those making the decisions. I think there
is evidence in the report that many of
these steps were taken by people rather
loosely and without mature considera-
tion?among other reasons, because they
did not think they would be blamed if
someone found out.
So both because our Constitution re-
quires it and, second, because we want
to make certain that our Government is
very careful when they do covert oper-
a tions?and I hope we will prohibit much
of the sort of thing that is in this re-
port?I think it is important to nail
down an accountability system that can-
not be avoided.
A second point r would like to make
thank you and Senator A1
era for your kindness du a' thaqitireriod
;
and to indicate that my views, very brief,
are found on page 297. In short, I feel
that I have been able to inhale enough of -
the testimony and participate in suffi-
cient of the discussion to support the
committee recommendations for a stat-
ute explicitly prohibiting assassination
activity. I feel that I would be faking it
If I signed a rePort indicating that I par-
ticipated in the authorship, or signed as
a regular -participant.
Mr. CHURCH. I just want to say
how much we all appreciate the fact that
Senator HART is back with us again in
connection with our continuing work.
I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Tennessee.
ME.DANga,. Mr. President, in my 9
ye.'aits in the Senate, I have never under-
taken anything more difficult, More em-
barrassing, and potentially more damag-
ing than this inquiry and investigation,
notwithstanding the others in which I
have participated. Even so, I think it
was essential that we go forward with
the inquiry, because I think that, having
the suggestions made that there were, I
believe, irregularities in the intelligence
apparatus,- it would be unconscionable
not to inquire into it.
I think both Senator Cnuacii and Sen-
ator TOWER have done a magnificent job,
not only of administering the investiga-
tion and the staff, but of maintaining a
degree of equanimity and tranquility in
an emotionally charged and a potentially
political atmosphere.
- I commend them and each member of
the committee as well as the staff for
keeping their cool.
I generally agree wtili the committee
report and with the observations by Sen-
ator Cuurtcu and Senator TOWER. I do
believe, however, that were we involved
in a trial of the facts before a jury in
the usual traditional way that a different
result might have obtained.
I. rather expect that a scholarly and
responsible analysis of the facts does
indeed give us only one possible eonclua
sion, and that is we do not know whether
Presidents authorized or did not au-
thorize these assassination attempts.
There is no doubt that the attempts
occurred. But I thinin if we tested the
proof by the usuarcourtroom standards,
tiiHrtir6 appearance and demeanor of
the witness while testifying, of his means
of knowledge, of his prior inconsistent
statements, of the possibility of involve-
ment, and inconsistencies while testi-
fying under cross-examination of the
witness, his means -of knowledge, his
interest in the subject matter, if any, I
think by observing the testimony as
well as hearing it, one would_conclade, as
I have concluded, on balance it is rnoet:e
likely that Presidents did know and
ii?hiT authorized the several activities
than Chataney did not. ?
a far cry from saying we have
proved that. Rather I think it more likely
that diminishes the image of the intelli-
gence community as an irresponsible ap-
paratus. I think it intensifies the need
that we put in place a system of account-
ability for significant agency and Presi-
dential activities.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I recog-
or a U S. i -se . o a , intik it is a very
dangerous tactic for Government leaders
to pursue. There is a statement. in Mac-
beth about how inventions return to
plague the inventor. We do not know
what happened, but when we pursue a
strategy of assassinating foreign leaders,
I think we ought to concern ourselves
with the possibility that foreign leaders
might decidethat if we are going to play
such a game against them they can play
it against us.
Now, it embarrasses me, with Senator
KENNEDY present?and it also is not an
accurate reflection of the record?to say
that one of the things that disturbed me
the most in our investigation was to find
an interview by Prime Minister Castro 5
weeks before the tragic assasination of
President Kenedy in which he said just
that. He knew that the CIA was trying to
assassinate him, and he said so publicly.
The second thing I would like to say
on this point is this: running through ?
practically every one of these attempts
by the CIA was an incredibly naive view
that somehow, with a couple of guns, a
couple of bucks or a couple of lies, we
know no one could ever do to us.
It never worked. We were never able to
kill anybody we tried to kill?that is the
first thing; and, moreover, there is no
evidence that if succeeded, it would not
be more harmful to 'us than leaving
things the way they were.
Third, it seemed to me there was never
any serious discussion abbot the overall
risks of what we were doing; what hap-
pened if the public heard about it, what
would be the results in that society, and
what would be the fundamental result to
the integrity and moral authority of our
country in foreign affairs. Today, no mat-
ter what happens around the world, if
Faisal is killed, we did it. If there is
trouble in Portugal, we did it. We get
blamed for more things we do not clo than
any country in the world, because we
have stuck our nose naively and foolishly
into too many people's businesses. And
almost always, it does not work. It kicks
back on us, and it hurts us more -than
it can possibly help. But it seems those
questions were never asked.
So I would hope we would look at the
system of command and control over
overt operations. But I also hope we
would look at the question of how much
American can really influence the inter-
nal politics of another seciety in this
way.
Mr. President, the events described in
this report are in every sense a tragic
chapter in American history. Rather
than dwell on the report and its detailed
account of the assassination plots which
the Select Committee investigated, I
would rather dwell upon America's re-
sponse to this tragic story.
There are two basic response to trag-
edy. One is to withdraw, to tun?. out, to
become self-absorbed and cyni :al. The
other, more difficult, response i ; to fle-
cept the facts and then go forwi rd with
the changes that will help asst re that
tragedy will not be repeated.
I believe that confronted w:th the
facts, the American people ha te the
strength and character to choose tie sec-
ond course, it is my hope that, through
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all the public outcry that this report will
rightly generate, the American people
will not lose sight of the important les-
sons to be learned. It is my conviction---:
based on this report and the subsequent
-work of the committee in the whole range
of intelligence activities?that major
changes are required in the way our Gov-
ernment conducts itself in this vital field
of national security. - ?
Today I would like to focus briefly on
these changes.
The first step, as -recommended in the
report, is to rule out assassination as an
instrument of U.S. foreign policy. War-
time obviously constitutes a different sit.;
nation, but in peacetime, there is no -
place for assassination in our arsenal of
international policies and programs.
Nonetheless, if we are to continue to
have clandestine intelligence organiza-
tions?which I believe are necessary
given the current state of world affairs?
then we must take steps to insure that
these organizations strictly adhere to
policies, purposes, and standards of the
American Government and the Ameri-
can people.
`I'wo things are called for:
First, we must devise a better struc-
ture of accounramlity tor clancletinemai-
tiVetraa.
- ?Second, we must adopt more mature
goverMg such mtelffeence op-
eraions.
Accountability is the most important
issue. I am prepared to accept that in-
telligence activities must be sectet. But
I am not willing to further concede that
they can be unaccountable. I am con-
vinced that if we had an effective sys-
tem of accountability, the misguided ef-
forts outlined in this report would never
have been undertaken.
Much public discussion is likely to fo-
cus. on whether the President knew and
approved of the assassination plots out-
lined in the committee's report. This is
an important issue and we have put for-
ward all the relevant facts at our dis-
posal.. But tbe real issue is that there
is no system to hold the Government to
account in such matters. Instead we had
a system of deniability, where everyone
could avoid responsibility or claim higher
authority for their actions, or both.
Theoretically, the CIA reports to the
President. But in practice, the Agency
usually takes orders from a committee,
or from Presidential assistants, or acts
on its own authority. Committees, of
course, are a notorious way to avoid re-
sponsibility. And in some adminstrations,
there were up to a half-a-dozen Presi-
dential assistants purporting to speak
for the President. Even in those adminis-
trations where the line of command was
clear, Presidential assistants have not
been subject to congressional scrutiny.
Until the establishment of the Select
Committee, the CIA itself did not appar-
ently discuss the matters contained in
this assassination report with the then
duly-constituted congressional bodies.
This system is unacceptable in a de-
mocracy. It must change. To this end. I
propose that the following_ remedies be
given serious consideration. They seek to
backed up by one of the most important
principles of our Founding Fathers?the
control of newer through the process of
cheeks and balances.
There must be a clear chain of com-
mand. No longer should the CIA report_
to a committee, or to a shifting group
of Presidential aides and advisers. More-
over, all Clandestine activities?intelli-
gence and counterintelligence, not just
covert actions?should be subject to re-
view in this chain of command.
The chain of command should in-
clude a Cabinet officer. The President is
too busy to monitor the intelligence com-
munity. The chief of intelligence cannot
do it himself; for he has too great a
self-interest. So there must be someone
between him and the President. Assist-
ants to the President should not do it, for
they are too insulated from congressional
oversight.
I have therefore concluded that it is a
Cabinet officer, be it the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Defense, on
whom we must place the primary re-
sponsibility for policy review and opera-
tional' accountability for our clandestine
intelligence activities.
Zee clandestine services, the "opeea-
tional" part cif the CIA, sleaullislieemade
.into a separate agency with a_ primary'
mission TEEcolleet intelligence_
This is strong Medicine, but I believe
it is essential to strengthen outside con-
trol over potentially dangerous and risky
clandestine activities. It would apply the
concept of checks and balances to the
intelligence community. It would permit
intelligence analysts t6 make a more ob-
jective assessment of the. activities of the
clandestine operators than if they live
under the same roof as. they do today?
an arrangement by which the operators
have inevitably bested the analysts.
The effectiveness of congressional
oversight would also be strengthened.
There is no question but that we can
keep closer tabs on clandestine activities
if they are not insulated from over-
sight by being mixed in with an agency
that has a vast array of other programs
and personnel running technical collec-
tion projects and producing various
forms of intelligence.
Moreover, we are likely to produce bet-
ter intelligence by moving the clandes-
tine service out of CIA. This would free
CIA analysts of any obligation to rely
more on their clandestine services than
on other vital sources of intelligence such
as NSA, State and Defense.
Finally, we must establish a system of
effective congressional oversight. The
Select Committee staff has been develop-
ing proposed- legislation to that end,
which the committee will turn to shortly.
We must of course have no illusion
teat structural changes alone will solve
e tery problem. They cannot provide loo-
p, rcent assurance against future abuse.
hile we must be realistic about -what
w can accomplish th-ough
me must avoid the cynicism which says
th if Government is inherently bad, that
no thing can be done about it, and that
all we can do is hope for better human
naiure. I believe that something can be
provide a clear system of accountability done; that something must be done. And But teettliaetanemleyetente genie:ekes:it to
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.1 hope that the changes I have outlined
will be given the most serious considera-
tion.
In, addition, however, we need to make
some changes in our outlook. The Amer-
ican people are determined not to be the ?
world's policeman, prepared to intervene
with military force in every co-globe. We must not substitute the equally \
corner of the
fallacious and naive idea that we can
change the course of history with a cou-
ple of bucks, a-couple of lies, or a couple
of guns.
As we face the challenges of the next
quarter of this century, we should keep
in mind an important lesson which ap-
plies to every aspect of life and human.
endeavor. We should do those things that
we do best; those things that we are ,
equipped to do. The brightest chapters
of American international involvement
in peacetime are the constructive epi-
sodes--the- Marshall plan, NATO, the
Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress?
and the darkest chapters are those when
we thought .we could beat the totalitar-
ians at their own game.- ?
- In facing the unpleasant facts of the
assassination report, America must also
face the more encouraging fact that we
are just not very good at that sort of
thing.
? The idea that this kind of business can
be kept secret, and therefore cost free,
has proven to be an illusion. The dirty
secrets inevitably came out and America,
ends up paying more, once these deeds
are revealed, than it ever could have
achieved by their success..
Mr. President, I am hopeful and con-
fident that America will learn the lessons
of this report. I believe that we can
modify our intelligence institutions to
make them accountable to the Congress
and the ? American people and prevent
further abuses of this sort. In the end, I
am confident ? that America will be
strengthened by once again learning the
lesson that our Government must be true
to the American character and to our
basic values.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
-Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, be
I read the paper I prepared I would
like to concur in what Senator BAKER has
said and what Senator MONDALE has
touched on by this statement: I asked
two different top men of the CIA if they
would lie to protect the Presidency, am.,
they both said they would. I think we
have to accept that determination on
their part as an obstacle over which we
probably can never crawl.
I believe that the pnialicaticsani an en-
ttedin report on assassinations is an es-
iiQt-te.oneh taetterEfeeTtetwill cepeetea yearejte
While-Trave added my signature to
the report, it is purely an act, of gratitude
for the hard work done by the committee
and the staff.
My own views on this whole subject
matter are appended to the report.
Now, strong arguments can be made
for the public's right to know. Anti, in
general,- I fully support the principle that
Americans must know and need to know
about their Government.
ove-mber 20, 1.975 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 20631
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. ?
the founding of this Repamlic, certain But, the fact that substantial damage First of ?all, I expresi-iny appreciation
iiafre been excluded WM --TM has already been done is no reason- to to the chairman and the vice chairman
laenerat pranciple. Grand Jury proceed:, throw another log on the bonfire, of our committee and the entire staff. I
iffiTT are r----intama- mple. The conduct of in- Part of the problem we are facing - think the leadership they have given to
telliaence operations and methods is comes from the determination of recent this Very important work has been ex-
another example. ? Congresses to assert authority over -for- emplary in every aspect of the word
In. one way or another the United eign policy. The meddling with Jewish and has contributed to the success the.
States has been involved in intelligence , immigration from Russia and the med- committee has had to date in dealing
activities beginning with the Revolution- tiling in the Greek-Turkish conflict over with these very difficult and complex
ary War. By tradition common to all Cyprus are two examples?and two ex- problems.
nations our intelligence operations have funnies where the effects were bad. I Mr. President, the Select Committee
been shrouded in secrecy, could cite more. To Study Governmental Operation's With
It is inconceivable to me that any of I believe it is impossible for the Con- Respect to Intelligence Activities is today
our allies would publish the kind of re- gress to try to influence the day-to-day releasing its first--and One of its princi-
port we propose to release today; and decisions in foreign policy. Moreover, I pal?reports.
let us remember that some of them hold believe the President and his agents must It is, therefore, a proper and fitting
to democratic principles just as dearly have the primary role in our relations time for us to pause .to reflect on the?
as we do. . ? with other countries. ? duties and responsibilities of the U.S. in-
There are several emestiens I believe In other words, the Congress is at- telligence community and of this con-
the Senators should ask themselves as tempting to do something which has gressional committee and to bring the
we' itonder the question of fa-easing an failed in the past. One of the weak- focus on this report and the committee's
interim report en assassinations. nesses in the Articles of Confederation activities into perspective.
First. Will it raise more questions than, was the lack of executive authority in There have been, since this investi-
it will answer? I Fre--e?thenanamiezise foreign policy. gation was initiated, fears by those who
"Yes." In the aftermath of World War I, the believed legitimate and necessary Intel-
Will the reputation of great Senate injected itself into the . postwar ligence activities would be undermined
Americans be damaged? i believe the settlement with .considerable damage and those who believed that a coverup of
answer is '.'Yes." done for the long-range interests of ? improper activities and policies was like-
-Th.-fee. Will it serve any public ineae- America. Notably, was the failure to join ly. I believe that our committee has prov-
ost? I say "No." the League of Nations, which signaled en that those on both the outer edges of
Ihriiir. Will it serve any legislative pur- that America had retreated into Isola- the spectrum were incorrect. I believe
poSe-?-1-say "N-67--- tionism. '- that. we have proven that we can study.
-F1ve7DO-flielienefits of publishing out- I believe that Congress does have rights even investig,ate, without Impairing nec-
weigh the hazards? 'Emphaticalry--,17F-ty and obligations in the conduct of foreign
essary operations and without blinding
policy. They derive from article II, sec- ourselves to questionable activities, which
- Mille there may be some possibility tion 2 of the Constitution. What we are may have gone beyond authority granted,
that classified information will be re- talking about is the broad area of gen- legal norms, or simple- propriety.
veined through the publication of this eral policy decisions through the treaty But, without a doubt, the greatest dis-
report, I believe a sincere and deter- making process. service we can do to our intelligence ap-
mined effort has been made to prevent . For the most part Presidents have paratus, our investigation, our Nation, or
such an occurrence, submitted important policy decisions to ourselves is to ,view these activities out
Van cehigafastonates the diplomatic the Congress. The creation of NATO and of the context in which they exist and
damage this docruneazifi--ray do t0_4111" of the Marshall plan are examples of which, to a great extent, has formed
country. It is difficult to predict the re- how the President and the Congress have them. For me, the danger of any imbal-
a-alai? of our friends and enemies shared important policy decisions. And, ance, of any misunderstanding, of any
abroad, but I believe it will be generally here are two examples where the Nation misrepresentation, lies in three areas we
unfavorable to Our interests. . ? and the free world benefited beyond should all be aware of. It lies, I believe,
In fact, a few weeks ago, in visiting, measure, in, first; a discounting of the threats to
the headquarters of NATO, this whole Mr. President, one more minute or two U.S. security which do exist; second, a
subject was the major subject of dis- is all right. pretension that ill-advised actions and
CUESIG/1 between our commanders there Turning to the subject of abuses, I policies have not taken place; or third,
anti the commander's of our allies. - believe we know the story of where re- allowing . sensational and isolated
Cooneration by foreign governments cent administrations strayed away from events?especially those events occurring
with our (diplomatic and intelligence the law. If laws have been violated, then in other times, other places, other at-
s7iiiVices Ts-To a large extent based on let us return indictments, and let the mospheres?to be Viewed outside the
I-al:tile' confidence niere InTelli ence courts do their job context in which they had their being.
operaiTirns are involved assurances a
The wholesale foraging of the Con- Fire is comfort or danger, depending on
secrecy provide a floig of ,fr-rf-Orin ati on?a gress-Mb-fh-a" detrtitr OffefelOrai-iiiilleY its nature and the circumstances. So, too,
ilowIliar stops-7-w Heil' se ci'-e. ey -agreernefiti anTtiii-ffirelrigence serVITes iitibii.-"Wialeb.
..._. ......_ _ are intelligence activities, The key lies
I3.'e violated. '? ---------' it ;crep-elia-s-,--tliiri-ohly serve .5- giir_e_scial- in protecting the features .:vhich provide
------iiiiarTnniblication of till'. report will fort toour opponents and to embarrass comfort and preventing. these which raise
certainly have one had eV:1TE- it will our frietas. danger.
:More (71111-Th-TFToF1Treign gore'fii.- - - dur IT'011:Itation abroaals Mt enhaiLeslt Intelligence ac tivi
_. ......... .?
. ties do not today?
or ifinaffTbii?em4ii erriTzeffs Co be- a a ?,.ef:,c .acIf,.,. oSaii.iiiiic s_e_lIztla_44e.114Wri, and never have.?existed in a vacuum. It
-- -y can en-t?.r into confidential Most of our allies are dumfolindecLin- is, I believe, important to remember that
rela.tions with tne United ,s`liTates of ciTaff1o17,-ala -s-Eilnffiet-rb.:7 viA We ;Ira modern U.S. intelligence activities were
.._
Ae a., wrucli wall be respected. M u c h of doing, ..._
an outgrowth of the attack on Pearl Har-
the information received by tne elea --ret us get on with the job of remedial bor more than 30 years ago. There had
eniiiitee that -ii-i7,.fiE-Ii'ito the-fiTteiTiri-r& legishition where needed been a number of warning s'.girs that
portte a s ET:ill-fled-IF" -OtriTf "gba...7173-ii7oni.Ve-i7- Let us not tell the world we are re- hostilities could he -expecn,ed, but the
sOT7s --.; :176 -We're 'given prornises .oit. condi- treating into isolationism. available -information was not properly
dentiatitv ancIiii S-O-ffieTifiSfaii-Ces,prolece Uost important, let us get our Intel- a,nalyzed and evaluated?and in there-
non_ ligence services- out 6-2-17:6-Erreg Wiltsi fore, was not translated into Pa icy. U.S-
I ha.zten to add that the substantial because those liFiTtsThlifid them at a intelligence activities were furtl ter ntir-
aalkaTzTE-,irfient In ofrr?rit-r-csi7. - ? -
age. that has been done to our Intel- tured in post World War It Europe.
ligence services is not the result of ac- Mr. cirOir7T-r-mr-r-funzterm, I me- where a confrontation between Last and
tion by Congress. We all know the story. ognize Senator IltreeeesroN for 5 min- West became the modus oeerant ti And
Much o what has appea,recl in the press utes. with time, as American int( restse-
was released by persons who had some Mr. ITUDDLESTON. I thank the chair- whether for good or for bad, zwliel her in-
political or personal grievaalces. a man.
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ae?read through-
S 20832 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENA
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out the World, so too chitU.S. e igence ic s a cornefetone o much o our
eiforts. Nation's security. As such they need, de-
As the years have passed, the direct serve?and must know they have?the
and obvious relations between intelli- firm backing of those they work to pro-
gence and national security have perhaps tect. And, they are certainly entitled to
been obscured. A softening in the chale clearly defined authority and guidelines
lenge atmosphere of previous decades clearly enunciated by the Nation's policy-
makers.
and a diminishing threat of military
confrontation in Europe have suggested
to many that the cold war has indeed
become history. As Berlin walls have
given way to d?nte, Sputniks to joint
space ventures and Czechoslovakias to
security conferences, the events and de-
velopments which once reminded us of
security needs have been clouded.
This does. not mean, however, that
they have ceased to exist. Today, inter-
ests continue to vary among nations. One
need only look at recent debates within
the United Nations to see how far and
deep the divisions run. One need only fol-
low the arms sales throughout the world
and the probable impending enlargement
Of the nuclear cemmunity to understand
-
how fragile peace and security really are.
One need only review the recent history
of the Middle-East to know that, despite
some rays of light, the ? stages for con-
frontations are still set. One need only
examine the very complex shifts in world
economic power to realize that challenges
to peace and economic well-being will
arise in many new forms in the years
ahead. One need only refer to scholars'
speculations about the Soviet Union after
Brezhney or Yugoslavia after Tito ? to un-
derstand that the world is still not the
safe haven we wish it would be. One need
only read the press speculations about
SALT violations to recall that some of
our Security blocks are e agreements,
which are subject to abrogation and
breach. . .
The threats remain. The conflicts
-among those who share this planet are
still there. That they may look?and in-
trinsically be?different from the way
they were: in the late 1940's; the 1950'a,
and even the 1960's, does not signal their
demise. Forms can change but basic real-
ities remain. And out of this comes two
lessons: The need for a strong, effective
.intelligence community. continues,. and
methods and policies of the past may be
creatures of -their own time and place.
While today's interim report of the
select committee details the kind of sen-
sational, spectacular, and 'even bizarre
activities that always grab the headlines,
It is important to remember that intelli-
gence operations are more than dreams
and fancies pursued by modern-day ad-
venturers. They are much more than
groups of hi-advised men and women
stirring a witches brew of plots and
counterplots and manipulating foreign
nations and peoples, as many detractors
of the intelligence community would have
us believe. These situations are the ex-
ception, not the rule. They are the few
instances where the bounds of authority
and propriety have been clearly over-
stepped. They need correction. But, the
larger number of persons in the intelli-
gence community are involved in legiti-
mate activities, taken under proper com-
mand and control?honest men and
Thus, in approaching the committee's
work, I have tried constantly to keep
in mind these few principles?my work
on the committee has only underscored
my belief in them?my commitment to
a strong, efficient, well-organized intelli-
gence community as an essential of our
national security, my concern that in-
telligence agencies be put above the level
of suspicion raised by many reports and
the belief that we must constantly strive
to keep the information available and
our activities in proper perspective.
As we begin with the report before us
today, I hope my colleagues will think
about these principles and their relation
to our considerations.
EVOLVEMENT OF ASiASSEgATION REPORT
lb November 20, .1975
Rag 9 9,9 9,910 5f-ik to be fair to the !
agency and to the -individuals involved,
living and dead, and hopefully to resolve '
the questions concerning authority and
col/Inland and control followed every
lead, requested every relevant document.
and interviewed every available witness.
It is important to note that as a result of
such an indepth look at this single issue
of assassination we gleaned valuable in-
formation that will be applicable to our
broader investigation of the intelligence
community. For example, we have re-
ceived documents of the various National
security council, special group, special
group?augmented, 303 committee, and
40 meetings. Thus, we have been privy
to the documents of the decisio-nmaking
mechanisms in the executive branch
which deal with covert actions of vari-
ous types. We have seen the problems in ,
that clecisionmaking process, the dilem-
mas, and pitfalls.
Our exhaustive look into "Operation.
Mongoose," the anti-Castro covert action
program in the post-Bay of Pigs era.
readily demonstrates the ? importance
which our assassination investigation
'served.- The totality of the documents
and testimony concerning that operation
provided a substantial background for
the consideration of other instances Of
'covert action.
IMPORTANCE OF REPORT
It is certainly true that the assassi-
nation issue Is not' only one of the more
sensational of. those covered, but prob-
ably, also the most unpalatable to the
American people and to the world. But-
its sensational and unsavory nature does
not mean that it can or should be
avoided. In fact, it is,. perhaps, particu-
larly important that these matters be
reviewed in an ?Pen and objective man-
ner and be placed in proper perspective.
Ignoring the issues could only have
fueled the fires of speculation and innu-
endo. It could only have provided those
with qualms about the agency with addi-
tional reason to charge "coverup." The
far better approach, I believe, is -this re-
port which has been worked on by all
members of the committee and which
seeks to bring the very important ole-
relents of knowledge and perspective to
the events of a time when U.S. foreign
policy and the U.S. role in the world were
:perceived quite differently from the way
they are today.
At the same time, the report is im-
portant because, as I suggested earlier..
it raises many of the more general hence'
'regarding intelligence activities. It raises-
questions of propriety regarding policy..
This is, of course, an extremely cLicult
area with which to deal. One man's
morals are not another's. What is per- :
missible in war and confrontation may
? not be permissible in peace. Considers-
Aloe of such issues readily lends itself to
pim is oratory and rhetoric which contrib-
ute little to a true understanding of the
con plex and comprehensive issues in-
volt ed. I think there could be little de
batt over the statement that assassina-
tion of foreign leaders is not a policy of
the 7J.5. Government. It is not. It should
riot lea But, to wax oratorically on that.
to the exclusion of other considerations,
is to place the issue out of context.
To properly appraise the significance
of the committee's Interim Report on
"Alleged Assassination Plots- Involving
Foreign Leaders" we must look at the
genesis of the report. The enabling reso-
lution, Senate Resolution 21, instructs
the committee to investigate and report
on the full gamut of governmental In-
telligence activities and the extent, if any,
to which such activities were "illegal,
improper, or unethical." Moreover, in ad-
dition to that general mandate, the com-
mittee was and remains bound to Investi-
gate, study, and make legislative rec-
ommendations.
. Senate Resolution 21, for example, re-
quires the committee to study and inves-
tigate the following:
'The extent and necessity of . . covert in-
telligence activities . . . abroad;
(The) nature and extent of executive
branch oversight of all United States in-
? ?telligence activities;
The need for improved, strengthened, or
'consolidated oversight of United States in-
telligence activities by the Congress .
During the course of the inquiry Of
the Presidentially appointed Rockefeller
Commission into improper domestic ac-
tivities of the CIA, allegations surfaced
concerning assassination activity. by the
agency on behalf of the U.S. Government.
That panel conducted interviews and re-
viewed documents, and it filed with the
President a separate, classified report on
the various assassination plots pursuant
to information provided to it by. the CIA
in the form, basically of the 1967 Inspec-
tor General's report. That Commission's
report was not and never has been made
public. At the direction of the President,
however, the Commission delivered to the
select committee what work It had com-
pleted, along with documents relating
to assassination.
? The committee then proceeded to con-
duct an exhaustive investigation. Liter-
ally thousands of documents were read,
hundreds of witnesses were interviewed,
and thousands of pages of testimony were
taken under oath in executive session to
determine both the truth of the allega-
women pursuing a job which few will tons and under what authority such ac-
ever know about or appreciate and yet tions, If true, were conducted: The corn-
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November 20, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE S 20633
' Beyond the proprieARKAYO,RfigrgetPaniSP e.i122931flakel2nAtieclue-ATKIPeue8n4i TRIR-78PolPaWil?iTe9e2dttilist Papers and
are the questions of' what intelligence report, the records of the Federal Convention,
policies are proper, how such policies I believe further- that the legislative that the President was to be held re-
should be- determined in a democratic response is much more likely to be ap- sponsible when he failed to superintend
society, what command and control ar- propriate if both Congress and the people his subordinates. Moreover, superim-
rangements exist or should exist both are informed of' the nature and extent of posed upon this more particular stand.-
within an intelligence agency and above s. - aid was his constitutional duty to take
it, what the role of covert activities in The findings of the committee repre- care that the laws be faithfully executed.
intelligence work is, what standards sent a distillation of all the evidence. Thus, whatever else may be said on the
should overlay our entire intelligence ef- both documentary and testimonial, coin- question of authorization, the various '
forts, and what degree of direction and piled by this committee on this highly Presidents involved in the time frame of
,supervision should be assumed by Con- sensitive issue. We deplore the use of as- these plots should have known about
'grass. These are not .easily answered, but sassination as an instrument of either them if, in fact, they did not. It Is such
the information which we have gathered official or unofficial U.S. policy. Having accountability that supports the fragile
as part of the assassination study should said that, however,- I must hasten to add underpinnings of a democracy. This
lend understanding to them, and it cer- that it was not and Is not the task of this Conclusion is clearly supported in terms
tainly underscores the necessity for committee to assess blame for these acts, of the constitutional history and frame-
clearer determinations of policy as early Our investigation into this one area was work within which these tragic events
as possible..
not conducted as a trial. Our objective 'occurred-
COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS has been to ascertain what occurred, how But, as I have said, it is for each reader
The committee has, of course, con- it occurred, why it occurred, under what of the report to decide for himself where
authority it occurred, and how the deei- responsibility rests. Our task new is to
ducted an of its proceedings concerning
sions were arrived at, assume the burden of oversight and act
the subject of this report .in .executive
session. This was clone out of a unani- - There is no doubt, as the report clearly *here we may have failed to act in the '
mom understnding and appreciation of details, that agents of the U.S. Govern- past.
the need to be responsible in our method ment plotted the assassination of foreign We have an old saying in my State
We have had access to the most sensitive leaders and in some cases direct action that "it ain't what you don't know that
information which nations can possess. was taken to cally out the plots, hurts you; it Is what you know. that
? We heard from individuals whose verY The evidence does not show that any ain't so that gets you into trouble." I
lives were in the balance because of their foreign leader was actually slain as a think from reading ? reports around the
past involvement in these activities. All result of these plots, country and the world a lot of people
of the members of the committee felt a And, unfortunately, the evidence also know a lot of things that "ain't so" about
deep sense of personal responsibility for is not conclusive as to the question of ori- the United States and our intelligence
the actions of the committee and, on the gin or authority and to what extent, if gathering operations. I believe the re-
whole, we met that challenge by estab- any, Presidents participated or had lease of this report will help dispel some
lishing what I consider to be a remark- knowledge of the plots themselves or the of those misconceptions..
able record of security during our delib- actions to carry them out. I decided to support the releamelanWee
orations. Each member exercised great Ills not happenstance that this is the evereearay af ter_heineeeeneemayi io
restraint considering the length and case. The doctrine of plausible deniabil- my own mind that the release would do
depth of the proceedings on this Issue. ity, the practice of' circumlocutory re- KO sub'f?9 ma Rife:::
For security reasons, some information ports, and oral-only accounts of official gathering opera irin.- Toe.nellbst411,teetite
must remain secret. But, because of the meetings have effectively confounded all that, I mega sayethateweeletayeeloahefoee
attention given to the issue and the ques- efforts to piece together the complete and the committee members of the flikl-lke
tions raised, - a report to the American
accurate story after the passing years, g.'Elletzasthering organIzalialre who have
people seems essential to overcome any
as indeed they were probably intended - testified that up to his lisaesthezezorleof
brooding shadows which may remain. We to do. That is part of the system as it tr17.Q.STifiltrate-67 the Information tf",e4 f-'14a,
would not have served our citizenry well operated that cries for correction been ob-,'-'finTs-!--aile-ed. 'ire- serious
? had we left them totally in the dark on What Presidents knew and what part P-r-661-6f71-T..... fi"s"-rdrreZM'frSrtilfel'P.-O-iZtiei'n;-
these activities. I decided to support re- they played in these matters is left to qaTiFe-- where one hent tEitt they night
lease of the report, however, only after the inference of each reader of the re- lliileli7A7ble-t6-Ver 113Xl1:0W-Cil'ilits0
assuring myself that such release would port. The available evidence is there. bseariiie 'f5art-CrOur operation--one that
in no way impair our national security.
Whatever view is taken on that issue, the thErfnigliK-7/1-071 1 hot ;11,e'Wen.oresu
The committee has engaged in long and r..e
system by which CIA actions in this Whether th7377-vetil have seettaerlairn...pr
, deliberate consultation with the various area of inquiry were supposed to be 21.2f---
t/agencies who are referenced in the re- supervised and controlled was grossly So we are not engaging here, in my
port in order to come to agreement on inadecmate. Agency officials have testi- Judgment., in any exercise that is going
! what had to be deleted to avoid banning fled that on occasion they failed to fully to cause serious harm to the security of
legitimate intelligence activities of an or adequately disclose to both Directors our country,
ongoing nature. These negotiations have of Central Intelligence and to officials We are, of course, fully aware of the
led to massive deletions from the original above the agency the exact nature of probability that the release of this re-
text in an effort to accommodate the their actions. Conversely, this approach port would cause some embarrassment
-
needs- of intelligence with the needs of to "briefing" both directors and respon- to the United States. We- haee taken that;
the public.
sible officials at high levels of the execu- into fun consideration. We have been
11.1 concluding that American citizens tive branch was, in part, precipitated by very careful to delineate between ern-
should he advised to the fullest extent the subtle indications .of those higher barrassment arid real harm. I personally
possible of the activities of its Govern- officials that they wanted to be kept hi- -Clink that our country is strong enough
ment full consideration was given to the sulated from certain "activities," so that and our people ai-e hardy enough -that
probability that the revelation of these they could plausibly deny knowledge, we can accept embarrassment when such
activities most likely will be embarrassing As the committee notes, blame not- is called for. It just might be that that
to our country. Great care was given to withstanding, the responsibility for the very embarrassment will provide the in-
cliff erentiate between embarrassment and plots must lie with the Presidents. Re- centive, the spur that we need, in order
real harm to national security, cent investigations by the Congress? to take the kind of decisive and swift
It is my judgment that our country is Watergate and the formal impeachment action that is necessary to provide the
gm eat enough and our people hearty proceeding?have focused on the stand- legislative framework to prevent these
enough to sustain embarrassment when ard of Presidential responsibqity re- things from recurring.
such is esilled for. And perhaps the em- quired in areas involving the Etctions of As has already been , pointed out, we
h-irrassment itself will provide us with subordinates. Indeed, during both of the did not conduct the hearings; as a court.
the necessary incentive to take swift and above investigations frequent reference It was not our objective to attempt to
decisive action to prevent the recurrence was made to the 1Vladisonian nrecept, Ex blame. We simply tried ..to find mit
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S 20634 Approved For IMMARMVON22,:iat-811E644417119M6700090.00200mber 20, -19'1.5
well. I believe that nothing that is in
these pages will be found to contradict
the lessons that mankind ought to have.
learned, that you cannot practice this
kind of policy without very grave conse-
quences.
The question has been raised here, and
I am sure will be raised in many places.
as to whether there will not be grave?
damage to our country's name in the eyes
of our friends abroad and our friends
around the world. I think that we will
In fact strengthen our country's reputa-
tion by making known our efforts at
self-correction, and by our adherence to
the traditional values and beliefs that
the world associates with America. I
think that by doing that, we can insure
that America keeps its place as a beacon
to which men everywhere may look as
the best hope for representative democ-
racy on the globe.
The PRESIDING OF-FICER (Mr.
STONE). Who yields time?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from North Caro-
lina.
- Mr. MORGAN. Mr, President and gen-
tlemen of the Senate: I join with -what.?
has already been said by my colleagues,
and especially with regard to the objec-
tivity of the committee and the diligence
of the committee. I think if you read this
report carefully, you will find the sub-
Stance of some 11,000 or 12,000 pages of
testimony set_ forth in a very objective
Manner.
: At the end of the report, on pages 299.
300, and 301, are set forth three pages of
additional views which I have tried to
prepare very carefully. I. ask unanimous
consent that those three pages be printed
in the, RECORD at this point.
- There being no objection, the addi-
tional views of Senator Nfoacae; were
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows: . .. -
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SF,NATOR ROBERT 2,-.10ROAN
. Our Nation needs a strong, secure, and ef-
fective Intelligence community. Our memory
of Pearl Harbor and testimony taken in hear-
ings with regard to that catastrophe as well
as testimony taken during these hearings
clearly establish the need for a. central intel-
ligence agency to coord:nate the intelligence
gathered by our variou.:s agencies of Govern-
ment. IC the United States had had a co-
ordinating intelligence agency in the
disaster at Pearl Harbor would, in my opin-
ion, have been averted. That we have
and continue to have, ouch an agency Is es-
sential if we are to avert any future threats
to our national security. Our national .f-scur-
ity is, after all else, of paramount import-
ance.
We must recognize, however, that our
national security can be subverted by over-
zealous governmental action as well as antag-
onistic domestic or foreign agents. Our Na-
tion cannot remain Intact if v,o ourselves
subvert our own ideals; consequently, it is as
important for our government to abide by
them. In the words of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis:
"Decency, security, and liberty. alike de-
mand that governmental officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct RS
the citizen. In a government of laws, esht-
ence of the government will be imperiled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or fur ill, It teaches the
Rsagaux gjaMple. If the govern-
ntln,aker, 15 breeds eon-
what occurred, when it occurred, why it
occurred, how it occurred, and how the-
decisions were arrived at that initiated
this action.
The evidence, of course, is not con-
clusive in every respect.
There can be no doubt that this coun-
try was involved in plots and attempts
to assassinate foreign leaders. There can
be no doubt_ that in at least two instances
plans were put into effect to carry out
these plots by our own agents.
The question of what Presidents knew,
to what extent they participated, Is left
unclear and is left to the inference of
each reader of this report as to where
that responsibility is.
But I believe the report is correct, and
the findings of the committee are cor-
rect, when they say that the -final re-
sponsibility must rest with the Presi-
dents.
-.-Our responsibility now is to proceed
to our own oversight burdens, and the
burden of providing the kind of legis-
lative framework that is necessary in
?order_to make sure that our Intelligence-
gathering Operations can operate in the
very- efficient -manner that...4s necessary
but stay within the bounds, of what a
free and democratic society demands. ?
Mr. -TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the. Senator from Maryland.
_Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Texas for yielding me
this time.
I. believe that the painful story that
has unfolded in the factual record which
Is now on the desks of Senators can, In
fact, be the source of some important
lessonslor the future,
Very briefly, I would suggest that these
included some new insight into the cor-
rosive effects of the _exerdise of great
power in excessive secrecy without those
checks and balances that are designed
to guard -liberty and to protect- our
Yadues.
Second; I -would suggest that- it poses
the necessity lor Congress to determine.
the proper role of intelligence agencies
within the constitutional system of Gov-
ernment.
Finally, that it poses the need :for
new, comprehensive statutory charter
for all of the intelligence agencies.
I think viewed in this perspective we
can see that the publication. of the report
does have a clear legislative purpose, for
the proposal of that charter for all in-
telligence agencies is the most useful
work that the select committee can ac-
complish. I think it is the basic justifi-
cation for the existence of the com
tee. I believe we are going to have to work
very, very hard in the next 3 months to
fulfill that purpose.
But the legislative purpose is also
served by the mere factual record which
is set forth as a part of this: eport.
In the course of this examination and
this investigation, as Senators have
heard, we have -examined witnesses, we
have examined many documents. I be-
lieve constitutional government requires
more than rhetoric. It requires some ren-
dering- of accounts, accountability. That
is really the definition of this report.
said that knowledge will forever govern
Ignorance and people who mean to be
their own governors must arm - them-
selves with the power which knowledge
Is. .
- I believe Madison there spells out a
duty which is the very essence of democ-
racy.
. This is a darker side of life, a darker
side of Government, cOntained in this
report, but life presents us sometimes
with hard and difficult jobs. If we are to
prevent further erosion and rot we have
to face up to the facts as we have found
them to be.
Much of what Senators will find in this
report is, of course, inconclusive._ There
ought to be no illusions that even the
work done by the Members of the com-
mittee and by the very efficient and effec-
tive staff that we have gathered gives us
any more than some oblique insight, into
the destructive effect of excessive secrecy
on. the practice of Government..- There is
much more here that is of concern to the
Congress: Attempts to pervert the press,
attempts, to invade the literary and aca-
demie Worlds. If the Congress is con-
cerned about these subjects, it is going to
have to stiffen its backbone to consider
what was the' job to be done in these
areas. -
Our purpose here was not to damage
the intelligence services or injure the rep-
utations of past administrations. What
we Were trying to do and are trying to do
is to stop the erosion of society's values
caused by excessive secrecy and by un-
Checked executive power by making -this
record just as factual and accurate as
possible.
These assassination plots are, of
course, profoundly disturbing. But I
think we have to recognize they are not
unique. They are a repetition of many
stories that are familiar in history. I be-
lieve they are disturbing because they
represent a step backward. History has,
in fact, of ten witnessed the practice of
assassination as an instrument to prac-
tice or to terminate political power, and
history also shows that men and govern-
ments have come -to recognize the com-
pelling force of ethical principles,
- Over that far doorway is the motto
novous ordo seclorum, a new order of the
ages. But the story that is unfolded in
this document is not the story of is new
order for the ages. It is the old order, the
order that we thought we had abandoned
In establishing this Government.
When practiced against, a . domestic
leader, assassination is common murder.
When practiced against a ,:)reign leader,
assassination IS an act of war without
even the sorry sanction that war gives to
the taking of human life.
I think there can be no place in a
world that is striving to rard civilization
for either practicing, or eta-Waning assas-
sinations. I think that pr neiples are im-
personal?if they are rigl t -for the weak,
they ought to be right fc r the strong?
and that moral strength ,s more endur-
ing than power.
If nations will be Oujdee by these con-
cepts, I think they ca.n.-aivc id some-of the
lessons of history, that a contrary course
On the question of publication I would briny traclv not eittii the victim of
refer you again tApproveduPorRelease OR 412A 1) I DR84407110
1,\Toveol;ber 2:0, .19;75 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD ?SENATE - 'S 20-635
tempt for ;he it invtteAPPr9alokar ROrenetai4914141AP.:uglAREE?4T-007,NR.QQ67PAMMTQview previons
Come a law unto-himself; it Invites anarchy.
To declare in the administration of [a
democrecy such as ours i the end justifies the
means * * * would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine, .[wet re-
solutely set [our I face."
It is argued, and in many eases, justifiably
so, that in dealing with our national secur-
ity, and especially with hostile or adversary
forces ahroad, extraordinary means are neces-
sary. So long as the Soviets maintain KGB
agents around the world, we must maintain
an effective intelligence gathering capability.
However, this report deals with a particular
activity of the government, which in the
absence of armed conflict, would, if true,
shock the conscience and morals of most
Americans. That this investigation was neces-
sary was unfortunate, but it was, made so
by the broadly circulated and printed re-
ports of alleged assassination plots, some of
which were given credence by public, state-
ments by various officials.. It was my belief in
the beginning, and still is, that it would be
far better to ascertain the truth, as far as pos-
sible, and clear the air? to the end that. our
intelligence agencies could get back to, their
assigned tasks.
I have weighed in my own mind for many
clays and nights how much of the informa-
tion contained in this report should be made'
available to the American public and thus to
the world, including: our potential adver-
saries. That the public has a right to know
is incontrovertible, but whether that right
extends to information which- could damage
our image and national security is not .so
easily determined. Is it satisfactory for the
members of the Congress, the duly elected
representatives of the people, to hold auch
Information in trust for the people? In some
cases of national security the answer can
.and must be "yes", and in the future, such
information must be held by competent and
aggressive oversight committees.
In the present situation too much water
has gone over the dam for such secrecy and
to refuse to make as full and complete a dis-
closure as Is consistent with the safety and
protection of our present intelligence per-
sonnel would only add to the intrigue, and
the Issue could not be put to rest. So though
have in some instances voted with some
of my colleagues to retain much information
In executive session, I have concurred with
the issuance of this report after being assured
that the release of it would not violate any
law with regard in classified matter and after
the re.spectIve agencies have had another
chance to recommend exclusion of extremely
sensitive matters.
Throughout the hearings one issue has re-
mained paramount in my mind. If the. alleged
acts happened, were they the result of over-
ansious, over-zealous intelligeace agents who
v.-ere acting like "a rogue elephant on the
rampage", or, were they basically the acts of
m;ponsible, welledisciplined intelligence
seames acting in response to orders of "high-
er anthority"? To me the conclusion Is im-
portant, ef the first is ten', then the agencies
mast be 'revamped or possibly dismantled
end new
agencies created to replace them. If
ihe eecond le true, then clearer lines of au-
thority roust be established and stringent
oversight by dee duly elected representatives
of the people most take place.
During the course of these hearings. I have
been impressed by the belief held by the
principals that those illegal and immoral
acts ennatted in by our intelligence agencies
were ea/tenoned by higher authority and
,n-en by the "higheet authority." I am con-
vinced by the large amount 01: eircumstan-
nal evidence that this is true, Although
illegal and immoral activities carried out by
our inelligence agencies etinnot be justified
-by any :irgument, it is, I think, important
n> note that these actions wore carried out
Pu the belief that they were efinetIoned by
- tee has been unable to establish whether or revelations. Concerning assassinations which
have appeared in the press have gone a long
way towards sensationalizing this country's
involvement in assassination plots. This re-
port conerms? some prior public allegations
while it. disproves others. While sorne may
shudder upon learning that the events re-
lated in the report actually took place, we
can all take great pride in the ability of this
country to leek frankly at problems within
our system of government, and accordingly,
in our ability to govern ourselves. History
will undoubtedly record our ability to openly
reveal and discuss improper, unpoptilar gov-
ernmental actions as one of the basic ele-
ments in the continued existence of our free
society and the general ability we, as a ca-
tion, have achieved to subject ourselves and
our gevernraent to the rule of law.
not presidential authority was given. -
Some of the acts conducted by these agen-
cies could have been, and probably were, be-
yond the scope of the projects authorized.
In addition, the agencies may have con-
ducted, other activities which, in. spite of this
Investigation, are still unknown to this Com-
mittee. Thus, they cannot be absolved or all
the blame.
Since our intelligence agencies act on both
a compartmentalized and need-to-know
basis, it is difficult to establish in retrospect
who was. Informed and, what authority was
given. It is also difficult to establish, what
was told to those who were informed since
circumlocution was also a standard practice
within the chain of authority. The practice
was, after all, adopted to insure official de-
niability as well as to acquire consent. And
the effectiveness of these techniques of
t"need-to-know" and "circumlocution"- is at-
tested by the fact that this Committee not
only has been unable to' establish whose con-
sent was given but has also been unable to
establish who was not involved. We have been
able to establish 'neither responsibility nor
Innocence. In this situation, the presumption
of innocence cannot be applied without
question, since the mere willingness to par-
ticipate In eiretunlocutions briefings implies
arwillingness to deny responsibility aterucial
times. Consequently, I also believe that re-
sponsibility for the illegal actions of our in-
telligence agencies lutist be shared; it should
'not be carried entirely by our intelligence
community.
In drafting legislation to circumscribe the
activities of intelligence gathering agencies,
tI would stress the need to guarantee their
ability to function effectively in, our complex
and dangerous world. The effectiveness of
our intelligence agencies must not be limited
solely by sound and practical applications of
law drafted with clear objectives in mind.
-We must know what we want our intelligence
agencies to do and what we do not want them
to do. Then we can confidently allow theist to
function in the knowledge that they will not
only defend the law but abide by it. Only imm
that way can we be certain that our society
will be preserved as an embodiment of our
openly democratic ideals. Although we must
liars intelligence, we also roust preserve our
open society, for to destroy the latter for the
sake of the former would be a complete per-
version of our goals.
While we may manse that investigations
of this nature into sensitive governmental
actions.in effect strengthen our country, we
would be foolhardy to think for a moment
that our enemies, and perhaps even friends,
will openly acknowledge this signileant ac-
complishment. We can as,..surne, for instance,
that our opponents will go to great lengths
to publicize sad distribute propagenda based
or this report inimical to the best Interests
of the United States. That this, in tact, will
he done only seig,,es to reinforce my belief
that we need, and must have, as strong an
intelligence capability as possible. imd while
this Committee is charged with the respon-
sibility of investigating and reporting on the
misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency,
we cannot reveal the details of the malty
meaningful accomplishments of the Agency
which without a doubt have been beneficial
to our country. That we have stic,h an igency
now, that we maintain our intelligence po-
tential in these times of eolith-ming inter-
national tension is essential to one society
and continued existence as a nation.
The release of this report, be-,!11 on the
public's right to know, does not ccrinproml,&
our right to be secure. The report details
only the actions of Agency employ's its the
cases under investigation -inct ch.:en not un-
necessarily reveal confidential in ciligence
sources sad methods_ One can, howt.ver, sac-
censfully predict the impact the deeat. will
Mr. MORGAN. In' addition to that,, let;
me say just one or two things.
I join especially in the comment or
the distinguished Senator from Ten-
nessee with regard to the facts_ and the
evidence as he has. observed them, and
espeeially in the Comments_ of-the Sena-
tor from Minnesota-. (Mr. MoiloAnE)
with regard to .his very keen observa-
tions concerning the need for a Central
Intelligence Agency, and also. the need
for some degree of Secrecy.
As we. have gone about, our duties
throughout these several months, there
hos been one question paramount in my
mind. That question is this: Were the
events which we have all found shocking
to the morals and consciences of all
Americans committed by agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency on their
own and without authority, acting irre-
sponsibly, or were they in fact acts which.
were committed by a well-disciplined in-
telligence organization acting under the
justified belief that they were carrying
out orders of higher authority?
I think the answer to these questions
is important. For if the answer to the.
first is affirmative, then we must, in my
opinion, reorganize and revamp the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, if not in fact
dismantle it and start again. But if.. on
the other hand, the answer is "no" to
the first and "yes" to the second, that is,
that they acted in the belief that they
were carrying out orders- of higher au-
thority, then I think we are compelled
in this Congress to strengthen the guide-
lines under which the intelligence agen-
cies operate, and the oversight that Con-
gress must tain.
'from listening to all of _the evideni_-!e
tertri opserving the lirfliSSSTS;..),-;
725 beforeT us, Thaw" ecinelinded fi?ort ..
thiii-CaitTeiF77135f,-1,-Whq we 17-1
would call its f.-;Fe7:ItI:i.--inileTtFie
e-v-eliETtriaTi.:, are L:oking
lcVi iri-TriTITti;lertitrtheY
,01-1E FaTeS p i!
tiorpiyelira..1 m iii-FaU-SITie-d-Iiii-1711YM-Irrid
that theY wereniustitied in that beld,2?.
That is not to 'say that, I believe that
every single act carried out by the Cen-
tral Intelligence agents was authorized
by higher authority, but it is to say that
think the overall plannimf was author-
ized by higher authority, aunt. least the
principals were justified in believing so.
That being true, I believe it devolves
- open us now to legislate change, not only
le outlawing assassinations, which, a.1
I say, have shocked the consciences and
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S 20636 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 20, 1975
morals of every APIKROttolaigeanAgN144n StikREP4r94140
can, but also it becomes incumbent upon
us to make sure that we maintain strict
oversight over these, agencies.
I find, Mr. President, as a whole, that
the members of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other intelligence agen-
cies are highly dedicated and competent
individuals. I have said many times
throughout this investigation that while
I am extremely concerned about the
events that we have disclosed to you here
this morning., I believe more strongly
than I ever have that the real -threat to
the national security of this country and
to the individual freedoms and liberties
of the people of this country comes not
so much from the Central Intelligence
Agency, but from the abuse Of power and
the misuse of power by .the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and possibly the
Internal Revenue Service.
So as we proceed with the next 3
months of this investigation, I hope you
will he just as aware and just as atten-
tive to what is going on as you have seen
for the. last 9 months.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. _
Mr. TOWER. I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, first,
'61 woluid like to compliment the chair-
man of our distinguished commit-
tee, the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CIIURCH) and the vice chairman of our
committee, the Senator from Texas (Mr..
TowEa) for their very great leadership
and very fair and equitable handling of
some very difficult and complex problems.
Second, I would like to compliment the
staff for their dedicated zeal in the effort
that really made this very tedious and
painful job possible.
I join with my colleagues on the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities to present to the Senate a report
entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots in-
volving Foreign Leaders." The investiga-
tion which led to this report has been
long and difficult. I believe the commit-
tee report accurately reflects the evidence
uncovered, and I concur With the com-
mittee's findings and conclusions. Thus,
I would like to address these remarks to
the question of why this report should
be made public. .
The Select Committee voted without
dissent- to make the report available to
the public. I strongly .sup-port that judg-
ment. This decision was made after 9
months of taking testimony from over
100 witnesses, reading literally hundreds
of documents, spending many hours dis-
cussing findings and formulating rec-
ommendations. It was made after exten-
sive consultations with the executive
branch, including meetings with repre-
sentatives of the Defense Department,
the State Department, and the CIA.
These discussions enabled the committee
. to insure that no sensitive sources and
methods of intelligence gathering were
ncluded and compromised. It was ms.de
.Lfter the committee examined the pres-
ent circumstances of each -individual who
I gored in this report, deleting the names
f many and _disguising others by the use
c! aliases, RO that no one's life or
,cd would be threatened.
RAKTI499P,Pgighe other agencies as
well. Such an understanding is abso-
lutely necessary if the public is to be a
participant instead of a bystander in the
dialog about the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies' future.
These are among the positive benefits
of publishing this report. I do not need,
I believe, to belabor the point that de-
mocracy depends upon the accountability
of public servants. And accountability
rests upon knowledge. Thus, the public's
right to know is central?is funda-
mental?to our very form of government.
As James Madison wrote:
A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is
but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance. A people who mean to be their
own governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives.
The report should be made available
so that the public will know what has
been done in its narne. Without Such a
report, the people could not understand
their past, nor would they be able to de-
sign a better future. The great American
philosopher San tanyana once wrote:
Those who do not remember the past are
condemned to relive it.
The assassination attempts 'by' oui?
Government are a shameful part of
American history. They must be con-
demned. They must not be repeated. As
they were a product of secrecy, public
disclosure will assure that they will nevee
happen again.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield
5 -minutes to the Senator from Colorado.
Mr. GARY 'HART. Mr. President,
shortly- after taking office, President
Eisenhower asked a citizen commission 'to
study the status of the intelligence com-
munity in this country. In September
1954 that commission reported back to
the President and its chairman, General
James Doolittle, in staLethents contained
in the introduction of that report, stated
as follows:
. . . another important, requirement is
an aggressive coveyt psychological, political
and paramilitary organization more effective,
more unique, and, if necessary, more ruth-
less than that employed by the enemy. No
one should be permitted to stand in the way
of the prompt, efficient and secure accom-
plishment of -this mission. . . .
. . . It is now clear that we are facing al.
implacable enemy whose avowed objective
is world domination by whatever means and
at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a
game. Hitherto acceptable norms of humao
conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive,
long-standing American concepts of. "fair
play" must be reconsidered.. .
. . It may become necessary that, the
American people be made acquainted with,
understand and support this fundamentally
repugnant philosophy,
ground of the fullest possible study of
the- lame.
But some might say that the securbag
of sources and methods of intelligence
gathering and the protection of individ-
uals is not enough. They say that the
report should not be published because
it would embarrass the United States and
hinder our Nation in the conduct of its
foreign affairs.
There may be temporary injury, true.
But I believe the countries of the world
will recognize that our willingness to ex-
amine our past and seek a better future
openly, without flinching, is an indica-
tion of the greatness of our country. In
our effort not to offend, we could suppress
this report, but our Nation is admired in
proportion to the openness of our society.
Withholding this report from the public
would more _closely resemble the prac-
tices of totalitarian regimes, who are
haunted by tlie disparity between their
Public faces and their private souls, than
it would the history of this great land.
Even more important than the impact
of this report on other nations are the
effects of its publication here at home.
It is these ultimate positive effects on the
Nation which led me to join with the
:committee in its approval of fle publi-
cation of this report.
The publication of this report will:
First, clear the air. The innuendo,
charges, piecemeal and self-serving dis-
closures, have 'provided an incomplete
and distorted view of what individuals
and Government agencies did, and what
they did not do.
The publication of this report will dis-
courage similar occurrences in the future.
Great power, and the serious abuses
which flow from it, flourish in secrecy.
Government officials with such power will
hesitate to use it for illegal or unethical
conduct-if they know that some day their
actions will be exposed and that they will
be- held accountable. Thus, public dis-
closure is yet another check in our sys-
tem of checks and balances.
The publication of this report will re-
new public faith in Government. The
public has been ignored, or deceived, too
long. The public needs governmental rec--
cognition of their right to know, and gov-
errunental acknowledgment of the im-
portance of honesty and candor. The
public will .not stand for yet another
COVerUp.
The publication of this report will _al-
low the public to make up its own mind;
not- the. Senate, not Congress, not the
President, not the CIA?the public.
Without the information contained in
the body of this report, the public could
not possibly judge either the conclusions
or the recommendations of this commit-
tee or whatever legislative action that we
are going to take in the future in this
area.
The publication of this report will en-
courage public participation in the legis-
lative process. Congress will soon be con-
sidering legislation concerning not only
assassination, but also executive and con-
gressional oversight of the intelligence
agencies. This detailed. report provides a
basic understanding Of the very special
Mr. President, we have sowed the wind
and we are reaping the whirlwind.
That philosophy ratio 'slated in that
report has dominated tie intelligence
community in this couni ry the last 20
years, and today we sre seeing its
results.
Our committee did not choose to get
into the assassination ? ciu? stion. But wa
had no alternative once the facts began
problems of this important and highly
En short, the decision to make this to emerge but to inquire In o those facts,
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No .'c:' ilLibei. 2D, 1 9 7 5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S- 20637
and we had no a1ternAPPERYPoOfflgarROttaggina3IPAMe: iclOrP471P7M9Pe6t.T.Pc9rnint&-Sonic a view d lis
those facts wherever they might leath judgment, someone in our committee or ferent from that of the executive branch_
Mr. President, if this report represents on its staff has. leaked information, WA I can explain each of those nine, but I
anything, it is the fact that the. truth not to the jeopardy or detriment of the will just give you some idea why the cow-
cannot and will not be hidden. What national security of this country. mittee took a different view, by citine
I have we found as a result of 0 mon:Efna of Mr. President, Congress itself has been a few examples..
1 a,-vorE', 'Vreiiiiff-cliaos, we found rianre on :trial?the question of whether Con-
c. .? _ - One such example is Mr. Dearborii
i of control, we TaTirci- expecTency, and gress could exercise investigative respon- who is named in the report. He was the
woint. of all, weYound-ilaandonnient Of sibility in an area of the utmost secrecy . ranking U.S. official in the Dominican
title-democratic prfficiples upon wmch and delicacy and carry out that respon- Republic where the assassination of
thiS7-Nalen was lounded7-- ' sibility in the rammer that it has been Trujillo occurred. He was in close end
It is tragic and ironic that upon the carried. out. I think our committee and continuous contact with the assassins.
eve of the celebration of the 200th. aunt- the Members of this body should be even, transferring weapons, and, has iden-
versary of this Nation its greatest delib- proud of the work that has been done titled, himself publicly by writing a letter
erative body would sit here today dis- here, and all done under the umbrella of to the editor of the Washington Post on
cussing matters of this sort, national security, the assassination.
I point out that this is, first of all, an I was appointed to this committee less A second, Conein, was the contact with
interim report. None of us believes that than 30 days after I took the oath of the assassins in another country, South
this report contains all of the facts. For office. In the 9 or 10 months that have Vietnam, and his role was fully publi-
myself. I am not sure that all of the passed since that time, -I have become cized when the Pentagon papers were
, facts will ever be known. In a. footnote aware that whether I serve here 5 more published. Indeed, the reference to him
at page 131 of this report, Senators. will years or 50 more years. the work that by name in the report helps to clarify
find a matter that only recently came to this committee does may be the most im- the fact that the United States never
our attention that a middle-levet CIA portant think. in which I will have an intended the assassination of Diem.
official requested the establishment of opportunity to participate. The work Three others?Harvey, King, and
something that he called a "Health that the committee presents to you, the Tweedy?were high-ranking CIA officials
Alteration Committee" to deal with an Sento, of the United States, will be among who helped develop detailed plans for
Iraqi colonel, presumably to eliminate the most important of the issues that the assassination plots. Two of them held
him merely because he did not agree any of you will ever face. policy-making positions, and their role
with our foreign, policy in his nation or There is a saying from the Bible: is so intricately interwoven into this re-
in fact balked at some of the activities You shall know the. troth, anct the truth port that to exclude their names and pia-
that we wanted to pursue. clean make yon free. i sitions would be to render the report
Information of this sort will continue. ally, that, mott he Central int o is found on th AgencY e
to come out over the years, mid I a '0,
m not Two others are Viaux and Valenzuela.
li,11s- of telligence .
stare the American people will ever en- who are foreigners. They were convicted
Difr, CHURCH. Mr. President, I should
tirely know the truth. by military tribunals for their roles in
like to )5 less one or two other matters.
One other fact I think is important. the pilots in their own countries.
and I will be brief.
We are looking at the entire intelligence ? Three others were members of the
First of all, this committee faced. the
community. As our distinguished col- Mafia John Roselli was a Mafia leader
choice, when it 'began this unpleasant
league from Missouri (Mr. Sy:Antal:0N) who, contacted by Mayheu, participated
duty of investigating the aesassination
has pointed out on many occasions, the with the CIA. in several. att,impts against
allegations,. of whether to conduct its
CIA in dollar terms only repreSents the are of Castro. His appeartmce before
zr:66--a-15 perceati_g_sia.si . eflee e,---)iu,,s,..e? hearing's in public or in executive ses,- ,
thEt coramittee was highly publicized, tan,
,"i'e'-'t r- sion, behind closed doors. I clo not, believe
itityt The. information thac a e deve.op by he committee but by the peess. His
that any member of the committee had
-about other elements of this community role has been commented on extenii,Yely
any donbt that a long series of public
Will be brought out in our final rep0rt.. jai the press on numerous oceadons. n-
A
- heatrings, featurMg these many witnesses.
There is one other element that I other is Santos Trafficani: e . He was a
and telec rs ast to the, four cm of the
think is important for os ptirticuffIrly globe for weeks and months on el d. ityLatia chieftoin with gambling interest:,
, i
here today to note, and that is there is a t would have constituted unprecedented in Cuba who R.
was used by oselli and
endency when things go wrong or un- . out Mayhou to locate the Cubans to c arry
political box oflice. But it would have.
happy filets come out for the politicians done this country' grievous damage. So the af; sassination plots and w ri
as a inn
or this country to point their finger at copal in the conspiracy:
we refrained from holding any public
the people who carry out orders. But if The final name was Robert Mallen,
this record shows anything, Mr. Prost- hearings. on the matters that are taken
u and discussed in this r himself, who was the CIA's contact mail
p eport .
tient, it shows that the politicians in the with the Mafia. He testified before the
However, from the beginning. it, v.-a,
'White Hr ,e in administrative posi- coininittee and, indeed, at fierwcard he
tanderstood?andThe conunittee 1 wiee. by
tions, were themselves as guilty as the held a press t:onference in 'which he this-
operatives who carried, out many of these as 75;761T-EratTe-d=tria at the end of tile 'sussed his role.,
activities, and the Congress of the t. uteri TititvestigaTia: a repoet -would iesueeTilitt.
Scitwe Lel:tea/ad:lad in tato i eases wher ,
St:ites over the years, I think, neust her v-,-a.74 JiiireFrobdity "Elie PreseleilFanTf .ili? ,:-..,er c'i' filt-,? 1TH., cr,o--.1,:atedtet-lte.s.
eta:al blarae for not exercising its proper tiltage"drall-e Vy hag-It:dr:scrota ildwith whom se names in the re.port ave have dor
role of oversight and resooneadlity, and 1.Tfire-old::.lit-171..tiat.invil.8 -britTkITSt.990. at the liludic10,1ul'7. TiiKrall,L t,-...kiii;._--dathaaLeni?
Ii
that is tile matter that not only care 'coin- 6:1:A. At 'Elie. it tl-t hum,,o...l_t_91-. theetycerk .. thiFtlet l'Ot 1::?' a it son fur cA;jec t,ir,%..
teittee, but every Membee of this body of Dip: conunittee 1t,-7 peen dorie. PrtJy
- erc:a a - ? -fl.7ii-ef5611. a F (Iii -dimt.
will have t.O. answer f?or eventually. Mainber Of road blocl,s ..t,co ftii''?';1-13. 1. n Tovn--1A. ,c,e-E-Pi'a'i,:i;at r yieid
I add one word to that which has been .an atrernPE. to keep this, ietiolf,-CIO-licTealed. myself 2; miniites.
F.aid by many of our colleageus. We had ThaF verTyad-sr.oretnose road Tirdriifil-fia-d
Generally sneakingalthotte 11 what Coe
a !3 t aft' of 100-some individuals, collected to, f'.1.O. _With _certain names connonetleett
ad-taint:atm siniis is cori?cet, tia.at sOan' e oh-I
ender an atmosphere where people in ql.'? r!a?Prt?
studies were thrown in the way of the in-
the Ness end in this body itself said we Senatm"fowaa has already told you vestigation, we probably got as inuch co-
could. not put together a staff which how carefully we went through this re- oneratiion as iae reasonably - ? il I eei eet
would act responsibly mid even tliemern- port with agents of these very agencies I note that': i t V,?as not. -sO.'(;?111-11-4-1'ije
bers ol the committee themselves could to execlude any name that, in the jueig- tanee in disclosing matters Ca- t.-le a --:
not, act responsibly. I took the :floor sev- merit of the committee, should be deleted. mitten. as in Tack-ing those ,laseto, rs c(,1.1".
cral days ago to point out there had been or any reference that in any way might lie. J. think that has been the in?inPrars-
lcales, but there had, not been at. that expose intelligence sources or any other conceal. of tau:, varirma adencJ?s h
tone cite leak that was attributable to matter relating to the legitimate national which we have dealt--not Vast 711Lv
tile. committee members or the staff that security interests of the United States. did not want to cooperate with 1:17:e con'-
vie had vollected. Of those names they asked us to ex- mittee and disclose sensitive matters to
-Up curtain ate137, since that time, there elude, we excluded 20, and that left about the committee, but that they did tic L it sail;
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S 20138
the matters furtheisclosed
lie. It is important1WPM
lion because, generally speaking, I think
we have had a pretty good level of coop-
cratioft
i_mvaL 40,v thateMr_ceolbyehas been
ctetremely cooperative. He, of course, ob-
jected to our ptiblication of this report,
win=thitiM- is normal under therai::-
ctimsfti.nces. But I- ti-o-not believe thdlaf
any time he withheld anything from the
committee in an effort to impede its in-
vestigation.
So again I think the point should be
made that the question is: What do we
make public? What is of such sensitive
nature that it should not be made pub-
lic? I think the Members of the Senate
and the Members of the House have a
right to know, on a need-to-know basis,
anything that the intelligence commu-
nity has. But I think that we, ourselves,
must be very judicious in what we reveal
to the public. We will be facing up to
this awesome responsibility in the days
to come, in our continuing investigation.
I stress what Senator HART men-
tioned?that is, that this is an interim
report, that our work is not yet done,
and we are currently engaged in looking
Into the matters that I think prompted
Senate Resolution 21 in the first place,
which launched this investigation, and
that is in the area of domestic abuse.
I believe this is the area of perhaps
greatest importance.
So I want to make sure that you have
everything in perspective and know that
this committee has not been dealing only
with .assassinations. This is only part Of
it. This is perhaps a less important part
of it than what is done in the domestic
area, in the way of abuse, that infringes
on the rights of American citizens.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to
the Senator from Michigan.
yr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator
from Texas.
Mr.. President I did not rise to speak
to'ffie question of the wisdom of rere.E-
friT; this repoTra-Fo the pubitc-blit, rather,
the-ritestion of the procedure by Whih
lrWouldSe doreTh-decision is made.
-T-should lace fa-i prevairupon S-ena-f-dis
to refer to the Standing Rules of the
Senate and turn fh-ru-Te-M7r,--Taticu.-
1-aiT37- sections-2 arid B therear-a7nd I think
We- can -EiTrigeinto focus the dltestion
want to raFe.
That is- rule xxxvi of the Senate,
particularly sections 3 and 5, I take it
that no one wouldmestion
P.-Ca cOni.ain.s infornaggn which wits thtto-
vided by the President or heads of de-
perieneneas of the executive lane in
classified -Thfm.. Vac oasic question is _
whether or not that-maTerial-la-1-6-"be-
made epaibli.c anVif -.KeliedVris. it to be
mdejubliwhaiixtcedue9 Let me
just fill in here by calling attention to
a letter dated October 31, addressed to
Chairman Cauricir, from the President
ci the United States, to which reference
ii 33 already been made. I want to focus
o i a couple of sentences.
have endeavored to make available all
ii o material In the executive branch on this
am bject to the Select Committee of the Sen-
at and the Home and the Department of
Ju dice. This was done under procedures de-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 20, 1975 -
ear signe&l_to "(Tye the national interest. The LL_tom.,
-Ke asetaZati3/4)412addGIA-RDP,84e1078011941P6M Pavvw.g
a impact
a profound .
ti relations. It will
You will recall that I said on June 9, 1975,
"I know that the Members of Congress in-
volved will exercise utmost prudence in the
handling of such ieformation."
The President goes on in his letter to
the chairman of the committee: -
It is not a question of withholding infor-
mation required by the Select Committee to
carry out its inquiry into these allegations,
which relate entirely to past administrations
of both parties. On the contrary, I have en-
deavored to snake all of the information
available to your committee so that legisla-
tion can be proposed, if necessary, flnd to the
Justice Department to facilitate any investi-
gation indicated. However, we must distin-
guish between disclosures to the Select Com-
mittee of sensitive information and publica-
tion of that information which is harmful to
the national interest and may endanger the
physical safety of individuals. There is no
question about the access to these materials
by appropriate officials. The only issue con-
cerns publication, which obviously cannot
be limited to Members of Congress or other
American citizens.
Then, if you will read with me from
rule xTrie verarst clause ofTsee-
tion 3 reads asifellows:
74.11.2a0=13. ,ea-a comma=catiais made by
the -Presidep.t of the United State to th-e
8-enalIrShal1 be by the Senators and the
omEjthe SAMIte_Rept secreand
tr-eaties which may be laid before the senate,
and dl-Termarks, votes, and _proceedings
it1Ifc?t. . .
Notice the word "also," which indicates
that the second clause is a separate
clause from the first clause. But even in
the case of treaties. it says
. . . until the Senate shall, by their reso-
lution, take off the injunction of secrecy, or
unless the same shall be considered in open
Executive session.
Even more pertinent is section 5 of
rule XXXVI.
Whenever, by the request of the Senate or
any committee thereof . .
And these materials were provided in.
response to the request of the commit-
. . . any documents or papers shad be com-
municated to the senate by the President or
the head of any Department relating to any
matter pending in. the Senate . . .
The CIA investigation by this commit-
tee was a matter pending in the Sen-
ate
, . . the proceedings In regard to which
are secret 'tne 171..pp,
said:c.f.,79nrnents nd_napers siz:ffill be con, I
ered as cot fidentiali asLdc_ahau not be clis-
?CIci_sed_ithatt_le_avie_01.the
I raise this Question because I think it
Is a very, very fundameental_tiggstagnatas
Lund erstand the_Eipitqpitrk which_ts beiqg
presented, It is that unless the Senate
takes some affirmative action to overruY
the action of the seTeet committee, fuss-
r-e-pOrt will be:made-public-.
subin?it that wou-1ti be not only in vio-
lation of the. mitea-Tif 'Ili-e-S-enatet_but
v-e-Fy bad precedent. If we were to do
thisd'mayheii be done?it is
certainly one of the most basic and fun-
damental decisions that is going to be
made in the service of any of us in this
body.
have a profound inipact, I suggest, on the
ability of the executive branch, of the
President, under any administration of
either party, in his relationship with
Congress, if he -cannot assume that con-
fidential information requested of liim
and delivered on a cleasitied basis will be
treated as classified information, at least
in accordance With the rules of the Sen-
ate itself. And certainly, it will have a
profound impact on the ability of the
President of the United States to deal in
international affairs with other nations_
It is not enough to say, yes, but you can
make a motion here, in the Senate, in
closed session, to deny the committee the
right to publish this report. If we accept
that, then we have said that any com-
mittee or any subcommittee of the Sen-
ate, from now on, has the right to make
public any classified information pro-
vided by the executive branch.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yeeld
for a question?
Mr. GRIDVLN. I gladly yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator agree
that the Senate itself has the right to re-
move the secrecy and authorize the ad
hoc committee to publish the report?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I think that section 5
Is right on the point.
Mr. PASTORE. In other words, what
you are actually saying is that the com-
mittee, on its own--
Mr. GRIFFIN. Does not have that
authority.
Mr. PASTORE (continuing). Must
have to report back to the Senate with
their recommendations.
Mr. GRIFFIN. That is right.
Mr. PASTORE. But it is up to the Sen-
ate to authorize the publication of it.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And it is an obligation
under the rules that the Senate itself, as
a whole, cannot duck.
Mr. PASTORE. LijiialLita_SenartA27j5
right, Otherwise, we would be settinue
behd.eptrteceeFEE-57fid-/ think we can do it,
cimprtm We had this kind of
question arise in the Committee on For-
eign Relations, having to do with classi-
fied documents relating to the Sinai
agreement. The committee inadvertently,
I would say, because I do not think we
were adequately aware of the rules of the
Senate when it was done, without any
improper motive, whatsoever?anti I at-
tribute no improper motive, incidentally,
in this situation, either. We can have dif-
fcrencas of opinion as to what the rules
should require.
In that instance, classified documents
which had already appeared in the New
York Tunes were made public by a com-
mittee vote. But, afterward, the com-
mittee itself recognized that they had
made a mistake and that the action
taken by the committee was not in ac-
cordance with the rules, arid it so Indi-
cated. At least, that precedent was not
established, because the :ornmittee, it-
self, acknowledged that it had-not acted
in accordance with the rul Is of the Sen-
ate.
I just want to ern ehash e the impor-
tance here of not ellowir g this to be
made public without cam .iliance with
the rules of the Senate.
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Novel-1'0er 20, .1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR.D ? SENATE
S 20639
I will say this: As 4a3raygdsERKIREIMsiqc?fR49ogcli; 9A-MENT,9,9
781W9gCRINgl9re.sident. will the
have a difficult time voting today, not tlia=t this committee was given The au- Senator yield for a question?
having had a chance to read this report thority to issue this report ea:orl the Ts Mr. MONDALE. Yes, I yield.
at all, on the question of whether the of The--8-exialeTeing referred to here are t Mr. PASTORE. Why did we have to
not being niterprn_iFerettoneerry by public. I think Senators ought to have distinguished Senator from Michinehno
arn op enneiriTTO-lead-filid--to .They do not, in the circumstances, pre-
and to deliberate, to some extent, on Me elude the committee from issuing the
verye very fundameTatal que-Ribn infORT- report, on its own authority. We have
nig national security and national inter-- looked into this very carefully. -
est, as to tiffether this documerit Should If the Senate ?ants to vote no confi-
ne-Tz-ia--.d-e--Ptigfa--.-TciiiriY-I-e that:1-iifEe &rice in the Colll'aittee and
end, I Sh-rd. tFinak-Fir-pilblifiT-= committee from issuing_titheereportail,
I should think that it would betherefter may do so. But it takes an atithaim Live
part of wisdom to delay this decision 6:-ca Of the-Senate to do that. It is always
until after the recess and- to give Seia- within the Senate's power. For that rea.-
nfors an opportunity to be fully cogni- son, although these reports are out on
zarik and aware of what they might be the Senators' desks and, as practical
doh:1h public men we know the difficulty, fol-
Mr. CURTIS. Will the distinguished lowing. this session, of preventing the
Senator yield for a question? contents of the report from being dis-
Mr. GRIFFIN. I am glad to yield to the semiriated
Senator from Nebraska. Mr. P.ASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Mr. CURTIS. Is what the distin- Senator yield for a question?
guished Senator saying that a commit- Mr. CHURCH (continuing). Never-
tee cannot release secret information theless, in deference to the Senate, we
unless the Senate affirmatively grants have refrained from circulating the re-
permission for it? port to the press until we have first had
Mr. GRIFFIN. I have a difficult time an opportunity to come to the Senate
reading section 5 any other way, I say to and make its contents known to the Sen-
the Senator from Nebraska. ate. But we do not accept the proposi-
Mr. CURTIS. In other words, the ab- tion laid down by the Senator from
sauce of a motion denying the committee Michigan, and we are prepared to refute
the right to release it would not suffice, it.
would it? Mr. PA.STORE. Is the Senator saying
Mr, GRIFFIN. Absolutely not. thatothe original re.--s7.1iTiou gn:es Him
Mr. CURTIS. I think the penalty re- that atithort
ferred to in section 4 or paragraph 4, Mr. CHURCELeyes.
whichever it is, of rule XXXVI is so Mr. PASTURE. I Would like to hear the
severe? argument as to why it does.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- CRUITC-Er,. .. y`61(T-To Senator MON -
ator's 10 minutes have expired. DALE.
Mr. TOWER. I will yield 5 :additional Mr. MONDALE. I would like to respond
minutes to the Senator from Michigan. to this.
my, CURTIS. lenelifeiee_we shotIldehan- Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, is this on
die this in sixict conformity to the rules, the time of the Senator from Idaho?
otherwleenthe catrunitteeaor thosennem- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it is.
beees?of. the committienyho do release. it Mr. MONDALE. This executive session
wonitlebeefacing.a \Try. embarrassing Sit- was called under the unanimoits-consent
itaXtelle ? agreement propounded by the majority
Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator for leader, not for the purpose of acting on
his contribution, the report, but for the purpose of hearing
I will be glad to yield to the Senator it, We thought out of deference to the
from Alabama. Senate and in view of the delicacy of
Mr. ALLEN. I think we might inquire this neater that it ought to be heard
of the chairman if dais committee report first by Senators before it is released to
may not possibly be in the hands of the the public. It is not here to be adopted
media now in view of the embargo or approved. It is here to be heard. That
printed here on the outside indicating is the nature of this meeting.
they have got a right to move it starting The suggestion was made by the Son.
at. 4 o'clock this afternoon? ator from Michigan that under rule
Mr. CHURCH. First of all, I am in X XXVI, S 13.1Ce thiS report WRS based M
complete disagreement with the argue Part upon sonic classified information
meat- being made about- the rules of the obtained from the executive deoartment,
Senate and their applicability in this it may only be released under that rule
case, and we are prepared-- by an affirmative vote of the Senate.
Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator Woo/Lane_ .checkert_willa_the a -
speak louder; we cannot hear him? meaarian and it. is his cityinion tiert
Me. CHURCH. I tun_in. earemletendis- rule XXXVI refers to private communi-
allta With alilieneargialitent beirig ffjjfi
-trar-are pars'eritrid-trintile
Stit-
icque .-Ifititit -our teironeedinpasi hero arc in ate SS whole in, TiT,--lifi-e---eafe-SF at
any respeat yontrary to the riffe-S--ToTitTi-e -ispec
Senate.
ancf-matters of that-Tiind--That are cia7,1--
We have investigated this very thor- Sidered- ei-,:-ectilive sesallin. Cinder tho-se
()uglily. We have conferred with the Par- chigninstances you -Faye to vOre to re-
..
Senate should authorize it to be made ? have an executive session today if you
are going to release it anyway? If you
are not seeking the approbation of the
Senate in what you are doing, why did
we come here in secrecy to begin with?
.Why did we not have an open meeting?
Mr. MONDALE Two things: First,
there are many matters that could be
asked about that could only be answered
in executive session and, in deference to
the Senators
Mr. PASTORS. Answered by whom, by
the Senate?
M. MONDALE. Well, by experts?
Mr. MANSFIELD. By the committee.
Mr. MONDALE. By expert people,
dealing with some aspects not neces-
sarily stated in this report, matter that
could not be answered except in execu-
tive session.
Second; cut of deference to the Sena-
tors, in light of the highly delicate na-
ture of this matter, it seemed only proper
that a thorough briefing of our colleagues
be made.
Now, the_Senate resolution, which was
the product of the-rillailiZWifeil-Seini-
tor from -11HOde- IsTand
P-ii-c9.4.11...nit.tee_theatinthoeity, indeed
requires of _this committeee that iS the
Coni-init-Tee 6-n-,Infeilieteericezhthatettneliall
issite atlimTlereport. Moreover it may?it
has the authority?to issue such int--erirri
retlOrta.n2,Sni1. dianXIS aniaroliiTate. There-
ienorea_Dienardingato the Parliamencariari.
t hisneuleedoeserm t afioly leteisoom emit to
_ deal wi riot! Lifer() nt situntion.
Another 1.:(.111jthisai we accept the
interpretation of the Senator ft- x--71n1M-tel-
-iLean, I want you, all to be familiar. ?ith
chniMinrille we iltami-estan'iist7W is
time the Armed Services Committee is-
sues any reportahateiis tanecUlleesetlyna
LT.Isiti:psgy_...9 ! confidential cm' claiesifietleine
tormation coming from the executive
all..20_,thate to g_el_alagiro-sial..rni? [is t'gli're
The same gees for NASA, the Space Com-
mittee, Foreign Relations or anyone else.
It will mean that whenever the executive
ancli---iiiairg-to bottle - sonieflcing ipo
they will take -fi) stamp ouER the lower
Sfampit -top seent:ic:"
a_nc-1-S-FiTcrifTio you c'fassificri viirt be a
new Official Secrets -Act. 61----"t7T11:cl-W:17
rmverhadi3formm. execu-
tive branch p--6-ciier they or had be-
fore, power binding not rely upon the
executive, but upon the Cargress
It will destroy Congress power and re-
sponsibility of informing the public. I
cannot think of any
Mr. PASTURE. Mr. President, will the
,:iencitor yield to me?
Mr. MONDALE. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. I am for die release of
this report 100 percent.
Mr. MONDALE. Correct.
Mr, PASTORS. And if this rule is being
used, the recitation of this rule, to get
into a filibuster, then all bets are off. But
thought it would be a very nice thing
for the public to know that Jona PASTORE
and five:17.0)04.1y else in the Senate are for
tbe release of this publication. That is
liamenturion e ; w have received his opin- Irasejt. fillut, he sainhat inal-teri th
'b at
ion ased upon fa precedents-, and" tip gohroittinely 15-e-aFe---e-e-mmatees, "i7hicb.
are prenaiqid to argUe the cate? ihnietooden -classifie-cr,---ciin a riiITT----ast5S7
Now, weenre ntLepaKed _Lo show,a
based thosoliiiiiittees_in their uprrnal rune-
_
on 'the wec-eclents and-theiiriinion we don
_... _________...................._ _________ --?-- the only reason why I raised the question.
_____ .......
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S 20640 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 20,' 1975,
I would lite %Pprayscitweas?vipsaetrvs .mti rriti_p
_acre for a vote. 01;
I would hope we would not filibuster. this, due respect to the Parliamentian, 1 course, the Senate could, if it new chose
and we could get a unanimous-consent findahea., to be an inareillbielltraerareffa to do so, enjoin the committee from is--
agreement to vote at 1 o'clock, and I tio_n_of e.eettrieta . , suing the report.
'am all for that, and then we are all in . In effect the ruling is that a committee That is our situation and, if we go with
on it; and that is the reason why I raised or Siib-committee?iir-F, Committee raffia the suggestion of the Senator from Mich-
the queston. , ertortffe-Banate eTantrise afiiiiie tae.Srefi.- igan, we change the whole meaning of
Mr. MONDALE. The Senator is right. ate itself and would have morePiiwer this rule. From now on we establish a
However, I do not hear the Senator from than the Senate ,..7V-6-a-da--- ..
precedent which will require all corn-
Michigan saying that. The Senator from --TEe-effect of the-r-uling Is to say that if mittees, under similar circumstances, to
Michigan .is saying that we cannot re- the President had addressed and de- come back to the Senate and obtain a!-
lease this report until the Senate votes livered . the confidential information to firmatiae consent if there is anything in
. to release it. That is an entirely differentthe Senate rather than to the committee, those reports that Is derived from any
thing. If the Senate wants to vote--- that then only it could have been made material that the executive branch has
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is not so. public, only by action of the Senate. classified. -
Mr. MONDALE. That is what the Sen- If the Senate is required as a whole to That is the reason I object so strenu-
ator from Michigan is saying. He says make public information of information ously.
the only -way it can be released is to vote directed to the Senate, how in the world Mr. BUCKLEY. 'Will the Senator yield?
to release it. That Is not what the rules can we say that a committee has more Mr. TOWER addressed the Chair.
say. I predict that if we get onto that power than the Senate as a whole? Mr. JAVITS addressed the Chair.
track and the report is not released, it And that is the effect of the ruling of Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, who has
will be leaked all over town in the worst the Chair. the floor?
possible way. We are going to be charged Rather than to have that kind of prec- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
with a -coverup, and moreover we will edent established?and I am sure this is ator has the floor. -
come dangerously close to a new prece- an unprecedented situation?rather than Mr. CHURCH. Do 't have the floor?
dent that means every time an executive to leave the Senate in a situation where . Several Senators addressed the Chair.
official puts a secret. stamp on something we are saying, in effect, that a committee The PRESIDING 0.aVICER. Just a
that comes up to a committee you have has the power to make Public classified minute. I recognize the Senator from
to get Senate approval to release it. information, I ask unanimous consent, Texas (Mr. TOWER).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will even though I personally prefer we not Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, is there a
the Senator yield. vote until after the recess, I do not want consent request pending, did the Clis?tin-
Mr. MONDALE. I yield, to be put in the position of having that guished whip couch his proposal in terms
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am important rule of the Senate brushed of a consent request?
in complete aTiza with what the clis- aside on the theory that I am trying to The PRESIDING OFFICER-Qa aetlia-
ting,uished Senator from Minnesota said. filibuster, that is not the case, I will vote tion to be made that we vote at I o'clock.
You cannot keep this secret. After all, today. MI. CRITACII-alldressetlatiretChalre-
ffiralTair-FetrielTerratiaillatilaiiliirsaratelited" I will ask unaninious consent we vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
1-1IP catailiTtof MIT:0 at; 1 '? clock ah-ea'Malidiflatta.aeeerdanc,e- now is . going to ask for an 'objection.
tiag_Benate as a courtesy and as a, duty, with . section -5.-XXXVIa to aare leave --ME-CHURCH. Mr, President-,L have
and I certainly hope tilde is no indica,- Of Ilie-SaaTaTe te raak.,; this reParfaablic an objection to taistretaieet. tailesat it is
lieneriaalleapartadtarivenafor lb hord I maytvete against it, but I- will make plitaiiias,i. clgferentify.
back the_publico.tioti of this repeat, be-a the raetion. ' in order to preserve the precedents of
cause it will go out with Or- Without Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, reserv- the Senate and in order not to make a
aetiorea's.a.alee this afternoon, and Ing the right to object, and asking for an bad mistake that would do grave injury
if you think- you can keeff-thrs-e76-fet opportunity to reply, it is a grave mis- to committees in the future and greatly
_____
ratvero-a araTillataakert., representation to suggest that the Parli- exalt executive power over the Congress,
So I tun delighted that the Senator amentarian's ruling in any way implies that motion must be made in a different
from Minnesota said what he has said, that a committee, let alone this commit- form.
I hope the Senate as a whole will recog- tee, but that any committee of the Sen- Mr. GRIFFIN. No.
nize its responsibility and not throw any ate has powers that exceed the power of Mr. CHURCHa-Tho. motion must he
- roadblocks in .the path of this interim the body made that the SeriaeTeject: tlie report-
report. . That is not what the Parliamentarian OrenjoinThe committee from issuing it;
Mr. MONDALE addressed the Chair, - has ruled. Our situation is quite different. 2therw.1-6Thve ..chaftfe the of the
Mr. GRIFFIN addressed the Chair. Under the resolution that created this Senate and we set -a preceTtentariTie-rve
.. .
Mr: MONDALE. Mr. President, a par- committee, the Senate conferred upon Cannot five viiffilii the filture.
lia,mentary inquiry. . . the committee the right to make this re- I would have no object-10TM that, but
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. port or any other report. In the dialog let us not play around with rules of the
Font). The Senator will state it. He has that took place at the time of the debate, Senate that will Impose limitations, not
the floor. . that was made very clear, only upon committees, but enhance ex-
Mr. MONDALE. Is it the opinion of Let me quote. Mr. BANER said: ecutive power over the right of Satiate
. -
the Parliamentarian that this report and If there appears to be conduct by any committees to deal with classified in-
its contents were not within the rule agency of the United States Government that formation in the future.
XXXVI in terms of the requirement of appears to be improper Cr exceeds its jur- Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator
affirmative Senate vote? Iscliction that would not be limited by para- yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It Is the Mr. CHURCH. Yes.
graph 2 of this amendment.
Te Senator has e d-
M
opinion of the Parliamentarian that this Speaking to an amendment of the
Mr. MANSFIELD. -. '
does not apply under rule =XVI. para- resolution which was adopted. vanced. a reasona,b1-e Proposition The
CiOnirriiatee -Oh Thc e I h .*.- i 1 Te- - did --1-,. . i 6 have
graph 5, because it is not a communica- Mr. STENNIS replied:
toecornet-atae.k atiiit
tion from the President of the United rre is does not put a limitation on the corn-
make_aarepdrt to the
S-aate.t t
States to the Senate. . mittee. It requires the committee to proceed e Warat
The second part of tile erule says: To under rules, regulations and procedures, but Is doing on its own
committee is doing, It
OwEliiiEWve,,Ito require-
the Senate?not to tla Senator or the these things are still left in the hands of meat
committee.
the committee. The chairman and the ranking minor-
Mr. GRIFFIN.. Mr. I resident, may I Nowi?his committee?and we re- ity member have met with the joint lead-
now be recognized for tie remainder of Sear
-ched it carefully?coula-Tiave issued ers from time to time to discuss thiscos-
?sibility and we encouraged them to re-
my timen ii.I1.5 rePert-With-baireVer coming back to
Mr. il'OWER. Mr. President, I yield 3 the Senate becaiise the Senate had Lea-Vela. Port to the Senate.
minutes to the Senator. ? ' us that _power. PaErraaie chose to come But what I want to emphasize is that
The PRESIDING OareeCER. The Sen- beat to the Senate so that Senators they were not required to, This was an
tutor from Michigan. might first know what was in the report, action taken- by the chairman and the
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Nore:mber 20, 1975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE - S 20141
Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006700090002-0
vice chairman and concurred in by the I think we will have gotten out of this Furthermore, when we passed this
resolution, everybody in this body knew
exactly what we were doing. We knew
we were not going to call in a reporter
for the Washington Post. We knew the
committee would have to call in the CIA
Director. The committee would have to
call in people who were in sensitive posi-
tions. They were going to have to listen
to secret, classified information. On the
basis of that information, the commit-
tee would present a report. This is re-
quired by the language of the Senate
Resolution 21. .
1 folly agree that if we come in here
to release full documents that are classi-
fied, we would be violating the law re-
lating to classification,- unless the Sen-
ate, by affirmative action, takes a posi-
tion to the contrary.
Mr. BROCK. Will the Senator Yield
further?
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mir., President, I
think in aaveery_r2a1 sein-set'i've _gave., Ottr.7-
selves -the ieces&rkncehy the
aiiifirarresolution which item 6 thidel?
rufe .2sJs,2erVI aTeady requires. namely,
that said documents and papers shall be
Considered confidential and :Tiall. not
ellaili-iia-withont leave of -efie Setcate.
Tilie-SeettatEreiTve leave to tffis Special
es=iiiiffee by trie--Ve7fr-iff-aninig?OT-Ilie"
resdhution ? crebling .trie-torriffiffre-E---
The S.-enale authorized This committee
to use documents, to investigate, to inter-
rogate, to move into classified informa-
tion; and now it is presenting to the Sen-
ate the committee report. Persamally, I
would like to resolve it by an affirmative
- vote. I feel like the Senator from Rhode
Island. I would like to let the country
know what is in this document, I would
like to be on record, not because I (sooty
reading what is in this document, but be-
cause certain conditions now prevail
which require official, concurrence in the
release of the report.
First, this document is out of the pub-
lic as sure as my name is HUBERT H.
HuruenaEy, and it is going to appear in
the New York Times and other publica-
tions. It is going to happen. It is printed.
if we do not know that around here, then
we are babes in the woods. We are blessed
with a -degree of innocence which an un-
born child does not have.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Will the Senator from
Minnesota yield ?
Mr, PASTORE. Wilt the Senator yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY I yirld.
Mr. PASTORE. I hope I am not bring
misundersiefid.. My position is that in
view of the- letter which was V, t,te rt ir
the- President, all I would suitgest. slsort
of a filibuster?because I would not toler-
ahs that as iy way--I would say publish the
report regardless of what the legalities
are. I am not getting into the legalities.
All I am saying is in view of the fact that
the letter of the President has been pub-
lished, that he has asked that this docu-
ment not be made public, my motion
would be to compliment the committee
for the fine work that they have done and
that the report should be published. That
is all. I would like to have my name ap-
pear on the record. ?
Mr. HUMPHREY. I thoroughly agree,
may I say, :cvith the Senator from Rhode
Will not prejudice the rules, just that full ...s.ittiret docutnent, It is parts CT isittnd. / hope he will make that pro-
the Senate says to relApplit6v?10.FOriRelSili..20001044291iliefAiRDIMP10780R006g0C09000240
any way violate
rest of the committee.,I4ppp wewill keep dilemma, and it is a real dilemma.
that to ctsar_in aincl_ans- riot trY_D-slib.- Several Senators addressed the Chair.
merge what this, committee has done by Mr. CHURCH. I yield such time as he
taking a 'rule out of Tlie-procediiielieo% may require to the distinguished Senator
inaci -ast-y-iiirsItat this applies to whatthis from Minnesota.
(--drarrilEfeeh has done, tbecutse, tiff3 Mr. HUMPHREY. When the distal-
F.-:enator from "Minnesaota has_. ta14.t guished Senator from Michigan first
would apply to the Armed Services Corn-t brought this to our attention, I tended
Mii:tee it weiilajahlito-tlie_Foreignile- to agree with him. But I believe if we will
'salons ,Committee, it would apply to the read the rule and listen to the mandate
Government7Operations . Committee, it which was given to the special commit-
would apply to all s"ensitive appropria- tee
,
tions subcommittees.
I want Senators to think this matter
through carefully because all of us, no
matter what conunittee we are on, all of
us are going to be affected if we follow
through what the distinguished assistant
minority leader had in mind and has in-
dicated he might propose at this time.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields tithe?
Mr. TOWER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER,. Mr. President, I yield 2
minutes to the Senator from New York.
lyfr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have no
desire to participate in this debate, but
I feel I must because I think the Senate
is missing a number of critical facts.
One fact is, Mr. President, that we are
now in a very delicate situation with the
Presidency. We want more information
than probably a Senate has received in
history. We have to be responsible for it
when we get it.
Second, Mr. President, if this rule does
not say what BOB GRIFFIN says it says it
should be revised, and I will say why.
The President, the rule admits, has
the right to stamp a document as con-
fidential. We have the right to undo it, if
the President protests the publication,
which he is doing here.
He is the President of the United
States. We are the Senate. We are both
sovereign.
This is very serious, Mr. President, be-
cause in a confrontation between the
President and the Senate on this very
issue, as we want more than we have ever
gotten before, we could lase, and the
country could lose.
I _believe what JOHN
getecl is absolute-1Y_ right. Without com-
p ro in is in g the rule in any way, and not
trying_ to settle this legal dispute on
which ? have an
ha s5fl ,opiniOn an th afters ,let iR. vole
on this particular prentosition, No 'nen-
udicet just vote. Whatever words we can
invent. and ii-EiVbe I Can invent some
Mr. SYMINGTON. The vote should be
an appeal against what the Parliamen-
tarian says. I do not think there should
be any vote, but if there is going to be
a vote, it should be a vote against the
Parliamentarian, not against the com-
mittee.
Mr. JAI/ITS. If the Senator will for-
give me, it is not necessary to decide that
question here and now. It is too sticky
and I respect Senator Cnusen. Let us
just vote some catechism of words, which
we can invent in a few minutes, which
Mr. CHURCH. May I yield 5 minutes
to the Senator?
HUMpHREY (continuing). We
will see that the circumstances that, pre-
vail now are substantially different than
under ordinary circumstances.
No. 1, the special resolution creating
this committee called upon the commit-
tee to make a report to the Senate; sec-
ond, to make interim reports if it so
desired. That rule, in other words, ful-
fills the injunction that is in subsection 5
of rule XXXVI, where it says, relating to
confidential information, "shall not be
disclosed without leave of the Senate."
The Senate already gave to the com-
mittee the power f6 make thorougE in-
l'i_eAlicrations. It was completely and well
understood that that Tnypsi'gatign would,
by -iieFerf:Y, require confidential and
secret inforrnatron. The commit-fee is not
reporting a closymtat OTthe President.
Tik-6 csImmittee is not reporting confi-
dential instruments of an executive
taraueh.,Tteepriunittee is reporting a
committee investigation with co/talu-
s:T:0ns antr recouroattanaaliii
evidence CI:11d information obtained by
the cennuittee. That committee repoit
has drawn from secret and confidential
information just as the Appropriations
Committee draws from it when it , has
executive officers before it; just as the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
draws from executive sessions where
confidential and secret information is
given to us.
The situation relating to the Foreign
Relations Committee on the Sinai agree-
ment was substantially different because
we were then releasing the entire actual
document, word-for-word, that was
stamped "secret."
In this instance, the actual documents
are not being released. Excerpts and
paraphrased language are being re-
leased, interpretation is being made,
dialog and testimony are being evalu-
ated. But as I have glanced through this
report rather hastily there are no offi-
cial documents, as such, stamped secret,
top secret, confidential, sensitive or
classified.
Mr. FROCK. Will the Senator yield?
How can we say that a part of a top
secret document is not secret? How do
we selectively declassify? I am for re-
lease of this ma lerial.
Mr. HUMPHREY. We frequently do
what we call sanitize: top secret mate-
rial or excerpt or capsulized extended
information.
Mr. BROCF.?. This is not sanitized.
These are direct quotations, word for
word, hie, two, three.
Mr. HUMPIIRaya..Ent_tnat ts not the
S 20642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE' . - November 20) 1975
Approed For Release
. 1/.21% i 26-591pLypsgoRqoupoo9own-o
rule =2011 no. matt whatand o n- ready do not understand, though,
terpretation is put on it. We ought to do Mr. CHURCH. And that we are not the reasons for pressing the so-called
it in an ,pffirmative manner, going to open the report to another assassination story to the front, and
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- series of motions that could amend or rushing out with the publication of it
ator's 5 minutes. have expired, alter it. Give lis that protection. now.
The Senator from Idaho. Mr. MANSFIELD. We go out at 1 I want to respond to two things. Time
Mr. CHURCH. I ask for the attention o'clock. That time is set hard and fast, is limited. The Senator teem Minnesota
of the distinguished Senator from Rhode and if no action is taken by 1 o'clock, made a splendid statement,. I thought,
Island. - . then publication of the report goes out, but there are two points in here, as
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield? If other action is taken which is dee- brought up by the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. May I make a sugges- terious, which is dilatory, which indicates There were two former Presidents;
tion first? If that is worded so that it does a filibuster or a squeezing of interpreta- both of them have passed on. There was
not prejudice the rule one, way or an- tions to get around rule XXXVI. I think something said there about the way of
other, so we do not set had precedents we had better be careful. President Kennedy haying some kind of
for the future ? Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield knowledge, or there was an intimation,
Mr. PASTORE. We. do not mention the myself such time as I may require. a shadow east, about some kind of re-
rule. I hope we can dispose of this matter port. And there was another point about
Mr. CHURCH. I think we should in- with a motion. I abstained, in commit- President Eisenhowee; the testimony
serf:. in the. unanimous-consent request tee, on the matter of public release of showed that someone thought that
that it is done without prejudice to the the committee report. I did not - vote President Eisenhower said at a National
rule and, second, we should insert in for public release. But we are where we Security Council meeting, or had inch-
the unanimous-consent request that this are, and the fact of the matter is there cated to the witness, that the President
is the - one vote the Senate is going to is no way you can keep this report secret knew about, at least, these assassina-
take, that we are going to take it at a now. No way. tion plans.
time Certain and that we are not open-
Therefore, if we delay the vote until -, Mr. President, in such a grave matter,
ing ourselves up to a whole series of
after the recess, or even until later today let us not fool ourselves. If that report
proposed amendments to the report and or until tomorrow; I do not.think it would goes out in its present form?and I think
alterations of the report. We either vote prevent this report from coming out; it ought to be modified; if you do not
it up or down.
because it was generally understood. that have evidence on a thing,- do not men-
If those conditions are in the unani-
it would be released, and I think if a tion it?it will be talked about a hundred
mous-consent request, then I think we
'vote were taken right now, a majority years from now, that those two men as
could get together, of the Senate would vote to release it. Chief Executives of - our Nation, who
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President?
I see no point in filibustering the issue, were clean as a pin, I think, knew about
and I do. not think anyone is trying to or talked about or somebody said some-
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield? filibuster ? it. I see no point in trying to thing about it in the solemnity of this
Mr. CHURCH. I yield ? amend the report, because I think any report, and in our deliberations here we
Mr. PASTORE. This is it: Whereas,
the Senate has heard and received the effort to that end would fail We worked approved it.
like hell on this docuinent for a long
interim report of the select committee on time, and I think the committee will I commend again the work of the corn-
the matter of the. fissassinations defend the report a
, be it mittee, but could we not do- something
lt
therefore resolved that the Senate corn- th ant inst any assau
at is made on it. at least to correct that situation, and
mends the select committee for its work So I think the Senator f tom Idaho eliminate that inference and shadow?
and welcomes its interim report as a sig- is correct in insisting that we vote on one Mr. TOWER. I yield 1 minute to the
nificant contribution towards the pur- issue, but I think, too, that other Sena- Senator from Nebraska.
pose of the charter, and that it? be re- tors were right in not wanting to nail Mr. CURTIS. gr. Peesident. when the
leased.down or seal in cement some particular President. riellyereet_th enneate dale tenthe
Mr. CHURCH. I think the wording is interpretation of rule XXXVI that they Committee he deliyergd it to_ttie_,Sguaf.e.
beautiful, but I think somewhere there happen to disagree with; and I can I viiitird likentra?uitv,eetheeattentierr el tlie
we should say without prejudice to this understand such concern. lettrliamentarian. When the Pi esiaent
rule so we do not set a bad precedent for I think in matters of this sort, whether iTeMered the material to theadrunittee,
committees. in the future in matters of the -rule requires it or not. the Senate lie croric?ed itTaTie
....._. _
this kind. - - ought to join together in voting to release In section 3 of the resolution, weeread?
Mr. PASTORE. I am not invoking the this information, even though the rule The Senate. hereby_empowers the stieet
rule one way or the other, does not require it. So for that purpose, corniiiilTee as an agency of the Senate.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President-- Mr. President, I will put my motion, Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, may we
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- which is debatable, and urge its adoption. have order ? '
ator from. Texas. I move that the Senate approve .
?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. - President, I yield The PE F F
RI OFICER (Mr. The PRESIDING OFICE R.the SeriFoge) . Will the Senator euspend so that its will be in order. Senators will please
myself such time as I may require. It other Senators might listen to his take thei r seats.
occurs to me that this /natter could be ?
motion? The Senate will be in order. Mr. CURTIS. And then it g o
oes n find
think we need to complimen the
handled by a simple. motion. I doco not-
m Mr. TOWER. I men that the Senate recites What powers the committee has
. t
fnittee at all----L. approve the publication_ and general. Os- as an agency of the Senate.
eeminati-oli -61.-frie- iTif,Film?i'T-P-o-ii: cd -the There is not a lawyer in this Chamber
Mr. Salt:NM& mr. president,. may 1,e-e secie-,(i_FL_CTQAtitirfteenwit,iialt .1-yeii:1.1,ic to who would dispute the fact that the de-
have quiet so we can hear? the. committee's. rights under rule_XYM. livery was a delivery of the material Io
Mr. TowER. I feel constrained th pro- -8(Tieral-giii---ti-iNIFeSsed the --elia-ii. the Senate. .Purthermore, Mr. President,
pound a motion that would read this M. r. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I section 5 of the. resolution says this:
'way: offer the Pastore proposal as a substitute. Tie select committee shall make a final
I move that the Senate approve the release B,-Iveral Senators addressed the Chair report of he results of the Inve,stigation and
of the interim report of the select committee, - Toe PRESIDING OFFICER. Who study conducted by it purivant to this res-
without prejudice to any rights the com- yieh s time otution, together with iLs findings f Lod its
mittee irnty have under rule XXXVI. Me. TOWER. I yield such time as he recommendations as to new congressional
SEVERAL SENATORS, Question! Question! may require to the Senator from Missis- legislation it deems necessary or desirable,
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would sippi to the Heiette, . . . The select committee rosy
be prepared to support such a motion, Mr STENNIS. Mr. President, I have also submit to the Senav.e such interim re
-
as long as it can be done in connection no amendment or anything like that:, no ports as it considers appropriate.
with a unanimous-consent agreement filibuster or anything. I am concerned The l',!tiQltitidill (b.d_tiOthatalterizeethen
that if ' we are going to have a vote on about this matter. I-. totally applaud the committee to report to anyone but the.
that motion, we will have a vote on it at comm ttee on the really fine work they Senats.
a time certain. have c one
halihkaarli6
- Approved For Release 200/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R____ ____-0
Arovember a.O, 1975 CO
Approved For
The PRESIDING OFterCER. Who
yields time?
Mr. cHurwa. I yield to the distirnw
gui shed Senator from West
How much time do I have left, Mr.
President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 13 minutes.
Mr. CHURCH. How much time does
the Senator require?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I do not knoW.
Just let me begin, and finish when I can.
Mr. CHURCH. Very well.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
may we have order in the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER: The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I do not see where the rule is prejudiced
whatsoever by the release of this report.
I think it is up to the Senate to vote not
to release the report if that be its will.
Mr. HANSEN. We are unable to hear
the Senator.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I say I think
it is up to the Senate, if it des not
wnt
I do not think that a release ofthe report
would prejude the rule in any way
?Whataieev-e-E- .1.=;.,LarneraTe-the
reasons why,
end leave it to the Senate to -tied-cle
it &es not want to release thfaetp.21t.
-Reludtiantly, I sTaalirneiric--fo e against
release of the report. I say reluctantly,
because the report was made available
to us only today. I am somewhat non-
plused also by this embargo on the face
of the report, but nevertheless that is
another matter.
Now, Why do I say that the release of
this report by the Senate committee
would not prejudice the rule? I read the
rule:
Whenever, by the request of the Senate
or any committee thereof?
So we have the Senate or, in the al-
ternative, any committee thereof?
any documents or papers shall be commu-
nicated to the Senate by the President
And so on.
If the authors of the rule had intended
for the committee to be included they
would have said:
Whenever, by the request of the Senate or
any committee thereof, -any documents or
papers shall be coinintinicated to the Sm-
ate or any committee thereof.
Th.lt they did not say that. They notice-
ably, and, undoubtedly, we have to as-
tonne. intentionally, left; out the words
"or any committee thereof.,"
ho it says:
'cviietievar, by the 'rot:nest of ihe Senate Cr
ar cairrILittee therco'f, any documents or
papers SO 51 be communicated. to the Senate.
These papers were not communicated
to the Senate. The papers were com-
municated to a committee thereof. Con-
r,equently, the rule that we are talking
about does not cover the actions that
were taken in submitting material to a
committee.
Materials that are submitted to the
Senate from the President have to come
in that front door from where they pro-
ceed to the desk or they have to be au-
thorized to go over there to the Secre-
tary of the Senate. It. takes an authori-
zation by the Senate to
N'GRESSIONAL 'RECORD ?SENATE S 270643
Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-007qpR006700090002-0
the Secretary. They either have to conic r. ZDTENNIS. No. f' s not the purpose
Apprstivedltdr
in the front door, where an announce-
ment is made, they go to the Secretary.
That is when a communication is made
to the Senate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. No, jest in a
moment when I have completed.
These communications that went to
the committee, are not covered by this
precise rule in this particular instance.
Further, my second reason why I say
that the rule is not violated-4n my
judgment, we do not have to be con-
cerned about this rule?rule =VI has
to do with executive sessions which deal
with treaties, nominations, and so on.
That is the historic reason and use for
ruleXXXVI.
We are not diwksing a nomination
here: we are not-discussin, a treaty, here.
Mire -=-01-T-covers treaties autlenciani-
iyitions. We an---e`fii--Closed seeelernetaday
under rtife-ft5tV=E-re?icttkiiisja_fiQaul
doors.
..intlettalee for the sake qf ex-
gument only that rule N;c1c1fleeieen.j.ne
creating this committee, by its resolu-
thii-rad?as it ...,va-s--inodified -that
rule. 'MT-Ts it we wish to assume that
for a mom--ent-tassiiiiie_tat. Here is. wtiat
the 8-61-i-ae said:
Select Committee shall make a final
report. The Select Committee may submit
to the Senate such interim report as it con-
approprIate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I only
wished for order in the Senate so we
could hear.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The select
committee, shall institute and carry out
such rules and procedures as it may deem
necessary to prevent: First, the disclo-
sure outside of the select committee of
any information relating to the activi-
ties of the CIA and, second, the dis-
closure outside the select committee of
any information which would adversely
affect the intelligence activities of the
CIA.
We know how valid and important
legislative history can often be in matters
that come before the courts of this
country. I shall read a section of the
legislative history from the debate
the resolution creating the committee
that will substantiate my contention that
the Senate in creating this resolution
determined?if one wants to assume for
a, moment, and I do not so assume for
the reasons already stated?that rule
Xl!,iiSiVI was not to rpoly ?here is the
section from the debalt:.
it would appear --
Serie tor BAKF:a
on its surface to say that if a o i.ui:ibI.'d
into a matter such am the Chilean t;ituation,
the Bay of Pigs or the Lebanon incursion,
notwithstanding it; might appear to he COM-
mittee, ii. might be some thing that ought to
be dealt with in the Congress, 'we should not
disclose it.
Senator BAKER is a member of the
committee--
Mr. TOWER, addressed the Chair.
Will the Eenator from Mississippi reas,ure
rise that that is not the purpoie of pars- The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
Reldate 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006700090002-0
paragraph it. We tried to wrap it up in such
is way as to require rules of procedure in
the committee which I underStand to be the
feeling of the Senator from Trrmessee.
Mr. BAKEIL If there appears to be conduct
by any agency of the 'United Suites, Govern-
ment that appears to be improper or co'-
'-earls its jurisdiction that will not be limited
by paragraph 2 of this amendment.
Mr. STENNTS. This does not put a. limita-
tion on the committee. It requires the com-
mittee to proieed under rules, regulations,
and procedures, but these things are stilt
kit in the hands of the committee.
SO I say to Senators even disclosures
iisa(rnaye poTentialLy harmful to 'the
Punted State:c of America_ Nyere to he
within the committee's discretion In
make, by authority -delegated-17:5-iiTtly
have been an un.wise
-celegti-tion of-authority, ..ut Mere it is.
That is the leg:sr:lb:ye-EISA:or:ye trioit is
the pertinent section of the resolution.
'ehat is the pertinent extract from the.
legislative debate. I say to Senators that
the committee is acting within its au-
thority, delegated to it previously by the
Senate. If the Senate today :vises to vote
down publication of the report--thus re-
trieving the authority previously dele-
gated to the committee?that is quite
a different matter. But I sato Senators
that the publication of this report will
ecit violate rule xxxvr. -
Mr. GRIFFIN.. Mr. President, will the
Senator from West Virginia yield for 2
minutes'?
Mr. 'PASTORE. Mr. President, will the;
Senator yield? ?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. PASTURE. Does the Senator
the point_ we are missing here? The
President did not raise rule 7-+LXXV.L
Mr. CHTJRCH. Mr. President, may we
have this on the: other side's time?. Our
time is running out. Can 7"-Ye have this
on the time of Senator Towea?
Mr. PASTURE. Nobody has elven time.
I asked a question.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President. I yield 2
minutes to the Senator from Rhode Is-
land, and then I must yield to people on
the other side.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Two minutes
are yielded to the Senator Horn Rhode
Island,
Mr. pAsTortE. The President did not
faise the que.tion as to rule =XVI. Ile
raised it on Vic questiofl of public policy.
In view of that letter, I ma talthey this
poition., regardless of the te4alities, tie
the right thing, for us to 11,1. in clew of
the letter ?vrittea by the President, who
cairns that this will be C.k,iriaghle:. We
6o not think so. The repott should be
pubished. It would be more ,iffectiee anti
more comfortable for the people of t?his
country if they knew that tiae Senate
rook affirmative action, anti that is the
etn.y reason why I raised the question.
I do not see as reasonelie inert wtty
we cannot trite a vote at J. p.m., and
either vote it out or in.
Mr. MATTSPIELD. Make it 12:45.
-1,11r. PASTORE. 12:45. Any time is all
tin dl with me. ?
Mr. ivIANSPIELD. mr. President, will
to Senator make a motion?
S 20644 Approved For RaAWW0Sigi?PW'CV-WOli34:170Sir81604A700090064ember 20; 1975
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that no later than
1 pnit we take a vote--
Mr. MANSFIELD. At 12:45.
Mr. PASTORE. At 12:45, no later than
12:45 we take a vote on the motion.
Mr. MANSFIELD. On the Pastore'
substitute.
Mr. PASTORE. The motion that is
Pending at the desk now which is the
Pastore substitute.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection?
MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
Mr. TOWER.- Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, it is my understand-
ing that the motion of the Senator from
Texas is the pending business. -
The VICE PRESIDENT. No; the sub-
stitute by the Senator from Rhode
Mr. TOWER .Mr. Fresklent, will the
clerk state the substitute? -
The VICE PRESIDENT. The substi-
tute will be stated.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Read it.
Mr. PERCY addressed the Chair.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
We do not
as follows:
clerk state the substitute? .
know what it is.
The legislative clerk read
The Senator from Rhode Island (Mr, Pas-
ate has heard
t of the Select
tivities on As-
tore) moves whereas the Sen
and received the interim repel
Committee on Intelligence Ac
sassinations, be it resolved, therefore, that
the Senate commend the Select Committee
for its work and welcomes its interim report
rt toward the
that the said
ublic without
as a significant contributio
purpose of its charter and
report- be released to the p
prejudice to rule =XVI of ti
ie Senate.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I object.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, re-
move the words "without prejudice to
rule =VI."
- Mr. PASTORE. Take it out. They
asked me to put it in.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That was not in
there. No. Let me see it.
Mr. TOWER addressed the Chair.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Take them
out. Do not put them in.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Texas.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator wants
that last part deleted.
The VICE PRESIDENT. It is so modi-
ned.
Mr. TOWER, Mr. President, might I
suggest I do not see why we are splitting
hairs insisting on a particular interpre-
tation of the rule, even though the Par-
liamentarian agrees, the majority dis-
agrees, or whatever, but that seems to
be sticking in people's craw. Why do
we have to get into it? Why could we
not simply say "without prejudice under
the rules" and leave it at that?.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. We do not
have to make that statement. That im-
plies that the rule is contrary to the
action by the committee in releasing the
report.
Mr. TOWER. Let use tell the distin-
guished assistant majority leader that he
ts getting us into a brawl on the rules
now, se we are going to hassle on the
rules.
Mr. HUMPETP,EY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. TOWER.. I see no point it it. I see
no point in getting into a fight on the
rules. Let us do that seine other time. Let
us come back after the recess with a pro-
posed amendment to the rule.
Mr. PASTORE. I ask that it be deleted
without prejudice to the rule.
Mr. ILUIVIPHRE.Y. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Texas yield?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the last modiffcation?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President--
Mr. PASTORE. Let us have it read
again.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
reread the substitute.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Whereas t7,1 Senate has heard and received
the in-teiTin reOrC-
intelli,encs Activities op_flssassinatiorTs,
Bolt thereioren -Senate
coiinneuds_nie aeiect cornmittg.,..1-,?or ItsBrug
and welcomes its Interim report as a
contributiolktficYarai4le_
clutiteLAnd_tha. the said pep?ort Itorelea.s.cd
bt&
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object----
The VICE; pRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to voting at a quart-Jr to 12
?Mi. CASE. Mr. Pre.Haent; reserving the
right to object
Mr. TOWER. Reserving the right to
object, Mr. President, I ask the Senator
from Rhode Island to say "not later than
1," rather than a quarter to 1.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield? After all, we have
souse business to attend to today in addi-
tiOn to this. We have the Interior appro-
priation bill; we have the budget resolu-
tion; we have conference reports. Also,
the Senate has agreed that the discus-
sion of this matter would occur only be-
tween the hours of 6 and 1. Hence, the
atienator from Rhode Island asks that
the time be 12:45, and M executive ses-
sion.
The VICE PRESIDENT, The Senator
from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. The reason why I ask the
Senator from Rhode Island to amend his
request is that I have a number of peo-
ple here who are seeking time, and I
want to try to accommodate them. If
we run out of gas over here, we can yield
back time.
Mr. PASTORE:. Make It 1 o'clock.
Mr. MANSETELD7Th3t-15-XCle
o'clock, I ask for the 37-11-s?itFia.i-lays.
WirE:-CASE. What is the proposition?
The VICE PRESIDENT. To vote not
later than I o'clock.
Mr. CASE. On what?
Mr. DELMON. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to objects--
The VICE PRESIDENT. Not later than
1 o'clock.
Mr. CASE. We have to go out, if we are
g ting to vote, unless we have unanimous
censent. We want to stay in closed ses-
si )fl until this is disposed of. We would
hi ye to do that by unanimous consent,,
at d I object to that until I have spoken,
',An MANSFIELD. I just asked for the
yens and nays on the pending amend-
merit.
Mr. CASE. We cannot vote on that in
closed session.
The VICE PRESIDENT. IS there a
sufficient second? There is a eufficient
second.
The yeas and reayttwere ordered.
Mr. '.DOWER. Mr. President, I think I
am about the only one who has much
time left. I will yield it to everyone who
wants to speak, if they will indicate to
me that they want to speak.
Am_ _I to undeastajact nowt.that the
unanimous-consent resieet l,ias been o is'
NM LL ION. Yes, I object.
rSE I objeiEte---
The VICE PRESIDENT. There was an
entlMr. MANSFIELD. To wha;;-----
eti-
The VICE PRESIOENT7To voting_ at.
1 o'clock.
5-eas and nays have been ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Something is going to
happen at 1 o'clock, anyWay.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary Inquiry.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Does some-
one yield for a parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. TOWER. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Michigan.
Mr. GRIFFIN, I thank the Senator.
I think that the argument of my dear
colleague from West Virginia, who has
made a masterful argument with a very
weak case, has to be responded to, even
though I am glad we are putting this
ruling aside, but I do not think we should
let that argument not have a response.
Pint of all, he is saying that delivery
of conffdential information by the Presi-
dent to the committee does not consti-
tute delivery to the Senate and that
therefore the rule does not apply. With
all due respect, that Is incredible. It
is saying, in effect, that for the Presi-
dent of the United States to deal with
committees, such as the Committee ten
Armed Services, the Committee on For-
eign Relations, and other committees,
he must be sure that he sends the ma-
terial to the President of the Senate, and
then the rule will apply. I think that is
incredible.
What county or municipality' rises
above the State? The effect of this ruling
or the interpretation is that a commit-
tee rises above the Senate itself.
Second, he tries to labor hard with the
language hi the resolution. 'rho Senator
from Nebraska already has pointed out
that the authority given to the corn
mittee VMS to report to the Senate, not
the public. If that report contains claesi ?-
fied information, the rule
applies.
The other interesting aspect is section
The Select Committee shall institute anl
carry out such rules and procedures as it
deems necessary to prevent the disclosure
outside the Select Om:raittee c.f informa-
tion -
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. As it deems
necessary.
Mr. GRIFFIN. To prevent the disclos-
ure outside. We are not doing that. We
are going contrary to the provisions of
tile resolution.
So I hope we will not decide the ques-
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.A,roveinber. 2-0, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 20645
,
-Mr. TOWER. Mr. PreArtlargWedIFOr
minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
iMre.PEROV. Mr. President. I trust
that my comments will not in any regard
detract from my gratitude and admira-
tion for the work of every member of the
committee. Certainly. I have long be-
lieved in sunshine legislation and open-
ing up the processes of government. As
I understand it, too much sunshine
sometimes causes cancer.
Sometimes we forget that we are not
a Nee -democracy; that we cannot Iiity
f"..rv-tlii.p._g_otir-arrii- bare tc-Felore the
whole world beetnise it isiThoing,' -16 be
used by our enemies as a hatTeireTTirtFaTn-St
us
Wetalagt have to take into account that
sometimes, in The conduct of inteit-
niitTeinalaalfairs and oufillfir.b-iiiailT"Tand
thete-eatfatalauneht?ot
deal with confidence and' m cieinfj.cdAi,
we clearly laid out certain provisions,
certain standards, and provided that if
they were met, we would close those doors
and conduct our business in a confiden-
tial manner.
lam deeplyseneerneddrthant the whole
We are making it more and more dLfflQhht
to goytern the NRIO-n.
There Is a mood of distrust with the
executive branch of Government that
permeates through the whole country,
and we are adding to it. The executive
branch has tried now, in reaching out
to the legislative branch, hi every con-
ceivable way, to say that the rules of
the past are no longer the rules of the
future or the present so far as our rela-
tionship with the elected representatives
of the people is concerned.
They have baiee_d_jjaellersoulaThey
14-ittt_jtt.t_tletseteytittier canittltn_Unien..11,11e
der the rules of the game_ thatthey
thought existed at that titne?thatteit
was releaS-edeihea confidential _manner,
under the confidence rules of the Senate
and that partilar Obininitteel. NV
seem to he changing thoite rit_lesetWee
bordered on!t witTi respect tO the Sinai
ngieemdht.tA.,e re deeply
about --LITE. I think all of us were. But
now we have once again a case where
we are asked to approve something as a
fait accompli, when we are told it can-
not be kept secret, anyway. I ..(hiniceit
'20.1410 'PC' lel? taieen.itnifiewe..:S.' ertrit .ait d
we tan release a sallitized version that,
could reach treasonable staillTtIfiWlYe-
Ia ceo the l';h:e-td-at-ii tit it i
aoses?..
hope we do not hand a hatchet to
the euemy. If we are asked to vote on
? this, I cannot. possibly vote to release this
clocannent, when I have not mad it, and
no one other than the committee mem-
bers has read it. We do not know what
is in it. All we 'know is that we have a
i.olenin letter from the President of the
ienited States, as a former Member of
? congress, urging us, with all the candor
? he has exercised?and no President has
dealt with Congress with greater candor
than he has--that it would be against
the national interest to release this re-
port, 'which we have not yet read,
Therefore, If there is a resolution to
(ole on whether or not to put it out, even
Releasee2?103/041293thekk4RDP8O
be difficult, .E will have to vote against
that resolution. I cannot assume the re-
sponsibility, against the judgment of the
President of the United States, without
knowledge of what is in this report.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 3
Minutes to the Senator from New York.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the Senator
from Texas.
First of all, I just want to say that I
cannot see why the elementary distinc-
tion cannot be made between the right
of a.comraittee to leave access to con-
fidential documents in order to derive
conclusions which are incorporated in
a report and a disclosure or a compromise
on the confidential information itself.
I should like to address myself now to
what was talked about by the Senator
from. Illinois.
Fra.nkly, I have been appalled, totally
appalled and disturbed, by the fact that
we seem to be presented with a fait aC-
oompli. The distinguished Senator front
Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) and the dis-
tinguished majority leader have told us
that we have to snap to because' we have
no choice, that it, will - be out in the
streets. If we in fact have no control over
the dissemination of information such as
this, which none of ;us has had a chance
to analyze, to judge' independently, then
something is incredibly wrong with our
institutions.
If the gentlemen who say we cannot
control the dissemination of this infor-
mation. are stating that the Senator and
officers of the Senate cannot be trusted
to keep their mouths shut or to honor
their obligations, then I suggest that we
consider seriously applying section 4 of
rule =XVI, which says:
Any Senator or ?nicer of the Senate who
shall disclose the secret or confidential busi-
ne[is or proceedings of the Senate shall be
liable, if a Senator, to suffer expulsion from
the body; and if an officer, to dismissal. . . .
We sort of make a ganie of the fact
that any time we close these doors, with-
in 2 minutes, the Washington Post will
have an accurate verbatim copy of what
goes on. I think this is disgraceful. I
think it is something that we should be
ashamed of, and I hope that this body
has the guts to press for the identifica-
tion of anyone who leaks any informa-
tion out of this proceeding or any fu-
ture proceeding, and has the further guts
to. Thsliitute proceedings for expillsion.
I have not made up my mind how I
am going to vote on this. If I vote to
approve its dissemination because I think
it is a fait accompli, it win be done un-
der prot.ist. Itoweved 1 shall probably lee
joining the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, first? we
hear that the Senate ought to vote be-
cause that is the proper way to et,. Then
we hear that the Senate ought cot to vote
because it has not had a chore to fully
consider the report. These art the verv
reasons why the committee did this on
its responsibility. The rules are clear that
we had the right. We did not come here
to ask for a vote. We came he to ex-
plain what was in the report. that we
bad already voted to make public .
I am not hero asking for a vote, either.
I am here ?nit, to uphold the rut -s of the 1 are. one of those who faeors sunstilia
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R00.67001191300241 prerogaftvea
of the committee. Therefore, I cannot
accept the argument that we are forcing
Senators to vote without full knowledge'
of what is in the report, because nobody
on the committee came here for that
purpose this morning.
Mr. CURTIS. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. CHURCH. I have only 1 minute
left.
Mr. TOWER, Mr. President, I yield 3
minutes to the Senator from hew Jersey.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, this is not
the kind of thing we ought to try to
answer by reference to specific language
hi a rule. This is a matter of broad
public policy and relations between the
executive and the legislative branches of
Government. I think that JOEN PAsroass.
with his usual good gut reaction, hit the
right note vnien he said that no matter
what the rule might say in ordinary
circumstances, no matter what the Ian-
'mage of the authorization might be con-
strued to permit, we, in. the light of the
President's very clear statement that this
is a serious matter, affecting our public
relations, ought to take it with equal
seriousness and treat it as. it matter for
decision by the whole Senate.
I think, as a matter of fact, that in
order to preserve our right as it body to
declassify material sent un under the
stamp of confidentiality, we should do
it in all cases. I think we have to insist
that, ultimately, the Senate, may decide
what to release to the public. I think we
ought to be very, very- slow in having
this kind of thing done by any action
)ciFS than full action by the whole 'Senate,
and that, in this instance, it is portlen-
Iarly important.
I do not accent the suggestion that
ItestANK has made that, because some peo-
ple do not want. to release it at all; or
some people do not want to release it
until they litre read it, the committee
lies to take this kind of action, I think
the committee itas done -a .inperit job. T
agree fully with the report_ I, myself,
have read enough of it to satisfy myself
that I can answer intelligently the- tales-
tion, Should it be published or not? And
I am prepared to do it.
But I think we ought not to--? the let-
ter killeth and the spirit giveth." That is
the thing' we ought to clo here. We ought
to act as a body approving the publica-
.
Lion and not try to do a legalistic job at
(iecidtnft whether ink; is going to add ao
many cubits to this particular precedent
tor committee authority or sv cid rat.
is a rnciteg,, whiclatellttctUat.n.-QL-Ilt4
C'S dl nature_ re, 1:ve all
tslhlhtto be handled haathe
thout prejliarf7-53 finy7t1',
Mtn.
Mr. TOWER.. I yield 2 minutes to the
senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. BELLMON. I thank the dietiti-
euished senator.
Mr. President, so far aa I know, no
Member of the Senate had seen this re-
port until Cie hour of 9. o'clock this
li;,orning,. There are 346 pages. I have not
had a chance to read even ('lie page,
so far.
S 20646
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 00, 1975,.
legislation. I wasAgEfe9ndcfCrWt9akgaRQZ94A: igliAgWT,#-PPTA9R9,9ATRPPQ94. q,
,...oetant to vot:e to re-
report, lease something as sensitive as this is
without knoWing what it contains,
Therefore, I may have to vote "Present."
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's
time has expired.
Mr. TOWER. I yield 1. minute to the
Senator from Virginia. ?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR, Mr. Presi-
dent, I feel one would need to go through
many pages of the CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD
over many years to find 11 more excellent
speeches than were Made this morningby
the 11 members of this committee.
Each speech was concise, restrained,
thoughtful. .
In regard to the situation we find our-
selves in now, I think the Senator from
Arkansas has raised an important point.
As I understand it, as I read the rules of
procedure of the committee itself,
adopted April 9, 1975, and amended Sep-
tember 22, 1975, on page 17 it says this,
beginning on line 1:
The select committee shall Make a flnia
report to the Senate. The Select Committee
may also submit to the fienate such interim
reports as it deems appropriate. ?
It seems to me that report should have
been submitted to the Senate before any
effort was made to release it to the pub- '
lic. I probably will vote to release it to ;
the public because, as a practical matter,
I feel rather sure the reports are in the E
hands of the news media, and that prob-
ably stories have already been. written
based on the report. But I think we are
faced with a rather unfortunate situation
because I hesitate to vote to release a re-
port of 350 pages without having an op-
portunity to read it.
. Mr. TOWER. I yield 2 minutes to the
Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President,
make this very practical _suggestion.),
irlifFfiefS14iThle-siTgteestieniiiiifte
on iialiTTiTcles of this Issue.
We have lieTrel mafly legal argumenn
we are not prepared to judge. I offer the;
proposal?the Senate, as provided in
Senate Resolution 21, has received the
report of the committee. The SenaO-,
commends the committee on its interim
report and concurs in the release of the
report of the committee.
My motion or, should I say suggestion
gets the Senate not on record in terms
of all of the provision of the report or eO
of the legalities or teehnicalities, but it
does at. least follow the procedure out-
lined in the resolution; namely, ti-ds com-
mittee is an agent of the Senate, the
committee was callert to report to tbe
Senate. The Senate takes note that it has
received the report, commends the come
matey, and concurs in its release.
Mr. PASTORS. That is what I did.
Mr. HUMPHREY. i3ut, may I sew most
respectfully, the other one said that we
supported it.
Mr. PASTORS. No.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I think that by the
word "concur" in the roles se we find our-
selves not in the position of either dot-
ting every "1" or crossing every "t" or
supporting particular ma erial or even
having to make judgment on rule
XXXVI and its reference tc the language
that has a sunshine law and I know it
works; I am hi favor of it. But I think it
is totally unfair to ask Senators who
have not read a report like this- to vote
for or against it.
I want simply to say that, as one Mem=.
her of the Senate, I am going to object
to any unanimous-consent request to
vote on this matter until at least we have
had a chance to know what we are Vot-
ing on.
- Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, will somebody yield me 2 minutes?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Wyoming 1 minute.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I speak
In response to the observations made by
the Senator from Nebraska .in calling
attention to what rule XXXVI said, as
commented upon by the distinguished
- majority whip. As I recall what the Sena-
tor frOm West Virginia said, it was es-
sentially that this confidential informa-
tion was not released to the Senate, it
was released to a committee of the Sen-
ate. I make the point, Mr. President, that
every committee of the Senate is a crea-
ture of the Senate. `They can be estab-
lished and they can be abolished. It
seems to me to beg the question to try
to argue that it is not being handed to
the Senate when it is handed to a com-
mittee of the Senate. When a witness
before a committee of the Senate re-
fuses to testify, the action is not to hold
him in contempt of that particular com-
mittee; he is held in contempt of the
Senate.
must say that, though I nearly always
agree with the logic of the majority whip,
in this instance, I think it misses the
point.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
in the abstract, the Senator is right; com-
mittees are the creatures of the Senate.
But we are talking about the rule and
how it specifically does not apply under
this particular circumstance.
Mr. HANSEN. It was precisely that
point I was addressing. I think the Sena-
tor from -Nebraska, laid it clearly on the
line. This material was made - available
to the Senate. The report is made to the
Senate, and nobody else has any right
to it until the Senate says, we will re-
lease it.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 2
minutes to the Senator from Alabama.
Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished
Senator from Texas.
.Ae I understand it, Mr. President, "we
are going to vote, if we vote at all, on
the Pastore motion or resolution first. I
would favor the "Whereas" portion of
the Pin tore resolution in which the com-
mittee is commended?and I commend
the committee for its dedication, its hard
work, its sense of duty, and the fine in-
restigation that it has done,
The second phase of it would impel
se to vote against the whole resolu-
Uon; that is, on release of this very sen-
a tive information. So I am going to
have to vote against the Pastore resolu--
teon and, either way that goes, I would
anio vote against the Tower resolution,
The committee has done a great lob,
but it ought to keep a great deal of 'this
information Within its breast. I think
that therein lies the fault of the report.
I do not feel that much oh-this informa-
tion should be released. But as far as
commending the committee for its fine
work, I am all for that and I want to ex-
tend my commendation, for what little
it may be worth, to the committee for the
great job that it has done. -
Now, on the matter of discretion, on
the matter of the exercise of discretion,
In the release of sensitive information,
well, I cannot say so much. If they had
left off with investigation and not so
much report I think we would be much
better off. I oppose releasing the confi-
dential and sensitive information con-
tained in this report.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Texas yield me 1 min-
ute to offer a proposal?
Mr. TOWER. I would be delighted to
yield to the Senator in just a moment,
but
Mr. HUMPHREY. A conciliatory pro-
posal, may I say, that will help us. -
Mr. TOWER. May I yield to other Sen-
ators and then I will put the Senator's
name on the list. ?
I yield 1 minute to the Senator from
Arkansas.
Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, may
I have the attention of the distinguished
chairman of the committee?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes, indeed, if he may
have it on Senator Toweat's time.
Mr. TOWER. Yes.
Mr. MeCLELLAN. Do I tmderstand the
committee is not asking for the Senate to
vote on the release of this report?
Mr. CHURCH. That is correct. The
-Senate comrdittee came here, having
voted to release it on its Own authority
and responsibility. The purpose of this
meeting was to inform Senators first
what the committee's findings were.
Mr. THURMOND. We cannot hear the
Senator.
Mr. CHURCH. In response to the Sen-
ator's request, I said the committee did
not bring the report here for the purpose
of imposing an obligation on the Senate
to vote on it one way or another. It is the
committee, on its own responsibility and
on the authority that had been delegated
to it, which voted first to approve the re-
port and, second, to make it public. We
came here, in deference to the Senate, eo
Senators might first know what the find-
ings of the committee were,
Mr. MeCLELLAN. Mr. President. if the
Senator will yield further, this report we
are asked to vote to release contains
about 346 pages, and I discovered--
Mr, CHURCH. That is precisely why
we did not come here to ask the Senate
to vote on it.
Mr. McCLELLAN. That is why I am
asking for information. We have had no
time, as the distinguished Senator from
Illinois pointed out, I have had no time,
to read it. I do not know what is in it. I
might vote to release it all if I had some
opportunity to be familiar with the re-
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Wm:weber 20,
I 94proved 6PaeatsesMigul'9E:?61A5-13?4AbR006700090002-0
of the report. We would be acknowledg-
ing the report and commending the com-
mittee, and expressing our concurrence
in the publication and dissemination of
a very important public document. This,
in fact, is what Senate Resolution 21 pro-
vides when it calls upon the committee
to report to the Senate.
May I say I believe there has been
argument here on that rule today which
needs a great deal of clarification and,
in fact, _in my own instance I am con-
vinced there was classified material in
the report, which causes inc doubt as to
some of my own argument.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes -
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The Senator
is asking the same thing the Senator
from Rhode Island is asking for except
saying that it comes within the pro-
visions of the original resolution which,
I think, is good.
Mr. HUMPHREY. yes.
I send this to the desk. I do not know
if it is in order. I give it to Senator PAS-
TORE. He has taken the lead.
Mr. PASTORE.. Mr. President, I ask
that mine be modified. I think it is the
same thing.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Let us do that.
Mr. PASTORE. I ask that my amend-
ment be modified.
Th.e VICE PRESIDENT, Without
oh-
,jectior, the pending motion \On he so
modified.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Parliamentary in-
quiry.
The VICE PRESIDENT.- The Senator
will state it,
Mr. SYMINGTON. Do we not have to
have unanimous consent?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The yeas and
hays have been ordered. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr, BELLIVION. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object, is there a motion
before the Senate?
The VICE PRESIDENT, The clerk will
read the modification.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Tbqammtcasc1edinJtrte-
ComnhittCEj._ The Senate commends the com-
mit:tee cit its iERrinn reEcit allti
the release of the report of the nom-nate,.
Mr. BELLMON. Is the motion subject
to debate?
The VICE PRESIDENT. It is debat-
able. It is a unanimous-consent request.
Mr. CHILES, Reserving the right to
object--
The VICE PRESIDENT, On 'those
tithe?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, / have
not yielded the floor.
Mr. CHILES. I object.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the unanimous-consent?
Mr. CHILES. I object.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Objection, is
beard,
Mr. TOWER. Then the original mo-
tion of the Senator from Rhode Island
is the pending business, is that not cor-
rect?
The VICE PRESIDENT. That is cor-
rect.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I will
yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Tennessee and then I am going to yield
back my time.
Mr. 'BAKER. Mr. President, I only
want to say just this: I have the advan-
tage over all 10 of my colleagues in the
Senate in that I have been intimately
involved in developing the information
on which this report is written and, in
fact, in the preparation of the report
itself.
I am familiar with all 346 pages of it,
including .those 43 that are my separate
views in the appendix attached to it.
I understand your concern about vot-
ing to release this report before you have
read it, but I commend it to you.
I agree with the Senator from Rhode
Island, the Senator from New York, and
others who have expressed concern that
we are about to do something I think
we do not intend to do, and that is to
basically alter and change the relation-
ship between the Senate and the execu-
tive department with respect to declassi-
fication of documents. I agree we need
not fight that battle here, as the Sen-
ator from New Jersey pointed out.
I simply want to say it is the position
of the Senator from Tennessee that this
report should be released, that we should
not deal with the precedents involved.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, may we
have order?
Mr. BAKER. May I ask one question:
It was my understanding that the Chair
stated the position of the Parliamen-
tarian on this issue relating to rule
XXXVI. It was not my recollection that
the Chair ruled in that manner, and 1
propound now a parliamentary inquiry
as to whether or not the Chair has ruled
in accordance with the recommendation
of the -Parliamentarian on that point.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has
stated his opinion on the advice of the
Parliamentarian, in response to a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
Mr. -BAKER, Ma President, I really do
not wish to disagree unduly with the
Parliamentarian, whom I respect, but
that is not the way I recall the record,
and I will not, debate the matte' here ex-
cept to reserve my rights with respect to
that as we 1..ead the written record on
the point.
It is my contention haat the Chair has
not ruled in accordance with the recom-
mendation of the Parliamentarian.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields
time now?
Mr. TOWER,. Mr. PresideM,, it the
chairman iS prepr,red to yield back the
remainder of this time I am prepared to
yield back mine.
Mr. CHURCH. I yield back the r(1-
mainder of my time,
Mr. TOWER. I yield back the re,main-
der of my time.
STATEMI-;NT STRIA1111';:il) liv Nut. 'ffery
Mr. TAFT, Mr, President, I abate in
the additional views expressed hi the re-
Port by Se filitt,Or GOLDWATER and on the
floor by the Senator from Illinois (Mr,
PERCY) as to the danger of releasing this
report.
The President's warning that the re-
pert will do grievous damage must be present.
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S 20647 -
taken seriously. It seemS.gertain that, as
he says, it "would likely be exploited by
foreign nations and groups hostile to. the
United States in a manner designed to
do maximmn damage to the reputation
and foreign policy of the United States.
It would seriously impair our ability to
exercise a positive leading role in world
affairs."
The likelihood is that the report will
leak if it is not authorized to be pub-
lished and much of the damage will be
done, but that does not, mean we should
endorse or legitimatize its publication. I
shall not join. in compounding the error
of releasing the report.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDE-NT, The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll, and the following Senators
answered to their names:
- [Quorum No. 83 Leg.)
Allen Garn Muskie
Baker
GlennNelsxi
Bartlett
Goldwater Nunn
Beall Griffin
? Packwood
BelImon Hann Pastore
Brock
Hart, Gary Pearson
Buckley
Bumpers Hart, Philip A. rPeelrIcy.
Hartke
Burdick
Byrd
Hathaway
Ribicoff
Hatfield Randolph
Harry F., Jr. Helms 'Roth
Byrd, Robert C. Hollings Schweilter
Cannon
CASO Hruska Scott, Hugh
'Rudd] eston Sparkman
Chiles Humphrey
tatford
Stennis
Church Inouye
Clark - Jackson
Stevens
Cranston
Culver Jr,totvallti; Stelae
, Symington
Curtisoo M 'ntt
agnuson ,
D
Mansfield Talmadge
Demented
Durkin Mathias Thurmond
McClellan Tower
.Bagleton
Eastland. McClure, T tall] ey
McGee
Fannin Mondale 1,Velcker
1.1:o?11?Cl.g. Montoya "Young
Morgan
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
GRAVEL) , the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. ABOUd EZR) , the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. Ilkytt), the Senator from
Texas (Mr. :3EN TEN), the Senator from
Delaware (Mr. lamEN), the Senator from
Colorado (Mr. HAskre.fo,), the Senator
from Louisiana (Mr.- Joiansrow), the.
Senator front Massachusetts (Mr. na:li-
NEoy), the 'Senator from Louisiana
Lam), the Senator from South Dakota
MeGoveaN), the Senator from 1\ie,3
Hampshire (Mr. iNileINrygr), hie .3iinater
tram Montana (Mr. MErcAt.v), the Sen-
tor from H oh (Mr. Moss,. the Senator
from. Wisconsin PEninvirs), the
Senator. from, Illinois (Mr. SasiwrNsoN ,
and -the Serator from New Jersey (Mr.
WILLIAMS) Vce necessarily absent._
Mr. GR,IEFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Massachussetts (Mr.
IiRooxin), the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
T,,AXALT) , and the Senator W2/1 Virginia.
!.Mr, WILMA I,. SCOTT)
bsent.
LECHSLATIVE SESSION
(At, 12:51 o.m. the doors of the Cham-
ber were tg_ened.)
The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum Sr
S 20648
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---i SENATE - .November 20,.-197'.5 -
Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006700090002-0
INTELT.TGENCE ACTIVITIES for the United States Government for the Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President--
fiscal year 1976, directing certain - recoil- . The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
ciliation action, and providing for the transi- from New York has 3 minutes.
tion quarter. -
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to
The Senate proceeded to consider the say only that I approve the publication of
concurrent resolution. the report of the select committee-. If
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, let there had been a vote, and I believe there
us have order, should have been-it is a great mistake 1
The VICE PRESIDENT. There will be we have not taken it--I would have
order in the Senate, please, voted yea.
The Senator from New York. Mr. President, I also wish to state that
the, advice of the Parliamentarian needs
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I move that. the Senate go back into open
session.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
Is on the. motion?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The motion is
not debatable.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
is correct. (Putting the question.)
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President--
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, obviously
a number of people have decided that
they doiro-t-want-te; i-ote on This issue.
I am clistfess&rafid-Sorfy-111421Vriiiib-&S
Of Ilie-SeTrate-haVei-ATrived at ffiat
-IIETLOBERT C. BYRD. Is the Senate
now in open session?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate
Is now in open session.
Mr. TOWER. Therefore, Mr. President,
since the Senafe-TiaTirdtiVorelVriVillit
ni-iWTO-TitibiredY chsassociatiFmyselrfrh-iiii
ani-rifibliFferease orthis report.
'Mr. MANSEIELD:-Mis -PreeldgentonIt
believe it ought, to be kegTfitiiiindifiat
fiiiiiiber of Senrat6r-S-riaatetintiney,
critt not want to WIlL. ee.jjegaeof
this report bt,,Icause,theLbaamotread_it,
and Other Senators indicated they would
oppose any unanimous-consent request
lentliniaCra-Yote. rtImnwhirfhesJe
special committee leiRi-cfone-Tifolulfill its
ietii-AiSibilities. "It-has ai'dEittell-to-flie
Siene an interim report, and I tie not
believ-e-thesFeWariY-IoTogy clue anyone
for any action
tilt; P.CeViiiiisT hours.
commera-thir chairman and the
? ranking minority member, and I find
no fault but only approbation for what
the committee has done.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
was perfectly prepared to vote to release
the report I would have contended that
we should have inserted some line in-
dicating that we had not had time to
read it. Had we had a resolution saying
that the report shall be made, that the
Senate obviously has not had time to
read it but that it does have high regard
and great confidence in the committee, I
could have then gladly accepted it.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may we
have order in the Senate so Members can
be heard?
The VICE PRESIDENT. There will be
order in the Senate.
Mr. MANSFIEhD, Mr. President,
regular order.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET FOR U.S.
GOVERNMENT, 1976
The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the
previous order, the Seri tie will now re-
sume consideration of Sc -tate Concurrent
Resolution '76, which the clerk will state.
The assistant legislatine clerk read as
follows:
A Senate concurrent res Aution (S. Con.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Mr. JAVITS. I ask recognition to make
a unanimous-consent request, Mr. Presi-
dent, and would ask the leadership to
hear me, if it will. -
May we have order, Mr. President?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from New York is asking a question of
the leadership.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may we
first have order?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Senators will
please take their seats.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, Senators
have the right to be heard respecting
their position on a report which was
discussed in executive session.
May lack the leadership on the ma-
jority and minority side whether, as a
courtesy to me and to other Members of
the Senate, a Iliac be allotted-dt does
not have to exceed 30 minutes-to allow
Members to express themselves-upon this
subject as Senator TOWER has done in
public session.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Of course. At the
conclusion of the regulae business today,
we will set aside 30 minutes.
Mr. JAVITS. May I say to the Sena-
tor, as the Senator knows that will not
work because the presa of the world will
carry this story and they are not going
to carry it if it comes at 7 tonight.
Therefore, Mr. President?
Mr. MANSFIELD. They can caryy any
story they want. The Senate has agreed
to a consideration of a concurrent resolu-
tion on the budget, which Is of prime
Importance. The Senate has agreed to
take up the Interior appropriations bill.
If the .Senator can -get time from either
Senator BELLMON, the ranking member
of the Budget Committee, or Senator
Musafre the chairman, during that time,
that would be fine. As far as I am con-
cerned, I approve the report. I am glad
it is going to be publicized. My record is
clear and that is that.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President
- Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from New York has the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. lathe time con-
trolled?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields
Lime?
Mt. MANSFIELD. How much time does
the Senator want?
Mr. JAVITS, Mr. President, if I could
have 3 minutes of that time--
Mr. MANSFIELD. Three minutes on
the resolution?
Mr. JAVITS. That is correct.
Mr. BROCK. Three.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Get Senator BELL-
MON here. He can give time.
to be reviewed. I have very grave doubts
about the validity and propriety of the
construction of rule XXXVI which the
Parliamentarian has suggested to the
, Chair. I hope that at, an appropriate
time, without doing it now, that may
be reviewed. I do not wish, as one Sena-
tor, to be bound by that ruling. On the
contrary, should that ruling . he made
by the Chair, I would consider it my duty
to take an appeal to the Senate -
overrule it.
I thank the Chair for its time.
The VICE PRESIDENT, The Chair
would like to comment that there was no
ruling made?
Mr. JAVITS. May we have order?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair
would like to comment that was no.
ruling made. There was R. comment by
the Parliamentarian. I checked because
I was not here. He said it was a com-
ment, but that no ruling or precedent was
set.
Mr. jAVITS. I thank the Chair. That is
exactly what I thought.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I have
the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 1 minute to the
distinguished Senator from Nebraska.
- Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, it. is my
-
opinion that this report cannot be re-
leased without affirmative action by the
Senate. The penalty lor doing so is very
severe. Therefore, Mr. President, I send
my copy of the report to the Chair for
safekeeping.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I think
the distinguished majority leader yielded
2 minutes to Senator Bitoc.x.
Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, I would
like to associate myself with the remarks
of the Senator from New York. I thor-
oughly disagree with the advisory opin-
ion of the Parliam.entarlan. It le the most
stretched construction I have ever seen
in my life.
think it is utterl' Inexcusable that
tins body has refused to come to gri os
with a fundamental peblic responsibility.
I resent the fact that we were not al-
lowed to vote. I regret it. My own in-
clination would have been to accept
fait accompli, because we had no choice.
The matter is before the public now. But
I wanted the right to vote up or down.
Ills my responsibility under the Consti-
tution to so vote, and I do not like being
put in a position where tilt:parliamentary
devices of this body are used to prevent
Members from having an opportunity to
accept and, undertake their constitu-
tional responsibility. I regret it very
much.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 2 minutes to the
ApROVekcff oi-VeleasVitioiNOIr ditEREA:44-b08.00081060seatritoTerseY.
Arorel;9.ber '20 1975.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 20649i
'Mr. CAE. Mr. presApprovedaForeRebeasea2003/04/129 aiGIA-RDR8440780R0067000900012/400-1 a paaliamen-
relations or might impede the agents
themselves, and that is the concern that
I would have. Not having been able to
read the 346 pages and at least make up
my mind whether that would be true or
not certainly would govern me as to
whether I would vote for the release of
the report.
I think the information should be re-
leased. I believe if a vote had occurred,
I would have voted against the release
of the full report at this time, without
having had an opportunity to read it.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 10 seconds to the
Senator from Louisiana for a unani-
mous-consent request.
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that Mike Stern of my
staff, have the privilege of the floor in
connection with this matter.
ccfmnittee has clone a superb job in this
interim report, and I commend the com-
mittee and all Members for the way
they have handled this difficult and ter-
ribly important matter. As I said in ex-
ecutive session, I think the matter of re-
leasing the report should have been de-
cided by the whole Senate. I think this
was an important decision for us to
make, not because I think that the re-
lease of the report will damage the coun-
try; I was prepared to vote to release it,
and if -we had had a chance to do it, I
would have so voted. I think the public
is entitled to have this information the
way it is presented in the report, a very
beautifully and carefully written job.
But I. think it was most unfortunate
for the Senate to acquiesce in a pro-
cedure which suggests that a Committee
of this body has a right to release infor-
mation given to it or to the Senate?I
do not make any great distinction be-
tween them; Senate committees are
bodies of the Senate?without action by
the whole Senate. We should have taken
that responsibility, and. I think for the
future of our relations with the executive
and our ability to get confidential infor-
mation which we must have to do our
job, we should insist upon this propo-
sition: The Senate has the right to de-
classify information, but only by ac-
tion of the whole Senate.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield 3
minutes to the Senator from Florida, and
then 2 minutes to the Senator from
South Carolina.
Mr. 1\.IcCLELLAN. Mr. President, let
us have order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Durant). The Senate will be in order.
Senators will take their seats.
Mr. CIIROES, Mr. President, I believe
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence has worked long and hard and
done- an outstanding job. I was im-
pressed with the fact that members of a
bipartisan and hi-nhilosophical commit-
tee could reach a unanimous conclusion.
I was also impressed, with the summary
we received, which showed there were
plots hatched by the CIA and members of
the Government to carry out political
atisessinations. I think the American
people are entitled to that information.
My personal belief would be that it
would be better to summarize some of
the t. information than to have tried .to
detail every bit of it. Not having had the
opportunity to read the report and its
2l6 pee ,te, it certainly would not. be some-
thing, ttnit I would like to say that I con-
cur tilet everything in that report shoulcj.
I et renteeted. 1 also no not :I gr(e ',via). a,
representation that was made by the
to the effect that every
eiaminittee can now declassify informa-
tion just because tile confidential infor-
mation goes to the committee rather
than through the doors of the Senate
Charatier. I think that is a ruling we
could lice to regret.
st, seems to me that we could get all
ol- the essence at the report necessary to
the nmerican people, the summary and
i he findings and the necessary legisla-
tion that Ls going to be required, with-
out having to go in and publish every
tary inquiry. Will the Clair please con-
firm that understanding foe me?
The PRESIDING OPEICER (Mr.
GARY Mar). Rulings are issued only in
response to points of order, mid no point
of order having been -made, there was
no official ruling of the Chair.
Mr. BAKER, That is more than I
asked for, but let me make sure I have
it nailed down. I do not really care about
that point. I simply want to know, was
there a ruling by the Chair as to rule
XXXVI, based on the advice of the
Parliamentarian? -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair can enly restate the statement it
just made: Rulings of the Chair are
issued in response to points of order.
No point of order having. been Made,
there was no ruling of the Chair.
Mr. BAKER. Do I understand, then,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without there was not?
objection, it is so ordered. The PRESIDING 07..`FICER, The
- Several Senators addressed the chair. Chair restates *hat it just said.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, my order Mr. BAKER. That is the way I nter--
of recognition was dictated by the ma- pi-et it.
jority leader, who yielded this time be- Mr. MUSKIF,. I yield to the Senator
fore I arrived. Senator THURIVIOND,?I be- from Georgia.
have, is next, and then Senator BAKER. 141.r. NU NN. Mr. President,..f. think the
Mr. 'THURMOND. Mr. President, I
commend the committee for the work Senate has made a very had record today
in the way this matter has been handled.
they have done On this subject wish
What has been set as a precedent,
we had ha,d a vote. I would have voted whether by rirling of the Chair or other-
to release the report. I disagree with the wise, is that a committee Inay declassify
opinion of the Parliamentarian that the
information Without the t;oncurrence
committee had the right to release it
of
without coining back to the Senate. the full Senate.
What I ton afraid of is that the exec-
that
think rule XXXVI, section 5, is clear
utive branch of the Government may
that the Senate is the one that would
very logically draw the conclusion that
have to release it. I regret that action
the only way that classified information
was not taken by the full Senate today.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 2 minutes to the can be protected as to a decision by the
full Senate is to send that information
Senator from Termessee (Mr. BAKER) . 1
through tiett door, rather than directly
minute to the Senator from Georgia (Mr.
to committees. So I think we ha-ve jeop-
NuNIO, and 1 minute to the Senator from
ardized the committees of the Senate in
IVIaryland (Mr. MATHIAS), in that order.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President I, like the being able to receive, handle, and Dna-
occupant of the chair and others, worked lyre classified information, and I believe
we will come to regret the way we have
long and hard, and I hope diligently, on
lituidled this particular situation this
this report. I came to this session today
fully expecting and intending to vote for date.
its releaseto the public, if that vote was Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the Senator
tint.
from /Vial:viand.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the se-
I urn now in a position, regretfully, to
lect committee took great care in the sub-
say only that I think the Senate has
m ission of this report to reserve the op-
tibia
this matter in the vsnist pos-
tion of the Senate to make a decision,
sible way. I do not doubt for 1 second
that a majority of the Senate, given an and the Senate has today refused to ex-
ercise that cption. I think his is-a matter
cpportunity, would have voted to release
t
for oient regret, and I find il.:yeT;elf
I' it report, and I think that cold nave
stantial agreement with the distinguished
been the right decision. But I think to
Senators frem ':tennassee ( ant. natitea and
re it released by inacition CF,14,S credit
Mr. BrucEn't tlie se:tit-km:tots that they
Oil neither the Sc -t nor the commit-
have just ei. iaitased.
tee, and I regret it.
-I -do not !hit:1k that the Senate taniiit
I would make only one further point,
that I believe is already clarified, but, if to leave the subject under any delusion
the Chair Will giV!' me his attention and that by failing to exercise itie option the
the Parliamentarian will listen for a select comretittee gave it that it has oat
moment, I want to make sure the record Laken action.
is abundantly clear on this point. Mr. BROCK. Right.
On the question that I raised during Mr. MATMAS. It has taken action,
the executive session with respect to action that is going lobe viewed as ma:e-
ta/le XXXVI, does the ruling of the Vice edent. It Is going to affect our future de-
President, then the occupant of the cisions, and I flunk it is a great Dile,-
Chair, that the Parliamentarian's state- fortune because." it was not done in. a
ment in that respect was reflected as an deliberate, careful, and a profitable way.
opinion of the 'Parliamentarian, anti not, I only vi ii to Sugg.est to the Senate.
as the ruling of the Chair, mean that that this is a subject to which we are go-
the Chair (lid not rule on that point? lug to have to return so that we do not
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. 2.0,?
1975.
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lutve another msfortune of the kmo people to understand what happened 2he9at IDI G
OFFICER. The thee
-which we have experienced.
Mr; FORD and Mr. McCLURE ad-
dressed' the Chair. -
Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator front Kentucky 1 minute.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, there have
been several inquiries of the Chair as to
the ruling on the Parliamentarian's in-
terpretation.
I make a matter of record that I was
in the chair at the time the question was
put. I related the opinion of the Parlia-
mentarian at the time, but no riding of
the Chair was made. So there has not
been a ruling by the Chair on. the Par-
liamentarian's opinion. I was only stat-
ing his opinion at that time upon the
question of the Chair.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Kentucky yield briefly.
Mr. FORD. Yes.
- Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator from
Kentucky for that clarification.
Mr? MUSKID. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I do not
know whether to do this or not in a for-
mal way, but I suggest that someone
might wish to ask unanimous consent of
the Senate that no member of tae select
committee be subject to expulsion under
the rule, because, while we made no de-
cision, as a matter of fact we backed away
from making a decision as to the effects
of the rules of the Senate in regard to the
release of classified information. If that
rule applies, and if it is applied here, it
also subjects- every member of that com-
mittee who voted for the release of the
committee report to expulsion from the
Senate. --
Mr. Brz,ockc. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McCLURE. I am happy to yield. -
Mr. BROOK. I think ills appropriate
to point out that the members of the
committee did not vote to release the
raaterial. They voted to bring the matter
to the Senate for the Senate's decision,
and the Senate copped out because it
would not reach a decision. It refused
to allow a, vote on the matter.
- Mr. McCLURE. I suspect, if someone
were to bring an action asking for ex-
pulsion of all 11 members of that cam-
mittee for a violation of the Senate rules,
that there would then be a question of
whether or not the committee had re-
leased the material or whether some un-
named individuals with or without the
authority.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
The Senator from Ivladne. -
Mr. IlUDDLESTON addressed the
Chair.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am per-
feetla"willing to yield within reason, but
there is limited time on the budget reso-
lution. I have been yielding for a minute
or 2 minutes. I do not wish to get into
a question of a vote for an issue that is
extraneous to the budget resolution.
wish to have this time for that purpose,
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the
chairman indulge roe 1 additional
inareite?
Mr. MUSKIE. One additional minute.
Mr. McCLURE, I thank the chairman
here this morning when we took a rule
of the Senate and subverted it through
parliamentary .devices which sometimes
in other contexts are known as filibusters
in order to avoid the Senate taking a
vote on one of the most critical issues
that will confront us with respect to the
release of classified information.
I agree with the various Senators who
have expressed the opinion that we took
very hasty and ill-advised action.
Mr. HARR,V F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield a minute to the
Senator from Virginia.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD,- JR. First, I
ask if the Senator from Maine at the ap-
propriate time will yield me 12 minutes
from the concurrent resolution.
Mr. MUSKIE. By all means, yes.
ORDER FOR 'YEAS AND NA YS ON SENATE CON-.
CURRENT RESOLUTION 76
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Second, I
ask for the yeas and nays on the con-
current resolution.
Mr. McCLURE. What is it?
Mr. MUSKIE. He asked for the yeas
and nays on the budget resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The was and nays were ordered.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield 2 minutes?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the Senator
from Kentucky 2 minutes.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Maine.
First, I wish to correct an assertion
made by the distinguished Senator from
Tennessee. I am sure he did not Make it
intentionally. But as a member of the
Select Committee, let me state emphatic-
ally that the Select Committee did vote
to release the assassination report. It was
never contemplated by the Select Com-
mittee that that report would be brought
before the Senate for the purpose of
securing concurrence of the Senate or
approval of the Senate for release by the
Senate in order to fulfill what the com-
mittee saw was its responsibility.
The whole purpose of coming before
the Senate by the committee was simply
to inform Senators so they would not
read about the report in the press before
they had any knowledge what it is all
about. The unfortunate thing about this
zooming, of course, is that we spent
nearly the entire time debating the ques-
tion as to whether or not the Senate
ought to vote or not vote on releasing
the report. Members came here prepared,
each one of us assigned a particular seg-
ment of the report, to answer the most
detailed and specific questions about this
report that Senators may have had. We
went through the entire morning with-
out ever having an opport mita to answer
one single question about the substance
of the report. That is nal atunate. Sen-
ators will now have an pportunity to
read it in the press and re: .d their inter-
pretation of it and make whatever as-
sumptions that they care t make.
But it is unfortanate tb t the Senate
today got hung up on th ale questions
which were not even perianent to the
of the Senator has cx15ired.
The Senator from Maine.
Mr. .BELLMON.. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Maine yield to Inc for 1
minute?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to my good friend
from Oklahoma.
Mr. BELLmoN. Mr. President, 'I thank
the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky for the statement he just made.
It very much enlightened the Senate, I
believe, on what the intentions of the
select committee were this morning. I
believe if it were better understood the
great deal of debate that occurred would
not have occurred, aad we would have
been able to get from the members of
the conunittee the enlightenmenta they
were prepared to give us.
I feel very strongly it has been a mis-
take to ask those of us in the Senate who
never had an opportunity to see the ra-
port to pass judgment on it as we were
asked to do..
I thank the Senator from Kentucky
for enlightening us as he just has.
Mr. FORD. I thank. the Senator from
Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET FOR U.S.
GOVERNMENT, 1976
.The fifenate continued with the con-
sideration. of the concurrent resolution
(S. Con. Res. 76) revising the congres-
sional budget for the U.S.- Government
for the fiscal year 1076, directing cer-
tain reeonciliation action, and providing
for the transition quarter.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, if I may
yield myself a minute or two, I under-
stand that Senator KENNEDY is on his
way to the Chamber i.C) oder his amend-
ment which, as I understand it, is the
only amendment that is likely to be of-
fered to the budget .resolution.
I take this time to eapress my appreci-
ation to the -staff of the Committee on
the Budget. I pay special tribute to the
Staff Director, Douglasi Bennet, and Chief
Counsel, John McEvoy, who were the first
to be appointed to the staff, and who had
to brine it through the difficult organiza-
tion and recruiting period. They have as-
sembled, I think, one of the outstanding
professional staffs of any committee on
the Hill. To them I give my al-Jona-a:it:ion
and my personal gratitude.
Then beyond them I thank tha whole
staff of the Committee on the fnudget,
net oaly on my own behalf or for the
committee, but .also on behalf the
entire Senate. Exploring new territory
is hard work. There are false starts. and
dead ends. There are imagined dangers
that do not occur anti unimagined ones
that do, and the destination is never en-
tirely clear.
For over a year now, the staff of the
Senate Committee en the Budget, every
member of it, has beeit under enormous
Pressure to make tine; drat year work.
Their performance has been heroic.
Their seeress can be measured by the
sense I feel in this Chamber today that
Congress really has lasatun to take hold
for doing so. of America's fiscal.priorities and nation-
?
raise that q1m
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